The UK’s view of China’s rise : homogeneity or heterogeneity in opinion?

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The UK’s View of China’s

Rise: Homogeneity or

Heterogeneity in Opinion?

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By Edward Coventry

Research Project: China’s foreign relations in an age of change

Supervisor: Dr. Julia Bader

Student Number: 10599975

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Abstract

The objective of this research is to examine how the UK views China’s rise, and explain why there is either homogeneity or heterogeneity in opinions when different societal sectors’ views are compared. The societal sectors examined are the general public, the political elite and the business elite. A mixture of poll data and content analysis of speeches, statements and press releases are used. The results indicate that the UK views China’s rise in a broadly positive way but that there is

heterogeneity in opinion. This heterogeneity is evident in that the elites in general view China’s rise more positively than the general public and in that the business elites have a marginally more positive view of China’s rise than the political elite.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Julia Bader for her assistance in helping to formulate the project and her subsequent critiques of some aspects of my ideas and presentation, and my classmates for their assistance in reviewing the project at various stages. It was a massive help.

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List of Figures

Figure 1: Do You Have a Favourable or Unfavourable View of China? ... 36

Figure 2: Would You Describe China as a 'Partner', 'Enemy' or 'Neither'? ... 38

Figure 3: How Much Does China Take into Account British Interests? ... 39

Figure 4: Is China's Growing Military Power a Good or Bad Thing for the UK? ... 40

Figure 5: Political Elite Positive/Negative Mentions ... 43

Figure 6: Political Elite Content Analysis Overall Totals... 45

Figure 7: Political Elite Word Mentions Over Time... 46

Figure 8: Business Elite Positive/Negative Mentions... 48

Figure 9: Business Elite Content Analysis Overall Totals ... 50

Figure 10: Business Elite Word Mentions Over Time ... 51

Figure 11: Overall Totals Comparison ... 53

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1. Introduction

This thesis examines the question of how the United Kingdom (UK) views China’s rise. More specifically, it aims to explain what shapes different perspectives on China’s rise within the UK, drawing on three different theories in order to so.

China is an incredibly important country currently and is set to become increasingly so in the coming decades. ‘The sustained rapid economic growth in the last three decades seem to have confirmed the rising trend of China as a potential global power’ (Yue, 2008, p. 439), with Goldman Sachs suggesting that it will overtake the US economy in size in 2027 (Jacques, 2012). This led to Gordon Brown, former UK Prime Minister, to suggest while he was Prime Minister that the emergence of China as a powerful nation both economically and politically is ‘one of the most significant developments of our time’ (Brown & Miliband, 2009). Therefore, it is has been argued that China is already a superpower, given it meets the criteria of a large population and a high economic output (Baptista, 2012). Further to this, it is clear that it is rising and that there is concern about the implications of this rise (Feng H. , 2009).

This demonstrates the importance of China’s rise, and it is important to see how other countries view the implications just mentioned. This is because the view of other countries will play a significant role in how they react to China’s rise, influencing their behaviour to a great extent. This means that whilst China might want to rise peacefully and not disrupt the international order, if it is interpreted as wanting to do something different this will cause a different set of behaviours by other countries. This will also in turn influence China’s behaviour, as if its rise is met with hostility it may, for example, return this hostility. This is also important to study as it is a source of much debate; ‘China’s rise has aroused endless debate about its implications for international politics and global stability. At the heart of the debate are theoretical and policy discussions about whether a rising China constitutes a threat or an opportunity, whether it is a conservative status quo power to be engaged or a rising revisionist state to be contained’ (Feng Z. , 2008).

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2 This research will be carried out within the framework of power transition theory which places China in a stage of transitional growth in power but heading towards a stage of power maturity, meaning that its relative power is growing. The framework is also evident in that countries are categorised as either dissatisfied challengers or satisfied members of the status quo, and this provides a scale to see how China is viewed by the UK, and fits in with other debates on China’s rise, such as whether it is a status quo or revisionist power.

This demonstrates the importance of the debate and a framework from which to discuss it, and this thesis attempts to view how these debates are resolved in the UK as well as attempting to see how different sections of UK society view China’s rise.

1.1. Summary of Approach and Findings

As mentioned above, this thesis looks at how the UK views China’s rise and more specifically it tries to explain different perspectives within the UK on China’s rise. The different sectors examined in this instance are the general public, the political elite and the business elite, with attempts to see whether the elites in general, but also the business elite in particular, have more positive views than the general public. This looks at various debates surrounding China in general, such as whether it is a status quo or revisionist power, and whether it is an opportunity or a threat, and attempts to apply them to the UK context, including different societal sectors within the UK. The theoretical frameworks used as potential explanations are power transition theory (predicting a unitary and most likely negative view of China’s rise, which should have become increasingly negative over time), a theory of populist xenophobia (predicting an elite-non-elite divide in opinions), and political economic theory (predicting that the business elite will have the most positive view). These predictions are then examined through a mixture of empirical methods, with the use of a number of different polls as well as a content analysis of various documents.

The research finds that the UK views China’s rise for the most part positively, with much more emphasis of it as an economic opportunity than anything else. It

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3 also finds that there are significant differences between societal sectors in how China’s rise is viewed. This is evident firstly in that the elites in general have a much more positive view of China’s rise than the general public. However, this does not mean that the general public’s view is overwhelmingly negative; it is not. Instead, the reason for the divide is the incredibly positive view of China’s rise amongst political and business elites. In addition to this elite-non-elite divide, it is also found that the business elites have the most positive view of China’s rise, with a hugely positive attitude to it and a huge emphasis on China as a partner and an opportunity. However, it must be noted that the difference between the political and business elites in their views is nowhere near as marked as between the elites in general and the general public. This provides a (very) brief overview of the research question and the findings of the research and now the choice of the UK as the case to be studied will be discussed.

1.2. Why the UK?

The first reason for the choice of the UK is that as a result of a huge emphasis in the literature on the US and how it views China’s rise (see, for example (Buzan & Cox, 2013), (Foot, 2006) or (Friedberg, 2005)), there is a definite research gap in examining how other countries view China’s rise. However, this still raises the question of ‘why the UK?’ as opposed to other countries of note, and there are several reasons for this.

Firstly, the UK’s previous power and changes in power and relative power over time make it a unique case. The first point in this regard is that UK is unique outside of the US in the modern era of nation-states as having been the predominant power in the world, which could create a unique insight into power transition, given that the UK was previously overtaken as the predominant power in the world by the US. In addition, the UK provides the combination of being both still fairly powerful but having been in relative power decline for a long time. It is therefore still relevant to China, for example through economic interdependence (in 2004 the UK became China’s fourth largest trading partner after the Japan, the US and Germany (Li &

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4 Hewitt, 2008)), but also presents a declining power within the power transition theory. Finally, and also relevant to power transition theory, the UK is clearly a status quo power in the current international system. This is true to an even greater extent than other similar European powers like Germany and France, given the UK’s traditional partnership with the US (often dubbed the ‘special relationship’). This also means that the UK will give a unique insight.

Additionally, and not relating to issues of power, is the fact that China is clearly very important for the UK, particularly economically. Prime Minister David Cameron has described China’s rise as ‘one of the defining facts of our lifetime’ (Li & Zhang, 2013), which emphasises the high level of importance with which it is regarded. This is also further emphasised in a 2009 government report, which suggests that in the next decade China will offer more opportunities for British businesses than any other country and that its impact on UK interests is already ‘critical’ and is expanding (Brown & Miliband, 2009). This high level of importance placed on China’s rise in the UK adds to the relevance of this study, as it means that people will most likely have an opinion about China, and also the impact China is already having will influence views in a way it wouldn’t in countries where its rise is viewed with less importance.

Finally, there are practical reasons for the choice of the UK. As someone from the UK, I have a better knowledge of where to access information from places such as the media and the government, which will mean that the information I access will almost certainly be of a higher quality than if I was studying a country that was foreign to me. Further to this, the UK has very free access to information and data, helped for me personally by the fact that all the information is available in English. This means that my research will be valid and that I will have access to all the information I need.

For all these reasons, the UK represents a good choice of case study to examine attitudes towards China’s rise, as well as attempt to place the more general debates about it in a more specific context. The next section provides a brief overview of the following chapters.

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1.3. Overview of Thesis

This section provides a brief overview of what will be discussed and where within the thesis. The following chapter, the literature review, presents firstly views of China’s rise at a global level, with a focus on the US relationship with and views of China, given the prominence of these topics in the academic debates. This section examines the extent of China’s rise and whether it can and will be peaceful to begin with. In addition, it looks at whether China is a status quo or revisionist power, a key debate on China, and finally whether this has changed through a proposed ‘new assertiveness’.

Also as part of the literature review, the limited literature on how the UK views China is examined to see whether the debates on a global level transfer to the UK and also to provide a background. This looks at general trends in UK-China relations, the importance of economic relations between the two, and media coverage of China in the UK.

Following this, the theory chapter introduces three theories which all have different implications for how the UK, and different sectors within UK society, will view China and its rise. This section most broadly gives rise to three different hypotheses, one per theory. The first to be examined is power transition theory, which is looked at through Organski’s (1958) original theory, ways this theory has been built upon, critiques of the theory and finally its theoretical predictions, with the key take-away the hypothesis that derives from it (something which is the same for the other two theories). The next theoretical section focuses on populist xenophobia, with an examination of populist xenophobia in the rise of the radical right in Western Europe, the use of trade as an example to demonstrate the influence of populist xenophobia on policy and beliefs more generally, an examination of populist xenophobia in the UK, and finally a discussion of the theoretical predictions, with an accompanying hypothesis. Finally, the section on political economy focuses on attitudes to trade and examines Ricardian and Stolper-Samulson approaches to trade first, before synthesising them and linking them to

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6 Milner’s work on the decline of protectionism. Finally, the theoretical predictions of this theory are discussed and once again a hypothesis is derived.

Before the presentation and analysis of my empirical results there is a methodology that looks at how the data was collected and how it will be presented. The data relating to the three different sectors of society examined- the general public, political elites and business elites- are then presented, along with a discussion of trends relating to the data. This analysis also contains reference to events and hypothesises how they may have influenced opinion. This is followed by two comparison sections that attempt to identify similarities and differences between the sectors, with one comparing the political and business elites and one comparing the elites as a whole and the general public. Finally, the impacts of the data on the hypotheses are presented, with each hypothesis examined individually, to attempt to find concrete conclusions as to their validity.

Finally, in the conclusion there is an overview of the aims, approach to and findings of the research. This includes a discussion of the implications of the findings for UK-China relations as well as suggesting the likely implications for policymakers. Following this, there is a discussion of the limitations of the research, talking about problems of the scope of the project and the lack of access to certain data that could have been useful, as well as the difficulty in proving that certain correlations were the result of the theoretical causations used to predict them. This concludes the thesis.

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2. Literature Review: Views of China’s Rise on a Global and UK

Level

This literature review examines views of China’s rise, starting out with an examination of the debate on China-US relations, which dominates the literature. This is also combined with debates about how the world views China, with an investigation into the extent of China’s rise, whether the rise can be peaceful, whether China is a status quo or revisionist power, and finally whether there has been a recent new assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy. It then turns to how the UK specifically views China, and identifies a research gap given the lack of research in this area, and in particular the lack of research into how different societal sectors in the UK view China’s rise.

2.1. How the World Views China’s Rise

The section looks at a number of different debates about China’s rise, with varying conclusions. Briefly, these can be summarised as that China is clearly rising but is still not close to overtaking the US as the predominant global power, that the most likely form of rise for China is one that involves a ‘cold peace’ (Buzan & Cox, 2013, p. 132), that China is mostly a status quo power with some revisionist elements in its policy, and finally that suggestions of a conscious ‘new assertiveness’ in Chinese foreign policy are not evident in Chinese policy.

2.1.1. The Extent of China’s Rise

The first debate to be discussed is that of to what extent China has risen and is rising. There is a general consensus that ‘the sustained rapid economic growth in the last three decades seem to have confirmed the rising trend of China as a potential global power’ (Yue, 2008, p. 439). It is already the leading regional power in Asia due to its size, strategic location, and rising economic and military power (Sutter R. G., 2003-2004), and with its power still growing, this is likely to transfer beyond China’s immediate region to a more global reach. However, whilst China may be closer to

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8 reaching parity with the United States, the current global hegemon, it is still a long way away in terms of power (Baptista, 2012) and in this way ‘the assertion of a ‘rising China’ is premature and problematic’ (Yue, 2008, p. 452). A number of reasons have been advocated as to why this is.

Firstly, there are economic issues. Whilst China’s present international significance is largely based on its rapidly growing economy and its increasing integration with the world economy (Sutter R. G., 2003-2004), there are potential hindrances to this economic rise. Goldstein (2007) has suggested that whilst stagnation or economic collapse have not yet occurred, this does not mean that they are out of the question, and that political turmoil has the potential to derail China’s economic development. Regardless of whether this occurs, there is a strong suggestion to say that economic growth rates will slow down due to the fact that the dramatic rise of the past twenty years has been largely fuelled by two one-time bonuses, the population’s declining fertility rate and its increasing urbanisation, and because of political, environmental, and structural barriers to growth that China faces in the coming years (Babones, 2011). Further to this, a perceived area of economic strength, the fact that China holds so many US dollars, is actually not a strategic advantage, as ‘if it dumped its dollars, China might bring the United States to its knees, but might also bring itself to its ankles’ (Nye Jr. J. S., 2010).

In addition to these economic issues, China lacks both military and normative power. In fact, it has been described as a second-rate military power, far from being able to challenge the US (Segal G. , 1999), and as having only limited amounts of normative power and influence (Sutter R. G., 2003-2004), with US normative power remaining far greater than China even despite largely being blamed for the financial crisis. Due to these reasons Segal, admittedly writing fifteen years ago, surmised that ‘the Middle Kingdom... is merely a middle power’ (Segal G. , 1999, p. 35). However, a more realistic conclusion is that of Yan, who suggests that ‘the status of China’s comprehensive power already ranks second in the world, but it remains at the second echelon compared to the US superpower status’ (Yan, 2006, p. 30).

Despite these questions of the extent of China’s rise, there is a broad consensus that it is rising, and the most important scholarly debate is therefore that

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9 of what the implications of its rise will be and how it will behave. These wider debates will provide a framework from which to analyse how the UK views China’s rise, and will also most likely be in existence (although not yet studied) in the UK.

2.1.2. ‘Peaceful Rise’?

While it is a fact that China’s power is increasing, scholars are divided with regard to the question of what the consequences of a rising China are for world peace, and whether the official policy of ‘peaceful rise’ (now renamed ‘peaceful development’) is possible. This ‘peaceful rise’ has been defined by Buzan as meaning that ‘a growing power is able to make both absolute and relative gains in both its material and its status positions, in relation to other powers in the international system, and to do so without precipitating major hostilities between itself and either its neighbours or other major powers’ (Buzan, 2010, p. 5). There are three differing perspectives on this issue.

The first of these is put forward by power transition theorists, who suggest that a power transition, such as is occurring in the case of China, will always cause conflict. This is evident in the prediction that ‘the U.S.-China power transition will be characterised by significant economic and political conflicts of interest and persistent strategic competition’ (Ross & Feng, 2008). This prediction is based on the assumption that China will become more assertive in order to attempt to shape the international environment in ways conducive to its national interests (Art, 2010). This is particularly relevant as China’s low-tech growth means that it needs access to resources, an interest that it is likely to come into conflict with other nations over (Yue, 2008). Mearsheimer is even more pessimistic, suggesting that China’s rise is ‘likely to lead to an intense security competition between China and the United States, with considerable potential for war... to put it bluntly: China cannot rise peacefully’ (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 382).

The second perspective contradicts this, however, and says that there are a number of reasons for optimism, with suggestions that conflict is neither inevitable nor particularly likely. Ross and Feng (2008) suggest that each power transition is a unique event and that therefore conflict can’t be assumed, and Nye Jr. (2011)

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10 emphasises that not every power’s rise leads to conflict, citing the example of the US overtaking the UK at the end of the 19th century, and suggests that as a result it is important to prevent exaggerated fears of conflict creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. The case of the US rising peacefully is evidence that a peaceful rise can occur, and in many ways the conditions are more conducive to peaceful rise for China than they were for the US, with a well-developed institutional order, war being much more dangerous now given the access of most major powers to nuclear weaponry, and an absence of empire-building, official racism and deep ideological divides (Buzan & Cox, 2013). Further to this, China’s worldview seems to be different to previous rising powers, with an emphasis on state sovereignty and not interfering in the affairs of other states suggesting that it is likely to be very peaceful as a power (Buzan & Cox, 2013). In this way, China does not pose a significant security threat akin to UK-Germany before World Wars I and II, and poses less of a geopolitical threat than the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Art, 2010). Finally, economically China’s rise will cause its economy to open up further so as to serve as a growing market and therefore an opportunity for the rest of the world, rather than posing a threat to the international community (Zheng, 2005).

The third and final perspective on this issue suggests that a peaceful rise is possible, with it dependent on the actions of China, the US and the international community as a whole (Qin, 2010), and that some kind of cold peace is most likely. This means that whilst there are a number of possibilities given the range of actors and possible actions involved, the ideas of Buzan and Cox represent the most likely outcome. They say that ‘peaceful rise is possible for China, and in the narrow sense of it not triggering great power war, very probable. The choice is between what kind of peaceful rise- warm or cold. There is still time and possibility to choose about this, but on the present trajectory China is heading for a cold peace, both in its neighbourhood and in the world’ (Buzan & Cox, 2013, p. 132).

2.1.3. Status Quo or Revisionist Power?

A further debate is over whether China is and will become a status quo or revisionist power, and these concepts need to first be defined. Buzan (2010) suggests that a

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11 status quo power is happy with both its status and with the institutions of international society. Further, he suggests that revisionist states want to change some aspect of the international system and can be categorised into revolutionary, orthodox (happy with the international structure but not their status within it) and reformist (accepts some institutions of international society but wants to reform others and is also unhappy with its status within it) (Buzan, 2010). This section examines both sides of the argument and concludes that China is most likely a status quo power, whilst admitting that there is somewhat conflicting evidence.

There is a strong feeling amongst some scholars that China is a revisionist power, and is likely to become increasingly revisionist over time. Buzan (2010) says that China is by default revisionist, as any rising state would be, and suggests that the reformist position best sums up China’s position. This sentiment is echoed by Efird, Kugler and Genna (2003), who suggest that in particular the disparity in GDP per capita at the same time as China’s overall power catching up with the US creates the possibility of very different perceptions of an acceptable status quo, with China therefore a revisionist power.

This revisionism is evident or will likely become evident in a number of ways. The most obvious of these is a future move towards an increased assertiveness; ‘There will likely come a point well before 2020 when Chinese leaders will develop sufficient power to choose a different and more assertive approach to international affairs’ (Sutter R. G., 2003-2004, p. 88); ‘China will become more ambitious, challenging the interests of other states’ (Kirshner, 2010, p. 59). There is evidence that this to some extent has already happened, with Kastner and Saunder’s (2012) research into Chinese leadership travel as an indicator of status quo or revisionism suggesting that Hu and Wen displayed more ‘challenger-type behaviour’ than Jiang and Zhu, their predecessors.

On the other hand, however, there is also a large school of thought that suggests that China is more broadly a status-quo power; ‘it is not clear that describing China as a revisionist or non-status quo state is accurate at this moment in history’ (Johnston, 2003, p. 6). This is clear firstly in that there is no evidence that China is part of or seeking to establish any kind of anti-hegemonic coalition (Foot,

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12 2006). This is largely because China has displayed increasing cooperation in the international community, with it being described as a ‘more responsible player’ on the global stage and becoming increasingly involved with a number of issues on the international agenda (Shambaugh, 2005). ‘Since the mid-1990s, China has expanded the number and depth of its bilateral relationships, joined various trade and security accords, deepened its participation in key multilateral organisations, and helped address global security issues’ (Madeiros & Fravel, 2003, p. 23). This includes increased efforts to conform to international norms on sensitive issues such as economic practices, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and even environmental standards (Sutter R. G., 2003-2004), all of which suggests that China is a power acting within the existing status quo. In this way, China appears to be adapting to the Western international order’s strong framework of rules and institutions, with it set to thrive within this order (Ikenberry, 2008).

As well as its increasing incorporation with the international community, China has also suggested a status quo orientation in two other prominent ways. Firstly, in East Asia its emergence as the most powerful state has been accompanied by widespread stability because it has signalled very moderate intentions that have become increasingly moderate even as China’s power has increased (Kang, 2005). Secondly, China’s leaders have generally been found to have a status quo orientation, evident for example in research by Feng (2009) that suggests that China’s leaders (other than Mao) have generally favoured cooperative strategies at least as much as the average world leader, and that the younger generation of leaders (represented by Jiang and Hu) actually have a lower level of belief than the older generation (represented by Mao and Deng) of their control over historical development. There is also evidence that the new leader, Xi Jinping, shares Hu’s beliefs and will oversee more continuity than change in Chinese foreign policy, albeit his strategy in achieving goals appears to be slightly more assertive (He & Feng, 2013). In this way, China has actually become increasingly status quo; ‘China has struggled over the threshold of membership in international society and has evolved in the last three decades from a revisionist to a detached and then to a status quo power’ (Qin, 2010, p. 153). This suggests a broadly status quo orientation, although it

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13 remains to be seen to what extent this position will change, and it is also must be noted that there are some revisionist aspects of China’s policy.

2.1.4. A ‘New Assertiveness’?

The question of whether China’s position will or has changed is highly relevant in another current debate, with conflicting claims about whether there have been signs of a ‘new assertiveness’. While there are two sides to this debate, in the end the majority of the evidence seems to point to the fact that there is no conscious ‘new assertiveness’ by China.

Nonetheless, there is an argument that suggests that there has been a ‘new assertiveness’ in China’s foreign policy. This means that whereas China has muted interest divergences with other powers, in particular the US, in the past, an increasingly powerful China has recently assumed a more assertive position towards it peers (Baptista, 2012); ‘A series of moves in China’s foreign policies since the global financial crisis in 2008 seems to suggest that China is now more confident than ever in its external behaviour’ (Chen & Wang, 2011, p. 195).

There are a number of proposed reasons for this change in behaviour, with Scobell and Harold (2013) suggesting that the increased assertiveness from 2008-2010 was caused by two different waves of opinion in particular. The first wave ‘was prompted by feelings of premature triumphalism- a sense that the US commitment to East Asia was declining and Washington was more accommodating toward Beijing’s “core interests”’, with this triumphalism also partially a product of the financial crisis in the West (Scobell & Harold, 2013, p. 111). The second wave ‘was a response to perceived US threatening actions’, in particular the US ‘return to Asia’ (Scobell & Harold, 2013, p. 112). Both waves were also amplified by the dual domestic challenges of the Chinese leaders’ hyper-sensitivity to popular nationalism and poor bureaucratic coordination amongst an expanding number of domestic foreign policy actors (Scobell & Harold, 2013). This implies that China has become increasingly assertive in its foreign policy.

However, there are questions of this idea. Even Scobell and Harold (2013), who support the idea of ‘new assertiveness’, suggest that a more conciliatory

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14 approach to foreign policy had returned by the end of 2010. Further to this, Jerden (2014) questions the idea of a new assertiveness existing at all, and proposes that occasional assertiveness was the normal state of affairs in Chinese foreign policy throughout the 2000s, and that the scattered policy changes from the financial crisis to the end of 2010 do not amount to a general change in foreign policy. Johnston (2013) goes even further in examining seven events in 2009-2010 that are meant to exemplify this ‘new assertiveness’, and suggests that only China’s actions on the South China Sea represent a ‘new assertiveness’. He therefore surmises that ‘in toto, the differences across these cases suggest that there was no across-the-board new assertiveness in Chinese diplomacy’ (Johnston, 2013, p. 32). This shows that whilst parts of China’s foreign policy were assertive, and in the case of the South China Sea there was a new assertiveness, this has not been a conscious shift in policy.

2.2 How the UK Views China’s Rise

How the UK views China is not widely covered in academic literature, in particular when compared to the huge amount of literature on US-China relations. I will try and fill this gap by researching how different sectors of UK society view China’s rise and whether there is some kind of unitary view. However, despite the general lack of literature on UK-China relations, there is a small amount of academic and political debate on the subject. This will now be discussed.

There are a number of general trends in how the UK has viewed and responded to China’s rise that have been discussed by scholars. Firstly, Breslin (2004) has identified that official policy has focused on the dual aims of developing commercial opportunities for UK companies and promoting positive social and political change in China. This policy has also increasingly been carried out by non-state actors, particularly non-non-state economic actors such as the China Britain Business Council (CBBC) (Breslin, 2004). A further trend is that whilst there is some evidence of a ‘China threat’ dialogue in the UK, it is not very prominent and is definitely balanced out by an understanding of the economic opportunities of China (Breslin, 2004). Further to this, ‘there is a realistic recognition that the UK alone

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15 cannot do much to contain China even if it wanted to’ (Breslin, 2004, pp. 415-416). It must be noted that all of these observations are from an article from a decade ago, and in the studies of large aspects of UK-China relations this represents the state-of-the-field.

Regardless, it can be said that probably the most important aspect of UK-China relations is economic, with the UK’s interests regarding UK-China focussing on economic terms and using economic policy towards China to enhance its economic interests as well as a means to engage China (Breslin, 2004). The economic relationship has been of growing importance, particularly UK imports of Chinese goods, with the UK’s trade deficit with China 0.1% of GDP in 1992, compared to 1.2% in 2009, which given that the UK’s total 2009 deficit on the current account was 1.1% of GDP, shows the importance of Chinese imports (Chamberlain & Yueh, 2011). There is also the fact that ‘China’s continued growth is likely to see demand for consumer goods and services rise’, something which can be a huge opportunity for the UK, in particular within the services sector and within that the financial sector (Chamberlain & Yueh, 2011, p. 45). However, it must be noted that despite China’s growing importance it still represents only a very small part of the UK’s total trade and income transactions with the rest of the world, with for example the UK’s services trade surplus to China just 0.1% of GDP, compared to 1.2% for Europe and 1% for the US (Chamberlain & Yueh, 2011). Further to this, China’s rise also has some negative impacts on the UK economically, in particular in boosting oil and other commodity prices (Knapp, 2004). However, despite these problems, China is still largely seen as an opportunity and as such ‘the official UK approach is... built around the question of how best to engage China’ (Breslin, 2004, p. 414).

The other aspect of how the UK views China’s rise that has been studied to a limited extent is how the media portrays China. China has received a wide coverage in UK newspapers, with it written about in the daily press on a fairly regular basis, albeit that there is a large imbalance in coverage between tabloids (less coverage) and broadsheets (more) (Sparks, 2010). Much of this coverage is negative, however, with a comparison by Zhou (2008) between the media in the UK, US, Hong Kong and Singapore, suggesting that the UK’s coverage would more likely portray the Chinese

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16 government unfavourably than Hong Kong and Singapore, although slightly less so than the US. Further there was a greater emphasis on conflict and, in the domain of internet that Zhou (2008) focuses on, much more coverage of internet control censorship and regulation than in Hong Kong and Singapore. This is particularly true in the tabloids according to Sparks (2010), who suggested ‘a strong and persistent emphasis on framing China as strange, alien, cruel and threatening’ (Sparks, 2010, p. 362). However, there was much more positive coverage in the broadsheets, which whilst containing some negative coverage, generally presented China in a more favourable light (Sparks, 2010).

Therefore, to conclude, there is only a very small amount of literature that examines how the UK views China’s rise, and much of this is out of date (for example see (Breslin, 2004)). Further to this, none of this examines the key thrust of my research that attempts to see whether different societal sectors view China’s rise differently, and what shapes these views.

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3. Theoretical Framework: Three Different Theories and their

Implications

This chapter looks at the theories that will be used to create predictions in my research in an attempt to help explain UK views on China’s rise. It looks at power transition theory, a theory of populism and xenophobia and political economic theory and applies them to the UK-China case. These theories are examined because they have different implications for how UK society as a whole and also how different sectors of UK society view China’s rise.

These implications are now briefly introduced. Power transition theory is useful for the study of how the UK views China’s rise for two reasons. Firstly, it provides a framework in identifying the UK as a status quo power in the ‘stage of power maturity’ and identifying China as in a stage of ‘transitional growth in power’, which in turn means that China must be somewhere on the scale from ‘dissatisfied challenger’ to ‘satisfied member of the status quo’. This creates potential positions and policies that China might pursue based on where they stand, and also implies UK reactions to these. Further, it provides the prediction that the UK will have a fairly consistent and unitary view of China’s rise that will most likely be negative, and also will have become increasingly negative over time. In contrast to this, the theory of populism and xenophobia predicts that there will be an elite-non-elite divide in attitudes towards China’s rise. Accordingly, the political and business elites will most likely have a more positive view due to the populist xenophobia of much of the general public which will influence their views on China. Finally, political economic theory predicts that due to the UK economy being increasingly based on trade, and that most large UK companies are exporters and/or importers, that business elites will have the most positive view of China’s rise. This is most basically based on the idea that economic interests form preferences. These theories and implications will now be discussed in far greater detail.

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3.1. Power Transition Theory

3.1.1. The Original Theory

Power transition theory was first advocated by Organski in his 1958 book ‘World Politics’. He spoke of three stages of power transition, which are as follows; (1) stage of potential power (low but stable power but potential for much greater power in the future); (2) stage of transitional growth in power (nation industrialises and leaves pre-industrial nations behind whilst catching up with existing industrialised nations); and (3) stage of power maturity (fully industrialised and slow economic growth with a likely relative decline in power) (Organski A. F., 1958). This latter decline in power can even occur as a nation grows richer, more industrial and more efficient, as ‘power is relative, not absolute. It is not a characteristic of the nation itself, but a characteristic of its relationships with other nations’ (Organski A. F., 1958, p. 305). In this way, there will be constant changes in relative power, with nations overtaking one another to become the hegemonic nation or group of nations. This is evident in events according to Organski, with British supremacy challenged by the US and Germany and now US supremacy being challenged by Russia and China (writing during the Cold War) (Organski A. F., 1958).

The important factor at this point is whether the challenger power(s) are satisfied with the status quo, and Organski classifies nations as; (1) powerful and satisfied; (2) powerful and dissatisfied; (3) weak and satisfied; and (4) weak and dissatisfied, with the second category the most dangerous powers that are likely to challenge the existing international system (Organski A. F., 1958). This means that peace ‘is most likely to be maintained when the powerful and satisfied nations together with their allies enjoy a huge preponderance in power over the challenger and its allies... War is most likely when the power of the dissatisfied challenger and its allies begins to approximate the power of those who support the status quo’ (Organski A. F., 1958, p. 332).

However, this does not mean that all transfers of hegemonic power result in war, as can be evidenced by the transfer from the UK to the US, and there are a number of other factors at play that impact on the likelihood of war. These can be

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19 summed up as potential power (how powerful the rising nation could be in the future and if it will be much less or much more powerful than the current hegemon this reduces the chances of conflict), the speed of rise in power (quicker rise increases the chance of conflict), the level of acceptance and flexibility by the declining dominant nation, and the level of friendship between the dominant power and the challenger (Organski A. F., 1958). This theory leads most basically to the conclusion that all major power wars are as a result of structural conditions of the international war, with for example, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand prior to World War I largely irrelevant, as ‘the structural conditions were ripe for major power war’ (Abdollahian & Kang, 2008, p. 354). This represents an overview of the original theory, but this theory has been built upon significantly over time.

3.1.2. Ways the Theory has been Built Upon

Organski’s (1958) original theory has been changed and built upon in a number of ways. For example, Gilpin (1981) focuses less on the importance of industrialisation, and unlike Organski implies that there is no prospect of the cycle of power transitions ever ending, suggesting that ‘the nature of international relations has not changed fundamentally over the millennia’ (Gilpin, 1981, p. 211). In addition, there has also been empirical testing of the theory, for example in Organski and Kugler (1980) and then Houweling and Siccama (1988), who test on a wider range of powers than Organski and Kugler. In both instances the theory is proven to be correct, and Houweling and Siccama (1988) surmise that ‘differential growth rates and specifically power transitions among great powers are indeed a potent predictor of consecutive outbreak of war’ (Houweling & Siccama, 1988, p. 101). Whilst this research refers specifically to war, it can be deduced from this that power transitions are also more likely to cause conflict, and in doing so influence attitudes. Finally, and somewhat in line with Houweling and Siccama’s (1988) research, Lemke and Werner (1996) also extend the theory. They suggest that there can be multiple hierarchies of power in the world, with power transition theory relevant to all the hierarchies (Lemke & Werner, 1996).

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20 However, the most relevant way the theory has been built upon for my research is in the work of Kim (1989) and Kim and Morrow (1992), who have created the idea of ‘alliance transition theory’. This adds the assistance that a nation would expect from its allies to the calculation of its capabilities, and suggests that alliances and the interests that motivate them play a key role in understanding big wars, as well as providing support for their claims in their statistical analysis (Kim & Morrow, 1992). This role of alliances means that rather than war and conflict being more likely when two nations in a dyad have approximately equal power, war and conflict are more likely when two alliance coalitions have approximately equal power (Kim, 1989). This does complicate the question of judging power transitions and create the possibility that the power transition might occur after the rising state has overtaken the declining state in internal capabilities, as the declining power is likely to form alliances to bolster its capabilities (Kim & Morrow, 1992). However, it does provide a more accurate account of how the world works than suggesting that there are just two powers and that their alliances are irrelevant, and as such is a useful addition to power transition theory.

3.1.3. Criticisms of the Theory

Despite the prevalence of the theory and the various ways it has been built upon, there have been some criticisms of power transition theory. De Soysa, Oneal and Park (1997) in their empirical testing say that while they find substantial support for the power transition theory, the evidence is not consistently favourable and that support for the theory to a large extent depends on the measure of power used and the set of cases chosen for analysis. Fearon (1995) attacks power transition theory alongside all ‘rationalist’ theories of war, in suggesting that it fails to address or resolve ‘the central puzzle, namely, that war is costly and risky, so rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the gamble of war’ (Fearon, 1995, p. 380). Finally, Lebow and Valentino (2009) suggest that the international system has almost never been characterised by hegemony where one power can dominate all others, that power transitions most often occur peacefully, and that they are more often the result of wars rather than the cause of

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21 them. They further offer a number of examples of wars where major powers went to war not because of the threat of an opposing power but because they thought they were powerful enough to increase their power further (Lebow & Valentino, 2009). In this way, they suggest that their ‘data offer no support for power transition theories’ (Lebow & Valentino, 2009, p. 405).

3.1.4. Theoretical Predictions

Power transition theory explains how the UK will view China’s rise on the basis of structural factors and the distribution of power at the international level. This is on the basis that China has risen rapidly and the UK has had a decline in its relative power, as well as the fact that the UK is a status quo power within the current international order. Given these facts, the theory predicts that the UK will have a fairly consistent and most likely (although not necessarily) negative view of China’s rise, which will also most likely have become increasingly negative over time. However, it must be admitted that China has already overtaken the UK and is set to be a much larger power than it, which according to Organski (1958) reduces the chances of conflict.

However, this brings into the picture the ways that Organski’s theory has been built upon, and in particular the works of Kim (1989) and Kim and Morrow (1992). In their work, the UK would form part of the US-led ‘Western’ alliance, which could be seen as the alliance that is in competition with a different Chinese-led alliance. This means that the UK fits in with the ‘alliance transition theory’, and if China is the leader of a revisionist group of states this would still influence opinions in the UK. Therefore, power transition can still be applied to this case.

A point to note is that the assessment that the UK’s view would most likely be negative is based on the previous analysis, but leaves some option open for a positive view, as it is included within the theory that either (1) China could be a satisfied member of the status quo; or (2) the UK could have accepted that China will more powerful than it (due to the massive disparity in potential power) and come to terms with the revised or revising international order.

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22 In sum, if power transition theory is correct, I would therefore expect there to be a fairly unanimous and most likely negative view of China’s rise. I would also expect that views of China’s rise to have become increasingly negative over time.

Hypothesis 1a: The UK’s view of China is unanimous and most likely negative. Hypothesis 1b: With China’s rise, the UK’s views of China have become more negative.

3.2. Populism and Xenophobia

In an attempt to explain the UK’s views on China, it was important to use other theories that do not conform to power transition theory in predicting a unitary and negative view, as this may well not be in existence. Populist xenophobia is useful in this regard as it predicts a general public-elite divide in views about China’s rise, with the elite having a more positive view than the general public. This theory will now be explained, and its implications discussed in greater detail.

3.2.1. The Link between Populism and Xenophobia in the Rise of the Radical Right in Western Europe

The radical right has emerged as an electoral force in Western Europe in the past two decades (Rydgren, 2007, p. 241), and this has been fuelled by racism and xenophobia (Williams, 2010). Therefore, these radical right-wing parties espouse a type of politics that could be described as ‘exclusionary populism’ (Betz, 2001, p. 393), and this link between populism and xenophobia will now be discussed. First, xenophobia must be defined, and Rydgren provides a useful definition; ‘fear of individuals who are different or ‘strange’... characterised by a belief that it is ‘natural’ for people to live amongst others of ‘their own kind’ and a corresponding hostility towards the presence of people of a ‘different’ kind’ (Rydgren, 2003, p. 48). Rydgren (2004) suggests that these attitudes come from two types of erroneous references. Firstly, stereotyping, where people draw false conclusions about individuals based on the social group the individual belongs to, and secondly,

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23 ‘inductive strategies and heuristics’, where people draw false conclusions about social groups and categories based on observations of individual instances. These referencing processes are often used when people who lack knowledge need to form quick social categorisation in order to process information about someone or something (Rydgren, 2004), and both types of xenophobic referencing would likely create a negative view of China’s rise within UK society.

This is heavily linked to populism, and populism in general has returned as a force since the 1990s in a number of areas, including radical right-wing populism in Western Europe (Filc, 2011). ‘Populism is a defining characteristic of the new radical right’, with accusations aimed at ‘elites’ of putting internationalism ahead of the interests of the nation (Rydgren, 2007, p. 245). This can lift latent xenophobia (unarticulated negative stereotypes and beliefs) to a manifest level (more elaborated beliefs and attitudes, with a higher level of consciousness), in particular through the existence of a well-known radical right-wing populist party (Rydgren, 2003). This occurs firstly due to the influence that it has on existing political actors, often causing them to shift to the right (see the Conservatives shift to react to the rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) (Meredith, 2013)), and in doing so the existing political actors legitimise these views. This means that xenophobic beliefs may spread to those who previously would not have voiced such views due to the stigma attached (Rydgren, 2003, p. 46). In addition, because there is a different political ideology or ‘line of thought’, radical right-wing parties offer a frame for people’s unarticulated xenophobic beliefs to be articulated (Rydgren, 2003, p. 61).

This evidence therefore suggests that ‘the new radical right-wing parties share a core of ethno-nationalist xenophobia and antiestablishment populism’ (Rydgren, 2007, p. 242). This suggests both that there is a latent xenophobia in Western Europe that will influence attitudes (albeit most likely in an unarticulated way) but also that the rise of radical right-wing parties can exacerbate this xenophobia. Also, it could also be said that the media could also play a similar role as a political party in legitimising and articulating xenophobic views, which is something that is very relevant to the UK case.

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24 3.2.2. The Influence of Populist Xenophobia on Trade Policy as an Example

This section shows how populist xenophobia can influence people’s policy preferences, looking at the example of trade. This is relevant to the UK-China case firstly as it shows how people’s perceptions of China can be influenced by populist xenophobia, and also because trade policy towards China is a particularly important sector of policy that will therefore likely be influenced by populist xenophobia. It is also relevant in suggesting that the reason for the populist xenophobia is an elite-non-elite divide, which is a key prediction that arises from this theory.

There is a large amount of evidence to suggest that populist xenophobia influences attitudes towards trade, with ‘high degrees of neighbourhood attachment and nationalism/patriotism... associated with protectionist tendencies’ (Mayda & Rodrik, 2005, p. 1393). These attitudes are linked to pride in one’s country, a sense of national superiority as well as to extremely antagonistic views towards those who are not part of the nation (O'Rourke, Sinnott, Richardson, & Rodrik, 2001). ‘There is little support for free trade among people... who feel that members of other ethnic and racial groups are less praiseworthy than their own racial or ethnic group’ (Mansfield & Mutz, 2009, p. 427), and these findings are evident across all countries in the research of O’Rourke, Sinnott, Richardson and Rodrik (2001).

These attitudes are widely attributed to limited education, which suggests an elite-non-elite divide. There are a number of theories as to why this is the case, but there is undoubtedly a clear link (Mansfield & Mutz, 2009, p. 452). One example of such a theory is that there are socialisation effects, and that a college education in particular creates these more tolerant, cosmopolitan views of the world, suggesting further evidence of an elite-non-elite divide (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2006). This demonstrates the link between populism and xenophobia and its impact upon policy preferences and now evidence of these kinds of attitudes in the UK will be discussed to see whether it is an issue that could influence people’s views of China’s rise.

3.2.3 Populist Xenophobia in the UK

In the UK context, there is still a lot of evidence that racism and xenophobia are fairly widespread; ‘racism itself has not gone away... racism is not a relic’ (Fox, 2013, p.

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25 1873); ‘In contemporary Britain there are a plethora of suitable enemies’ (Cole, 2009, p. 1671). Evidence of this is found in the continued racialisation of blacks and Asians, for example in police ‘stop and searches’ (Cole, 2009), and in that the UK has experienced a general upward trend in racist crime, albeit it is hard to deduce whether this is due to better recording of crimes or more racist crime (EUMC, 2007). Further to this, the British National Party (BNP), the most radical of the right-wing parties has made ‘dramatic inroads’ in British politics, rising from no councillors in 2002 to over 50 in 2008 and gaining two Members of the European Parliament in the 2009 European elections (Rhodes, 2011) (albeit they had less positive results in the more recent elections (Goodwin, 2014)). All of this evidence points to fairly widespread populist xenophobia in the UK and as much as the BNP plays some role, the role of the media is larger. ‘Hostility has been fanned by the tabloid media’ (Fox, 2013, p. 1871), with their articles reinforcing the prevailing cultural assumptions about the world of their readers, and therefore contributing to a culture of exclusion, in particular but not exclusively based on skin colour (Fox, Morosanu, & Szilassy, 2012). However, it can be said that xenophobia in the UK is popular regardless of the BNP or tabloid press, with Tusa (1996) arguing that ‘British xenophobia... needs little boosting from the press. It is endemic.’

There is also evidence that there is an elite-non-elite divide in the UK in terms of xenophobia, which has been explored in particular by Fenton (2012). He divides ethnic majority views in the UK into two distinct orientations; ‘resentful nationalist’ and ‘liberal cosmopolitan’ (Fenton, 2012). The first orientation is associated with resentment at the direction of social change, with anti-immigration, anti-foreign and anti-multicultural attitudes (Fenton, 2012, p. 466). This is evident in the rise of UKIP, which promotes these attitudes through what they have framed as anti-establishment populism (Barber, 2013; Watt, 2013). The second orientation does not feel this sense of frustration and is a broadly more liberal view with comparatively open attitudes towards the outside world (Fenton, 2012, p. 466). These orientations are generally divided on the basis of success and education (Fenton, 2012, p. 479). This represents evidence of an elite-non-elite divide and this is the key implication

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26 that will be used in this research from this theoretical framework, and these implications and subsequent predictions will now be discussed.

3.2.4. Theoretical Predictions

This theory would predict as a result of the above analysis that the elites (represented in this research by political and business elites) will have a more positive view of China’s rise than the general public, with the xenophobia creating a sense of fear amongst the general public about China’s rise that the elites will be much less prone to.

This is due to a number of reasons. Firstly, political elites will automatically be opposed to populist parties that challenge their authority and threaten them electorally. Admittedly, they may shift their views to some extent in order to stop voters defecting to right-wing parties like UKIP and the BNP but they will still have a more positive view of China’s rise than the non-elite supporters of these parties. Further to this, the role of the tabloid media is most likely to influence views in the non-elite section of society, as non-elites are much more likely to read tabloids and not read the broadsheet newspapers, with both business and political elites more likely to read the broadsheet newspapers. This is because ‘media coverage generates the perception of China’s rise that the reader gains, given that it is one of the most important sources of news for people’ (Zhang L. , 2010). This will mean, as existing literature has proven, that the tabloids (which have a higher circulation due to their non-elite appeal) will reinforce the existing views of their readership, while the broadsheets will to some extent do the same for the elites. Finally, the political and business elites are likely to have higher education and to be wealthier than the general public, and therefore will have more positive views about the world at large and be more cosmopolitan. This fits in with the research on trade described above and also with Fenton’s (2012) distinction between ‘resentful nationalists’ and ‘liberal cosmopolitans’, with the political and business elites in the latter category and the general public to a large extent in the former.

Whilst sections of the general public may in fact be in the latter category, there are still a large number that will have had their views influenced by populist

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27 xenophobia. Therefore, the elites should have a more positive view of China’s rise as a result of this populist xenophobia influencing the general public, of which much evidence has been presented both in general and in the UK context. Therefore, in contrast to power transition theory, this theory predicts that there are heterogeneous views on China, and that the political and business elites in the UK will have a more positive view of China’s rise and see it as more of an opportunity than a threat than the general public or non-elites.

In sum, if the theory of populist xenophobia is correct, I would therefore expect there to be an elite-general public divide in views of China’s rise, with the elite view more positive than the general public view.

Hypothesis 2: The UK’s view of China’s rise is heterogeneous, with a more positive view amongst the elites than within the general public

3.3. Political Economy

Finally, I relate to a third theoretical perspective that has different implications and may also help to explain potential heterogeneity in UK views about China’s rise. In this instance, the prediction is that economic interests form preferences and that this is likely to lead to business elites having the most positive view of China’s rise given that it presents a large economic opportunity. This discussion focuses on attitudes towards trade and protectionism in this regard, and the first two approaches to be discussed are the Ricardian and Stolper-Samuelson ones.

3.3.1 Ricardian v. Stolper-Samuelson Approaches

These two positions are briefly summarised by VanGrasstek (2011) as such; ‘in a Ricardian or sectoral system, the decision of whether or not to open markets will depend on the relative political strength of the industries that favour or oppose this move’; ‘In a Stolper-Samuelson or factor-based approach, we should expect liberalisation to be more popular among those whose skill sets and other

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28 endowments are most likely to thrive in an open market, and to be opposed by those who fear being left behind’ (VanGrasstek, 2011, p. 5).

The Ricardian or sectoral system therefore suggests that people’s opinions on whether there should be protectionism or free trade is based on the industry in which they work, with the assumption of utility maximisation meaning that ‘owners of both labour and capital within a given industry tend to take the same position on protectionist measures’ (Cassing, McKeown, & Ochs, 1986, p. 844). This means that those who work in an industry that is export-oriented will likely support free trade, where as those who work in an industry adversely affected by import competition will likely support protectionism, and these results are evident in Irwin’s (1994) study of the 1906 British general election. This is a good case study as the election was effectively a referendum on trade policy (Irwin, 1994), much as it is clearly somewhat outdated. However, this finding is also backed up by Scheve and Slaughter’s (2001) more recent research, which found that employment in industries more exposed to trade, measured by tariff rates of net exports, was an indicator of opposition to new trade barriers.

In contrast, the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, originating in their 1941 study, suggests that the divide is based on the factors of production, with those that have a skill-set better suited to gaining from trade more likely to favour free trade and those who fear that they might lose out more likely to favour protectionism; ‘pro-trade preferences are significantly and robustly correlated with an individual’s level of human capital’ (Mayda & Rodrik, 2005, p. 1393). Further evidence of this is found in Milner and Tingley’s (2011) of American preferences which found that districts with large percentages of high-skill workers had the highest level of support for international engagement in trade, and in Hainmueller and Hiscox’s (2006) study which found that those with a college education are much more likely to favour trade openness. This means that business elites would most likely have a more positive view of free trade.

However, despite this theoretical divide, there are some suggestions of a synthesis, indicating that both factors and industry of production can play a role. This is evident in Mayda and Rodrik’s (2005) article, which suggests that both play a role

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29 in people’s views. Beaulieu (2002) also follows this argument; ‘Factors of production are found to be important determinants of preferences on trade policy. However, the industry of employment also helps determine preferences on trade policy’ (Beaulieu, 2002, p. 99). This synthesis that both theories can help explain views on trade policy is what will be used, and its link to the UK views of China more generally will be explained later.

3.3.2. The Decline of Protectionism (Milner)

The synthesis described above is also evident in Helen Milner’s ‘Resisting Protection’ (1988), which is the basis of the main political economic predictions of this research. She was researching the contradiction that economic conditions in the 1970s and early 1980s were ones that according to traditional theory would lead to protectionism (as had happened in the 1920s), and yet in this period the major advanced industrial countries maintained relatively open markets (Milner, 1988). In keeping with the Ricardian perspective, she suggests that internationally oriented firms have resisted ‘protectionist urges’ better than domestically oriented firms, but also suggests that there has been a ‘change in the way domestic and international economies are integrated’, which has increased economic interdependence since World War II (Milner, 1988, p. 15). ‘In the 1970s many more industries resisted protectionist urges, despite the economic turmoil, because they were deeply tied to the international economy’ (Milner, 1988, p. 16).

Milner suggests that this has occurred because of two key reasons; firms’ export dependence and multinationality. Export dependence refers to the ties that a firm has to the international economy that arise from its trade relations. Multinationality refers to the significance of the firm’s production capacity and profits in foreign markets in comparison to the domestic market and thus the firm’s vulnerability to changes affecting its foreign operations (Milner, 1988). This is often indicated by levels of intrafirm trade, with high levels of intrafirm trade indicating ‘a significant attachment to the international economy’ (Milner, 1988, p. 21). Therefore, protectionism would cause multinationals (which are an increasing proportion of businesses) the problems of closed markets and the disrupted trade

The UK’s view of China’s rise : homogeneity or heterogeneity in opinion?