Post-9/11 U.S. development aid
How securitization changed the foreign assistance towards
Indonesia
Name: Rens Kouwenhoven Student number: 10052097
E-mail: renskouwenhoven@hotmail.com
Bachelor: Political science
Specialization: Transnational spaces: political geographies of security First reader: Dr. S. Simon
Second reader: Dr. D. Vigneswaran Date: 28th January 2014
Content
Introduction p. 4
Securitization theory p. 6
Data & method p. 9
Analysis p. 11
Conclusion p. 20
Discussion p. 21
Introduction
In 1949 President Truman heralded an era of development in a speech the day after he took office. He said: ‘We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing’ (Truman, 1949). This particular quote indicates a highly humanitarian and well-meant goal. Making the benefits of our scientific advances available for the less fortunate, without exploitation for foreign profit. The idea of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing is still a stated goal of U.S. foreign policy. USAID, the American institution for development aid, alone spends over $700 million a year on democracy promotion, through election support, the strengthening of parliaments, judiciaries and political parties, and fostering the growth and power of civil society organizations such as labor unions and women’s and human rights groups (carothers, 1999).
Supporting democracy through development aid has been a core feature of American foreign policy since President Truman took office. In this sense, nothing has changed. The way development agencies and governments frame the necessity of development aid and its impacts are somewhat newer. Some scientists claim that the practice of development assistance is being securitized. One of these is Mark Duffield, a renowned scientist in the field of the so called security development nexus (Duffield, 2001: 310-312). Rita Abrahamsen (2005) argues that in Great Britain the New Labour’s increasing attention to Africa is part of an ongoing securitization of the continent with a shift from development and humanitarianism towards risk, fear and threat. She emphasises on the negative impacts this may have on development aid. The securitization of Africa ‘can be seen as part of a strategy for mobilizing support for the “war on terrorism”. It has, however, very little to offer in terms of solving Africa’s development problems’ (ibid: 74). In this thesis, I develop a similar argument about the American government and development aid agencies towards Indonesia.
In 1999 the Clinton administration laid sanctions on Indonesia for human right violations in East Timor. This had implications for the aid Indonesia was getting. After 9/11 the Bush administration lifted these sanctions, because Indonesia might be an important partner in the war on terror (Tujan et al., 2004: 57). Studies on U.S. foreign aid to South East Asia also show that the amount of aid towards the region has increased after 9/11 from $201 million in 2001 to an average of $953 million a year from 2002 to 2006 (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Division, 2006). This means the amount of development aid towards the region has grown by more than 400 percent.
Tujan et al. (2004) and Fleck and Kilby (2009) also note a change in development strategies due to the global war on terror. Can this change in development aid spending be explained through the securitization of underdevelopment? Is Indonesia securitized after 9/11 and did that change the foreign assistance policy of the United States towards Indonesia? Focussing on U.S. aid towards Indonesia, the main research question is:
Can the securitization theory explain the shift in U.S. development aid policy towards Indonesia after 9/11?
To answer the question posed above, I will first elaborate the securitization theory as it was created by the Copenhagen School. The second step is to apply the theory to development aid in general, which I will do with Duffield’s theory of the securitization of development. A small modification of the theory is needed to make it more useful for the Indonesian case. To do this I use Abrahamsen’s argument on the securitization of Africa. With this theoretical framework, I will begin to explore the case of Indonesia to see if the securitization of development aid is also happening in this particular case. The securitization theory is based upon the supposition that threats are socially constructed. In this thesis, I will thus focus on the narratives of Indonesia in official U.S. government documents to see if there is a change in the way Indonesia is seen. This will be done by looking at quotes from U.S. congress, USAID documents and government policies regarding Indonesia as a development aid recipient. Finally, I will take a look to which sectors the development aid is going to. By doing so, I hope it will become clear if the development aid is for helping the poor, or merely an act out of geopolitical motives. The example of the sanctions towards Indonesia after some human right violations makes clear that the Clinton administration did not link development to national security as much as the Bush administration. This is why I will look at the securitization of the development aid towards Indonesia from 1999 to 2003. Two years before and two years after 9/11. The thesis will thus compare development aid prior to 9/11 and development aid post 9/11.
Securitization theory
To know if securitization can explain the shift in U.S. foreign aid towards Indonesia after 9/11, an exact definition of securitization is needed and the concept must be adjusted to make it more applicable for this particular case. In this section of the thesis it will become clear why and how. First the concept of securitization will be elaborated in general and in the field of development in particular.
In their book, Security: a new analytical framework, Buzan et al. (1998) describe securitization as a process that drives issues from the normal political arena outside the normal political arena, when a certain issue is framed as a security issue. Buzan et al. (1998) claim that if this happens, extraordinary measures are accepted in order to deal with the new security issue. This means that security in the securitization theory is not an objective condition, but the outcome of a specific social process (Abrahamsen, 2005: 57). This means that security is not a goal or something one can achieve. Security in this sense is a socially constructed idea. Ole Wæver regards security as a speech act. ‘Security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act’ (Wæver, 1995: 55). This means everything can potentially be a security threat, if it is framed as such, but the practice teaches us that not all issues can get effectively securitized. The same goes for securitizing actors. Not all political actors are able to effectively securitize a certain issue. As described above, the securitization theory consists of two parts. The first part is that an issue needs to be effectively framed as an existential security threat and it needs to be broadly accepted by the public as an existential security threat. This means people must be able to link the threat to something real, something that could happen. After this framing and accepting of an issue being a security threat, the second part of the securitization theory begins. The second part of the securitization theory is that the issue is lifted above normal liberal democratic politics. This works as followed. The framing of an issue as a security threat involves ‘dramatizing the issue and presenting it as an issue of supreme priority’ (Buzan et al, 1998: 26). This stresses the need for extraordinary means, to use all means possible to establish a secure environment.
A good example of the securitization theory in contemporary politics is the secret tapping of civilians by the NSA to prevent terrorist attacks, without congressional approval. There are many more examples of the securitization theory in politics these days, but is the issue of development aid or underdevelopment a good example? Mark Duffield is a an expert in the field of development and security and argues that there is a link between the two concepts. He argues that development has been increasingly merged with and subjected to security concerns (Duffield, 2001a). This started in
the 1990’s when economic inequality, underdevelopment and poor governance were becoming popular causes and explanations for armed conflict and crime. This is a clear expression of securitization, because it literally frames underdevelopment as a cause for an insecure situation. If security is wanted, underdevelopment has to be eradicated. While this kind of thinking of underdevelopment started in the 1990, development and security were also linked during the Cold War. Third World countries were important for the U.S. in the fight for the balance of power. Foreign aid in those days was used to win over developing countries for capitalism, which often meant supporting guerrilla movements in their fight against communist governments or supporting governments to win the fight against communist guerrilla movements. When the cold war ended this strategy was no longer necessary. Underdeveloped countries were no longer seen as potential partners in the fight against communism. Instead these countries became violent, unstable and unpredictable actors in international politics (Duffield, 2001b). Duffield argues that therefore a new security paradigm was created with a focus on ‘changing the conduct of populations within states’ (ibid: 310). This explains the popular explanations for violent conflict and crimes that emerged in the 1990’s. Within this new security paradigm stability is achieved by reducing poverty, satisfy human needs, strengthen economic sustainability, create representative civil institution, protect the vulnerable and promote human rights.
The fact that the securitization of development was already going on prior to the period that is being investigated in this thesis might cause some trouble, because if securitization was already going on in the early 1990’s it cannot explain a shift in policy somewhere in 2001. Buur et al. (2007: 9) argue that the popular explanations for violent conflict in the 1990’s have been reinvented after 9/11. Underdevelopment, poor governance and economic inequality where seen as ingredients for terrorism. The difference between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 is that the threat of terrorism has become existential after 9/11. Terrorism has been proven to be a threat within the borders of the United States. It is exactly this reasoning why the securitization theory is still applicable. The threat has changed and thus the language used to describe the threat has changed. It might even get more support of citizens because it has become an existential threat after 9/11.
This being said, the theory still needs some modifications to be useful for this thesis. I will use an article of Abrahamsen (2005) to do this. In this article Abrahamsen is researching the securitization of Africa in Britain and she concludes that the Copenhagen school would not regard Africa as being successfully securitized, because policies towards Africa are still in normal political realm (Abrahamsen, 2005: 59). This is exactly the problem with the American policies towards Indonesia. The first part of securitization theory is still useful, but since the issue is still subjected to the rules of liberal democratic politics, the second part of the theory needs an adjustment.
Abrahamsen states that this is a point of critique that is not new to the securitization theory. In most cases the transition from normalcy to emergency is a process and it does not happen overnight. Abrahamsen argues that the process of securitization is as if an issue is on a continuum from normalcy to worrisome to risk and to existential threat. Normalcy would mean that help for Indonesia is for their economic development or for human rights support. Existential threats would mean that development aid is framed as necessary for the war on terror. The type of securitization Duffield mentions would at best be worrisome, because underdevelopment is only related to regional or internal threats. The scale of securitizations ensures that politicians have some flexibility in dealing with certain issues. In other words, securitization can be a tool to deal with issues.
In this thesis the concept of securitization is thus not as black and white as the concept of securitization developed by the Copenhagen school. Security is still seen as something that is socially constructed through language, but if an issue is constructed as a security threat it does not necessarily mean that it will be lifted out of the liberal democratic political game to take extreme measures. Framing an issue as a security threat can be used to change a policy towards an issue or a country.
Development aid in this thesis is seen as all the assistance from the United States towards Indonesia. This includes helping democratisation, supporting and training the army, helping the government deal with corruption, supporting the economy etc. Development aid pre-9/11 is considered normal, with an annual $201 million budget and restrictions when a country is violating human rights. The 400 percent increase in budget and the lifting of the restrictions after 9/11 are considered as abnormal development aid.
Data & method
The conceptualization of securitization makes it clear that if one wants to identify a securitization of a certain issue, in this case Indonesia as a developing country, one should look for clues hidden in language that point in the direction from normalcy to existential threat. Normalcy would mean that the development aid towards Indonesia is needed to fight poverty, bring democracy and secure human rights. Normal development aid would be as President Truman envisioned, making scientific and industrial progress available for the improvement of underdeveloped areas. Existential threat would mean that the underdevelopment of Indonesia is a threat for the United States and therefore development aid is needed. The clues that will point towards a shift from normalcy to existential threat are hidden in the language of political actors. I will focus on two discourses. First, the emphasis throughout the data on the importance of Indonesia for the United States. Second, on the interpretation of the underdeveloped situation in Indonesia as dangerous. The type of threat will be evaluated as well, because it is well possible that over time the threat is framed as an international threat, instead of a local threat.
The political actors that are of importance for this case are USAID as an organisation and members of the Senate and House of Representatives. To see if the discourses of these actors about Indonesia is moving from normalcy to existential threat on the scale described in the theoretic part, I will collect data from the U.S. Congressional Records of the Senate and House of Representatives, a report on U.S.-Indonesian relations to Congress and official reports of USAID. These official documents are mainly strategy planning documents and annual evaluations. The data is from the time period 1999 to 2003, because the shift in policy that is under investigation took place somewhere in 2001. This way a analysis can be made from two years before the shift in policy and two years after this shift.
Normalcy in the issue of development aid towards Indonesia can be detected in the data, when political actors mention Indonesia as a developing country in need of help, because of a lack of democracy, economic downfall or the inability of a government to keep order. Underdevelopment can be seen as the source of local conflict. In the conceptual framework I mentioned that this might be seen as worrisome on the securitization scale. But since this scale of securitization did not affect the policy in terms of dollars spend on development aid, it will be seen as normalcy. Normalcy can also be detected in the argumentation for the benefits of aid to Indonesia for the United States. If actors argue that aid is good for the trade between the U.S. and Indonesia, this is considered as normal, because there is no mentioning of an international security threat. Supporting democracy for
the sake of regional stability is also seen as normal, because stability is needed for trade and a growing economy. Instability in the region is therefore seen as a condition for economic benefits instead of an security threat for the United States. This is the type of securitization as mentioned by Duffield and will be considered as normal in this thesis. Abrahamsen’s argument is that the securitization goes further up the ladder, when the threat of underdevelopment is internationalized.
This means that the underdevelopment of Indonesia would be framed as an existential threat if the underdevelopment is linked to international terrorism threatening the United States. Arguments would no longer emphasize the economic importance of a stable Indonesia or the importance of development for dealing with local conflict, but rather emphasize on the impact of instability and underdevelopment on terrorism. The need to send development aid to Indonesia is thus framed as a national security issue.
The data will be analyzed to see if a shift from the normal situation to the existential threat situation can be detected in the language used by political actors concerned with Indonesia. If this securitization has taken place, it could well explain the shift in development aid policy towards Indonesia. If the securitization theory is applicable for this case, the shift in the policy itself has to be some sort of extraordinary measure that has become possible because of the shift on the securitization ladder from normalcy to existential threat. To see if an extraordinary measure has taken place, the policy towards Indonesia has to be investigated.
Analysis
To keep everything well ordered the analysis section will be divided in three parts. The first part will describe the shift in U.S. policy outcome, without mentioning the arguments behind the shift. I will argue that this shift is a extraordinary measure. The second part will provide an overview off the discourses used and problems addressed when the subject of Indonesia was debated in the found data between 1999 and 2001 and what implications this has for the level of securitization of Indonesia. The third part of this section will do the same for the time period between 2001 and 2003. The curious shift in U.S. policy towards Indonesia was already mentioned in the introduction. After 9/11 the budget for foreign assistance rose with more than 400 percent and the Bush administration lifted military support towards Indonesia. It is important to know the history of the restrictions laid upon Indonesia to understand why the lifting of these restrictions can be seen as a curious political act. East Timor is a province in Indonesia that has been fighting for independence. The Indonesian government did not plan on letting that happen and reacted with firm and violent oppression. Time after time the U.S. congress expressed its concerns with the situation in East Timor, because the Indonesian government was reacting beyond normal proportions, violating human rights. At first the Indonesian government was urged to take steps to protect fundamental human rights (Congressional Record – House, 11/02/1999). When the human right violations continued, the reactions from congress became more forceful. Mr. Kerry expressed his concerns that American weaponry were used to violate human rights (Congressional Record – Senate, 04/05/1999). Ultimately, this fear of U.S. weapons being used for the violations of human rights by the Indonesian army led to restrictions on all assistance to Indonesia and U.S. opposition for aid towards Indonesia in international financial institutions, like the IMF, in 1999 (bill H.R. 31517, 27/10/1999). This indicates the congress’ devotion to human rights during this period. Under the Clinton administration these restrictions lasted for military assistance, due to the grave concerns with the human rights situation in Indonesia. After 9/11 the Indonesian President Megawati visited Washington. It was then that the curious political move was introduced. Although U.S. congress had been concerned with the human rights situation in Indonesia throughout 1999 and 2000, Bush declared that some of the military restrictions would be lifted in the spirit of their shared commitment to promote reform and professionalization of the military. In June 2002 the lifting of restrictions were further stressed by U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. He stated that the Bush administration intended to work with congress to re-establish the kind of military-to-military relations appropriate (Hallinan, 2002). To work with congress indicates that the rules of a normal democratic political game are followed. Abrahamsen’s argument is that the securitization could lead to strong and curious shift in policy and
not per se that the rules of the normal democratic game are violated. The Bush administration argued that the abuses in the Indonesian army have been solved and that therefore the restrictions could be loosened (ibid). At the same time the Indonesian army was involved in suppressing independence movements in Aceh and in Irian Jaya. Over 6.000 people were killed in Aceh and in Irian Jaya the army has fired on peaceful demonstrators (ibid). One could only conclude that the abuses in the Indonesian army were not solved, making the decision to lift the restrictions a curious political move especially because congress was so concerned with human rights in Indonesia during Clinton’s years as President.
Another sign of how the policy towards Indonesia and Southeast Asia dramatically shifted, is the increase in development assistance. In a report for congress from 2002, Thomas Lum described the trends in U.S. foreign assistance from the fiscal years 1999 to 2002. The total assistance to Southeast Asia rose from an average $500 million a year between 1999 and 2001 to an estimated $1.348 million in 2002 (Lum, 2002). In comparison, foreign assistance to Africa, Europe and newly independent states hardly increased or decreased (ibid). The Bond organisation notes that the U.S. foreign military fund (FMF) grew by 1,614 percent between 2000 and 2003 and the international military education and training (IMET) rose by 4,575 percent that same period (Bond, 2003). This made IMET the largest U.S. aid program in Southeast Asia (ibid). These increases are so huge, that it qualifies as curious political act.
The next step is to see if the discourses about Indonesia have changed during the 1999-2003 time period from a normal discourse towards an existential threat discourse. Arguments on the benefits of aid towards Indonesia for the U.S. will be analyzed and to what extend the underdeveloped status of Indonesia is seen as a security threat for the United States. The discourses that will be analysed are collected from Congressional Records, Reports to congress and official USAID documents.
In the time period from 1999 to 2001 there are a few repeated discourses on Indonesia. The most frequently seen discourse is Indonesia as unstable country that is unable or unwilling to provide security for all its citizen. In this narrative political actors consider the Indonesian state responsible for human rights violations. The violence is a response to protests and independent movements. These unrests are seen as the result of the economic crisis of the late 1990’s and the political crisis since the resignation of President Suharto. In this narrative political actors argue that the United States should focus democratizing Indonesia, to improve the lives of the Indonesian people. Congressman Blumenauer argues that the United States should get involved in Indonesia. Not only because of the human rights status, but Mr. Blumenauer also stresses that Indonesia’s economy is in
a heavy recession and can use some American help. Further he states that after years under the autocratic regime of Suharto, Indonesia was making steps towards democratic elections. He argues that: ‘It may be a little trouble for the United States to be involved in Indonesia during these troubled times, but I can think of no place in the world where our investment would have more impact on the global economy and on the lives of ordinary men and women’ (Congressional Record – House, 27/02/1999). The underdeveloped situation in Indonesia is the cause of unrest and the Indonesian government’s lack of ability to do something about it is also partly seen as a result of the underdeveloped situation in Indonesia. This linking of underdevelopment to security is like Duffield describes the security-development nexus of the 1990’s. Underdevelopment is seen as a cause of conflict and the inability of the government to act adequately leads to an escalation of violence instead of resolving the conflict. To solve these problems the United States should get involved in helping Indonesia develop. Although this is part of a securitization of Indonesia, it is not yet related to the U.S. national security and can thus still be seen as normal. After the first democratic elections in years the dominant discourse changed. The lack of democratic development could no longer be used to explain the human right violations. When the human right violations continued, Indonesia was framed as a rouge state, that did not deserve U.S. assistance. The development aid restrictions are educational punishments, but it also shows that funding economic growth and supporting democratic elections was not enough to bring a secure situation for the minorities in Indonesia. The discourse of Indonesia as a human rights violating state dominated much of the debates in congress throughout the 1999-2001 time period.
In 1999 Indonesia suffered a intense economic crisis. The second discourse that was often used during the first time period is the poor economic status of Indonesia. Instead of focussing on the human right violations of the state, this discourse mainly focus on the economic situation in Indonesia. The economic situation is in this narrative also linked to social unrest, but the need for development aid is stressed because of the economic situation. The first discourse stressed the need for help because of human rights violations, although the two are related. Especially the USAID documents reflect the second discourse. The value of the rupiah dropped by 67 percent, the unemployment rate has become 20 percent nationwide and the economy shrunk with 15 percent in 1998. Twenty banks went out of business and commercial banks did not make a loan since September 1997. Private dept was estimated at $60-70 billion and an estimated $20 billion of foreign and domestic capital fled out of the country. The real estate market has collapsed and business became bankrupt. In 1999 40 million Indonesians are living in the rank of absolute poverty (USAID, 1999: 1). Another USAID document describes how poverty has led to an increase in AIDS/HIV infected people and has led to reduced political access and rights for women (USAID, 2000: 6).
In a third discourse, Indonesia is framed as a state in a political crisis, due to the resignation of Suharto. This narrative sees the political power vacuum as a problem for the economic development, but also as an opportunity to establish democracy and therefore a new age of peace and prosperity. According to USAID, systematic misgovernment and abuse of power created condition for this economic collapse. The political crisis of East Timor, Irian Jaya and Aceh led to a devolution of political authority. The role of the army was under heavy fire and the abrupt departure of Suharto left Indonesia in a unclear situation, who to govern the country (USAID, 1999: 2). This uncertainty and the economic crisis have contributed to the humanitarian malaise in this period. Countless men lost their jobs and became unable to support their families, children were not able to go to school and women were forced into the sex industry, which led to a dramatic increase in the number of sexually transmitted infections and abortions (ibid: 1). The humanitarian crisis led to serious social unrest, of which the burning of rice warehouses is an example (ibid). The second and the third discourse are related and they both explain the social unrest as a result of underdevelopment. One is economic underdevelopment and the other is political underdevelopment. The crunch is that underdevelopment leads to an internal security issue. These two discourses also reflect the kind of securitization Duffield describes.
The level of securitization on the Abrahamsen’s scale from normalcy to existential threat can also be detected by analysing the arguments for development aid towards Indonesia because of the benefits for the United States and the rest of the world. In the period from 1999 to 2001 the data mentions two types of benefits for the United States. The most obvious and simple benefit is an economic argument. Investing in a free-market economy for Indonesia opens a huge new market for the United States, because Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populated country. USAID argues that Indonesia played an important role in the economic growth in Southeast Asia and Indonesia could do this again with some help (ibid: 3). Establishing economic growth in the whole region will again benefit the United States. The geographic position of Indonesia, in the middle of the world’s most frequently used trade route, is also of grave importance. The underdevelopment of Indonesia is in this argument linked to reduced economic results for the United States. This is at best a economic securitization of Indonesia’s underdevelopment, but not securitization in the national security sense. The second benefit of a developed and stable Indonesia for the U.S. and an argument for development aid towards Indonesia, is related to regional security and therefore economic benefits. It is argued in congress and in USAID documents that investing in Indonesia would lead to a stable, peaceful and prosperous Indonesia, which in turn would have a stabilizing effect on the Southeast Asian region as a whole (ibid and Congressional Record – House, 09/03/1999). This argument again reflects Duffield’s view of the development security nexus on a regional level.
Throughout the years from 1999 to 2001 the level of securitization can be considered as normalcy on the Abrahamsen’s scale, because it is the level of securitization that was noticed by Duffield that after the Cold War. The underdevelopment of Indonesia is seen as an internal or at best a regional security issue, with eventually economic consequences for the United States. The independent movements in East Timor, Aceh and Irian Jaya are seen as the result of the economic and political crisis. Not too long before 9/11 the social unrest in Indonesia was linked to extremist Islamic groups trying to establish sharia law in Indonesia. The violence spread throughout the country between Christians and Muslims making it ethnic violence. This still did not change the degree of securitization for the U.S., because it was considered to be an internal security issue. The threat was insecurity was far away. This changed after 9/11 and this is well documented in the data.
The discourses about the underdevelopment of Indonesia rapidly moved from internal to international threat after 9/11. Congress became very concerned with Muslim radicalisation because of economic underprivileged situation. The underdeveloped situation would mean that Indonesia had become an ideal breeding place for international terrorism. Before 9/11 the economic malaise and political crisis in Indonesia was linked to ethnic violence. Just before 9/11 the congressman Pitt did warn for Jihadist groups in Indonesia, trying to establish Sharia law, but this was more a local or Indonesian issue. A report from the National Commission on U.S.-Indonesian Relations (CUSIR) to Congress makes this new discourse perfectly clear. The document starts by explaining the importance of Indonesia to the United States. The economic advantages for the U.S. did not change of course, this means that partly this narrative returned in this document. The narrative is that Indonesia is of great geographic importance and that the economic value of Indonesia is important for the U.S., but also for the whole world. Indonesia is rich in natural resources and home to $25 billion in U.S. investment (CUSIR, 2003, 14).
The same report also adds two new arguments that echo some national security thinking. It displays a discourse that the underdeveloped and unstable situation in Indonesia is a international threat. Firstly, the commission states that the moderate Muslims in Indonesia have a moderating impact on debate within the Muslim world on the relation between religion and state. This influence will be even bigger if Indonesia succeeds in its efforts to develop a fully functioning democratic system (ibid). The terrorists who attacked the United States were extremist Muslims coming from the Muslim world. Indonesia, as the largest Muslim populated country in the world, is thought to have a moderating impact, if stable. In this narrative underdevelopment is seen as a factor that could influence radicalisation. A stable developing Indonesia is thought to stay moderate due to a lack of complains with life in Indonesia. An unstable Indonesia in a time of political and economic crisis could have the opposite effect on radicalisation. As a consequence, Indonesia would lose the moderating
effect on the rest of the Muslim world. This discourse does not only frame a unstable situation in Indonesia as a breeding place for international terrorists, but also as a dangerous development for the whole Muslim world. This can clearly be interpreted as a discourse that describes an existential threat, because the underdevelopment of Indonesia is directly linked to international terrorism. This makes it a threat for the United States.
The second new argument is that the political and economic instability in Indonesia caused a weakening in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which then caused instability in the whole region. Instability in the region has already provided openings for Islamic radicalism, it is thus important to focus on Indonesia (ibid). This argument develops in a similar manner as the first argument from the CUSIR report. Stressing the importance of a stable Indonesia in the war on terror. The CUSIR summarizes that ‘an hostile or unpredictable Indonesia would adversely affect U.S. interests and objectives, tilt the international balance towards radical Islam, complicate transit through strategic sea and air routes, hamper efforts to combat piracy and drug trafficking, and weaken a potentially constructive regional counterpoint to China (ibid: 5). The report from 2003 questions why this is the time to rethink the U.S. strategy towards Indonesia. It answers this question by stating that Indonesia has made major improvements since 1999, but that it is all still very fragile. The nation of Indonesia is at a critical time in its democratic transition and economic reform. ‘If the democratic transition is unsuccessful, Indonesia’s political situation will become less predictable, with increased risk of exaggerated nationalism and/or Muslim radicalism’ (ibid: 18). This is why the United States need to seek policies and programs that will help strengthen the nation’s prospects to success. One of the key priorities in accomplishing this is security. The U.S. could help improve the Indonesian capabilities to guarantee security through the education of the police and military. This will be in the interest of Indonesia and will ‘coincide with U.S. strategic objectives in the war on terrorism’ (ibid: 19). The UCIR again warns for the threat of radical Muslims in Indonesia. Although the Muslims in Indonesia are generally seen as moderate, there is a problem of radicalism. According to the report, the U.S. ambassador has publicly said that al Qaeda is present in Indonesia. The CUSIR argues that ‘the United States should also expand its commitment to help Indonesia address the socio-economic, political and juridical failures that have contributed to the growth of radicalism’ (ibid: 31).
The overall discourse in this document to congress is that Indonesia, as a Muslim state, can develop dangerously and radically, if the democratisation and economic reforms will fail. Radicalism lies at the roots of international terrorism threatening the United States. Therefore development aid towards Indonesia is needed for the sake of national security. A USAID strategy planning document
for the years 2004 to 2007 reflects the same discourse and argues in the section, United States
strategic priorities, that Indonesia, as the world’s largest Muslim country, is too important to fail.
‘The outcome of Indonesia’s democratic transition has profound implications for U.S. strategic interests in fighting terrorism’ (USAID, 2004: 5). After this opening statement about Indonesia’s development and its importance in the war against terrorism the document discusses the other familiar arguments. The rationale of development, democracy apparently also reached the USAID. Although this document is dated after the timeframe under investigation it is still useful, because it reflects the general strategy of a 2002 USAID document (USAID, 2002) for Indonesia. This new discourse becomes even more clear through 2004-2009 department of state and USAID strategic plan, where it is stated that ‘USAID provides development assistance designed to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit’ (Department of State, 2004). The focus in doing this is on diplomacy to identify, disrupt, and destroy terrorist organizations; expand antiterrorism capabilities; and diminishing the underlying conditions linked to terrorism. These underlying conditions are weak institutions and neglected social, economic and political capacity (ibid). Underdevelopment is thus seen as a condition for terrorism.
On 12th October 2002 a bombing took places in a nightclub in Bali. The act of violence was
immediately linked to international terrorism, making the threat of a underdeveloped Indonesia more existential. The act itself was not linked to the underdeveloped status of Indonesia, but calling it an act of international terrorism did stress the presence of terrorism in Indonesia and the threat to the United States. In an introduction to a resolution Mr. Hasting of Florida repeatedly mentions that the bombing is an act of terrorism and that the international war on terrorism needs to be continued, because there are no borders for terrorism. This implies that the act of terror was on Indonesian soil this time, but it could just as well be on American soil next time. Furthermore, two Americans lost their lives in the attacks. Mr. Hasting speaks of an ‘unspeakable level of terror heaped upon the Americans and vacationers of other countries’ (Congressional Record – House, 17/10/2002). He further claims that this bombing indicates that the U.S. should support the Indonesian government to bring the responsible terrorist to justice and that this act of terror reminds the United States ‘to keep an eye on the ball and continue to engage those who would deliver terror upon our cities and citizens’ (ibid). In other words, U.S. should assist Indonesia to prevent international terrorism. This is links foreign assistance directly to national security interests. The resolution that was delivered that same day stated that two Americans died during the attacks and at least three were injured. The fact that the target of the bombing was a touristic hot spot made it easier to link the act to international terrorism. The resolution therefore urged the president to sources available to help Indonesia to
address this current crisis, and bring to justice those individuals and organizations responsible (Resolution H. Res. 589, 17/10/2002).
In the period from 2001 to 2003 development aid in general is framed as a tool in the war on terror by USAID and the specific case of Indonesia is not different. The overall discourse in this timeframe is that the transitions of Indonesia towards democracy and economic reforms are important in the war against terrorism. Development aid to Indonesia is tool to provide economic insurance for the people of Indonesia, fighting terrorism at the roots of its cause. Secondly, the development of a democratic and moderate Indonesia would have a moderating effect on the rest of the Muslim world. In this discourse development aid is seen as part of the solution against terrorism, which means that underdevelopment is a cause of terrorism and is thus a threat for the United States.
After 9/11 there is a clear shift in the discourse about Indonesia. In the data from 1999 to 2001 a few general statements about Indonesia during that period are noticeable. The data from congress showed a clear emphasis on human rights violations and democratisation. The political violence was primarily seen as separation conflicts, due to the political and economic crisis, or underdevelopment status of Indonesia. The economic benefits for the U.S. and the general stability of Southeast Asia were seen as the main favourable consequences of a stable and democratic Indonesia. The USAID documents reflected the same sentiments, but the focus was more on poverty and economic reforms. The benefits that were mentioned were framed as economic and regional Southeast Asian security and stability benefits and in no way as an security issue for the United States. Indonesia was thus framed as a developing country provided opportunities for the United States. The human rights concerns and limitations to assistance showed that congress and USAID were concerned with the quality of the lives of the people of Indonesia. A general idea of developing Indonesia out of humanitarian ideals and economic benefits came forward from the data. This can be seen as normal. The underdeveloped situation was seen as a cause for internal social unrest and ethnic violence. This securitization, according to Duffield, was introduced after the Cold War. This type of securitization was already going on before 1999 and is therefore seen as normal, because it cannot explain the change in policy after 9/11.
After 9/11, President Bush declared to lift some of the military restrictions laid upon Indonesia in order to deal with terrorism. The development aid towards Indonesia also increased during this period. The lifting of some military restrictions might not have been outside the rules of the normal liberal democratic game, but it is a curious move in the lights of the congressional concerns in the years leading up to 9/11. This analysis showed that these curious political moves
were possible, because Indonesia moved up the scale of securitization. After 9/11 Indonesia was formally linked with international terrorism. Especially in Congress Indonesia was linked with terrorism. The report on the U.S.-Indonesian relation was very insightful in stressing out the importance of a stable and democratic Indonesia for the United States and the fight against terrorism. A failure of transition to democracy was framed as a possible devastating turn in the fight against radical Islamism and could therefore become a security threat. The underdeveloped situation pre-9/11 was seen as a internal security threat and post-pre-9/11 the underdevelopment of Indonesia was framed as a international terrorist threat, making it a existential threat for the United States.
Conclusion
In 1999 the Clinton administration laid sanctions on Indonesia for human right violations in East Timor. This had implications for the aid Indonesia was receiving . After 9/11 the Bush administration lifted these sanctions, because Indonesia might be an important partner in the war on terror. Studies on U.S. foreign aid to South East Asia also show that the amount of aid towards the region has increased after 9/11 from $201 million in 2001 to an average of $953 million a year from 2002 to 2006 (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Division, 2006). This means the amount of development aid towards the region has grown by more than 400 percent after 9/11. This thesis considers whether or not securitization can help explain this shift. The main question that needed to be answered was therefore: Can the securitization theory explain the shift in U.S. development aid policy towards Indonesia after 9/11? The original securitization theory claims that certain issues can be framed as existential threats and that this practice of framing could lift certain issues above the normal liberal democratic game. Extraordinary measures are then accepted because of the importance to well being and security of a Nation. The original theory did not provide a applicable theoretic framework for this case study. This is why a slightly altered theory by Abrahamsen was used. She described securitization as less black and white. In her view, an issue can move up a scale from normalcy to existential threat. Political actors can move issues up and down this scale, which will influence decisions about the issue. By examining Congressional Records and official USAID documents from the period from 1999 to 2001, it became clear that pre 9/11 Indonesia was framed as a country in political and economic crisis, and a country where the human rights conditions were terrible. In the dominant discourse during this period the underdeveloped situation of Indonesia was framed as disadvantageous for American economic interests and as a cause for internal ethnic violent situations. After 9/11 this changed. Indonesia was more framed as a country where the success of democracy was needed for the balance in the fight against radical Islamism. The underdeveloped situation was seen as a cause for terrorism. Development aid towards Indonesia was therefore framed as a tool in the international war against terrorism. It can be concluded that in the period between 1999 and 2003 Indonesia moved up the scale of securitization and that this could well explain the shift in U.S. development aid policy after 9/11. This does not mean that Indonesia is fully securitized as mend by the Copenhagen school, because the curious political move stayed within the borders of the normal liberal democratic game.
Discussion
In this thesis I developed an argument that the shift in U.S. development aid towards Indonesia could be explained by the securitization theory. Because the securitization theory assumes that the security is not an objective condition, but a socially constructed condition. What is considered a security threat, lies hidden in the language of political actors. Therefore, I collected strategy planning documents from USAID and debates from congress, because in this type of data the narratives about Indonesia that lead to the U.S. foreign assistance policy towards Indonesia can be found. The data was sufficient to see the differences in discourses after 9/11. Before I had gone through all the data, I suspected that the war on terror would be integrated in the USAID policy, because other articles showed that the development aid to countries with a lot of Muslims rose more than the aid to other ‘lower risk’ countries. While investigating the Indonesian case it was striking to see how soon after 9/11 the former ethnic or internal separatist violence changed to international terrorism and that human rights became a second concern. In this sense the data showed a clear shift from normalcy to existential threat for the United States. USAID strategy documents stressed that development aid is a tool in the war on terror and that Indonesia is an important front in this same war. I argue that the huge budgetary increase of development aid and the lifting of the restrictions on military aid is the result of linking underdevelopment to terrorism and therefore internationalizing the threat. The underdeveloped status was linked to violence prior to 9/11, but not as a threat to the U.S. national security. The linking to terrorism made this underdevelopment a existential threat. I think the fact that I had to use an altered version of the securitization theory made the findings a bit less spectacular. The development aid policy followed the rules of the normal democratic game. This study does show that securitizing is a powerful tool to dramatically change a policy. On the other hand, 9/11 was a dramatic incident that scarred America and it could well be that the powerfulness of securitizing is the dramatic experience of 9/11. This thesis shows that the curious political moves went coupled with internationalizing the threat of an underdeveloped Indonesia. In this particular case study the Abrahamsen’s securitization theory was verified. Also because Indonesia, as a country with a large Muslim majority, can be easily linked to terrorism. For further research it might be interesting to study a less obvious case.
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