An emotional Russian foreign policy : identifying ‘victimhood’ and ‘frustration’

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An emotional Russian foreign policy

- identifying

‘victimhood’ and ‘frustration’.

Master Thesis submitted by Max Talbot

Master Political Science – ‘The EU in a Global Order’ Student number: 10003375

Research Project: The EU and its immediate neighbours Supervisor: A. Demidov

Date: 24-06-2016

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Abstract

Since 2003 the West has regarded Russia’s foreign policy behaviour towards them as increasingly more assertive and aggressive. This can be traced back to Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008, disagreements surrounding energy trade and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Larson & Shevchenko, 2014; p 269). These examples show that, over the years, Russia has taken a more volatile stand towards the West. This has made their foreign policy

strategies unpredictable which raises concerns for Western policy makers. By analysing the role of emotions in Russian foreign policy in relation to three different case studies, the Russian manner of thinking, their motivations and objectives can be identified. These case studies are the Kosovo conflict (1999), Georgia War (2008) and the Ukraine crisis (2014). The significance of analysing emotions in international politics lies in the fact that certain emotions can be a strong motivator for any state’s behaviour in, for example, conflict.

The main argument of this thesis, after analysing the discourses of three major conflicts, is that Russia portrayed itself as a victim of the West’s foreign policy behaviour. Russia’s dignity was hurt creating discourses containing elements of mistrust and, in addition, the West’s hypocrisy triggered emotions of frustration and anger. These emotions are

reflected in Russian foreign policy as it grows in confidence. Seeing itself as a strong

international player has increased Russia’s degree of hostility and offensive reactions of late. These reactions, perhaps resulting in Russia having a more isolated role in the political arena.

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1. Introduction

Since 2003 Russia’s behaviour towards the West has been interpreted as more confident, decisive and assertive. This is reflected in its rejections of Western diplomatic initiatives, such as in the Syria war, but also in Russia’s war with Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. These events demonstrate a more volatile stand from Russia, making Russia’s foreign policy strategies less predictable for the West (Forsberg, Heller & Wolff, 2014).

There is little doubt that Russia plays a significant and, from a Western perspective, provocative role in international affairs. This can be seen in the Ukraine crisis. Looking at Russia’s relatively dominant role in the international community, understanding its way of thinking and identifying its motivations concerning its foreign policy goals is significant. Russia is one of the countries possessing a veto in the United Nation’s Security Council (United Nations, 2016) and it is a crucial player when it comes to energy security and in dealing with the instable Eurasian lands (Larson & Shevchenko, 2014).

Russian foreign policy is difficult to define and even more difficult to predict, making it very hard to respond to in a consistent and coherent manner (Kubicek, 2000; p 547). Many scholars such as Alexei Arbatov argue that the origin for the inconsistency and confusion is to be found in Russia’s turbulent domestic politics (1993; p 5). It has often been argued by scholars of International Relations that Russian foreign policy can be interpreted, on one hand, as very pragmatic and, on the other hand, based on its ambitions to restore its great power status. As most of its decision making is heavily influence by nationalists or parties striving for Russia to be a great power again (Kuchins & Zevelev, 2012; p 152). This view on the Russian foreign policy, is usually endorsed by classical realist academia. Realists further argue that Russia acts on the basis of domestic security threats and a maintenance or further growth of their power (Kropatcheva, 2012; p 31). Therefore, realist scholars believe, that a nation-state or its representatives only act rationally, leaving no room for emotions in

decision-making. This is due to the fact that it is usually assumed, that a pragmatic approach would put concerns related to emotional discourses regarding status and respect to one side (Forsberg, Heller & Wolff, 2014). This is further highlighted by journalists and researchers marking Vladimir Putin’s practice of politics as emotionless (Judah, 2014).

The unpredictability of the Russian foreign policies intertwined with their significant role in the international community lead to differing concerns for the West. How is it that Russia has presented itself with volatile policies and, therefore, perceived as hostile towards the West? What kind of thinking or emotions caused this to occur? Therefore, this thesis will

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answer the following research question: ‘How does Russia present itself when in conflict with

the West?’.

This thesis argues that the leading realist perspective gives a very black and white

interpretation as the significance of emotions should not be underestimated for states to act in a particular way. For example, when a party is angry, he would probably act more hostile and is, therefore driven by his emotions (Coicaud, 2014; p 504). Additionally, it can be argued that the (neo-)realist perspectives have a strong relationship with emotions and provide them with a substantial role. Although realists see the role of emotions as irrelevant, they confirm their existence as well (Coicaud, 2014; p 496). This can be concluded from, for example, the main argument from realists that a state’s survival and its security are at the core of its behaviour. However, it can be argued that these aims are loaded with emotions. Emotions linked to the feeling of rejection or fear of being treated as an equal partner, after which the lack of validation and frustration, as a result, motivates a state party to act. In other words, it is impossible to distinguish feelings from how people think. This is due to the fact that feelings cause thoughts and, the other way around, lines of thoughts generate feelings (Loseke, 2009; p 499).

Nonetheless, actual research on emotions influencing a states’ foreign policy actions are still absent and overlooked. So, this research will attempt to prove the significance of emotions and their relevance in the studies of International Relations. It is in this thesis that it is argued that Russia’s ambition to be recognised as an equal partner is pivotal for its foreign policy standpoint, especially as Russia responded emotionally, to in their view, to humiliation which led to them seeing themselves as being victimised. In other words, the role of emotions plays a significant part in Russia’s foreign policy and are, therefore, of great importance to analyse.

Accordingly, in the broader theoretical discussion, this research argues that emotions provide for a wider and more in-depth analyses on Russia’s behaviour in conflicts over the last 16 years.

For this reason, it will be argued that the tensions between the West and Russia are driven by emotions triggered by discourses in which the West portrays Russia as an aggressor, while Russia sees itself as a victim of Western actions. An analyses of Russia’s rhetoric and discourses on the West in relation to its own foreign policy, will be conducted. Although Russia never explicitly state that they are a victim, this victimhood is an underlying dynamic

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behind Russia’s discourses. The term ‘victim’ shall be conceptualised as a party being harmed by another party as the result of certain events or actions. In other words, a victim is a

symbolic framing in which emphasis is put on the fact that people have been harmed through no fault of their own (Holstein and Miller 1990; Best 1997; Loseke 2003). Within these discourses, emotions attributing to the establishment of the Russian foreign policy will be uncovered. These emotions are to be measured through cognitive assessments, while

cognitive assessments require analysing language (Loseke, 2009; p 500). After examining the language, the main argument to be constructed is that Russia portrays itself as a victim of the West’s foreign policy behaviour. Its dignity was hurt creating discourses containing elements of mistrust and irritation at the West’s hypocrisy. These discursive elements triggered

emotions of frustration and anger. The reason for choosing these two discursive elements is because this thesis identified that over the course of the three conflicts these elements were constantly returning and at the core of the Russian discourses of the West’s reactions.

As mentioned earlier, nowadays, Russia’s foreign policy behaviour is more or less taken for granted as pragmatic. Not enough research has been done on the emotional

background related to Russian actions in differing conflicts. For this reason, this thesis gives a slightly different perspective in relation to work by realist scholars by focussing on the

emotional side. It combines a relatively known and common used methodology of analysing discourses, but comes with a far more concrete understanding of why and how Russia reacts in conflicts with the West. This particular research can be seen as a necessary addition to academic work already done on Russian foreign policy.

It analyses the following three conflicts: Kosovo (1999), Georgia (2008) and the Ukraine crisis (2014). In all three conflicts different speeches by significant political representatives will be looked at. Russia will symbolically frame itself as a victim of the West’s actions, causing emotional elements of frustration and anger. The Russian discourse of being a victim of the West’s actions can be concluded from the manner in which the injury or harm has been inflicted as well as the degree of innocence of those suffering is illustrated (Best 1997 & Loseke, 2003). Within this symbolic frame or discourse, the uncovered emotions are vital components and are constructed to express feeling (Loseke, 2009; p 498-499).

It is through this way that in the speeches made by significant Russian political representatives the framing of being a ‘victim’ intertwined with the emotions of ‘frustration’ and ‘anger’ will be identified. By doing this, the Russian manner of thinking, their feelings relating to how they have implemented their foreign policy, can be better understood (Loseke,

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2009; p 499).

In order to realise this research, a theoretical framework on emotions, their significance and how they can be uncovered will be elaborated on. After that, it will be demonstrated that Russia feels frustrated at being a victim of Western actions in which mistrust and hypocrisy are the main discursive elements. Subsequently, it will uncover and analyse the emotional elements of frustration and anger within the Russian discourse of three chronologically set conflicts: the Kosovo conflict (1999), the Georgia war (2008) and, the Ukraine crisis (2014). After examining the empirical data, a brief summary of the main arguments will be provided, in the final conclusion.

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2. Research design

As the hypothesis and research problems have been elaborated on, the research design has to be outlined in order to answer the research question.

In the first paragraph, the methodology of the research will be discussed. After that, a description of the methods of analyses as well as the selection of the case studies will be explained. Finally, this chapter will provide a brief overview of the sources used.

2.1 Methodology

The research question will be answered through a discourse analysis. In other words, this is qualitative research. Additionally, the empirics will be analysed by focussing on the

individual cases as well as through the work of cross-case analysis. It is through the latter method, that cases can be compared and changes in the Russian discourses, can be identified.

The methodological approach of this research, is that these emotions and their role in foreign policy will be traced back through analysing public speeches and interviews by Russian political leaders. The reason for analysing political representatives’ speeches is that nation-states lack emotions as well as a conscious. Discourses are created by individuals representing the states as they identify themselves with it, for example, the president (Bloom, 1993 & Druckman, 1994). Discourses have strong elements which can uncover emotions. Positive emotions, such as gratitude, but also negative emotions, such as dissatisfaction or anger. Therefore, the focus will not necessarily lie on the content of the discourses, but more on the emotional background they provide.

The experiences of emotions are to be measured through cognitive assessments, while cognitive assessments demand analysing language (Loseke, 2009; p 500).

It is through this way that in the speeches by significant Russian political

representatives the symbolic framework of being a ‘victim’ intertwined with the emotions of ‘frustration’ and ‘anger’ will be identified. By doing this, the Russian manner of thinking, their feelings related to how they have implemented their foreign policy can be better understood.

2.2 Case study selection

Within this research, three case studies have been chosen, to identify the Russian discourses of how they are portrayed as victims of the West’s actions. These case studies are the Kosovo conflict (1999-2000), the Georgia War (2008) and the Ukraine crisis (2014-until present-day).

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The selection of the case studies is based on several criteria. To kick-off the research, the case study of Kosovo was chosen as it was a conflict triggering emotions, while the discourses can be regarded as emotionally driven expressing the Russian feelings. Moreover, as the other conflicts arose, arguments where based on the events during Kosovo. This makes this conflict a priority to analyse first. The additional, case studies of Georgia and Ukraine were chosen because of the fact that the Russian foreign policy shocked the world with their military interventions (The Economist, 2014; Burbach, 2011; p 155). In all three case studies, Russia was in direct disagreement with the West and these conflicts can be regarded as the main major conflicts between them over the last 20 years.

Moreover, similar emotions of frustration and anger, already shown in Kosovo, were coming back in the discourses. The three cases also demonstrated similarities when it comes to the causes of conflict. These causes consisted of geopolitical issues and disagreements when it comes to respecting of international law. Therefore, it is no coincidence that

politicians, such as Putin and Medvedev, referred back to the Kosovo case during the Georgia War and Ukraine crisis. Due to this, the three case studies are intertwined when it comes to how the Russians felt they were being treated by the West, after being engaged in relatively similar conflicts. This makes studying these case studies, to identify emotions in the Russian discourse, significant.

2.3 Sources and data

This research consists of mainly primary sources, such as official policy documents and public speeches. The speeches were mainly found in the archives of Russia’s official governments’ site, the Kremlin. Through this approach, policy documents were noticed as well. Furthermore, transcripts by well-recognised newspapers were used to analyse the discourses of public interviews.

Most of the secondary sources are used to provide the arguments with a theoretical base and are at the core of describing the major events within the conflicts. In other words, they shape the image and give a better understanding of the context in which, for example, speeches were performed. These secondary sources consist of newspaper articles, academic work and articles by analysts or scholars.

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3. Theoretical framework

Emotions play a much underestimated role and are often overlooked in international relations. Therefore, more research has to be carried out to define their role. This chapter will

demonstrate why this is the case. Additionally, it will show that analysing the emotions of state-parties is significant due to the fact that emotions contribute to a state’s behaviour in the international political arena. Therefore, the theory of emotions in International Relations will be elaborated on.

In this thesis, emotions will be conceptualised as an individual-level experience. An emotion is currently understood as a social, cultural, subjective and biological phenomenon (Tudor, 2003 & Loseke and Kusenbach, 2008, for reviews). It is not possible to distinguish feelings from how people think. This is due to the fact that feelings cause thoughts and, the other way around, lines of thoughts generate feelings (Loseke, 2009; p 499).

Feelings generate thoughts because cognitive decision are often affected by emotions (Lowenstein et al, 2001). Additionally, stories consisting of emotional elements receive cognitive attention more rapid than those without emotional elements (Grader, 2005).

Furthermore, the level of response to a speech is greater when the audience feels an emotional connection to the matter or person (Roser & Thompson, 1995).

In order to understand how people think or make moral evaluations, it is needed to grasp how people feel. In the same manner, it is needed to know how people feel in order to understand the way they think. A state’s foreign policy behaviour and the way it legitimises its acts can be better understood this way.

The experiences of emotions are to be measured through cognitive assessments, while cognitive assessments demand analysing language. Language is socially constructed and, therefore, follows that the subjective experience of emotion is socially shaped by the ‘impersonal archipelagos of meaning…. Share(d) in common’ (Zerubavel, 1996; p 428). These ‘impersonal archipelagos of meaning’ are historically and culturally located, socially flowing, complicated and intertwined with systems of ideas about how a nation thinks the world works, how a nation thinks the world should work, of rights, responsibilities, and normative expectations of people in this world (Loseke, 2009; p 500).

However, after taking the earlier mentioned into consideration, the question of how the words used in speeches appeal to a majority of people who live in very different conditions. Therefore, these words can be expected to cause very different emotional reactions to specific events is brought up. This question can be answered by looking at discourses circulating

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symbolic frames and emotional elements (Idem). Symbolic frames can be a set of ideas conceptualised on ‘how the world works, how it should work, of the rights and responsibilities

of people in the world’ (Alexander, 1992). ‘As cultural ways of feeling, emotional elements are sets of ideas about what emotions are appropriate to feel when, where, and toward whom or what as well as how emotion should be outwardly expressed’ (Loseke, 2009; p 499). This

can be through foreign policy or statements.

Russia symbolically frames itself as a victim of the West’s actions, causing emotional elements of frustration and anger. The symbolic framework of being a victim of the West’s actions can be concluded from the manner in which the injury or harm is dramatised as well as the degree of innocence of those suffering is illustrated (Best 1997 & Loseke, 2003). Within this symbolic framework, emotions are components and constructed to express feelings (Loseke, 2009; p 500).

It is through this way that in the speeches by significant Russian political

representatives the symbolic framework of being a ‘victim’ intertwined with the emotions of ‘frustration’ and ‘anger’ will be identified. By doing this, the Russian manner of thinking, their feelings related to how they implement their foreign policy, can be better understood. Nonetheless there are certain restraints in the framework on analysing emotions and the way how Russians think. Firstly, the discussion of the contents of the symbolic frame and emotional elements cannot be regarded as complete (Loseke, 2009; p 501). This is the case as symbolic frames and emotional elements are not permanent. These two aspects are always open for argumentation and can be modified (Swidler, 1986). Therefore, in this research the more general interpretations will be outlined. Secondly, it is relatively difficult to set apart particular emotional elements as there is not an accepted vocabulary for discussing emotion (Loseke, 2009; p 501). Scholars can debate that particular emotions, for example

‘dissatisfaction’ and ‘frustration’, are more dissimilar than similar (Boltanski, 1999).

However, this work will ignore these kinds of differences among emotions and will just focus on the elements of ‘frustration’ and ‘anger’. It is also for this reason that the emotion of frustration will be conceptualised in its most general understanding, which is according to the dictionary. Therefore, ‘frustration’ is defined as the feeling of being upset or irritated and being unable to change the situation (Oxford dictionary, 2016). Thirdly, by analysing symbolic frames and emotional elements in speeches, this research will point out individual emotional understandings and experiences. Methodologically seen this is not acceptable. This is due to the fact that this work will contribute to social discourses but the empirical data is measured more at an individual level. Nonetheless, this is done for the reason that if several

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studies demonstrate that particular kinds of events are linked with particular kinds of

assessment or with particular emotional responses it can be concluded that something is going on (Loseke, 2009; p 502).

The significance of analysing emotions is that in the more realist International

Relations studies, the role that emotions play in a state’s behaviour is very underestimated and overlooked. Especially in the field of the realist perspective. Of course, this perspective, the validity of the theory and its positivist methodological approach, have contributed to the study of international relations in providing depth in the research of how the behaviour of states in international relations are constructed (Coicaud, 2014; p 493). Despite this, the leading perspectives did not pay enough attention and did not recognise the significance of analysing the role of emotions in a state’s foreign policy behaviour in the international community.

For this reason, the realist and neo-realist approach argued that, when emotions and their role in international affairs were referred to, they were to be regarded as misleading. This is for three reasons. Firstly, the realists regard the role of emotions in international politics as irrational and, due to this, not reliable for explaining decisions. Secondly, material elements, such as oil or money, are seen as the leading factors of describing a state’s actions and are easy to measure. Therefore, there is little room for including analysis on immaterial elements, such as emotions. Thirdly, as the international political arena is supposed to be anarchical, the more social factors, such as emotions, are simply ignored (Coicaud, 2014; p 495). This line of argumentation demonstrates that emotions have a negative image in the more classical studies of international relations.

However, the significance of understanding emotions in international politics is that certain emotions can in fact be a strong motivator for any state’s behaviour in, for example, conflict. Acts to have the same emotional experience, such as satisfaction, or to prevent experiencing the emotion again. Emotions such as shame, harm or revenge. For this reason, it can be argued that emotions are loaded with an active dimension and at the core of a state’s behaviour (Larson & Shevchenko, 2014; p 270).

Nonetheless, it can be argued that the (neo-)realist perspectives have a strong

relationship with emotions and provide them with a substantial role. Although realists see the role of emotions as irrelevant, they confirm their existence as well (Coicaud, 2014; p 496). This can be concluded from, for example, the main argument from realists that a state’s survival and its security are at the core of its behaviour. However, it can be argued that these aims are loaded with emotions. Emotions linked to the feeling of rejection or fear of not being treated as an equal partner, which results in frustration and motivate a state party to act

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(Larson & Shevchenko, 2014; p 270). In summary, ‘Emotion is necessary to rationality and

intrinsic to choice. Emotion precedes choice (by ranking one’s preferences), emotion

influences choice (because it directs one’s attention and is the source of action), and emotion follows choice (which determines how one feels about one’s choice and influences one’s preferences’ (Mercer, 2005; p 94).

Although this thesis will not research to which extent emotions influence a state’s foreign policy behaviour, an example of how emotions can influence behaviour will be provided. The emotions of anger or frustration, being the main emotions discussed in this work, often lead to verbal or physical actions in retaliation for injuries to dignity and prestige. These emotions are also often linked to the perception of being treated unjustly or by

illegitimate actions by another state. Above that, the belief that the victimised party is a strong character, increases the level of emotions and likelihood of offensive actions to be undertaken (Mackie et al., 2000). However, the actual goal of an offensive reaction is not always

performed out of the idea to prevent further injury or humiliations in the future. Such actions are more done to restore power and status. In other words, to return the situation to a desired state of affairs (Shaver et al., 1987; p 1077-1078).

From this theoretical framework it can be concluded that emotions are very hard to analyse or measure and are strongly linked with other factors. However, that makes the understanding and research of emotions more compelling as well as significant.

This thesis will focus on uncovering the emotions of Russia in its inter-state relations with the West. The main advantage of analysing these emotions is that Russia’s way of thinking and motivations can be thoroughly identified. In order to understand how people think or make moral evaluations, it is needed to interpret how people feel. In the same manner, it is needed to know how people feel in order to understand the way they think. By doing this, a broader and more in-depth analyses can be provided on Russia’s behaviour in conflicts over the last 16 years, in relation to the leading perspectives, which were views driven by security issues and national interests.

In the broader context, some aspects of research in Russia’s foreign policy behaviour are neglected or not paid as much as much attention to as they should. Thus, focusing on the role of emotions in the discourses of international affairs provides for a relatively new scope and territory for research. Not just in relation to the Russian foreign policy but also in the study of International Relations in general. For this reason, this thesis can be regarded as the basis for further analyses on Russia foreign policy behaviour.

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4. Kosovo conflict

The Kosovo conflict is the first case study to be analysed. In this conflict, the Russian

discourses of how they portray themselves in relation to the West’s actions will be looked at. In order to do so, speeches by for example, the then ruling president, Yeltsin, will be

analysed.

Firstly, a brief introduction into the conflict will be given. As a response to this, speeches and interviews will be analysed. The focus lies on analysing two main elements within the Russian discourse in order to identify emotions. These elements are: ‘mistrust’ and ‘the West’s hypocrisy’.

It will be argued that, within this conflict, frustration caused by the West’s hypocrisy and mistrust is the leading emotion to be identified in the Russian discourse. Russia portrays itself as a victim due to the West’s hypocritical stand towards international law and the ignoring of Russian interests which led to a lack of trust between the two sides. Emotionally driven statements and reactions were the result.

4.1 Introduction to the Kosovo conflict

As this subsection regards the actual causes for the Yugoslavia war not significant enough for the aim of its analyses, it primarily focuses on the conflict between Russian and the West in relation to Kosovo. Therefore, it is assumed that the general facts of the Yugoslavia war are already known. This part of the chapter will provide a brief summary of the Kosovo conflict in order to understand the context in which certain emotions were illustrated through public speeches by Russian political representatives.

The Russian frustrations with the West in Kosovo began after it heard that NATO started to bomb Kosovo on the 24th of March 1999. At this precise time, the Russian prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov, was flying towards Washington, USA. After receiving word of the bombings, Primakov decided to immediately turn back to Moscow. The reason being that he, as well as the rest of Russia, felt ignored and insulted not to be consulted on the bombing of Kosovo. It was Bill Clinton, who did not see any need or reason to wait several hours longer for Primakov in order to consult him or, maybe even more importantly, pretend he was present during the negotiations where this decision was taken (Gessen, 2014).

Earlier, Russia had expressed that their relationship with the Serbs meant a great deal to them due to, for example, religious and cultural reasons. This American act, without informing Russia, was a clear message as far as Russia was concerned that the United States

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of America thought itself to be the most dominant country in the international community. Russia felt and was completely ignored. From the Russian perspective, this made it

impossible for Yeltsin’s administration to justify any friendly relations with the West (Idem). This was further highlighted by the different kinds of Anti-American sentiments expressed by Russians. Firstly, the Russian prime minister when returning to Moscow joined a nationalist party opposing Yeltsin and refused to any form of co-operation with the West. Secondly, many Russians volunteered at the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow to help defend Serbia (Idem).

The West’s decision to support Kosovo’s independence from Serbia was not well received by Russia. Especially as Serbia had a good relationship with Russia (Idem).

However, the frustrating aspect was that after the Second World War, it had been agreed that geopolitical borders would not be changed on the European continent. The reason for this convention was to prevent any form of conflict. This was agreed upon in the Helsinki Accords in 1975:

‘The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States.

Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force.

The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of

international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal’ (Article 4)

As a response to the ignoring of this article, Russia more than once asked the West not to give Kosovo formal independence, but a more informal kind of autonomy. All requests were rejected or ignored by the West (BBC, 2015).

From this, it can be concluded that Russia felt that its interests as well as its opinion were completely ignored and not regarded as important by the United States. This event highlighted a rift in Russia’s relationship with the West. It can be argued that, in this case, by ignoring Russia’s interests through the West’s hypocrisy towards international law, frustration was caused which was a vital emotion for Russia’s foreign policy behaviour.

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4.2 Russian discourses of Kosovo conflict

As can be highlighted from the introduction above, Russia felt humiliated and incorrectly treated by the West. It felt its international status was damaged. Russia perceived the West to be hypocritical as it felt it took the law into its own hands as it bypassed, for example, the Helsinki convention. Moreover, the fact that Russia and its interests were ignored, led to inevitable issues of mistrust towards the West. For this reason, this subsection on the Russian discourses has been divided into two focus points of analyses: namely ‘hypocrisy’ and

‘mistrust’. These being the main aspects in the discourses displaying emotions.

Therefore, several speeches of important political representatives on this particular conflict will be analysed. After this, emotions of frustration will be identified.

It will be argued that Russia portrayed itself as a victim of the West’s hypocrisy and that Russia felt the West was not to be trusted. It was surprised by the West’s foreign policy acts and felt powerless. Russia lacked the confidence and perceived itself not as a strong party. The emotion of frustration is to be identified to express the Russian feeling.

4.2.1 Mistrust

The first emotion in the Russian discourses to be analysed is frustration. This is done through looking at the discursive element of mistrust which was stimulated by the West’s

unwillingness to see Russia as an equal partner. It will be argued that the issue of mistrust played a vital role in Russia’s symbolic framing of being a victim as it portrayed itself as being betrayed and damaged in its status. Moreover, they felt that they were not treated as equal partners. As a result, these discourses triggered the emotion of frustration with subsequent reactions.

Firstly, it should be noted that the West’s decision to bypass and ignore Russia when starting a NATO campaign, is to be seen as a critical blow to Russia’s role and involvement in international politics. Russia regarded this as a betrayal and self-assertion by the West after years of trying to improve their relations (Marantz, 1998; p 345). Russia’s international status was damaged. A situation was created in which Russia questioned and mistrusted the West’s foreign policy ambitions. This was highlighted by Russian foreign minister Yevgenii

Primakov who stated that ‘Russia has been present on the Balkans for more than 200 years. It

is a mystery to us that America now wants to dictate their recommendations to this region and to solve problems on their own initiative there without even consulting with us’ (Primakov,

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region for a very long time is emphasised. Through this statement, Primakov put extra focus on the damage done to Russia. It had to suffer a blow to its international status as it was ignored by the West. From the Russian perspective, America was dominating the decision-making, leaving no room for Russia to change the course of the conflict or take a stand in the international community. The emotional element within this discourse is frustration.

Frustration caused by the fact that the years of improving their relationship had been for nothing and frustration with the notion that they felt betrayed as well as bypassed. All these actions had been caused by the West, and aspects which Russia could not solve on his own. In other words, it could not really change the West’s behaviour. Therefore, Russia expressed the emotion of frustration. This frustration was further, for example, reflected by Russia’s prime minister Primakov suddenly turning back to Russia as an act of protest against the West’s NATO’s mission.

Secondly, Russia’s discourse on being betrayed by the West is illustrated in Yeltsin’s announcements that the West had revealed its true face. Additionally, he voiced his concerns of not being treated as equals; ‘it kept Russia feeling like a student taking an exam. This was

unacceptable’ (Yeltsin, 1997). Also emphasised by Vladimir Lukin, who is a Russian political

liberal activist, ‘Russia cannot be treated like some lackey. We’re partners, not lackeys’ (Lukin, 1999). Therefore, it should be concluded that the more general notion was that Russia was treated by the West as an unimportant, defeated state and junior partner in the

international community. The Russian political representatives emphasised their degree of innocence and incurred damage as they referred to their feeling of not being treated as an equal. This was highlighted by Russia illustrating themselves as lackeys or students. In other words, not as equals. They symbolically framed themselves as a victim of the West’s actions. Russia was harmed in its dignity and status. It was not in the position to change the West’s behaviour or its stand in the international community. Therefore, it can be argued that this particular discourse consisted of the emotional element of frustration as this was the most appropriate to feel. Russia felt upset and felt it was unable to change the earlier mentioned West’s behaviour.

Thirdly, in order to highlight the issue of mistrust and being ignored is reflected in Russia’s requests to not formally grant Kosovo independence, but instead, to provide Kosovo with an informal form of autonomy. This was not something difficult for the West to concede to Russia. Nonetheless, this request was ignored and later became an issue of much

discontent. As Russia’s interests were not to be accommodated, it had every reason to mistrust the West’s foreign policy ambitions.

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All the above points left Russia frustrated as it was perceived that Russia could do little to change the earlier mentioned situation and the decisions made by the West.

From this paragraph should be concluded that Russia’s discourses were that it felt betrayed by the West. Russia was ignored, bypassed and humiliated. The actions of the West damaged Russia’s role in the international community and Russia could do little about it. Russia framed itself a victim, mistrusting the West’s action. Therefore, the issue of mistrust did play a vital role in Russia portraying itself as a victim. This discursive element triggered Russia to get frustrated with the West, especially as it was felt that it could do little to stop or oppose the West. Frustration was to be found in official statements highlighting Yeltsin’s concerns of not being treated as equals, but also in actions, for example the turning around of the plane which was heading for Washington DC. In particular, the latter is to be perceived as offensive and can be regarded as an action in retaliation for damaging Russia’s prestige.

4.2.2 Hypocrisy

The last of the two discursive elements to be discussed in this conflict is that of hypocrisy causing frustration and anger. Through differing quotes and events it will be demonstrated that the Russian discourse of the West was that Russia thought they were acting

hypocritically. In the eyes of Russia, the West ignored and violated international norms after

which Russia was victimised.

Therefore, is it to be argued that Russia felt that the West acted hypocritically in relation to international law and Russia discoursed itself as a victim of the hypocritical behaviour of the West. After this, frustration is the main emotion to be identified in the speeches.

Russia viewed the West’s interfering as actions not granted or justified by international law and they viewed these actions as acting as judge as well as jury of international law. This being the case, without any kind of right of appeal by other nations. While on the other hand, Russia’s justifications of acting on the basis of having a responsibility to protect was regarded as an abuse of humanitarian language and a cover-up to reach supposed geopolitical goals (Kurowska, 2014; p 489). Other forms of hypocrisy by the West towards international law -and norms will be noticeable in the later conflicts. This is due to the fact that this was the first major conflict concerning direct confrontations with regard to international law and, in order to identify hypocrisy, more events have to be looked at.

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However, the fact that hypocrisy played an important role in this conflict and others to come, is to be reiterated as Vladimir Putin stated the following several years ago: “Our

western partners created the Kosovo precedent with their own hands. In a situation absolutely the same as the one in Crimea they recognized Kosovo’s secession from Serbia legitimate while arguing that no permission from a country’s central authority for a unilateral declaration of independence is necessary’ (Vladimir Putin, 2014b).

For this reason, it can be argued that the discursive elements of Western hypocrisy played a vital role in the discourses of the Kosovo conflict. However, more obvious examples of this hypocrisy created by the West in which Kosovo is regarded as the catalyst will be identified in later conflicts.

Nonetheless, Russia’s feeling of betrayal by the West due to hypocritical behaviour in this conflict was recognised during the NATO’s campaign to intervene in Kosovo. This was particularly true as these actions were not mandated by a Security Council resolution. For this reason, Russia was ignored as well as bypassed after which it did not have any say in NATO’s mission. It felt that the West violated international law, despite consistently highlighting its importance and value. The then ruling president of Russia, Yeltsin, described these events as ‘the ground slipping beneath his and Russia’s feet’ (Yeltsin, 2000). Several conclusions can be drawn from this statement. Firstly, that Yeltsin was shocked and surprised by the West’s foreign policy act as he illustrates that he was to lose his footing. The West violated

international norms, and as a consequence Russia no longer had any say in NATO’s mission. Secondly and subsequently, the notion that Russia felt it now could not do anything to stop the West interfering in Kosovo can be regarded as a loss of control. In other words, Yeltsin felt that he was powerless to change the course of the conflict or Russia’s position in the international community. Thirdly, that Russia’s confidence as a recognised player in the international community, decreased. The West proved to be willing to go beyond international law to reach its foreign policy goals. In other words, Russia felt it was not treated as an

important or equal partner by Western nations. Fourthly, that Yeltsin’s personal political move, to improve relations with the West after the fall of the Soviet Union, collapsed. All things achieved were now gone.

Yeltsin emphasised the way in which he felt Russia was victimised and illustrated its vulnerability. He highlighted the fact that he had no control over the situation and that he had no grip on what was happening. Russia was left as a weak player by the West’s foreign policy behaviour. Their status was harmed and damaged. Therefore, the emotional element to be uncovered is frustration. Russia was annoyed with the West’s actions, but could not change

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the situation to one suiting their preferences. Yeltsin constructed the emotion of frustration as a way to express feeling.

Therefore, it will be argued that Russia portrayed themselves as a victim of Western actions and hypocrisy. A victim, as their interests and role in international relations were ignored and, therefore, damaged. As a response, Yeltsin reacted emotionally frustrated to express Russia’s feeling. This was the main emotion to be uncovered within this discourse.

4.3 Conclusion

In the final conclusion of this chapter, it will be shown that in the Russian discourses it portrayed itself as a victim of Western actions during the Kosovo conflict. This is the case as it can be observed that Russia perceived it was hurt and humiliated by the West. Although it can be questioned whether this was immediately reflected in actual policies, strong statements illustrating Russia’s dissatisfaction were made.

Firstly, it should be concluded that the West acted hypocritical towards international law as it ignored and bent the rules to their own advantage, for example, bypassing the NATO

mandate. This form of hypocrisy was reflected by Yeltsin’s discourses during the Kosovo conflict but also through statements by Vladimir Putin 15 years later. During the Ukraine crisis, Putin then referred to events which occurred during the Kosovo conflict and came to the conclusion that the West abused international law for their own objectives. Kosovo was to be regarded as the catalyst for the West’s hypocrisy in other conflicts to come. Hereby, its significance to analyse is highlighted.

Secondly, it should be noted that Russia felt it was shocked and could do nothing to stop the West interfering in Kosovo. As Yeltsin mentioned, it felt like the ground was

slipping beneath his and Russia’s feet’. He emphasised the way in which he felt Russia was

victimised. In his eyes, the situation created was uncontrollable. Russia was left a weak player by the West’s foreign policy behaviour. Their status was damaged. Therefore, the emotional element to be uncovered is frustration. Russia was annoyed with the West’s actions, but could not change the situation to one suiting their preferences. Yeltsin constructed the emotion of frustration as a way to express feeling.

Thirdly, is it to be concluded that a relationship of complete mistrust was created after the West ignored and, in Russia’s eyes, betrayed them. Moreover, its official requests to not

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formally grant Kosovo independence, but to implement an informal variant, was ignored. Russia perceived itself as being ignored and not seen as a significant enough party in the international community. Russia portrayed itself a victim as it felt it was clearly harmed regarding dignity and status. This can be concluded from the Russian political representatives’ rhetoric, as they referred to their feeling of not being treated as an equal, they emphasised Russia’s degree of innocence and incurred damage. This was highlighted by, for example, Yeltsin and Lukin illustrating Russia as lackeys or students in the international political arena. So, they symbolically framed themselves as a victim of the West’s actions. It was not in the position to change the West’s behaviour or its stand in the international community.

Therefore, it can be argued that this particular discourse contained also the emotional element of frustration as this was the most appropriate to feel. Russia felt upset and felt it was unable to change the earlier mentioned West’s behaviour

For this reason, it should be confirmed that, during the Kosovo conflict, the Russian discourses portrayed Russia as a victim of the West’s behaviour. This led to Russia feeling frustrated. This emotion was most appropriate and expressed Russia’s feeling. Lastly, the Kosovo conflict will prove to be a significant event and catalyst of Russia’s frustration towards the West’s hypocrisy in the years to come.

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5. Georgia War

In this chapter the Russian discourses of the Georgian war are to be discussed. This topic is often taken as an example for other academic work on Russian discourses and again has to be taken into consideration as it is elemental to the construction of Russian discourses on

conflicts with the West. Not enough attention by International Relations scholars is paid to the relevant emotional background regarding these discourses and how Russia portrays itself in

conflicts with the West.

In order to analyse the Russian discourses on this issue, a brief introduction on the Georgian conflict will, firstly, be provided. This is in order to grasp the context in which the speeches were made. After that, the Russian discourses of the West’s behaviour will be outlined and analysed. It is in this subsection that Russia’s discourse in this conflict and how they portray their situation in international relations influenced by the West’s actions will be discussed. The two main aspects of the discourses to be focussed on are ‘mistrust’ and ‘hypocrisy’. Through these discursive elements, emotions of frustration and anger will be uncovered. In the latter subsections, speeches as well as interviews are to be analysed.

The main argument of this subsection is that Russia countered the West through arguments and discourses based on international law as well as norms portraying itself as a victim. It highlighted its innocence and illustrated that Russia was harmed by the West’s actions. The emotional element to be uncovered with these discourses is frustration of the West’s hypocrisy and anger as Russia felt betrayed by the West.

5.1 Introduction to Georgian conflict

In the first subsection the conflict of Georgia will be introduced as a case study. This part of the subsection will outline the conflict and is significant because it will provide a better understanding of the context in which particular speeches were performed. Additionally, by introducing the conflict, the more technical matters of speeches are better grasped and a broader picture of the Russian emotional dissatisfaction within this conflict can be identified.

Although the focus will lie on the events in 2008, it has to be noted that tensions between Russia and Georgia had been present since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. It was in this year that the region of South Ossetia declared autonomy. As a result, Georgia and South Ossetia were in an armed conflict until June 1992. In following years, the region of South Ossetia drafted their first constitution and elected a president, Eduard Kokity (Reuters, 2008).

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determination and, eventually, absorb it within Russia. It was not until 2005 that Russia responded to this solicit and gave guarded approval to Georgia’s plan to grant South Ossetia informal autonomy. However, in exchange, South Ossetia had to drop their ambitions to become formally independent (Idem).

Despite this offer, South Ossetia advocated for a split from Georgia through a referendum. As a result, the Georgian prime minister accused Russia of supporting South Ossetia’s attempt to become formally independent. In April 2007, the Georgian parliament passed a law to establish a temporary administration in South Ossetia, which was much to the disliking of Russia (Idem).

It was in June 2007 that the tensions escalated and that the conflict became violent when Tskhinvali, the capital city of South Ossetia, was attacked by Georgia. As a result of this, and after the West’s approval of Kosovo’s independence, South Ossetia asked the rest of the international community to formally recognise their independence as well. In March 2008, a request was made supported by Russia who felt that after Kosovo it was obliged to

recognise South Ossetia’s as well as Abkhazia’s independence. The West refused (Idem). One month later, the South Ossetia government refused to sign a Georgian power-sharing deal and still insisted on full independence. This caused the Georgian army to again attack Tskhinvali, and try to re-take it by force. This was the moment when Russia took military action. They bombed a military airfield outside Tbilisi, which is the capital of Georgia, and a conflict arose. The war lasted for 5 days (Idem).

5.2 Russian discourses related to the Georgian conflict

In this subsection the conflict in Georgia will be used as case study. By analysing this conflict, dissatisfactory discourses consisting of negative emotions towards the West will be discussed. These aspects within the discourses are split in two paragraphs. These are: Russia’s mistrust and Western hypocrisy, followed by a paragraph on Russia’s response to the

emotions determining their foreign policy.

It will be demonstrated that, through the discursive elements of mistrust and hypocrisy, Russia portrayed itself as a victim of the West’s foreign policy behaviour.

Additionally, it will be proven that these elements contain the emotions of frustration and anger.

Finally, Russia’s foreign policy acts and the role of emotions uncovered from the speeches related to the Georgian war shall be briefly compared to the Kosovo conflict. It will be discussed to which extent the Russians changed their discourse and counter-argumentation

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towards the West over this particular period of time.

5.2.1 Mistrust

The discursive element of mistrust had a significant influence on Russia’s foreign policy behaviour and can be traced back to Russia’s victimisation by the West’s. The overarching emotions of frustration during the Georgia conflict are emphasised by the discursive element of mistrust. In this subsection, the latter element will be highlighted after which the emotions of frustration and anger, in the differing speeches by Dimitry Medvedev, can be identified.

At first, although Russia tolerated the earlier accession rounds, it rejected the West’s attempt to let Georgia join NATO. This was due to the fact that Russia publicly accused the United States of trying to encircle and break up Russia after it believed that the USA not only

suggested Georgia to join the NATO, but supported them financially as well (Hallinan, 2016). This can also be concluded from the following extract from an interview with Dimitry

Medvedev, the then ruling president of Russia;

‘I've said before, I think the support that Saakashvili received from the United States and some other countries played a certain role. And it wasn't just plain encouragement, but there was financial support as well. Let me remind you that by 2008, Georgia’s defence budget had grown to almost a billion dollars, 50 times what it was in 2002. Clearly, Georgia was

boosting its military might, and something like this always affects policy.’ (Medvedev, 2013)

Due to the USA’s dubious role in supporting Georgia and the already present mistrust caused by the further expansion towards the east, it can be argued that the lack of trust in the West, only increased and a relatively hostile atmosphere was created. This was because as NATO would then be present in the Caucasus and Russia felt it would be left indefensible. This argument being backed by the swift growth in Georgia’s military power which could pose a direct threat to national security and be "a seriously destabilising factor" for the Russian federation (Medvedev, 2008c).

This element of mistrust is further emphasised by Medvedev’s assumption that he feels that the United States of America are ‘testing Russia's strength and confidence …from

what we have encountered in the last years, that is, the construction of a global air defence system, the encirclement of Russia with military bases, NATO's unstoppable expansion and other ‘presents’ to Russia one can get a firm impression that our strength is being tested’

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that the West was testing Russia’s ‘strength and confidence’. Something Russia could not undo as it felt that NATO’s expansion was unstoppable. Russia portrayed itself a victim of the West’s NATO expansion ambitions by emphasising the damage as well as the degree of innocence it was suffering. The underlying emotion being frustration as it can be argued that irritation was also at the core of this statement and Russia could do nothing to stop the West

‘testing’ them.

Besides the earlier mentioned Russian frustration with the West, it was again clearly confirmed after it felt that the United States of America ‘unfortunately, do not wish to listen to

us’, and take Russian interests into consideration. Despite Russia being willing and hoping ‘to take part in joint actions… against common threats’ (Medvedev, 2008e). The West did

nothing to realise Russia’s hopes. Again, harm was done to Russia’s dignity and trust to establish a working relationship with the West against ‘common threats’ (Idem). Additionally, Russia portrayed it could do little about the situation caused by the West. Therefore, the emotion of frustration was voiced through these statements as it, for example, stated that the West was not even willing to listen to Russia. Anger with the fact that they were ignored and frustrated due to the fact that Russia felt it could do little about the West’s behaviour.

Frustration was the primary feeling expressed.

An addition to Russia’s above mentioned frustration was the fact that it was portrayed in the Western world as well as the Georgian media that Russia was the aggressor in this conflict. Even though Georgia initiated the war, Russia was accused of using excessive force and having a neo-colonial agenda. This was highlighted by the Georgian president Saakashvili who stated; ‘It is clear that Russia’s current leadership is bent on restoring a neo-colonial

form of control over the entire space once governed by Moscow. We can’t be treated as some second-rate backyard to some kind of re-emerging empire’ (2008). As a response, Vladimir

Putin emphasised that it was performing a peace keeping mission for its minorities (Toal, 2008). Moreover, he called the USA’s financial support to Georgia ‘cynical’. He stated that ‘the scale of cynicism is surprising and the skill to present white as black and black. The trick

to present the aggressor as the victim of an aggression and to place the responsibility for the effects on the victims’ (Vladimir Putin, 2008b). Putin highlights the degree of innocence as

emphasises Russia’s tricked by the West, clearly states that Russia is a victim and irritation with the West’s portraying of Russia as an aggressor is shown. Therefore, it is argued that the underlying emotion of this statement is frustration.

Furthermore, it is also important to note that Russia eventually felt, it acted under the responsibility to protect norm. It felt responsible to protect Russian citizens as well as the

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Russian speaking people in Georgia. ‘Any country that is harassing national minorities and

denying rights to so-called ‘stateless’ citizens’ […] and protection and defending those rights is obviously one of our responsibilities’ (Medvedev, 2008a). As Russia used this particular

international norm to justify their actions, Medvedev is clearly highlighting the degree of Russia’s innocence as an aggressor. This being a vital element in Russia portraying itself as a

victim of the West’s actions.

Russia’s intervention was also justified by Russian Ambassador Vitali Churkin, who stated that Georgia undertook ‘an aggressive action against the people of South Ossetia’ (2008a). Thereby, disrespecting international law and failing ‘the obligation to protect

civilians from dangers related to military operations’ (Idem). As a result, Russia ‘calls into question Georgia’s viability as a State and its viability as a responsible member of

international community’ (Idem) and was obliged to act. The Ambassador, as Putin and

Medvedev did, highlighted the degree of innocence by justifying Russia’s actions through international law. Additionally, the harm done to Russian minorities. Thereby confirming Russia’s role as a victim in this conflict.

Another interesting point, strengthening Putin’s and Medvedev’s arguments of operating a humanitarian mission, is that in the discourses of Russia it called Georgia ‘a

region of privileged interest’ (Medvedev, 2008d). This particular usage of words is interesting

as it demonstrates a change in language related to geopolitics. During the Soviet Union era ‘sphere of influence’ was used to describe Russia’s neighbourhood (Pasatoiu, 2014; p 6-10). Therefore, the shift from ‘influence’ to ‘interests’, being used nowadays, emphasises a

significant pragmatic shift in thoughts on geopolitics. Especially, as it can be regarded that the word ‘interest’ is far less exclusive and less dominant (Trenin, 2009).

Although reference is often made to Vladimir Putin’s speech stating that the collapse of the USSR was the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century, this does not necessarily mean that Russia wants a return of Soviet Union’s power. It could also mean that due to the disintegration of the USSR, an environment was created in which the Russian national security was threatened by the West’s preferences.

Below is that particular extract, of Vladimir Putin’s state of the nation speech of 2005, highlighting the geopolitical disaster of the fall of the Soviet Union;

‘Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama.

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In summary, the fall of the Soviet Union left the Russian Federation surrounded by nations having preferences for Western ideals.

For this reason, it can again be argued that Russia portrayed itself a victim of the West’s actions. Russia was portrayed as the main aggressor having neo-colonial aspirations. While Vladimir Putin argued that Russia was operating a humanitarian mission and had no great-power aspirations whatsoever. He even literally stated that Russia became a victim as he mentioned that the West placed ‘the responsibility for the effects’ of the 5-day war ‘on the

victim’ (Putin, 2008b). Russia was once again damaged in its dignity and status by the West.

It was portrayed as an aggressor by the West while it felt that it was acting in line with humanitarian norms. Russia felt it could do little about being portrayed as the aggressor through media and speeches by the Georgian president. Especially, the statement of Vladimir Putin stating Russia’s victimhood clearly uncovers the emotion of frustration within this discourse. Annoyance and the inability to change the situation were emphasised to express Russia’s feeling of frustration.

Therefore, it can be argued that the emotion of frustration was very much caused by: the mistrust towards the US as they were active within Russia’s region of interest, the hope of taking part in joint actions, Russia was not being listened to and was being depicted as the aggressor in this conflict. Frustration due to the fact that these acts damaged Russia’s role in the international community and Russia felt it could do little change it. Concluding that, all these issues led to Russia’s untrustworthy approach towards the West’s actions or promises and stimulated the emotion of frustration. The element of mistrust clearly plays a vital role in their relationship. A discursive element playing a part in Russia’s portraying that it cannot do much and is dependent on the West’s willingness as well as actions. It is for this reason that Russia sees itself as a victim of the West’s actions during the Georgia War and is frustrated about this.

In summary, this paragraph illustrates that Russia symbolically pictured itself as a victim, because of the fact that it could not rely on the West, mistrusted them and felt it could not do much to change matters. All factors triggering the emotion of frustration reflected in its statements.

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5.2.2 Hypocrisy

The second discursive element to be analysed is, the West’s hypocrisy. Through looking at these discourses, emotions can be identified which can explain Russia’s foreign policy reactions.

In this subsection, it will be argued that Russia portrayed itself as a victim of the West’s hypocrisy. This discursive element triggered Russia to be frustrated and angry.

Besides Russia’s interpretation that when Georgia joined NATO this would be a direct security threat, it was made clear by the West because of the Kosovo experience, that it was not willing to take Russia’s preferences into account. Not even in relatively secondary or minor matters. If Russian’s interests could not be accommodated, in not even a serious and significant matter, then it can be argued, that Russia and the West were in conflict (Friedman, 2008).

After Kosovo, Russia decided to respond with a strong hand in South Ossetia and in

the same manner as when the West acknowledged Kosovo.If Kosovo was to be declared

independent under Western sponsorship, then the two autonomous regions of Georgia,

supported by Russia, should be declared independent as well. Russia ‘felt obliged to recognise

South Ossetia and Abkhazia as other countries had done with Kosovo’ (Medvedev, 2008b).

Of course, any form of opposing this Russian idea would only confirm the West’s hypocrisy, but also validate Russia’s symbolic framing of being a victim.

Nonetheless, the West rejected the Russian idea. As expressed by Barack Obama; ‘I

condemn Russia's decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states and call upon all countries of the world not to accord any legitimacy to this action’ (2008).

From a Russian perspective, these kind of statements confirmed the West’s hypocrisy and increased Russia’s frustration with the West as not being treated as an equal. It can be argued that the West bent the rules of international law to their own advantage or just undermined international law when comparing the two cases. From the Russian perspective, both situations were similar. Their role in the international community was damaged as they had nothing to say and, eventually, were to listen to the dominant Western interests. Russia felt it could do little about it.

This kind of hypocrisy and the West’s unjustified bending of international law, according to the Russian perspective, was further highlighted in a subtle manner in the following dialogue between Vladimir Putin and Sarkozy, the then ruling president of France, by referring to events happening in the Iraq -and Georgian war;

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29 "I am going to hang Saakashvili by the balls," he said.

"Hang him," asked Mr Sarkozy."

Why not?" retorted Mr Putin. "The Americans hanged Saddam Hussein’’. (Putin & Sarkozy,

2008)

From this dialogue it can be concluded that although Vladimir Putin highlights the last issue in a relatively ironic manner, Western hypocrisy and cynicism are at the core of some of Russia’s frustrations about the West’s pressuring and dominating role in international

relations. Russia feels that Western hypocrisy damages its interests and is unable to change it. It clearly feels victimised by the West’s actions triggering frustration. Twice did Russia illustrate, from their point of view, comparable cases. Within these cases, the West acted first and subsequently, Russia wanted to act in the same manner. This was by providing the two autonomous regions independency and hanging Saakashvili. In both situations Russia’s requests were rejected. This highlighted the West hypocrisy, but also confirmed Russia’s role as victim of the West’s actions.

When Russia received a lot of criticism of acting disproportionately in its military act, Churkin referred to the humanitarian ‘track record’ of the United States, ‘a country whose

actions we are aware of, including with regard to civilian populations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Serbia’ (Churkin, 2008b). In other words, Ambassador Churkin reacted towards the

criticism with sarcasm, highlighting Western hypocrisy and illustrating an independent Russia as it was to ignore the West’s arguments. Nonetheless, the underlying emotion being

frustration. Churkin clearly reacted irritated with the received negative comments and, as a response, referred to the USA’s action in other conflicts.

At the end of this subsection, it is concluded that Russia was really frustrated with the West’s behaviour towards them. Russia did not feel it was treated as an equal partner. Moreover, the emotion of frustration was further triggered by Russia’s perception that the West did not treat the Kosovo case in the same manner as Georgia. Kosovo was given formal independence, but the two autonomous of Georgia were not. Russia received criticism for the disproportionality of their acts, while it felt the USA did worse in conflicts, such as Iraq. In all cases, irritation and the inability of Russia to change its position was emphasised after it was mentioned that Russia’s status in the international community was damaged and that they were innocent in the conflict.

An emotional Russian foreign policy : identifying ‘victimhood’ and ‘frustration’