The effects of incentive systems on retail sales

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Thesis

The Effects of Incentive

Systems on Retail Sales

Performance

Author

Frank Rico Gerard Pek – 10317317

Supervisor University Prof. Dr. J. Strikwerda

Professor of Organization (Internal Governance) and Change

Supervisor MBNL Jorg Roelofs

Sr. manager dealer development at Mercedes-Benz Nederland

University

Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam Business School

Executive Programme in Management Studies, specialization: Strategy

Publication date 07-04-2015

Version Final

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Preface

In front of you lies the thesis “Effects of Incentive Systems on Retail Performance”. A qualitative research based on the knowledge of experts obtained trough dept-interviews. The thesis was written for my graduation assignment in Business and Management for the

University of Amsterdam (UvA). From June 2014 until March 2015, I’ve been busy with the research.

First of all I would like to thank my supervisor from the UvA, who guided me and provided me with the right feedback and theoretical backgrounds and steering. Prof. Dr. J. Strikwerda, thank you for all the effort and wisdom you gave me.

The Thesis was written in cooperation with Mercedes-Benz The Netherlands, where Jorg Roelofs took responsibility in guiding me. Thanks to him it was possible for me to be a part of the Network Development team, which provided me with great colleges, the right resources, a working station and the opportunity to meet with all the experts in the business. Jorg, thank you so much for taking the effort of doing so, without you, it would not have been possible. Last but least, I would like to thank all the interviewees and colleges that invested their time for the interviews and for their support. Without any exception I had interesting and pleasant interviews, nobody rushed it and really invested their time, you where great thank you all. Kind regards to all of you, hopefully you will enjoy the thesis.

Frank Pek

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Abstract

In this single case study I will report the effect of the strategic motivational system on the behavior of a retailer in the automotive industry. Sales performance is the core business of a retailer and therefore relevant to optimize there where possible. I started to link the existing literature to create the bases for the hypothesis and to explain why continuous rewarding may have a negative effect on sales performance (instead of the desired positive effect). I used the motivational studies and rewarding system studies and linked them to the rather abstract PAT (Principal Agency Theory) and the double marginalization theory. Gaming and Sandbagging are negative effects of the rewarding system which is being used now. This research will clarify the relation between rewarding and the behavior of the retailers and therefore give insights about the current situation of bonus systems. Like the expectancy theory supports, there is a positive relation between effort and performance. I will compare the continuous returning monthly monetary rewarding system with actual performance figures.

Research question: “Does the Strategic policy of the Wholesaler have a counterproductive influence on the sales performance of dealers” is true or false. This study has an exploratory aim and will be a snapshot with a timeframe based on data from the years: “2014” and “2015”.

Keywords: Automotive industry, retailer, behavior, rewarding system, incentives Sales performance, PAT, double marginalization, Gaming, Sandbagging, Expectancy Theory.

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Introduction

My aim will be to be useful for the Wholesale automotive company where I’m currently employed, because this interests me and the people I work with, so I should be able to get a lot of information and maybe lead to new insights and higher effective use of every body’s effort on their daily job.

The most important indicator of success for a wholesale company like the one I did this case study for, is sales performance. Where Sales Performance can be defined as: number of new sold cars per month (measured trough numbers of “Rijksdienst Wegverkeer” National Service Road Users, which is the official independent party who registers the vehicles license plates in The Netherlands. Therefore I will explore the automotive industry in the Netherlands using real figures from RDC and the company (Importer) where I’m currently employed. My aim is to prove wetter the current motivational rewarding system for the retailer is effective or if it leads to negative behavior, creating negative sales performance. I will link several studies regarding motivational systems, team performance, double marginalization, PAT (Principle Agency Theory), to create the theoretical framework. The figures of the market will show me if the effects everyone expects, even exist. So is there an actual increase in Orders and

registrations in the last week of the month? I will combine these findings with the findings of the interviews with high level managers in the business, the market manager from Head Quarters in Stuttgart and 3 different sized contract partners, further called “Dealers”. I would like to investigate the following. In the Netherlands there are 12 contract partner Dealer-companies from a certain brand, who all have a certain selling potential various from number of selling points. The Wholesale company or also called Importer has to sell X cars (new cars), to the dealer-network each year, to reach the targets it gets from Head Quarters. To meet these targets they are dependent on the sales performance of the dealer network. Which are on their turn effected by external market influences, like “Bijtelling” (typical Dutch tax-system for the Business sales Channel), Image, competitors and the overall financial situation of the Netherlands. To increase sales, the Wholesaler is trying to motivate the retailer’s trough monetary rewarding systems, so they get a discount which they can spend on selling more cars or earn a bigger profit. The incentive system is divided into several aspects. One is the monthly action plan, where very specific vehicles will be financially supported trough registration bonuses, we call this the “month plans” Another one is the Quarterly action plan, a temporary offer to increase sales just before closing the quarter. A constant non-temporary system is, Variable Dealer Margin, which is a bonus system which

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will give the dealer company a percentage of its total turnover at the end of the year and at the end of each quarter. This will be called VDM further trough this document. The VDM, can be roughly be divided into 3 parts; The Fixed part gives 8% which the dealer earns on each sale, a quantitative factor, which increases the percentage the dealer can earn at the end of the year which increases trough the total number of units and a qualitative part, which are steering mechanisms from the Wholesaler, to improve the quality of the Retail Processes, like CSI (Customer Satisfaction Indicator), Conquest and Loyalty, when end-customers of competitors are won in sales.

The VDM-system is being influenced by some negative emotions from dealers, because historically the entire Margin, which is about 14, 9% on average was fixed. But the Variable part, which consist of 14, 9% - 8% fixed = 6, 9% has become a steering device for the Wholesaler. Most of the dealer companies would rather see it all fixed again.

Then there are individual supporting cases, which can be given by the Area Sales Managers (contact persons from Wholesaler), which can for example give support if a deal with a specific end-customer can be made through discount. And there are Corporate Sales and Fleet Sales discounts, where Corporate Sales Managers and Fleet Sales Managers create National Fleet Agreements with companies who own fleets of cars; they will receive a standard discount so cars can be selected on the leasing list of the company.

All these incentive systems and the conflicting profit maximalization, of the dealers and the Wholesaler lead to questions about the efficiency. Since the monthly actions are in such a continuous basis, my hypothesis is as following: Dealers wait with putting in orders and registration (the two main triggers for performance), so it seems the market is rough, the wholesaler puts in their budgets to reach the targets, (so managers get their short-term bonuses PAT) and Dealers sell all their cars in the last week of each month. Because this is a repeating cycle and they know it will happen. Therefore, the behavior of dealers is negatively

influenced, because they wait with selling and ordering, to make a bigger profit later. Which has a negative impact on sales performance and margin levels, which makes it a negative spiral, this phenomenon is known as double marginalization. Both the wholesaler and retailer are fighting over the same piece of the pie, instead of working efficiently together and

creating a bigger one. Therefore I searched for articles that state things about behavior and market performance and wholesale discount. Which lead me to the Research gap, of how to manage this situation of double marginalization aligned in the most efficient way.

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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

In the next chapter “Theoretical Framework” I will further explain the earlier mentioned theories and the link with the assumptions.

Sales performanc e

Retailer

Discount policy Wholesaler

(AT short-‐term

target incentive)

Behavior Retailer

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Theoretical Framework

Double Marginalization, The most relevant figure to measure for a wholesaler is its sales performance. But the challenge is: how to get the incentives between two groups within the same supply chain in the same direction to both perform optimally. The retailer and the

wholesaler are different parties in the supply chain of the automotive industry, who both strive to reach their own goals and targets. This double marginalization is the result of this construct and decreases total sales and the profit levels. James A. Brickley & Jerold L. Zimmerman (2001).

Lying for honor

Michael C. Jensen (2004) states that: there is evidence that shows that 60% of the managers is willing too and lies about reaching their goals to get a small monetary reward, even 40% lies about their performance when there is no reward at all, just out of an honor principle.

Paying people to lie

Also from C. Jensen (2004),

These effects can be linked to the: “PAT” PAT Principal Agency Theory,

Eisenhardt (1989) & Jeremy C. Stein (2003) + Pratt, J. W., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (Eds.). (1991). Principals and agents : the structure of business. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press. People are assumed to reach maximal profits and even use their power of knowledge “information asymmetry” in their favor to manipulate the situation for their principals. Also this theory states that agents or managers have other incentives than their principles or stakeholders, because, agents are more risk averse in fear of losing their job and agents have (monetary self-interests) that do not match those of the principles. This last point states that managers will do a lot to earn just a bit more for them, even if it means it’s a bad decision for the company. The absolute solution should be to increase the total supply chain profits and exterminate the struggle over profits between wholesaler and retailer, “so make the pie bigger, instead of fighting over the same piece”. J. Strikwerda, (2014) But what kind of factors are of importance in this case, actually a lot, so much I cannot even start to write them all down, but I will focus on a small part which can be measured and tested on existing relations and can be realized within the time spend of this thesis.

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Importer so HQ NL. All contracted franchises known as the official dealers, have to maintain these prices but are able to work with discounts. In most cases they can “seal the Deal” when they give customers a small discount, still leaving them the needed margin to earn money on the sale. The main target for the dealers is to increase the total number of sales, so the total number of cars in the Netherlands is bigger, while they can earn their real profits on After Sales (parts and maintenance) as well as the Variable Dealer margin goal.

This last rewarding system is designed in a way, based on performance per Dealer in

comparison with the realized absolute total of all dealers combined, instead of a pre-set target based on historical or forecasted performance targets. This aspect is known by the dealers and I aspect this effects the performance of dealers in a very relevant way. Because they can determine the total for each month, while all together they are the 100% total. High level managers at the Importer think that dealers are influencing the performance working together to reach higher bonuses. So maybe this way of setting goals and measuring the total market should be different, this might be a possible conclusion when I’m finished.

Behavior, as mentioned before, behavior is one of the factors that are being measured and even rewarded (by the variable dealer margin yearly bonus system) and are the most important factor which can hopefully be influenced through actions of the wholesaler, with the goal of a higher sales performance from everyone in the end. So I will focus on the behavior of the dealer, where behavior can be defined as: matching their incentives in terms of sales performance with those of the wholesaler, meaning, reaching as much as possible sales (within the limits of the brand). This last part is noticed, because for long term

performance Customer satisfaction plays a big role and the premium pricing strategy has to be honored. A lot in psychology has been written and studied about behavior, but never, at least not that I could find, in relation with rewarding systems within the Automotive industry in terms of sales performance, therefore I’m exploring it. Bridoux et al. (2011) States: that it’s important to work together as a team and that everyone will be motivated by monetary incentives and that together value will be created. While it’s important that there will be no discrimination within team, otherwise some of its team members will feel less valuable then others and therefore will be less motivated. This article is complementary to the PAT of Eisenhardt (1989) & Jeremy C. Stein (2003).

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Expectancy, Vroom (1964) discusses the expectancy theory, where input equals effort and output relates to performance. He states that certain choices and the level of effort which someone invests in his actions, lead to an expected outcome, which is a performance. This is applicable in the automotive supply chain, because here as well, input leads to a certain output. So it’s important to create a positive incentive to increase the effort of the input to reach a higher performance “Output”. So the question remains, how can a Wholesaler

positively incentivize the input “effort” of the retailers, to increase output “Performance”. But also, when is the effort at its maximum, how can Retailers invest positive effort so their performance is increased in the most efficient way. What is efficient and what’s not.

Non-Monetary Rewarding incentives

Bowles et al. (2008) State, that indeed everyone is self-interested like the PAT states, but that: for some people that motivation is not monetary rewards, but could also be, helping some else or just sharing their knowledge and feel helpful. It’s important to keep in mind that these articles state about teams working together within the firm, while in my case they are two different parties, so their incentives differ even more. But I believe just like prof. dr. J.

Strikwerda, that it should be one team effort of increasing total turnover “the pie” as effective as possible, so this might give the right direction on where to look. Jay Barney (1991) but here as well, asymmetric information and self-interested managers can choose for themselves instead of the good of all and therefore monitoring can be an option, but costs a lot of money. So this leads to the question, is that profitable, or is there even more capital destroyed by monitoring everything. The most obvious answer here is again: the incentives of the Wholesaler and the Retailer must be more aligned, so get the noses in the same direction.

Gaming or Sandbagging

M. Jensen (2008) Stated that rewarding systems and begetting bonus systems influence the behavior of the people in a very negative way, causing them to lie about performance to get higher rewards and therefore destroying value for the firm. This concept is called “Gaming or Sandbagging”. In another article, Jensen states that Gaming is a common wide spread well known effect within begetting systems. The two main effects will be tested in this research as well and are 1. Both the managers and it´s subordinates lie about their performance to reach their targets and therefore destroy value for the company and 2. They game the realization of the budgets, for instance they suggest must lower planned performance then what they actually expect, so they can get their bonus easily.

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Pay without performance

Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (2004) are questioning if the extremely high compensations for managers “CEO’s” within the corporate world, are adding value for the stakeholders. Their research states that when the CEO has a very high compensation, but a relative small share in the company and its interests, the CEO will make decisions for self-interest and even on purpose will not serve the interests of shareholders to reach it. This theory complements the PAT, and is an important basis of my research and hypothesis, since the company I’m investigating is also active at the Stock-market, so the same might be happening here.

All these theories and the assumptions lead to the following Hypothesis which I want to find before I can answer my research question.

Hypothesis 1: There is a positive significant correlation between the sales performance of the dealer and the rewarding system of the wholesaler.

Hypothesis 2: The dealer can be motivated by monetary rewarding systems.

Hypothesis 3: The monthly continuous rewarding systems lead to negative effects of dealer-behavior with respect to effort for sales performance.

Hypothesis 4: Negative dealer behavior with respect to effort leads to a negative effect on total sales performance.

Hypothesis 5: The dealer can be motivated more trough short term rewards than trough long term rewards.

Hypothesis 6: The Retailer & wholesaler differ in incentives and are both striving for self-interested profit maximalization and therefore destroy a part of the possible total turnover within this part of the supply chain.

Hypothesis 7: Dealers work together using their asymmetric information about performance and their total selling performance being 100% sales, in keeping the total figures lower to get lower targets for bonus rewards.

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In the hypothesis above, behavior is often mentioned, the definition of behavior is the way someone “Often the dealer” handles his business. Is he holding back some information to make a bigger profit, and is he really trying his best (effort), or does he need some extra motivation to push him to maximum performing conditions?

I linked the literature and the assumptions to create the hypothesis, in the next Chapter “Research Method” I will describe which method I used to do the research.

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Research Method

Methods

This is a qualitative single Case study, meaning, the information is obtained trough in debt-interviews within the Mercedes-Benz Cars for the Netherlands Case.

The theoretical framework is based on literature provided tough the resources of the UvA.

Data collection procedure

All the interviews took approximately 45 minutes and consisted of a combination of open questions and statements, where I tried to test my hypothesis.

For all the interviews I asked for permission to record the conversation and all interviewees agreed on it. All interviews have been latterly transcribed and afterwards coded and labeled.

Selection of respondents

My research is focused on the premium automotive industry, sales of new personal cars, based upon figures and information from “Mercedes-Benz Nederland” and therefore the unit of analysis is embedded. I selected the respondents based on experience with the strategy, targets and motivational systems at the Head Quarters of the Wholesale Company “Mercedes-Benz Netherlands at Utrecht”, The Dealer companies and Head Quarters from Daimler, so this is a typical sample. To get a complete view from a different angle, of how and why the Wholesaler chooses its strategy the way it does, I will interview three different Business Units, One high level HQ-Stuttgart employee and different size dealer companies. I specifically choose this variation in functions, levels and departments, to reduce biases as much as possible.

Characteristics of the case respondents. Wholesale Company

Therefore the respondents exist of Product management, (2 persons, who have a big responsibility in decision making of temporary rewarding systems and the price position. The Area Sales managers (2 persons), are the contact persons between the Dealers and HQ-NL, they need to use their communication and their emphatic skills to intermediate between Dealers and HQ-NL. Network Development (ND), is the BU where I will be positioned and supported through a supervisor, this BU has valuable inside information about the dealers, so here I will also interview (2 people). The Retail Manager is responsible for the total number

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of retail sales in the Netherlands, so this person is connected with all incentive systems. (1 person). The Senior Corporate Sales Manager, this is a very outspoken willing and

experienced person, who also has experience in the management at the dealer-side and knows a lot about the Corporate Sales system. (1 person).

Head Quarters Stuttgart

The European Margin Model Manager from HQ-Stuttgart, He has experience from another chain in the total supply chain, “HQ” and knows a lot about the VDM model, which is a very important topic, he can also share insights about other countries and competitor brands and their Margin Models.(1 person)

Dealer companies

3 Sales Directors from different sized dealers. A relatively Small one, with a turnover of approximately 5% of the yearly total, a Medium sized one, with 10% turnover and a large one, with up to +15% turnover on a yearly basis. (3 persons)

Access to the data

I’ve been working at Mercedes-Benz HQ in NL for over 3 years now, a lot of the BU’s and colleagues know that I’m doing the research for MB and are very willing to cooperate and share their knowledge with me, so I can graduate. I want to add value to the company with my research, so I monitored before I started what kind of research would fit their desires the most, and therefore the subject Sales Performance of Dealers was chosen. Management also

supports my research and I’ve been provided with a personal workspace, Desk, desktop, phone, login-account, supervisor from the company and a contract which states how I should process confidential information. I will use the internal appointment program “Outlook” and plan the interviews with the specific respondents. I’ll sign a separate contract especially for my research so I can use my account to enter all necessary data. My supervisor from

Mercedes-Benz, Jorg Roelofs, has the necessary contacts with Head Quarters Stuttgart and the Dealer Network, so he will introduce me and help making appointments for the interviews. The company also supplied me with transportation to visit the dealers in person.

The interviews

Due to natural tension between the Dealers and employees of the Wholesale Company, such as myself, because of differences in interest and access to certain pieces of information, I needed to be more cautious while interviewing the dealers then the employees of the

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Wholesaler. The same actually counted for the HQ-Stuttgart respondent, for the same reasons. Therefore, I needed to create 3 different approaches of interview topics, questions and

statements, which can be found in Appendixes #2 “Interview Questions” of this document. In all the interviews, I always started to ask for the approval of recording, for transcription purposes and everyone agreed upon this. Then I would always try to explain in big lines where the research is about, so what the boundaries of the conversation should be and then I tried to break the ice and to learn something about the person’s background for future interests and interpretation purposes, by asking about his or her background, and working experience. After this phase, I could lock someone in a certain level of expertise and would try to ask as much as possible about these. At the end I always asked the opinion of the interviewee about some very sharply formulated statements, where I could test some of the hypothesis I didn’t get in the conversation about the topics.

Since I’m also working for the company, I used the opportunity to learn about the flaws and the ideas of the people involved in this research, by asking them for feedback and

improvement ideas which I will not include in this thesis, but I will provide the company with that information trough a presentation.

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Analytical Strategy Methods

For the analysis of the thesis, I have put the information that the interviewees provided me with into transcripts. These can be found in a separate highly confidential PDF-document. I analyzed the information and clustered them according the hypothesis which I wanted to test trough this research. As mentioned before, some of the background information and

recommendations will not be included into the thesis because for the academic piece it will not add any significant value and is therefore out of scope. The parts that do will be clustered into themes and subthemes, trough coding and labeling. In the results section, Quotes from the interviews will be linked to the hypothesis and the interpretation towards the theoretical framework is made.

Data collection procedure

All of the interviews were personal conversations with the recipient and me, the researcher. All of the selected recipients agreed upon the recording of the interview. Therefore all of the interviews could be latterly transcribed, coded and labeled.

The analysis consists of an thick narrative description, meaning: “I used key themes derived from the theory as a basis for the interview construct, which were further derived into questions and statements. The answers given, where then coded through a combination of deductive (for the main themes) and later inductive (for sub-themes) codes. The coding process, followed a descriptive and magnitude coding system, so I can display the results in a matrix taking into account the heaviness of arguments, providing the most clear summarize. In “Attachment 3” I’ve build the construct and the relations from the hypothesis with the questions and statements, to derive the main and subthemes. On this basis I’ve designed the codes and labels “Attachment 4”.

In the next chapter I will state my findings according the hypothesis; I will clear out why the hypothesis was tested and how it meets the theory. For analysis purposes I divided the parties: Head Quarters Stuttgart (HQ), The Wholesale Company (Wholesaler) and The Retail Sale contract partners (Dealers) into sub-groups. The general view from the groups will be

described where quotes will be included to support the findings, the opinion of the group will be market with + when they don’t the hypothesis and with – when it does not.

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The results

Hypothesis 1: There is a positive significant correlation between the sales performance of the dealer and the rewarding system of the wholesaler.

All of my interviewees where familiar with in most cases all of the earlier mentioned,

numerous acts of dealers which use monetary incentives to create discounts and therefore seal the deal are being talked about in all groups.

H1. Statement 1: Without action plans, targets and the planning of the dealers are impossible to reach.

HQ’s point of view: +

(#9.H1) “so that’s also why we euhm, tend to reduce the quantitative part of the margin,

because if there is too much of a quantitative incentive, this leads to basically eeuh, attendance to fight for the last unit, euhm, you basically give discounts in order to get the bonus you are looking for.” This, states that the people are actually fighting for the last units

when they can reach a certain set target, for a monetary reward and are even willing to decrease their margins to reach a certain target.

Wholesaler’s point of view: +

Opinions where aligned, everyone supported the hypothesis and answered yes. Due to the high level of competition and the aggressive discounting policies of competitors Mercedes-Benz feels forced to go along with this battle, (#5. H1) “Mercedes can’t decline the decrease

in price of competitor brands, especially in such a price elastic market as the Netherlands. So to stay competitive and to reach the ultimate goal of 2020, being bigger then BMW and Audi, Mercedes has no other choice then to go ahead in the discounting policies. ”

Dealer’s point of view: +/-‐

The dealers mostly agreed upon the fact that monetary rewards or support was needed, to win deals from the competitors. But there is a negative feeling about the VDM, like stated before, dealers feel like they already should just get the margin and not have to do extra effort for it, things like: (#10.H1)”More orders thanks to the VDM-model, no…. no I don’t believe we had

one extra order in all these years. ” where stated regarding the VDM.

But also (#11.H1) “In short, yes money works, look if I receive an email today with a bonus,

I’ll always have a look if a can arrange something, so yeah, sure it works.”

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slip, in other words, then I will just write it down and look later on if I can get the money for it” This indicates that indeed the dealer is willing to invest extra energy and effort, but he

actually needs the money to invest in a deal. But that the sharing of information, of when they do get support and when they don’t is crucial in their bargaining position.

So there is separation within the sample group of dealers regarding the positive effect of the mechanism.

Conclusion: The hypothesis can’t be rejected, because it’s supported by all of the groups and all of the interviewees. Therefore the conceptual framework can also not be rejected yet. But it’s always a challenge to distinguish between dealer margin and “discount ammunition”, that money which the Retailers use to reach the customers which otherwise would not have been reached. It seems that when discounts are available, Retailers often quickly give them to customers and that therefore the margin of the whole supply chain decreases, so too much monetary support of the Wholesaler leads to margin decreases in the whole market.

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To test if the PAT Principle Agency Theory, Eisenhardt (1989) & Jeremy C. Stein (2003). And if money is the right method to increase the effort, which according to Vroom (1964) has a positive correlations with performance.

The magnitude differed of the answers on the above hypothesis differed, so I divided the subject into two statements: where in the second statement, I tested if there was any evidence for the theory of Bowles (2008) Non-Monetary incentives for motivation.

H2. Statement 1: Money is a perfect motivational source to get the dealers motivated to perform better in their Sales Performance.

H2. Statement 2: Money is the only real incentive a Wholesaler can use to motivate the dealers to reach higher Sales Performance.

HQ’s point of view +

H2. Statement 1 & H2. Statement 2

#9.H7“That is unfortunately quite true, I mean, that is, that at least have been proven in most

of the cases. Ja”

Wholesaler’s point of view +/-‐

H2. Statement 1 All of the respondents agreed upon the fact that in the end we are business partners and it’s all about making money and survival, (#8.H2) “Money talks, dealers need to

make a living to you know.. So sure money works”

(#5, H2) “The price elasticity in the Netherlands is so extreme, that whenever you decrease

the price: new sales are born.”

H2. Statement 2

(#4.H7) “Yes, sure money works, buts it’s not the only thing what matters, sales persons can

also be positively motivated trough other things then money, the incentive sales card system for example.”

Dealer’s point of view: +/-‐ H2. Statement 1 +

All the dealers agreed upon this point, in the end they want to earn a living and are being monitored and rewarded on financial results of the company as well. The dealers also told me, that they all use incentive systems of their own, to motivate their Sales people individually, so they do believe in the idea of motivation trough financial incentives.

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H2. Statement 2 -

All dealers did not agree upon this point, which I found quite interesting, Quotes like: (#10.H7) “No I don’t agree upon that, no no no … The function of the Wholesaler is to make

easy for the people on the work floor. And that’s not only trough money. But off course it’s always welcome.”

Conclusion: All of the interviewees supported the hypothesis, so it can’t be rejected, However, money is not the only supply HQ and the Wholesaler can use to motivate the dealers. Taking this into account, the PAT Theory as well as the theory of Bowles 2008, have found qualitative supporting evidence.

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Hypothesis 3: The monthly continuous rewarding systems lead to negative effects of dealer-behavior with respect to effort for sales performance.

The thought behind this hypothesis, is that the dealers use their asymmetric information advantage about when they actually can sell a car to an end-customer, to reach bigger profits through the supporting systems of the wholesaler, because they will wait until the time is their when the profits are the highest.

The hypothesis is created to test the Lying for honor, Michael C. Jensen (2004) theory in combination with the PAT Principle Agency Theory, Eisenhardt (1989) & Jeremy C. Stein (2003). This chapter is divided into a negative effect between the HQ and the Wholesaler and an effect between the Wholesaler and the dealers.

HQ point of view: +

“Jeah, the issue you might have, is that the target of managers who set these targets for the

retail network, euhm are driving partly of course the margin system, euhm, Euhm, In general a margin system should euhm, euhm have a lot more long lasting impact, because euhm, not only a short term success driver but it should also be a driver for the development of the network. Jeah that’s the question, if it’s not sometimes shortsighted, it’s that link, the direct link, they drive more short term targets that’s the issue.” This is similar of what the PAT in

combination with Jensen’s Lying for honor and the Pay without performance theory state, so evidence for these theories are supported by this group.

Wholesaler’s point of view +/-‐

From the Wholesaler all partly agreed upon this, because they believe that the waiting game, gambling and sandbagging theory M. Jensen (2008) is applicable here. None of them could actually prove anything but the suspicions are very real, because they also realize that the PAT Eisenhardt (1989) & Jeremy C. Stein (2003) Exists. For example: (#6. H4) “What would

you do, if your margins are strongly under pressure and you have the knowledge that all the A-klasses you’re about to do next week, could also give you a bigger profit, one week later, are you going to say nothing and play it by the rules, or take the extra profit you and your organization desperately need?”

Dealer’s point of view: +

Since the lying on purpose, would be alarmed as fraud, I could not ask this to the dealers, but I only tried to measure how the Wholesaler and HQ were thinking about this topic.

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This can also easily be supported, through the fact that two of them worked for several years at the Wholesaler and told me they are familiar with the processes etc. They also told me that they noticed that end-customers are aware of these provision systems as well and that this is leading to waiting of purchases by them.

company receive bonuses too, just like the managers at dealer companies and they are in charge of the Margin systems and the short-term Action plans, this negative behavior can continue to exist and cause negative impacts on long term targets.

Here you can see that the self-interest such as described by the PAT theory exists at the Wholesale Company.

Conclusion: In a total view to the supply chain, all of the groups support the hypothesis, but everyone points to the next chain in the supply-chain, so I would based upon the in depth interviews state that there is evidence to support the hypothesis. Therefore, the PAT Eisenhardt (1989) & Jeremy C. Stein (2003) Definitely can be supported here. Trust in the behavior of the dealer is a big issue at most of the internal interviewees, this is a real challenge, if in the end efficiencies should be achieved, like the working together as a team theory of Bridoux would be the solution to create a bigger pie.

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Hypothesis 4: Negative dealer behavior with respect to effort leads to a negative effect on total sales performance.

Here Behavior is defined by, level of motivation to perform and sales performance is defined by number of total newly sold cars within a period of time. This hypothesis should provide evidence for the Expectancy theory and to see if working together theory would be a positive effect on the situation.

Statements 1: “All periodic supporting systems just lead to a shift in realization not to an improvement of total sales.”

HQ’s point of view: +

HQ supports the vision of the Wholesaler as well, with the right processes and methods more sales will be won in the future, so a good behavior leads to more sales, just like a bad one would have a negative effect. Quote: (#9.H4)“Eeuhm ja, as I said, coming down from the

quantitative part, we off course can also combine it with qualitative targets, which in the end will drive quantity as well.”

Wholesaler’s point of view: +

This is being supported by of the interviewees within this group, because they think that a certain process and method works and that a better CSI, Customer Satisfaction Indicator, will lead to more sales on the long term, that’s why these subjects are included in the long term “quality improvement side” of the VDM-model.

From the dealer perspective the quantitative bonus systems also do create a time shift of the realization. One of them gave the following example: (#10. H4) “The pre-registrations are

like a snow plough, you keep on stocking them, until it won’t move anymore, then we stop and first have to solve the stacking problem, as in the cars that are in our stock with license plates on them.”

They also acknowledge the need for investment in the quality on the long term, of the processes.

Like described before, dealers where used to the situation where the qualitative part was not included in the Margin System yet, which off course was a lot easier for them, because they could spent the money at discounts, while in the current situation they are dependent on their qualitative performance. I do think this aversive behavior towards the VDM-system is out of irritation of its complexity, not because they don’t believe in the improvements on the long run.

Conclusion: Most of the receptions supported the Hypothesis, so it can’t be rejected. Which also means that the motivational that it does make sense to invest in the long term qualitative projects and not only support the pushing quantity action plans.

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Hypothesis 5: The dealer can be motivated more trough short term rewards than trough long term rewards.

This hypothesis was created to test if the time factor is important and therefore if people are very short term-target driven or of they are willing to see and invest in the long term as well. H5. Statement 1. Would you rather receive 100 euro at the end of the year, or 20 euro at the end of each quarter?

HQ’s point of view:

This point was not discussed with this group.

Wholesaler’s point of view: +/-‐

The respondents from this group reacted differently at this question, some fully agree, others say that it’s just hard to measure but easier to see the short term effects and therefore you might conclude that it’s true, but actually it’s not. Others say that:”The more professional dealers are more successful in calculating and therefore able to see the bigger picture and think ahead, while the less-professional organizations cannot and therefore often only join with the very short term projects.” So this point depends on which dealer and how you measure long and short term success.

The respondents in this group reacted different to this statement as well, (#10.H5) “Well, I’d

rather have a single payout of hounded, but that’s because we have the liquidity to backup for it”

(#11.H5) It’s both, you’ll have to keep on changing it, once they get used to it, they’ll fall

asleep, keep them motivated”

(#12.H5) The mix should be good, some things should concentrate on the short actions and

some invest in the future.”

So dealers seem to like the changes and appreciate the effort that the Wholesaler takes to invest in improvements in quality.

Conclusion: The Hypothesis has both supportive and arguments against it, the liquidity situation seems to be of influence on the level of importance of short and long term action, but this an assumption which can be a subject for future research.

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Hypothesis 6: The Retailer & wholesaler differ in incentives and are both striving for self-‐interested profit maximalization and therefore destroy a part of the possible total turnover within this part of the supply chain.

In The Netherlands there is an Own-Retail Sales dealer company, which is actually a part of the Daimler group as well and can be closely monitored. In most of my interviews I asked people about it to investigate if the PAT-theory was strongly decreased here, like I would expect, since there is 100% monitoring possible, so no asymmetric information. But the results of the Own-Retail Sales channel are often less good then those of the externally owned Sales partners. This was

HQ’s point of view: -‐

This group agreed that the hypothesis is probably correct, but also agrees, that other factors are active that have an even bigger influence on the performance, because the performance of the Own-Retail Sales Channels in several countries are constantly lower than the one used in this theory and therefore outperform the own Retail Sales Channel. Still Own-Retail is very useful as an indicator of what really happens in the market and they can serve as a pilot to test new methods and ideas of Retailing.

Wholesaler’s point of view: +/ -‐

In this group the opinions went separate was, not all interviewees agreed here, very extreme disagreements have been seen, (#1.H6) “The money we give them, it’s never enough, they

always want more the next time”. (#6.H6) “The dealers and we must work together and I think that’s going very well”

One thing that did come up was the fact that dealers have a large interest in the Sales of used cars, which has a conflict with the focus on newly sold cars, where this whole thesis is about. This spread of focus and interest makes it harder to incentivize all of the dealer’s attention towards the sales of new cars. But the opposite has off course also been told, because in the end we all want the Retailers to sell more cars, just like they do.

Conclusion: I think that based on the qualitative results the hypothesis has been supported, but at same time evidence shows that other factors play an even bigger role in being

successful as a Retail Saler, but what these factors are, was not in scope of this research. Suggestions are that size of the Retailer and Skill of the people who work there are very important; this might be interesting for future research.

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Hypothesis 7: Dealers work together using their asymmetric information about

performance and their total selling performance being 100% sales, in keeping the total figures lower to get lower targets for bonus rewards.

This hypothesis was created, due to the theories of PAT and the Gaming and sandbagging theory and the Lying for honor Michael C. Jensen (2004) theory.

HQ’s point of view:

This topic was not discussed, due to law issues it did not seem to be wise to discuss this with HQ.

From the Wholesaler’s point of view+/-‐

Although no one had real evidence for it, almost all of the interviewees of this group agreed that the effect of dealers working together to decrease the total market share, was actually happening.

But one, because (#6.H7)”Dealers don’t work together, they don’t like each other, so conspiracy? No, way.”

Dealer’s point of view: (+/-‐)

I could not ask the dealers directly if they violated the law, so I tried to interpretate things they told me, about their ways of processing and their opinion about others to get an idea if the hypothesis might be supported or rejected.

I picked up two different signals, (#11.H7)” I see other Mercedes-Benz dealers as my biggest

competitors, even bigger then Audi or BMW, the competition is so aggressive and the market is under such great pressure that dealers wish the others were dead.”

Dealers can be in the “PW-Commissie”; this is the Person Cars committee, which is a dedicated group of decision makers which discuss action plans and marketing plans with the Wholesaler. These dealers do actually talk with the Wholesaler and probably also with each other, which would be illegal, but I think quite inevitable.

Conclusion: This highly sensitive point, created support as well as arguments with the hypothesis, therefore it can’t be rejected, But it’s also not fully supported, Although this does indicate that the trust at the Wholesaler towards the dealer is an issue.

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Conclusion

Research question: “Does the Strategic policy of the Wholesaler have a counterproductive influence on the sales performance of dealers”

None of the included enquires would agree upon the statement of: “The strategic policy, of giving discounts, to the dealer companies” would be totally counterproductive. Because everybody thinks the financial incentive systems are being used to reach customers they otherwise would not reach. So “New customers are born, at lower prices of the products” and this has a positive effect on total sales.

Although, the effect of shifting transaction moments was not declined by anyone either, so at the same time the counterproductive effect actually does exist. Somewhere in the middle lies the solution to maximum effect of the incentive systems.

Anti-Trust plays an important role for the “Working together theory of Bridoux” and the conflicts of interest between the several parties keep the short term action plans alive, so the PAT theory of Eisenhardt (1989) & Jeremy C. Stein (2003) does exist and decreases the potential of the supply chain.

Evidence for the Gaming and sandbagging theory and the Lying for honor Michael C. Jensen (2004), have also been proven, but still, dealers are able to outperform the Own-Retail Sales Chanel, where effects are a lot smaller or do not exist at all.

An important distinguish between quantitative and qualitative incentive bonuses can be made, where the qualitative side adds most value to future sales and improvement of the total

organization.

The effect of the quantitative incentives on the value of the stock, has not been researched enough to conclude if these supporting systems actually add value or are costing the Daimler group more then it earns them. I have my doubts about this, because the results show that a lot these short term “action plans” lead to shifts of transaction moments, which would happened later anyway, future research should prove if this is paying off in terms on the stock market or if its wasted money.

Recommendation

The total turnover of the whole supply chain has to be increased; this can be reached through two important factors, effort of the Retailer and efficient implementation of the effort. Therefore my recommendation is to invest more in the qualitative improvement side then in

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quantitative sales targets, to improve the quality of the sales chain on the long term and therefore use the efforts efficiently and to share information between the Wholesaler and the Retailer to increase the total turnover. This last recommendation is based on the reduction of the; PAT Eisenhardt (1989) effect, the incensement of effort; Vroom (1964), and working together. Bridoux, an important factor which has to eliminated, is the trust one, without trust the Wholesaler and the Retailers are not working together in harmony and with open

information. Therefore to conquer this challenge, the sharing of interests is important to reach the ultimate goal of total supply chain incensement.

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Strengths and limitations

Strengths

The research is based upon actual sales data, collected right from the source. Highly experts shared their insights and knowledge in contribution to this research. Several Business units were analyzed which reduced the level of bias considerably. The high-level Head Quarters Market Managers U.S. and Europe, was able to share his insights on the topic, so the side of the HQ was represented as well.

The dealer side of the story has also been researched, even in three different sized dealer companies.

Four “multiple” sources of data have been used to analyze, this creates constructed validity

Limitations

The research is primarily focused on the Premium Automotive incentive systems in the Netherlands and therefore can’t be used as an international general principle. One top-management expert on incentive systems in the automotive premium segment from Head Quarters shared his international experience, but only his view is used to give insights on other than the Dutch market.

The research does include the Dealers point of view, but I only had time to include three of the twelve contract partners, so this might lead to biased conclusions, but it does include an external view.

Eight of the approximately 15 experts within the Wholesale Company have been included in the research, representing a significant view on the topic.

The research was focused on a specific group of analysis, which makes it less generally applicable.

The scope of the research limited me, to further dive into the details of the mechanism of the stock market, which actually is the source at the Head Quarters, where the Price strategy of the products are set, and where the effects of the monthly profit expectations for the stock market can be researched.

This last point is in my opinion a very important one and can be subject of future research, what are the overall gains measured in stock levels of the mother company compared to the investments it does on quantitative targets each month and quarter.

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Discussion

Sincerity

All interviewees where informed very frankly “See Attachment 5 Invitation Mail”, about the research and where asked to be honest and open about their thoughts, given the security of confidentiality.

Significant contribution, Relevancy

The contribution of this thesis to the academic world is significant, because this very wide scoped case study links relevant topics to the theories. It’s interesting, that while these theories are on itself existing and the main target for all of the parties is the same (More Sales), still the combination of self-interest, double marginalization, and sandbagging continuous to exist.

For the company I will spread only one sample of the thesis itself, due to its confidentiality and theoretical form, but I will also spread the information that I’ve gathered to the

organization trough a presentation, where I will share my insights and will try to create synergies between the ideas of others and the people involved.

Coherence

The interview questions and statements where directly linked to the theory and the most relevant topics and therefore captured in the interviews.

Learning Experience

I learned a lot by being at the source, where it all happens, and the employees were very willing to help and share their insights. The most difficult thing for me was to decide where to pull the line and stop collecting data. I think the connection with the Automotive and the theories where spot on, the pitfall for me was when I heard something interesting; I wanted to expand the scope of the research, which makes it at some point too big to handle in my short researching time.

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References

Article # 1. C. Fred Miao & Kenneth R. Evans (2012) ‘ The interactive effects of sales control systems on salesperson performance: a job demands–resources perspective’ J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci. (2013) 41:73–90

Article # 2. C. Fred Miao a, Kenneth R. Evans b, Shaoming Zou c,1 (2006) ‘The role of

salesperson motivation in sales control systems — Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation revisited’ Journal of Business Research 60 417–425

Article # 3. Erin Anderson and Richard L. OliverSource (1987) Perspectives on Behavior-Based versus Outcome-Behavior-Based Salesforce Control Systems

Article # 4. David W. Cravensa,*, Felicia G. Lasskb, George S. Lowa, Greg W. Marshallc, William C. Moncrief (2004) Formal and informal management control combinations in sales organizations The impact on salesperson consequences

Article # 5. Kenneth R. Evans & Timothy D. Landry & Po-Chien Li & Shaoming Zou (2007) How sales controls affect job-related outcomes: the role of organizational sales-related psychological climate perceptions

Article # 6. Bernard J. Jaworski, Vlasis Stathakopoulos and H. Shanker KrishnanSource (1993) Control Combinations in Marketing: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence. Article # 7. Manfred Kraffta, Sfnke Albersb,*, Rajiv Lalc (2004) Relative explanatory power of agency theory and transaction cost analysis in German salesforces

Article # 8. C. Fred Miao a, Kenneth R. Evans b,1 (2012) Effects of formal sales control systems: A combinatory perspective

Article # 9. Herman Aguinis *, Harry Joo, Ryan K. Gottfredson (2013) What monetary rewards can and cannot do: How to show employees the money

Article # 10. Igor Bykadorov a, Andrea Ellero b,*, Elena Moretti b, Silvia Vianello c (2009)’ The role of retailer’s performance in optimal wholesale price discount policies’

Article # 11. Schweitzer, Ordonez, and Douma (2002) ‘The Dark Side of Goal Setting: The Role of Goals in Motivating Unethical Decision Making’ Academy of Management

Proceedings.

Article # 12. Michael C. Jensen (2004) ‘Issues and Puzzles in Performance Management’

Barbados Group Working Paper No. 2-05.

Article # 13. James A. Brickley, Jerold L. Zimmerman (2001) ‘Changing incentives in a multitask environment: evidence from a top-tier business school’ Journal of Corporate

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Article# 14. Samuel Bowles, et al . Behavior (2008) ‘Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine "The Moral Sentiments": Evidence from Economic Experiments’

DOI: 10.1126/science.1152110

Article# 15. JEREMY C. STEIN (2003) ‘AGENCY, INFORMATION AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT’ Handbook of the Economics of finance Harvard

Article# 16. Jay Barney (1991) ‘Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage’ Journal of Management Vol 17, No 1 , 99-120

Article# 17. Michael C. Jensen (2003) ‘ Paying people to Lie: Truth about the Budgetting Process’ European Financial Management Volume 9, issue 3, 379 – 406

Article #18. Vroom (1964) Journal of Applied Psychology Vol. 81, No. 5, 575-586 Article #19. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (2004) Pay without Performance, The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive CompensationHarvard University Press

Slides #1. Eloisa Federici (2014) Thesis Research Methods Qualitative - Data Analysis “From Data Condensation to Data Display” Lecture 4 TRM O’Dwyer’s (2004)

Slides #2. Eloisa Federici (2014) Thesis Research Methods Qualitative – “From Data Display to Data Interpretation” Lecture 5 TRM Huberman & Miles (1994)

Interviewee #1. Internal Employee Wholesale Company, Function: Corporate Sales Account Manager

Interviewee #2. Internal Employee Wholesale Company, Function: Retail Manager Interviewee #3. Internal Employee Wholesale company, Function: Manager Network Development

Interviewee #4. Internal Employee Wholesale Company, Function: Area Sales Manager Interviewee #5. Internal Employee Wholesale Company, Function: Area Sales Manager Interviewee #6. Internal Employee Wholesale Company, Function: Retail Sales Consultant Interviewee #7. Internal Employee Wholesale Company, Function: Junior Product Manager Interviewee #8. Internal Employee Wholesale Company, Function: Senior Product Manager Interviewee #9. External Employee Head Quarters Daimler Stuttgart, Function: Market Management Europe and the U.S.

Interviewee #10. External, Large sized dealer, Function: Dealer Sales Director Interviewee #11. External, small sized dealer, Function: Dealer Sales Director

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Interviewee #12. External, medium sized dealer, Function: Dealer Sales Director

Attachment 1. List of Hypothesis

Hypothesis 1: There is a positive significant correlation between the sales performance of the dealer and the rewarding system of the wholesaler.

Hypothesis 3: The monthly continuous rewarding systems lead to negative effects of dealer-behavior with respect to effort for sales performance.

Hypothesis 4: Negative dealer behavior with respect to effort leads to a negative effect on total sales performance.

Hypothesis 5: The dealer can be motivated more trough short term rewards than trough long term rewards.

Hypothesis 6: The Retailer & wholesaler differ in incentives and are both striving for self-interested profit maximalization and therefore destroy a part of the possible total turnover within this part of the supply chain.

Hypothesis 7: Dealers work together using their asymmetric information about performance and their total selling performance being 100% sales, in keeping the total figures lower to get lower targets for bonus rewards. Being 100% sales, in keeping the total figures lower to get lower targets for bonus rewards.

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Attachment 2. Interview construct

Interview Intern Introductie

Mijn onderzoek gaat over de beloningssystemen richting dealers vanuit de importeur, hierbij kunt u denken aan VDM, maandelijkse-‐actieplannen, kwartaalplannen, en VO dus Corporate Sales en toezeggingen. Het doel van mijn onderzoek is om in kaart te brengen wat we graag willen bereiken als importeur, hoe doen we het nu, waarom doen we dat, werkt het? Om zo te leren wat we kunnen verbeteren om samen met het dealernetwerk de hele keten succesvoller te worden in het verkopen van nieuwe auto’s “Retail Sales Performance”.

Kunt u een omschrijving van uw werkervaring geven,

-‐ Relevante werkervaring vanuit vorige banen, opleiding, etc. -‐ MB specialist of verschillende werkgevers?

Kunt u een korte omschrijving van uw huidige functie geven? -‐ Dealercontact

-‐ Persoonlijke targets, waar streeft u naar

Beloningssystemen

Kunt u voorbeelden noemen van beloningssystemen die vanuit de importeur richting de dealer zijn opgezet, waar u persoonlijk mee te maken heeft.

(VDM, Corporate Sales –Verkoop Ondersteuning, Individuele toezegging, Maandelijkse-‐ actieplannen, Kwartaalplannen)

Wat denkt u dat het achterliggende doel is van de ondersteuning mechanismen? Hoe komt een maandplan tot stand?

Welke externe factoren worden er meegenomen tijdens het opzetten van een maandplan? (Dealers input, landelijke prestatie, Target vanuit HQ)

Denkt u dat dit doel wordt bereikt met de huidige beloningsstructuur? Wat zou er volgens u beter kunnen? aanpassen/afschaffen/niets

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Stellingen

Extra geld in de vorm van Ondersteuningsmechanismen, is een uitstekend

beloningsmiddel om dealers positief te motiveren een hogere sales performance te halen.

Geld is het enige echte motivatiemiddel wat wij als importeur kunnen gebruiken om hogere sales performance te realiseren bij dealers.

Dealers: “wachten/houden achter” met orders inleggen en voertuigen registreren tot de volgende actie wordt afgetrapt, zodat ze dezelfde orders met een hogere marge kunnen verkopen.

Alle periodieke ondersteuningen zorgen slechts voor een verschuiving van de realisatie, niet voor een verbetering over het totaal.

Ons dealernetwerk kan heel goed zelf beslissen hoe ze de financiële ondersteuning kunnen inzetten en zijn ondernemend genoeg omdat handig aan te pakken, dus we kunnen ze net zo goed een grote zak geld geven en de andere mechanismen afschaffen.

Dealers reageren vaak actiever op korte termijn beloningen dan op lange termijn beloningen. Actieplannen zijn onmisbaar, omdat we anders onze targets per maand nooit halen.

Is er ervaring (getest) wat er gebeurd wanneer er geen maandelijks actieplan is?

Aanvullingen

Heeft u nog aanvullen die aansluiten bij het onderwerp die u graag aan me mee zou willen geven?

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Attachment 5. Invitation mail

Dear .., Kind…,

As you might possibly already know, I’m currently writing a thesis, this is the last step of my Master “Business management at the University of Amsterdam”. I would like to include your knowledge and expertise about the subject during the writing of the thesis, due to a interview which takes approximately 30 till 60 minutes. The subject of the Thesis is:” The effects of financial support on Sales performance and the behavior of dealers”.

PS: If you don’t mind, I would like to record the interview, to make sure I don’t miss out on any important information and to make it easier to process in the thesis.

Kind regards, Frank Pek Mobile: 06-27330341 Intern: 41729 Intern DSO In Dutch:

Zoals u misschien al weet, ben ik momenteel bezig met het schrijven van een scriptie, Dit is de laatste stap van mijn Master Bedrijfskunde aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam. Ik zou uw kennis en ervaring graag meenemen tijdens het schrijven van de scriptie middels een

interview dat ongeveer 30 tot 60 minuten zal duren. Het onderwerp van de scriptie is: “De effecten van financiële ondersteuningen op de Sales Performance en het gedrag van Dealers”.

PS: Als u het geen probleem vindt, zou ik het gesprek graag willen opnemen, om geen belangrijke informatie te missen en het te kunnen coderen/labellen, zodat ik het kan verwerken in de scriptie.

Met vriendelijke groet, Frank Pek

Mobiel: 06-27330341 Intern: 41729

The effects of incentive systems on retail sales