A Multi-Level Approach to Counteract Islamic Radicalization
in the City of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Master Thesis Conflict, Resolution & Governance
University of Amsterdam: Graduate School of Social Sciences.
Author: Rosa T.J. de Jong (10075658) Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Anja J. van Heelsum Second Reader: Dr. K.M.H.D. Roex
Word Count: 23703
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ABSTRACT – This thesis seeks to provide an understanding of the multi-level approach on de-radicalization implemented by the municipality of Amsterdam by testing whether its policies on de-radicalization match work in practice. This research focuses on three levels of policy that can be derived from the model of the process of radicalization created by Slootman and Tillie in 2006. These three levels are: the breeding ground for radicalization, the deepening of religion, and the legitimate use of violence. Interviews with actors on all three levels of policy provide an insight into the way different actors operate in counteracting and preventing Islamic radicalization in Amsterdam. Besides, it provides an understanding of the way these actors perceive the helpfulness of their work. It turns out that most respondents find their work relevant and helpful in counteracting Islamic radicalization in their city. Moreover, it is evident that the municipality of Amsterdam adheres partially to the theory of the model of the process of radicalization in its policies. Particularly in the policies on preventing radicalization, the municipality aligns with this theory. In its policies on intervention, the municipality follows a slightly different approach, mainly because of the principle of the division between church and state in the Netherlands.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS – Before presenting my final thesis I would like to take the opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to several people. First of all, I would like to sincerely thank my respondents for devoting their time and effort to my research. Without them I would not have been able to conduct a thorough analysis. Secondly, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Anja van Heelsum for supervising my work. Thank you for always having constructive and critical feedback on my thesis. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. David Laws for expressing his passion for conflict during the Master Conflict, Resolution & Governance and the fact that he was always ready to guide any of the students in the right direction.
3 Table of Content 1. Introduction ... 5 2. Theoretical framework ... 8 2.1 Radicalization ... 8 2.2 Salafism ... 10
2.3 Social Categorization Theory ... 11
2.4 Identity ... 12
2.5 Policies on radicalization ... 14
2.5.1 National level policies ... 15
2.5.2 Municipal level policies ... 16
2.5.3 The large-scale approach ... 19
2.5.4 Current municipal policy paper ... 20
2.6 The division of church and state ... 22
2.7 The model of the process of radicalization ... 24
2.8 Research questions ... 27
3. Research methods ... 28
3.1 Research design and methods ... 28
3.2 Research area and units of analysis ... 28
3.3 Operationalization ... 29
3.4 Data collection ... 30
3.5 Limitations ... 31
4. Policies to diminish the breeding ground for radicalization ... 32
4.1 Two accounts of employees of the municipality ... 32
4.2 The role of secondary education in de-radicalization policies ... 35
4.3 The role of anti-discrimination projects in de-radicalization policies ... 38
4.4 From polarization towards dialogue and connection ... 39
4.5 Women’s organization targeting the participation of migrant women ... 41
4.6 Conclusion on the breeding ground policies ... 43
5. Policies on interventions in religion ... 46
5.1 The role of key figures in de-radicalization policies ... 46
5.2 The municipality and intervention in religion ... 48
5.3 Towards a moderate Islam ... 50
5.4 Interreligious activities and their contribution to de-radicalization ... 51
5.5 Conclusion on policies on interventions in religion ... 53
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6.1 The role of the police in de-radicalization policies ... 55
6.2 The role of the Public Prosecutor in de-radicalization policies... 58
6.3 Conclusion on policies on interventions on violence ... 60
7. Conclusion ... 62
Bibliography ... 66
5 1. Introduction
“We always emphasize that we cannot completely prevent an attack originating from radicalization. We can take away the breeding ground by focusing on exclusion and discrimination etc. We have to try that as much as possible. But it remains hard to take it away completely. I regard radicalization as a kind of market of supply and demand. Often radical youngsters are people who are dealing with existential questions, identity issues” (Respondent 1, quote 1).
The quote above is from an employee of the municipality of Amsterdam made during one of the interviews for this research. It encompasses the main attitude towards Islamic de-radicalization in Amsterdam. All efforts that are executed to prevent de-radicalization can never completely ensure that a terrorist attack is ruled out, or that individuals will not proceed in a process of radicalization at all. However, the main focus of the municipality and its partners in de-radicalization policies is prevention and intervention. This introduction will provide some context for this research and the topic of radicalization. The following section will touch upon the international level. Then I will zoom in on the situation in the Netherlands. Finally, this introduction will consider the situation in Amsterdam, which is the focus of this research.
International level
Terrorist attacks and the fear for extremism is nothing new. Although fear of radicalizing Muslims has been present since the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the more recent events generated renewed concerns. The most recent terrorist attacks in Europe at the beginning of 2015, were on the editorial staff of the satirical French magazine Charlie Hebdo, a Jewish supermarket in Paris and in Copenhagen during a demonstration for freedom of speech.
These events have set in motion extensive media coverage of Islamic extremism and radicalizing youth in cities, and has stimulated negative debates about Islam and Muslims. Muslims are being asked to express their disgust about terrorist attacks and to express that they as good Muslims are separated from the radicalized Muslims. Nowadays, not dissociating from this radicalization seems to mean that you are an extremist yourself. Feelings of fear and incomprehension increase polarization in cities. Some people have the idea that their democratic society is under attack. The fear of extremism and radicalization is noticeable in the Netherlands as well. Although there have not been any recent attacks in the country itself, the proximity of the latest attacks in Europe have an impact on the inhabitants.
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The Netherlands
Since the war in Syria, and the rise of Islamic State (IS) in the Middle East, the Netherlands has been dealing with radicalized Muslims who are willing to join IS in Syria, and comply with their ideology. The Dutch intelligence services are very busy nowadays keeping an eye on these potentially dangerous Muslims, who could turn violent. The Current Threat Level in the Netherlands has been set at ‘substantial’ since March 2013. This means that the chance of a terrorist attack in the Netherlands is realistic (NCTV-c 2014).
In the Netherlands, a large percentage of Muslim residents live in cities like Amsterdam and The Hague. The attacks and their media coverage have triggered debates about Islam and prevention of radicalization among young people. It has evoked a sense of fear in Dutch society towards Muslims in general. The indication of Muslims as possible threats has consequences for the way Muslims identify themselves (Tillie et al. 2009). Their sense of belonging to the Netherlands might decline if they have the feeling that the ‘ethnic’ Dutch are against Muslims and their religion. If residents start perceiving the population as an ‘us-them’ division, polarization of society could increase, which would enhance alienation of certain groups in society, with the potential of further radicalization as a consequence.
Especially the larger cities in the Netherlands are dealing with the issue of radicalization. Every city has different characteristics and adapts its policies to its current situation, but the main centers of counteracting radicalization are Amsterdam and The Hague.
The municipality of Amsterdam
After the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004 in the east of Amsterdam, the city’s municipality started a de-radicalization policy. Because of the murder, performed by a radicalized Muslim, a general fear of Muslims increased. Negative media coverage about Islam enhanced the us-them idea of Muslims and Dutch people. Dutch Muslims felt as if they were automatically perceived as bad because of their religion. The municipality tried to prevent polarization occurring. In order to prevent further escalation of this looming conflict, the municipality of Amsterdam made an effort to effectively address the crisis. Policies targeted at the Muslim population were the result (Van Heelsum 2009). It created lots of activities and initiatives for and by young Muslims.
These initiatives still exist nowadays. Young people are of particular interest, since they are perceived as the most vulnerable and most easily influenced by radical thoughts. The municipality tries to involve schools, parents, civil society and Islamic organizations in its plans to address radicalizing Muslims. Its aim is to make sure that radical thoughts have no chance
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of becoming dangerous (Gemeente Amsterdam 2009: 2). By organizing debates about radical ideas, young people are taught to dispute and refute ideas, so that they will not immediately believe these thoughts. The municipality argues that one needs to take away the breeding ground for radicalization in order to stop it. This breeding ground is based on multiple factors: the perception of discrimination and marginalization; polarization between groups of the population; and limited social cohesion (ibid). The municipality identifies the breeding ground as one of the most important points of focus to address radicalization.
Since Islamic radicalization is a topic that involves religion, the municipality of Amsterdam faces an obstacle. The municipality has the job to make sure there is a separation of church and state (see section 2.6). However, it is not always possible to execute policies without blurring this boundary (Dijkman et al. 2014: 4). In order to prevent radicalization and extremism, it is necessary to interfere in religious spheres as well, though it might be done indirectly.
Because of the recent terrorist attacks and the growing fear for extremism and radicalization in cities, this research touches upon an important societal issue. More understanding about the way the municipality of Amsterdam addresses radicalization and how this plays out in practice can give new insights for future policies. Although there is a lot of research being carried out on radicalization, there has not been a thorough understanding of how the municipality stimulates participation of other organizations (such as mosques, youth workers, police, and schools) in order to reach its aimed goals, without violating the division between church and state.
It is relevant to examine the policies on de-radicalization of the municipality and learn whether its employees consider their work helpful in counteracting radicalization. It is, therefore, academically relevant to do research on how municipalities address radicalization in their cities. The aim of this research is to learn from the perspective of the employees of the municipality of Amsterdam how complex and controversial issues like Islamic radicalization are being dealt with, and to test whether the policies on de-radicalization match work in practice. Therefore, the main research question of this research is: How does the municipality of Amsterdam counteract Islamic radicalization using the phase model of Slootman and Tillie, and do its employees perceive their work as helpful?
8 2. Theoretical framework
In this chapter I will treat several core theories that are relevant for answering the main research question. In order to find out how the municipality deals with radicalization, it is first of all important to have a clear definition of what radicalization is. This definition will be examined in section 2.1. Furthermore, there are some related concepts that are important to define clearly since they can be causes of radicalization. Therefore, the concepts of Salafism (2.2), Social Categorization Theory (2.3), and identity (2.4) will be discussed in detail.
Then, in section 2.5, I will consider the different policies on radicalization in the Netherlands, and especially within the municipality of Amsterdam. Subsequently, in section 2.6, the issue of the division between church and state and its consequences for Dutch policy will be discussed. Section 2.7 will examine the model of the process of radicalization created for the municipality of Amsterdam. Although all theories treated in this chapter matter for the understanding of radicalization and its policies to diminish it, the theory in section 2.7 is the one used for further analysis in this research. This chapter will close with the presentation of the research questions of this thesis in section 2.8.
2.1 Radicalization
This section will consider the definition of radicalization. In order to find explanations for why people radicalize, it is important to distinguish between two commonly used terms: extremism and radicalism. Extremism can be defined as every opinion and behavior that is opposite of democratic institutions and values (Buijs et al. 2006: 12). Extremism disputes equality of all citizens and propagates that one specific class, ethnic group or religion is chosen and predestined to reign. It defends uniformity against diversity, intolerance against tolerance, order against dialogue, unity against plurality and moreover, it prefers the clarity of violence over the chaos of compromise (ibid).
Radicalism is a term that can be used in both a positive as well as in a negative way. It
can be defined as serious discontent with the existing societal constellation. It entails an image of people and institutions that are responsible for this discontent, and there is an idea of utopia, which provides options for a different world. Furthermore, there is a concept of actors who can bring about this utopian world (ibid: 14).
The term Islamic radicalism entails a political oriented ideology that differs from the non-political Islam. The ideology is based on Salafism but goes beyond it in terms of political aspirations. Islamic radicalism is mostly inspired by Sayyid Qutb and Sayyid Abul A’la
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Mawdudi. They aspired the establishment of an Islamic state with a political system based on Islam (Slootman & Tillie 2006: 18). In other words, Islamic radicalism aims to effectuate a society that is the purest reflection of the core of the original sources of Islam (Gemeente Amsterdam 2007-a: 5). It is used as the groundwork for contemporary jihadism. However, it should be emphasized that there is a difference between orthodoxy and jihadism.
Although there are many factors that can differentiate types of radicalization processes, according to Buijs et al. (2006) there are three general development stages. The first stage is the breach of trust, where trust in the existing government has gone and conflict arises between a group or movement and specific leaders over specific policy. There is not yet an ideological breach, but there is distrust with respect to the ruling class. At the second stage, the legitimacy of the political system itself is disputed instead of its policies. This conflict of legitimacy causes the opposition to formulate an alternative ideological and cultural system that will disparage the ruling regime and its social norms. The last stage is called the legitimacy crisis, and entails that critique on society will be expanded to people who are connected to it. Those persons will be dehumanized and the oppositional radicals will start considering themselves as fighters of Good who fight against Evil (Buijs et al. 2006: 17).
Figure 1: Factors leading to possible radicalization
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The municipality of Amsterdam considers youngsters aged 16 to 18 years old with an average or high level of educational as the most vulnerable and receptive to radicalization (Gemeente Amterdam 2009: 14). The Information Management Center (Informatie Huishouding) of the municipality argues that the combination of questions about life itself, the availability of radical ideas and thoughts, the presence of a breeding ground accompanied with low resilience or ability to resist and dispute certain ideas, together with a personal or societal ‘crisis’ could lead to receptivity and radicalization (ibid). If the availability of radical thoughts corresponds with the need to address questions about life, a cognitive opening is made possible and the process of radicalization begins. Figure 1 above depicts this process.
2.2 Salafism
In this section I will examine the theory around Salafism, which is important to distinguish from jihadism. Buijs et al. describe the development in de last decade of a small group of Moroccan youngsters in the Netherlands who refer to themselves as Salafis and address politics and religion in a very new and different way. Salafism refers to the ancestors and especially the generation of the Prophet Mohammed and the first three Muslim generations that followed. This period in history contained the most pious and devout Muslims. They have participated in the most pure form of Islam and applied this to all aspects of their lives. According to them this would have led to harmony and peace (Buijs et al. 2006: 59). The Salafis advocate the return to pure Islam of the Prophet, since according to them this is the only way to cleanse Islam of all evil. Their interpretation of Islam is a very orthodox one. Therefore, they also dress very specifically and follow strict rules in their daily lives. Their ultimate aim is to install the Islamic laws of the sharia and create an Islamic caliphate.
Interestingly, the Salafis interviewed by Buijs et al. all placed being Muslim as the most important feature of their lives and beings. Some of them identify with multiple ethnicities or identities (Moroccan, Dutch, Muslim), but not all. A small group explicitly identified themselves as being Muslim. Everything that is not Muslim or Islamic is indicated as negative. They explain that they differentiate themselves from the Dutch (ibid: 64). Many of the interviewed Salafis mention to have struggled in the past with their identity. However, the choice of having a primary identity being Muslim provides them with inner peace (ibid: 65).
Furthermore, the research of Buijs et al. points out that these Salafi Muslims are very negative about the media and politicians, that they feel alienated from the Dutch citizens, and feel bitter about the Dutch way of living (ibid: 68). Some of them try to avoid Dutch society. Their formulations of the world are dichotomous, in an ‘us-them’ contrast. Most interviewees
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indicate that they have dealt with discrimination their whole lives, which makes them feel disappointed in society and stimulates feelings of powerlessness (ibid: 110).
Some Salafis who are further developed in their radicalization process argue that violence is legitimized by Allah in order to create an ideal and peaceful world. These Muslims call themselves jihadi Salafis. In jihadism, a ‘good’ Muslim is expected to use violence against non-believers in order to protect their Muslim brothers (ibid: 79). They see themselves as the only ones who stand up for their fellow Muslims. They believe the differences within the Muslim faith need to be eradicated, since there is only one pure Islam. They are strictly against making compromises with non-believers. Everything that is different is considered disbelief and, therefore, needs to be eradicated (ibid: 81). These jihadi Salafis, who legitimize the use of violence to reach their ideological goal, are potentially dangerous individuals in society.
Figure 2: Spectrum of radicalization process
(Source: Slootman & Tillie 2006: 4, translated).
In 2006, Slootman and Tillie were commissioned by the municipality of Amsterdam to conduct research on the processes of radicalization in Amsterdam. They created the model above, which shows that only a very small part of Muslims are potentially dangerous, violent extremists, and that the majority of the population is not likely to undergo a process of radicalization.
2.3 Social Categorization Theory
In order to understand feelings of belonging to society or social groups, and categories of identity I will consider the theory about in-group/out-group, or Social Categorization Theory in this section. The theory elaborated here is mainly based on the work of Tajfel and Turner.
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Social Categorization Theory as defined by Tajfel and Turner creates and defines an
individual’s place in society. “We can conceptualize a group (…) as a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus about the evaluation of their group and of their membership of it” (Tajfel & Turner 1986: 15). Identification with a certain social group is, in that sense, relational and comparative: individuals’ positions are defined in relation to members of other groups. This way, categories of certain groups are created to which only certain people belong.
The concept of social identity is created by a person’s self-image and develops by the social categories the individual perceives him/herself to belong to (ibid). According to Tajfel and Turner, a person strives for a positive self-concept. They claim that social groups and categories are related to positive or negative value connotations. Besides, they argue that the evaluation of one’s own group is based on comparison to other groups (ibid). The group an individual identifies with is called the in-group, while the group that does not belong to the individual’s social category is perceived as the out-group. The in-group is automatically related to a more positive connotation. If the image of the out-group becomes negative, stereotyping occurs (Van Heelsum & Vermeulen 2015: 4).
According to Tajfel and Turner, “when social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will strive either to leave their existing group and join some more positively distinct group and/or to make their existing group more positively distinct” (Tajfel & Turner 1986: 16). In their research, Tajfel and Turner argue that a person’s low social status tends to intensify out-group hostility when groups are socially, politically or economically subordinate (ibid: 12).
2.4 Identity
In this section I will explain the theory around identity, because identity problems are often seen as the first step in the process of radicalization. I will start with explaining the theory of identity by Verkuyten and then combine it with views of other scholars, including Phinney, and Fearon and Latin.
Verkuyten explains that “most societies around the world are, or rapidly are becoming, ethnically and culturally plural. Ethnic diversity challenges the existing social hierarchies and exclusionary conceptions of citizenship, but also leads to a new tribalism that threatens democracy and cohesion” (Verkuyten 2005: 1). Therefore, it seems logical that topics like ethnicity, identity and multiculturalism are debated regularly nowadays by citizens and picked up by the media. Because of globalization, people come more easily into contact with other
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ethnicities. Living in a world with mixed ethnicities, can trigger questions about one’s own identity.
Verkuyten points out that in the Netherlands the position of most ethnic minority groups is lower than the ethnic Dutch (ibid: 7). Their position in the housing market, in schooling and the labor market is relatively bad. This is especially true for the Dutch Moroccans and Dutch Turks: their academic results are the lowest, they have the highest unemployment rates and they are at the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy, so are the least accepted in society (ibid). This division in society is important to keep in mind since it might explain certain feelings or actions.
“Identity is the key word for conceptualizing the relationship between the individual and society”, asserts Verkuyten (ibid: 10). Identity explains how people categorize themselves and others in social settings. Therefore, when societal changes occur issues of identity are emphasized. Identity, as defined by Fearon and Latin refers to a ‘social category’, “and in particular a social category that an individual member either takes a special pride in or views as a more-or-less unchangeable and socially consequential attribute” (Fearon & Latin 2000: 848). The membership rules, valuation and content of identities are the outcome of human action and speech, and therefore, can change over time (ibid). Everything that has to do with the relationship between the individual and society will influence the concept of identity. Hence, political, economic and demographic transformations have an influence on identity. The cultural, ethnic and religious diversity that societies have to deal with urges both authorities and civilians to address the concept of identity (Verkuyten 2005: 11).
Facing diversity, people from ethnic minorities need to find a place in society for their background. How do they express their origin while living up to the standards of the majority population? “Especially young people from ethnic minority groups try to give their own meaning to their ethnic background” (ibid: 11). The background of their parents often does not correspond to the lives they are living. Besides, a feeling of being only partially accepted by the majority group impedes the urge to orient towards that group.
Phinney defines identity as the individual’s sense of self in relation to membership of a certain ethnic group. “Although the term is sometimes used to refer simply to one’s self-label or group affiliation, ethnic identity is generally seen as embracing various aspects, including self-identification, feelings of belongingness and commitment to a group, a sense of shared values and attitudes towards one’s own ethnic group” (Phinney et al. 2001: 496). Societal changes have an influence on the individual’s ethnic identity because of the changing value that is put to it. “Ethnic identities are not simply the products of ethnic assignments imposed by
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others or assertions made by people themselves, but the result of the interaction between the two” (ibid: 18).
Muslim young people in the Netherlands are the second generation of Muslim immigrants that entered the country in the 1970s (Van Heelsum 2009: 7). The majority of Muslim young people in the Netherlands grow up in areas where Muslim communities are concentrated. While they mostly go to regular schools and live in Dutch society, they also have close contact with other cultural values, taught to them by their parents, family members and members of their cultural community. On the one hand they are Dutch citizens participating in a Western, democratic society with a welfare state. On the other hand they are Muslims participating in the cultural habits of the Moroccan or Turkish community. Although the two idenities could exist symbiotically, negative debates in society can stimulate a sense of having to choose. Benet-Martínez and Haritatos (2005) refer to this as bicultural identity. “Biculturalism can be associated with feelings of pride, uniqueness, and a rich sense of community and history, while also bringing to mind identity confusion, dual expectations, and value clashes” (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos 2005: 1017). Furthermore, biculturals often deal with racial stereotypes and prejudices, different expectations from their communities and negative debates in the media.
In contrast to the theory of biculturalism, Saharso and Ersanili (2001) argue that the identification of immigrants consists of two dimensions: identification with the settlement country, and ethnic identification. Since identity is a multilayered concept, Saharso and Ersanili argue that a person cannot be torn between cultures, but is able to effectively combine two cultures. There are factors that can influence a person to identify more strongly with one side, such as experiences of discrimination, socio-economic factors, segregation and national integration policies (Saharso & Ersanili 2001: 908). However, an individual will never have to feel torn between identities according to Saharso and Ersanili.
2.5 Policies on radicalization
There are all kinds of options for policymakers to address radicalization in society. Here, I will first explore the national policies on radicalization in the Netherlands. Then I will proceed by zooming in on policies that were developed by the municipality of Amsterdam. Within this second section, I will start by elaborating on policy that was implemented a few years ago and explain how it developed into the policy that is implemented nowadays.
Although repression of youngsters who want to join terrorist organization seems logical, several academics argue that this is counter-productive and will cause alienation from society.
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They claim that it is crucial to keep in contact with the people who join these organizations to prevent polarization in society (Van Ginkel 2014). To predict who and when someone is going to radicalize is extremely hard. Therefore, policymakers face a difficult task adapting their policies. However, there is one main focus in every policy, which is trying to distinguish: “the point and circumstances where negative attitudes transform into actual violent behavior” (Van Heelsum & Vermeulen 2015: 4).
2.5.1 National level policies
In August 2014, a new policy was implemented by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) at the Dutch national government level: An Integrated Approach to
Jihadism. The aim of this policy is threefold: (1) protection of the democratic rule of law; (2)
tackling and weakening jihadist movements in the Netherlands; (3) removing the breeding ground for radicalization (NCTV 2014-b). The Integrated Approach to Jihadism focuses on intensification of collaboration and information exchange between national and local government levels. The national level expands its knowledge of prevention of radicalization and controlling societal tensions. The local level has the essential task of identifying people in the municipalities who are radicalizing, and then intervening. The NCTV developed a form of assistance to support municipalities in developing a local approach to counteract radicalization (NCTV 2014-d).
According to the NCTV, prevention entails the stimulation of de-radicalization. However, it distinguishes between de-radicalization and disengagement. De-radicalization means that an individual goes from being extreme to adhering to the democratic society, and so implies the abjuration of extremist thought. Disengagement entails coming loose from the extremist sphere of influence (NCTV 2014-d: 27). Within disengagement, though radical behavior is renounced, the individual still thinks in a radical way (Gemeente Amsterdam 2012: 6). According to the NCTV the municipalities should focus on disengagement, since that is more feasible than de-radicalization.
In 2010, the national government indicated that jihadism in the Netherlands had decreased. Nowadays there is a different view. The dynamics of jihadism have developed in a few years’ time, thanks mainly to the use of social media, which has caused the movement to change in character and cohesion. The Dutch intelligence services describe this character as the dynamics of a swarm (AIVD 2014: 23; NCTV 2014-e). There is a less hierarchical structure and a less present leadership. It cannot be described as a network, since its structure is more fluid. Members of the movement have de-centralized self-control. The resultant ongoing
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horizontal and reciprocal interference by friends, family, neighbors, and peers in the online and offline world proves to be very influential. Groups of people can be very quickly mobilized. This makes the jihadist movement more flexible, more maneuverable and less vulnerable to ‘attacks’ from the outside (AIVD 2014: 23). The government expresses that merely focusing on individuals is ineffective in tackling jihadism in the Netherlands. A more effective strategy is to disturb the accretion of new members to the movement. This strategy is considered to be a long-term approach (ibid: 28).
2.5.2 Municipal level policies
In the following sections, I will elaborate on the two latest policy papers at the time of writing (June 2015) authored by the municipality of Amsterdam. I will start with the older policy paper that was put into action in 2007, called Amsterdam Against Radicalization. In section 2.5.3, a further explanation of the ‘large-scale’ approach will be given, followed by a description of the administrative and criminal approach. Section 2.5.4 discusses the current policy paper, Reorientation Radicalization and Polarization Policy (2012) and explains how it developed from the 2007 paper.
Amsterdam has been conducting an anti-terrorism policy since 2004 under the responsibility of ‘The Triangle’, namely the municipality of Amsterdam, the police and the Public Prosecutor, who work closely together. In 2004, Amsterdam set in motion a ‘large-scale approach’ to tackle radicalization. The municipality considers itself the foremost accountable actor for addressing the process of radicalization (Meldpunt Radicalisering 2015). The mayor is responsible for the entire policy. When radicalization transforms into (the preparation of) terrorism, the police and the Department of Justice take over. The municipality currently defines Islamic radicalization as a very serious problem, which may lead to the use of violence, but also some grave societal issues. The municipality argues that incidents of radicalization can cause citizens or groups of citizens to polarize immensely and lose their trust in the rule of law (Gemeente Amsterdam 2012).
The main points of emphasis in the policy paper Amsterdam Against Radicalization are: (1) early identification/de-radicalization; (2) increasing resilience; and (3) diminishing the breeding ground (Gemeente Amsterdam 2007-a: 8). It expresses three target groups: the radical, the seeker, and the setting. Furthermore, it emphasizes that intensive cooperation with civil society organizations such as education, youth workers, and ‘key figures’ is very important to construct an inclusive approach (ibid: 19).
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A key figure is a concept created by the municipality of Amsterdam, and can be regarded as a form of a community leader. An example of a key figure is a local imam who is able to connect with the person in question because of their shared religious background, but who is also able to discourage extreme developments. However, it can also be a student with a Muslim background, who wants to make an effort for his/her community. In other words, anyone who wants to contribute to his/her community can become a key figure.
‘Radicalization’ in the policy paper Amsterdam Against Radicalization is described as a large societal problem and a realistic risk to the stability of society. The paper defines radicalization as: “the growing willingness to pursue and/or support far-reaching changes in society that do not align with the democratic legal order and/or whereby undemocratic means are being used” (ibid: 5). Radicalization is perceived to be a process whereby a person increasingly becomes influenced by radical thought and eventually becomes a jihadi, willing to use violence in order to reach ideological goals. This means that behavior and expressions can change over time under the influence of personal developments, interpersonal processes, changes in supply of radical thoughts, and changes in (international) circumstances (Gemeente Amsterdam 2012: 6). Polarization is defined as “the sharpening of contradictions between groups in society that can result in tensions between those groups and increase segregation along ethnic and religious boundaries” (Gemeente Amsterdam 2007-a: 18).
The policy paper of 2007 emphasizes that there is a difference between being orthodox and being radical. Whereas orthodoxy is profession of religious life, radicalism aspires for change in society. The paper explains that orthodoxy does not automatically lead to political discontent and potential radicalism, and makes clear that it is crucial to learn about the political ideology and the goal that one aspires for identifying radicalism.
In 2006, research was carried out by the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) to gain more understanding of processes of radicalization. It offered several important recommendations for action against radicalization (Slootman & Tillie 2006: 6): (1) increasing societal trust; (2) increasing political trust; (3) increasing religious resilience; (4) contact with radical youth. Slootman and Tillie argue that trust in society and politics needs to be reinforced so that youngsters will not sway from democratic society. Radicalization is a process of de-legitimization, whereby an individual loses trust in society (ibid: 110). Besides, they explain that it is important to find a way to show the diversity of Islam to society and stimulate debates about religion. Young people must be prevented from seeing society in a dichotomous worldview, since this stimulates an us-them feeling. They need to be taught that Islam is not a political controversy. Slootman and Tillie explicitly stress the importance of cooperating with
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and supporting mosques in addressing radicalization. However, they also emphasize the fact that radicalization is a social phenomenon, which makes it crucial not to lose contact with youngsters. If youngsters isolate from society, the boundary between radicalism and extremism will become smaller (ibid: 7).
Furthermore, Slootman and Tillie recommended performing a large-scale approach to reduce the breeding ground for radicalization. This implies that measures such as projects focused on integration, participation, cohesion, bonding might at first not look like they are aimed at tackling radicalization, but aim to reduce the breeding ground for radicalization (Gemeente Amsterdam 2007-a: 6). Crucial in the large-scale approach is cooperation with key figures and religious organizations in society (see section 2.5.3).
Slootman and Tillie, argue that there are two central motivations for radicalization. The first is expressed as a religious dimension, the very orthodox practice of Islam. The second dimension is a political one, which entails the idea that Muslims are being treated unjustly and unfairly by society and politicians, and that this threatens Muslims and Islam (Slootman & Tillie 2006: 4). They concluded that an increased risk to radicalization derives from the combination of these two dimensions (ibid; Gemeente Amsterdam 2007-a: 21). Inhabitants of Amsterdam who adhere to these two dimensions, thus combining religion with a political incentive, are likely to undergo a process of radicalization.
In order to address radicalization it is important to take the context of the setting into account. For the analysis of the Amsterdam context, three relatively independent developments are identified in the policy paper: demand, supply, and breeding ground. The process of radicalization starts when demand matches supply. Put differently, when an individual internalizes extremist thoughts, he or she starts in the radicalization process. The breeding ground facilitates the possibility of this process. A breeding ground is created by frustrations. When perceptions of different groups in society clash, polarization can occur.
An important aspect in the process of radicalization explained in the policy paper of 2007 is the personal crisis as a turning point. In a normal situation, a person can decide to disregard extremist thoughts. However, there are moments when natural resilience has been weakened. This moment is called a personal crisis. The personal crisis causes a person to not experience the radical thoughts as irrational extremism, but as a welcome alternative that depicts a more realistic reproduction of reality and promises a better and righteous future (ibid: 18). The quest for identity and truth leads many youngsters to search on the Internet, where they can find a strong and convincing offer of radical answers to their questions.
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The cumulative frustrations of Muslims and non-Muslims in Amsterdam are indicated by the municipality as part of the breeding ground. The clash between perceptions of Muslims and non-Muslims causes polarization in the city. Among Muslims a wide-spread frustration about the way Muslims are treated dominates. There is a perception of injustice: discrimination, exclusion, polarization and limited future prospects. In the media, Muslims are often negatively depicted. Furthermore, frustration about international conflicts whereby Muslims suffer, including unjust treatment by the West in these countries, stimulate negative feelings towards Dutch society (ibid: 20). Among non-Muslims in Amsterdam a sense of discomfort and sometimes fear and frustration about Muslims dominates. These feelings are being stimulated by incidents and events that have nothing to do with Islam itself, but are being perceived as such. This causes a reinforcement of negative images and associations about all Muslims (ibid).
There is a large supply of politically extremist thoughts that present as the religious truth (ibid). Next to the religious messages, they claim to offer the reader societal truth and tell the reader how to act accordingly. This message is not being spread by Amsterdam mosques. It is mainly available on the Internet, but is also being spread by local young adherents and experienced preachers. The explanation of breeding ground, presence of questions, and presence of supply of radical thoughts discussed here are also depicted in figure 1 (section 2.1).
2.5.3 The large-scale approach
Since 2004, the municipality of Amsterdam carries out a ‘large-scale approach’ to tackle radicalization. The approach is wide-ranging, having a spectrum from repressive to preventive and specific to generic. The following table shows this spectrum.
Table 1: Type of intervention per case
The ‘doers’ are the people of whom intelligence services suspect will use violence to realize their ideological goals. When offenses are being committed, prosecution will follow. The task of actively retaining the actions of the doers will be delegated to the police. The doers will have to be actively de-radicalized and re-connected to Dutch society in a positive way. The ‘thinkers’
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are the people who do not use violence (yet), but are increasingly adhering to radical thoughts.
Specific interventions will be carried out on an individual basis to make these individuals more
resilient and empowered. The ‘seekers’ are people who are vulnerable to radicalization, most of whom are struggling with their identity. They have to be taught how to become more resilient to radical thoughts (Gemeente Amsterdam 2007-a: 7).
A general preventive approach is focused on the group in society that is being affected by negative developments that damage their bonds with the rest of society. In order to prevent them from becoming radicalized, the breeding ground for discontent will have to be addressed. Reciprocal tolerance and acceptance is stimulated (ibid). The city districts are entrusted with the task of carrying out these measures.
The policy paper of 2007 distinguishes between two types of approaches within the government: the administrative approach and the criminal approach (ibid: 17). The administrative approach focuses on the risks and effects of radicalization that cannot be prosecuted criminally (see figure 3 below). This administrative approach is complex. It is crucial that the interpretation of information is being dealt with carefully. Society can be confronted with radical ideas or expressions that are not prosecutable. The potential negative consequences of ideas and expressions require continuous administrative attention. The questions, worries and fears that derive hereof need to be addressed adequately in order to avert unwanted effects. This is part of the administrative approach.
Figure 3: Administrative and criminal level approach within The Triangle
2.5.4 Current municipal policy paper
In 2012, a revision of the municipal policy from 2007 entitled Reorientation Radicalization and Polarization Policy was published. The policy on radicalization requires a continuous process
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of revising and reflecting since reality develops as well. Time and again the municipality questions whether the policy still matches the nature and size of the issues.
In Reorientation Radicalization and Polarization Policy, the administrative approach, as discussed above, is placed at the center of policy. Furthermore, the deficits of the large-scale approach are acknowledged. The paper’s aim is to develop a more specific approach towards radicalization, although the large-scale approach is not abandoned completely. The municipality leaves the wide-ranging topics to other partners and focuses itself on radicalization and polarization specifically. The same definition of radicalization and polarization are used as in the 2007 policy. The three main points of action in this policy are: (1) early identification & de-radicalization; (2) monitoring tensions in society & developing specific interventions; (3) specific projects to decrease the breeding ground for radicalization (Gemeente Amsterdam 2012: 31).
According to this 2012 paper, radicalization includes the absence and/or intolerance of other groups in society, or people of different descents, sexual orientation, or belief. An extreme act can result in increasing polarization since the whole group in society will be held responsible for it. Polarization could influence the ontological search and frustrations of youngsters in a negative way and increase their receptivity for radicalization. The breeding ground for polarization and radicalization overlap, and therefore, the approaches overlap too (ibid: 8).
The paper also explains that the breeding ground for radicalization incorporates the development and the congregation within communities of feelings of frustration, isolation, deprivation, experienced discrimination, hostility, humiliation, inequality, experienced and perceived injustice or subordination (ibid: 9). In other words, the breeding ground consists of an accumulation of rationalized feelings and experiences that are the result of actual or perceived abuses with regard to the own group or an individual’s life, which are translated out of a position of impotence to a perspective of action.
This policy paper includes a threat assessment set up by The Triangle. This assessment is in need of revision since a lot of the threat situations have changed in a short period of time. For example, it says that there is still a threat of terrorism, but that it has decreased (ibid: 11). As mentioned before, since March 2013, the Dutch national threat level has been put at substantial. Therefore, the threat assessment in the policy paper is not up-to-date anymore. The same holds for the assessment that there are a limited amount of jihadist organizations and that there are only several people traveling to Syria (ibid: 12).
The policy paper stresses that they have to define their target group for a specific activity more clearly than before, in order for the policy to become more effective. It acknowledges that
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the former policy was too large-scale and too generic. One of the ways to overcome the difficult task of reaching specific target groups that live isolated lives is to invest in networks and key figures. Strong networks are important when identifying potential tensions in society. Having strong networks allows the deployment of suitable people at an early stage. Furthermore, key figures can function as a bridge between community and government in times of crisis and in the case of potential radicalization. This requires more professionalization and thus training (ibid: 19).
Intervention with radicalizing individuals is an important part of this policy paper. Interventions are care-oriented and meant to help the individual to (re)connect in a positive way to society. The interventions are focused on two domains: material and immaterial care (ibid: 20). In terms of material help, the focus is on employment, education, housing and debts. The focus for immaterial help is the attenuation of radical thoughts. This includes stimulating the individual to think critically about their views, think independently, being self-reflective, moving away from black/white thinking and conspiracy theories, and becoming open-minded about different views and backgrounds.
The key difference from the 2007 policy is that the approach is risk-based, with the focus on actual found risks (ibid: 24). The approach to radicalization and polarization is specific, with an emphasis on de-radicalization and identification of signals. Networks and expertise are required. Thus a large-scale approach in collaboration with the police, Department of Justice and other relevant partners remains essential. The former main points of focus regarding decreasing the breeding ground and increasing resilience have become part of regular policy (ibid: 25). In comparison with the former policy, the current policy has fewer actions classified as approach to radicalization and polarization, but there are more specific policies on these issues. The largest risk is addressed first, so the deployment of instruments has become more efficient.
To sum up, all policies, national or local, emphasize the need to diminish the breeding ground for radicalization. The breeding ground has been indicated as the most important starting point in counteracting radicalization. Many policies mention early identification of signals and strengthening resilience. Amsterdam’s latest policy paper also stresses that specific and general interventions on the radicalization process are important points of action.
2.6 The division of church and state
Islam as a religion has developed rather quickly over the last decades in the Netherlands. Therefore, discussions about the position of Islam in our society have become prominent.
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Moreover, discussions are raised about how the Dutch government and Islam need to be related. Some people argue that Islam in the Netherlands needs to be treated differently than other religions, since Islam does not distinguish between church and state, but treats both as one.
The principle of the division of church and state can be traced back to the French Revolution, and is a very important basis for all West-European states. There are, however, differences in ways that states have incorporated this principle in society. There are three models: (1) state church; (2) cooperation between church and state; (3) strict division between church and state (CBW 2008: 3). The Netherlands can be classified in the second model, which means that there is no strict division between church and state.
The principle of the division of church and state is a fundamental starting point for the organization of the current Dutch democratic state (ibid). It has been defined as follows: “in the relation between church and state it is not allowed that there is any institutional say over one another, nor should there be direct say over content” (ibid: 7). However, the principle has not been incorporated in the Dutch Constitution. In fact, it is a political agreement between the ecclesiastical and worldly powers to stay out of each other’s way. The principle relates strongly to Article 1 and 6 of the Constitution that define equality and the freedom of religion and belief (ibid: 4). However, since the principle is a theoretical and political one, it is possible that municipalities have different interpretations and operations (KIEM 2005: 22).
Therefore, it can be argued that the principle of the division of church and state does not oppose every relation to or every form of support to churches and/or religious organizations by the state (CBW 2008: 7). Dialogue and deliberation between churches and/or religious organizations and the government is not excluded from the principle. The same holds for subsidization of societal activities of churches and/or religious organizations. The principle, however, does mean that the government should have wariness when supporting activities that are performed by churches and/or religious organizations (ibid). Moreover, there are some limits and conditions to subsidization. The subsidies cannot interfere with the content of religion and the provision of subsidies cannot be based on the beliefs that the organization has, but instead based on the goals that it wants to achieve (VNG 2009: 14).
In the approach to radicalization, the municipality can decide to cooperate with people who work for churches, mosques, or organizations that are based on religious or ideological beliefs, in order to realize specific policy goals (CBW 2008: 12). Specific religious or ideological discourse can be used as a strategy to remove youngsters from isolation and to bring them back into society. However, based on the principle of division of church and state, municipalities cannot ask religious leaders to change their discourse (for example discouraging
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the use of violence), as this would be an example of direct interference with the content of religion (VNG 2009: 38). When the government cooperates with religious organizations and persons the principle of the division of church and state will not be infringed, since there is no institutional interference of one another (ibid). Merely the goals and achievements of the activity are important.
2.7 The model of the process of radicalization
In this section I will refer back to the model of Slootman and Tillie (2006) that was created for the municipality of Amsterdam. I will split the model up into three parts in order to classify different policies in different phases of the radicalization process.
Figure 4 below depicts the spectrum of the radicalization process, as constructed by Slootman and Tillie, divided in three phases. The process of radicalization develops in various ways, depending on the individual. Sometimes it evolves very fast and sometimes it takes years for someone to actually become radicalized (Buijs et al. 2006). A trigger in the form of a personal or societal crisis is often decisive for an individual to start a process of radicalization. The model of Slootman and Tillie presents a logical and general process.
As mentioned above, Buijs et al. assert that there are three phases that can be distinguished in the process of radicalization: breach of trust; conflict of legitimacy; and legitimacy crisis. In the model of Slootman and Tillie different phases within the process of radicalization can be distinguished as well.
Figure 4: Model of the process of radicalization divided into three phases
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Phase I: the breeding ground
In the first phase of radicalization, people start to remove themselves from society since they find themselves in “insecure situations, perceiving exclusion and feeling disconnected from society in general” (Van Heelsum & Vermeulen 2015: 3). In this phase people look for peers who are equally frustrated with society. This first phase could be compared to the development of the breach of trust, as explained before by Buijs et al., where trust in the government starts to break down and policies become contested between a group or movement and their leaders. Distrust in the ruling elite develops, although there is not yet an ideological breach (Buijs et al. 2006: 17).
The first phase involves a lot of factors that influence the possibility of an individual to proceed in a process of radicalization. The importance of influence of factors is different for each individual. However, there are several factors identified by Slootman and Tillie and the municipality, including: weak civil society, lack of social cohesion, attitude towards Muslims, family situation, identity/meaningfulness of life (Slootman & Tillie 2006). For example, in a weak civil society, the connections and contacts between people are weak, meaning that there is no form of ‘safety net’ to rely on when tensions in the city arise.
Van Heelsum and Vermeulen (2015) indicate perceived deprivation, perceived exclusion, personal victimization and political grievance to be additional factors that can lead to radicalization. Social conditions can also contribute to feelings of frustration, discouragement, unhappiness and anger, such as unemployment, and events of discrimination. Moreover, this phase involves the start of in-group/out-group thinking (Van Heelsum & Vermeulen, 2015: 4). This phase is mainly focused on preventing individuals from leaving the majority non-radical population. Every factor that contributes to taking a step towards the next phase of radicalization should be addressed by the authorities. All these factors together create the breeding ground for radicalization. Phase I, therefore, emphasizes the importance of intervening in the development of this breeding ground. Interventions could mean discouraging susceptible individuals from getting more and more discontented and stopping them thinking in a radical in-group/out-group manner (ibid). The stimulation of critical thinking and having debates are examples of interventions that can prevent someone from proceeding along the radicalization spectrum.
Phase II: the deepening of religion
In the second phase of the radicalization process the individual proceeds from general discontent to finding a ‘solution’ or support in ideology (ibid). As explained by Buijs et al., this
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phase identifies itself by the conflict of legitimacy. The legitimacy of the ruling political system becomes contested, instead of the policies. An alternative ideology is constructed disparaging the ruling government and its social norms (Buijs et al. 2006: 17). The individual becomes convinced that the solution to his/her problems can be found in strictly following the rules of the ideology.
Taking the principle of the division of church and state into account, the municipality cannot directly intervene in processes of religious thinking. A way the municipality of Amsterdam makes sure the right people are involved in preventing individuals from developing further in the radicalization process is, through cooperation with the aforementioned key figures. Another important strategy of the municipality is strengthening networks of contacts with religious organizations and mosques. Making use of these key figures and keeping in contact with religious partners allows the municipality to indirectly intervene in the religious sphere without violating the principle of the division of church and state.
Phase III: the legitimate use of violence
The third phase of the model of radicalization entails individuals who are already identified as radical becoming potentially violent and, therefore, dangerous for society (Van Heelsum & Vermeulen 2015: 6). In this phase, ideology is combined with political aspirations. As explained by Buijs et al., this last phase entails a legitimacy crisis that formulates a critique on society. The people that are connected to this society will be targeted, resulting in dehumanization (Buijs et al. 2006: 17). This allows the radical to legitimize his/her use of violence against these people. The radical at this stage is willing to use (political) violence to reach his/her goals. Moreover, the radical sees him/herself as a fighter against evil (ibid). These goals are based on the strict rules and thoughts of the ideology which the radical believes need to be implemented everywhere in society.
Within this last phase there are two possibilities. The first possibility is that a radical individual approves the use of violence in order to reach the targeted goals, but the person has not (yet) used violence him/herself. The second option is that the radical person is actually planning violent actions, including terrorist attacks. At this point, the police and intelligence services are crucial for monitoring the radical. When the law is broken, they can arrest the individual and prosecute him/her.
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2.8 Research questions
The sections above clarify that the model of Slootman and Tillie is used in the policy papers of the municipality of Amsterdam on counteracting radicalization. In order to find out what it takes to handle the problem of radicalizing residents in Amsterdam, it is crucial to understand which actions and policies the municipality of Amsterdam implements in practice. Since these issues are often sensitive and hard to grasp, the municipality needs the participation of residents and other organizations to be successful. However, how does the municipality make sure that its policies match reality? Does the model of the process of radicalization by Slootman and Tillie provide a realistic framework for policies in Amsterdam? Based on these questions, this research will focus on the following main research question and sub-questions. Now, the central question will be specified.
As was formulated in the introduction, the main research question is: How does the
municipality of Amsterdam counteract Islamic radicalization using the phase model of Slootman and Tillie, and do its employees perceive their work as helpful?
Because the phase approach uses three phases, I will use three sub-questions that will be answered in three separate result chapters:
1. How do the people who execute the policies on the ‘breeding ground’ projects operate and do they see their approach as helpful for de-radicalization?
2. How do the people who execute the policies on intervening in ‘religious thinking’ operate and do they see their approach as helpful for de-radicalization?
3. How do the people who execute the policies on intervening on the use of violence operate and do they see their approach as helpful for de-radicalization?
28 3. Research methods
In this chapter I will explain the methodology that has been applied in this research. In section 3.1, I will explain the applied research methods, strategy and design. Section 3.2 will discuss the operationalization of concepts. Subsequently, in section 3.3, I will explain the methods for data collection. Thereafter, explanation of the research area and units of analysis will be offered (3.4). The closing section will discuss the limitations of this research (3.5).
3.1 Research design and methods
The framework for the collection and analysis of data that has been used in this research is the
case study research design. The case study is the preferred design because the main research
question is posed as a ‘how’-question, the researcher has little control over the events related to the research, and the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context (Yin 2009: 2). Since this research tests a well-formulated theory (Slootman and Tillie’s model), it is a critical case. “The single case can (…) determine whether a theory’s propositions are correct or whether some alternative set of explanations might be more relevant” (ibid: 47). This research is a case of municipal policy. The case study design enables the researcher to elucidate specific features of a case. The collected data will be related to the unique situation and time of collection (Bryman 2008: 62).
In this research, the local setting will be examined by conducting qualitative research
methods. Qualitative research methods are the most suitable approach since the three policy
levels that have been formulated before are hard to quantify and often involve narratives that consist of rich details. Therefore, the emphasis will be on qualitative interviewing, conducting
semi-structured interviews. The use of semi-structured interviews provides the interviewer with
some flexibility, since he/she can deviate from the list of questions.
3.2 Research area and units of analysis
This research focuses on counteracting Islamic radicalization in Amsterdam. Certain districts in Amsterdam are dealing with higher radicalization rates than others. Districts that were mainly a point of focus were Amsterdam East, Amsterdam West, and Amsterdam New-West. These districts have relatively high percentages of Muslims. Amsterdam East is the place where Theo van Gogh was murdered by an Islamic extremist. His murderer resided in Amsterdam New-West. Therefore, both districts have dealt with issues of radicalization, fear, discrimination, polarization and alienation before. Amsterdam New-West contains the highest percentage of
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Muslims in Amsterdam: 51 percent in 2014 according to the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS 2014). Nevertheless, this research was not limited to these three districts.
The sampling strategy that was used to select respondents for this research was
purposive sampling. This means that a person working on radicalization that is available and
willing to do an interview is considered a possible respondent. However, keeping the model by Slootman and Tillie in mind, the aim was to conduct interviews with people working in all three phases of the radicalization model.
The units of analysis in this research are the professionals and semi-professionals, working for the municipality of Amsterdam, or independent organizations that deal with radicalization policies in their work. This means that, besides employees of the municipality, employees of civil society organizations, mosques, youth workers, schools, etc. that have set up projects to address radicalization (and might be financed or supported by the municipality of Amsterdam) were all potential respondents for interviews.
3.3 Operationalization
In order to analyze data, it is crucial to understand the meaning and the purpose of concepts that are being used for this research. Since the model of the process of radicalization created by Slootman and Tillie is being used as the foundational theory of this research, the model will be operationalized here.
The model of the process of radicalization is used as a framework to conduct interviews and test the collected data. The three phases of the model that have been distinguished in section 2.7 were used to categorize the interviews, and therefore the fieldwork itself. In every phase, individuals working on specific policies (breeding ground, interventions in religion, interventions on violence) were interviewed. Since this model is also used by the municipality of Amsterdam to formulate policies, using this model in this research provided a way of testing whether the model proved to be useful in practice.
The phases of the model and their accompanying policies can be described as follows. The first phase, namely the policies focused on the breeding ground, is the most common, since the largest group of people in society is not radicalized. This category is broad and is mainly based on the prevention of the start of the radicalization process. Since there are many causes and factors for the start of the process of radicalization, there are many projects and policies involved in this phase that one would not always consider directly linked to preventing radicalization, such as anti-discrimination projects, empowering migrant women, targeting
