Graduate School of Communication
Master’s Thesis
Two Sides of the Same Coin?
How the German Automotive Industry Makes Sense of their Political Activities in Relation to their Social Responsibility
__________
by Filip Tiedge
11834811
Master’s Programme Communication Science Supervisor: Dr Irina J. Lock
15th February 2019
Abstract
The relationship between corporate political activity (CPA) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) is of growing academic importance. Associated with the rise of political CSR
literature, responsible lobbying approaches enjoy increasing scholarly attention. The present study investigates how this development in rationalized by the German automotive industry in the context of the diesel emission crisis. By means of a qualitative case study, this study applies Basu and Palazzo’s (2008) process model of CSR-sensemaking to understand how the German carmakers make sense of their CPA in relation to their CSR. Following the principle of data triangulation, the analysis is based firstly on interviews with representatives of one of one of the biggest carmakers and secondly on a wide range of publicly available documents. Findings indicate that the crisis worked as a driver of change, disrupting ongoing
sensemaking processes within the automotive industry and forcing the carmakers to mentally re-enact their organizational environment. As a result, CPA and CSR are no longer seen as equal – potentially competing – business functions. Instead, sustainability was “upgraded” to a fundamental strategic principle, serving as a guiding light and orientational framework for political activities. The findings have both practical implications for managers within the automotive industry and academic implications for researchers investigating the relationship between CPA and CSR.
How the German Automotive Industry Makes Sense of their Political Activities in Relation to their Social Responsibility
“Lobbyism and sustainability – Two sides of the same coin”: What could be the title of a normative article about corporate political activity (CPA) is in fact the headline of a commentary written by Thomas Steg, Volkswagen’s chief lobbyist (Steg, 2016). The piece was published in the carmaker’s sustainability magazine ‘Shift’ in November 2016, one year after the eruption of what can arguably be seen as the largest ever corporate scandal. The diesel crisis affected not only Volkswagen but Germany’s main industry in its entirety, with millions of cars exceeding emission standards, causing thousands of premature deaths (Chossière et al., 2017) and Volkswagen paying the largest criminal fine ever levied against any automaker (Eisenstein, 2017). From a communication perspective, it moreover raised the question how an entire industry – that had so flagrantly tried to mislead the public – can be trusted again by its stakeholders. As such, it essentially concerns the relationship between the automotive industry, politics and society – a relationship that is both shaped by the carmakers’ CPA and their CSR. In that sense, Steg was perfectly right in addressing the relationship between lobbyism and sustainability. The question remains however, how this relationship is actually rationalized by German carmakers – both in their external communication, and more importantly, through internal sensemaking processes. This study aims to answer that question.
The topic is relevant for at least two reasons. Firstly, regarding academic relevance, the interplay between CPA and CSR has long been overlooked but is increasingly gaining popularity (Den Hond, Rehbein, de Bakker, & Lankveld, 2014). The rise of political CSR literature, which links corporate social responsibility and political theory, has pointed out the ‘new political role’ of firms in a globalized world (Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2011). With this theoretical focus, the connection between a firm’s political activities and its social responsibility is of increasing importance – a fact that is also reflected by the growing numbers of articles on deliberative- or responsible lobbying (e.g., Anastasiadis,
Moon, & Humphreys, 2018; Lock & Seele, 2016). Nevertheless, empirical studies
investigating the relationship of CPA and CSR remain rare. The present study aims to fill that gap by putting empirical flesh on the theoretical bones of political CSR literature and
deliberative lobbying approaches.
Secondly, regarding societal relevance, the relationship between CPA and CSR among German carmakers is especially interesting, as the car industry is considered the most
powerful lobby group in German politics (Endres, 2018; Meyer-Fünffinger, 2018). Furthermore, German carmakers have long been seen as best practice cases for CSR,
receiving prestigious awards for their sustainability initiatives (Volkswagen Group, 2015). A recent sensemaking study by Anastasiadis (2014) moreover showed that European car manufacturers deliberately kept their CSR and lobbying functions separate in the context of EU policy making on CO2-emissions. Anastasiadis demonstrated that using a sensemaking approach is a fruitful way of analyzing organizational processes around lobbying and CSR. The present study follows his example by applying Basu and Palazzo’s (2008) process model of organizational sensemaking to investigate CPA- and CSR-sensemaking processes among German carmakers. By means of a qualitative case study, it will try to answer the following question:
RQ: How do German carmakers make sense of their Corporate Political Activity (CPA) in relation to their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the context of the diesel emissions scandal?
Context of Research: The German automotive industry and the diesel scandal
The automotive industry is arguably the largest and most important industrial branch in Germany. Generating a yearly revenue of over 400 billion Euros (roughly 25% of
Germany’s entire industrial revenue), its companies provide employment for over 800.000 people (Breitinger & Groll, 2018; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017; Verband der
Automobilindustrie, 2018). The industry is dominated by the five largest brands, Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Audi and Opel, who together control 55.8% of the German market (Kraftfahrtbundesamt, 2012). For this study, interviews with representatives of one of the largest German carmakers were conducted.
Due to its sheer size, the automotive industry is traditionally seen as the industrial branch with the highest lobby power in Germany, having close ties to the federal government (Endres, 2018; Junginger, 2017). All German carmakers are united within the German
Association of the Automotive Industry e.V. (Verband der Automobilindustrie, [VDA]), which represents the interests of the entire branch, as well as the Federation of German Industries e.V. (Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie, [BDI]). Besides their association-based political activities, the major carmakers also act as individual players in the political arena. These activities are strategically planned and coordinated by Public Affairs
departments located at the company headquarters and mostly executed by inhouse lobbyists in Berlin, Brussels, Washington D.C. etc. (e.g. Volkswagen Group, 2017a).
With respect to CSR, all major German carmakers dedicate vast amounts of resources to manifold initiatives all around the globe, ranging from climate protection and
decarbonization over diversity management to human rights initiatives (BMW AG, 2017; Daimler AG, 2017; Volkswagen Group, 2017c). For their far-reaching commitment, the German car producers were long seen as best-practice cases for CSR. Volkswagen, for example, was rated world’s most sustainable automotive group by the Dow Jones
Sustainability Indices (DJSI) in September 2015 – only few weeks before the diesel emission scandal started making headlines (Volkswagen Group, 2015).
The scandal gained traction later in September 2015, when investigations by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) revealed that VW had intentionally manipulated the engine software of 11 million Diesel cars worldwide, resulting in cars exceeding emission standards by 40-times or more (Chappell, 2015; Ewing, 2015). Recent studies estimate that
VW diesel car excess emissions led to 1.200 premature deaths in Europe between 2008 and 2015, resulting in 1.9 billion EUR in costs associated with the life-years lost (Chossière et al., 2017). Independent researchers later revealed that the models of other German carmakers largely exceed emission limits as well (International Council on Clean Transportation, 2015). In Germany, the diesel scandal had far reaching political consequences. Several inquiry committees were formed within the Federal Ministry of Transport, the Federal Motor Transport Authority (in German: Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt, KBA) and within the German Parliament (Bundestag). Especially the Bundestag inquiry committee attracted much public attention as prominent politicians – including Chancellor Merkel – and representatives from the leading car manufacturers had to testify (Bundesministerium für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur, 2016; Deutscher Bundestag, 2017). According to academic assessments, the Diesel scandal did not only negatively affect the public’s perception of the entire industry, but also undermined the manufacturers’ earlier privileged position in the political arena (Valentini & Kruckeberg, 2018).
CPA and CSR: two closely related concepts
The present study rests on the underlying assumption that Corporate Political Activity (CPA) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) are inherently related: Both concepts address the interplay between firms’ economic, political and societal concerns and affect a firm’s reputation and its legitimacy (Den Hond et al., 2014; Lock & Seele, 2016). In spite of these evident connections, academics and communication professionals have dedicated surprisingly little attention to the relationship between CPA and CSR (Anastasiadis, 2014; Rasche, 2015), resulting in a missed chance to deliver greater value to both individual companies and society (Beloe, Harrison, & Greenfield, 2007). The following section will therefore discuss the current CPA- and CSR-literature to explore conceptual connections and point out similar developments in both fields.
CPA is an umbrella concept, subsuming all corporate policies, processes and practices “intended to influence public policy” (Windsor, 2006, p. 98, see also Den Hond et al., 2014). Consequently, CPA does not merely represent a synonym for lobbying, but should instead be viewed as a broader concept. In fact, lobbying understood as “the strategic communication of politically relevant information to government officeholders” (Baron, 2006, p. 232)
constitutes only one subset of CPA, as the latter includes many more activities such as political advertising, stakeholder management or legal actions (Anastasiadis et al., 2018; Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005; Den Hond et al., 2014). The CPA literature looks at how firms aim to influence their political environment and has long been dominated by
instrumental approaches, e.g. from nonmarket strategy perspectives (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004; Rasche, 2015; Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer, 2002). Nonmarket strategy theorists view CPA as “attempts to shape government policy in ways favorable to the firm” (Hillman et al., 2004, p. 838) and eventually as a means to maximize corporate profits. Due to the complex and context-dependent nature of public affairs, researchers often struggle to quantitively measure the direct impact of a firm’s political activity (Anastasiadis, 2014; Mahoney, 2008) Hence, qualitative case studies represent a popular methodological approach among CPA researchers (Lock & Seele, 2018a), which is reflected by existing studies on CPA within the automotive industry. Guérard, Bode and Gustafsson (2013) analyzed the case of the diesel particulate filter in Germany, revealing how German car manufacturers lobbied against the introduction of cleaner particulate filters, thereby contradicting their own sustainability programs and thus ultimately harming the industry’s public reputation. Anastasiadis (2014) analyzed carmakers’ lobbying approaches in the EU policy process on CO2-emission regulations, thereby identifying that it is in the character of most carmakers “to rail against politics and political control” (p. 286). Using a sensemaking perspective, Anastasiadis reveals that European car manufacturers did not perceive CSR as relevant for lobbying, thus
Like CPA, CSR is mostly used as an umbrella concept. As such, it encompasses all corporate policies, processes and practices implemented to comply with stakeholder
expectations and societal demands beyond what is required by law (Carroll, 1979; Den Hond et al., 2014). A plethora of articles, mostly within communication-, business- and
management literature has been dedicated to the topic of CSR in recent years. Due to this interdisciplinarity, the current literature lacks a consensus on a definition of CSR
(McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006). Nevertheless, most CSR-scholars agree to the basic understanding that CSR involves elements of voluntarism and self-regulation, aimed at contributing to societal welfare (Brammer, Jackson, & Matten, 2012; Moon, 2007). Similar to CPA, the CSR literature has long been dominated by instrumental approaches, which view CSR as “a source of opportunity, innovation and competitive advantage” (Porter & Kramer, 2006, p. 80), emphasizing that firms should only engage in CSR initiatives if there is a strategic reason to do. Today, most CSR-research is either content- or activity-focused (Basu & Palazzo, 2008), with scholars analyzing either corporate CSR-communication (e.g.
sustainability reports) or focus on activity measures (e.g. how much a firm invests in initiatives). According to Basu and Palazzo (2008) however, simply documenting CSR-related activities is unlikely to reveal any real differences between firms, due to a rising homogeneity and standardization in CSR-reporting. Hence, the authors suggest studying internal sensemaking processes within which CSR is embedded to understand how the world is perceived within an organization. The present study follows Basu and Palazzo’s
argumentation and applies a sensemaking perspective to explore the relation of CPA and CSR within the German automotive industry. Previous industry-relevant CSR studies showed that most carmakers make no clear distinction between the concept of CSR and that of corporate sustainability (CS). Valentini and Kruckeberg (2018) pointed out how both concepts are often used interchangeably, although sustainability enjoys higher popularity and is mostly used as the superordinate term. This is in line with a recent study by Gatti and Seele (2014), who
found a rise of sustainability in comparison to other concepts. In the German automotive industry, the term CSR is mostly used referring to labor- and social issues, human rights and anti-corruption initiatives, while sustainability refers primarily to environmental concerns (BMW AG, 2017; Daimler AG, 2017; Volkswagen Group, 2017c).
Connections between CPA and CSR: reconciled through the deliberative turn?
CPA and CSR are firstly connected through a shared thematic focus. Being located at the crossroads between economy, politics and society, both concepts study the link between a firm and its social and political environment (Rasche, 2015). Secondly, there are interactive reputation effects between CPA and CSR (Den Hond et al., 2014). As “relational activities”, CPA and CSR are both concerned with shaping a firm’s social and political context and therefore have a direct impact on the perceptions of key stakeholders – e.g. governments, environmentalists and NGO’s (Fassin, 2009). Den Hond et al. (2014) thus argue that CPA and CSR together affect a firm’s reputation. Thirdly, CPA and CSR also affect a firm's legitimacy. Legitimacy, seen as the judgement about a firm’s conformity with societal norms and often described as its ‘license to operate’, rests heavily on normative demands such as transparency and accountability (Lock & Seele, 2016; van Ruler & Verčič, 2005). Relevant research recently found that a “disconnect between companies’ thinking on lobbying and CSR […] is dangerous for those firms’ ongoing legitimacy” (Anastasiadis, 2014, p. 261). Lock and Seele (2016) therefore argue that corporations need to achieve a noncontradiction between their CPA- and CSR efforts to foster legitimacy. Their ideas are exemplary for a deeper
development in the academic discourse about CPA and CSR, which has been described as a “deliberative turn” (Anastasiadis et al., 2018, p. 212).
This deeper development is strongly associated with the rise of political CSR literature and affects both CPA and CSR, thereby further emphasizing the concepts’ mutual
2011) rejects aforementioned instrumental approaches for being limited and instead emphasizes a firm’s responsibility to address social and environmental issues in case of regulatory gaps (Rasche, 2015). Contrary to nonmarket strategy perspectives, which assume a clear separation between business and government, political CSR scholars emphasize the ‘new political role’ of firms in a globalized world, thereby blurring such separations through a focus on governance processes (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2011). Building up on a
Habermasian approach, corporations are seen as being embedded in deliberative democratic processes and should aim to solve public issues, that were previously assigned to the
governmental domain. The rise of political CSR is also relevant for CPA and lobbying. Contemporary studies about corporate political activities are marked by a growing interest in responsible lobbying, often resting on similar theoretical foundations as the political CSR literature (Anastasiadis et al., 2018; Lock & Seele, 2016). Most noteworthy is Lock and Seele’s novel type of deliberative lobbying (2016). Based on Habermas’ normative ideals about discourse, transparency, and accountability, Lock and Seele encourage firms to actively align their CPA with their CSR to solve public issues. The deliberative turn can therefore be seen as a chance for reconciling CPA and CSR, since deliberative approaches highlight the chances that lie in aligning CPA and CSR-activities.
Aligning CSR and CPA: exploring possible synergy effects
As indicated above, many corporations largely ignore the relationship between CSR and CPA due to a limited understanding of the interplay between the two areas (Beloe et al., 2007). Aiming to fill that gap, Den Hond et al. (2014) developed a conceptual model to describe whether and how firms have their CSR and CPA aligned, non-aligned or mis-aligned and how that affects the firm’s reputation. In that context, alignment is defined as strategic fit, “when firms use – or are perceived to use – their CSR and CPA to achieve the same outcome in addressing a policy issue” (Den Hond et al., 2014, p. 792). When CSR and CPA are
non-aligned however, firms use their political activities and CSR-initiatives to work on different policies or unrelated issues. Even more harmful is the third form, mis-alignment, where CPA and CSR are used to achieve opposite outcomes in addressing a policy issue.
Based on that understanding, Den Hond et al. identify a variety of resource complementarities between CSR and CPA and argue that jointly coordinating both areas promises valuable synergy effects. Alignment accordingly supports a firm’s CSR activities by helping to set priorities, enhancing the viability of policies and increasing the overall
credibility of CSR commitments. At the same time, alignment supports political activities by facilitating access to the polity, reducing the cost of interacting with politicians and regulators and enhancing the overall efficacy of a firm’s political activities. Den Hond et al. (2014) conclude that by synchronizing their CSR and CPA efforts, firms can capitalize on synergies between both fields and achieve beneficial reputation effects.
Non- or mis-alignment on the other side leads to contradictory signals from the firm, that might be perceived as misleading and may negatively affect stakeholder evaluations. Reasons for non- or mis-alignment can be manifold: e.g. institutional pressures, societal expectations or even strategic decisions. All forms of non- or mis-alignment share the same outcome however, as they ultimately harm a firm’s reputation. One specific form of
misalignment is described by Lock and Seele (Lock & Seele, 2018b), who posit that corporations tend to (mis-)use CSR activities to advance instrumental lobbying goals. By doing so, these corporations not only subvert political CSR but even engage in a completely different instrumental form of CSR in the political arena: politicized CSR. Empirical studies have shown that these tendencies are particularly visible among carmakers, with Anastasiadis’ (2014) study on the EU legislation process around CO2-emissions being most relevant. Given that this study applies a similar sensemaking approach, the following section will provide a short overview of the sensemaking literature, focusing specifically on Basu and Palazzo’s (2008) process model of CSR-sensemaking.
Sensemaking Perspectives in CSR and CPA Research
Sensemaking is most commonly defined as “the ongoing retrospective development of plausible images that rationalize what people are doing” (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 409). As such, it is a central organizational construct in Communication Science, describing how individuals in an organization give meaning to events within and outside of their
organizational context (Cornelissen, Carroll, & Elving, 2009; Weick, 1995). Those events are often surprising or unexpected, thus disrupting the ongoing flow of events and forcing
individuals to make the new context intelligible to themselves and others. Sensemaking is therefore particularly well-suited to describe crisis situations. Previous studies highlighted the powerful generative effect that crises can have on organizations, enabling renewal and
positive change in the organization, thereby describing crises as potential drivers of organizational change (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010).
The present study aims at understanding how the relationship between CPA and CSR is rationalized by German carmakers through sensemaking processes. The analysis is based on Basu and Palazzo’s (2008) process model of organizational sensemaking, which aims at describing a firm’s CSR-character by proposing a tripartite set of cognitive, linguistic and conative processes, explaining how managers think, discuss and act with respect to their key stakeholders. These dimensions are graphically displayed in Figure 1 (Basu & Palazzo, 2008).
Cognitive processes (‘what firms think’) concern the organization’s relationships with its stakeholders as well as its understanding of legitimacy. Organizations can either have an individualistic identity, emphasizing liberty and self-interest; a relational identity, perceiving themselves as partners in relationships with their stakeholders; or a collectivistic identity, addressing social or environmental issues in collaboration with other institutions. In terms of legitimacy, firms can have different approaches towards striving for compliance with social norms and values. Linguistic processes (‘what firms say’) concern firms’ ways of justifying their reasons for engaging in certain CSR activities as well as their willingness to be
transparent about those. Conative processes (‘how firms tend to behave’), involve the behavioral posture that firms’ adopt, along with the commitment and consistency it shows (Basu & Palazzo, 2008, p. 124). A firm can thus behave defensive, accepting no feedback from others and isolating itself from external input; it can be tentative, showing both
established patterns of behavior and new behavior directed at redressing misdeeds (George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006); or it can be open, portraying willingness to listen and respond to alternative perspectives offered by external stakeholders. This posture can either be driven by instrumental- or normative commitment and it can be consistent or inconsistent both strategically and internally. All three dimensions together define a firm’s character, which is why all three dimensions must be analyzed to fully understand “the way [a firm] goes about making sense of the world” (Basu & Palazzo, 2008, p. 124).
Although Basu and Palazzo’s process model was originally conceptualized to describe organizational sensemaking processes around CSR, the present study uses it to understand the relationship between CPA and CSR. This little theoretical stretch is justifiable with the
aforementioned close relationship between CPA and CSR. Both concepts share the same thematic focus, rest on similar theoretical premises and are both related to reputation and legitimacy. It is therefore assumed that the model can be used to analyze both concepts as well as their mutual relationship.
Method
Research approach
To answer this study’s research question, a qualitative case study approach was chosen. The analysis was based on both semi-structured interviews and publicly available documents. Creswell (2007, p. 73) defines case study research as “a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) […] over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information”. Qualitative case studies have been a popular methodological choice in both lobbying and CSR-research due to the complex and context-dependent nature of both fields (Lock & Seele, 2018a; Richter & Arndt, 2018). It is thus believed that a qualitative case study allows for the best possible
understanding of organizational sensemaking processes around the relation of CPA and CSR in the German automotive industry.
As Lock and Seele (2018a) point out however, case studies have also been subject to much debate surrounding their rigor in terms of reliability, validity and generalizability. The method has especially been criticized for not producing findings that are generalizable beyond the research context and thus for not contributing to scientific development (Valentini & Kruckeberg, 2018). In order to minimize these alleged shortcomings, the present thesis followed three specific methodological advices provided by Lock and Seele (2018a) as well as Flyvbjerg (2006). These advices are outlined below in table 1.
Table 1
Overview of how the shortcomings of case studies were minimized in this study Case study
shortcoming
Solution Implementation in this study
Problematic construct- and external validity
Data triangulation (Lock & Seele, 2018a)
Analyzing both interviews and publicly available documents
Problematic reliability Transparency
(Lock & Seele, 2018a)
A detailed list of all
interviews and documents, as well as the interview guide and the full transcripts plus a list of all used codes are provided in the Appendix* Problematic generalizability
beyond the research context
Choice of „atypical or extreme cases“
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 229)
The case of the German automotive industry during the diesel emission scandal arguably provides an atypical or extreme case as it can be considered an extraordinary industry crisis that unfolded over a longer period of time (Valentini & Kruckeberg, 2018)
Procedure
The three largest German carmakers (Volkswagen Group, BMW AG, and Daimler AG) as well as the industry association VDA were approached for interviews. Unfortunately, only one of the carmakers agreed to allow access to their employees – under the condition of complete personal and organizational anonymity. The corporation will thus be referred to as “Germania Motors” (GM) and the employees will be given pseudonyms based on popular German surnames with their gender being randomized.
Five semi-structured interviews with corporate representatives were conducted between November and December 2018. All respondents declared their consent in written form and were provided with the full interview guide prior to the interview (see Appendix D for the full interview guide). Two of the interviews were conducted one-on-one in the
respondents’ offices at the GM headquarter, three via phone (see Appendix B for details). All interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed. The transcripts are essentially
verbatim but were “tidied up” from garbled or unintelligible speech “in the interest of providing a more readable text” (Brod, Tesler, & Christensen, 2009; Poland, 2003, p. 272) Information that would reveal the respondents’ identity or that of the organization was
concealed (see Appendix E for the full transcripts). As all five interviewees are German native speakers, the interviews were conducted in German. Key quotes, selected to illustrate the main findings, were subsequently translated to English by the author and double-checked by two native speakers.
Transcripts and documents were coded using the qualitative data analysis software ATLAS.ti. The coding involved selecting relevant quotes in view of the research question and assigning them to Basu and Palazzo’s tripartite set of CSR-processes (2008). In other words, the author searched for key sentences that revealed how the German carmakers think, discuss and act regarding their CPA in relation to their CSR. The seven dimensions from Basu & Palazzo’s sensemaking process model (identity orientation, legitimacy, justification,
transparency, posture, consistency, commitment) served as superordinate themes under which individual codes were subsumed (see Appendix C for details). In the analysis, it was
distinguished between a micro level perspective – analyzing sensemaking processes at GM based on the interviews – and a macro level perspective – analyzing sensemaking processes within the German automotive industry based on the available documents. Only the results of the micro level analysis are anonymized.
Sample
Five interview partners were selected by the author based on existing personal
contacts. Three of the respondents work for GM’s public affairs department (one of them as a lobbyist in Berlin) and the other two respondents work for the department of sustainability (see Appendix B for details). Following the principle of data triangulation, a variety of publicly available documents was used as a second source of data. The documents were selected based on topical relevance and within a specific timeframe, starting with the formation of the Bundestag inquiry committee in July 2016 and ending with the
announcement of the so-called ‘diesel compromise’ in October 2018 (Bundesministerium für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur, 2018), thus resulting in a total timeframe of 27 months. Data sources were defined as topically relevant if they could be characterized as official publications by federal authorities, industry-related associations or carmakers and were from a political- or sustainability context related to the diesel scandal. The final sample included 26 documents with a total of 2,599 pages (see Appendix A for details). Relevant parts within these 26 documents were identified through a set of eight keywords, which were based on the interview guide: “responsibility”, “sustainability”, “CSR”, “political”, “public affairs”, “lobbying”, “government” and “stakeholder” (as well as their German translations).
Findings
Identity orientation. GM reveals a relational identity, meaning that respondents highlighted the importance of partnerships with diverse stakeholder groups – primarily governments, investors, political parties and NGO’s. In that sense, the firm “does not sit in an ivory tower” (Mr. Schneider) but is very keen on having a functioning exchange of
information and opinions even with critical stakeholders. Most respondents perceive
themselves as an interface between the company and its stakeholders, bringing external input into organizational decision-making processes and explaining corporate policies to the outside world. Mr. Weber referred to himself as a translator “Politics-GM / GM-Politics” in this regard. However, all interviewees mentioned that the diesel scandal made it much more difficult to maintain previous partnerships – especially with critical NGOs – due to a loss of trust and reputation. Accordingly, one of the main current purposes is to stabilize existing relationships and “to remain open for dialogue in all directions” (Mr. Weber), which was described as “sustainability in relationship-management”.
We always aim to work towards constructive solutions together with others. Hence, we want to keep communication channels open […] also if we encounter difficult topics or conflicts. The goal is to never lose that connection. Because we always believe that we can still find a solution somewhere. (Mr. Schneider)
This understanding is shared by the rest of the industry. The underlying paradigm is that businesses can only achieve sustainable profitability in stable and functioning societies, as expressed for instance by Thomas Steg, chief lobbyist of the Volkswagen Group (2016). In that sense, the organizations perceive their long-term business success as being dependent on a functioning societal and political context, to which they can contribute through responsible lobbying and sustainable conduct. All analyzed organizations show a clear understanding of governance processes, which rely on close public-private partnerships and aim to fill gaps resulting from a lack of collective goods or failing government regulation (Steg, 2016). Based on that perspective, all major carmakers have numerous memberships and commitments in
industrial and trade associations (most importantly BDI and VDA) as well as partnerships with NGOs on both national and international levels. While the analysis also revealed aspects of the individualistic- (a trend towards more inhouse lobbying and less association-based activity) and the collectivistic trait (taking a strong stance against racism and right-wing populism), the relational trait was clearly dominant both at GM and within the industry.
Legitimacy. GM revealed to be undergoing a transition from a pragmatic understanding of legitimacy towards strategies that aim for cognitive legitimacy.
Traditionally, the firm’s legitimacy was based firstly on its role as a reliable provider of individual mobility (Ms. Schmidt), secondly on its economic performance, providing jobs and generating tax revenue and thirdly on its technical expert status as a leading car manufacturer. Yes, GM is a legitimate player in the political process. This legitimacy arises from the government needing input in the legislation process to know how a regulation is going to be functioning. And therefore, it needs expertise – from everyone it can get it from. (Mr. Müller)
At the same time, GM is aware that its legitimacy as an expert is based on the provision of truthful information. Hence, the diesel scandal was described as “a dreadful example for how it does not work” (Mr. Müller) resulting in a significant loss of legitimacy. As a reaction, GM actively tried to improve its CPA-processes to match external expectations and stakeholder demands for transparency and accountability thereby showing a shift towards cognitive legitimacy. This shift included opening up to critical stakeholders and purposely integrating their voices in GMs own corporate communication; a step based on the understanding that coming to “a good result with others” (Mr. Schneider) is beneficial for the firm’s credibility and legitimacy.
Only by fulfilling external expectations and demands was it possible to maintain our own processes and business operations. (Ms. Fischer)
On a macro level, this trend was reflected by an increased focus on compliance with societal norms. Volkswagen, Audi and Daimler all released codes of conduct & integrity codes promoting openness, transparency and responsibility in their engagement with political stakeholders (e.g. Audi, 2017; Volkswagen Group, 2017b). All producers fully revealed their party donations. Volkswagen moreover released corporate lobby guidelines, promising strict compliance and neutrality (Volkswagen Group, 2016), and appointed a sustainability council, which provides strategic assistance on sustainability questions and gives policy
recommendations. In their first report, the council strongly recommended to establish a factual and transparent dialogue with political decision-makers, NGOs and other stakeholders (Volkswagen Group, 2018). These examples demonstrate the car industry’s attempt to comply with societal demands for transparency and responsibility in their CPA. The shift towards cognitive legitimacy was thus found both on a micro- and macro level.
Linguistic Processes
Justification. GM shows a mixture between legal, scientific and economic justification approaches for their CPA and CSR – with the economic trait being the most prevalent. Legal justifications are mostly used with regard to the ongoing investigations in the diesel scandal. According to GM, there was no fraud and no ‘defeat device’, hence also no breach of German law. At the same time this also implies however, that the firm cannot communicate anything in their CPA- or CSR-communication that would jeopardize this argumentation and thereby open a door for potential lawsuits.
And that’s why you’ll always watch out to legally expose yourself. Because you cannot do that due to financial risks, which you have to avoid as a stock corporation. Otherwise your shareholders will sue you. Hence, the whole field is strongly shaped by legal considerations. (Mr. Müller)
In that sense, legal and economic justifications are essentially connected due to the permanent threat of shareholder claims and financial penalties which strongly limits the firm’s ability to
be transparent and self-critical in their CPA approach. The importance of financial stability was especially highlighted by respondents from GM’s sustainability department, who emphasized that profitability lays the foundation for CSR.
Without economic success one cannot assume societal responsibility in the long run. It doesn’t help to be the best and most sustainable corporation in social and
environmental terms when you are completely operating in the red. (Ms. Fischer) Economic justifications, based on the sheer size and financial power of the industry, were found to be most prevalent on both micro- and macro levels. All respondents, all
sustainability reports, lobby guidelines and even official statements at the Bundestag inquiry committee highlighted the industry’s responsibility as a major employer, providing jobs and generating tax revenue, bringing wealth and stability for the German society. Respondents from GM’s sustainability department moreover highlighted the economic need to act socially responsibly in the context of SRI (Socially Responsible Investing) in order to attract investors and maintain a stable cashflow (Ms. Fischer).
Scientific justifications for CPA and CSR were also found both on a micro- and macro level – mostly related to the carmakers’ expert status in the societal transition toward
emission-free mobility. BMW (2017) was most clear about that, openly disclosing how advocating for measures to promote electromobility (foremost the development of public charging infrastructure) was the primary goal of their political activity between 2016 and 2017. Similar statements were found in all sustainability reports, as well as in publications of the industry association VDA. Respondents from GM moreover emphasized the limited knowledge of most political stakeholders with regard to electromobility and hence the importance to inform members of the Bundestag about technological developments. In that context, Mr. Weber highlighted the firm’s role as an enabler of emission-reduction.
If it’s desired by politics to fulfill CO2 targets by bringing more electric cars on the street then we need certain things with regard to infrastructure […] in that sense we are
actually the enabler that makes sure that the climate objectives defined by politicians can be reached in the product without the new technology flopping in the end. (Mr. Weber)
Transparency. In terms of the valence of information included in their public affairs and sustainability communication, the automotive industry is clearly biased both on a micro- and macro level. Accordingly, all carmakers tend to focus on releasing favorable information while omitting unfavorable ones (Basu & Palazzo, 2008) – which was especially visible in their sustainability reports. Nevertheless, a slight movement towards a more balanced
communication was found on the micro level, as all GM representatives expressed their wish to be able to communicate in a more open and transparent way. In that regard, transparency was described as a matter of respect towards external stakeholders (Mr. Müller).
[…] I fully agree with you that it would make sense to open up these processes to create a better transparency […] of course it would make sense to move that towards the public so that we have a stronger transparency and that will hopefully come in the future. (Ms. Fischer)
The diesel crisis had ambivalent effects on that wish. On the one hand – as mentioned above – the threat of legal claims for compensation clearly hindered GM communication officials to speak out openly and self-critically about their organizational misconduct. On the other hand, it was so obvious that all German carmakers had lied to the public (in that their cars were by far not as clean as they had claimed) that they had no other choice but to open up and improve transparency in order to protect their credibility and legitimacy. Volkswagen for instance did that by releasing lobby guidelines, revealing the organizational structure of the public affairs department (Volkswagen, 2017) and – just as Daimler and BMW – by fully disclosing their financial contributions to political parties.
Posture. The German carmakers revealed a tentative posture with regard to their CPA and CSR, which means that they showed both established patterns of behavior (those being criticized) and new behaviors directed at overcoming their previous wrongdoing (George et al., 2006). This was found most clearly on a micro level. On the one hand, GM maintained its bias in terms of transparency (see “Transparency”) as well as its prioritization of economic profitability (Mr. Müller, Ms. Schmidt) and a generally instrumental understanding of CPA and CSR (see “Commitment); on the other hand, GM upgraded sustainability to a
fundamental strategic principle, and focused on strengthening compliance and integrity as corporate values, thereby building a normative orientational framework for political activity. This volatility in addressing previously criticized behavior was repeatedly mentioned in the interviews as well.
We always oscillate between these two poles, proactivity and reactivity or progressive and unprogressive tones. Without saying that it is purely intentional…but that is my personal impression of the public debate, also as an employee. (Ms. Schmidt) On a macro level, the tentative trait was reflected by the above mentioned reactions to the diesel emission crisis – for example by Volkswagens contradictive approach with regard to the Jones Day investigations (Bender, Iwersen, & Votsmeier, 2018). In the political
discussion about hardware upgrades for EURO5 diesel cars, BMW categorically refused to financially support appropriate measures (Doll, 2018) – which even indicates a defensive posture. Daimler published an integrity code that demands “ethical behavior” and “transparent dialogue” when dealing with political stakeholders (Daimler AG, 2016) but has – unlike Volkswagen – not published corporate guidelines for political lobbying. Volkswagen installed a sustainability council, starring renowned experts on sustainable mobility and environmental protection, for strategic assistance on sustainability topics. Until today the sustainability council mostly operates behind closed doors however, having published only five brief documents in over two years of work (Volkswagen Group, 2018). All of these examples
reveal a tentative posture with partly contradictive behavior related to both CPA and CSR. This tentative posture was found on the micro- and macro level.
Consistency. GM revealed to be strategically consistent and yet internally inconsistent with regard to the relationship between CPA and CSR. GM’s behavior is strategically
consistent in the way that sustainability is embedded as a core value in the corporate strategy thus serving as an operational framework for CPA. Sustainability goals are moreover
operationalized through precise operating numbers which “leave no room for interpretation” (Mr. Schneider). Especially this consequent measurement has been highlighted because “what is not measured, is not managed” (Ms. Fischer). The respondents moreover emphasized the congruence between lobby goals and sustainability goals.
Sustainability goals and lobby goals have to be the same […] The lobby-positions that we communicate externally are based on strategic decisions and they are based on the goals of the corporate strategy. (Mr. Müller)
In that sense, strategic consistency is actually perceived as fundamental by the respondents because it provides them with a clear guideline and orientation in their daily doing and gives meaning to the entire organization.
And that’s why sustainability plays such an important role, because […] you have a superordinate framework that all people can orientate themselves by, even if they have different tasks and different goals…and this provides the organization with a certain meaning, where it wants to go. In the sense that, it is not all about creating economic growth but also an added value for society that goes beyond profitability. (Ms. Fischer)
In spite of the essential importance of strategic consistency between CPA and CSR, GM revealed an internal inconsistency – mostly due to target conflicts between short term
profitability and long term sustainability1. Although internal consistency was mentioned as the goal by most respondents, they were realistic about the fact that in an organization like GM there are too many people involved, issues are too complex and organizational processes have too many layers to achieve complete internal consistency (Mr. Müller). At the same time, Mr. Müller and Ms. Fischer also referred to educational background as one important aspect with regard consistency – being reflective of the fact that they both studied
Communications and Political Science and thus had a deeper understanding of the firm’s responsibility as a political actor while the vast majority of top-managers at GM either have a technical, legal or economic background and thus a mostly instrumental understanding of CPA and CSR.
If you have a board that consists of a jurist, a financial expert and a technician then it is unlikely that anything else than profitability will be the prioritized outcome in the end. […] Also, you will still find departments today that view sustainability as “a nice color”. (Mr. Müller)
On a macro-level, it was difficult to precisely analyze how strategically consistent the German carmakers are with regard to the relationship between CPA and CSR – even less so for
internal consistency. Volkswagen, Daimler and BMW, for instance, mention sustainability in their strategic vision but do not provide detailed explicit or implicit information about how sustainability goals are operationalized throughout the organization – neither do they publicly discuss potential target conflicts between sustainability and profitability.
Commitment. Both on a micro- and macro-level, the German carmakers revealed a clearly instrumental commitment towards CPA and CSR. The goal of CPA was described by one respondent as making sure “we can successfully maintain our business model” (Mr. Schneider). Especially shaping the transition towards electric mobility in a way that allows
GM to stay profitable during that transformation process was highlighted by the respondents as a main motivation in their current CPA. At the same time, Mr. Müller described a strategic shift from “how can we avoid potential regulation?” towards “we would like to talk about what regulation we need to create a certain context”, which was described as an instrumental yet constructive approach by the respondent.
CSR was often discussed from either a risk management- or reputation management perspective. GM seems to have learned from the diesel crisis that sustainability will protect the firm from future crises, when conducted consistently.
Firms are less likely to experience legitimacy crises for instance, when they have a very good sustainability management. So that has a positive effect if crises arise and it also protects the firm from economic harm through boycotts etc., so there is always an economic interest behind that. (Ms. Fischer)
The financial benefits of being a sustainable company were also discussed in reference to investors (SRIs) and consumers (‘sustainability sells’). In a political context, sustainability was described as way of gaining legitimacy. By adapting responsible lobbying approaches based on transparency, neutrality and accountability, GM aims at maintaining a status as a morally legitimate player, thereby being able to participate in the political process as a “subject” and not an “object” (Ms. Schmidt). Commitment to sustainability is moreover supposed to increase GM’s agenda setting power. Hence, the firm tries to be particularly progressive with regard to electromobility (Mr. Weber).
This instrumental understanding is shared by all analyzed carmakers. Appropriate statements can be found throughout all sustainability reports, codes of conduct and association publications. The Daimler declaration on “Political dialogue and representation of interests” (2018) serves as a representative example:
In order to safeguard the future of the Daimler Group, it is therefore important that we represent the interests of our company in an open dialogue with governments,
associations, organizations and various groups in society. […] Our principles for political dialogue and communicating our interests form the basis of responsible lobbying (Daimler AG, 2018, p. 1).
Although the term “responsible lobbying” was never clearly defined in any of the analyzed documents, it was still clear that sustainability in general and responsible lobbying in
particular can be seen as the industry’s crisis-response to the diesel emissions scandal and as a tool to regain lost reputation and legitimacy. This instrumental commitment was found both on a micro- and macro-level.
Discussion and Conclusion
This study aimed at explaining how the German carmakers make sense of their CPA in relation to their CSR in the context of the diesel scandal. Both on a micro- and macro level, the diesel scandal can be seen as driver of change for organizational sensemaking processes, as it fostered a higher understanding of sustainability as a fundamental strategic principle. While CPA and CSR had previously been perceived as equal – potentially competing – business functions, sustainability was “upgraded” to a higher strategic goal after the crisis and is now superior to public affairs, serving as a guideline and orientational framework for CPA.
This development was most clearly found on the micro level. Through a sensemaking lens, the revaluation of sustainability can be seen as an instrumental crisis-response strategy by GM, an answer to the question “what now?” This is in line with existing studies in the field of crisis-sensemaking, which highlighted the powerful generative effect that crises can have on organizations, enabling renewal and positive change in the organization (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010). Crises interrupt well-rehearsed patterns of action and have thus been described as drivers of organizational change, emphasizing possibilities not only for recovery
but also for improvement to prevent similar crises in the future. From a sensemaking perspective, the diesel scandal can thus be compared to the Bhopal accident (Weick, 2010), the Tenerife air crash (Weick, 1990) or the Mann Gulch fire (Weick, 1993). It is believed that the major decision makers at GM were forced to mentally re-enact the organizational
environment and adapt their business strategy to the changed context. Accordingly, the firm moved towards a higher understanding of sustainability as a fundamental strategic goal.
The macro level analysis revealed similar developments – although cognitive
sensemaking processes around public affairs and sustainability were not stated as explicitly. Among the German carmakers, the development towards strategic sustainability manifests itself in two ways: firstly, in a clear development towards decarbonization – mostly through an expansion of electromobility (product dimension) – and secondly in a noticeable effort to comply with societal norms and external stakeholder expectations (process dimension); the latter being strongly associated with a movement towards responsible lobbying. This development was found both on a micro- and macro-level and becomes more clear when discussed along the lines of Basu and Palazzo’s model (2008).
Cognitive processes
From a sensemaking perspective, the development towards responsible lobbying represents a movement from pragmatic legitimacy towards cognitive legitimacy. Responsible lobbying for the carmakers means an incorporation of normative values such as neutrality, accountability and transparency, which have long been demanded by external stakeholders. In that sense, the German carmakers are aligning corporate processes with external stakeholder expectations thereby trying to achieve cognitive legitimacy. This interpretation is in line with the findings of Richter and Arndt (2018) who, studied the CSR-character of British American Tobacco (BAT), and found an attempt to align CSR-processes with external stakeholder demands, which characterizes BAT as a cognitive “legitimacy seeker” (Richter & Arndt, 2018). The German automotive industry – arguably a controversial industry too – showed
similar sensemaking processes around their CPA and CSR. Similar to BAT, the German carmakers moreover revealed a strong relational identity, focusing on the importance of functioning stakeholder relations. This relational identity orientation is related to a
governance perspective, highlighting the relevance of private-public partnerships as described by political CSR scholars (e.g. Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2011) and was found both on a micro- and macro level.
Linguistic processes
In spite of the aforementioned focus on stakeholder partnerships, the carmakers’ main motivation to engage in responsible lobbying is still its own profitability. This was clearly demonstrated by the dominance of economic justifications for CPA and sustainability both in a micro- and macro level. As expressed by all respondents and most documents, the German carmakers share the belief that a company can only act sustainably if it has the financial resources to do so – which is related to legal threats of compensation payments associated with the diesel scandal. This also implies however, that the industry will most likely not further expand responsible lobbying in the future, if there is no economic incentive, thereby revealing a managerial understanding of CPA and sustainability similar to non-market perspectives (e.g. Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004; Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer, 2002). The present study agrees with Rasche (2015), that this co-existence of governance perspectives and instrumental economic self-interest underlines existing commonalities between non-market strategy approaches and political CSR literature. The analysis of linguistic sensemaking processes moreover revealed that the German carmakers have a different understanding of transparency than Basu and Palazzo (2008). From an industry perspective, transparency does not necessarily require the firms to openly discuss unfavorable information but instead implies disclosing rather basic information such as organizational structures, financial matters and general areas of political interest. In spite of the clearly visible movement towards a more balanced transparency – which was also reflected by the GM
representatives’ wish for a more open and transparent communication – the industry’s sensemaking of transparency must therefore be described as biased, according to Basu and Palazzo (2008) – both on a micro- and macro level.
Conative processes
Following Basu and Palazzo’s argumentation (2008), the carmakers’ tentative posture – which was found on a micro- and macro level – can be seen as the result of the industry’s inexperience with crises of that scale or because it lacks appropriate tools to solve the diesel scandal, causing it to be uncertain regarding the consequences of its actions. Given the scope and nature of the diesel crisis, it is a logical interpretation that the German carmakers were actually overwhelmed with the challenge of finding an appropriate crisis-response, which was presumably exacerbated by the complexity of the issue and the large variety of involved actors. This complexity moreover provides a logical explanation for the found internal
inconsistence with regard to sustainability, which is related to the tentative posture. According to Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) a tentative posture leads to further criticism because external stakeholders get the impression that the affected organization is not serious about addressing the debated issues. This perspective provides a possible explanation for the ongoing public criticism towards the German automotive industry. The instrumental commitment that was revealed among all carmakers can moreover be seen as one key finding on this study, as aspects of this instrumental understanding were found in almost all dimensions. As such, the industry understands the importance of acting sustainably and cooperating with external stakeholders – but not primarily for normative reasons. Instead, sustainability and compliance with societal norms allow the firms to maintain their business model. This instrumental understanding was partly explained by the respondents with the educational background of the firm’s top-managers, which can be seen as being related to recent academic debates around corporate statesmanship and the CEO as chief political officer (e.g. Rudy & Johnson, 2019).
Limitations and future research
The present study comes with three major limitations. Firstly, only one carmaker agreed to be interviewed which resulted in a small interview sample and limits the generalizability of the findings beyond the organizational context of GM. The distinction between micro- and macro level can be seen as an attempted solution. Secondly, political activity is still mostly conducted behind closed doors, with little or no publicly available evidence. The interviews only allowed for a quick snapshot into the “black box” of GMs sensemaking processes. In order to generate a deeper understanding of how crises change organizational sensemaking processes, a research project with larger resources should be realized, that conducts more interviews over a longer period of time. Thirdly, the conative domain could only be partially depicted due to confidentiality reasons. Respondents were often not at liberty to be fully transparent or, if they were, it could not be disclosed within the context of this study. As a result, certain aspects of the conative domain remained in the dark.
In conclusion, the present study has shown how crises can be drivers of change for organizational sensemaking processes. The diesel emission scandal disrupted well-rehearsed patterns of action, thereby accelerating an industry’s movement towards strategic
sustainability and responsibly lobbying, characterized by a stronger focus on transparency. The analysis indicated that firms will eventually give in to stakeholder demands in an attempt to achieve cognitive legitimacy in the political arena. Nevertheless, corporate sensemaking processes around CPA and CSR are still primarily driven by profitability, which is related to a deeply rooted instrumental understanding. This also implies that more public pressure is needed in order to bring firms to move their political activity towards responsible lobbying. In the end, lobbyism and sustainability are indeed to sides of the same coin. The German
carmakers seem to have learned through the diesel crisis that sustainability is of crucial importance for CPA. Their success as legitimate players in the political arena will depend on whether they are able to effectively integrate both sides in the future.
References
Anastasiadis, S. (2014). Toward a View of Citizenship and Lobbying: Corporate Engagement in the Political Process. Business and Society, 53(2), 260–299.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650313483495
Anastasiadis, S., Moon, J., & Humphreys, M. (2018). Lobbying and the responsible firm: Agenda-setting for a freshly conceptualized field. Business Ethics, 27(3), 207–221. https://doi.org/10.1111/beer.12180
Ashforth, B. E., & Gibbs, B. W. (1990). The Double-Edge of Organizational Legitimation. Organization Science, 1(2), 177–194. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1.2.177
Audi. (2017). Code of Conduct. Retrieved from
https://www.audi.com/content/dam/gbp2/company/sustainability/operations-and-
integrity/compliance-and-risk-management/2017_10_20Audi_Code_of_Conduct_EN.pdf
Baron, D. P. (2006). Business and its environment (5th edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Basu, K., & Palazzo, G. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility: A process model of sensemaking. Academy of Management Review, 33(1), 1–43.
https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.2008.27745504
Beloe, S., Harrison, J., & Greenfield, O. (2007). Coming in from the cold: Public affairs and corporate responsibility. Retrieved from
https://sustainability.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/sustainability_coming_in_from_the_cold.pdf
Bender, R., Iwersen, S., & Votsmeier, V. (2018, July 6). VW und die Diesel-Dokumente – Chronik einer blockierten Aufklärung. Handelsblatt. Retrieved from
https://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/bericht-von-jones-day-vw-und-die-
diesel-dokumente-chronik-einer-blockierten-aufklaerung/22771920-all.html?ticket=ST-3985324-nzyAHXfVDgFawEyfkZSz-ap3
BMW AG. (2017). Sustainable Value Report 2017. Retrieved from
https://www.bmwgroup.com/content/dam/bmw-group- websites/bmwgroup_com/ir/downloads/en/2017/BMW-Group-SustainableValueReport-2017--EN.pdf
Bonardi, J.-P., Hillman, A. J., & Keim, G. D. (2005). The Attractiveness of Political Markets: Implications for Firm Strategy. Academy of Management Review, 30(2), 397–413. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2005.16387895
Brammer, S., Jackson, G., & Matten, D. (2012). Corporate social responsibility and
institutional theory: New perspectives on private governance. Socio-Economic Review, 10(1), 3–28. https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwr030
Breitinger, M., & Groll, T. (2018, October 17). Unter Strom. DIE ZEIT. Retrieved from https://www.zeit.de/mobilitaet/2018-10/automobilbranche-verkehrswende-mobilitaet-
industrie-produktion-bedeutung?fbclid=IwAR23pr6mlbxaAEXZ0QA2oHiUyTgPcZFrlnvOCYntYZBKeMBp E9_Evc_5eEU
Brod, M., Tesler, L. E., & Christensen, T. L. (2009). Qualitative Research and Content Validity: Developing Best Practices Based on Science and. Research, 18(9), 1263–1278. https://doi.org/10.1007/sl
Bundesministerium für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur. (2016). Bericht der Untersuchungskommission „Volkswagen“. Retrieved from
https://www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/DE/Anlage/VerkehrUndMobilitaet/Strasse/bericht-untersuchungskommission-volkswagen.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
Bundesministerium für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur. (2018). Konzept für saubere Luft und die Sicherung der individuellen Mobilität in unseren Städten. Retrieved from
https://www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/DE/Anlage/K/konzept-klarheit-fuer-dieselfahrer.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
Carroll, A. B. (1979). A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance. Source: The Academy of Management Review, 4(4), 497–505.
Chappell, B. (2015, October 8). “It Was Installed For This Purpose,” VW’s U.S. CEO Tells Congress About Defeat Device. National Public Radio Inc. Retrieved from
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/10/08/446861855/volkswagen-u-s-ceo-faces-questions-on-capitol-hill
Chossière, G. P., Malina, R. C., Ashok, A. L., Dedoussi, I. R., Speth, R. D., Barrett, S., & Eastham, S. (2017). Public health impacts of excess NO x emissions from Volkswagen diesel passenger vehicles in Germany. Environmental Research Letters, 12(3).
https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa5987
Cornelissen, J. P., Carroll, C., & Elving, W. J. L. (2009). Making sense of a crucial interfacte: Corporate communication and the news media. In C. Chouliaraki & M. Morsing (Eds.), Media, Organisation and Identity (pp. 1–22). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave McMillan. Creswell, J. W. (2007). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five
Approaches (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
Daimler AG. (2016). Integrity Code. Common Guiding Principles at Daimler. Our Principles of Behaviour and Guidelines for Ethical Conduct. Retrieved from
https://www.daimler.com/documents/sustainability/integrity/daimler-integritycode.pdf Daimler AG. (2017). Sustainability Report 2017. Retrieved from
https://www.daimler.com/documents/sustainability/other/daimler-sustainability-report-2017.pdf
Daimler AG. (2018). Political dialogue and representation of interests. Retrieved February 14, 2019, from
https://annualreport2017.daimler.com/non-financial-report/social-issues/political-dialogue-and-representation-of-interests
on two chessboards: Reputation Effects between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Political Activity (CPA). Journal of Management Studies, 51(5), 790– 813. https://doi.org/10.1111/joms.12063
Deutscher Bundestag. (2017). Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 5.
Untersuchungsausschusses gemäß Artikel 44 des Grundgesetzes. Retrieved from https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/129/1812900.pdf
Doll, N. (2018, November 8). VW und Daimler zahlen im Diesel-Streit – BMW nicht. Die Welt. Retrieved from
https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article183513984/Diesel-Nachruestungen-VW-und-Daimler-wollen-zahlen-BMW-nicht.html
Eisenstein, P. A. (2017, April 21). Volkswagen Slapped With Largest Ever Fine for Automakers. NBC News. Retrieved from
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/autos/judge-approves-largest-fine-u-s-history-volkswagen-n749406
Endres, A. (2018, October 10). Kuschen vor der Autoindustrie. DIE ZEIT. Retrieved from https://www.zeit.de/mobilitaet/2018-10/klimaschutz-ziele-eu-kohlendioxid-autos-deutschland-bremse-vorreiter
Ewing, J. (2015, September 22). Volkswagen Says 11 Million Cars Worldwide Are Affected in Diesel Deception. New York Times. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/business/international/volkswagen-diesel-car-scandal.html
Fassin, Y. (2009). The stakeholder model refined. Journal of Business Ethics, 84(1), 113–135. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-008-9677-4
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research. Qualitative Inquiry, 12(2), 219-245. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800405284363
Gatti, L., & Seele, P. (2014). Evidence for the prevalence of the sustainability concept in European corporate responsibility reporting. Sustainability Science, 9(1), 89–102.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-013-0233-5
George, E., Chattopadhyay, P., Sitkin, S. B., & Barden, J. (2006). Cognitive Underpinnings of Institutional Persistence and Change: A Framing Perspective. Academy of Management Review, 31(2), 347–365. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2006.20208685
Guérard, S., Bode, C., & Gustafsson, R. (2013). Turning Point Mechanisms in a Dualistic Process Model of Institutional Emergence: The Case of the Diesel Particulate Filter in Germany. Organization Studies, 34(5–6), 781–822.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840613479237
Hillman, A. J., Keim, G. D., & Schuler, D. (2004). Corporate Political Activity: A review and research agenda. Journal of Management, 30(2), 837–857.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jm.2004.06.003
International Council on Clean Transportation. (2015). From Laboratory to Road: A 2015 update of official and “real-world” fuel consumption and CO2 values for passenger cars in Europe. Retrieved from
https://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/ICCT_LaboratoryToRoad_2015_ Report_English.pdf
Junginger, B. (2017, August 23). Angela Merkel: Die Autokanzlerin ohne Benzin im Blut. Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung. Retrieved from
https://www.augsburger- allgemeine.de/wirtschaft/Angela-Merkel-Die-Autokanzlerin-ohne-Benzin-im-Blut-id42472101.html
Kraftfahrtbundesamt. (2012). 20 Marken bestimmen den Automobilmarkt. Retrieved from https://www.kba.de/DE/Statistik/Fahrzeuge/Neuzulassungen/MarkenHersteller/2012/201 2_n_kurzbericht_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=8
Lock, I., & Seele, P. (2016). Deliberative Lobbying? Toward a Noncontradiction of Corporate Political Activities and Corporate Social Responsibility? Journal of Management
Lock, I., & Seele, P. (2018a). Gauging the Rigor of Qualitative Case Studies in Comparative Lobbying Research. A Framework and Guideline for Research and Analysis. Journal of Public Affairs, 18(4), 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1832
Lock, I., & Seele, P. (2018b). Politicized CSR: How corporate political activity (mis-)uses political CSR. Journal of Public Affairs, 18(3), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1667 Mahoney, C. (2008). Brussels versus the Beltway: Advocacy in the United States and in the
European Union. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Maitlis, S., & Sonenshein, S. (2010). Sensemaking in crisis and change: Inspiration and insights from Weick (1988). Journal of Management Studies, 47(3), 551–580. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00908.x
Matten, D., & Crane, A. (2005). Corporate Citizenship: Toward an extended theoretical conceptualization. Management Review, 30(1), 166–179.
https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2005.15281448
McWilliams, A., Siegel, D. S., & Wright, P. M. (2006). Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategic Implications. Journal of Management Studies, 43(1), 1–18.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2006.00580.x
Meyer-Fünffinger, A. (2018, September 25). Die Lobby sitzt mit am Tisch. Tagesschau. Retrieved from https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/kba-beirat-101~_origin-0e67955c-63ce-4657-bad7-34fe6f0cd914.html
Moon, J. (2007). The contribution of corporate social responsibility to sustainable
development. Sustainable Development, 15(5), 296–306. https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.346 Poland, B. D. (2003). Transcription Quality. In J. A. Holstein & J. E. Gubrium (Eds.), Inside
interviewing: New lenses, new concerns (pp. 267–287). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. (2006). Strategy and society: The link between competitive advantage and corporate social responsibility. Harvard Business Review, 84(2), 78–92.
