Migration Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Leiden University

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Migration Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: The

Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Programme: Crisis and Security Management Name: Martin Plaček

Student Number: s2519046

Supervisor: Prof. dr. A. L. Dimitrova Second Reader: Dr. S. D’Amato Word Count: 19 421

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Abstract

Migration governance poses a challenge to consolidated states, let alone states with limited statehood. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), considered to be such a state, has not been providing services to the high numbers of migrants and refugees that came to its territory since 2018. Other governance actors, such as grassroots associations, stepped in to fill the gaps left by the state. Instead of embracing grassroots associations‘ work, state authorities sometimes interfered with their activities and acted in a hostile manner towards them. In this thesis, I answer the question Why did the Bosnian state not provide necessary services to migrants and refugees

and what factors influenced the Bosnian authorities’ interactions with grassroots associations between 2018 and 2019?

Based on the literature, I have identified conditions suggesting that migration governance is an area of limited statehood for a particular country, and by analysing documents, as well as semi-structured interviews with volunteers from four grassroots association operating in BiH between 2018 and 2019, concluded that migration governance is an area of limited statehood for the Bosnian state. However, the lack of the state’s involvement in migration governance cannot be explained only by its lack of capacities to govern in this area. Other, mainly political, factors, could have influenced this lack of involvement. These other factors influenced the Bosnian authorities’ interactions with the grassroots association as well, showing that grassroots associations had only limited options on how to influence the state’s actions towards them. Further research is needed to establish whether the factors identified in this study extend beyond this spatial context.

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1. Introduction

The so-called migratory crisis of 2015 posed a significant challenge to many European states individually, as well as to the European Union (EU) as a whole. The influx of migrants and refugees to EU member states has brought the issue of migration to the spotlight, leading to many debates in the public space (Schulpen and Huyse 2017, 163). As the flow of people migrating to Europe decreased in 2016 after the EU had signed the controversial refugee agreement with Turkey, so decreased the attention given to the issue (BBC 2018; DW 2018). Nonetheless, migration to Europe did not stop in 2016. Since 2016, migrants and refugees have been continuing their attempts at reaching the EU, while the EU states have been strengthening their border regimes to keep migrants and refugees away. This strengthening has made the crossing of the EU external border more difficult, resulting in a higher risk of getting caught while attempting to do so. To increase their chances of crossing, migrants and refugees have resorted to using more remote and dangerous routes where the EU external border is not as heavily protected. This adaptive behaviour has led to the shifting of one of the major migratory routes to the EU, the Balkan route. In 2018, due to the increasing difficulties of transiting through Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) became the most prominent transit country for people trying to reach the EU. Since 2018, almost 40 000 migrants and refugees have passed through BiH, crossing to Croatia and, if the police did not apprehend them, eventually to Slovenia and Italy (Brelie and Salfiti 2018; Cavanagh 2019).

Nevertheless, crossing into Croatia or Slovenia, both being EU member states, does not guarantee that an individual will be able to apply for asylum there. A common practice in the Western Balkans has been to carry out ‘push backs’, i. e. unlawfully removing an individual from the territory of a state without allowing them to apply for asylum. Since 2018, Slovenia and Croatia have been pushing migrants and refugees out of their territories, returning them to BiH (Asylum Information Database 2019; Human Rights Watch 2018). Instead of criticizing Croatia for its unlawful treatment of migrants and refugees, the EU has continued supporting it with funding and equipment to improve the protection of the EU external border (European Commission 2018, 2). Although the effectiveness of such deterrence measures in reducing the numbers of migrants and refugees attempting to reach the EU is more than questionable (International Detention Coalition 2015), what they achieve is slowing the movement of migrants and refugees. Crossing the EU external border may take several attempts over several months, and each unsuccessful attempt leads to a return to BiH. Not surprisingly, the strengthening of the EU borders, both by lawful and unlawful means, results in a concentration

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of migrants and refugees in BiH – mainly in Sarajevo, the country’s capital, and Una Sana Canton, a part of the country bordering Croatia. Currently, BiH hosts over 7500 migrants and refugees (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 2019), the majority of them have no intention of staying in BiH but want to continue their journey to the EU, making BiH a ‘bottleneck’ on the Balkan route.

The high number of migrants and refugees currently staying in BiH has put pressure on the Bosnian state to manage the situation and provide adequate services to them. However, the state’s response has been severely lacking (Vikic 2018). To compensate for the lack of state’s provision of services, other actors stepped in. UN agencies such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHRC), international humanitarian organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), local branches of international relief movements, such as Caritas Bosnia and Herzegovina and The Red Cross Society of Bosnia and Herzegovina, local non-governmental organizations such as Pomozi.ba and SOS Kladuša, as well as grassroots associations – the main subject of my research – consisting of international volunteers became involved in the governance of migration in BiH in the last two years. The main focus of this thesis is to answer the question

Why did the Bosnian state not provide necessary services to migrants and refugees and what factors influenced the Bosnian authorities’ interactions with grassroots associations between 2018 and 2019?

The thesis aims to explore the governance of migration in a context of a state whose capabilities to provide governance are limited, thus considering BiH to be a state with limited statehood (Börzel and Risse 2010). What this thesis seeks to answer is whether the Bosnian state did not provide migration governance because it lacks the capabilities in this area, or whether the state did not seek to provide migration governance for other reasons. In either case, it could be expected that the other actors involved in the governance of migration would be beneficial for the state, helping it to address the needs of migrants and refugees and thus alleviating the pressure this situation puts on the Bosnian government. Nonetheless, at least in the case of grassroots associations, the state interacts with these actors in various ways. Sometimes the state lets associations operate and pays no attention to them, sometimes it coordinates with them, and sometimes it acts in a hostile manner towards them, even ousting them out of the country. I would like to explore the interactions between the Bosnian state authorities and grassroots associations and identify conditions under which different forms of interactions occur.

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Academic and Societal Relevance

This research will not only bring new insights into the study of migration governance in areas of limited statehood (Lavenex 2018), but more importantly broaden the knowledge of the role grassroots associations play in migration governance and how they interact with the state. In recent years, research has been conducted exploring the creation of grassroots associations assisting migrants and refugees (Çelik 2018; Kitching et al. 2016; Sandri 2018; Milan 2019), their development (Robins 2009; Haaland and Wallevik 2019; McGee and Pelham 2018) and motivations of individual volunteers to take part in these initiatives (Fechter and Schwittay 2019). While some academic literature looks at the relationship between grassroots associations and established actors (Haaland and Wallevik 2019; Sandri 2018), they do so only peripherally, prevalently exploring only one facet of the relationship when grassroots associations act as an agent of resistance, providing ‘an alternative to the humanitarian machinery’ (Sandri 2018, 2). Moreover, except for Milan (2018, 2019), the Balkan region has not received enough scholarly attention, especially compared to the cases of Greece and France, whose grassroots associations and their role in migration governance have been studied extensively in recent years (McGee and Pelham 2018; Sandri 2018; Kitching et al. 2016; Haaland and Wallevik 2019; Oikonomakis 2018). Previous research thus overlooks the complexity of grassroot associations’ interactions with other governance actors. Moreover, with the trend of stigmatization, or outright ‘criminalization’ of assistance to migrants and refugees in Europe (Caritas Europa 2019; Reidy 2019), as well as in the US (Karas 2019), it is important to examine the role grassroots associations play in the humanitarian response to the influx of migrants and refugees. Moreover, by exploring the conditions under which grassroots associations and state authorities work together can serve as a guide for grassroots associations that seek to coordinate their activities with the state.

Structure of the Thesis

The first chapter of the thesis consists of the introduction, including the research question, and the academic and societal relevance of the research. The following chapter offers a theoretical framework used in this thesis, introducing the concept of limited statehood as well as the concept of areas of limited statehood, including how these areas are governed, who the governors are and what modes of governance arise in these areas. Furthermore, I introduce the concept of migration governance in areas of limited statehood and discuss four implications of limited statehood on migration governance. The chapter is concluded by introducing the role of grassroots associations in migration governance, defining grassroots associations, the current

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research that has been conducted on this topic, as well as stating some expectations that I have for the results of this research. The third chapter describes the research design used in this research. The following, analytical, chapter – the longest of the thesis – presents the results of my research and their interpretation. This thesis is concluded by a conclusion and a list of references.

2. Theoretical and Literature Review

Limited Statehood

The concept of limited statehood utilizes Max Weber’s definition of state and statehood, i. e. ‘[a] compulsory political organization with continuous operation (politischer Anstaltsbetrieb) will be called a ‘state’ insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order (Weber 1978: 54, as cited in Börzel, Risse, and Draude 2018, 4). Throughout history, states were constrained in their ability – referred to as domestic sovereignty – to control their subjects, monopolize the means of violence and make and enforce decisions (Risse 2011b, 5). The idea of a state capable of entirely monopolizing the use of force and ruling over its subjects – referred to as a consolidated state – is both relatively new and incorrect. This idea emerged only in the last two hundred years in the European context and spread with colonization to other parts of the world, making it a European-centric concept. Moreover, most contemporary states lack the ability to uphold the monopoly on the use of violence and to make and enforce central decisions (Risse 2011b, 3–6). Figure 1 illustrates how widespread limited statehood is when showing different degrees of state consolidation.

Still, the lack of domestic sovereignty does not make states lose their recognition as states. We can differentiate between two kinds of sovereignty: international sovereignty, i. e. a state is recognized as a state by the international community, and domestic sovereignty, i. e. ‘the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity’ (Krasner 1999, 4). Thus, a state can be internationally recognized while not being able to enforce its laws in certain parts of its territory. For example, Pakistan is an internationally recognized state while, at the same time, lacking the ability to enforce central decisions and uphold the monopoly on the use of violence in the

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Figure 1: Degrees of state consolidation (Risse 2011a, 8).

Areas of Limited Statehood

The limitations put on a state’s domestic sovereignty are not only territorial; Börzel, Risse, and Draude (2018) differentiate between several additional dimensions along which domestic sovereignty can be restricted. They identify sectoral (regarding particular policy areas of the state), social (regarding specific parts of the state’s population) and temporal (regarding specific periods) dimension (Börzel, Risse, and Draude 2018, 5). As Risse points out, except for failed states, ‘limited statehood’ is not homogenous and does not ‘obtain for a state as a whole but in areas’, described as territorial or functional spaces within the state (Risse 2011b, 5). A state can thus be functioning in most areas but be limited in its ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions or uphold its monopoly on the use of violence in other areas (Risse 2011b, 4). What happens then in the areas of limited statehood if the state is not capable of governing them? Has chaos taken over? The answer is no. The mere lack of supreme authority does not necessarily lead to disorder. The anarchic nature of the areas of limited statehood can be compared to the anarchic system of international relations: the absence of a central authority does not lead to the system not being governed. While it is true that some areas of limited statehood are governed better than others, we can witness a degree of governance being established in most of them (Börzel, Risse, and Draude 2018, 6).

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Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood

While governance can be understood as ‘steering the behavior of actors towards some desired end’, this understanding is too broad to serve as an analytical tool (Breslin et al. 2018, 194). Since the aim of research on governance in areas of limited statehood is to identify how goods and services for a given community can be provided in the absence of a well-functioning state, a narrower definition of governance needs to be used. Börzel and Greslin thus define governance as ‘the various institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, and/or to provide collective goods’ (Börzel and Risse 2010, 114).

Governance thus consists of structure and process. Governance as structure focuses on the ‘architecture of governance’, that is on the institutions and actor constellations involved in governance (Breslin et al. 2018, 194). Governance as process relates to the ‘modes of social coordination by which actors engage in rulemaking and implementation and in the provision of collective goods’ (Börzel and Risse 2010, 114). Governance as process thus consists of two elements: actors and modes of governance, these will be discussed on the following pages. Actors of Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood

A consolidated state can govern a particular area on its own (governance by government), it can form a network with private actors to govern jointly (governance with government), or non-state actors and civil society can govern by themselves (governance without the non-state) (Börzel, Risse, and Draude 2018, 7). In areas of limited statehood, the state does not function well enough to provide collective goods and services for the community, yet governance emerges even under these conditions. Other actors – both state and non-state – step in and start providing collective goods and services for the community, giving rise to new modes of governance. These other state actors involved in governance can be foreign governments and international intergovernmental organizations. Non-state actors include local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), business actors, local chiefs, ‘traditional’ authorities (Förster/Koechlin 2018), and violent non-state actors (Börzel, Risse, and Draude 2018, 8). Risse offers a more in-depth typology of governance actors when he distinguishes between state and non-state actors, as well as local/domestic and trans- and inter-national/external actors (see Figure 2).

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Figure 2: Governance actors typology (Risse 2012, 9).

Modes of Governance

Consolidated states have the ability to govern hierarchically and authoritatively enforce the law through policing and command and control, relying on ‘institutionalized relationships of domination and subordination’ (Börzel and Risse 2010, 115). Moreover, consolidated states are capable of casting a ‘shadow of hierarchy’, which can be defined as a capacity of a state to ‘incentivize other actors to provide governance in order to avoid hierarchical coordination by the state’ using explicit or implicit threats (Börzel, Risse, and Draude 2018, 7; Börzel and Risse 2010, 116). In contrast, in areas of limited statehood, the state’s ability to enforce decisions and thus rule hierarchically is either weak or missing (Risse 2018, 2). This does not mean that hierarchical rule is absent in areas of limited statehood; as other actors step in, some of them, such as violent non-state actors and ‘traditional’ authorities, can have the ability to rule hierarchically (Börzel, Risse, and Draude 2018, 8; for more about hierarchical modes of governance, see Risse 2018, 2-6).

However, it is the non-hierarchical modes of governance that are more common in areas of limited statehood (Börzel, Risse, and Draude 2018, 8). We can distinguish two types of non-hierarchical modes of governance: those based on the logic of action (the logic of consequentialism) and those based on the logics of appropriateness and/or of communicative rationality, ‘including non-manipulative communication, persuasion, and learning’ (Börzel, Risse, and Draude 2018, 9; Risse 2018, 6). The former – the logic of consequentialism – assumes that actors possess given preferences and seek to maximize utility. Moreover, their cost-benefit calculations can be changed both by positive and negative incentives in order to

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‘induce the desired behaviour’ (Börzel, Risse, and Draude 2018, 9). In these negotiations, power asymmetries are present, which does not mean there is a hierarchical rule taking place.

The latter – the logics of appropriateness and/or of communicative rationality – seek to induce actors into ‘socialization process to internalize new rules and norms’ (Risse 2011b, 12) by challenging the factual and normative validity of actors’ statements about their interests and preferences. The goal here is to ‘reach reasoned consensus rather than a bargaining compromise’ (Risse 2018, 6), meaning that parties to the negotiation agree on an outcome for similar reasons, rather than agreeing to an outcome for entirely different reasons. The two types of non-hierarchical modes of governance are ideal types that co-occur in the real world and are difficult to distinguish (Risse 2018, 7).

Migration Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood

Limited statehood and migration share a complicated relationship. On the one hand, limited statehood is a cause for migration: if a state is not capable of providing public goods – such as security, economic opportunities, and a good education – to its citizens, the citizens may decide to leave the country. On the other hand, ‘ungoverned migration may reinforce limited statehood’ (Lavenex 2018, 7). If a state already lacks the capacity to govern in certain areas, an influx of migrants and refugees will pose a challenge for the state, diverting resources to migration management from other areas. In turn, the state’s capacity to provide public goods could diminish to the point when it lacks this capacity altogether, forcing its citizens to emigrate. One state’s limited statehood thus may result in another state’s limited statehood. One of the critical roles of the state is to control who can and who cannot enter its territory. What if the state lacks the capacity not only to control its borders but to take proper care of the migrants and refugees that reside in its territory? If that is the case, then we are dealing with migration governance as an area of limited statehood. Lavenex (2018), in her article, explores the link between limited statehood and migration governance and identifies four implications that limited statehood has on the area of migration governance:

(1) ‘If the development of migration governance is a corollary of the development of statehood, one should generally expect less state governance in ALS [areas of limited statehood]. This should show in both a more limited exposure to pertinent international norms and a generally more limited scope of domestic migration policy.

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(2) Since limited statehood is defined as a lack of state capacity, we should expect states’ formal commitments towards migrants and refugees to match only imperfectly with political practice.

(3) In the absence of effective state governance, the ubiquity of international migration and refugee problems in these regions will incite informal modes of governance by default, with a prominent role of private actors and international institutions.

(4) With immigration being viewed as a threat by consolidated states, the latter will exert considerable influence on ALS to contain the problem and limit their exposure to undesired migration flows, thus increasingly subjecting the latter to patterns of external migration governance’ (Lavenex 2018, 7–8).

We can understand Lavenex’s four implications as conditions. If we analyse migration governance in a particular country and establish that these four conditions have been met, then we can assume that for this particular country, the area of migration governance is an area of limited statehood.

When the state lacks the capacity to govern in this area, other actors step in: migrants and refugees, international organizations, civil society, NGOs, and grassroots associations, attempt to provide alternatives to state governance (Lavenex 2018, 12–13). The main site of migration governance are camps, both official – usually under the administration of the UNHCR or IOM – and unofficial – set up organically usually by migrants and refugees themselves with no authority running the camp. Other sites can be abandoned buildings in which migrants and refugees have found shelter, community centres set up by governance actors, as well as larger areas in which governance actors provide assistance to migrants and refugees, e. g. mobile food and clothes distribution teams covering a whole neighbourhood.

Grassroots Associations as Migration Governance Actors

Since the beginning of the migration crisis in 2015, a broad set of actions and initiatives have been launched to address the needs of migrants and refugees reaching Europe, mostly reflecting a perceived inadequacy of states’ response to the crisis (Della Porta 2018, 2). Private citizens motivated by solidarity with migrants and refugees tried to step in and provide what they believed was missing. While these initiatives and actions have taken on various forms, sometimes operating in no systematic or organized fashion, I have focused my research on grassroots associations (GAs) as defined below.

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Smith defines GAs as ‘locally based, significantly autonomous, volunteer-run, formal nonprofit (i.e., voluntary) groups that manifest substantial voluntary altruism as groups and use the associational form of organization and, thus, have official memberships of volunteers who perform most, and often all, of the work/activity done in and by these nonprofits’ (Smith 2000, 7). What sets GAs apart from other non-profit organizations is their relatively small local scope; GAs conduct their activities in a small area, ranging from a building to a neighbourhood or a metropolitan area (Smith 2000, 8). Moreover, members of GAs do not need to come from local communities; they can come from different parts of the country or even from abroad (Smith 2000, 8). Kunreuther, building on Smith’s theory, concludes that GAs are ‘characterized by more democratic and less hierarchical forms of governance and accountability’, when members of GAs either need to accept or negotiate how the group operates and conducts activities (Kunreuther 2012, 2).

Over the past years, academics have started to pay closer attention to GAs involved in migration governance, mainly focusing on the cases of Calais and Lesvos. Kitching et al. (2016) explored the role of GAs providing humanitarian aid to migrants and refugees on Lesvos in 2015, introducing a particular type of a GA – ad hoc grassroots organization (AHGO). According to Kitching et al., an AHGO is a group that did not exist before a particular disaster, composed of non-professional individuals (Kitching et al. 2016, 2). The authors note that AHGOs active on Lesvos in 2015 have stepped in to fill the vacuum left by the Greek state and INGOs, concluding that the AHGOs’ efforts at providing humanitarian aid should be recognized and ‘frameworks must be developed to evaluate and create favorable conditions for their existence and mobilization in future humanitarian crises’ (Kitching et al. 2016, 13).

Sandri (2018) explores the work of GAs in the makeshift refugee camp in Calais and by identifying similar characteristics of these GAs, introduces the concept of ‘volunteer humanitarianism.’ This concept builds on Smith’s definition of GAs. However, it adds that ‘volunteer humanitarianism’ is carried out by GAs with ad hoc and apolitical nature, emphasizing the lack of expertise of their members that leads to their improvisation when carrying out activities. Sandri argues that by stepping in and trying to fill the vacuum left by the French state in the governance of the camp, GAs turned against the state, challenging the state’s position and practices (Sandri 2018, 7). The relationship between GAs and the state is not explored beyond stating that the GAs in Calais did not want to cooperate with the government and INGOs, striving to offer an alternative to the ‘humanitarian machine’ (Sandri

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2018, 2) and resist the ‘violent inaction’ as a form of structural violence perpetrated by the state (Sandri 2018, 6).

Haaland and Wallevik (2019) investigate the case of Lesvos and the role of GAs in the provision of humanitarian aid to migrants and refugees as well. However, they work with a different concept of GAs – citizen initiatives for global solidarity. This term, created initially to describe citizen initiatives working in the development context, is newly used by Haaland and Wallevik in the humanitarian aid provision. Like Kitching et al. (2016), Haaland and Wallevik point out the ad hoc nature of these initiatives. Moreover, similarly to Sandri (2018), the authors explore how these initiatives challenge (and resist) established governors of migration – such as the state, UN agencies, and INGOs. However, Haaland and Wallevik go a step further when they pay closer attention to how the initiatives’ resistance to established governors of migration influences both the initiatives and established governors.

While different conceptualizations of GAs exist, I will be using Smith’s definition of GAs in my thesis for its general applicability and extensive usage (as the overview above of previous research in the field demonstrates). The body of research focused on the role of GAs in migration governance mainly explored the characteristics of these associations, not paying much attention to the various forms of interactions between GAs and the state.

Expectations

Drawing on the theory, literature, and my personal experience volunteering in BiH, I have developed a set of expectations. Firstly, I expect that, for the Bosnian state, migration governance is an area of limited statehood. BiH is not a consolidated state and, having witnessed the problems the Bosnian state has in coordinating across different levels of government, as well as the lack of institutional capacities and resources, I assume that the Bosnian state lacks the capacities to provide public goods and services to migrants and refugees. To verify this expectation, I will, firstly, analyse the general governance capacities of the Bosnian state, and secondly, analyse migration governance in BiH by using Lavanex’s (2018) four conditions. If these four conditions are present, I will conclude that migration governance is an area of limited statehood for the Bosnian state.

Secondly, based on my personal experience, I expect that how the Bosnian authorities interact with GAs (ignore them, coordinate with them, or are hostile towards them) is not random; I assume internal and external factors (as seen from the perspective of the GAs) influence the form these interactions take. Internal factors are characteristics and actions of GAs, such as size,

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the ratio of local to international volunteers, the scope of activities, source of funding, interactions with INGOs, degree of criticism of the state, degree of visibility, political leaning, and compliance with the law. My expectation regarding the internal factors is, on the one hand, that the authorities are more open to coordinate their activities with GAs if these ‘play by the rules’, i. e. do not criticise the state authorities and/or comply with the law. On the other hand, I expect the authorities to be hostile towards GAs if these criticize the state authorities and/or do not comply with the law.

External factors are factors lying outside of the scope of GAs’ influence, such as the season of the year. My expectation regarding external factors is, on the one hand, that the state authorities are more open to coordinate their activities with GAs during the winter months when the weather is exceptionally hostile (night temperatures can drop to -20° C). Migrants and refugees become exposed to harsh weather conditions, risking even death (Higgins 2018). The authorities may seek any support they can get in providing goods and services to migrants and refugees when these are facing such horrible conditions. On the other hand, I would expect the state authorities to be more hostile towards GAs during the summer months when the tourist season is underway. Civil society and GAs have been portrayed across Europe as a ‘pull factor’ for migrants and refugees (Vosyliute and Conte 2018, 5), it can be thus expected than similar attitude has been adopted in BiH as well, seeing grassroots associations as one of the reasons why migrants and refugees had come to the country. Tourism in other countries is seen as being negatively impacted by the presence of migrants and refugees (Schmitz 2019; Krateseva 2018). Bosnian authorities may share this view and in an effort to protect BiH’s tourism industry – one of the important sources of income for BiH (Garaca 2018) – seek to lessen the number of migrants and refugees in the country. To achieve this goal, the authorities may try to get rid of one ‘pull factor’, namely GAs.

3. Research Design

My research is qualitative in nature. To answer my research question, I am conducting a single case study. This method allows me to answer ‘why’ questions and provide an in-depth description and exploration of the phenomena described above (Yin 2018, 33). The research will thus be exploratory, hopefully creating a proto-theory explaining what factors influence the state authorities’ interactions with GAs in the area of migration governance.

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Case selection

I have selected the case of BiH because of pragmatism, convenience, and personal interest; I have spent several months working in BiH with various GAs and thus have some knowledge about migration governance in the country, and the role the state and GAs play in it. Moreover, I have access to people who are familiar with the modes of migration governance in the country, as well as local and international volunteers who have in-depth knowledge of the realities on the ground. Getting access to these individuals is challenging; it requires time and a high degree of personal trust. Having gained this access, I have decided to focus this research on migration governance in BiH and obtain revelatory insights that would be otherwise hardly accessible.

Selection of Grassroots Associations

Initially, I have preselected several organisations that I have interacted with or heard about during my stay in BiH. Then I gathered more information about them to establish whether they fulfil Smith’s (2000) definition of GAs and were operating in BiH between 2018 and 2019. I have tried to account for a wide range of GAs, operating in different parts of BiH and having various characteristics to ensure the group of GAs being studied would be heterogeneous. Ultimately, I ended up with a group of four GAs. Three of these GAs were operating in Sarajevo while one in Una Sana Canton. Moreover, three of these GAs have been still operating in BiH by the end of 2019.

Data

The data I need to obtain to answer my research question is official documents (mainly produced by the Bosnian authorities and the EU institutions), media outputs (mainly mainstream media such as BCC and DW, specialized media such as The New Humanitarian, and regional and Bosnian mainstream media publishing in English, such as Balkan Insight), and reports by non-governmental organizations (such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch). However, some data necessary for my research, especially the data relating to GAs and their interactions with the authorities, is not publicly accessible. I have, therefore, conducted semi-structured interviews with experts (a Bosnian lawyer and a founder of a locally registered NGO) and members of GAs (such as their founders and long-term volunteers) familiar with the context of migration governance in BiH. The first few interviewees have been selected by me, and the rest have been recruited by these first interviewees (so-called snowball sampling). In total, I have interviewed seven individuals. While the expert interviews have helped me understand the role of the state and INGOs in migration governance, as well as the

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legal framework regarding the work of GAs, the interviews with founders and volunteers of GAs have provided me with insights into the workings of GAs, their characteristics and motivations, as well as interactions GAs have had with the authorities.

Interview Analysis

To analyse the interviews, I have developed a coding scheme that consists of code categories that group two or more codes. For creating the coding scheme, I have used the both deductive and inductive coding method. Most of the code categories, as well as some codes, had been created before the conducting of the interviews, using the interview questions as a point of departure (Yi 2018). A few categories and codes have been added during the coding process. The coding scheme can be found in the annexe to this thesis.

Limitations

To improve the reliability of my research, i. e. that the instruments used in this study would lead to the same results if this study would be repeated, I have created a list of questions that have been used when interviewing participants of this study. Moreover, a coding scheme has been used to analyse the interviews (whose transcripts are included in an annexe to this thesis). The scheme clearly describes what statements have been assigned which code, providing a guide to how the interviews have been interpreted. By using these instruments (included in the annexe), other researchers should be able to replicate the study and get the same results. Internal validity of research ‘refers to the extent to which the findings are an accurate representation of the phenomena they are intended to represent‘ (Anderson 2010). I have attempted to improve the internal validity of this research by acknowledging my prior involvement with GAs and tried to scrutinize any biases I may have regarding GAs, as well as the state’s actions towards them. Moreover, by creating a list of questions for conducting semi-structured interviews and making transcripts of interviews, I was able to check whether I have asked leading questions that may support my preconceived notions (Alshenqeeti 2014, 43–44). Finally, external validity refers to how much findings of a particular study can be generalized to a larger population (Drost 2011, 120). My research was set in a particular context of BiH, and thus being set very locally (Leung 2015). It cannot be concluded that similar findings can be found in different locations. Nonetheless, the findings relating to identifying the factors that influence how state authorities interact with GAs could serve as a steppingstone, laying a foundation for creating a theory in the future. Further research will thus be needed to address whether similar findings can be observable in different contexts.

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4. Analysis

In this chapter, I will focus on the Bosnian state and its limited statehood and introduce migration governance in BiH while accounting for the roles different actors play in it. Furthermore, I will introduce the GAs studied in this research and finally, establish whether migration governance is an area of limited statehood for the Bosnian state and what factors influenced how the state authorities interacted with GAs in BiH.

Limited Statehood of the Bosnian State

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a multi-ethnic country – the main ethnic groups being the Bosniaks (50 % of the total population), ethnic Serbs (30 %) and Croats (15 %) – with a fragmented political system (Central Intelligence Agency 2020). Formerly a part of the Federation of Yugoslavia, BiH declared its independence – with strong opposition from the Serb minority – from the federation in 1992. The Yugoslavian government responded by force and civil war, in which warring parties mobilized according to ethnic identities, erupted (Carmichael 2015, 135– 43). The war came to an end after an intervention by the international community with the signing of the Dayton agreement in 1995. This agreement laid down the workings of the new government; by dividing the territory of the country and creating complicated decision-making structures to reconcile the interests of the three major ethnicities living in the country (Bennett 2016, 8–11), one of the most complex systems of government in the world has come into existence (Nardelli, Dzidiz, and Jukic 2014). The highest political power in the country lies with the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, who is responsible for monitoring the peace process and has extensive powers, such as adopting binding decisions and removing state officials (Führer 2011).

The main power in the country lies with the state government. The main state institutions include a directly elected tripartite presidency (consisting of one Bosniak, one Serb and one Croat), the Prime Minister, various ministries, and the Parliament. The state-level institutions are in charge of an exhaustive list of matters, which include, among other things, foreign policy, national defence, intelligence and security, monetary and fiscal policy, immigration, refugee, asylum policy and regulation (European Committee of the Regions n.d.). However, BiH consists of two entities with a high degree of autonomy: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republika Srpska. Brčko District – a self-governing administrative unit – is formally part of both entities (Nardelli, Dzidiz, and Jukic 2014).

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Each entity has its own constitution and administrative and political system. Each entity has its legislature and executive (including a president, prime minister and ministries), and is responsible for the fields that are not expressly assigned to the central government, such as police and internal affairs, healthcare, education, and culture in its territory (Nardelli, Dzidiz, and Jukic 2014). Moreover, the entities are divided into ten cantons with their own local governments, having a substantial autonomy as well (Domin 2001). The cantons in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina are further divided into municipalities with their own governments. In total, BiH has three presidents, 13 governments and prime ministers, more than 180 ministers and over 700 members of parliament (Galdini 2015).

Such a complicated multi-level political system was meant to ensure all the main ethnicities living in the country would be sufficiently represented on all levels. One of its effects, however, was a fragmentation that hinders attempts at effective governance. Bertelsmann Transformation Index, a project analysing countries‘ quality of governance using a wide range of indicators, assigned a score of 3,8 out of 10 to BiH in its latest country report (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020), stating that the fragmentation of the political system and the inability of the central government to coordinate policies across different levels prevent the state from effectively governing (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 3–4). The European Commission in its Report on BiH’s application for membership of the European Union similarly concludes that ’[t]he governments’ capacities for policy planning and coordination across all levels of government are still insufficient‘ (European Commission 2019a, 21) and that ‘[f]requent disputes on the distribution of competences between the State and the entities affect their effective exercise’ (European Commission 2019a, 10). Moreover, Börzel and Risse (2010) emphasize the circumscribed nature of BiH’s sovereignty by pointing out its ‘protectorate-like’ status due to the existence of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to Börzel and Risse, BiH is a prime example for areas of limited statehood (Börzel and Risse 2010, 122).

Migration Governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Role of the State

Migration and asylum policies are the sole responsibility of the state level; the state body charged with its creation, maintenance and implementation is the Ministry of Security (MoS). The ministry is divided into several sectors, involved in migration governance are two of them: the Sector of Asylum and the Sector for Immigration. The Sector of Asylum of MoS is responsible for registering asylum seekers, issuing identification cards to asylum seekers, as well as maintaining their database, evaluating and deciding upon asylum applications,

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interviewing asylum seekers, and securing reception and accommodation of asylum seekers in reception centres (Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2012a). The Sector of Immigration is responsible for drafting legislation related to immigration, administers reception of foreign citizens under readmission agreements, and produces reports and analyses on migration issues (Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2012b).

However, the most prominent authority in migration governance falls within the MoS but operates as an independent administrative unit. The Service for Foreigners’ Affairs (SFA) performs operative-inspection and legal and administrative tasks related to immigration affairs. The SFA is responsible for the entry and stay of foreigners in BiH, conducting surveillance of foreigners present in the territory of BiH, as well as control of their movement and stay in the country (Service for Foreigner’s Affairs 2016). The SFA is in charge of verifying foreigners’ visas, deciding on foreigners’ stay in the country by either approving or rejecting their application for temporary or permanent stay, detention of foreigners with irregular status (Bureau of Democracy 2019, 16) and expulsions of foreigners. Moreover, their offices are the first instance where asylum seekers apply for asylum (UNHCR Bosnia and Herzegovina n.d.). The SFA gathers information on all aspects of irregular migration, investigates foreigners’ stay in the country and their possible misuse of entry visas (such as claiming to be a tourist while working as a volunteer), and conducts assessments of foreigners’ level of threat to public order or national security (Service for Foreigner’s Affairs 2016).

As shown above, the SFA possesses far-reaching competences; to carry out its duties, it has law-enforcement powers comparable to the Police, enabling it to detain, arrest and interrogate foreigners. It thus plays a decisive role not only in the lives of migrants and refugees but of GAs as well. It is the SFA that is responsible for overseeing foreigners’ stay in the country, effectively deciding who can stay in the country and who cannot.

Another actor involved in migration governance within MoS is the Border Police. The Border Police are tasked with managing border crossings, patrolling the border, issuing visas at border crossings, as well as revoking visas or shortening their duration, and escorting asylum seekers to SFA offices where they can register asylum seekers’ intent for international protection (UNHCR Bosnia and Herzegovina n.d.; Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2019). The other state-level ministry responsible for immigration and asylum policy is the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees (MHRR), although its role is less important than the MoS’s role. The MHRR has been tasked with monitoring and implementation of international conventions

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on human rights and freedoms, promotion of individual and collective human rights and freedoms, coordination of the implementation of the duties enshrined in international conventions, and cooperation with non-governmental organizations on human rights issues (European Committee of the Regions n.d.). Once an asylum seeker is granted asylum (upon a decision of the MoS’s Sector of Asylum), they become a responsibility of the MHRR. The MHRR does not possess powers comparable to the ones given to the MoS; the role of MHRR lies in its monitoring and advocacy function in relation to other public bodies, but it lacks the mandate to enforce its decisions.

Each entity in the country has its own entity-level ministry dealing with displaced persons and refugees (the Federal Ministry of Displaced Persons and Refugees in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Ministry of Refugees and Displaced Persons in Republika Srpska). The Federal Ministry of Displaced Persons and Refugees is responsible for gathering and processing of data on refugees and displaced persons, construction of accommodation units for refugees and displaced persons, registration and supervision of NGOs, and running of centres for assistance to immigration and asylum activities (European Committee of the Regions n.d.). The Ministry of Refugees and Displaced Persons covers a broader scope of activities: it provides legal protection to refugees and displaced persons, runs a program of resocialization of vulnerable refugees and displaced persons, coordinates with other actors in the implementation of programs of social integration of refugees and displaced persons, and provision of accommodation to refugees and displaced persons (European Committee of the Regions n.d.).

Previously, the entities’ Ministries of the Interior had far-reaching powers and broad authority in migration management. However, with the establishment of the SFA within the state-level Ministry of Security ‘the responsibility for enforcing in-country migration management has shifted from the cantonal/regional level’ to the SFA (Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2019, 87).

The Role of INGOs

Several INGOs have taken part in migration governance in recent years, most notably the UNHCR, IOM, Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Doctors without Borders (MSF). Each of them works closely with the state, providing needed services that the state does not provide itself.

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IOM plays arguably the most important role of all the INGOs; it has been tasked by the state with running official reception centres – most of them located in Una Sana Canton – that accommodate migrants and refugees. Although it is the MoS – more precisely the SFA – that is responsible for these centres, it has delegated management of these centres to the IOM. The SFA only has a supervisory role over the centres now. IOM is thus ‘providing for the basic needs of migrants, including food, hygiene products, clothes, water, sanitation and hygiene facilities, 24/7 IOM centre management staff, and 24/7 cleaning, maintenance and security personnel‘ (IOM Bosnia and Herzegovina 2020). By the end of 2019, IOM was managing six reception centres in the country, which had, according to IOM, a total capacity of almost 5000. Furthermore, IOM has deployed mobile protection and assistance teams and opened an office in Una Sana Canton to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants and refugees. IOM also manages the transportation of undocumented migrants and refugees (it is illegal to transport an undocumented migrant in BiH) in need of medical care and identifies vulnerable individuals that it subsequently refers to the UNHCR.

Moreover, IOM supports the Border Police and the SFA in strengthening their capacities to register irregular migrants.

The UNHCR mainly provides free legal assistance, counselling, and representation to asylum seekers in BiH, runs an information centre for asylum seekers located in Sarajevo and supports state authorities in securing the rights of individuals granted asylum or subsidiary protection. It protects vulnerable individuals, such as minors and victims of human trafficking (United Nations Bosnia and Herzegovina 2020). Moreover, usually in cooperation with GAs, UNHCR organizes educational and recreational activities for migrants and refugees (UNHCR Bosnia and Herzegovina n.d.; UNHCR South Eastern Europe n.d.). The UNHCR has a presence in reception centres where it provides information to migrants and refugees, as well as psychosocial support.

DRC mainly focuses on improving access to health care for migrants and refugees. It has set up clinics in official reception centres in which DRC’s Bosnian personnel should provide health care services to all migrants and refugees, irrespective of their status (Danish Refugee Council 2019). In some instances, DRC personnel have started providing services in reception centres run by NGOs, such as in case of Pomozi.ba’s reception centre in Tuzla, where DRC personnel screens new-comers for scabies.

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The MSF has been offering medical assistance – in cooperation with Bosnian medical authorities – to migrants and refugees in Sarajevo and Una Sana Canton, as well as showers, clothing and laundry facilities, usually in cooperation with local NGOs and GAs (Medecins Sans Frontieres 2018a). The MSF has deployed a mobile clinic staffed with Bosnian doctors to treat minor injuries and health problems. More severe cases have been referred to local hospitals with expenses covered by the MSF (migrants and refugees get free medical care only at DRC clinics in reception centres). Moreover, the MSF advocates against the use of violence against migrants and refugees and openly speaks out when state authorities violate the rights of migrants and refugees.

The MSF has had a more complicated relationship with the state than the above-mentioned INGOs: it has been forced to leave BiH at the beginning of 2019 by the state authorities and returned in July 2019. The exact reasons for the MSF’s expulsion are unclear, but what seems to have been a factor was the MSF’s lack of proper registration in the country, as well as MSF’s activities that were mainly targeted at migrants and refugees living outside of the official system, i.e. those migrants and refugees lacking proper identification documents, formal registration in BiH, as well as those migrants and refugees not living in the reception centres. The exact number of these ‘shadow’ migrants and refugees living in BiH is difficult to estimate, precisely due to their existence outside of the system and the difficulty of getting access to them. Nevertheless, the MSF puts their number at 4000 (Medecins Sans Frontieres 2020). The Role of Grassroots Associations

As previously mentioned, several GAs have become involved in migration governance in BiH over the last years. Based on interviews with their founders, GAs stepped in because the response by the state and INGOs to the huge inflow of migrants and refugees to BiH have been insufficient. The GAs then identified gaps in the provision of public goods and services to migrants and refugees and tried to fill them. In some instances, a particular service was completely lacking, in other instances, a service provided by other governance actors was simply – in the eyes of GAs’ founders – not good enough, either because its quality was low, or it was not accessible to all individuals. All the GAs I have encountered during my stay in BiH acted out of a sense of solidarity with migrants and refugees, trying their best with limited resources to provide services that migrants and refugees desperately needed. What is typical for these associations operating in BiH is their highly networked nature: some of the founders and long-term volunteers have been involved in various GAs, either being members of more than one GA at one point in time or leaving one GA and founding or joining another one.

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Furthermore, GAs operating in BiH get their regular funding and in-kind-donations from several European NGOs. These NGOs, in turn, usually support more than one GA in BiH and have knowledge about the resources these GAs in BiH possess. If a European NGO gets to know that a GA in BiH needs specific resources, it can facilitate their hand over from one GA to another GA. Most importantly, the majority of GAs and their volunteers share a particular esprit de corps based on mutual respect and solidarity; several platforms for the exchange of information and resources have been set up to include all the GAs working in BiH and facilitate cooperation.

In my research, I have focused on four GAs operating in BiH between 2018 and the end of 2019, three of these GAs working in and around Sarajevo and one – No Name Kitchen – working in Una Sana Canton. In the following paragraphs, I will first describe the legal framework regulating operations of GAs and then introduce each GA that I have studied and the role it played in migration governance in BiH.

Legal Framework

If a GA wants to operate in BiH legally, it needs to meet specific legal requirements. A GA has to register itself with the state and obtain an ID. Moreover, a GA should make sure its international volunteers have registered their address of residence with the SFA (an obligation every foreigner in the country has). Finally, a GA needs to get volunteer visas for its volunteers. Registration with the state and obtaining an ID

To be legally recognised in BiH, a GA must register itself with the Ministry of Justice. A GA has two options to choose from: it can either register as an association or as an office of a branch of a foreign NGO. In theory, the former option is preferable for associations that only operate in BiH. In contrast, the latter is convenient for associations that are already registered abroad and want to expand their activities to BiH. In practice, though, most GAs operating in BiH have some form of registration in an EU country; most GAs I have encountered in BiH rely on funding and in-kind donations coming from private citizens or European NGOs. Having a legal status in one of the EU countries reportedly makes administration of donations easier for GAs and gives them a certain level of trustworthiness as well. GAs operating in BiH therefore usually choose to register an office or a branch of a foreign NGO. Unlike with associations, the Ministry of Justice’s website – the primary source of information regarding registration – does not state which statutes regulate this issue. The Ministry’s website, however, provides readers with information on how the process of registration works, what documents an applicant needs to submit with the application and how much the process costs (Ministry of Justice of Bosnia and

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Herzegovina 2012a). The information provided on the website seems clear and easy to follow but what all the interviewees reported is that the process is very complicated, time-consuming, and unclear.

The first obstacle is the fact that even though the necessary documentation is listed on the Ministry’s website (Ministry of Justice of Bosnia and Herzegovina n.d.), the office that administers NGO registration often asks for additional documents that are not listed on the website, referring to different statues that regulate NGO registration (but these statues are not known to applicants until they reach the office). Moreover, all the documentation, as well as forms accompanying it, needs to be submitted in one of the official languages of the country, that is Bosnian, Serbian, or Croatian (Ministry of Justice of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2012b, 2012a). The fragmentation of the law regulating NGO registration combined with the need to speak one of the official languages of the country makes this process inaccessible to GAs that do not hire a local lawyer to take care of the process. Hiring a lawyer is costly and since some of the GAs operating in BiH work on a minimal budget, spending money on a lawyer is not their priority.

Moreover, the department of Ministry of Justice responsible for processing NGO registration applications does not respect the prescribed term of decision; according to the law, the authorities need to decide on the application for NGO registration in 30 days but that ‘has never been the case with any GA that applied for registration’ (J.B., personal communication, May 16, 2020). In the case of Aid Brigade, the association waited for five months until the Ministry of Justice finally rejected their application.

The next step in becoming a fully registered organization in BiH is applying for an ID. This step, however, is not described on the Ministry’s website and most GAs are either told personally about the step at the Ministry’s office, or by fellow volunteers. Again, a GA willing to obtain an ID needs to meet requirements that are not only publicly accessible online, but for a GA with a low budget, difficult to meet. As one volunteer involved in the process of registration and obtaining an ID stated: ‘If you’re a small NGO and you don’t really have full-time employees that have the capacity to fully focus on this then this whole thing [NGO registration and obtaining of an ID] is extremely difficult’ (J.B., personal communication, May 16, 2020).

In sum, the law regulating NGO registration is fragmented and confusing, with the authorities often not following the prescribed procedure, leading to a rift between the theory of NGO

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registration as stated in the law and on the Ministry’s website, and the reality when the authorities ask for additional documents and send GAs’ representatives to different offices that, according to the law, should not be involved in the process. The law regulating the obtaining of an ID is not accessible online or in English. To successfully navigate the process, a GA needs to hire a local lawyer that takes care of every step of the way. However, Bosnian lawyers that have been working on this matter have stated that even for them, the process is unclear. Moreover, the authorities do not abide by the time limit for deciding on an NGO registration application, making the whole process extremely time-consuming and costly.

White Cards and Volunteer Visas

Every foreigner staying in BiH for more than three days needs to register their address of residence with the SFA within 48 hours of entering BiH. If a foreigner is staying at a facility that is registered as a provider of accommodation to foreigners, the facility is responsible for the foreigner’s registration with the SFA. However, if a foreigner stays outside these facilities (e. g. residing in a rented apartment), then they are responsible for arranging the registration themselves (Article 103, Law on Aliens). The registration itself has to be done by the landlord who first, needs to pay a fee at a post office, and then visit an SFA office to present their ID, a property ownership deed, the foreigner’s passport and fill out a registration card (so-called white card). If the registration card is approved by the SFA officer, it is given to the foreigner to be kept together with their passport. In some instances, the failure to register an address of residence with the SFA can result in being expelled from the country.

Any organization that has volunteers in its ranks needs to obtain volunteer visas for their volunteers, or how they are officially called, ‘Temporary Residence Grounded On Volunteering.‘ Visa-free entries, referred to as tourist visas, which are the norm for EU citizens, do not allow individuals to volunteer in BiH (Giancono 2019). However, a tourist visa allows a foreigner to stay in BiH for three months without applying for any documents, it is thus a preferred choice for most volunteers, although it means the volunteers – and GAs as well – are breaking the law.

Not having a volunteer visa and volunteering in the country can be punished by deportation, a fine and a ban from the country (ranging from a few months up to a year). In contrast to NGO registration and obtaining an ID, this process is more defined and leaves less space for confusion. The SFA have provided information in English on where to apply for the visa and what documentation needs to be submitted with the application on their website (Služba za Poslove sa Strancima, n.d.). Getting information about the process is, therefore, relatively easy.

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What is difficult is meeting all the requirements: in total, 18 documents are required, some of them – such as a police check – need to be obtained in the potential volunteer’s country of origin, while some documents – such as volunteering contract – need to be provided by a legally registered organization in BiH.

Moreover, all the documents need to be translated into Bosnian, Serbian or Croatian by an official translator. The fees for submitting an application is 150 BAM, which is less than 80 Euro. However, the issuance of all the documentation necessary for the application is charged as well and combined with the price of translating the documents, the whole process of applying for a volunteer visa costs around 200 Euro (J.B., personal communication, May 16, 2020). The complexity of the process and the price for obtaining all the documents make the application for volunteer visas beyond means of most organizations operating in BiH. Considering the high turnover of volunteers working with GAs and the limited budget of these associations, the process has built-in obstacles that prohibit GAs from following it.

Profiles of Grassroots Associations Aid Brigade

Aid Brigade (AB) was set up in July 2018 in Sarajevo by a group of volunteers who had previously been working with another GA in BiH. Initially, this GA had around ten volunteers and focused on cooking and distributing food to migrants and refugees living outside of official reception centres. As the number and needs of migrants and refugees living on the streets rose, so did the scope of activities offered by AB, as well as the number of its volunteers, reaching 30 in 2019. AB’s volunteers were predominantly foreign nationals, and only a few Bosnians were involved in AB’s activities regularly. In January 2019, AB opened a community centre in the centre of Sarajevo, providing a wide range of services not only to homeless migrants and refugees but to Bosnians as well. The community centre became a base for most of the services offered by AB: visitors were offered food prepared by volunteers, first aid and psychosocial support, as well as educational activities. Moreover, AB volunteers started going to the Ušivak Temporary Reception Centre, an official reception centre near Sarajevo, to provide recreational and educational services to its residents. To fund such a wide range of activities, AB was relying on regular funding from European NGOs, complemented by financial and in-kind donations by private individuals.

AB was a reasonably prominent association running several projects, its visibility was thus high, mainly due to the existence of the community centre. Moreover, AB’s core team members

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were occasionally giving interviews to the media, and TV crews have visited the community centre several times as well. AB was publicly criticizing the state on its social media profiles for its human rights abuses aimed at migrants and refugees (MiGreat / AidBrigade 2019). Moreover, some of its volunteers were collecting testimonies of border violence, published in monthly reports under the umbrella of the Border Violence Monitoring Network. In general, though, AB was more critical about the EU migration policy than the shortcomings of the government’s or INGOs’ response in BiH (Al Jazeera Balkans 2019).

AB was interacting with various GAs, as well as INGOs: it took part in the UN coordination meetings that were attended, among others, by representatives of IOM, the UNHCR, DRC, the authorities, and some other GAs. Moreover, AB cooperated with IOM in accessing the Ušivak Temporary Reception Centre and providing recreational and educational services there. Although many AB volunteers were critical of the IOM response, they did not share their views publicly. Some of AB core team members that were attending the UN coordination meetings, on the other hand, voiced their criticism regarding the treatment of minors at the camp. This criticism has been directed both at IOM and the authorities. Shortly after this incident – in May 2019 – AB’s access to the Ušivak Temporary Reception Centre was denied, and on May 25, 2019, the community centre was visited by the SFA, volunteers working there taken to the SFA office for questioning, the community centre ordered to shut down, and subsequently, AB was forced by the authorities to cease its activities in BiH altogether.

AB filed for an NGO registration application in January 2019. However, the authorities took over five months taking a decision, which they delivered – the application was rejected – in May 2019, a few days before the community centre was shut down. AB volunteers mostly did not have white cards, and none of the volunteers has obtained volunteer visas. Moreover, many of the volunteers were staying in BiH longer than three months, which is the limit set for tourist visas, and thus residing in BiH illegally.

Table 3: Characteristics of AB

Start of activities in BiH July 2018 End of activities in BiH May 2019 Number of volunteers in the field ~30

Type of volunteers Predominantly international, legal representation by a local