Program: MSc Crisis and Security Management
Student: Sara Zolak
Student Number: S1623818
Date: January 13th, 2019
Subject: Antisemitism, and the influence of Islamists in the Netherlands Word Count: 23.998 (Excluding references, bibliography, and footnotes) Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Myriam Benraad
“All political thinking for years past has been vitiated in the same way.
People can foresee the future only when it coincides with their own
wishes, and the most grossly obvious facts can be ignored when they are
unwelcome.” George Orwell
ACKNOWLEGEMENT
Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Myriam Benraad. Thank you so much for your calm guidance and intelligent recommendations. Dr. Joery Matthys, thank you for your comments, and for being the second reader. Additionally, I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Dr. Alex P. Schmid for introducing me to the topic of antisemitism as a research subject. It has changed my perspective in many respects. It is something hard to let go now.
Furthermore, I would like to express my appreciation to both the Orthodox and Liberal Jewish Community in Rotterdam, and especially to Chawa and Albert – thank you for your time and cooperation. Paul van der Bas, you were very kind and helpful – thanks.
My special gratitude goes to my dear mother Andrée Louise. Thank you for providing me the opportunity to study, and for giving me all that you never have had.
1 INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION ... 2
1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE ... 6
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ... 6
1.3 SOCIETAL RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH ... 6
1.4 ACADEMIC RELEVANCE:LITERATURE REVIEW ... 9
1.5 READING GUIDE ... 13
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 14
2.1 ANTISEMITISM ... 14
2.2 ISLAMISM ... 18
2.2.1 DA’WA: THE CALL FOR ISLAM IN THE NETHERLANDS ... 21
2.3 ISLAMISM AND ANTISEMITISM ... 24
2.3.1 SCHOLARLY DEBATE ... 25
2.3.2 ISLAMIZED ANTISEMITISM ... 33
3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ... 36
3.1 THE FIRST PHASE: ANTISEMITISM AND STATISTICS ... 37
3.1.1 FINDINGS ... 38
3.2 THE SECOND PHASE:JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN ROTTERDAM ... 41
3.2.1 FINDINGS ... 42
3.3 THE THIRD PHASE:INFLUENCE OF ISLAMISTS ... 44
3.3.1 OPERATIONALIZATION ... 44
4 ANALYSIS: ISLAMISTS IN ROTTERDAM ... 46
4.1 DATA GATHERING ... 57
4.2 OPERATIONALIZATION ... 58
5 INTERVIEW FINDINGS ... 61
5.1 RELIGIOUS PRACTICES ... 61
5.2 PERSPECTIVES ON DUTCH SOCIETY AND THE WEST ... 62
5.3 THE MEDIA ... 63
5.4 PALESTINE AND ISRAEL ... 66
5.5 ZIONISM ... 69
5.6 USGOVERNMENT ... 70
5.7 HOLOCAUST ... 72
5.8 SOURCES ... 72
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ... 74
6.1 DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS ... 74
6.2 CONCLUSION ... 78
6.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ... 79
7 BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 81
1 Introduction and Research Question
Since the year 2000 there is a clear rise of antisemitism, not only worldwide, but also in Western European states. Although, antisemitism is as normal in everyday life in the Middle East –today this, what Bassam Tibi (2010a) calls a Genocidal
phenomenon, is (re)entering through the Muslim diaspora and is becoming more prominent in Western Europe as well. Radical Muslims are a recent group of perpetrators of antisemitic terrorist attacks in Europe. They justify their acts on religious grounds (Wistrich, 2002; Tibi, 2010). More often we hear of brutal Islamists antisemitic violence. In March 2018, Mireille Knoll, an 85-year-old Holocaust
survivor was brutally murdered in her home in Paris by her 28-year old neighbor who she had known her whole life. Sadly, these kinds of threats against Jews are apparent all across Europe, in France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and also in the Netherlands (Ariel, 2018; BBC, 2015; Chazan, 2018; Derksen, 2018; Mamou, 2018). As a result of the Brussels Jewish Museum attack in 2014, more severe security measures are undertaken to protect Jewish institutions and religious places in the Netherlands. For example, the Anne Frank House and the Jewish Historical Museum in Amsterdam are under permanent protection - but also Jewish schools and
Synagogues (van Weezel & Broer, 2014). In a short period of time, three assaults were carried out against the same Jewish restaurant in Amsterdam. Subsequently political parties initiated The Jewish Accord,1 in order to combat antisemitism, and to take action for the safety of Jews living in Amsterdam (NOS, 2018; Derksen, 2018).
According to archives and historical literature the first Jews arrived in the port cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Middelburg) of the Netherlands in the late 16th century. The first Jewish community was registered in 1602 in Amsterdam
(Joodserfgoed Rotterdam, 2016). In the beginning of the 18th century this became the largest Jewish community in Western Europe. Due to the French Enlightenment at the end of the 18th century it became possible for Jews to integrate socially and politically in Dutch society – at 2 September 1796, the National Assembly of the Batavian Republic decided unanimously a decree that provided Jews with equal rights. In the same year the exclusion of Guilds membership was reversed. These changes provided
many new chances and possibilities. Accordingly, Jews obtained prominent position in political and social life (Visser, 1996; CIDI, 2010).
In September 1939 the Second World War started. The following year, on the 10th of May in 1940, Germany invaded the Netherlands. Four days later, Rotterdam was bombed and destroyed, which resulted in the capitulation of the Netherlands. The occupation of Nazi Germany ended at the 5th of May in 1945. The armed resistance was only small during these five years of occupation, and a relative large number of Dutch men had joined the Germans on the Eastern front (CIDI, 2010). Large-scale deportations started in 1942, the first on the 14th of July. From then on, Jews were systematically transported via Camp Westerbork. Most were sent to Auschwitz, others to Sobibor, Bergen Belsen, or Theresienstadt (Joodserfgoed Rotterdam, n.d.). The Dutch police was involved in the razzia on Jews (CIDI, 2010). With the last deportation in September 1944, a total number of 102 deportations were carried out. Approximately 107.000 Jews were deported and only 5.200 of them had survived the War (NIOD, n.d.). Between 1940 and 1945 Dutch Jews were obligated to hand in all their valuables to the Liro,2 which was a bank located in the Sarphatistraat in
Amsterdam. The Liro was authorized to “manage” Jewish assets (Onderzoeksgids Oorlogsgetroffenen WO2, n.d.). In practice, Jewish assets were stolen. Additionally, Dutch Jews paid their own train tickets to the concentration camps, as well as the gas that killed them in the gas chambers of the extermination centers (Lipschits, 2001). The Dutch Railways (NS) made approximately two and half million euros from the transport of Jews3 (Historiek, n.d.). Moreover, after the War, the Holocaust Survivors were generally not warmly welcomed. In Amsterdam they were not allowed to return to their homes (Damen & Pen, 2015). Stateless Jews were refused at the borders, and some were even detained in Camp Westerbork. Due to the failing of the post-war right of restorations, many survivors never retrieved their material belongings. However, they did have to pay back taxes. As a result, and with collusion of the Dutch government, over 45 billion euros was stolen from Jews during and after the war.4 Additionally, Jewish parents who had survived the war had to fight for their temporarily abandoned children. Only after long struggles were Jewish Orphans able to return to the Jewish community - this is known as the Jewish child robbery (Koops,
2 Short for Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co 3 Today’s value
2017). The Dutch historian Isaac Lipschitz called the post-war period a “little shoah,”5 the horrific experiences of the Jews were downplayed, and their reentering into Dutch society was hard. After the war, antisemitism in word and writing was more violent than it had been before 1940 (Lipschits, 2001).
A 2017 report of Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israel (CIDI), argues that even today Jews are significantly overrepresented as victims of discrimination (Mestrum & Bas, 2018). Many Jews are concerned with antisemitism, especially by Dutch
individuals with a migrant background. Around 90% argued that the government should do more to combat antisemitism, and to bare hate-speakers from speaking in public. Nearly 40% said that they not always dare to tell to be Jewish (Jager & Waterman, 2017). Not only violent attacks are a security issue, antisemitic rhetoric also flourishes in the Netherlands (Mestrum & Bas, 2018). Slogans such as:
“Khaybar Khaybar, ya yahud, Jaish Muhammad, sa yahud”6 in combination with
Hamas and Hezbollah support during pro-Palestine or anti-Israel demonstrations are not uncommon (Het Parool, 2009; EAIG, 2013; Hoogwerf, 2017; Marije, 2017). Antisemitic speeches “disguised as criticism of Israel,” but also plain antisemitic rhetoric is regularly provided a podium. For example, in 2017 in debating center De Nieuwe Liefde in Amsterdam. Dyab Abou Jahjah7 was invited as a speaker. He concluded in regard to legitimate forms of resistance against Israel: “throwing all
Jews into the sea, as we wanted to do in the Arab world in the 1940s, is not feasible”8 (WNL, 2017). Another example is Rapper Appa,9 who has many (mainly young) followers, and is regularly invited to speak in public. During a protest speech on the Dam in Amsterdam, during the 2014 Gaza-War, he shouted to the crowd “Fuck the
Zionists” and “Fuck the Talmud.” He further argued that Israel is an illegal rouge
state; he compared Israel with Nazi Germany; he used classic conspiracy theories, like Zionists rule the world; and he even characterized Zionists as “Greedy hyenas who
are out for our money and our blood”10 (Het Parool, 2015; RTL Nieuws, 2015; Gazaoui, 2015; Walsum, 2017; Brassé & Pelle, 2014).
5 De kleine sjoa
6 “Jews, remember Khaybar, the army of Muhammad is returning” 7 He is a Belgium author and politician of Lebanese origin.
8 Alle Joden in de zee gooien zoals wij dat in de Arabische wereld wilden doen in de jaren 40, is niet haalbaar
9 Rachid Appa El Gazaoui.
In Dutch Politics the same kind of anti-Jewish expressions are made. NIDA,11 a political party in Rotterdam inspired on the teachings of Islam, claimed (while referring to freedom of expression) that Israel is an equivalent of the Islamic State. They tweeted “We argue: Zionism = ISIS”12 and summed up the supposedly similar characteristics between the Islamic State and Israel (NIDA Rotterdam, 2014).
Abderrazak Khoulani, a member of the City Councilor in The Hague and co-founder of the Partij van de Eenheid13 (Party of Unity,) made a comment on social media, referring to a group of Israeli students who visited the Dutch Parliament in 2017, as “Zionist terrorist” and “child murderers and occupiers” of the future14 (IJssel, 2017; PvdE, n.d.). Tunahan Kuzu, the National Party leader of Denk (Think,) equated Israel with Nazi Germany during a speech in the House of Representatives (Brussen, 2018). Selçuk Öztürk, member of the House of Representatives for Denk, spoke about “the long arm of Israel” and argued, “Jews would try to influence the House of
Representatives” (Luden, 2017).
Of course not all, and not only, Muslims are perpetrators of antisemitic acts or speech. However, and despite the fact that it is only a small number of Muslims that use violence against Jews or Jewish institutions, studies in Western Europe show that Muslims have a far less positive attitude towards Jews than non-Muslims. Although a lot of antisemitic rhetoric is used during anti-Israel events - research has demonstrated that there is almost no correlation between conflicts in the Middle East and
antisemitic violence (Due Enstad, 2017). However, there seems to be a correlation between religiosity and antisemitism (Jikeli, 2015a). While churches are emptying, Muslims in the Netherlands are becoming more religious (SCP, 2018). Accordingly, it is necessary to understand what the underlying rationales are for these anti-Jewish perceptions and how Islamists might influence the expansion of antisemitism in the Netherlands. In other words, this study hopes to produce a more complete
understanding of antisemitic attitudes, and the authority of Islamists in the Netherlands.
11 Nida means to “call upon God.”
12 Wij zeggen: #Zionisme = #ISIS #Vrijheidvanmeningsuiting
13 Partij van de Eenheid is a party inspired by standards and values of Islam.
14 Zionistische terroristen in wording gewoon keurig op bezoek bij de SGP. Dit zijn de toekomstige kindermoordenaars en bezetters.
1.1 Research Objective
The goal of this study is to understand and explain how Islamists influence the rise and expansion of antisemitism in the Netherlands, and more specifically in
Rotterdam. This study will therefore research whether Islamists have influenced young Dutch Muslims. Additionally, how these youngsters argue in antisemitic ways, and how they defend their reasoning. Moreover, this study wants to investigate whether they adopted Islamist antisemitic views. Furthermore, this study wants to understand, when antisemitic rhetoric is used, for example in relation to Israel, what the driving factors are. Differently put, do they identify themselves with Arab
Palestinians - regardless of their own tribal, ethnic, religious and sectarian identity or are they against a Jewish state? If so, who convinced them, were it Islamists, and how? Respectively, this demands an in-depth description of these arguments.
1.2 Research Questions
The central research question examines: How have Islamists in the Netherlands
influenced the rise in and the expansion of antisemitism, more specifically in Rotterdam?
In order the answer the research question, this study will use data triangulation, including desk and field research. Secondary analysis will be used to investigate the rise of antisemitism. Additionally, interviews will be held with prominent Jews from the liberal and orthodox community. In order to research the influence of Islamists in the expansion of antisemitism, interviews will be conducted with young Muslims who argue to be very religious.15
1.3 Societal Relevance of the Research
Before the Second World War some 140,000 Jews lived in the Netherlands, including Jews who had fled Germany due to rising Nazism and increasing Jew-hatred.
Approximately 102,000 Jews were killed during the Shoah. Jews are today only a
15 For the reason that there seems to be a correlation between religiosity and antisemitism (Jikeli, 2015a).
small minority in the Netherlands, around 0.3% of the population (LJG Amsterdam, n.d.). Nevertheless, antisemitism is a severe threat to Jews and Dutch society. There is an increase in (violent) antisemitic acts; Jewish institutions are desacralized; Jews are intimidate, their properties are vandalized; and antisemitic rhetoric can be found in public, in politics, and on the Web (Heck, 2018; Rijken, 2018). To guarantee the safety of the Jewish community in the Netherlands, and in order to maintain a healthy open society, it is critical and urgent to gain an in-depth understanding of the roots and rationales behind these antisemitic perceptions. Because today some of the worst kind of antisemitism is spreading - which grows through the Islamic diaspora in Europe and due to the influence of Arab and Muslim states (Tibi, 2010a).
In the 1950s Western Europe had approximately 50 thousand Muslims living within its borders - today around 26 million. Europe is becoming a continent of immigration. It is receiving more immigrants than the traditional immigration states like the United States of America and Australia. The relationships between immigrants and native population are changing. Muslims live more often in enclaves (Tibi, 2007; Pew Research Center, 2017). This is also true for the Netherlands (Ellian, 2018). Many Muslims live in their own societies, which Islamists seek to influence. They try to upraise the discontent, and in their indoctrinations courses, they spread the idea of a Cosmic War between Jews and Islam (Tibi, 2010a; Tibi, 2007). Despite the fact that many European Muslims are not followers of Islamism (According to Bassam Tibi, depending on the country, approximately 3% to 10% of Muslims constitutes
Islamists,) Islamists present themselves as “the voice of Islam.” They control
mosques, organizations, resources and infrastructure, and propagate their antisemitic rhetoric (Tibi, 2010; Tibi, 2007). This also seems to be the case in the Netherlands; a growing number of mosques are under the influence of Salafism. This growing Salafism tries to establish itself in more moderate mosques as well. This is alarming since Islamists, in a compelling way, try to inflict Muslims with intolerant, isolationist and anti-democratic ideas (WODC, 2017; NCTV, 2017). In 2010, a study, by Roex, van Stiphout & Tillie, showed that 11% of Dutch Muslims agreed that under certain circumstances their religion allowed them to use violence16 (2010, pp. 246-248). The visibility of Salafism is additionally stimulated due to its prominence in public
debates. Salafi preachers regularly engage in public debates and are subsequently able
to share their principles and views with a broad audience (WODC, 2017; NCTV, 2017). Some of these preachers encourage greater social involvement and a stronger political-religious engagement of Dutch Muslim youth in regard to conflicts in the Middle East (AIVD & NCTV, 2015).
These Islamist organizations additionally, distribute and publish literature; they control youth organizations; they are connected to Islamic schools; they have Islamic centers; they are active on the Web; they organize courses; etcetera (Roex, van Stiphout, & Tillie, 2010). This is dangerous and disturbing because youngsters are easily acceptable to propaganda of Islamism. Meaning that they are also easily acceptable to Islamists antisemitism, which in turn can translate into increasing verbal and physical aggression against Jews (Tibi, 2007; AIVD & NCTV, 2015). Hence, it is important to grasp the roots and rationales of antisemitic hostilities. Antisemitism is not only a danger to Jews; it is a danger to every person living in Dutch society. Freedom and equality are inevitable and fundamental principles of an open society, and Islamists seek to undermine it. Today attacks are carried out against Jews and Jewish institutions. Tomorrow, anyone who looks like a Jew could become a target. Perhaps anyone with Jewish friends becomes a target. Or maybe those who support the state of Israel are the next targets. To make this point even more clear, the scholar Bassam Tibi, who is a Muslim himself, provides a good example. He writes, among other things, critically about Islamism and Islamist antisemitism. Due to his scholarly work he is often threatened, even to a point that he had to go into hiding (Meyer & Schmidt, 2006; Tibi, 2010; Tibi, 2007).
In short, antisemitism is a crime against humanity, and it is a very dangerous phenomenon. It is a danger to democratic notions, to (religious) pluralism, and to robust citizenship. Islamist antisemitism can easily turn against other groups that are not regarded “ideologically pure” - against women, homosexuals, or reformist Muslims (Small, 2013). In other words, it is not only a security threat to Jewish communities and individuals; it is a threat to the entire Dutch society. It begins with Jews, but it will definitely not end there: the perils are real, the threat is clear, and they concern us all.
1.4 Academic Relevance: Literature review
A great deal is written and said about antisemitism in the Middle East. In many states antisemitism is widely propagated and accepted in society (Pew Research Center, 2006; Tibi, 2007). In Western societies it is not. Islamists are therefore more likely to disguise or hide (doublespeak) their antisemitism from the outside world (Tibi, 2010; Tibi, 2007; Wistrich, 2002). Nevertheless, it appears that the number of violent antisemitic incidents in Europe is much higher today, compared to the 1990s (Jikeli, 2015a). The problem, however, is that very few scholars, and institutes, are dealing with contemporary antisemitism in the West. Accordingly, there is only little research conducted on antisemitism and the Muslim population in Europe. Even less research has been conducted on Islamists antisemitism in Europe. Since, there exists hardly any research on the subject, especially in regard to the Netherlands, it is useful to take a brief look at studies that handle the topic of antisemitism and Islam in neighboring countries.
Pew Research Center published in 2006, a “13 nation attitude survey.” This study showed that there were almost unanimous unfavorable attitudes among
Muslims against Jews, in Jordan (99%), Egypt (98%) and Pakistan (94%). Muslims in Europe had a more positive view compared to the Middle East. Nevertheless,
according to this study the majority of European Muslims hold negative perceptions of Jews. Only 15% of the respondents in Turkey, 28% in Spain, 32 % in Great
Britain, 38% in Germany were favorable of Jews. France was the only exception with 78% of the Muslims holding positive views (Pew Research Center, 2006).
Moreover, the study of Johannes Due Enstad argues that individuals with Islamic backgrounds are prominent perpetrators of antisemitic violent incidents in Western European countries. His research on antisemitic violence in Europe between 2005 and 2015, also stresses that there is only little correlation between violent acts against Jews in Europe and conflicts in the Middle East (2017). Although he recognizes that these conflicts could provide individuals that already hold antisemitic attitudes and are prone to violence, a ground to carry out attacks. Additionally, the size of the Muslim or Jewish population within countries did not seem to play any role. He concludes that antisemitism is more widespread among Muslims than among non-Muslims – and that the level of religiosity plays a role in anti-Jewish attitudes (Due Enstad, 2017).
In 2014, Ruud Koopman compared religious fundamentalist attitudes of hostility towards out-group, between native Christians and Muslims (of Turkish and Moroccan origin). The study was conducted in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Sweden and could not confirm the assertion that fundamentalism is a marginal phenomenon among Muslims in the West. Up to 75% of the Muslim respondents was of opinion that Muslims should “return to the roots of the faith; that there is only one interpretation of the Qur’an which is binding for all believers; and that religious rules are more important than secular laws”17 (Koopmans, 2014, p. 51). In the Netherlands 40,4% among Muslims, compared to 8,4% among Christians, agreed with the statement: “Jews could not be trusted.” And 54,4 % of Muslim respondents believed that the West is out to destroy Islam (Koopmans, 2014). Koopmans also emphasized an earlier study by Heitmeyer, Müller, and Schröder, from 1997. This study demonstrated that in Germany amongst young people of Turkish origins almost half believed that Islam was under threat by Western and Zionists enemies. Moreover, they believed that Zionism in general, is a threat to Islam (2014). Surveys from other European countries also confirmed that anti-Jewish
attitudes are stronger amongst Muslims than amongst non-Muslims. In Belgium, two survey studies by the Youth Research Platform (JOP) confirmed that antisemitic views, among students at secondary schools, were especially high amongst students with Islamic backgrounds (approximately 50%). The first study in 2011 entitled
Young in Brussels18 showed an overwhelming percentage of Muslim students that held antisemitic viewpoints. Many agreed with the following statements: Jews want to dominate everything (56.8% agreed,) most Jews think they are better than others (47.1% agreed,) If you do business with Jews, you should be extra careful (47.5%,) Jews incite to war and blame others (53.7% agreed.) The study claimed that anti-Jewish perceptions seemed to be link to “being Muslim.” And that it is likely that anti-Jewish attitudes are fostered by theological Jew-hatred; by the Middle East conflict; and due to the influence and the encouragement of the environment in which Muslim youth resides (Elchardus, 2011). The second study, carried out in 2013 in the cities of Antwerp and Gent, confirmed the previous findings (Elchardus, 2013). Furthermore, it stressed that these youngsters hold a high level of antisemitism,
17 In the Netherlands 44,6% of Muslim respondents agreed with all three statements. 18 Jong in Brussel.
regardless of their personal, educational, and social – economic characteristics (Elchardus, 2013, p. 213). In 2013 a Dutch study entitled “Antisemitism on Secondary Schools,” researched antisemitic attitudes and Holocaust diminishment among students, by means of surveying secondary school teachers. The outcome of the study suggested that both are vastly more common in schools with a higher percentage of students of Turkish or Moroccan backgrounds.19 Additionally, the number of insults against Jews was significantly higher in schools that had many students of Turkish or Moroccan backgrounds (Wolf, Berger, & Ruig, 2013). Günter Jikeli’s study of 2015, had as purpose to provide a deeper understanding of anti-Jewish attitudes among young male Muslims, with various religious, ethnic, cultural, and educational backgrounds in France, the UK and Germany (2015b). He concluded: “The majority of interviewees displayed resentments against Jews in at
least one way or another. Negative attitudes toward Jews were often openly exhibited, at times aggressively so, including calls for violence against Jews and intentions to carry out antisemitic actions” (Jikeli, 2015b, p. 116). He had categorized four
typologies of anti-Jewish hostilities. The first category constituted classic antisemitic attitudes. The second category contained anti-Jewish attitudes with reference to Israel. The third category regarded hostile attitudes to Jews with reference to Islam, ethnic or Muslim identity. The fourth category entailed anti-Jewish hostility without rational. The outcome of the study showed that most respondents used a combination of categories to argue why they do not like Jews (Jikeli, 2015b). However, the level of antisemitism increased when the individual was more fundamentalistic in his religious views. Nevertheless, there was little or no correlation between antisemitic attitudes and perceived discrimination; legal restrictions of Islamic Faith; or demographic variables; and socio-economic variables (Jikeli, 2015c; Jikeli, 2015a).
In short, despite the fact that there are only few studies in regard to anti-Jewish attitudes among Muslims in Netherlands, it appears that generally speaking, Muslims have a far less positive perception of Jews than non-Muslims. Furthermore, these studies suggest that there is little correlation between anti-Jewish perceptions and socio–economic backgrounds. However, it is likely that there is a link between the level of religiosity and antisemitic attitude. This research will therefore contribute to a
19
more in-depth understanding of the influence of Islamists regarding antisemitism in the Netherlands.
First and foremost it must be made clear that Muslims are not a homogenous group, that notions of Islam differ between communities, and that many western Muslims are not radical Muslims. Yet, research shows that a large part of European Muslims holds negative feelings towards Jews (Jikeli, 2015; Koopmans, 2014). Since there is only little data available that explains where these tendencies come from, it is of academic interest to investigate the role of Islamists. It is necessary to research what the underlying bases of these hostile perceptions are and where they come from. It is essential to investigate whether antisemitic views are shaped due to the influence of Islamist authorities. When antisemitic attitudes are linked to the Palestinian
conflict, then it is important to understand how these perceptions are shaped. Many Islamists seek to politically involve Muslim youth in this matter. It is therefore interesting to investigate why youngsters are acceptable for this issue. What
convinces them? Especially since there are many, and much bloodier, tribal conflicts in the Middle East. It is important to find out how these perceptions are constructed and what the argumentations are behind these judgments. Moreover, there is no research carried out in the Netherlands that investigates how individuals can become acceptable to antisemitism when it is propagated by Islamist authorities.
Importantly, this study is not interested in making generalizations about Dutch Muslims, but rather to gain a better understanding of the reasons behind antisemitic sentiment amongst a part of the Muslim youth.
Antisemitism is very dangerous form of hatred and has to be taken seriously. In the words of Robert Wistrich, antisemitism is the world’s oldest hatred (2010). It transforms and adapts over time. So in order to combat it, we must first of all understand it. It is important to obtain an in-depth understanding of all forms of antisemitism, and therefore it is also important to understand the influence of Islamists in the Netherlands.
1.5 Reading Guide
This chapter elaborated on the topic of interest and clarified the intention and relevance of the study. The second chapter will provide a theoretical framework, which will focus on the essence of antisemitism, Islamism and a scholarly debate regarding the origins of Islamist antisemitism. Chapter three will elaborate on the methodology of this study. Thereafter, chapter four will provide the analysis of Islamism in Rotterdam, which is followed in chapter five by the presentation of the interview findings. The last chapter presents the discussion on the findings, which will be followed by the conclusion and research limitations and recommendations. At the final pages of this study one can find the Bibliography and Appendix A.
2 Theoretical Framework
To answer the central research questions, it is necessary to rely on a rich and
intelligent theoretical framework. This provides rationales and insights, which ensures a strong theoretical grounding. Since the objective of the study is to explain the rise in and expansion of antisemitism due to the influence of Islamists in the Netherlands, it is necessary to gain acumen into the topic of interest. Hence, it is of importance to gain a better understanding of the concept of antisemitism. Therefore, the study firstly explains what antisemitism entails, and will provide some insight into (new) varieties of antisemitism. Moreover, it is impossible to understand possible Islamist antisemitic perceptions amongst youngsters without examining Islamism. Accordingly, Islamism and Islamist antisemitism will be discussed. Subsequently, some context in regard to the Netherlands will be provided.
Furthermore, it is critical that terms are used in a very clear manner. Therefore this study will clearly distinguish between Islam and Islamism, between radical Muslims and Muslims. Hence, clear conceptualizations of the terms relating to the study will be specified.
In short, the theoretical framework exists out of three parts. Firstly, it covers
antisemitism. Subsequently, Islamism will be discussed. Lastly, Islamists antisemitism
and an overview of the academic debate will be provided.
2.1 Antisemitism
Since this study is concerned with antisemitism, it is of importance to create an understanding of the components that this subject matter involves. It is necessary to explain why this study speaks of antisemitism instead of discrimination against Jews, or merely Jew-hatred. Due to its complexity it is important to clarify the different stages that antisemitism went through, the grounds of antisemitism and the various aspects that it regards. Before we can fully comprehend what antisemitism entails, it is helpful to define the concept. Due to its complexity there are many different definitions, ranging from very short ones that describes antisemitism as “Hostility
towards and discrimination against Jewish people” (Wright, 2015,) to more broad
range from verbally expressed antipathy to physical violence toward Jewish individuals, their properties, institutions, communities, and the state of Israel” (Juergensmeyer & Roof, 2011). For the purpose of this study the
comprehensive working definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) will be applied: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which
may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities” (2016).
Today antisemitism is a widely known term, but its underlying phenomenon dates back many centuries, when Christianity was institutionalized and spread across much of the Mediterranean region. European animosity against Jews, and prejudice against Judaism, was religiously motivated. Christianity aimed to become the universal religion and most Jews refused to convert to Christianity, hence they were portrayed as rebels against God and blamed for the killing of Jesus Christ. Consequently they were stereotyped as the Anti-Christ and expelled or prosecuted until the late 18th century (Britannica, 2018). In other words, this first phase of antisemitism was generated by Christianity and had a religious fundament. Since many Jews (under force) had converted to Christianity, a second phase was needed in order to continue demonizing the Jews. From the 19th century on, antisemitism was based on racial grounds - on racial otherness. Moreover, the compound anti-Semitism is the English translation of the German word Anti-Semitismus, a term coined in 1879 by Wilhelm Marr (Zimmermann, 1986; Howatson, 2011). “Anti-“ refers to the Greek word antí, which means: against or opposite (Hoad, 1996). The word “Semite” is derived from the Hebrew name of Shem who was, according to the Old Testament, one of the three sons of Noah. He is regarded as the ancestor of the people that speak one of the related Semitic languages - including Arabs, Jews, Arameans and Assyrians
(Britannica, 2018; Hornblower, Spawforth, & Eidinow, 2012). Marr introduced the term antisemitism into politics for referring to a campaign in Central Europe against Jews, attributing racial or biological aspects to adherents of a religion. The term “Semites” may also refer to other ethnic groups in the Levant, but Marr explicitly used it to specify Jews. This new racial dimension was a product of the rise of a (pseudo-) scientific racism in the 19the century, which in turn influenced the National Socialists Movement after the First World War. It was only during this period that the term received its ominous political weight. Adolf Hitler underlined in his
correspondence with Herr Adolf Gemlich, in regard to the “Jewish question,” the necessity for antisemitism to be of rational and scientific basis: “Antisemitism as a
political movement may not and cannot be defined by emotional impulses, but by recognition of the facts. The facts are these: Jewry is absolutely a race and not a religious association. [….] Neither does the Mosaic faith members belong exclusively to just one definite religion” (1919).
In other words, the new term antisemitism marks a further development of an older anti-Judaism, adding a nationalistic and racial dimension to the religious one (Zimmermann, 1986; Britannica, 2018). During the Second World War Nazi
Germany had found the answer to the Jewish question in the Holocaust, through the total extermination of the Jewish race. Approximately, six million Jews were killed by systematic annihilation (Juergensmeyer & Anheier, 2012).
Since 1948, with the declaration of independence of the State of Israel, new antisemitism made its re-appearance and refers to hatred and prejudice against Zionism and Israel (Hogg & Levine, 2010). This new antisemitism is first a mixture of the previous forms of Western antisemitism. These previous forms are referred to as classical or traditional antisemitism. Some of the characteristics are for example
scapegoating - Jews were blamed for everything, they were behind all troubles in the
world (real and imagined). They were often accused of poisoning water sources, and of being child murderers. This is better known as the Blood Label, which entails that Jews supposedly murder Christian children for their blood to make Matzo Bread. All kinds of stereotypes and negative attributes were additionally ascribed to Jews (Mlodzianowska, 2012). For example, the portraying of Jews with long hook noses; depicting them as half man half beast; or picturing them as individuals that like to suckle on the teats of pigs (Hood, 2013). Another characteristic of this classic
antisemitism regards Jewish conspiracy theories. Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876,) who described Jews as an exploiting sect, as blood sucking people, and as parasites, claimed for example that Jews were behind capitalism and communism (Wistrich, 2010). Another example is the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The Protocols was a forgery by the Russian secret police in the beginning of the 20the century, which argues that Jews plan for world domination (Wistrich, 2010; Mlodzianowska, 2012). After Nazi Germany and the Holocaust, these forms of classical antisemitism were not sustainable anymore, so a third phase arrived. This new phase does not attack Jews as individuals; it rather attacks Jews as a collective and more specifically the
State of Israel (Small, 2013; Lewis, 2005). This new phase is disguised in a modern
form of political and ideological terms that elaborates on this ages-old hatred (Lewis, 2005). The political appearance of antisemitism is overtly expressed through the protest and decline of the Jewish right to self-determination. It involves delegitimizing the State of Israel. Additionally it entails the denying of any Jewish historical and
religious connection between the State of Israel and the Jews. Lastly, it involves demonizing Israel – and ascribing it all world’s evils (Cotler, 2009). The ideological
presentation of antisemitism goes under the veil of “humanitarianism.” It expresses itself by arguing that Zionism is a form of racism, or that Israel is an apartheid state – accordingly this demands the dismantling of Israel. Another feature is comparing Israel with Nazi Germany. All these characteristics regarding Israel are criminal indictments. Accordingly, Israel that is composed out of racism, Nazism, and apartheid has no moral ground and right to exist. This narrative advocates people to
resist this occupying state. As a result, “the masking of this antisemitism as if it were part of the struggle against racism, apartheid and Nazism” will thereby transform “an antisemitic indictment into a moral imperative with the imprimatur of
international law” (Cotler, 2009, p. 8).
Another aspect of new antisemitism that frequently is applied is the way in which it is combined and blended with anti-Zionism (Small, 2013). And despite the fact that anti-Zionism is not an equivalent of antisemitism; it is nevertheless often used so to disguise it (Lewis, 1976). The problem subsequently is, that it is hard to tell what we are dealing with. Hence, how can we tell whether we are concerned with antisemitism or rather with anti-Zionism? According to Abraham Foxman, the head of the Anti-Defamation League “anti-Zionism constitutes antisemitism if Zionism is
the only nationalism being opposed” (TOI Staff, 2014). According to the historian
Bernard Lewis (1916-2018), one can recognize antisemitism by its characterization of two particular features, namely: when Jews are judged by different standards than others, and secondly when Jews are accused of being cosmic or satanic evils (Lewis, 2005).
2.2 Islamism
Islamists are adherents of Islamism, Islamic fundamentalism, Political Islam, and Radical Islam, which are all different words for the same ideology. These words can therefore be used interchangeably. More importantly, it is of necessity to make a distinction between Islamism and Islam. Islam is a faith, a spiritual way of living. Islamism is a political ideology, which religionizes politics. Accordingly, there is a difference between the general Muslim population and Islamists or radical Muslims. For the first, Islam is nothing more than a faith and regard religion as a private matter. For the latter, Islam is a concept for political order - it is a unity of state and religion (Tibi, 2010a). Accordingly all Muslims use the same books, the Qur’an, the Hadith (the oral traditions) and the Sira (the biography of the prophet), they nevertheless decide and therefore they believe that they must be used differently.
Since this study regards Islamists, it is of importance to explain what they encompass and how they organize. Respectively I define Islamists as adherents of Islamist movements, which are religious movements, or religious groups of people,
who work together to advance their shared desire for Islam to direct all aspects of life, including the social and political sphere - anywhere and anytime. In addition,
this study will include Salafi and Wahhabi movements as Islamist movements. For this reason it is necessary to make a distinction between what I will call political and
apolitical Islamist movements.20 It is important to make this division because their ideologies and therefore their worldviews differ in certain respects (Tibi, 2009). Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, and their common hatred for Jews, I will place all these movements under the umbrella of Islamism, either political or
apolitical. Accordingly, political Islamist movements are movements like the Muslim
Brotherhood and its offspring who actively engage in politics. While these
movements refer to the ways of Islam, they use modern concepts that have no origin in Islamic scriptures. They are, unlike apolitical Islamists, no traditionalists; hence
20 Scholars like Bassam Tibi and Ahmad Moussali argue that one cannot regard Salafis and Wahhabis as Islamists since they differ in too many respects – their ideologies and worldviews (Moussali, 2009; Tibi, 2008). Moreover, salafism has changed over time, but also comes in many different forms; therefore it is impossible to simply include the whole spectrum of salafism as Islamism. For this reason, and for the purpose of the study, I will make use of a simplistic distinction between political and apolitical Islamists (–which both can be violent or non-violent).
they embrace modern technologies and innovation. Apolitical Islamists are orthodox Salafis or Wahhabis21 (Moussalli, 2009).
While for political Islamists the pursuit of power and therefore engaging in politics comes at the first place – apolitical Islamists consider party politics to be a manifestation of polytheism. They reject any form of innovation (bid’a). They want to live life in the same manner that the prophet did (Durie, 2013; Addi, 2009).
Furthermore, political Islamists may be linked to political lobby groups through which they try to influence governments. Apolitical Islamists rather isolate themselves and seek to influence other Muslims through, for example, education22 (Tibi, 2009; Durie, 2013). They desire a strict application of Sharia and submission towards these religious laws regards a compulsory nature (Moussalli, 2009). The political Islamists, in contrary believe that, during this age of transition, thus from the Modern world order to the Islamic world order, they are allowed (and it is even necessary) to engage in (Western) civilization and politics (Durie, 2013). Despite many differences, both have comparable ideas for the role of Islam. Both political and apolitical Islamist movements are a rejection to the decline of the Muslim world. Both are anti-Western and against secularism. Both want to follow the footsteps of the prophet Muhammad and view themselves as “true believers”. Both oppose religious diversity. Both believe that they are engaged in a Cosmic War against the Jews. They both desire a great Islam, and want life to be ruled by Sharia (Moussalli, 2009; Tibi, 2008). Political
Islamists however, are much more flexible in the means to envision this Islamic world
order.
There are two distinct ideas regarding how to establish this Islamic world order. Accordingly, we can divide both political as apolitical Islamists into two separate schools of methods: the Jihadist Islamists23 and the non-violent Islamists.
21 Salafis are followers of salafism, which refer to a particular Islamic thought that emphasizes the need to return to the principles and ways of “the Salaf.” The Salaf (al-salaf al-salih) are the pious
predecessor of Islam, often understood as the first three generations of the Muslim community. Wahhabism is a separate arm of Salafism, which regards itself as the true Salafism (Moussalli, 2009). They reject kalam (this means that they reject the use of rhetoric and debate to create an understanding of Islam). They claim that the earliest Muslims simply accepted the scriptures (the Qur’an and Sunnah) on the literal level and accordingly did not engage in any kind of interpretation (Durie, 2013; Addi, 2009).
22 Apolitical Islamists do not accept popular sovereignty, since sovereignty ought to be in the hands of Allah; hence they reject the democratic system of the ballot box (Tibi, 2009).
23 The jihadists Islamists believe that the only way to achieve their goal is through violence. Hence,
Jihad is simply a means to get to the Islamic world order. Accordingly “taking action against the West”
is perceived as a battle for Islam. The Islamists Jihadists carry out attacks, because they believe that the West is weak enough to win this final Jihad (Tibi, 2007; Tibi, 2008). The first Jihad started with
They both have the same purpose, to make Islam great again, but they have different ideas about how to achieve this. However, the past 20 years many Islamists changed their methods (Tibi, 2008; Tibi, 2010). Muslim Brotherhood leader Sheik Qaradawi explains “The conquest of Rome – the conquest of Italy, and Europe – means that
Islam will return to Europe once again. Must this conquest necessarily be though war? No. There is such a thing as peaceful conquest. […] The peaceful conquest has foundations in this religion, and therefore, I expect that Islam will conquer Europe without resorting to the sword or fighting. It will do so by means of da'wa and
ideology” (Qaradawi, 2007). Accordingly, these non-violent Islamists see much more
possibilities in Da’wa and much more promise in institutions. Da’wa can best be explained as the organizational infrastructure of non-violent Islamists. This
infrastructure exists out of all kinds of methods, such as: instruments for propaganda, resources, recruiting - anything to win the hearts and minds of Muslims (Hirsi Ali, 2017). Hence non-violent Islamists have faith in Father Time (Wistrich, 2010; Lewis & Wistrich, 2010). In the unmistakable words of the Egyptian activist and television preacher Amr Khaled:“The Muslims keep having children, while the Europeans don't.
This means that within 20 years, the Muslims will be a majority, which may have an exceptional influence on the decision-making. This makes other groups very angry, and they consider this to be very dangerous. These are the enemies of Islam, as we know full well. […] If the 30 million Muslims manage to ignore these provocations, and to channel their anger in support of the Prophet Muhammad and of Islam into becoming walking propaganda machines” (Khaled, 2008). Moreover, non-violent political Islamists foresee great opportunities in democratic institutions, through
which they can move upwards – and bring change in a suitable way.
In order to function in Western democracies and institutions, Islamists apply
iham or deception of unbelievers (Tibi, 2008).24 Islamists had discovered, that by
using non-violent measures and deceit, they could achieve much more than through
Mohammed in the 7th century. The second Jihad started with the Ottoman Empire and Constantinople in 1453. During both Jihads, parts of Europe were conquered (Lewis & Wistrich, 2010).
24 Shi’a Muslims often had to apply taqiyya in order to survive in majority Sunni lands. This entailed a denial of religious beliefs towards the prosecutors. Islamists learned this part of the Shi’a belief and adopted this convenient tool to deceit the unbelievers in regard to its true ambitions – an Islamic Sharia state (Tibi, 2008).
Jihad.25 However, behind this façade shelters another face, another speech, and another idea about Islam26 (Hirsi Ali, 2017; Dankowitz, 2006).
Altogether, Islamism started first in Sunni Islam, and subsequently in Shi’a Islam. Today there are many different Islamist movements and organizations and they are present and institutionalized all over the world (Tibi, 2008). There are political and apolitical Jihadist or non-violent Islamists.
2.2.1 Da’wa: the call for Islam in the Netherlands
Hassan al-Banna, the founding father of the Islamist movement the Muslim Brotherhood, believed that he could achieve the brotherhoods goals by means of expanding social networks; by operating through legitimate state institutions to voice their political goals; and through da’wa27 (el-Helbawy, 2016). To achieve these objectives the Brotherhood make use of a gradual strategy that involves a bottom-up policy. This strategy of slow but steady advancement requires the effort of step-by-step influencing individuals’ identities till they are in line with the perceived values (el-Helbawy, 2016). This is set in motion by reaching out to society in order to
disseminate the Brotherhood’s ideas and ideology among the general population. This is done, for example, through grassroots activities, media campaigns, sermons in mosques, and public lectures. Correspondingly, these Islamist preachers seek to be identified, allegedly by its targets, as good Muslims. Respectively, at first they will keep their affiliation with the movement a secret; they will argue that they operate for the sake of Islam (Ayyash, 2016; el-Helbawy, 2016).
In the 1960s many affiliates of the Muslim Brothers like Said Ramadan28 immigrated to Europe. This European network of the Muslim Brothers can be
described as a diffuse network of individuals and organizations that strive for the (re-)
25 For example, take a look at the Hamas Covenant of 1988 and the recent Covenant of 2017, the difference in language is apparent.
26 One of such (former) celebrated people is Tariq Ramadan, a lecturer at Oxford University. Ramadan held a guest professorship at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam and from 2006 till 2009 he held a consulting position (regarding matters of integration) in the municipality of Rotterdam. He presents itself as a reformist Muslims, however, he appeared to be a man with two faces - depending on his audience. Moreover, Tariq Ramadan is the grandson of Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), the founder of the first (political) Islamist Movement (Fourest, 2008; Tibi, 2008; Dankowitz, 2006; Ekiz, 2018). 27 The Islamic call.
Islamization of the Muslim community, in which Islam is assigned to direct daily life. Moreover, by gaining influence in civil society they try to pave the way for a greater role for Islam in the entire Western society (ANP, 2011; Clingendeal, 2013).
In the Netherlands there exists a diffuse network with sympathizers of the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Their main goal is in line with Hassan al-Banna’s thought, namely spreading their ideology and increasing its sphere of
influence. According to the AIVD, their sphere of influence in Dutch society is indeed
expanding. In order to spread their ideas among the Muslim community and in order to strengthen the position of Islam in Dutch society they employ various activities for which they have financial resources at their disposal coming from the Middle East, particularly from the Gulf States (2011).
In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood is involved in a variety of activities that side with the Palestinian case and accordingly they sympathize with Hamas, a Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood established in 1987. The AIVD
stresses that the brotherhood is actively organizing meetings, which focuses on da’wa activities and tarbiyya, which are only accessible to persons belonging to a small circle of confidants of the organizations29 (ANP, 2011). It enables the Brotherhood to impose the norms and values of the brotherhoods ideology on a person’s identity, which embeds the religious, social and political dimension (Ayman, 2016). As in other European countries, individuals and organizations based in the Netherlands deny any affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. Importantly, the AIVD warns, in the long term these activities could pose a realistic threat to the democratic legal order in the Netherlands (ANP, 2011).
Like the Brotherhood, orthodox Salafi organizations in the Netherlands firstly propagate da’wa in all facets of life, mainly focusing on the Dutch Muslim
community. Like the brotherhood, they do not only involve young people and elderly in their activities, they also attune to children. Hence, every target group asks for a different approach. In regard to youngsters, the mosque for example, often also functions as a place for after-school care and homework assistance. In addition these institutions often organize youth events, youth camps, and sports competitions. By means of da’wa they strive to eventually establish the ideal society (Roex, van
29 Da’wa is the call for Islam. Tarbiyya or socialization is a core concept in the Brotherhoods ideology. It is a process that redefines one's views, perceptions and ways of life to match the brotherhoods worldview and principles. Tarbiyya is “the proper way to influence individuals and to change them for
Stiphout, & Tillie, 2010). Since 2002, apolitical Salafists have exposed themselves publicly as more moderate Muslims. However, according to the AIVD this moderate appearance is nothing more than policies of deception. They present themselves as moderate adherents towards the outside world, which in reality they are not.
Moreover, since the nineties there has been an evolution of the jihadist faction within Salafism in the Netherlands as well (NCTb, 2008). More recently, a rise and
increasing influence of salafism has been observed in the Netherlands. This is especially apparent in a number of mosques in which Salafi influences has
manifested, as well as in the amount of lectures that are administered throughout the country. Moreover, this growing influence and expansion of salafism in the
Netherlands is accompanied by means of professionalization of Salafi organizations. They make extensive use of social media (NCTV, 2018). Furthermore “A segment of
the Salafist movement advocates and legitimises active intolerance and
anti-democratic activities, and consequently poses a threat to national security. There are also individuals within the Salafist movement who legitimise terrorist violence, typically veiled in religious terms.” (NCTV, 2018).
In the Netherlands over 30 organizations receive foreign funding, mainly from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – which most likely is accompanied by foreign ideological influence (Kouwenhoven & Holdert, 2018). At least eight Islamic organizations in Rotterdam requested foreign funding.30 However, Salafi organizations are today much more aware of government's supervision, as a result they are more cautious in the distribution and announcing their activities to the outside world (NCTV, 2018). These Salafi movements are supervised, because they clash with the foundations of the Dutch democratic legal order, as Salafi preachers call for isolationism, intolerance, and the rejection of the Dutch legal constitution. They have anti-Western ideas and present an image that claims that the “enemies of Islam,” meaning Jews and Christians or the West, are threatening Islam. Accordingly, like political Islamists, orthodox Salafists offer individuals (especially youngsters) who are in search of themselves an alternative identity. “One of the reasons why the redemption offered by
the Islamists is so attractive to people with a Muslim cultural background is that it rests on religious ideas and cultural motives they are familiar with,” argues former
30 Moskee Nasuha; Stichting Tunesische College voor Samenwerking en Ontwikkeling; Moskee de Middenweg; Islamitische Universiteit Rotterdam; Stichting Rahma Relief; Al Nour Foundation; Essalam Moskee; Stichting Islamitische Minaret Centrum Rotterdam (Kouwenhoven & Holdert, 2018).
Salafist Ahmad Mansour who currently fights against antisemitism and radicalization (Neugroschel, 2017). These movements feed feelings of exclusion, and accordingly provide them with a ground to hold upon in this complex modern Western society. They provide these susceptible individuals with a safe haven, a place where they feel safe and accepted amongst brothers and sisters. They listen to them, and integrate them into their communities. They provide them with a sense of belonging, that they are chosen ones and part of a religious revelation. They may have felt a sense of marginalization emanating from western society. Subsequently this divine feeling of superiority - what others are ignorant of, will compensate this. (NCTb, 2008;
Neugroschel, 2017).
Additionally, NCTV reports that Jihadism in the Netherlands has grown significantly. With the collapse of the Caliphate “Jihadist now no longer have a
compelling reason to travel to that part of the world, and their focus has shifted to da'wa, or spreading the jihadist message.” Moreover, there are international jihadist
networks operating in the Netherlands, some with links to ISIS or al-Qaida, which still intend to mount attacks in Europe (NCTV, 2018).
2.3 Islamism and Antisemitism
Islamist antisemitism is the most dangerous mutation of antisemitism that exists in the world today (Tibi, 2010b; Milson, 2013). This Islamized antisemitism includes, next to classic antisemitism, both ideological as political forms of antisemitism. It involves all forms possible (Kotzin, 2013). It is such a horrific variety, due to the volume and magnitude of its call for the destruction of Jews. It can be state sanctioned, as in Iran. It can be a fundament in charters or covenants, like in the case of Hamas, Hezbollah and al-Qaida. The call for destruction can be preached in Mosques, during Friday sermons, and presented as a religious obligation. Additionally it can be demanded by means of religious sanction, like fatwas or by a writ of execution (Cotler, 2009). As Ismail Al-Wahwah, during a Friday sermon in Australia, explains:”It is a delusion to think that there can be peace and coexistence with the Israelites, with the Jews. It is a delusion to think that we can share one state or two states, and that the Jews can be our neighbors, as suggested by some self-proclaimed, yet deluded, "scholars." […]
There is only one solution for that cancerous tumor: It must be uprooted and thrown back to where it came from” (Al-Wahwah, 2015). The difference with all former
forms of antisemitism is that it presents itself on religious grounds. It aims to justify itself by reference to Islamic scriptures. These references supposedly reveal the evil nature of Jews and obligate followers of the prophet to fight against them.
Accordingly, in name of Islam, they call for the annihilation of Jews.
Yet, for that it is possible to understand this variety of antisemitism, it is important to discuss the scholarly debate on the origins of Islamist antisemitism.
2.3.1 Scholarly Debate
The scholarly debate regarding the origins of Arab and Muslim antisemitism can be divided at separate levels. The first distinction is in regard to the Palestinian conflict, between those who claim that antisemitism is a result of the conflict and those who think differently. A second distinction focuses on Islam, between scholars who argue that antisemitism is alien to Islamic history and culture, and those who assert that antisemitism is inherent to Islam.
Yehoshafat Harkabi (1921-1994) was a scholar who believed that antisemitism was the consequence of Zionism and the Palestinian conflict. Consequently, he asserted that antisemitism would vanish when the Palestinian conflict is settled. He claimed that antisemitism was the result of politics, exerted by governmental and elite propaganda. Accordingly, he argued that it had no genuine bedrock in popular thinking. Nevertheless, since the conflict became a reality, and subsequently Arab and Muslim antisemitism became palpable, antisemitism would become one of the characteristics that would define and bear the conflict (Webman, 2013; Wistrich, 2002; Küntzel, 2013). Bernard Lewis argued that antisemitism in Arab and Muslim countries, was due to the large scale of indoctrination of
generations of Muslims. He believed that antisemitism was mainly literary, political, intellectual and ideological. Like Harkabi, he claimed that it was imposed from above and that it had no popular ground. He argued: “For Christian anti-Semites, the
Palestine problem is a pretext and an outlet for their hatred; for Muslim anti-Semites, it is the cause. Perhaps, if that cause is removed or significantly diminished, the hostility too may wane- not disappear, but at least return to the previous level of prejudice” (Lewis, 1986, p. 259.) Juliane Wetzel claims that, in contrary to former
forms of antisemitism, this variety is based on a genuine problem, namely that of the unjust treatment and offense against the Palestinian people. This implies that
antisemitism can only be defeated when the conflict is solved. Hence, antisemitism is merely a reaction to the policies of the State of Israel (Küntzel, 2013).
Nevertheless, these theories fail to explain why every peace offer, and
withdraw from Israel, has been answered with aggression against Jews in and outside Israel. Moreover, before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, many attacks were already carried out against Jews in and out side of the region of Palestine
(Dershowitz, 2003). Accordingly, there are scholars who argue that there is an obvious connection between antisemitism and the Israel conflict, however they disagree in regard to the nature of this link. These scholars argue that as long as antisemitism is prevalent the conflict will not and cannot be resolved. They argue that unlike the irrational nature of German antisemitism, Islamist antisemitism is driven by a reason of interest (Küntzel, 2013). Nevertheless, these scholars differ in arguments regarding the incentives that caused Islamic antisemitism.
Scholars like Jeffrey Herf and Matthias Küntzel argue that the rise of antisemitism is the result of the contributions of Nazism and Islamism. Küntzel additionally stresses the importance of the Middle East conflict in generating antisemitism. He argues that the Nazis succeeded in spreading, throughout the Arab world, a pronounced antisemitic interpretation of the Palestinian conflict. He
furthermore argues how Nazism has influenced Islamism. The Hamas Charter of 1988 offers an example; it has many similarities with the antisemitic discourse of the Nazis (Küntzel, 2009). Moreover, in Küntsel’s book Jihad and Jew-hatred he demonstrates that Hitler was the source of inspiration for the 9/11 attacks in the United States of America in 2001.31 Islamists believe, just like Hitler did, that New York is the center of world Jewry and that Jews rule America (Küntzel, 2013; Küntzel, 2009).
Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Martin Cüppers assert in their study Nazi Palestine:
The Plans for the Extermination of the Jews, how the Nazis, with the help of the local
31 The idea of burning skyscrapers in Manhattan arose during the Second World War. Hitler was obsessed with his desire to kill all Jews everywhere. Especially in New York, since he regarded it as the center of World Jewry. He fantasized about how New York would fall down in a sea of flames. How the skyscrapers would burn and collapse into each other. He thought of the Amerikabomber, a cargo plane that would carry small planes. These small planes would be steered by suicide bombers in order to transform New York in clouds of fire. In 2001 on the 11th of September the United States was attacked and the famous Twin Towers of New York went down in flames. The attacks were
