European separatism 2.0: crossing
platforms and nationalities
Author: Susan Clandillon Student Number: 10620567
Email: clandism@tcd.ie Date of Submission: 26/06/2014.
University: University of Amsterdam, Graduate School of Humanities. Programme: MA in New Media and Digital Culture.
Supervisor: Anat Ben David. Second Reader: Esther Weltevrede.
Table of Contents
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ABSTRACT!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!#%
INTRODUCTION!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!$%
CHAPTER ONE!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!%%%
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CHAPTER TWO!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!%&%
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CHAPTER THREE!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!'$%
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BIBLIOGRAPHY!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!%%&%
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List of Acronyms
Table 1: List of Acronyms
Acronym Description
ANC Assemblea Nacional Catalana (Catalan National Assembly) API Application Programming Interface.
CIU Convergència i Unio (Convergence and Union) Catalonia. DMI-TCAT Digital Methods Initiative’s Twitter Capture and Analysis Tool.
EU European Union.
ERC Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalonia). ICT Information and Communication Technologies.
N-VA Nieuwe-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance). PP Partido Popular (People’s Party), Spain.
PSC Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (Socialist’s Party of Catalonia). PS Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party), Belgium.
SI Solidaritat Catalana per la Independéncia (Catalan Solidarity for Independence). SNP Scottish Nationalist Party.
SNS Social Networking Site.
UK United Kingdom.
VB Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest).
List of Figures
Figure 1: SNP High Issue Mention Graph……… 45
Figure 2: SNP Low Issue Mention Graph………. 47
Figure 3: YesScotland Issue Mention Graph……….... 48
Figure 4: Scotland – Overarching Categories……….... 49
Figure 5: SNP Week 1 Issue Timeline………...… 50
Figure 6: SNP Week 2 Issue Timeline……….. 51
Figure 7: SNP Week 3 Issue Timeline……….. 52
Figure 8: SNP Week 4 and 5 Issue Timelines……… 53
Figure 9: SNP Week 6 and 7 Issue Timelines……… 54
Figure 10: YesScotland Week 1 Issue Timeline……… 55
Figure 11: YesScotland Week 2 Issue Timeline………... 56
Figure 12: YesScotland Week 3 Issue Timeline………... 57
Figure 13: YesScotland Week 4 and Week 5 Issue Timelines……… 58
Figure 14: YesScotland Week 6 and Week 7 Issue Timelines.……… 59
Figure 15: SNP Bubble Graph.………...……… 60
Figure 16: YesScotland Bubble Graph………... 61
Figure 17: Vlaams Belang, Issue Mention Graph.………... 62
Figure 18: N-VA, Issue Mention Graph.………. 63
Figure 19: Flanders – Overarching Categories………. 64
Figure 20: Vlaams Belang Week 1 Issue Timeline……….. 65
Figure 21: Vlaams Belang Week 2 Issue Timeline.………. 66
Figure 22: Vlaams Belang Week 3 Issue Timeline ……… 67
Figure 23: Vlaams Belang Week 4 and Week 5 Issue Timelines……… 68
Figure 24: Vlaams Belang Week 6 and Week 7 Issue Timelines……… 69
Figure 25: N-VA Week 1 Issue Timeline……… 70
Figure 26: N-VA Week 2 Issue Timeline……… 71
Figure 27: N-VA Week 3 Issue Timeline……… 72
Figure 28: N-VA Week 4 and Week 5 Issue Timelines.……….. 73
Figure 29: N-VA Week 6 and Week 7 Issue Timelines……… 74
Figure 30: Vlaams Belang Overall Issue/User Interaction……… 75
Figure 32: Convergència i Unio Image Comparison and Issue Frequency Bar Chart ……… 78
Figure 33: Assemblea Nacional Catalana Image Comparison and Issue Frequency Bar Chart……… 80
Figure 34: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya Image Comparison and Issue Frequency Bar Chart………….... 82
Figure 35: Solidaritat Catalana per la Independéncia Image Comparison and Issue Frequency Bar Chart……… 84
Figure 36: Catalonia – Overarching Categories for CIU and ANC……… 86
Figure 37: Catalonia – Overarching Categories for ERC and SI.……… 87
Figure 38: Catalonia – CIU Issue/User Interaction ……… 88
Figure 39: Catalonia – ANC Issue/User Interaction.……….. 89
Figure 40: Catalonia – ERC Issue/User Interaction……… 90
Figure 41: Catalonia – SI Issue/User Interaction……… 91
Figure 42: Co-hashtag graphs for Scotland: Hashtag Evolution.……… 93
Figure 43: Co-hashtag graphs for Flanders: Hashtag Evolution ……… 95
Figure 44: Co-hashtag graphs for Catalonia: Hashtag Evolution……… 97
Figure 45: Scotland: Overarching Categories, Issue Mentions and Hashtags.……… 100
Figure 46: Flanders: Vlaams Belang Overarching Categories, Issue Mentions and Hashtags………... 102
Figure 47: Flanders N-VA Overarching Categories, Issue Mentions and Hashtags……….. 103
Figure 48: Catalonia: CIU and ANC Overarching Categories, Issue Mentions and Hashtags……… 105
Figure 49: Catalonia: CIU and ANC Overarching Categories, Issue Mentions and Hashtags……… 106
List of Tables
Table 1: List of Acronyms………. 4
Table 2: DMI-TCAT Query bins for Flanders, Catalonia, and Scotland……...……… 31
Table 3: Facebook pages scraped with Netvizz per case study……… 34
Table 4: URL Categorization and frequency……… 37
Table 5: Keyword Dataset and User Dataset Comparison……… 42
Abstract
This paper gives a cross-nationality and cross-platform analysis of European separatism through the use of three relevant case studies - Scotland, Catalonia and Flanders - using a Digital Methods and Latourian
approach to studying political actors online. This study is reinforced by a theoretical framework that examines the correlation between Internet and politics. A historical framework further supports the chosen case studies, and elaborates on the political development of these movements and the actors therein. The Digital Methods Initiative’s toolset - chiefly the Facebook data extraction tool Netvizz, and the Digital Methods Initiative’s Twitter Capture and Analysis tool (DMI-TCAT) – allows for empirical research into these European separatist nationalities. These tools enable the researcher to capture data from eight key separatist actors across two social media platforms (Facebook and Twitter) over a dynamically bound date range. This permits an investigation into the distinct media strategies offered by these separatist actors, in terms of content sharing, issue sharing and hashtag usage.
Keywords: European separatism, Digital Methods, Web 2.0, platform studies, user engagement, media strategy, DMI-TCAT, Netvizz.
“In little more than a decade, the Internet has evolved from a collaborative tool for scientists to become a fundamental part of our system of political communication.” (Chadwick and Howard 9).
Introduction
The issue of European separatism is extremely current in light of the proposed independence referendums that are scheduled to take place in Catalonia and in Scotland in late 2014. With this in mind, the issue is considered to be of interest for research, given that political actors within the three chosen European separatist nationalities; Scotland, Flanders and Catalonia, will at this time be discussing the issue of European separatism through online political campaigns. This study is further enriched given that the Scottish and Catalan actors are expected to be engaging in fervent campaigns to attract voters to the yes side through targeted media-strategy and issue sharing more generally. The decision has thus been made conduct an in depth analysis of European separatism and the online political strategies of select European separatist actors through a cross platform analysis of their media strategy on Facebook and Twitter. Accordingly, this investigation into the political organization of European separatist actors and nationalities will be framed by the following research question:
To what extent can a cross-platform analysis of European separatist movements on Facebook and Twitter reveal distinct media strategies?
In order to answer this question the research will be broken down into a series of chapters and subsections, which attempt to tackle both the areas of online political participation, European separatist nationalities, and which further address the practice of doing research with natively digital social media data, before introducing the relevant tools, outlining the method, and later the findings per nationality across both platforms. Chapter one has thus been dedicated to the establishment of the theoretical framework related to the study of online politics, both in terms of political participation in the Web sphere, and a Digital Methods approach to studying political actors online, which draws upon elements of Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory. To facilitate the study of European separatist movements online, it has also been necessary to construct the respective historical framework for each European separatist nationality and this is elaborated in chapter two.
In this second chapter, care is taken to establish concrete definitions of what is meant by nationalism, nationality, nation-state, sovereignty and other key terms associated with the issue of European separatism. This second chapter is further sub-divided into three parts with each nationality having their own sub-section. Within these sections the political development of each of the European separatist actors is elaborated on from its origins to the present day. The third chapter then moves to explain the chosen methodology for both Facebook and Twitter, connecting the study of European separatism with previous studies into online political content and social media platforms. This section further describes the Digital Methods Initiative’s data extraction and data capture tool set and discusses sampling techniques used in conjunction with this tool set in the selection process for the chosen European separatist actors and the Twitter keyword dataset. The method for both Facebook and Twitter is then outlined in chapter four and sub-divided by visualization.
Chapters five and six are then dedicated to findings and the discussion of the media strategy of the European separatist nationalities on Facebook and Twitter. For Facebook, there is a focus on the sub-issues presented, overarching issue categories, issue timelines, image comparison and user engagement. For Twitter, this analysis concentrates on sub-issues, overarching categories and hashtags. Finally chapter seven features a discussion of cross-platform and cross-nationality media strategy, and will further consider the forms of nationalism displayed by the separatist actors through the issues they highlight alongside independence. This chapter will also provide an opportunity for reflection on online political organization on web 2.0 social media platforms, the significance of the medium-specific objects for each social media platform in terms of political communication and the merits of pursuing an Actor Network Theory approach to the study of online politics.
Chapter One
Internet and Politics intertwined
The realm of Internet politics is described as a channel whereby various political actors can organize themselves through Web production. Chadwick and Howard map the evolution of Internet politics,
recounting a time when activity conducted on the Internet was considered to be virtual and not tangibly ‘real’. They elaborate on the ‘ “lets wait and see” quality to the academic discourse of the 1990s.’ (3) Through to the beginnings of the word blog in 1997 (3) and the use of video platform YouTube by US Democratic candidate John Edwards in 2007 (4). In terms of online politics, the European separatist movements rely on
information and communications technologies (ICTs) to affirm their position within the Web sphere. A term coined by Schneider and Foot to refer to “not simply a collection of websites, but as a hyperlinked set of dynamically-defined digital resources that span multiple websites and are deemed relevant, or related, to a central theme or object.” (The Web as an object of study 118) Central to this conception of the Web sphere is the idea that its analysis would include the relations between users and producers who are given purpose through the functionalities of specific Web elements, such as URLs, comments or tweets. This may be understood in terms of political content produced by users and organizations and the shaping of this content by the platforms or websites on which it is distributed. Online political presence has been relevant since the early 1990s, although there has been increased uptake with the launch of Web 2.0 platforms. In his 2005 paper entitled ‘What is Web 2.0?’ Tim O’Reilly moves to provide a solid definition of Web 2.0, elaborating on its distinct features when compared with Web 1.0. These include harnessing collective intelligence, database management, and offering services in exchange for data rather than paying for software packages (5). Political organization has been greatly influenced by emergent Web 2.0 platforms, especially in terms of user
interaction and engagement with producer content, and indeed potential for mobilization.
It is Foot et al. who provide commentary on the interaction between the Web sphere and politics, with their medium-specific description of website features that have been produced by a collection of sociopolitical actors within a particular timeframe, such as emailing-forwarding provisions (40). As ICTs have evolved over time, the focus has shifted from Web page based engagement with users through email forwarding,
hyperlinks, mailing lists and intranets; to content and news sharing, user interaction with multimedia content and user generated content creation. Foot et al. outline the four electoral Web practices that constitute forms of user political participation: informing, involving, connecting and mobilizing (42). While informing relates to providing general information regarding the organization, party or actor - often through an ‘about’ page, involving attempts to recruit new members and encourages voluntary action by supporters. Involving may also include the provision of an events page. Mobilization however, looks to provide downloadable resources
for collective action, comparative tables for interparty analysis on an issue, and links and information relating to voting registration. These electoral Web practices remain extremely relevant today, especially in terms of online political strategy and Web 2.0 platforms. As social media sites or social networking sites belong to the genre of the Web 2.0 platform we include them here - as involving a supporter is now as simple as inviting them to ‘like’ your Facebook page. However, the ease at which supporters may connect with political organizations online is also problematic in terms of the dynamic between collective action and the free-rider or ‘slacktivism’ (Bimber et al.; Morozov). Bimber et al. outline the character of the free-rider to be one who - under certain conditions- can enjoy the outcome of an event regardless of whether they have directly contributed or not (72). The authors further decry the lack of clear membership boundaries which might encourage passive participation, although they do consider the potential value in the creation of informational goods, such as meta data ceded on social media platforms and value created through the contribution to and upkeep of Wikis (76). Evgeny Morozov also depicts a similar portrait in terms of slacktivism. Morozov describes slacktivism as “feel-good online activism that has zero political or social impact.”(1). He contrasts this with more traditional forms of activism, such as sit-ins, demonstrations, and police confrontation (2). Morozov outlines his fear that the increased ease of online participation in political activism may drive traditional activists away from their work on the streets and into the online sphere, with their absence creating a vacuum of effective democratic activity. Thus, there is an underlying assumption that interaction with, and membership of political organizations in the online sphere may be considered less effective than its ‘real-world’ counterpart.
Rogers challenges this assertion in his work on ‘the end the virtual’. He posits that there is a need to move beyond the idea of the Web as a virtual or placeless zone where politics, sociology and culture can be studied with the Internet (38). Instead he offers a vision of Internet research which intends to study the methods of digital objects or ontological objects, and learn from them with an aim to ground claims about social and cultural phenomena within the natively digital web data. Rogers identifies this genre of research as ‘digital methods’ (19). This approach, which seeks to reject the use of traditional qualitative and quantitive methods of the social sciences to study the web, echoes Bruno Latour’s desire to distance himself from sociological approaches to studying society and culture which lays a biased or incomprehensive framework onto research objects or actors. Inspired by Latour’s practice of following the actors within a network regardless of their weighting within a discussion or controversy, Rogers implores Web researchers to follow the medium specificity of web objects
.
For Latour, this is achieved through an Actor Network Theory approach where ‘the task of defining and ordering the social should be left to the actors themselves, not taken up by the analyst.”(23) For both theorists, these methods allow the objects and actors to speak for themselves. It is theUsers and Internet Politics
While there is much discussion on the impact that online political organizations have on individual users, several general theories emerge on the themes of user interaction, direct democracy and collective action throughout the literature, which aim to elucidate the role that Internet politics is playing in organizational strategy. While some, such as Brundidge et al. argue that the Internet has the capacity to lead towards increased engagement and direct democracy (144), they also acknowledge the phenomenon whereby, ‘the information rich get richer while the information poor will remain relatively poor.’ (145). This means that there exists a gap between those users from higher socioeconomic groups with an interest in politics who choose to seek out political content and news, and who are most likely to embed themselves within politically homogenous groups online - avoiding discussion with those with politically dissimilar interests. Brundidge et al. suggest that users from lower socioeconomic groups are more likely to be influenced by media framing of political actors and policies, which may lead to increased cynicism and disengagement (148). It is further stated that new communications technologies in the realm of Internet politics are most likely to be used by those who are politically savvy (149). This raises questions about participation of political actors and the kind of followers they attract on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, and also infers confusion in terms of content and news sharing by political actors on these platforms. If news media is indeed framing the debate -and thus influencing a wide range of supporters - then what does it mean for political actors to be sharing and curating this content, in the form of shares and hashtags? Furthermore, does the political actor’s combination of statuses, photographs and video clips with the sharing of relevant news sources thus stand to reach wider target audiences?
Brundidge et al. further warn of the dangers of the development of increasingly large knowledge gaps with decreased exposure to disagreement - in an online sphere where everybody inhabits their own ‘walled-garden’ (Rogers 1)1 - as they suggest that ideological domination may arise (Brundidge et al. 154). This idea is
particularly interesting in terms of social media platforms, and the strategies used therein to engage with followers and promote information, involvement, connection and mobilization. Sunstein also weighs in on the side of a potential lack of exposure to disagreement, through his elaboration of the ‘Daily Me’, first theorized by MIT technology specialist Nicholas Negroponte in 1995 (4). He describes the ‘Daily Me’ as communications package which is tailored to the user, through which unwanted content can be ignored. Sunstein examines whether an increasing trend towards personalized ‘Daily Me[s]’ in the Web 2.0 sphere
1Rogers outlines the idea of the ‘walled garden’ as a closed community where user information is only available to
friends, unless otherwise specified (friends of friends or all users are also possible settings). For Rogers, the walled garden represents a series of concentric circles which are closed off to non-members (25).
might have mitigating effects on democracy. He states that “[u]nplanned, unanticipated encounters are central to democracy itself”(5). Inferring the need to retain a common discussion space or ‘street corners’ for the dissemination of polarized opinions for the good of democracy (11). Thus offering a critique of the ‘Daily Me’. It reamains to be seen whether social media platforms offer a multitude of ‘Daily Me[s]’ or a street corner for the insection of diverse viewpoints.
Platforms and Post-demographics
The idea of the platform is picked up by Gillespie in his 2010 paper entitled ‘The politics of platforms’, whereby he seeks to define the concept in terms of its etymological origin and its political significance. As Gillespie draws upon the notion of the platform, as an even surface with is ideologically accessible for everybody he conjures up a vision of a cosmopolitan space where users, advertisers and organizations engage symbiotically in distinct forms of Web production (350). For Rogers, the emergent relationships and
dynamics resulting from social media platforms produce interesting metadata, which is worthy of research within the framework of post-demographics.2 Rogers promotes a departure from a traditional social sciences
approach to studying social networks in terms of established demographics of gender, race, age or income, and instead looks to examine new data on tastes, preferences, event attendance, group membership and liked pages (30). This theorization of post-demographics thus allows him to formulate new research areas that aim to grasp at the insights offered by natively digital data. Elmer and Langlois then pick up the study of metadata from Web 2.0 platforms, through a cross-platform analysis of networked campaigns on the Web, with a focus on political campaigning. They argue that political influence can be advanced through social media
participation, especially when targeting disjointed users, and ‘narrowcasting’ information to specific locations at specific intervals (43). Although, they too, elaborate on the distance that a ‘talking-point’ can travel from its source, and the speed at which this content can be re-mixed or critiqued by the opposition (43). This feeds into the idea that social media has its basis in content sharing and user generated content. While Elmer and Langlois engage politics and Web 2.0 through an analysis of traffic tags (in the form of plain text, user IDs, APIs, user-generated tags and hyperlinks – among others) they refer to difficulties encountered with this approach, which attempts to go below and beyond mere content analysis. Notably, they discuss the network bias encountered when operationalizing Facebook for political research, criticizing the ‘always-already personalized interface and algorithm’ (49). Further, Bruns and Stieglitz also elaborate on similar challenges in their work, ‘Quantitative Approaches to Communication Patterns on Twitter’ through the difficulties
2Here post-demographics are proposed against demography. The Oxford English Dictionary defines demography as,
encountered when data-mining the Twitter API amidst changing data policies.
Research approaches for Web 2.0 data
The constantly updatable nature of Web 2.0 platforms no doubt contributes to a researcher’s strife when working with social media data. While this may be cause for apprehension, it is not any just cause for dismay, as over the last decade many researchers have successfully carried out social and political research with these datasets, even before the popularization of scrapers for social media sites. Giglietto, Rossi and Bennato offer counsel regarding the use of Twitter, Facebook and YouTube as research data sources. They outline three methodological schemas for working with Web 2.0 datasets: 1) the ethnographical approach; 2) the statistical approach; and 3) the computational approach (149). Briefly, the ethnographical approach corresponds to the researcher inferring social meaning from content on the platform, usually on a small scale. The statistical approach focuses on a specific user as part of a wider group or sample, i.e. the analysis of Twitter users through the public API. And the computation approach deals with the interpretation of big data sets, and API manipulation coupled with visualization and modeling of the findings. These approaches are combined with a focus on post-demographics by Richard Rogers and his team in the Digital Methods Initiative at the University of Amsterdam. While quantitative analysis of large datasets with a computational approach is insightful and a useful indication of the temperature of a debate or phenomenon, a focus on digital objects and minor and marginal actors present may also yield interesting findings. Langlois and Elmer, in their paper entitled ‘The Research Politics of Social Media Platforms’ define digital objects as the elements that compose social media platforms, be they comments, social buttons, URLs, or hashtags. They further elaborate on the interlinked forms of the digital objects: as a media object (due to its semantic content), a network object (as an interface that connects informational networks together), and as a phatic object (as it establishes connections between users, makes users visible to other users, and establishes their position within the network) (11-12). Langlois and Elmer therefore illustrate the ways in which a study of natively digital objects might be combined with a big data computational approach, in order to infer conclusions about emergent forms of political participation online, and so-called ‘felt’ communities (14).
A framework that deals with the Web sphere, Web 2.0, and research into social media data and the
corresponding research practices aids an analysis of European separatist movements and their online political strategies. Given the correlation between Internet and politics, it is prudent to signal the role that ICTs play in promoting interaction between users and producers; and digital objects such as hashtags, comments, and URLs. These natively digital objects have emerged from the evolution and maturation of Web 2.0 technologies, which hold the user at the center of Web production through user generated content. In
examining these relationships, aspects such as the connection and mobilization of political supporters can be assessed against such concerns as slacktivism and the free-rider (Morozov; Burgess). This study endeavours to move beyond the idea of the Web sphere as a virtual space. Instead it examines a space that provides tangible post-demographic data, allowing the researcher to follow the actors and the medium (Latour; Rogers). Media strategy can thus be compared across these separatist actors, and across social media platforms. It is
interesting to examine to extent to which European separatist movements are providing a ‘street corner’ for discussion by supporters and opponents through their social media presence. As Gillespie indicates, the platform refers to the great equalizer that gives a voice to all – be they minority or majority actors. Thus it is worthwhile to consider these social media platforms as providing a level platform for political discussion between the European separatist movements and their supporters.
Chapter Two
Key Concepts surrounding separatism and national identity
Discussions relating to the issues of secessionism, separatism and the fight for independence find themselves located within a wider discussion of what it means to be a nation, a nation-state, a territory, an ethnicity or a nationality. Often distinctions arise from how a separatist group is viewed by their own nation-state and what their status is deemed to be constitutionally, and this may allow for semantics regarding nation, nationality, or community status. Before embarking on an investigation of European separatist movements in through the case studies of Catalonia, Flanders and Scotland, an attempt must first be made to understand the semantics and thinking behind the many classifications of what a separatist group may or may not be. Firstly, separatism is synonymous with nationalism and national identity. Hearn offers what he refers to as a working definition of nationalism – as he acknowledges the difficulties at play when attempting to define a term that is at the same time broad and narrow, and multivariate. He states, “Nationalism is the making of combined claims on behalf of a population, to identity, to jurisdiction and to territory” (11). These, he states are the main demands enlisted by nationalist movements today. It is however, too simplistic, to label these movements as merely nationalist, as distinct genres of nationalism apply to each case study. Flanders brings forward the case for ethno nationalism or ethno-centric nationalism that preoccupies itself with the cultural aspects of the community and bases belonging on grounds of birthrights and ancestry. In contrast, Scotland - a territorially bound nationality which exists within a post-colonial union of nations – purports an ideology of civic nationalism which denotes an attachment to society or territory which is seen a lever to achieve political change, but is not exclusionary to the same extent as in Flanders (Laible 51). Hearn on the other hand, describes nationalism in terms of primordialism and modernism. His definition of primordial nationalism corresponds directly to Laible’s definition of ethno nationalism, inferring that nationalism in Flanders is both ethno nationalist and primordialist, while his definition of modernist nationalism has more in common with the Scottish separatist movement (7)3.
Meanwhile, Catalonia demonstrates emancipatory nationalism in a response to the forced homogenization of the Spanish state following the fall of the Franco regime and the transition to democracy beginning in 1977. It is Guibernau who coins the term emancipatory nationalism to refer to the caliber of peaceful nationalist struggles occurring in Western European liberal democracies today. He states, “This nationalism has as its
3Hearn states that, primordialists view nationalism in terms of ethnicity, and emotional attachment arguing
that the modern nation-state has evolved from pre-modern ethnic groups. Modernism however, see nations as an entity resulting from the formation of nation-states which seek to emphasize their ideological dimension which understands the socially-constructed and plastic nature of ethnicity (7).
main task the rejection of the power of the ‘alien state’ through political emancipation of citizens” (371). A key focus of emancipatory nationalism is that is promotes the right to decide while seeking a consensus amongst the marginalized group and challenging the status quo. Emancipatory nationalism also gives weight to the practice of gaining international recognition for the separatist struggle. These appeals often fall on deaf ears however, with many states condemning the struggle as a domestic issue within the nation-state.
Observing this practice, Keating warns that holding the international community as an unbiased juror has its own problems, as organizations such as the UN and the EU have their own power structures and geopolitical interests (2). This account offers but a few types of nationalism which apply to the separatist movements in Catalonia, Flanders and Scotland, as the study of nationalism is a vast area which is far too broad to be explored here in its entirity.
Nationalism is usually posited against the centralized or federalized nation-state. Guibernau defines the nation as a conscious human group whose aim it is to form a community, having a common heritage, customs and culture, in a set territory (368). Further, he defines the nation-state as a modern political institution which maintains the legitimate use of power over its citizens within a defined territory and seeks cultural
homgenization. (369). This is futher expanded by Keating to the territorial nation-state. The nation-state as a concept is futher complicated by the ideas of stateless nations, nationality and national minorities. For Keating nationality refers to collective identity which is constantly modulating. (2). The distinction between nation and nationality is key to our discussion of European separatism as it is this semantic difference between nation and nationality in the Spanish constitution which presents itself as a key issue for the Catalan separatists. National minorities and nations without states refer to groups who are terriotorially located in a particular nation-state but have ties to another group elsewhere and consider their state to be ‘alien’.
Seperatist movents run the risk of creating further sub-national minorities upon seceding, as minority factions who oppose separatism may in turn feel alienated by the new state. This is a potential consequence of
separatism within the three case studies. It is worth noting here, that ethnicity and ethnic minorites who see themselves as unique groups, usually struggle and compete for recognition within the nation-state, and are not nationalist unless there is a clear goal of self-government in a given territory (as is the case in Flanders). Nationalism and nationality have sovereignty as their goal.
The notion of sovereignty today is complicated by the supranational stucture of the European Union, which since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 has allowed regions to participate above state level in the Council of Regions. The trends of globalization and transnationalism, and rapid global communication have moved focus away from the nation-state, and have dinished the important of demarked territorial boundaries.
there is a trend towards multi-level participation above the level of the nation-state, then the importance of the nation-state is a sovereign entity is waning, but why then do separatist movements pursue sovereignty? This question can be further explored through an elaboration of the historical, cultural and political background leading to the development of separatist movements in Flanders, Catalonia and Scotland.
Part I
Flanders
The state of Belgium was formed in 1830, when the southern provinces broke off from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands. Although the country was divided along linguistic lines, with the northern half speaking Dutch and the southern half speaking French, the language of governance was French and in the early 19th
Century Belgium was on its way to becoming a French-speaking country. Cultural bodies appeared in response to this, with the Vlaamsch Verbond (Flemish Union) being formed in 1861. Although equality of law was established in 1898, in essence it was years until linguistic divides within the nation were formerly recognized. As early as World War One tensions were rising as Flemish soldiers fighting at the front found it impossible to understand their officers whose orders were given in French. At this time, the Flemish
collaborated with the Germans and set up their own Flemish Council – declaring Flanders an independent state. (Laible 57) The Flemish Frontpartij (Front Party) was then elected in 1919 and it pushed a hardline Flemish Nationalist and Separatist agenda during the 1920s and 1930s. With the coming of World War Two, Flanders supported the Germans once more, and the Flemish Frontpartij became the Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (Flemish National Union) and moved towards fascism. In the post-war years, fascism and nationalism were discredited in Europe, and so the focus shifted to establishing a federalized Belgium within the European Economic Community. However, from the 1950s onwards the Flemish movement began to reject federalism in favour of separatism. While traditionally Flanders was the poorer of the regions, foreign direct investment following the Second World War fostered the development of a vibrant services economy, and soon Flanders overtook faltering and industrialized Wallonia economically.
From the 1960s onwards, both regions were fighting for increased autonomy. The solution came in the form of the subdivision of the Belgian state into language communities (French, Flemish and German) and regions (The Flemish region, the Walloon region and the Brussels capital region). It is worth noting that the regions do not have the same competencies as the communities; the communities look after education, culture and tourism; the regions tend to housing, environment, agriculture, and external trade. The federal government still retains the policy areas of justice, domestic security, taxation and social security. Federal social security
presents itself as a huge issue for Flemish nationalist parties, as they believe that the welfare transfers made by Flanders to Wallonia are unjust, given the historical legacy of rich Wallonia and poor Flanders and a distinct lack of economic support in the past. This is well outlined by Laible, who states “[f]uthermore, the cause of increased autonomy in Flanders has widespread appeal based on the perception that Walloon welfare is overly dependent on transfers of Flemish wealth” (70). This issue continues to be important for the Flemish
separatist parties today.
Political Development
The political development of the nationalist parties in Belgium began in 1954, with the formation of the Volksunie (People’s Union), which aimed to advance the separatist agenda. In 1978, the party divided as a result of internal tensions and two new parties were formed – the Vlaams National Partij (Flemish National Party) and the Vlaamse Volkspartij (Flemish People’s Party). These then merged the following year to become the Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block). The development of the Vlaams Blok and its journey into mainstream Flemish politics is important as it shapes our understanding of the longevity of the Flemish separatist demands and its different facets. The Vlaams Blok has a number of long-term interests, which include achieving economic prosperity for the region, establishing Brussels as the capital of Flanders, rejecting federalism, and forming a Dutch Union. Their ideology can be seen as far right with an emphasis on ‘imagined communities’ and ethno-nationalism, labeled by Laible as volksnationalisme (63). They are strongly anti-immigrant (a stance the adopted following the electoral successes of the French right-wing Front National in the 1980s) and draw support from apolitical sectors of Flemish society. Furthermore they hold a belief that ethnically homogenous societies are so cohesive that they do not experience crime or anti-social behaviour to the same extent as multicultural ones. Thus they ideally support an ethnically pure Flanders. The Vlaams Blok are virulently anti-Islam, and support the repatriation of immigrants who do not conform to the Flemish way of life. The origins of this stance comes from Vlaams Blok politician Filip Dewinter’s 1992 publication, 70 Solutions to the Immigrant Problem, which stated that Islam was incompatible with view of Flemish life offered by the party (Laible 63).
Over the years the Vlaams Blok has gained support from marginalized sectors of the community such as the unemployed as well as hardline right-wing Flemish nationalists. In 1991, they won 10.5% of the Flemish vote, putting them in fourth place in Flanders and causing all other parties to declare a cordon sanitaire against the party (Laible 64).4 While this meant that no other party would form a coalition with the Vlaams Blok, this did
not prevent their support from growing, and in 1999 support at 15.5% places the party in third place in Flanders, only to increase to second place in 2004 (Laible 65). The party officially rebranded itself as the Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) in 2004, following a lengthy court case accusing the party of inciting racist hatred. From 2001 onwards the Vlaams Blok/Belang was joined by another Flemish separatist party, the N-VA (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie or New Flemish Alliance), following the collapse of the Volksunie. The N-VA believes in democratic nationalism for Flanders, and has reclaimed the issue of separatism for the centre-right once more, encouraging those Flemings who support separatism but not far-right extremism to support it. During the 2000s, the issue of state reform and a future for Belgium took the country to its knees twice, with two governmental crises, following the federal election in June 2007 and the snap elections of June 2010, where the country remained without a federal government for 589 days (Strauss ‘589 days with no elected government’). The federal elections of 2010 showed massive support for the N-VA with 27 seats in the Belgian parliament, making it the largest Belgian party (17.4%) at the Belgian level (Rochtus 276).
A Future for Flanders?
In light of recent instability and calls for state reform from the Flemish parties, there has been much discussion on the future of Belgium. There is support from the Flemish camp for separatism, both from the politically dissatisfied and anti-immigrant supporters of the Vlaams Belang and from the more moderate N-VA supporters whose reasoning is more likely economic, stemming from frustration that Flanders is directly contributing to Wallonia in terms of welfare transfers. However, while these parties together occupy a large share of the Flemish electorate, the majority of Flemish parties remain in support of a federal Belgium. While the Open VLD (Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten or Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats), the CD&V (Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams or Christian Democratic and Flemish) and the N-VA support a confederal model primarily (the N-VA with an ultimate goal of independence) and the Vlaams Belang rejects anything but outright independence. 5 The most recent parliamentary elections in Flanders showed 28.34% of voters in
support for the N-VA and the Vlaams Belang, with the majoring of voters voting for parties whose agenda supported a federal and confederal model of government with Belgium.6 Additionally, it is important to
remember that a considerable amount of governance now also takes place at EU level through regional participation in the European Ministerial Councils and the Committee of the Regions. Flanders thus has a platform on which to realize its policy demands. Efforts have also been made by the Flemish foreign minster to refer to Flanders as a deelstat or part state in an effort to change EU perceptions of the Flanders region
5Dandoy et al. state, “The Flemish conception of confederalism implies that the subnational entities are at the heart of
the organization and that they are responsible for the allocation of competences and budget to other political levels and not the contrary.” (347) In other words they want control of the social security system, among other policy areas.
(Regionalism in the European Union 294). Indeed, Rochtus states that Flanders is trying to set the stage for statehood, not in the traditional sense but as a “ ‘post-modern state’ for which sovereignty is ‘a seat at the table.” (Regionalism in the European Union 294). Thus the Flemish separatist movement may indeed see a third way to obtain its secessionist aims.
Part II
Catalonia
The Catalan nationalist movement developed in response to the suppression of the Catalan language and the Catalan institutions following the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, which crowned Philip V King of Spain and thus Catalonia. This cultural movement did not develop until the mid 19th Century, but at this time a cultural
renaissance movement called the Renaixença had taken hold, although this was rather inhomogeneous in terms of the different nationalisms within. It was not until the Mancomunitat (1913-1923) that Catalonia began to enjoy limited autonomy, although this was suppressed once more following the coup d’état led by General Primo de Rivera in 1923.7 The Catalan government (the Generalitat) was then removed under the reign of
General Francisco Franco by the decree of April 1938 and Catalonia remained without an autonomous government until the transition to democracy in 1977 (Guibernau 373). The 1978 constitution was constructed as part of the transition, following the first democratic elections after the civil war through consultation with main political parties. Its aim was to create a democratic and unified Spanish state, all the while acknowledging the nationalities within. It is important to realise that Article 2 of the Spanish constitution is extremely conflicted in this regard due to the difficulty in reaching consensus on the issue of a united Spanish state as a result of the treatment and near annihilation of these nationalities during General Franco’s reign. Article 2 states, “The Constitution is based upon the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible patria of all Spaniards, and recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions that make it up and solidarity between all of them” (Spanish Constitution, Article 2). This semantics of nationality and nation represents an issue that is later picked up by the Catalan separatist movement. Following the consolidation of democracy with the agreement of the historic nationalities (the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia) an Autonomous Communities structure was set up. Some of these communities – such as the historical nationalities whose claim to autonomy was based upon historical precedent and nationality - gained full autonomy immediately, however others – some of which were artificially created – had to wait for five years to gain full autonomous status (Guibernau 375). Autonomy was
restored in Catalonia by the Decree of 29 September 1977 (Loughlin 111). It is important to note that Catalonia’s status as a nationality cannot be altered to that of nation to achieve independence without changes being made to the constitution, and this is an issue that becomes extremely relevant with regard to attempts to update the Statute of Autonomy in 2006.
Political Development
As a result of the first general elections in Catalonia in March 1980, Jordi Pujol was elected president of the Catalonia. Pujol and his party CiU (Convergència i Unió or Convergence and Union) were elected with 27.2% of the vote. The CiU had a nationalist stance and pushed a policy of linguistic normalization in the 1980s, which resulted in the establishment of ‘de facto bilingualism’ with the Castilian and Catalan languages (Petithomme and Fernández Garcia 3). In 1984 the party secured 46.6% of the vote, a clear majority that it held until 1995. Then from 1995 onwards, the CiU was in a coalition government with the PPC (Partit Popular de Catalunya or Popular Party of Catalonia) up until 2003 (6). After 23 years in government, the CiU finally left power in 2003. It was seceded by a new tripartite government made up of the PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya or Socialist Party of Catalonia), ICV-EUiA (Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds or Initiative for Catalonia Greens) and Esquerra Unida i Alternativa or United and Alternative Left) and ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya or the Republican Left of Catalonia), which reigned until 2010. Only to be toppled by another CiU government led by Artur Mas (6). Under the tripartite government efforts were made by leader Pasqual Maragall to redraft a new Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia. Guibernau describes this draft as much more ambitious than the 1979 Statute (380). While disagreement between the Catalan political parties as to the extent of changes made slowed the process down, the 2006 Statue was finally delivered to the Spanish Parliament, and after some deliberations between the Spanish Socialists (PSOE) and the Catalan socialist government, the draft was approved and the Catalan people ratified this in a referendum. Despite the bill having been approved and ratified through official channels, the Spanish Partido Popular (People’s Party) declared it unconstitutional and challenged 51% of the Statute, while the Spanish Ombudsman challenged a further 48% (381).8 This Statute was then debated in the
Spanish Constitutional Court for 4 years, sparking outrage in Catalonia.
8 The Spanish Partido Popular or People’s Party is a national centre-right political party, which is considered to be more
conservative economically and politically than its national counterpart, the PSOE (or the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party). The Partido Popular is currently in power in Spain and has been since 2011. Since then they have been implementing harsh austerity measures in the hopes of jolting Spain out of its severe economic recession. The Partido Popular believes in the unity of the Spanish state, as upheld by the Constitution.
Separatism Rising
Why then is separatism growing in Catalonia, when the nationalist movement has henceforth never displayed any particular desire for independence? This is a key question. There are a number of explanations as to why Catalonia has moved towards separatism in recent years which can be summarized as follows; a lack of response from the central government to calls for increased autonomy in Catalonia; the way in which the 2006 Statute of Autonomy was challenged in the Spanish Constitutional Court and the way that this reflected on the legitimacy of the Catalan nationality; increased awareness of the Catalan annual deficit which stands at 8% of GDP as a result of financial arrangements with the Spanish state; growing unemployment in Catalonia which stood at 23.9% in Spain and at 40% for young people in 2013 (380 -381). Thus the main rationality is both economic and welfare related, and related to autonomy for Catalonia.
To focus in on the Spanish response to the 2006 Statute of Autonomy, following four years of debate and alterations in the Spanish Constitutional Court, several articles were altered, as they were deemed unconstitutional, despite the fact that the Statute had already been revised and modified by the Spanish parliament in 2006. On June 28th 2010, 14 of the 223 articles in the Statute were declared unconstitutional
(Petithomme and Fernández Garcia 11). These 14 articles included references to Catalonia as a nation, which was declared unconstitutional, references to national symbols for Catalonia; which were altered to symbols of nationality so as not to be confused with Spanish national symbols. Furthermore, the Catalan language was not to be held above Castilian (Spanish) as the language of the territory (as the Spanish constitution clearly states that all Spaniards have a duty to know Castilian). And finally, attempts to solution the economic debt created by the imbalance in contributions to Spain by setting up a solidarity fund which corresponded more closely to the other autonomous communities were also rejected (Guibernau 382-383). The Spanish response affronted the Catalan people, it denied their distinct cultural identity, and did nothing to alleviate the mounting debt between the Spanish state and the Catalan nationality.
It is increasingly evident in the case of Catalonia that citizens there feel disillusioned with the central government, and are increasingly looking to the Catalan Generalitat to take over the role of welfare management. This is affirmed by Serrano’s quantitative research, which notes that, 63.5% of respondents claimed to support independence due to welfare reasons, while only 25.4% supported it due to national identity (534). Civil society groups began to take up the issue in 2009, and in that year 166 municipalities held symbolic referendums on independence, with an overwhelming 94.7% voting in favour of independence (with a voter participation level of 27%) (Guibernau 384). This was followed by a massive protest in Barcelona on 10 July 2010, which saw one million Catalan people take to the streets in protest at the response to the 2006 Statute of Autonomy (384). At
