Securitization and burden sharing of asylum seekers in the European Union

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Department of Social Science

Master thesis

Political Science in International Relations

Securitization and burden sharing of asylum seekers in the

European Union

Anne Leinonen

June 2014

Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Supervisor: Dr. Stephanie J. Simon Second reader: Dr. Jeroen Doomernik

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Abstract

European Union has been struggling to find common approach on migration and on asylum seekers for decades. Since 1990s the EU has focused its policies to securitize asylum seekers. The treaties and programmes adopted have focused on security issues and have neglected the humanitarian aspect of migration. When it comes to distribution of asylum seekers, due to geographical proximity to areas of conflict, certain Member States are under a lot of pressure and they end up with majority of the burden. The policies of the EU have contributed to the unequal burden sharing among MSs’ in respect to the management of asylum seekers in the EU. This circumstance has led to deadly tragedies at the Mediterranean Sea. Italy has plead for more help from the EU – however, the MSs’ in the north and west have not shown enough solidarity to the MSs’ in south and east. The thesis will emphasize the most important theories in the field of securitization and burden sharing before moving on to empirical evidence that shows how securitization of asylum seekers has impacted on uneven burden sharing in the European Union.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Western European countries have presented a variety of mechanisms in order to limit and manage immigration and asylum seekers flows into their territories since the 1970s. The political context connected migration to ‘destabilization’ of the national order (Doty, 1996; Marie, 1988; Ugur, 1995 in Huysmans, 2000: 754). It was agreed that free movement of third countries should be restricted and that the Member State (MS) should implement common rules for foreigners (Etienne, 1995 in Huysmans, 2000: 755). Back in the 1970s migrations took place mainly in the context of social and economic rights and in the integrated labor market where migrant workers were able to move freely between MSs’.

However, this changed in the mid-1980s. Migrations was politicized, in other words securitized, especially through the “(con)fusion of immigration and asylum”. Because of this confusion, asylum seekers are easily linked to illegal immigration. For example, section on Eurodac during the

Austrian Presidency links asylum seekers and illegal migration by stating: “in recent years the steep rise in the number of illegal immigrants (and therefore potential asylum-seekers) caught has

revealed the increasing need to include their fingerprints in the system […]” (Statewatch, 1998 in Huysmans, 2000: 755). Migration policy and developed was institutionalized by national

cooperation, the EU and ‘functional’ organizations like the police (Huysmans, 2000: 755-756). This cooperation formed different treaties and regulations regarding securitization of migration and asylum seekers.

These regulations regarding migration focused on decreasing immigration flows. As an example, the Dublin Convention determines the state responsible to process the asylum applications and it limits the possibility to share the burden of asylum seekers. The purpose of the Convention is to better the situation for the asylum seekers for example by seeking quicker ways to process

applications and reducing possible time to spend in detention. However, as Huysmans states: “this interpretation neglects the fact that the Dublin convention is heavily over determined by a policy aimed at reducing the number of applications” (2000: 756). When it is possible to seek asylum only in one MSs, it automatically reduces the chances to receive refugee status, which eliminates some of the asylum seekers from the EU. There are more control and restrictive regulations pushing European immigration policy than there are pulling initiatives, for example coordination and surveillance of external border control provided by FRONTEX in cooperation with MSs’ and visa policies in the Union (Lavenex, 1998 in Huysmans, 2000: 756).

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In addition, the developments presented migration as a threat to welfare state and the political debate framed migration as a ‘danger’ to the public. Securitizing regulations and technology entered the European migration policy field. The 1990s Convention applies the Schengen Agreement from 1985, which links migration and asylum with terrorism, international crime and border control (Bigo, 1996a; Verschueren, 1992; Lodge, 1993 in Huysmans, 2000: 756-757). In other words, regulating migration is connected with the need to protect internal security. These policy responses to growing migration are mechanisms to protect the MSs’ from the “dangers” related with asylum seekers and migrants. The way authority, national or EU wide, presenting migration and asylum seekers as a policy concern effects on the MSs’ public opinion and the MSs’ willingness to provide protection to displaced persons.

As Europe is currently under major pressure to accommodate millions of asylum seekers, this thesis examines whether the EU migration policy and mechanisms have impacted on burden sharing in the field of asylum. The migration policy, and policies regarding asylum seekers, have been developed in the favor of the EU, sometimes forgetting the Union’s “commitment” to solidarity and fairness regarding asylum seekers in the cases of ‘emergency’. Therefore, the topic of this thesis is important and relevant.

The securitization of asylum seekers is a result of the EU migration policies and mechanisms. Different treaties, programmes and mechanisms (the Dublin Convention, Treaty of Amsterdam, Tampere Programme, Eurodac, VIS, the Hague Programme, FRONTEX emphasized more in the analysis) have all led to securitization of asylum seekers and to the possibility to share the burden unequally between MSs’. The good attempts to commit to the common rules on asylum based on the implementation of Common European Asylum System, CEAS, is difficult because the old regulations. As only one MS can be responsible to process asylum application, it is easy to shift the burden to those states with the external borders or to the ones most popular among asylum seekers. Using Italy as a case study, this thesis shows that burden sharing regarding reception of asylum seekers should be taken into better consideration. Currently, Italy is struggling to handle asylum seekers reaching its territory and it is unable to control the migrations flows. Therefore, Italy has requested help and solidarity from the other MSs’ but so far, the response have not shown willingness to help when MSs’ can stand behind regulations, such as the Dublin.

The asylum applications numbers provided later on, show that Italy might not receive majority of the asylum applications, but it still is one of the MSs’ which is popular entry point to the EU and therefore, it is unable and unwilling to provide protection to asylum seekers and security to other

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MSs’. Italy’s response to the situation has been restrictive national policies and letting asylum seekers use Italy as “transit” country to other MSs’ (Barry, 4 July 2014).

The securitization acts regarding asylum seekers and migration has impacted on the unequal burden sharing situation in Europe. Some MSs’ are responsible to process majority of the asylum applications, others, such as Italy, are in responsible (in theory) to receive and provide protection to all of those asylum seekers who cross the Mediterranean Sea, now four out of five asylum seekers reaching the main land, (Bennett, 2 April 2014) together with few other MSs’ because of the Dublin regulations and other security measures. As the migration situation in Europe is unlikely to ease out in the near future, changes regarding asylum policy should be done at the EU level to balance the burden of asylum seekers.

1.1. Structure of the thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to examine securitization and burden sharing of asylum seekers in the European Union as it is struggling to find common approach to share the burden due to securitizing measures and the increased security concerns.

The third chapter will introduce the concept of securitization and the Copenhagen School (CS) theory of securitization. Because the CS concept of security focuses on securitization based on ‘speech act’, meaning that there are no security issues themselves because there are only issues that are created by certain actors, called “securitizing actors” (Wæver, 1995: 55), a wider definition of securitization based on the views of Sarah Leonard is necessary to be defined for the purpose of this thesis. Additionally, the concept of burden sharing will be explained. The chapter will introduce two approaches by Eiko R. Thielemann which will be used to study burden sharing in chapter three. Chapter four will provide an overview of the most important treaties, programmes and securitizing instruments implemented by the EU. The connection between these policies with burden sharing will be examined in order to answer the research question of this thesis, which is:

‘Has the securitization of asylum seekers had an impact on uneven burden sharing in the EU?’

The chapter will also provide data on asylum applications and it will study the two burden sharing approaches and how they can explain burden sharing. This chapter will give an overview in the EU level but because it is important to examine practices, chapter five will study the case of Italy in detail.

The case study in chapter five will discuss on the migration crisis in Lampedusa Island by examining national policies on migration and how Italy has reacted to the crisis. Then it will

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emphasize the reaction of the European Union and it will show how the EU is having problems to agree on migration issues in the case of mass influx of asylum seekers.

Last, this thesis will end with findings and conclusion in chapter six. The results will be used to give an overall answer to the research question of this thesis.

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Chapter 2. Methodology

The general approach of this thesis is to analyze if the securitization acts of the European Union have impacted on the unequal burden sharing of asylum seekers between the Member States of the Union. The central material for the thesis was documents published by experts in securitization and burden sharing framework. Therefore, the methodology used for the thesis is qualitative research method.

Document analysis includes mainly written material such as books, academic articles, and

newspapers. The theoretical framework and analysis chapters of this thesis uses already published material as a source to explain the chosen theories and to provide empirical evidences. The purpose of the document analysis is to provide a short and general image of the topic in order to produce conclusions (Tuomioja and Sarajärvi, 2002: 93-105).

Document analysis can be divided into material based analysis and theory based analysis. When theory based analysis is used, the material will be analyzed by using readymade theories (Ibid). This is the analysis model this thesis will be using. Using document analysis is not possible without limitations. The documents may not be enough to provide through analysis without being partial and the documents may be written for different purpose than where it is used for here. Therefore, it is difficult to consider all the different opinions of the authors. It might also be difficult to define whether the document is a source or a result of a phenomenon.

In order to respond to the research question, it was necessary to explain the main theories regarding the two main concepts of the thesis by using existing documents. The thesis starts with theoretical framework emphasizing the Copenhagen School of securitization because it is the main theory of securitization and it deserves attention due to other research conducted based on this theory. However, the understanding of security is fairly limited under the CS securitization framework because it focuses only on ‘speech acts’. Therefore, it was necessary to expand the concept of securitization to include other factors which can impact on the securitization process in the EU. The thesis will not analyze ‘speech acts’ alone but it will use content of documents as empirical

evidence. Focusing only on ‘speech acts’, the answer to the research question would have been too limited.

The second main concept of the thesis is ‘burden sharing’. After explaining the securitization theory in chapter 3, the thesis explains burden sharing with two theoretical approaches, cost-benefit logic and norm-based logic by Thielemann (2003). These two approaches were chosen because they are

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often used to explain burden sharing but they give enough contrast to see reasons for burden sharing.

The documents for the thesis are collected from different databases the University of Amsterdam provides access to. The database of the European Union was used to find information on the EU migration and asylum policies. In addition, important books were used and news articles were collected from the internet to find the most relevant information. Data on asylum applications and division between MSs’ is collected from Eurostat and the EU database. The data collection and analysis took place between April and June 2014.

The case study of Italy, focusing on the Lampedusa Island was chosen because it is the most recent major incident at the Mediterranean Sea. However, because the accident is not one of a kind at the same region, the selection was effective and gave comprehensive results because there has been other similar cases. Case study was chosen in order to show securitization and burden sharing of asylum seekers policies in practice to give as detailed answer to the research question as possible. The timeframe to produce this thesis caused some limitations for the research. Because of the nature of the thesis and the time limitations, collecting data via interviews or surveys was not possible. Therefore, the research cannot include all factors which may influence on securitization of asylum seekers and uneven burden sharing in the EU.

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Chapter 3. Conceptual and Theoretical framework

3.1. The securitization theory of the Copenhagen School

Because the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School is fairly well known followed by some interesting academic debates (below), here it is necessary to outline the main points of the theory. The main idea behind the securitization theory is that security is a “speech act”. According to the Copenhagen School, there are no security issues themselves because there are only issues that are created by certain actors, called “securitizing actors”, through speech acts. Wæver conceptualizes it: “in this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)” (Wæver, 1995: 55).

However, it does not mean that “securitization” is a subjective practice. In the Copenhagen School’s view it is, in fact, an inter-subjective process because of the role of the “audience” of the speech act. According to Buzan and Wæver, an issue is only securitized when the audience has accepted the issue as a threat (Buzan et al., 1998: 25). It is more likely to be accepted if the speech act fulfils certain conditions. First, the speech act have to follow the grammar of security, or in other words, it has to contain an existential threat, a point where there is no return from, et cetera. Second

conditions are social and contextual. The securitizing actor has to be an authority and it or s(he) can refer to the “objects” as threat to the audience.

Additionally, Buzan and Wæver challenge the traditional understanding of security by claiming that security is all about surviving. This comes from the definition of security that the securitization issue needs to be presented as existential threat, which the Copenhagen School calls a “referent object” for security. As an example, in order to securitize state A in state B would need to present state A as a security threat to the survival of the state B.

The Copenhagen School also claims that by “uttering security”, the securitizing actor “moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it” (Wæver, 1995: 55). That is why securitization is defined as: “[…] the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus by labelling it as security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means” (Buzan et al., 1998: 26).

The idea behind this is clarified more in detail in the introduction of the concept of “politicization”, which contrast to securitization:

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“Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized, through politicized to securitized” (Buzan et al., 1998: 24-25). According to Buzan and Wæver, scholars should study security by focusing on the process where an issue will be socially constructed and perceived as a security threat. They say: “[e]ven if one wanted to take a more objectivist approach, it is unclear how this could be done except in cases in which the threat is unambiguous and immediate. (…) It is not easy to judge the securitization of an issue against some measure of whether that issue is “really” a threat; doing so would demand an objective measures od security that no security theory has yet provided” (Buzan et al., 1998: 30). The main focus of the securitization framework is to understand which of the actors can speak about security successfully, how their legitimacy in that role is accepted and what kind of consequences their ‘speech acts’ can have.

The main idea behind the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework is that there are no security issues themselves but there are issues which are constructed as security issues because of securitizing actions. In a securitizing action, an actor presents an existential threat to the survival of a certain referent object. This gives the actor the right to use extraordinary measures in order to handle the threat.

Many scholars argued against securitizations theory, for example Roxanne Doty (1998: 92)

states:”security’s meaning is not fixed, but rather is the result of social-political practices in specific circumstances”. She continues that in order to understand securitization “it cannot be locked into a particular logic any more than it can be locked into a meaning. Several models of securitization characterized by different logics may be operative simultaneously”. She concerned because of the idea only taking one mode of securitization (from traditional security studies) and viewing for it additional “sectors” will lose the diversity and difference found within certain framework and within different sectors. (Ibid.).

For a few years most of the contributions to critic the security framework mainly concerned theoretical and normative questions. Articles and monographs amongst them can note the

intellectual origins of securitization theory (Taureck, 2006; Balzacq, 2005), the absence of gender in the framework (Hansen, 2000), the responsibilities of security analysts as a possible securitizing actors (Eriksson, 1999a &b, Wæver, 1999; Huysmans, 2006), securitization and modern techniques of the government (Huysmans, 2006), the potential negative consequences of securitizing an issue

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(Huysmans, 1995; 2002) and the interest of “de-securitizing” issues and bringing them into the context of “normal politics” (Aradau, 2001 & 2004, Taureck, 2006).

Additionally, Emmers argues that: “despite the School’s prominence in the security studies literature, the dynamics of the securitization (…) remain insufficiently understood empirically” (Emmers, 2007: 116). However, Eriksson claimed in 2001 that the securitization framework still lack on systematic empirical analysis and information about securitization is mainly based on theoretical assumptions.

The School recognizes only issues that have been ‘securitized’ through ‘speech acts’. Some

criticism claims that this is a very narrow approach to security and to the security process because it has too many limitations (Leonard, 2007: 13). Buzan and Waever admit that there are situations where “a logic of security is at play, even though there is no securitizing discourse uttered in the public sphere to justify it” (Buzan et al. 1998: 28). The school itself makes a point that “in cases where there is a persistent or recurrent security threat, a new drama establishing securitization is no longer necessary as securitization has become institutionalized over time. Such instances of

institutionalized securitization cannot be identified if the analysis focuses solely on security discourses” (Ibid.). Leonard continues that even though Buzan and Waever addresses these points, they do not draw all the possible conclusions (Leonard, 2007: 14).

In order to understand securitization of asylum and migration, both the discursive and non-discursive methods of the actors should be taken in to consideration. The practices and developments of actors are in crucial role in the process of securitizing asylum based on the criticism. Because of the limitations of the School’s theory, it is necessary to further develop its framework in two ways. The two aspects are “the conceptualization of security” and to include other non-discursive practices to the ‘speech act’ at the securitization framework. (Leonard, 2007: 11).

3.2. The conceptualization of security

It is in line with its “traditional military-political understanding”, where security is limited only on survival (Buzan et al., 1998: 22). Such a narrow description of security can be challenging in many ways. According to Doty (1998-99: 79-80) “Waever wants to rethink the concept of security ‘in a way that is true to the classical discussion’. The problem with this is that it implicitly assumes that the logic captured by the classical security field regarding state security is (…) the only logic worth consideration if one is to contribute to existing conversations on security. This precludes

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consideration of the possibility that important and relevant logics that cannot be played entirely within the classical security logic may be operative”.

This means that sectors and referent objects have different nature and it should not be assumed that all of them are administered by security dynamics which can be linked to characteristics of the military sector. Therefore, following only the narrow and traditional definition of security as the Copenhagen School suggests may cause difficulties in order to understand the “real life” security framework in sectors other than the military (Leonard, 2007: 12).

According to Leonard, another difficulty with the securitization concept is that “it leaves those who want to apply it with an artificial sharp dichotomy between ‘normal’, everyday politics on the one hand and the realm of security characterized by emergency and extraordinary measures on the other hand” (Ibid.). Leonard continues that in the Copenhagen School’s there is a clear line where both can have a successful act of securitization at a certain time and it fails to “theorize adequately the process by which an issue can move from one category to another” – despite of the fact that these processes are what the securitization framework argues to expose (Leonard, 2007: 12-13). This means that in real life, an issue cannot be made as a security issue only by one act of securitization and this claims is true when the securitization of asylum seekers is examined, since there has been more than one policy to support this direction of politics. However, certain issues can be a subject to intense process, which increases their “securityness” but it does not guarantee that the act of securitization will be successful (Williams, 2003: 521 in Leonard, 2007: 13).

Moreover, limiting security only to the extreme conditions of “existential threats” and “survival”, some scholars argue that wider and open definition of the framework should be implemented. This approach means that security issues can be seen to be “[moving] on a continuum from normalcy to worrisome/troublesome to risk and existential threat – and conversely, from threat to risk and back to normalcy” (Abrahamsen, 2005: 59 in Leonard, 2007: 13). Here the idea of ‘existential threat’ and ‘survival’ are not denied but are presented to be at the end of the continuum, where security issues can “be located at the lower level of intensity” (Leonard, 2007: 13).

Leonard continues that the benefit of this “re-conceptualization” is that “it captures the nuances of real security practices and discourses more accurately than the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework can”. The link is beneficial because it offers two references, “normality and

emergency/extraordinary measures”, but it does fail to sufficiently conceptualize the process of securitization (Ibid.).

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3.3. Security by ‘speech act’ – too narrow definition of security?

The Copenhagen School does not have security issues, instead the school recognizes only issues that have been ‘securitized’ through ‘speech acts’ and it can result in many limitations (Leonard, 2007: 13). Even Buzan and Wæver admit that there are situations where “a logic of security is at play, even though there is no securitizing discourse uttered in the public sphere to justify it” (Buzan et al., 1998: 28 in Leonard, 2007: 14). The Copenhagen School points out itself that in situations where there are insistent or recurring security threats, “a new drama establishing securitization is no longer necessary as securitization has become institutionalized over time” (Ibid.). Institutionalized securitization cannot be recognized if the analysis only emphases security discourses (Leonard, 2007: 14).

Leonard continues that even though Buzan and Wæver addresses these points, they do not draw all possible conclusions. Because there are many cases where “security practices are not legitimized in public by security discourse” (Buzan et al., 1998: 28 in Leonard, 2007: 14), the understanding of the securitization process cannot focus only on security discourses. Leonard continues to argue that it is mandatory to include ‘non-discursive’ practices, such as the “creation and functioning of

bureaucracies, the development of public policies, or the implementation of procedures”. Specifically she means that ‘security threat’ can be objectified also by other types of acts than a speech acts (Leonard, 2007: 14).

Additionally, Bigo (2000: 194 in Leonard, 2007: 14) claims that :“(…) it is possible to securitize certain problems without speech or discourse and the military and the police have known that for a long time. The practical work, discipline and expertise are as important as all forms of discourse”. This means that the networks and bureaucratic actors connected to security issues can play a more relevant role in the process of securitization than the speech act. Bigo has linked his argument to migration by stating that: “(…) the securitization of immigration (…) emerges from the correlation between some successful speech acts of political leaders, the mobilization they create for and against some groups of people, and the specific field of security professionals (…). It comes also from a range of administrative practices such as population profiling, risk assessment, statistical calculation, category creation, proactive preparation, and what may be termed a specific habitus of the “security professional” with its ethos of secrecy and concern for the management of fear or unease” (Bigo, 2002: 65-66).

Therefore, Bigo suggests to study the day to day practices of the security professionals at the

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approach may expose interesting deviations from official discourses and policies (Bigo, 1998a; Bigo, 2001 in Leonard, 2007: 15). Such an approach applied to the issues of immigration, according to Leonard, “would require including in the analysis the non-discursive practices of the actors dealing with immigration, rather than focusing exclusively on their discourse on immigration” (2007: 15). She continues to claim that when applying Bigo’s approach to illegal immigration and border control, it would also have to include to study “how the policy on illegal migration and border controls are implemented in practice”. Leonard argues that examining this could expose interesting differences between the official perception on illegal immigration and border controls and how they are actually implemented in practice (Ibid.).

Huysmans gives similar argument to Bigo. He argues that securitization discourses are connected with technology, specifically “particular technological devices and the knowledge and skills required for their use”. He continues to argue that technology is not only an instrument to implement policy decisions but technology also shapes the tone of policies available to

policymakers (Huysmans, 2004). In the case of immigration and especially on immigration control, this is very important to note. When examining the last decade, the Western states have been investing more and more in expensive and modern technology in order to improve border control. As an example, satellites, sensors, infra-red cameras can be mentioned. This technology has been invented mainly for other use, such as counter-terrorism actions, but their availability has led their adoption in order to secure borders. Other example are the databases; Schengen Information System (SIS), Visa Information System (VIS), Eurodac and most recently EUROSUR, created by the European Union in order to store as much information about immigrants and asylum seekers as possible. In some cases, the political objectives are not necessarily defined before there is the technology to achieve them (Leonard, 2007: 16).

All these databases are created to improve information sharing between the MSs’ and to provide security practices in the EU. One of the major institutional developments in the field of security, was the implementation of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) (Frontex, 2014). Its mission is to help MSs’ border authorities to work together. The ‘Joint Operations’ mission is the most relevant for this thesis because FRONTEX “plans, coordinates, implements and evaluates joint operations conducted using Member States’ staff and equipment at the external borders”. In

addition, the institutions does risk analysis and provide help for MSs’ when immigrants have not left the Union voluntary (Ibid). The tasks and mission of FRONTEX provides additional evidence of securitization of asylum seekers and immigrants, because they may be a ‘threat’ to the EU.

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Therefore, it is important to include technology and FRONTEX in the analysis related to the wider definition of securitization process of asylum seekers in this thesis.

3.4. Defining asylum and “asylum seeker”

Refugees have a right for international protection according to article 1 of the Geneva Convention held on 1951 referring to the Status of Refugees. As revised in the New York Protocol in 1967, the Geneva Convention delivers the legal definition of a refugee as follows: “A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is willing to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” However, Betts and Loescher (2011:1) state that the legal definition under the Geneva Convention is too strict and they offer another definition of refugees as an essential part of transnational politics. Betts and Loescher (Ibid.) define refugees as “people who cross international borders in order to flee human rights abuses and

conflict. Refugees are prima facie evidence of human rights violations and vulnerability.”

In addition, the UNHCR (website) definition for asylum seeker is: “someone who says he or she is a refugee, but whose claim has not yet been definitively evaluated”. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, article 14 defines the rights of refugees to seek asylum. The article recognizes the right to seek asylum by fleeing from persecution, to another state than the country of origin: “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”. Based on these definitions, asylum migration can be defined as action to cross international borders to escape human rights violations, conflicts and applying an asylum in another country to receive international protection. An asylum seeker is a person who migrates for asylum.

3.5. The securitization of immigration

At the end of the Cold War, especially after the emigration of East Germans to Austria through Czechoslovakia and Hungary, showed that immigration flows have been perceived as a threat to the security and stability of hosting states and regions as well as countries of origin and the

international order (Weiner, 1992: 91). As migration was securitized, there was no interested to share the burden. Quite the contrary, certain states, like Germany, were left alone to manage the migration flows. The scholars work about the importance of security in immigration and refugee studies are Weiner’s ‘International Migration and Security’ (1992) and Loescher’s ‘Refugee

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result and a cause of insecurity, because heavy flows of immigrants and refugees have created conflicts and insecurities in and between states for example causing economic tensions and internal violence. As shown above, tight border controls and strict asylum policies have been on top of the political agenda of the EU for a long time, especially after opening the internal borders, which made free movement within the EU possible and decreased the surveillance mechanisms at the internal borders. MSs became more concerned over their internal security related to migration.

According to Loescher & Milner, security threats originating from forced immigration may be divided in direct and indirect security threats (2005: 30). Direct threats are caused by “the spill-over” of conflict and the presence of “refugee warriors”. This means that the immigrants are engaged with armed campaigns, mainly against their home country. Direct threats can possibly regionalize the conflict in hand. On the other hand, indirect threats are harder to identify. These include increase of ethnic tensions as well as the possibility to create grievances within the local population, especially when the groups are competing for jobs and social services (Loescher & Milner, 2005). This is why it is in the MSs’ interest to securitize asylum seekers and immigrants – to ensure security in their own country which also impacts on the interest of a state to share the burden of asylum seekers.

Because of the EU policies and developments, it can be said that asylum seeker and immigrants have been presented as a ‘threat’ and the securitization of immigration that linked asylum seekers to terrorism became dominant in world politics after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Freitas argues that: “(9/11 led to) an abrupt and unprecedented state of emergency, where exceptional security measures were enforced, which had immediate impact on refugee policy and legislation (…) and may have an impact on how refugees are perceived in the different countries” (2002, 39).

In Europe, the cooperation between MSs on immigration and asylum policy was already based on increasing internal security, hence the Dublin Convention regulations, which limited the movement of the migrants and the adoption of the Tampere Programme, which highlighted internal security policies, instead of attempts to reduce human rights violations or continue to develop the common European asylum policy in favor of the displaced people (EC, 2014). Lavenex (2001: 864) claims that security issues became much more important than humanitarian aspect to immigration. National and EU level security and law agencies were eager to help in counterterrorism actions by controlling immigration policies and technologies: “systems for monitoring and gathering data on irregular migrants and asylum seekers, as well as surveillance opportunity offered by border

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control, have been harnessed as a component of a counter-terrorism agenda …[in the EU]” (Boswell, 2006: 2).

The 9/11 attack was seen as an opportunity to return to stricter immigration and asylum policies in the EU, especially regarding asylum claims (Faist, 2002: 7-8). According to Carr, one of the major effects of the 9/11 was that immigrants was not only seen as a police threat but also a military threat (Carr and Massey, 2006: 236-238). This meant that immigration was framed as a matter of security and the EU migration policy was securitized (Ferguson Sidoreko, 2007; Levy, 2005: 35). The JHA Council meeting was held on 20 September 2001 and it invited “the Commission to examine urgently the relationship between safeguarding internal security of the EU and complying with international protection obligations and instruments” (European Council, 2001).

The EC encouraged the states on the EU’s Common Position on Combating Terrorism in December 2001 to systematically apply exception clauses of the Geneva Convention (European Council, 2001). The clauses required MSs and the UNHCR to reject refugee status benefits from certain people who would otherwise been eligible to receive refugee status (UNHCR, 2003b). It was said that these measures were needed to ensure there is “no avenue for those supporting or committing terrorist acts to secure access to the territory of the Member States of the European Union”. This way it was legal to deny access from the third country residents by blaming the national security. However, the same reasons were used to reduce family reunification, economic immigration and deny long term visas for students and resident statuses (Ibid.).

Furthermore, some countries, for example Germany, adopted stricter migration policies by

suspending their law which allowed more immigrants to enter the labor market and other MSs such as Denmark, Portugal and the UK passed stricter immigration laws. Directives regarding family reunification and long term status of third country residents were modified to comply with the requirements of states who wanted to block anyone who was possible terrorist or unlikely to

integrate to the country (Karyotis, 2007: 7; Apap and Carrera, 2003; EC, 2001). Additionally, many scholars argue that even the UNHCR, a UN institute which should be concerned protecting human rights, took on the ‘discourse of security’ (Hammerstad, 2009). After this, the government of the US, the Security Council, EU institutions and even NGO’s perceived refugee flows as a problem to security.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks had a strong influence on the developments of the EU migration policies. MSs were concerned about the security of the EU and the EU linked immigration and asylum seekers with terrorism. The events of 9/11 and the EU reaction to the terrorist attack ‘finalized’ the securitization of immigration and asylum seekers. Because the Copenhagen School definition of

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securitization is fairly narrow, it is important to include other practices than speech act to the analysis chapter. However, in order to answer the research question, the concept of burden sharing of asylum seekers needs to emphasized next.

3.6. Explaining burden sharing

“International burden-sharing, that is, the question of how the costs of common initiatives or the provision of international public goods should be shared between states, has long been a concern for academics interested in the working of international organizations such as NATO or the UN” (Olsen and Zeuckhauser, 1966; Boyer, 1989; Oneal, 1990 in Thielemann 2003: 253). In the

European integration context, these concerns have been mainly limited to the discussions about the budget issues between the MSs, and recently referring to burden sharing by the EC and MSs’ as the ERF has been created. Despite of this financial burden sharing, the term burden sharing has not been defined in the EU. (Thielemann, 2003: 253-254).

Burden sharing, or responsibility sharing, refers to the common EU initiatives or the public goods, and how they should be shared between the MSs’ on a logic of cooperative action (Thilemann, 2003; Noll, 2000; Thilemann and Dewan, 2004). The trend among scholars since 1980s until today, is to understand the conditions of cooperation on asylum migration (Betts, 2011; Ghosh, 1999; Martin et al, 2006; Thielemann, 2003; Weiner, 2004). In reference to a question does the member states handle the reception of refugees and asylum seekers together, the term of ‘burden sharing’ is used. The scholars’ research on burden sharing on asylum migration has mainly been focused on the effectiveness of state policies or on cooperation systems. Some scholars think that the EU should focus on preventing asylum seekers from arriving to EU by providing more development aid, and in fact, tackle the reasons why people are seeking asylum in the first place (Czaika, 2009). However, Betts (2003) address that accepting and handling asylum applications based on cost-beneficial logic, the benefit depends on member state. Neumayer (2004) says that in order to share the burden on asylum migration, different situations of member states needs to be considered. Thielemann (2004) has analyzed burden sharing of asylum migration in the EU and he claims that inconsistent distribution of asylum seekers between member states can be a pulling factor for the asylum seekers. In his research Thielemann address that MSs’ with highest numbers of asylum applications are very likely to change their asylum policies stricter. By changing their application policies more strict than other member states, the one with “weaker” policies becomes more attractive and it creates a pulling factor (Ibid). Suhrke (1998) had the same findings in her research in the early 1990s. She emphasizes that even though asylum policies are changed to be more

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restrict, it does not decrease the amount of asylum applications in the EU. However, most of the burden sharing initiatives are neglecting reasons for the uneven balance in burden sharing; when most of the EU initiatives rely on cost-benefit structures, the norms and common interests of the EU should be taken into consideration (Czaika, 2009).

Additionally, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) focused on the protection of displaced people, argue that a better term to use would be ‘responsibility sharing’ (Noll, 2003:237, European Parliament 2010:26). States responsibility to provide protection is addressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 14 stating: “[…] everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution” (European Parliament 2010:26). Burden sharing is commonly linked to mass influx, despite of the fact that states already have the responsibility to provide protection. Because of this, the term ‘responsibility sharing’, would be more accurate term when debating on the distribution and costs on protecting refugees.

The main idea behind responsibility sharing mechanism is that cooperation would make protection for those in need stronger but also it would reduce inequalities and tense relationship within MSs’ (Suhrke, 1998: 397). There are two models, the cost-benefit approach and the norm-based logic, by Thielemann that can be used to explain burden sharing in the EU.

3.7. The ‘cost-benefit’ approach

Thielemann (2003: 255) emphasizes the public goods theory assumes that, “co-operation produces

positive-sum benefits which in turn creates the will to share burden/costs among actors as the benefit of the contribution exceed its costs”. This ‘positive sum’ suggests that when one actor wins,

another will lose. The public goods theory suggests that providing reception services for asylum seekers and refugees is an international public good, described as excludability” and “non-rivalry” meaning no one can be excluded from using the public good. When a receiving country provides reception services for displaced persons, it automatically creates a public good where all MSs’ benefit.

Two types of benefit can be gained from protecting refugees. Selfless benefits of the morally right and legal humanitarian responsibilities and security benefits by reducing the costs of providing reception for asylum seekers. This linkage is referred to be the main benefit between the MSs’. For example, by hosting displaced persons reduces the risk of them to create and fuel conflict in where they are fleeing from. This rises the security and stability of the whole area, when a country decides to provide accommodation because it can cause positive reactions in the surrounding countries

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because it benefits them with no major costs. Therefore, cooperation is motivated by the gained security benefit which has more value than the selfless benefit. The cost and benefit calculations should motivate the MSs’ to cooperate to provide reception for refugees because of the security benefit that cannot be obtained by acting alone (Betts, 2003; Surhke, 1998; Thilemann, 2003; European Parliament, 2010).

The assumption that ‘non-excludability’ and ‘non-rivalry’ describes public goods, the fact that ‘free-riding’ is present when establishing the good needs to be accepted. According to Olsen in 1965 (in Betts, 2003: 280) argues that actors who invests more for example financially, will accept the unequal burden sharing. In other words Olsen claims that the bigger states provides for smaller states because of their own security interests. For example, when states have a same, possible enemy, a defense alliance with common understanding of burden sharing is formed and it provides the opportunity to free-ride. NATO is an example of this. Article 5 states that “an armed attack against one (…) shall be considered an attack against all of them”. However, the USA and few other MSs’ in the EU have been taking a major part of the burden of NATOS’s actions for decades (Thilemann & Dewan, 2004: 4-5).

When public good theory is applied to the EU asylum regime, it is expected that there should be a correlation between national GDP and reception of asylum seekers. This means that the larger MSs’ would be responsible from majority of the burden. However, evidence show that this assumption is incorrect because many economically smaller states, such as Sweden, Austria and the Netherlands carry larger burden of accepting asylum application than some larger states, such as Germany and France (Betts, 2003: 279; Thilemann, 2003: 264-265). This means that, in fact, there is no

exploitation of “the big by the small”, rather the opposite.

The public goods theory provides insight on the burden sharing situation but it does not explain why the burden is shared unequal in order to provide reception services to refugees. The theory does show that there is a type of a ‘reverse’ free-riding between the large and small MSs’. However, the theory does not explain why smaller states are accepting larger burden to provide protection. Next, the norm-based, joint-product theory will provide insight on this issue.

3.8. The ‘norm-based’ approach:

This approach refers to the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ which means a situation “where actors who act solely with the aim of maximizing their own utility will produce a result which is contrary to their interest” (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Rapaport and Chammah, 1965 in Thielemann, 2003: 257).

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“Acting in solidarity under conditions of this kind is dependent on actors not acting according to the principle of utility maximization but according to the principle of universalization, i.e. acting as they would wish all others to act as well. The principle of universalization thus forbids free-riding or placing the costs for providing mutually desired goods disproportionately on the shoulders of others.” The act based on this is therefore based on the norm of fairness (Baurmann, 1999: 253 in Thielemann, 2003: 257). Here, the existence of solidarity may be seen as a way out of a situation which have the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ structure.

Approaches that follow norm-based behavior and highlight concepts of solidarity offer “ an explanation to the ‘why share costs’ question that provides a complementary or even alternative account to more prominent cost-benefit models” (Mason, 2000 in Thielemann, 2003: 257).

Solidarity as motivator to share the burden can be explained in two ways. According to Thielemann (2003: 257) “First, as a commitment to other members of a group to abide by the outcome of their collective decision-making. Even in many-actor cases, where it is often the case that one’s own actions will make no appreciable difference to the overall outcome, the concept of solidarity still matters when the community can be understood to have made some collective decision and solidarity is understood as a commitment to abide by such a decision. Second, solidarity is understood as a concern for other members of a group, which may be expressed by an

unwillingness to receive a benefit unless the other do, or an unwillingness to receive a benefit when this will harm them. This commitment to the well-being of others is sometimes conceived in terms of the recognition of special obligations between the members of a group, which exist in virtue of their being members of it” (Thielemann, 2003: 257-258). Solidarity can exist within a group of actors when “they have committed to abide by the outcome of some process of collective decision-making, or to promote the wellbeing of other members of the group, sometimes at significant cost to themselves” (Ibid.). This view can be linked to the EU, since it often invokes to solidarity when it comes to burden sharing on asylum.

Norm-based approach, emphasized by Thielemann, firstly claims that: “burden-sharing bargains can be guided by notions of equity, basing the distribution of burdens on some key that is linked to the actual capacity of the different participants of the burden-sharing regime. A second way of

explaining patterns from a norm-based perspective is to look at variations of the participating states’ commitment to norms that are related to the burden to be shared” (2003: 257). Thielemann

continues that: “from this perspective the burden that a state is prepared to accept in establishing or maintaining a burden-sharing regime that can be seen to safeguard certain norms (such as general human rights or norms of distributive justice) is positively related to a state’s commitment to such

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norms” (Ibid.). However, the differences in norms of solidarity and human rights between states with the fact that migration has been securitized, explains the unequal reception of asylum seekers. The norm-based approach offers a stronger explanation why states are willing to share the burden in the field of asylum seekers. However, the EU initiatives have not been enforced within the MSs because of the sovereignty of MSs’, and as a result certain countries are struggling to handle the asylum and refugee flows. In order to share the burden more equally in the EU, only ‘sharing money’ from common fund to those MSs’ facing the strongest impacts of asylum migration is not a long-term solution. The presentation and perception of asylum seekers and migrants as something negative would have to be changed first. The creation of CEAS, again a non-binding agreement, gives guidelines how to process applications but it does not remove the problem of burden sharing nor does it have impact on the securitizing mechanisms in the EU.

The securitization process in the EU took its place on the political agenda in the late 1980s, and especially the Balkan crisis in the early 1990s had an impact on the early securitization and burden sharing discussion in the EU. Over the 20 years, the Union created new rules to make migration harder and it adopted new instruments to securitize asylum seekers. Only few initiatives were taken to share the burden of asylum seekers, because security became a top priority after the 9/11. The creation of FRONTEX, CEAS and EUROSUR are all securitizing policies. Only CEAS has the idea to share the burden but it only focuses to limit migration and create rules in favor of the MSs’. Therefore, securitization and burden sharing walk hand in hand in the field of asylum. As long as migration and asylum seekers are securitized, burden sharing will remain unequal.

In the following chapter, this thesis will examine the European securitization process and burden sharing initiatives in the field of forced migration more in detail to see if asylum seekers have been securitized in the EU, and has the securitization process itself caused unequal burden sharing. The analysis will use the wide definition of securitization emphasized above instead of focusing on securitization by ‘speech act’. Burden sharing will be examined through cost-benefit and norm-based logic and it will examine, which one can be used to explain burden sharing better for the purpose of this thesis.

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Chapter 4. – Securitization of asylum seekers and burden sharing in the

EU

Securitization and burden sharing initiatives regarding asylum and migration have been a long process in Europe. In order to show how the European Union has moved securitization of asylum and burden sharing on top of the political agenda, it is necessary to provide an overview of the most important agreements and instruments that have shaped the common EU policy on asylum and migration. The aim is to show how the migration policy in the EU has developed and led to securitization of asylum and how, if at all, MSs’ are sharing the responsibility on reception and distribution of displaced persons.

4.1. Development of the EU migration policy

The Schengen Agreement was one of the key elements in European integration removing the

internal borders of the EU. The first initiative towards the agreement was taken in 1984 after France and Germany decided to end strict border controls. The Single European Act (SEA) was the

initiator for Schengen as it marked it as an “area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured” (Huysmans, 2000: 755). The Schengen Agreement was signed in 1990, however, it took five years to take place between the original parties. (Ferguson Sidorenko, 2007: 13-14, EC, 2008).

Since the late 1980s, the EU discussions on burden sharing became an important issue, in particular the Balkan crisis in the early 1990s triggered debate on how third country migration into the EU should be dealt with. As a result from the Balkan crisis, for example Germany changed it liberal asylum laws more strict in 1993 and indicated that asylum seekers who arrive through a country which Germany considers safe, the asylum applications will be most likely rejected. As a result, the asylum applications decreased sharply and inspired other EU countries to follow (Hall, 2000). Therefore, the early suggestions to share the burden included financial and physical burden sharing proposals and the first discussions on the topic were held by EU ministers in 1992 during the German Presidency. The proposal at the time considered equal reception of refugees based on three equal criteria, population size, MS territory size and GDP. However, the proposal did not receive support in the Council, especially the UK strongly opposed the proposal because at the time they were not receiving many refugees. Other members opposed the proposal because ‘physical’ burden sharing would potentially violate refugees’ human rights (Thielemann, 2003: 259-260).

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Agreement was reached much later in 1995 during the French Presidency. The Council resolution did not mention mandatory redistributive mechanisms nor figures. It only offered non-binding principle guidelines for MSs’ in the case of “mass influx of protection seekers”, including “the spirit of solidarity”, “equity of distribution” and “harmonization of response”. Additionally, the

agreement was considerate to the British and French participation in peace-keeping operations when the equity of burden was considered between the MSs’ (Thielemann, 2003: 260). The non-binding agreement was temporary and as Suhrke states: “evidently, a voluntary and ad hoc commitment to share in the spirit of solidarity represented the limits of the possible” (1998: 411). As Thielemann points out, the “ineffectiveness of these instruments became evident during the Kosovo crisis when neither of the two instruments were called upon by the Member States” (2003: 260).

However, two other EU initiatives in the field of burden sharing had more influence. According to Thielemann, the Dublin Convention created the EU’s ‘asylum acquis’ because it impacted in individual asylum seekers and also to the MSs’ responsibilities to provide protection. The Convention also includes the rule, where only MS of first entry can be responsible to handle the asylum application. If asylum seekers moves to another MS, the person can be sent back to the country of first entry (2003: 261). Therefore, the Dublin Convention had an impact on the

unbalanced burden sharing of asylum seekers because the Convention defines the MS responsible to process asylum applications limiting the possibility to distribute asylum seekers equally because only the MS of a first entry could be responsible for ones asylum application. The Convention made “asylum shopping”, (choosing the country where to apply asylum in), more difficult and therefore, it was easier to detect possible threats and to provide surveillance of asylum seekers because according to the EU migration policy, they could be a risk to the security of the EU.

Additionally, the EU institutions and MSs’ have mechanisms to cooperate in order to control the movement of migrants at the borders of the EU and within the EU territory. Thielemann states that “the mechanisms include pre-entry controls, such as carrier sanctions and technical assistance to third countries’ exit control as well as post-entry measures, such as rules for sending back asylum seekers to safe third countries” (Ibid.). The safety of a third country, however, is difficult to define because not many of them follow the common humanitarian agreements. The Dublin Convention and the other mechanisms can be connected with securitization framework. When the mobility of the asylum seeker is limited, the easier it is to gather information of the person and find possible security related reasons which may effect to the possible refugee status.

A step towards visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to the free movement of people from national government approach to common approach (and more comprehensive EU

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burden sharing system), was the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. The Treaty states that: “the Council shall adopt measures promoting a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons” (Ibid.). What these ‘measures’ were exactly, remains unclear. Also in that year, EU cooperation on immigration, asylum and external borders reached an important adoption of the ‘Tampere Programme’, which was a five year plan for “development of internal security policies in the EU” (Leonard, 2010: 6) and it also “called for the establishment of financial reserve for the implementation of emergency measures to provide temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of protection seekers” (Council Document SN 200/99 in Thielemann, 2003: 261). The Tampere Programme shows that asylum seekers have been securitized by referring to “internal security policies” and “emergency measures” related to

protection seekers. The initiative lead to the creation of the European Refugee Fund (ERF) in 2000, which was the first burden sharing instrument. The ERF rationale was to “demonstrate solidarity between Member States by achieving a balance in the efforts made by those Member States in receiving refugees and displaced persons and bearing the consequences of doing so” (Thielemann, 2003: 261). The MSs’ commitment to assign funds from their national budget to the ERF is an act of solidarity based on the humanitarian norms they have committed to but it does not impact on the unequal flow of asylum seekers and the need to provide reception for them. Because security issues and emergency measures were highlighted in the Tampere Programme, it has resulted in

unwillingness to accommodate more asylum seekers increasing the unbalanced burden sharing between MSs’. The securitization and uneven burden sharing of asylum seekers has been the consequence of these policy agreements.

In a reference to the cost-benefit approach on burden sharing mentioned earlier, it first seems to be the most convincing approach when considering the burden sharing developments and reasons. This perspective on burden sharing seems to offer the possibility for MSs’ to reduce their own reception of displaced persons costs and therefore, it is not surprising that first burden sharing initiative in the early 1990s came from Germany, which was heavily affected by the war in former Yugoslavia (Thielemann, 2003: 262). As Thielemann points out, it is important to note that EU burden sharing instruments leans on notions of “solidarity and fairness” (Ibid) instead of binding obligations. The ERF decision text is one great example of this. It states that “(…) implementation of such a policy [common policy on asylum] should be based on solidarity between Member States and requires the existence of mechanisms intended to promote a balance in the efforts made by the Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons” (para 2 in Thielemann, 2003: 262). It also says that “(…) it is fair to allocate resources [from the ERF]

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proportionately to the burden on each Member State by reason of its effort in receiving refugees and displaced persons” (para 11, in Thielemann, 2003: 262).

However, the distribution of the funds versus the amount of asylum seekers received, remains unbalanced. For example, France received 51 900 asylum applications in 2011, which is the highest number in the EU and it received 11.73 percent of the ERF funds from 2008 to 2011. As a

comparison, the UK received about 25 500 asylum applications in 2011 and it received 12.29 percent of the ERF funds during the same time period as France (EC: 2013, UK GOV website, UNHCR: 2011). The solidarity and fairness outlined in the ERF decision can therefore be questioned in real-life actions.

However, Thielemann (2003) argued that solidarity is not only non-binding “flowery statements” because most MSs’ have a long constitutional solidarity principles between regions within their state. All MSs’ constitutions include necessities to predict burden sharing based on some view of solidarity between territories and regions in the case of financial, economic or infrastructural imbalances but he notes that there does seem to be strict limits to “cross-border solidarity in the Union (…) if one keeps in mind how contested this notion has been in a national context” (2003: 262-3).

The reference to solidarity and fairness seems to have played a role in order to agree on these

initiatives to achieve harmonized Union. As Thielemann states “(…) the timing of the proposals, the hard bargaining that characterized the establishment of the ERF and the inability to agree on

distribution key in the case of temporary protection measures (…) led to strong support to

explanations derived from cost-benefit approaches” (2003: 263). However, the agreements are not fair to all MSs’ since there are always net losers, who still supported for example the establishment of the ERF, which means that cost-benefit logic cannot explain the motives of burden sharing in the EU very efficiently.

The Dublin Convention (I & II) defined other securitizing mechanisms to gather information on asylum applicants in order to have background knowledge and define possible connections to security threats abroad. As previously mentioned, the MSs’ are using Eurodac to collect fingerprints and VIS to have database for pictures and additional data on the asylum applicants. The Convention regulations have made it easy to transfer the burden of asylum seekers to other states (Kloth, 2008: 8-10, Battjes, 2002: 160) and to present asylum seekers as security threats. Instead of the good intentions of the Convention, the asylum seekers have been forced to wait the examination of their applications for extended period of time (Battjes, 2002: 160) and MSs’ with EU external borders

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became mainly responsible for asylum seekers, because other MSs’ could move their responsibility to one of those countries, which are more likely to be the country of first entry. The Dublin rules made it possible to shift the burden to save costs but it increased the burden of asylum seekers in some MSs’ increasing financial needs.

The next step to provide more secure Europe, was the Hague Program in 2004 which set out EU priorities to “strengthening the area of freedom, security and justice in the next five years” (Europa, 2009). In order to share the burden on immigration between MSs’ and still secure the EU,

FRONTEX agency for integrated border control and surveillance was established (Ibid.). The reasons to create FRONTEX, according to Leonard, was that migration flows had increased in Europe since the end of Cold War and it led to willingness to take many measures to decrease the number of immigrants, including strengthening the border controls to monitor the access of asylum seekers and immigrants to one’s territory (2010: 6). The reason behind the interest to decrease migration flow may be the financial aid MSs’ would need to provide for displaced persons and the increased security concerns after 9/11.

Additionally, the enlargement of the EU in 2004 created concerns over how some MSs’ would able to effectively control the new external borders of the EU. Stronger cooperation between the MSs’ on border control was considered to be most effective way to guarantee secure borders after new states joined the EU (Monar, 2006: 75 in Leonard, 2010: 7). Tightening the external border controls was also a necessary contribution in order to fight against terrorism after the 9/11 attacks (Monar, 2005: 147, Mitsilegas, 2007: 362 in Leonard 2010: 7). FRONTEX has been given the key role to establish the concept of “integrated border management” (IBM) and the concept has shaped the EU cooperation on border managements since the Tampere Program in 1999 (Leonard, 2010: 7). The establishment of FRONTEX made the border control more effective, especially for those countries where the migration flow was high. Greece and Italy has been cooperating with

FRONTEX in order to monitor the Mediterranean Sea better when boats try to bring asylum seekers over to the EU. This cooperation is based on the EU idea to keep asylum seekers from reaching the EU borders because asylum seekers may be a security threat to the EU. However, the MS

cooperation with FRONTEX does not eliminate the need to share the burden in reception of asylum seekers within the EU.

For the reception of asylum seekers, the EU has been developing a common policy on asylum, called the Common European Asylum System, CEAS, which was presented in 2008 highlighting three main pillars:

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1. “Bringing more harmonization to standards of protection by further aligning the EU States’ asylum legislation”;

2. “Effective and well-supported practical cooperation”;

3. “Increased solidarity and sense of responsibility among EU States, and between the EU and non-EU countries” (EC, 2014).

The first directive is the most important one regarding CEAS, because it deals with reception conditions, asylum procedures and the qualification as a refugee or a person in need for

international protection. Additionally, after its implementation CEAS has been looking for its final form and recently the new rules on asylum has been agreed on in order to “setting out common high standards and stronger co-operation to ensure that asylum seekers are treated equally in an open and fair system – wherever they apply” (EC, 2014). The previous version of the Asylum Procedure Directive rules, according to EC, were too vague and it allowed MSs to keep their own rules, even if they were below the basic agreed standards (Ibid.).

Despite of the new rules, burden sharing on asylum migration has not been solved. The rules might be more precise in order give instructions how to process applications and to make decisions more efficiently et cetera, but the problem still remains, country of first entry is still responsible for the asylum seeker and the burden within the EU is uneven. It even seems that the EU does not recognize the origin for the asylum problem.

The uneven distribution have been, and still can, cause unease in the MSs’ because asylum seekers have been presented as a possible threat and as people to take advantage of a welfare states.

Additionally, the above mentioned EU practices show that securitization of asylum seekers, or immigration in general, has happened in a wider understanding of securitization framework which was emphasized in chapter 3. Therefore, the securitization framework based only on the

Copenhagen School’s theory is too narrow definition when the securitization practices are examined in practice. The developments and practices to manage migration into the EU since the early 1990s has become more and more strict, leading to the securitization of asylum seekers and to the

possibility to MSs’ to share the burden unevenly. The case study in chapter 5 will demonstrate this claim in more detail.

4.2 Asylum applications in the EU

When looking at the asylum application numbers between the MSs’ it is easy to notice major differences in total amount of asylum application received and differences in actual reception