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Leiden University Faculty of Social Science
Bachelor project: Political Psychology In International Relations
Subject: Belief Stability of the Operational Code of Donald Tusk
Name: Mani Pourjalili Studentnumber: S1567322
Supervisor Bachelorproject: dr. F. E. Bakker Second Reader: dr. W. Veenendaal
Date: 20-12-2019 Workgroup: 2 Word Count: 7976
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1. INTRODUCTION
Actor centric perspectives and their underlying individual level theories, that
acknowledge the importance that individual leaders influence policy outcomes by their decision making behavior, have gained ground under International Relations (IR) scholars after the end of the cold war (Kaarbo, 2015). However many actor centric theories and their underlying assumptions about individuals remain untested in contemporary research in IR. Which in turn I argue has constrained its full potential for being applicated in IR studies. Testing the underlying assumptions about individuals of actor centric theories at an individual level of analysis, should therefore be the objective of contemporary scholars in IR. Which in turn can increase the relevance of the application of actor centric theories, with their focus on individual level of analysis, for explaining or predicting certain policy outcomes in IR, that cannot be adequately explained by the theoretical assumptions of structural IR perspectives. To contribute in testing individual level theories in IR, this study will review literature that signifies the difference between structural IR and actor centric perspectives in their level of analysis and the relevance for using the latter perspective in the realm of IR. Followed by explaining the importance of studying beliefs of individual leaders according to cognitive actor centric theories and why unclarity exists around the question of belief in/stability in IR literature. In the theoretical framework, literature surrounding belief stability assumptions of the cognitive consistency theory (CCT) and the relevance of applying the operational code construct to test those respective assumptions, will be elaborated. The methodological section in turn will describe the relevance of testing the CCT assumptions in the case of Donald Tusk, followed by presenting the results of his operational Code. Lastly, Tusk`s results will be discussed in order to understand whether they are consistent with the assumptions of the CCT and recommendations will be provided for future IR scholars in testing the CCT assumptions.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The application of theories of the so called “actor centric approaches”, for understanding and predicting foreign policy outcomes in IR, experienced a rise at the
beginning of the twenty-first century (Kaarbo, 2015, p. 514). This rise is caused partly by the increased inability of structural IR perspectives, for accurately predicting and understanding policy outcomes after the end of the cold war, which in turn can partly be ascribed to their assumptions, that undermines the importance of the individual as the central ground of analysis (Hermann & Kegley,1995; Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Byman & Pollack, 2001; Goldgeier &Tetlock, 2001; Kaarbo, 2015). Generally speaking, structural IR perspectives, like Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism, tend to predict and understand policy outcomes in IR, by analyzing social structures (Kaarbo, 2015, p. 207). In general, a social structure is conceptualized as an organized system of patterned arrangements, that according to structural perspectives, constrain the level playing field of individuals for making decisions
independently of the social structure (Barker, 2005, p.448). Hence, an actor’s decision that has consequences for foreign policy outcomes IR can be predicted, by mainly analyzing patterned arrangements imposed at system level. Both the former and latter assumption of structural perspectives are disputed by actor centric approaches as it downplays the relevance of analyzing individual leaders in IR (Kaarbo, 2015, pp. 194-195). Generally, this perspective presumes an exogenous role of individual leaders, which in turn implies that individuals can and often do make decisions independently of the social structure (Walker & Schafer, 2006, p.5). Furthermore, actor centric approaches assume that individuals hold the unique capacity of subjective perception (Kaarbo, 2015, p. 205). That serves as a filter for interpreting information externally from its source, namely the environment at system level with which it interacts (Jahn & Dunne, 2004, p. 547). In turn, an individual’s ability of subjective
perception, in combination with their possibility of independent decision making, influences policy outcomes in IR (Kaarbo, 2015). Based on the acknowledgement of actor centric perspectives that individuals influence policy outcomes, I argue that their theories with their underlying assumptions for understanding how individual leaders perceive and interact with their system level environments, should be regarded as the ground of analysis for predicting
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foreign policy outcomes in IR, in order to narrow the inability of structural IR theories assumptions, for accurately predicting and understanding them.
For example, assumptions of cognitive theories revolving around beliefs, have been applied at an individual level analysis in IR research, in order to increase our understanding how belief systems might influence a political leaders decision making behavior on policy outcomes. According to cognitive theories, beliefs are things that people hold as truth with regard of how the world operates (Renshon, 2008, pp. 820-827). Beliefs are important for understanding individual decision making, “because they serve as a prism that influences an actor’s perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events,” (George, 1969, p.191). More specifically, George insists that “a leader’s beliefs regarding the nature of politics and political conflict, their views on the ability to influence historical development and their perceptions of correct strategy and tactics, make up a significant part of an individual’s held beliefs concerning politics” (George, 1969, p.197). Furthermore, cognitive theories assume that beliefs do not automatically determine decision-making, though they nonetheless exert substantial influence on the decision making choice of an individual (George, 1969, p. 191; Walker, 1977, p.131). Besides, cognitive theories also suppose that under circumstances, whereby an individual is unable to accurately organize and process information from its environment or when new information does not fit within a leader’s pre-existing beliefs, belief systems can operate as a causal factor towards a leaders decision making (Holsti, 1976, pp. 13-22). Taking the above mentioned cognitive assumptions concerning the importance of beliefs in mind, it seems reasonable to argue that IR literature surrounding belief systems apply cognitive actor centric theories, in order to understand whether its assumptions about beliefs and decision making are a reliable predictor for understanding and explaining foreign policy outcomes.
Unfortunately, contemporary IR literature concerning belief systems falls short in providing a theoretical basis for understanding whether beliefs are stable or prone to change. This lack of understanding can partly be attributed to the fact that most IR studies applied the so called “operational code device”, for examining belief systems and they were dominated by the stability premises of the CCT, for understanding the influence of beliefs on a leader’s decision making (Renshon, 2008, pp. 822-823). This theory presupposes the relative stability of beliefs, since people have a tendency to assimilate new information into their preexisting beliefs (George, 1969; Holsti, 1967; Jervis, 2006). Therefore, studies that examined a leader`s belief system with the operational code construct, were not designed in order to find out
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whether beliefs are stable, because they took it for granted that they are (Renshon, 2008, pp. 823-827). Furthermore, while evidence based on empirical results of the operational code studies of Walker et al., (1998), Walker and Schafer (2000) and Feng (2005) have shown changes in a leader’s belief system after external events, there still remains a lack of understanding whether belief systems are relatively stable or prone to change, since those studies fall short to provide insight through which experience they might change and towards which type of direction. A shortcoming of the above mentioned operational code studies to provide answers towards those above mentioned questions, makes it in turn difficult to infer whether the belief stability assumption of the CCT is supported or rejected (Renshon, 2008, pp.821-830). These shortcomings undermine the power of the CCT, that fits into the broader umbrella of cognitive theory to predict foreign policy outcomes in IR based on their
theoretical assumptions that beliefs influence a leader’s decision making (Renshon, 2008). If future studies surrounding belief systems try to answer the questions, through which
experiences belief systems might change and towards which direction, it could not only contribute to an enhanced clarity on belief stability or change, they can also serve as a guideline for future research to examine its implications on a leader’s decision making behavior. In continuation, the latter could enhance the predictive power of cognitive actor centric perspectives in explaining foreign policy outcomes in IR (Renshon, 2008).
Renshon (2008) took a first step in providing answers on the potential causes and directions of belief change by examining the influence of external events, like 9/11 on George Bush`s operational code belief system. His study showed that after 9/11, the changed
components of the operational code that comprises Bush`s belief system, shifted in a negative direction, which seems to suggest that external events might have a negative influence on a leader’s belief system (Renshon, 2008, p.842). Nevertheless, more studies on the potential causes of belief change and directional type of change on a leader’s belief system should be examined in order to increase the theoretical understanding of whether beliefs are stable or prone to change (Renshon, 2008, pp. 840-842). Thus in following Renshon`s footsteps, this study aims to contribute to the discussion of belief in/stability through testing the CCT`S belief stability assumptions. This can be done by examining the potential influence of external events on a leader’s belief system. The process of how belief systems will be examined in this study by applying the operational code device, will be elaborated in the theoretical
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stability assumption of the CCT is:What influence have external events on the belief system of a political leader?
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1. The operational code construct and cognitive consistency theory
Renshon (2008) mentioned that contemporary studies in IR that applied the
operational code construct for examining belief systems during and after external events, left vast gaps in our theoretical understanding of whether beliefs are stable or prone to change. In order to understand his argument, it is necessary to describe the operational code construct as this device contains the building blocks of Renshon`s argument. The origins of its
construction stems from the “Operational Code of the Politburo and A Study of Bolshevism” (Leites, 1951;1953). However, it was Alexander George`s (1969) “Operational Code a Neglected Approach” study that conceptualized and revised its structure in order to measure the so called “political belief system” of an actor, which in turn made its application relevant, for studying and measuring beliefs and its influence on decision making behavior in the realm of IR (George, 1969; Walker & Schafer, 2006; Renshon, 2008). George conceptualized the operational code as a construct that contains five questions on the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political conflict and the individual, which he defined as philosophical beliefs. The second part of the operational code contains five questions on the ends-means relationships in the context of political action and is defined as instrumental beliefs (George, 1969, pp. 198-199). When actors provide answers to these questions, also defined as indices, it enables researchers to measure an individual’s instrumental as philosophical political belief system in foreign as in the domestic realm (George 1969, p. 221; figure 1). In turn, empirical results derived from the operational code can contribute to a better understanding of the influence of political beliefs systems on decision making behavior in IR from an individual level analysis (Schafer & Walker, 2006, p. 562).
Renshon furthermore mentioned that the construct of the operational code as defined by George (1969), was influenced by the three postulates of the CCT concerning belief systems. Because of this influence, expectations were formulated in this device that empirically reflect the CCT assumptions (Renshon, 2008, p. 824). Firstly, CCT assumes hierarchy in an individual’s belief system, whereby so called “peripheral beliefs” follow from
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the more important “core beliefs” (Rosenberg, 1986, p. 735; Renshon, 2008, p. 824). Besides, CCT assumes that core beliefs are more resistant to change than peripheral beliefs, whereby the latter beliefs are more prone towards change than the former (Renshon, 2008, p. 824). George (1969) attached this abstract hierarchical CCT postulate in the operational code by defining the P-1 indice as a master belief and all philosophical indices as core beliefs and argued that these indices are more resistant to change than the peripheral instrumental indices (George, 1969, p. 218). Furthermore, George argued that the four philosophical and five instrumental indices should follow from P-1 (George, 1969). The second assumption of the CCT is that beliefs are relatively stable as individuals process information of their external environment in order to make it consistent with their prior beliefs throughout their core ones. George (1969, pp.197-220) fitted this second CCT assumption in the operational code by expecting that al indices would be relatively stable and not prone to major shifts. Finally, the CCT assumption of internal consistency, which means that different components of an actor’s belief system are logically coherent with each other, influenced George to argue for internal coherence between the five philosophical indices and the instrumental one`s (George 1969, p. 218). Internal consistency and hierarchy can be expected when major changes occur in the core beliefs of an individual (George 1969, p. 218; Holsti 1970, p. 154; Renshon, 2008, pp. 823-825). Although beliefs and in particular core beliefs are highly resistant towards change, it doesn’t exclude its possibility and when change occurs in a core or philosophical belief indices, during a potentially change-inducing external event, its hierarchal structure towards the peripheral/instrumental belief will cause the indices of the latter beliefs to change as well and at a higher degree than the former beliefs. Internal coherence on the other hand will guide the changes in the peripheral beliefs in the same direction that occurred in the core belief (Renshon, 2008, pp.825-828). Because of George’s expectation that the CCT postulates should be presented during or after external events, Renshon (2008) mentioned that studying events and belief systems of political leaders throughout the operational code can enhance our theoretical knowledge on stability of belief systems in IR. Since empirical results derived from this construct, it is not only useful in enhancing our understanding of the relationship between an individual’s belief system on its decisions making in IR, it also enables
researchers to detect possible changes in the indices of the operational code before and during or after external events. Besides, as operational code results are quantifiable and reproducible, it can provide evidence and thus test whether George`s expectations that underlies the abstract assumptions of belief stability, hierarchy and internal coherence are supported or rejected (Renshon, 2008, pp.821-825).
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2.2 Empirical evidence
Renshon (2008) mentioned that contemporary studies in IR, that examined the operational code of political leaders before, during and after external events, provided evidence that already contradicts George`s CCT expectations. First, Walker et al., (1998) detected statically significant changes accompanied by a major negative direction in Carters P-1 and P-2 indices after the external event of the Afghanistan War. Second, during the Vietnam War, Walker and Schafer (2000) found significant changes that were accompanied by negative major directional shifts in president Johnson`s P-4, I-3 and I-5 Appeal indices, while the changes in his P-5 and I-4 Words/Deeds were accompanied by positive directional shifts. Lastly, during the external event of the Korean War, Feng (2005) detected significant and major changes in all of Mao`s philosophical indices, whereby Mao`s P-1, P-2 and P-5 indices shifted in a negative direction and his P-3 and P-4 indices shifted towards a positive direction, while none of Mao`s instrumental indices changed significantly. With the exception of Walker and Schafer (2000), the results of the above mentioned studies seem to indicate that on average belief stability can be assumed to exist in the instrumental indices and not in the philosophical. Namely, not only Carter and Mao experienced less statically significant changes in their instrumental indices compared to their philosophical ones during or after external events, but the changes in the former indices were also at a lower magnitude than the
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changes in the philosophical indices. In turn Walker et al., (1998), Walker and Schafer`s (2000) and Fengs`s (2005) results are not only in contradiction with George`s CCT belief stability assumption, which presupposes that al indices would be relatively stable and not prone to major shifts, but also with the hierarchical CCT expectation, which presupposes that core philosophical beliefs are less prone to change than peripheral instrumental beliefs (Renshon, 2008, pp. 825-827). Lastly, the operational code results of Carter, Johnson, and Mao showed that not all nine indices would change significantly and if they changed, not all changed at a higher magnitude and in the same direction like the master P-1 indice after an external event. Therefore, the results of Walker et al.,1998; Walker and Schafer (2000) and Feng (2005), do not support George`s hierarchy and internal consistency CCT expectation, that directional changes in the lower instrumental belief indices should follow from the same directional changes in the philosophical master P-1 indice (Renshon, 2008, pp. 825-827).
However, while the above mentioned studies provided evidence that George`s CCT expectations are difficult to defend, it left us with a shortcoming to understand whether the operational code experienced changes due to external events, as presumed by the CCT and if so, towards which type of direction (Renshon, 2008, pp. 827-827). This shortcoming can partly be attributed to the fact that the studies of Walker et al.,(1998), Walker and Schafer`s (2000) and Feng (2005) were conducted in order to enhance the understanding of a leader’s belief system and its influence on his decision making behavior on foreign policy and not necessarily to understand the potential influence of external events on changes in the operational code belief system (2008, pp. 821-828). Thus, while their results showed that George`s CCT expectations did not hold, they were not designed to test them. This in turn makes it difficult to enhance the theoretical understanding of the CCT postulates for
adequately explaining the potential causes and directional type of belief change, that political leaders might experience in IR. How Renshon`s (2008) study that builds on the above
mentioned studies which addressed their shortcomings, will be discussed in the section below.
2.3 Renshon`s Contribution
Renshon addressed the shortcomings of Walker et al.,(1998), Walker and Schafer (2000) and Feng`s (2005) studies, by among exploring the potential influence of change inducing external events and the directional type of change on president Bush`s operational code belief system. By doing this, Renshon (2008) also inferred Bush`s operational code results towards George`s CCT expectations in order to understand whether they are consistent
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with the CCT`S stability, hierarchy, and internal consistency postulates. Renshon however applied the operational code conceptualization of Walker et al., (1998), that partly differs from George`s conceptualization as its instrumental part is redefined as indices that measure the political beliefs of a leader and his view of “self”, while the philosophical indices are defined as a part of a leader’s belief system towards “others” in IR (Walker et al., 1998, p.176). One important underlying aspect for the operational code redefinition, is based on the assumption of independent functioning between the philosophical and instrumental part. Independence means that certain political views that a leader contains about others in his philosophical indices and himself in his instrumental indices, follows from different tracks (Walker et al., 1998; Malici, 2006). Due to the independence, the CCT expectations that are empirically reflected in the operational code, were according to Walker expected to exist within the instrumental and philosophical indices instead of between them, as George would expect. Namely, internal consistency and hierarchy in the operational code can be expected, when potential directional changes in the four philosophical indices should follow from the same directional changes in the master P-1 indice, while I-1 master indice has an identical function towards the four instrumental indices (Walker et al,1998, pp.177-178). Renshon (2008) took Walker`s remodified CCT expectation into consideration, when inferring the operational code results of Bush towards the CCT postulates as he builds on the empirical results of the above mentioned studies, that largely contradicts George`s CCT expectations.
Furthermore, Renshon invented the concepts of “reinforcement” and “reversal” to define a directional type of change in the operational code. Reinforcement is illustrated by a leader that already holds a conflictual view of the political universe, becomes more
conflictual, while the latter type is illustrated by a shift from a conflictual towards a
cooperative view of the political universe (Renshon, 2008, p.826). Moreover, he analyzed and compared Bush`s operational code before and after the 9/11 terror attacks to understand whether it was influenced by 9/11 as an independent variable and external event (Renshon, 2008, p. 821). Renshon (2008) does not specifically use the term external event but mostly refers to traumatic shocks when referring to 9/11 and its selection as a potentially change inducing event was influenced by Tetlock`s (2005) conceptualization of exogenous shock. Tetlock defined an exogenous shock as a short circuited event that happens unexpected, originates outside the experts logical framework of beliefs and whereby it is experienced as something dramatic. Tetlock mentions that “anything that falls outside the expert’s
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(Tetlock, 2005, pp. 131-132). Renshon argued that 9/11 fitted into Tetlocks exogenous shock concept as it was short circuited, being perceived by Bush as dramatic, unexpected and occurring outside his belief framework. In continuation, when a political leader in his office position is directly affected by an exogenous shock event, it can have a potential change inducing influence on his political belief system. Therefore, Renshon argues that exogenous shock events like 9/11 are useful in being examined as the potential causes of belief change and its type of change (Renshon, 2008, pp.820-840). Besides examining exogenous shock events also have the potential to further the CCT postulates as a theoretical basis for understanding belief in/stability in IR, which in turn is the aim of this study by testing Walkers CCT expectations, through answering the research question of this study. When referring however directly to external events, the social psychological attribution theory`s definition that “when people infer that their beliefs is due to situational factors outside their own personal factors”, closely resembles Tetlocks (2005) exogenous shock concept (Mcleod, 2012, pp. 1-4). Therefore, both definitions can contain identical events, which includes Renshon`s traumatic event of 9/11. Thus from now on mentioning 9/11 refers to the attribution theory’s definition of external event in this study.
The results of Renshon`s study are largely in line with Walker et al., (1998) and Feng (2005), that showed that instrumental indices are on average more stable than philosophical indices. No statistical significant changes in Bush`s instrumental indices were found, while Bush`s P-1, P-2 and P-3 changed significantly. Furthermore, the hierarchy and internal consistency expectation based on Walker et al.,(1998) remodified concept of the operational code, that major and directional changes in the master P-1 indice, would led to the same major directional changes and a higher magnitude in the other 4 philosophical indices, is not
supported by Renshon`s results as Bush`s P-4 and P-5 indices did not change significantly after 9/11 (Renshon, 2008, p. 834).
However, both changes between Bush`s P-1 and P-2 operational code indices, were like Carter`s reversed changes and Mao`s reinforced changes, accompanied by negative major shifts and it reversed Bush`s prior views on the nature of the political universe and realization of political values after an external event (Renshon, 2008, p. 834). Thus, the results of Walker
et al., (1998), Feng (2005) and Renshon`s (2008) studies seem to indicate the notion that after
external events, internal consistency and hierarchy are present between the P-1 and P-2 indices. Their results are partly in line with walker`s CCT expectation that large statically significant shifts in the P-1 master indice should also follow in the 4 other philosophical
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indices and in the same direction. Therefore, based on the studies of Walker et al., (1998), Feng (2005) and Renshon`s (2008), which revolve around external events and belief systems in IR, this study expects belief stability to exist in the instrumental “self” indices as they will not change significantly after an external event. Internal consistency and hierarchy will be expected between P-1 master belief and P-2 after an external event in the form of a statistical significant change and a major shift in a negative direction of these indices.
3.METHOD
3.1. Case selection, operationalization of external event and structure of the study
This study will examine the influence of an external event on the belief system of Donald Tusk. The reason for selecting Tusk as a case, is that during his political reign as president of The European Council (EC) (1 December 2014 - 30 November 2019), he experienced the leave result of the United Kingdom (UK) European Union Membership Referendum on 23 June 2016, which is also referred as “Brexit”, as a potentially change inducing external event on his belief system. As I already mentioned in the theoretical section, an event can be considered as external change inducing and thus relevant for being examined as potential causes of belief in/stability if its situational, thus falling outside a leaders belief framework, is short circuited, perceived as unexpected or dramatic by a political leader and the latter should in his office position directly be involved in the event (Renshon, 2008, pp. 820-840). Furthermore, as this study is interested in testing the CCT`S stability, internal consistency and hierarchy assumption of “political” belief systems in IR, the event itself must be political and international in scope (Walker et al., 1998). The 23 June Brexit result, has by Tusk himself been described as something unpredictable, dramatic and falling outside the scope of his belief framework. Namely in certain interviews Tusk spoke about Brexit as “a possible end of western political civilization, as the occurrence of dramatic and unpredictable political times and caused by the influence of external anti-European forces, whereby he hoped for another result” (BBC, 2016; Euractiv, 2016; The Irish Times, 2019; Council of the EU, 2016). Furthermore, after the Brexit result, the parliament of the UK invoked article 50 of the Treaty of The European Union on 29 March 2017, which started the official Brexit
negotiations between the UK and the EC (University College London, 2016). After the UK`s notification under Article 50, draft guidelines that are prepared by the president of the EC for the Brexit negotiations, were sent to EU delegations of the other 27 member states (the EU27)
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(Council of the EU, 2017). Thus the political consequences of invoking article 50, which was caused by the Brexit, is not only international in scope as the EU27 is involved in the
withdrawal negotiations, it also involves Donald Tusk directly in his leadership office, as the president of the EC, to negotiate the British withdrawal (Europarl, 2017). Thus as Brexit meets the conceptual requirement of an external event, is international and political in scope and Tusk`s direct involvement in Brexit, has formally been established, it seems reasonable to argue that Brexit might have been a change inducing experience on Tusk`s belief system. That in turn makes Tusk as a case and Brexit as an independent variable, both relevant for
answering the research question. It should however be mentioned that Brexit itself is not just a short circuited external event, but also a continuing process of negotiations between the UK and the EU of the planned withdrawal of the former from the EU (Parlaiment.UK.2019). Therefore, Brexit as a process cannot fall under the scope of external event as defined in this study. Hence, in this study Brexit and the external event under examination specifically refers to the leave result of the 23 June 2016 UK European Union membership referendum, that in turn caused the withdrawal negotiations (Bachtler & Begg, 2017, pp. 7-11). Than the question remains whether my research question support`s or reject`s my expectation.
This brings me to a second reason for selecting president Tusk as a case. In repetition, the operational code results of Walker et al., (1998), Feng (2005) and Renshon (2008) are partly in line with Walker et al., (1998) expectation that internal consistency and hierarchy after external events are present between P-1 and P-2, while stability assumption of the CCT seems to be supported by the results on the instrumental indices. If these expectations are also supported by empirical results on other political leaders that have not been examined in this way like Donald Tusk, it can further the CCT postulates as a theoretical basis for
understanding belief in/stability in IR.
This study will divide the case study of Tusk in two time periods, namely from 1 December 2014 till 22 June 2016 (phase 1) and from 24 June 2016 till 20 November 2019 (phase 2). By separating Tusk`s case in a period before and after Brexit, we can compare and detect potential changes in his operational code belief system in order to determine whether Brexit was indeed a change inducing event on his belief system. In continuation, the empirical results of Tusk`s operational code will be inferred to answer my research question. The latter answer in this study, should determine whether the expectation as described in the theoretical framework, is supported in Tusk`s case. The hypothesis is that Tusk will experience
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instrumental “self” beliefs after Brexit. The shift will be accompanied in a negative direction, of the nature of the political universe and the realization of political values.
3.2 Operationalization and Method of Analysis of Belief System
When a study is conducted at an individual level of analysis, it has been argued that applying the operational code scheme together with the VICS method is an appropriate research methodology. It can assess a leader’s belief system at a distance, which in turn can overcome some methodological obstacles that is associated with an individual level case study design. For example, when applying systematic procedures for measuring individual psychological characteristics like beliefs, the challenge for researchers is to rigorously asses psychological characteristics of individuals as direct access to political leaders. This, in order to examine those psychological characteristics, which is difficult to accomplish (Walker & Schafer, 2006, pp. 26-27). This makes it difficult to make valid and generalizable claims about the subjects that we are interested in for answering the research questions. The VICS method in the operational code overcomes this problem, as it enables researchers to examine the content of verbal behavior of political leaders, which is supposed to measure their belief system without having direct access to them (Walker & Schafer, 2006, pp. 26-28). Therefore, in this study the verbal content that comprises the political beliefs of President Tusk will be analyzed by applying the operational code scheme with the VICS Method.
The VICS Method works in two stages in its quantification process for categorizing the collected content in the 10 indices of the operational code. At first, utterances, which are sentences that contain verbs from the derived content, are coded for directionality which can be either placed under a conflictual (-) category or cooperative (+) category and for the intensity of those respective verbs as either words or deeds. The scales to categorize the intensity level are -3 (Punish), -2 (Threaten), -1 (Oppose), +1 (Support), +2 (Promise), +3 (Reward). In the second stage the verbs that refer to an ‘‘other’’ reflect beliefs on how others exercise power in the international system. They are supposed to tap a leaders
philosophical beliefs. Verbs that refer to “self” in the exercise of power are categorized in the instrumental part of a leaders belief system (Walker & Schafer, 2006, p. 32). This second stage of coding is thus in line with walker et al., (1998) remodified conceptualization of the operational code applied in this study, that instrumental beliefs relates to a leaders belief system about himself while philosophical beliefs measure and thus indicates a person belief
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system about others in the international system. The coding procedure of the VICS is Illustrated in the Table below (Table 1).
Table 1: Coding procedure of VICS (Walker et al., 1998)
If the above mentioned VICS coding procedure is followed, quantified index scores can be allocated to the 10 indices of the operational code coding scheme, which comprises the operationalization of the operational code followed by assigning them in verbal descriptor categories (Walker & Schafer, 2006, p. 32; Appendix B). In turn, the quantified results of the indices in the descriptor categories can provide operational definitions of “belief change”, a
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“negative direction” in the form of “reinforcement” or “reversal” and a “major shift” (Renshon, 2008).
Walker, et al., (1998) provided the formulas of the 10 belief indices. However, I will briefly discuss the formulas of P-1 and P-2 in order describe how operational definitions in this study for “belief change”, “ a negative direction in the form of reversal or reinforcement” and a “major shift” will be evaluated. The P-1 master belief “What is the essential nature of political life” measures the view of a leader about others (Walker & Schafer, 2006, p. 33). It can be categorized between 6 descriptor scales which varies in ranges from “extremely hostile (-1) 1, very 0,75, definitely 0,5, somewhat 0,25, mixed 0, somewhat 0,25, definitely 0,5, very 0,75 and extremely friendly, 1 (+1)” (Renshon, 2008, p. 832). Its score in a respective
category index can be calculated by counting the percentage of positive/ cooperative verbs minus the percentage of the negative verbs about others. “The more a content contains
positive verbs than the higher its direction of the friendly view a leader has about the nature of the political universe can be expected and vice versa” (Walker et al., 1998, p. 178). P-2 the realization of political values contains 6 descriptor categories and answers of political leaders can be categorized within the range of extremely pessimistic (-1), very 0,75, definitely 0,5, somewhat 0,25 mixed 0, somewhat 0,25, definitely 0,5, very 0,75 or extremely optimistic 1 (+1). The procedure for categorizing P-2 is based on the following score index. “: Mean Intensity of Other Conflict/Cooperation Transitive Verb Attributions for Scale with Values of -3 = Punish, -2 = Threaten, -1 = Oppose/Resist, 0 = Neutral, +1 = Appeal/Support, +2 = Promise, +3 = Reward”. The mean is divided by 3 to obtain a range of - 1.0 Pessimistic + 1.0 Optimistic. The higher the positive mean intensity score the more its optimistic direction for realizing his political values and vice versa (Walker et al., 1998, pp. 178 - 179).
According to Renshon (2008) any component of the verbal descriptor in a respective indice contains minimum or maximum ranges of scores in order to be included in the category. For example a “definitely friendly” or “optimistic nature” of the political universe and realization of political values ranges from 0,375 to 0,625. Furthermore, he argued that only empirical results that detects shifts from an descriptor category towards another one can be interpreted as major (Renshon, 2008, p. 836). For example, changing from a value of +0,5 towards +0,2, thus shifting in the category from “definitely friendly” or “optimistic” towards “somewhat friendly” and “optimistic”. Besides, a possible major shift should pas statistical significance (p≤.05) in order to be accounted as change. If the above mentioned conditions are met, than Renshon would interpret the above mentioned example of a negative directional
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change as a reversal of prior beliefs and a reinforcement if it occurred vice versa (Renshon, 2008, p. 836). In this study a possible change of Tusk`s operational code in a negative
directional shift of P-1 and P-2 will be assessed by statistical significance and a major shift in the verbal descriptor category will be interpreted as either a reinforcement or reversal. The coding process of al 10 indices by the VICS can be done by hand but in this study, I will apply the software programme of profiler plus v7.3.2, that automatically codes the verbs in the indices of P-1, P-2, I-1 and I-2, which in turn speeds up the coding process (Walker & Schafer, 2006, p. 38). However the coding process for the rest of the indices will be calculated by myself based on Walker et al., (1998) formulas.
3.3 Data Collection And Data Selection
The verbal content that is analyzed for measuring a possible change in Tusk`s belief indices, was gathered from the official website of the European Council and consists of speeches that were collected during the period of 2016 – 2019 (references). The speeches from this webpage consist of so called “formal speeches” and are defined as a “state`s” operational code, whereby they are written by key players of the administration and not by a leader himself (Walker & Schafer, 2006, pp. 46 - 47). When the VICS method analyzes these kind of speeches, the validly of whether they are truly indicative of providing an adequate image of a leader’s political belief system, has been called into question. Namely, the speech might capture the operational belief system of the writer instead of the leader which makes formal speeches prone to so called “speech writer effects” (Walker & Schafer, 2006, pp. 46-47). Walker and Schafer (2006, p. 46) reply to this critic by arguing that “a speech writer is likely to know the leader’s views on foreign policy issues and general cooperative and
conflictual tendencies.” “Speechwriters do not generally write speeches that belie the leader’s general positions and policy preferences”. That’s why Walker and Schafer argue that gathered content in the form of speeches can still provide an accurate profile of a leader’s belief
system. It must however, according to Walker and Schafer meet the criteria that the content is spoken by the political leader himself, consist of at least 10 random selected speech acts, is mainly concerned about foreign policy affairs, contains a minimum of 15-20 coded verbs and if it consists of at least 1,500 words. Furthermore, profiler plus works with coding verbs based on English speeches, therefore speeches need to be spoken in English by a political leader or be translated in English (Walker & Schafer, 2006, pp. 37 - 51).
18
For both respective time periods of this study, the collected content consists of less than 10 speech acts that contains the minimum requirement of 1500 words. Therefore, with the exception of the latter requirement, all of Walker and Schafers criteria, the time frame of my case study and English speeches (translations and spoken) were used as a selection criteria, which resulted in collecting 21 relevant speeches of Donald Tusk before the Brexit period of 1 December 2014 - 22 June 2016 and 39 speeches after the Brexit period of 24 June 2016 - 20 November 2019 (Table 2). The quantified results of Tusk his operational code indices will be presented in the section below.
Table 2: Gathered content, Phase and Time Period.
4. RESULTS
The quantified results of table 3 show the mean scores of every index of Tusk`s operational code schema and their corresponding T Values, both before the Brexit Period (1 December 2014- 22 June 2016) and the period after the Brexit event (24 June 2016 – 20 November 2019). The differences between the mean scores of both phases, the significance level (p≤0,05) and the direction of change of those means scores were compared between the respective phases, in order to evaluate whether Brexit influenced Tusk`s operational code belief system and to infer the results towards the possible support of my hypothesis.
Measuring the influence of external event: Brexit 23 June
The results in table 3 show that none of Tusk`s Philosophical “other” indices changed significantly from phase 1 to phase 2. Four of Tusk`s instrumental “self “ indices on the other hand did not experience an statistical significant change at a p≤0,05 level, while his flexibility of tactics between Cooperation/conflict changed significantly and experienced a reversed major shift. Four of Tusk`s instrumental “self “ indices on the other hand did not experience an statistical significant change at a p≤0,05 level, while I-4a (flexibility of tactics between Cooperation/conflict) changed significantly and experienced a reversed major shift as it
Phase 1
: Before BrexitPhase 2
: After BrexitTime period
( 1 December 2014 – 22 June 2016)( 24 June 2016 – 20 November 2019)
19
decreased from +,5 (medium flexibility) to +,31 (low flexibility) in the verbal category index (T(58)= 2,506, p= 0,015, r=.-313). As in this study, belief change is evaluated based on the statistical significance level of p≤0,05, the results of Tusk`s operational code seems to contradict the expectation of this study and Walker et al., (1998) Feng (2005) and Renshon`s (2008) results. These expectations and results were that philosophical beliefs are more prone to change than instrumental beliefs, after the occurrence of an external event. Furthermore, as none of Tusk`s philosophical indices changed, the expectation that external events would lead to changes in the form of major shifts in a negative direction of P-1 and P-2, is not supported by the results of this study. However, the fact that 4 of 5 instrumental indices of Tusk
remained stable after Brexit, offers some support for the expectation that after external events instrumental beliefs won’t experience significant changes.
Table 3 : Results Operational Code Donald Tusk
Phase 1 Phase 2
n=21 n=39
P1 Nature of the politcal
Universe 0,50 0,47 (0,396) P2 Realization of Political Values 0,26 0,21 (0,895) P3 Predictability of Political Future 0,23 0,22 (0,402)
P4 Control over Historical
Development 0,28 0,22 (1,912) P5 Role of Change 0,94 0,96 (-0,693) I1 Strategic Approach to Goals 0,46 0,64 (-1,744)
I2 Tactical Pursuit of Goals 0,18 0,29
(-1,663) I3 Risk Orientation 0,40 0,49 (-1,277) I4a Cooperation/Conflict 0,50 0,31 (2,506)* I4b Words/Deeds 0,39 0,26 (1,737) I5 Reward 0,11 0,12 (-,196) I5 Promise 0,04 0,06 (-,930)
20 Data in bold denote significant results
*p≤0,05
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this study the stability, hierarchy and internal consistency assumptions of the CCT were tested by examining the potential influence of an external event, in the form of Brexit on the operational Code belief system of Donald Tusk. In order to test those assumptions, based on Walker`s et al., (1998) reformulation of the operational code and the operational code studies of Walker et al., (1998), Walker and Schafer (2000), Feng (2005) and Renshon (2008), expectations were formulated that empirically reflect the abstract CCT postulates. In continuation the derived results in the case of Tusk should indicate whether a broadening of the expectation, that belief stability exists in the instrumental indices and internal consistency and hierarchy exists between the master P-1 and P-2 indices, could be accomplished. This in turn should increase the power of the CCT`S as a theoretical basis for understanding belief in/stability of political leaders in IR. Separating Tusk as a case study between a time period before an external event (1 December 2014 - 22 June 2016) and after (24 June 2016 - 20 November 2019) and comparing the results of his operational code between these respective periods, seemed most relevant to test the expectation of this study. Namely, as already explained in the theoretical framework, the CCT assumes internal consistency and hierarchy of the operational code belief system to be presented during change inducing events that might have an impact on a leaders belief system (Renshon, 2008, pp.821-832).
In assessing the potential influence of external events on a leaders belief system, the results of this study seems to be in contradiction with the expectation and the results of
Walker et al., (1998), Feng (2005) and Renshon`s studies, that after external events a negative major change of a leaders P-1 master belief would cause the other P-2 belief indice to change as well and towards a major negative direction like P-1. Namely, all of Tusk`s philosophical
I5 Appeal 0,57 0,64 (-1,197) I5 Oppose 0,16 0,17 (-,194) I5 Threaten 0,02 0,01 (1,269) I5 Punish 0,09 0,04 (1,592)
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indices did not experienced a significant change after Brexit. Those results make it in turn difficult to assume that after change inducing events, hierarchy and internal consistency should be expected to exist between P-1 and P-2. However, this inference should be interpreted with caution, as already mentioned in the framework, the CCT expects that so called “potentially” change inducing events on the leader’s master belief should lead to a change in the other indices and in the same direction of change like the master P-1indice. In other words, the CCT assumes that the meaning of a potentially change inducing event is not synonymous to an event that is change inducing on a leaders belief system (Renshon,
2008,pp. 826-828). Thus the fact that Tusk`s philosophical master P-1 and his P-2 beliefs did not changed significantly after the potential change inducing event of Brexit, is not
necessarily a refutation of the internal consistency and hierarchy assumption of the CCT. Perhaps the fact that the operational codes of Carter, Mao and Bush were examined during events of wars and terror attacks, that caused human casualties and could therefore be considered as violent tragic events according Tetlocks (2005, p. 131) definition of an exogenous shock, might have another change inducing impact on a leaders belief system, when compared to the potential change inducing effect of the Brexit referendum, which was largely a nonviolent political event. This might indicate that within certain phenomena which fits in the concept of external events as defined by attribution theory or Tetlock (2005) conceptualization of exogenous shocks, distinctions in future research should be made between external events that might have a violent change inducing impact and events that might have nonviolent impact on a leaders belief system like political events. This in order to understand which types of events are more potentially change inducing on a leaders belief than others.
Furthermore, based on Walker et al., (1998), Feng (2005) and Renshon`s (2008) results, which showed that instrumental beliefs are less prone to change than philosophical beliefs after an external event, I expected belief stability in all the instrumental “self” indices of Tusk. However the result that Tusk`s I-4a indice changed significantly after Brexit by a major reversal (from medium to low flexibility of tactics) and the fact that none of his philosophical indices changed significantly, is partly in contradiction with this expectation and with the results of the above mentioned studies. Thus as some parts of the expectations are not supported by the empirical results. It seems difficult to broaden the theoretical understanding that the belief stability assumption can be assumed to exist in “self”
P-22
1 and P-2 “other” belief. However the results do not entirely refute the expectation as 4 of the 5 and thus the majority of Tusk`s instrumental indices did not experience significant change after Brexit. Therefore, the results of this study are partly in line with Walker et al., (1998), Feng (2005) and Renshon`s (2008) results, which has shown that instrumental indices remained largely stable and thus provide some support to the assumption of the CCT that belief stability can be expected to exist in the instrumental indices.
Besides as Renshon (2008) mentioned, the relevance of examining through which experiences belief systems might change and towards which type of direction, in combination with examining how they are being influenced by so called interaction factors, has the
potential to contribute to an enhanced clarity on belief in/stability in IR. For example by examining how personality factors can interact, with a potentially change inducing event towards leader`s belief system, we can understand whether certain personality types are linked to certain directional changes on a leaders belief and why particular leaders are more
susceptible towards change inducing events on their belief system than others (Renshon, 2008, pp. 840-842). This in turn can enhance the theoretical basis of the CCT for
understanding belief in/stability in IR. Onwards future research can begin by linking those results towards a leaders decision making behavior. This in turn, as already mentioned in the review, can enhance the predictive power of the theoretical assumptions of cognitive actor centric perspectives of beliefs for explaining foreign policy outcomes in IR.
23
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APPENDIX A: COLLECTED SPEECHES OF DONALD TUSK
Phase 1: 2014.12.01 – 2016.06.22 (N=21)
Speech 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/01/13/speech-by- donald-tusk-president-of-the-european-council-to-the-european-parliament-strasbourg-january-13th-2015/ word count 1580.
Speech 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/01/14/speech-by- donald-tusk-president-of-the-european-council-at-the-event-to-launch-the-introduction-of-the-euro-in-lithuania/ word count 1143.
Speech 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/25/speech-president-tusk-european-parliament/ word count 874
Speech 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/25/report-tusk-european-parliament/ word count 915
Speech 5 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/29/report-tusk-european-parliament/ word count 1056
Speech 6 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/05/13/tusk-speech-aachen-charlemagne/ word count 2052
Speech 7 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/08/31/tusk-speech-bled-forum/ word count 1536
Speech 8 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/09/03/tusk-conference-eu-ambassadors/ word count 1883
Speech 9 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/09/07/tusk-speech-bruegel/ word count 2316
Speech 10 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/09/29/tusk-address-un-general-assembly/ word count 1006
Speech 11 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/10/06/tusk-address-european-parliament-informal-euco-september/ word count 1114
Speech 12 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/10/22/tusk-speech-epp-congress-madrid/ word count 589
27
Speech 13 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/10/24/tusk-speech-vvd-europadag/ word count 1320
Speech 14 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/10/27/pec-speech-ep/
Speech 15 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/10/tusk-speech-parliament-malta/ word count 1307
Speech 16 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/10/tusk-speech-europa-rede/ word count 2865
Speech 17 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/10/tusk-address-cor/ word count 1459
Speech 18 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/04/04/tusk-speech-epp-saint-gery/ word count 1536
Speech 19 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/06/tusk-speech-pope/ word count 582
Speech 20 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/30/pec-speech-epp/ word count 1049
Speech 21 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/06/01/tusk-speech-european-business-summit/ word count 1217
Phase 2: 2016.06.24 – 2019.11.20 (N=39)
Speech 22 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/09/19/tusk-speech-at-un-summit-for-refugees-and-migrants/ word count 382
Speech 23 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/09/21/tusk-speech-unga/ word count 1067
Speech 24 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/10/13/tusk-speech-epc/ word count 2151
Speech 25 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/10/26/tusk-report-european-parliament/ word count 1136
28
Speech 26 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/01/18/tusk-report-european-parliament/ word count 1022
Speech 27 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/01/24/tusk-speech-funeral-herzog-berlin/ word count 1047
Speech 28 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/15/tusk-report-european-parliament/ word count 1205
Speech 29 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/17/tusk-speech-conference-eu-parliaments-rome/ word count 850
Speech 30 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25/tusk-ceremony-rome-speech/ word count 816
Speech 31 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/30/tusk-speech-epp-summit-malta/ word count 767
Speech 32 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/05/24/tusk-speech-charlemagne-ceremony/ word count 1611
Speech 33 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/09/20/tusk-speech-un-general-assembly/ word count 1148
Speech 34 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/10/10/tusk-committee-regions/ word count 1579
Speech 35 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/10/24/tusk-report-european-parliament-strasbourg/ word count 1619
Speech 36 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/08/acceptance- speech-by-president-donald-tusk-upon-receiving-honorary-doctorate-from-the-university-of-pecs/ word count 2284
Speech 37 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/01/16/report-by-president-donald-tusk-to-the-european-parliament-on-december-european-council-meetings/ word count 837
Speech 38 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/03/01/keynote-speech-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-businesseurope-day/ word count 1186
29
Speech 39 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/04/10/speech-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-university-college-dublin-law-society/ word count 1646 Speech 40 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/04/18/report-by-president-donald-tusk-to-the-european-parliament-on-march-european-council-meetings/ word count 1053
Speech 41 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/04/30/speech-by- president-donald-tusk-at-ceremony-of-the-award-of-the-polonicus-2018-prize-in-aachen-germany/ word count 1212
Speech 42 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/07/03/report-by-president-donald-tusk-to-the-european-parliament-on-june-european-council-meetings/ word count 1087
Speech 43 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/09/27/address-by-president-donald-tusk-to-the-73rd-united-nations-general-assembly/ word count 1072 Speech 44 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/10/24/report-by-president-donald-tusk-to-the-european-parliament-on-october-european-council-meetings/ word count 1008
Speech 45 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/12/16/acceptance- speech-by-president-donald-tusk-upon-receiving-honorary-doctorate-from-the-technical-university-of-dortmund/ word count 1031
Speech 46 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/12/16/ceremonial-lecture-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-technical-university-of-dortmund/ word count 2028 Speech 47 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/01/22/speech-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-signing-ceremony-of-the-franco-german-treaty-of-aachen/ word count 435
Speech 48 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/02/20/speech-by- president-donald-tusk-upon-receiving-the-honorary-doctorate-from-the-lviv-national-ivan-franko-university/ word count 2081
Speech 49 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/03/27/report-by-president-donald-tusk-to-the-european-parliament-on-march-european-council-meetings/ 799
30
Speech 50 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/04/16/update- report-and-concluding-remarks-by-president-donald-tusk-to-the-european-parliament-on-the-special-european-council-art-50-meeting-on-10-april/ word count 901
Speech 51 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/05/03/speech-given- by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-university-of-warsaw-on-the-occasion-of-3-may-constitution-day/ word count 6283
Speech 52 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/05/10/speech-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-award-ceremony-person-of-the-year/ word count 3413
Speech 53 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/07/04/report-by-president-donald-tusk-to-the-european-parliament-on-the-last-european-council-meetings/ word count 595
Speech 54 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/07/11/speech-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-batumi-international-conference/ word count 1090
Speech 55 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/09/23/speech-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-meeting-on-the-action-for-the-amazon/ word count 409 Speech 56 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/09/26/address-by-president-donald-tusk-to-the-74th-united-nations-general-assembly/ word count 767
Speech 57 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/10/09/speech-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-athens-democracy-forum-2019/ word count 1302
Speech 58 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/10/11/speech-by-president-donald-tusk-upon-receiving-the-globsec-european-award/ word count 1137 Speech 59 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/10/22/report-by- president-donald-tusk-to-the-european-parliament-on-european-council-meetings-on-17-and-18-october-2019/ word count 722
Speech 60 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/11/13/keynote- speech-by-president-donal-tusk-at-the-opening-ceremony-of-the-2019-2020-academic-year-at-the-college-of-europe/ word count 2887
31
32
Appendix C: T TEST RESULTS AND COMPARED RESULTS
(p≤0,05)
Lower Upper
Equal variances assumed ,510 ,478 ,396 58 ,694 ,028195 ,071231 -,114390 ,170779 Equal variances not assumed ,408 44,765 ,685 ,028195 ,069098 -,110997 ,167387
Equal variances assumed ,015 ,902 ,895 58 ,375 ,043558 ,048683 -,053891 ,141007 Equal variances not assumed ,892 40,744 ,378 ,043558 ,048819 -,055053 ,142168
Equal variances assumed 1,024 ,316 ,402 58 ,689 ,013626 ,033882 -,054195 ,081448 Equal variances not assumed ,356 29,455 ,725 ,013626 ,038322 -,064698 ,091951
Equal variances assumed 3,607 ,063 1,912 58 ,061 ,054029 ,028251 -,002522 ,110580 Equal variances not assumed 1,757 32,452 ,088 ,054029 ,030758 -,008588 ,116647
Equal variances assumed ,800 ,375 -,693 58 ,491 -,007308 ,010538 -,028403 ,013787 Equal variances not assumed -,701 42,317 ,487 -,007308 ,010428 -,028348 ,013733
Equal variances assumed ,028 ,867 -1,744 58 ,086 -,180456 ,103464 -,387561 ,026649 Equal variances not assumed -1,785 43,855 ,081 -,180456 ,101102 -,384233 ,023321
Equal variances assumed ,559 ,458 -1,663 58 ,102 -,107507 ,064638 -,236895 ,021881 Equal variances not assumed -1,587 35,984 ,121 -,107507 ,067736 -,244884 ,029870
Equal variances assumed 4,691 ,034 -1,277 58 ,207 -,083900 ,065710 -,215432 ,047632 Equal variances not assumed -1,426 54,482 ,160 -,083900 ,058835 -,201833 ,034033
Equal variances assumed ,017 ,896 2,506 58 ,015 ,199634 ,079676 ,040145 ,359122 Equal variances not assumed 2,461 39,016 ,018 ,199634 ,081124 ,035548 ,363720
Equal variances assumed ,608 ,439 1,737 58 ,088 ,129542 ,074560 -,019706 ,278790 Equal variances not assumed 1,657 35,943 ,106 ,129542 ,078165 -,028992 ,288076
Equal variances assumed ,429 ,515 -,196 58 ,846 -,009084 ,046415 -,101994 ,083825 Equal variances not assumed -,213 51,538 ,832 -,009084 ,042663 -,094713 ,076544
Equal variances assumed 1,744 ,192 -,930 58 ,356 -,017564 ,018878 -,055352 ,020224 Equal variances not assumed -,992 49,069 ,326 -,017564 ,017701 -,053135 ,018007
Equal variances assumed 2,726 ,104 -1,197 58 ,236 -,070586 ,058991 -,188670 ,047498 Equal variances not assumed -1,350 55,478 ,182 -,070586 ,052276 -,175330 ,034157
Equal variances assumed ,799 ,375 -,194 58 ,847 -,015132 ,078081 -,171428 ,141165 Equal variances not assumed -,238 56,756 ,813 -,015132 ,063673 -,142647 ,112383 Equal variances assumed 9,392 ,003 1,531 58 ,131 ,011806 ,007713 -,003634 ,027246
Equal variances not assumed 1,269 25,396 ,216 ,011806 ,009307 -,007346 ,030958
Equal variances assumed 3,137 ,082 1,592 58 ,117 ,048059 ,030183 -,012359 ,108476 Equal variances not assumed 1,346 26,509 ,190 ,048059 ,035709 -,025274 ,121391 I5RW Utility of means (reward)
I5PR Utility of means (Promise) I5AP Utility of means (Appeal) I5OP Utility of means (Oppose) I5TH Utility of means (Threaten) I5PU Utility of means (Punish) P5 Role of chance I1 Direction of strategy I2 Intensities of tactics I3 Risk orientation I4a Flexibility of tactics (Cooperation v. Conflict) I4b Flexibility of tactics (words v. deeds)
Std. Error Difference
Interval of the P1 Nature of political universe
P2 realization of political values P3 predicatability of political future
P4 Control over historical development
Independent Sam ples Test
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df
Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean Difference
