Incentives, productivity, absenteeism and
employee turnover
Is there a relation, and if so why, between a monetary group incentive and labor
productivity, absenteeism and employee turnover?
Submission Date: 31 January 2014
Student and student number: Cathy Leegwater, 10297634 First Supervisor: Dr. Wendelien van Eerde
Second supervisor: Dr. Corine Boon
Qualification for: MSc. in Business Studies (HRM Track) Institution: Amsterdam Business School
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Abstract
This research aims to identify whether here is a relation between incentives, labor productivity, absenteeism and employee turnover, and if so, why. Much has been written about incentives, but it is difficult for consultants to make use of this literature because of the absence of research-based practices (Park & Sturman, 2012). The present thesis uses different motivational theories, such as goal setting theory, control theory and expectancy theory. It also uses an inductive approach, through two types of studies. The first is a quantitative data study, consisting of 70 timelines on the relation between incentives and employee productivity. The second of qualitative nature; it contains 10 interviews, complemented with numerical data. Both studies were carried out within one company, and thus all data pertains one case. Most of the multiple findings of this thesis are in line with the existing literature.
The first and most important contribution of this thesis is that there are too many factors
influencing group incentives for them to be perceived as fair and to have an effect. A distinction is made between internal and external factors. Among the former are employee turnover and absenteeism, while examples of the latter are clients and the economic situation. Both sets of factors affect the probability of getting an incentive. From the thesis can be seen that a relation exists between absenteeism, employee turnover and incentives.
The second contribution concerns the effect of time. Because of the rapidly changing
environment, the time between the making of a budget and the realization of the budget also plays a role on the probability of getting an incentive. If any of the abovementioned factors
3 lowers the probability of getting the incentive to a certain point, the incentive no longer has an effect on motivation.
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Preface
This thesis was interesting in many ways. Working with incentives and being surrounded by people who work with them, allowed me to form an opinion based on practical experience and my own standards and values. I began this journey with an interest on this subject but, as with most qualitative research, I was unsure of where my journey would end (Bansal & Corley, 2012). Reading specialized literature allowed me to relate my thoughts in a more academic perspective. Interviewing and listening to different people gave me a broader scope and made me see the subject from different angles. The discussion made this experience come full circle. Although my understanding is much larger after the writing of this thesis, I also realized that incentives are much more difficult to assess than people generally think. Their effects are not generalizable, and much more research must be done to have a full understanding. This thesis, as well as this educational path, was truly a journey. And although it was not always easy, I wouldn’t want to have missed it.
Acknowledgments
First, I want to thank my husband, who took care of our children while I was studying. Without him I would not have been able to develop myself in this way. Then, I want to thank Creyf’s for giving me the freedom and support for this thesis. And I want to thank Wendelien van de Eerde, my thesis supervisor for all her feedback and guidance, which were very motivational.
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Table of content
I Introduction ... 7 II Literature review ... 10 1. Incentives ... 10 2. Organizational behavior ... 12 2.1 Labor Productivity ... 13 2.2 Absenteeism ... 13 2.3 Employee turnover ... 153. A literature review and the research question ... 16
4. Theoretical framework ... 16
4.1 Expectancy theory ... 17
4.2 Goal setting theory ... 19
4.3 Control feedback loop and control theory ... 20
4.4 Crowding out effect ... 23
III Research methods ... 25
1. Research approach and design ... 25
2. Company and incentive description ... 26
3. Data collection ... 27
3.1 Study 1 ... 27
3.2 Study 2 ... 28
4. Validity and reliability ... 30
IV Results ... 32
1. Study 1 ... 32
2. Study 2 ... 34
2.1 General experience of incentives ... 36
2.2 Working with targets ... 37
2.3 Feedback ... 38
2.4 Other elements ... 39
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2.6 Numerical data of the locations interviewed ... 42
V Discussion ... 47
1. Study 1 ... 47
2. Study 2 ... 47
2.1 Interesting findings ... 50
VI Further research ... 52
VII Research limitations ... 54
VIII Managerial implications ... 55
IX Conclusion ... 58
References ... 59
Appendix 1, coding scheme ... 66
Appendix 2, timelines ... 67
Appendix 1, questionnaire (in Dutch) ... 139
List of tables and figures
Figure 1, An overview of the constructs, and the relation between the constructs………..8Figure 2, An integrated control theory model of work motivation……….22
Figure 3, Overview of the thesis structure based on Farquhar (2012)………26
Table 1, types of output that are the basis for the incentive system………...27
Table 2, Visual classified ranges on the total average number of hours of temporary work per location, per FTE, per quartile………34
Table 3, Numerical data on absenteeism, employee turnover, productivity and incentives……..44
Figure 4, Visualization of the recommend further research model………52
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I Introduction
Many organizations work with some kind of incentive system. By giving monetary incentives, companies seek to stimulate the behavior of employees within, which then leads to certain
organizational outputs (higher productivity, lower absenteeism and loweremployee turnover) and competitive advantage (Barney & Zajac, 1994). However, do incentives really have an effect on organizational outcomes? The literature on incentives, makes it difficult to give one general answer on that question (Mehrotra, Sorbero & Damberg, 2010), because the structures or frames of the incentive systems are diverse and difficult to compare. All frames of incentive systems are based on a different surrounding, such as specific HRM-practices. “The lack of research based guidance makes it difficult for both practitioners and academics to yield specific suggestions. To link employee rewards with desired individual and organizational level outcomes, more research is needed to fully understand how such plans motivate employee behaviors”(Park & Sturman, 2012, pp.44). The issue within academic literature is that, oftentimes, incentives are seen as generalizable. Research is usually done on one variation of the incentive and the impact of that variation, while the combination of the substantive differences within the incentive and the setting actually determines the effect (Thierry, 2001).
It is interesting to see if there is there a relation and why, between a monetary group incentive and labor productivity, absenteeism and employee turnover, because currently many companies have some kind of incentive system in place and once a company has implemented such a construction, it is difficult to eliminate it (Janssen & Mendys-Kamphorst, 2004).
8 Figure 1 provides an overview of the constructs, and the relation between the constructs in this thesis.
Figure 1. An overview of the constructs, and the relation between the constructs
Research for the present work was carried out within one company and includes quantitative as well as qualitative data. Both studies have an inductive approach, because the purpose of this thesis is not to test a specific theory, but to try to gain more knowledge and hopefully contribute to the existing literature. ‘One combination of different components from an incentive’ is visually analyzed and related to organizational outcomes. The first study entailed making 70 timelines of the relation between incentives and employee productivity. These timelines are visually analyzed. Then, a second study was done; it consisted of 10 interviews with company employees who are subject to the incentive system. These interviews are supplemented with numerical data. Within this thesis, academic literature is reviewed, and new information is related to it. The first aim is to find suggestions to add to the literature. The second aim is to disentangle the effect of a specific incentive in a specific situation, to establish the effect of this specific combination, and develop practical suggestions (Thierry, 2001).
9 The added value for practice is to give managers and CEOs in the Netherlands more practical information about the outcomes of incentives when using a specific combination. Although this thesis is not largely generalizable, it may increase general knowledge. This could be helpful when implementing or changing an incentive system in practice.
The thesis begins with a literature review that summarizes the literature within the constructs and between the constructs. Then, a theoretical frame work is presented, which includes expectancy theory, goals setting theory, the control feedback loop and the crowding out effect. After the research methods are described the chapter establishes the research approach, a case description, the type of data that collected and the validity and information about reliability of the thesis. The results incorporate findings on the two studies. In the discussion these results are related to academic literature and interesting findings are explored in further detail. The following chapter contains the suggestions for further research and managerial implications. These managerial implications were made specific for the company and can be seen as a guide for improvement. Some conclusions are presented in the final chapter.
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II Literature review
1. Incentives
Even though much has been written about incentives, not many authors define what an incentive is. English and English (1958), state that an incentive is: "an object or external condition,
perceived as capable of satisfying an aroused motive, that tends to elicit action to obtain the object or condition”. The basic idea about incentives is that they stimulate motivation, defined as being stimulated and energized ‘to move’ (Ryan & Deci, 2000). The effects of incentives have been studied for roughly a century (Chapman & Feder, 1917). Although generally the link between incentives and motivation might be seen as logical, there is much disagreement among experts about the effects of incentives (Frey, 1997; Kanfer, Chen & Pritchard, 2008; Kreps, 1997; Kohn, 1993; Markova & Ford, 2011). Incentives can affect “intrinsic motivation, which refers to doing something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable, and extrinsic motivation, which refers to doing something because it leads to a separable outcome”(Ryan & Deci, 2000, pp.55). Some authors argue that incentives have a positive effect mainly on extrinsic and not intrinsic motivation (Brehm & Self, 1989; Eisenberger, Rhoades & Cameron, 1999; Fang & Gerhar, 2011; Verburg & Den Hartog, 2008). Others state that incentives have a negative effect on motivation (Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999). There are yet other authors who state that it depends on different factors. For example, Cameron (2001) talks about factors such as task interest. Unintended effects, such as crowding out and the ratchet effect are known. Crowding out refers to situations in which the motivation which was stimulated intrinsically is now only stimulated by the
incentive (Frey, 1997). The ratchet effect means that the employee is first stimulated by the incentives, but after a period gets used to them and thus the increase in pay cease to have an extra motivational effect (Weitzman, 1980). If there is an incentive system within the organization but
11 no incentive is given, this can be perceived as a punishment (Merchant & van der Stede, 2007). An incentive not being awarded (because targets are not met) could lead to perceptions of unfairness and discouragement (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007).
There are numerous variations in incentives (Magee, Kilduff & Heath, 2011), such as whether they are given for individual, group performance, or companywide (Kerr, 1995; Thurkow, Bailey & Stamper, 2010). Another variation is whether they are tangible or intangible. The first refers to incentives based on a financial element, for example a trip or stock options. Intangible incentives those that cannot be touched, like compliments, autonomy, or development possibilities
(Woodruffe, 2006). When tangible, the proportion of the incentive in relation to the base salary influences the effect (James, 2004; Oah & Lee, 2011; Pouliakas, 2010).
The kind of incentives given also varies. Incentives could be given according to input or output (Yuan, McCaffrey, Marsh, Hamilton, Stecher & Springer 2013); could have long term or short term goals (Chung, Palaniappan, Wong, Rubin & Luft, 2010; Kerr, 1995; Kole, 1997; Mehrotra et al., 2010) or could be based on performance, merit, effort and knowledge (Martocchio, 2001). The experiences of receiving incentives can also depend on environmental circumstances such as culture (Lee, Iijimab & Read, 2011; Nielsen & Smyth, 2008). For example there is a difference in the effects of incentives among Western and non-Western employees (Lee et al., 2011). Also, the type of work affects how incentives are experienced. According to Osterloh and Frey (2002) there is a difference in the effect when comparing simple and complex jobs. Incentives have a positive effect on simple jobs but not on complex jobs.
The design of the incentive system should be aligned with the motives of the employees and the goals of the organization (Thierry & Koopman, 1981). The organization should have a clear
12 picture of which behavior it wants to stimulate and the general output it expects in terms of the desired organizational behavior (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). This output should be stimulated by the company structure. The incentive should be perceived as equitable, since employees find it important that incentives are distributed fairly (Robbins, Judge & Campbell, 2010).
In the present research one specific incentive is analyzed, namely a tangible incentive of high proportion in relation to the base salary, based on group performance and short term output goals. The next part of this thesis deals with organizational behavior and its outcomes. First a general definition of organizational behavior is given, followed by three outcomes of organizational behavior and further research on its relation to incentives.
2. Organizational behavior
According to Robbins, Judge & Campbell, organizational behavior is “A field of study that investigates the impact of individuals, groups, and structure have on behavior within
organizations for the purpose of applying such knowledge toward improving an organization’s effectiveness”(2010, pp. 7). The authors propose five different ways to measure organizational behavior (outcomes): labor productivity, job satisfaction, absenteeism, organizational citizenship and turnover. These outcomes of organizational behavior contribute to a firm’s competitive advantage and are therefore important for companies in general (Barney & Zajac, 1994). To improve organizational outcomes it is suggested that improvement should be made regarding the behavior of employees at all levels within the company (Weatherly & Malott, 2008). Within this thesis three of those outcomes are examined: 1. labor productivity, 2. absenteeism and 3.
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2.1 Labor Productivity
There are many ways to analyze a firm’s productivity; one is labor productivity, which is ratio between certain organizational outputs and inputs (Freeman, 2008), or the effectiveness of labor to achieve organizational goals (Pritchard, Harrell, Diaz Granados, Guzman, 2008). Labor productivity can be measured as absolute or relative to, for example, industrial development (Pritchard, Jones, Roth, Stuebing & Ekeberg, 1988). If an organization wants to increase its productivity, it is important to know what kind of productivity (output) it wants to improve, why it should be improved (from an employee perspective) and how this can be achieved (Van Tuijl, Kleingeld, Schmidt, Kleinbeck, Pritchard & Algera, 2011). Improving productivity is not only related to hard work and being stimulated, it is also about being able to have an overview, making work efficient and stimulating learning processes (Van Tuijl et al., 2011). This will lead to
economic growth (Saari, 2006).
There are different ways of stimulating labor productivity in general, for example by the simulation of labor skills or technological improvements (Myronenko, 2012). To stimulate workers and become more productive, one of the possibilities is to introduce a group incentive, even if this only provides a small increase in labor productivity (Pritchard et al., 1988). Pouliakas and Theodoropoulos (2009) state that there is a significant relation between incentives and labor productivity, especially incentives given on output. For this thesis the incentive is also given on output and it is interesting to see whether these statements are empirically supported through this research.
2.2 Absenteeism
Absenteeism means that an employee fails to appear at work. Companies can have an ‘absenteeism culture’ which refers to the level of absenteeism that is tolerated within an
14 organizational culture (Patton & Johns, 2012). Absenteeism can be viewed from different angles. Most academic literature refers to the causes of absenteeism, such as individual variables,
company structure, and supervisor attitudes. The press is generally more focused on the effect of absenteeism on organizational labor productivity and the costs of absenteeism (Patton & Johns, 2012). This is understandable because absenteeism is correlated to organizational productivity (Camp and Lambert, 2006). Employee earnings have an effect on absenteeism. Generally
speaking, an increase in salary has a limiting effect on absenteeism (Markussen, Røed, Røgeberg & Gaure, 2011). The characteristics of the position and the occupation also play a role in
absenteeism (Jensen, Holten, Karpatschof & Albertsen, 2011). More independent jobs are related to less absenteeism (Johns, 2011). There are many ways to influence absenteeism, such as
“reinforcement, punishment, and package approaches”(Boudreau, Christian & Thibadeau, 1993). Rewarding impacts absenteeism more than punishment (Camp & Lambert, 2006).
There is no consensus among experts. Herpen and Marco, and Van Praag and Cools (2005), show no significant relation between certain characteristics of the incentive system and absenteeism. This is partly consistent with the work of Johansson and Palme (1994) who found a small relation between incentives and absenteeism. The abovementioned studies, however, contradict Camp and Lambert’s findings (2006). They noticed a strong relation between incentives and absenteeism, although in their research design, the incentive was specifically given for attendance. Robins and Lloyd (1984) experimented by introducing a voluntary incentive program, which had an effect on absenteeism. How an incentive is perceived and the incentive structure may also have an effect. If the incentive is seen as unfair, and employees feel they were treated unequally because of this incentive, the level of absenteeism could increase (Carlsen, 2012). However, a good incentive system can also have a positive effect on absenteeism (Camp & Lambert, 2006). The
15 contradictory conclusions within the literature substantiate previous conclusions that incentives cannot be considered one general construct, but that their effects are dependent on the kind of incentive and the context in which it is given.
2.3 Employee turnover
Employee turnover means the number of employees leaving the company in relation to the total number of people working at the company. There are two different kinds of turnover: voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary turnover is the number of workers who leave themselves, involuntary turnover is the number of workers who are dismissed (Ongori, 2007). Apart from the manner in which employees leave the organization, a distinction is also made between types of employees: “functional” employees who perform poorly and “dysfunctional” employees who perform well (Abelson & Baysinger, 1984). Employee turnover can be seen as one of the outcomes of employee motivation and can be affected by the fairness of an incentive system (Herpen et al., 2005). If the incentive has a positive effect on pay satisfaction, it has a negative effect on
employee turnover, although the effect is also dependent on the individual characteristics, such as age, tenure and educational level (Cotton & Tuttle, 1986). Griffeth, Hom and Gaertner (2000) recognize six drivers of employee turnover. One of those is the incentive system. They state that high performance workers are stimulated by merit-based pay. Individual incentives decrease the turnover of these workers because they feel individually appreciated. The kind of incentive (long term incentives or short term incentives) also affect turnover. In general, companies that use ‘pay for performance’ and have a lower base salary, have a higher turnover rate than companies that do not have a ‘pay for performance’ and have a higher base salary (Batt & Colvin, 2011).
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3 A literature review and the research question
In sum, from the literature it can be seen that there is no such thing as a ‘general incentive’. There are many variations when talking about incentives, they are given for different variations, and there is no general effect. Multiple authors provide contradicting statements about the effect of incentives on the three outcomes of organizational behavior. It would be of additional value to have a clear picture of what makes an incentive effective, and the impact of various combinations of the components of an incentive. Therefore, a gap in the research about incentives is that
academic literature cannot talk about the general construct, and research needs to disentangle it (Thierry, 2001). A second gap in the literature is that after incentives are given, motivation is not solely driven by getting the next incentives. Past experiences and time could also influence motivation. Most of the literature draws a simple line between motivation and incentive; the thought of getting an incentive stimulates motivation. Within this research one specific
combination of components of an incentive is examined (tangible incentive of high proportion in relation to the base salary, based on group performance and short term output goals) with the aim of investigating the effects of this specific combination. The research question for the first study is whether there is a relation between monetary group incentives and labor productivity,
absenteeism and employee turnover?
For the second study the research question is: Why is or is not there a relation between a
monetary group incentive and labor productivity, absenteeism and employee turnover?
4 Theoretical framework
The different constructs within this thesis, such as organizational outcomes and incentives, are influenced by motivation. It is unclear whether the ‘thought of getting’ an incentive stimulates and motivates organizational outcomes; whether getting the incentives motivates organizational
17 outcomes; or if it is a circle in which previous incentives and possible perspectives of incentives influence organizational outcomes (a mutual effect and reciprocal relation). The relation between the incentive and the outcomes is not always clear (Robbins et al., 2010). Because of the
changing context, such as economic and generational changes, it is unclear whether the ‘scientific models of employee motivation’ are effective (Martocchio, 2011). Within this thesis multiple theories are explored, to see if and how motivation influences organizational outcomes. The outcomes of the first study assesses whether effort predicts performance, as expectancy theory proposes (Mitchell, 1974). The second study is done to see how recipients perceive a possible relation. According to these theories the relation between incentives and organizational behavior are linked by motivation. This thesis combines expectancy theory and goal-setting theory, together with the control feedback loop and the crowding out effect. In the following section these subjects are described in further detail.
4.1 Expectancy theory
“Expectancy theory is a widely researched theory of motivation” (Reinharth & Wahba, 1975, p. 520), and one of the most commonly explored theories on work motivation (Sloof & van Praag, 2007). The basic statement behind the theory is that people change their behavior when they think that new behavior will lead to certain outcomes and these outcomes are valued by them (Muchinsky, 1977; Vroom, 1964). The theory is built “around three basic variables: valence of job outcomes, performance outcome instrumentality and effort-performance expectancy. Valence (V) refers to the perceived attractiveness or desirability of potential job outcomes; outcomes include such rewards as pay, promotion, recognition, etc. The performance-outcome
instrumentality (I) is defined as the perceived relation between performance and the attainment of job outcomes. Finally the effort-performance expectancy (E) refers to the perceived relation
18 between the level of effort expended and the level of resultant performance” (Schmidt, 1973, p. 243). Hedonism, the idea that behavior is focused on pleasure and away from hurt, underlies this theory (Reinharth & Wahba, 1975). Expectancy theory has been reviewed a number of times and modified by various authors, like Heneman and Schwab, who turned the model around and added elements such as ability and role perception (Heneman & Schwab, 1972). There are different downsides of the theory, which could also be viewed form a different angle. For instance Sloof & Van Praag (2007, p. 22) stated that it: “suggests that more uncertainty in the relation between effort and performance will demotivate the agent to exert effort”. The theory is not generalizable for all employees as “The problem with the expectancy theory is that: workers must choose effort budgets for attaining personal outcomes, and all will not respond similarly to a given outcome, since valences and expectancies will likely vary between persons” (Kennedy, Fossum & Bernard, 1983, pp. 141).
There is disagreement within the literature about the reliability of the theory, since several papers provide conflicting outcomes (Reinharth & Wahba, 1975). The original theory is limited, and different researchers have added factors that could influence the behavior, such as individual and environmental differences, job control and tenure (Heneman & Schwab, 1972; Reinharth & Wahba, 1975).
Unlike many studies that have as main goal to test the expectancy theory (Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996), the purpose of this thesis is to use it, to see whether it can provide an explanation for employee perception and whether there is a relation between incentives and productivity, absenteeism and employee turnover.
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4.2 Goal setting theory
“Specific, high (hard) goals lead to a higher level of task performance than do easy goals or vague, abstract goals such as the exhortation to "do one's best". So long as a person is committed to the goal, has the requisite ability to attain it, and does not have conflicting goals, there is a positive, linear relation between goal difficulty and task performance.” (Locke & Latham, 2006, pp. 265). The goal setting theory of Locke and Latham (2006), developed in the 1960s, has been developing ever since (Locke & Latham, 2006). The basic idea is that specific and difficult goals (subject to certain conditions) motivate more that easy and non-specific goals. There are different moderators of the relation between goals and high performance, for example: the goals should have an added explanation, to clarify why they are important (Locke & Latham, 2006).
According to Klein, Wesson, Hollenbeck and Alge (1999), commitment, expectancy and
attractiveness (corresponding to the expectancy theory) have a larger impact on performance than goal difficulty. Based on the theory, the focus on a goal is also important. Improvement is only seen for the goals that are provided and monitored. Non-monitored, job responsibilities do not show improvement (Locke & Latham, 2006). Goal deadlines have more impact when they are tight (Locke & Latham, 2006), and if the tasks are complex and difficult, goal setting can lead to anxiety (Locke & Latham, 2006). Achieving goals and being able to take on difficult goals are also related to self-efficacy, trust in co-workers and knowledge-sharing (Quigley, Tesluk, Locke & Bartol, 2007). Self-efficacy is the employee’s belief of being in control. Employees with self-efficacy believe in their own competences and abilities (Bandura, 1997). Self-self-efficacy is related to multiple theories, such as the goal setting theory and the control theory.
Some other authors state that motivation comes from learning mandatory skills and knowledge, rather than from difficult goals (Latham & Ernst, 2006). Therefore, stimulating skills and
20 knowledge could have an effect on labor productivity, absenteeism and employee turnover. There are differences between individual employees and a team of employees and the motivation
derived from goals. Individual employees are more affected by goals when they are learning-oriented, while within a team of employees goals are more effective when they are linked to performance (Nahrgang, De Rue, Hollenbeck, Spitzmuller, Jundt & Ilgen, 2013). When working together it is important that the team jointly decides and agrees on performance goals, a process known as participative team goal setting. Participative team goal setting has a positive effect on commitment and performance (Lee & Wei, 2011). The effect works in two ways: there is a rational and direct effect at the individual employee level, and there is an indirect motivational effect, because of the team spirit (Lee & Wei, 2011).
When combing incentives with goal setting, getting an incentive is seen as proof of having
achieved a success. The level of difficulty of a goal and whether or not the goal is met, affect how successful an employee feels (Dowling & Richardson, 1997).
This thesis does not seek to test the goal setting theory but uses the theory to try to explain part of the relation between the construct ‘incentives’ and the different organizational outcomes. For example, whether the goals create a “strong situation” that “minimizes the effect of personality differences among people on performance” (Latham & Ernst, 2006, pp.188). This thesis tries to give causal explanations about the different effects of incentives (Lee & Wei, 2011)
4.3 Control feedback loop and control theory
The control feedback loop is about a continuous cycle of control and feedback, with the purpose of increasing the level of output. “The most common treatment of the effects of an organism's actions on the stimuli affecting it is to carry out the analysis stepwise: First, a stimulus causes a
21 response via the organism, then the response causes a new stimulus or modifies the next stimulus, and the cycle begins again” (Powers, 1973, pp. 41). Behavioral input is provided with feedback, this causes a specific behavior, and so there is a circle of cause and effect. These effects can be moderated by different factors, such the amount of time between feedback rounds, type of feedback and environment (Powers, 1973). The original control feedback loop came from a machine model and was later changed into a human action theory. The change was made because the machine model is invalid as it did not include human behavior. In the changed theory, human action takes into account different factors, such as motivation and commitment (Locke, 1991). Just as with goal setting theory, ‘control theory uses goals as a key motivational construct’ (Vancouver & Kendall, 2006). Control theory states that humans want to control certain
outcomes and put in effort to increase their trust in fulfilling these goals (Vancouver & Kendall, 2006). Self-efficacy plays an important role in the effect on motivation for control, because if they employees possess self-efficacy they believe that they have the ability to control.
Different frameworks describe the control feedback loop. The basic loop has five constructs: goal, input, form, indicator and output (Klein, 1989). Klein (1989) changed the control theory, integrated other theories and made a new model. When looking at the effect of feedback loops, the change in output could lead to another loop, the output and feedback re compared to the goals and if there is an error, then there is a modification within the ‘subject expected utility of the goal attainment’.
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Figure 2, an integrated control theory model of work motivation, Klein (1989)
A goal is made (1), than the employee presents a certain behavior (2), the (4) feedback is based on the performance (3), this is then compared to the goal (5) and reviewed for errors (6). If there is no error, the behavior stays the same (7), if there is an error a cognitive change (12) has to take place (13). The different constructs within the model influence each other; one of those constructs is feedback. There are different types of feedback (positive and negative), with different effects. Encouragement and the acceptance of difficult goals are associated with positive feedback. Behavior change and (motivation for) working harder are associated with negative feedback (Cianci & Klein, 2010). The way feedback is received and its effect depend on personal factors, such as conscientiousness and tension on the part of the employee. The basic idea about feedback is extremely important because, without support and adequate feedback, employees are unlikely to be motivated. No adequate feedback or support “diminished the sense of challenge, and thereby reduced the system’s positive motivational force” (Dowling & Richardson, 1997, pp.361).
23 “To live human beings must act to achieve goals. This requires that they first choose or set the goals and then work to attain them; there is a continuous cycle of discrepancy creation and reduction as a concomitant of this process” (Locke, 1991).
Control theory is taken as the departure point for this thesis.
4.4 Crowding out effect
“Monetary incentives can “crowd out” other sorts of motivation, often called “intrinsic” motivation. Once crowded out the “intrinsic” motivation often does not come back after the monetary incentive has been removed” (Janssen & Mendys-Kamphorst, 2004). When an incentive is given, the intrinsic motivation of an employee can be substituted by the motivation for an incentive, so the incentive diminishes the intrinsic motivation; this effect is called the ‘crowding out’ effect (James, 2004; Osterloh & Frey., 2002). The effect of crowding out is largest when the incentive influences the autonomy and competence of the employee in a negative way. The size of the incentive, the strength of the relation between the incentive and motivation and whether the incentive is experienced as controlling, can moderate the relation between incentive and motivation (Deci et al. 1999; James, 2004). Incentives may undermine self- responsibility of individual employees, which may lead to a loss of motivation (Deci et al., 1999). However, this negative effect could depend on a combination of circumstances and environment. For instance, fulfilling tasks under time pressure, and with no feedback, but being rewarded with incentives could have a negative effect on self- responsibility (Cameron, 2001). This environment can be the sector that employees work in; an incentive could have a different outcome in the financial sector compared to a government environment (Walton, 2011). The sector is paramount since incentive systems may also be dangerous to the social norms
24 established within organizations. For example, they can cause tension and conflicts between management and employees because incentives stimulate them to act in their own interest (Brickly, Smith & Zimmerman, 2004).Tenure also has an effect on motivation, as it seems that employees get accustomed to an incentive. Pouliakas (2010) indicated that the average
motivation of employees who received incentives for four years was lower than the motivation of employees who had never received an incentive at all.
In the literature, the crowding out effect is related to the agency theory and the principal—agent theory (Dickinson & Villeval, 2008; James, 2004; Siciliani, 2009). These theories deal with controlling the behavior of employees and how the differing interests of employers and employees affect their relation and communication. The principal—agent theory and the
crowding out effect both state that, because of the contradictory interest between employees and employers when giving incentives, problems can occur (Brickly et al., 2004).
The literature about the crowding out effect is considered when looking for employee perceptions on the relation between incentives and organizational behavior outcomes. The theoretical
framework describes the components that may influence the relation between the incentives, and turnover, and absenteeism. It will be included as guidance for the next sections. The following section is the research approach; there, the literature review and the theoretical framework are used as basis for the second study, and are incorporated in the interview questions.
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III Research methods
1. Research approach and design
An exploratory mixed-methods study has been applied in this research. First, a quantitative analysis on secondary data was done. These data were collected at one company over a period of 2.5 years, and includes data on incentives, productivity, absenteeism and employee turnover. From the 73 locations, 70 time series and timelines were made over the period and divided into quartiles. These data were only inspected visually. The purpose was to see whether there were certain patterns within the timelines, for example “after a period of growth there is a decline in productivity while the incentive remains the same”.
The second study was done by collecting interview data, supplemented with numerical data. The interviews were conducted to provide a more extensive explanation of how incentives are
perceived. Because this is an exploratory thesis, flexibility had to be incorporated, to gradually narrow the research development (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 1997). The aim of the second study is to further research the patterns identified in the first study. 10 interviews were held that sought to explain the relation between incentive, behavior and organizational outcomes (Robbins et al., 2010).
These two studies are complementary and the qualitative data aids in the interpretation of the quantitative data (Saunders et al., 1997; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). No propositions are tested in this thesis, because it aims to add to existing literature, in an inductive approach (Saunders et al., 1997). The following figure has been added to provide a clear overview of this thesis. This figure is based on figure 2.1 of “Case study research for business” (Farquhar, 2012, pp.24).
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Figure 3, Overview of the thesis structure based on Farquhar (2012)
2. Company and incentive description
The two studies conducted for this thesis were conducted in a company active within the staffing sector, which rewards its staff with a basic salary supplemented with monetary incentives. These monetary incentives can be as high as 50% of the basis salary. For example, if the basis salary is €2000, - per month, it could be complemented with an incentive of maximum €1000, - per month. Incentives are given within a group, based on results of the particular location; there are 70 locations. The group size at each location usually ranges between three and seven employees. The incentive is dependent on the realization of the budget. The budget is based on the results of the previous year. For example, the budget of 2013 is based on the results of 2012. The incentive in 2013 is given on the realization of the budget of 2013. The incentive depends on to what extent the budget was exceeded, beginning at realizing 100% and capping at 135% of the given budget. The budget is solely based on output (turnover, margin and hours), and not on input. Input means the activities that a location has undertaken, such as the extent of recruiting, telephone acquisition and the number of clients visited. For output, 3 factors are used. First, the hours, defined as the total number of hours that temporary workers worked within a period. Second, turnover, or the
27 total amount for client rates, multiplied by the number of hours temporary workers worked at the clients, within a given period. Third, margin, or the rate minus the cost price, multiplied by the number of hours within a specific period.
Table 1. Types of output that are the basis for the incentive system
Output period
Hours Total amount of hours
of temporary workers
3 months
Turn over Total amount of hours
of temporary workers
x rate 3 months
Margin Total amount of hours
of temporary workers
x (rate – cost price) 3 Months
The group results are divided, based on the number of working hours per week and job title (for example a consultant earns less than a manager).
3. Data collection
3.1 Study 1
The quantitative data was collected within the company and contains information for a period of two and a half years. The data were collected every three months and there are a total of 10 measurement points. Using secondary data of a longitudinal character made it possible to give high measurement validity, a strength of this thesis (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). The level of
28 the incentives was collected on 70 locations within the organization. The data on labor
productivity, absenteeism and employee turnover were also collected on the same locations. After collection, the data were classified into 5 categories: 1. locations with no clear relation, meaning that so many fluctuations can be seen in the timeline that no visual relations can be seen; 2. locations with a clear relation between incentives and productivity, where an increase in one construct is associated with an increase in the other; 3. locations with a decline in or no incentive and steady productivity; 4. locations with a decline in or no incentive and a decrease productivity; 5. locations with a decline in or no incentive, and an increase in productivity. The locations were also classified by size (less than 4000 hours per quartile per FTE (full time employees), 4000 to 5500 hours per quartile per FTE, 5500 to 8000 hours per quartile per FTE and more than 8000 hours per quartile per FTE). This was done to see if there was a difference between locations with high productivity and low productivity in relation to one of the patterns and productivity.
3.2 Study 2
The second part of the research consists of semi-structured one-on-one interviews based on the results of the first part. It seeks to find more information on ‘why and how’ the previous effects were found (Park et al., 2012). It is possible to generate a large amount of qualitative data relatively quickly using a semi-structured interview (Saunders et al., 1997; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). The sample (10 interviews) was based on a selection from the first data; this was done to support the exploratory research (Saunders et al., 1997). The semi structured interviews were based on the theoretical framework and different theories of motivation (goal setting theory, control theory, expectancy theory and the crowding out effect).
29 - Expectancy theory questions: is the incentive seen as a valued outcome? Do the
interviewees believe that performance will lead to the desired outcome? Do they believe their effort will lead to the desired performance?
- Goal-setting theory questions: Are there specific and difficult goals? Is high effort put in achieving these goals? Is there commitment and acceptance of these goals? How is the feedback on these goals? Do interviewees feel they were appropriately managed and supported to develop these goals?
- Control theory questions: What kind of feedback do interviewees get? Do they experience feedback as positive or negative? How does feedback influence their motivation? How does the environment influence their motivation?
- The crowding-out effect theory questions: How were they motivated when they began these jobs? How did it make them feel and did it motivate them? Did they have an incentive that what lower or no incentive after that? How did it make them feel and did it motivate them?
Semi-structured interviews give the respondents the freedom to answer with information they consider important because there are no restrictions on the answer. There is also the possibility to obtain information that has not previously been discussed in the literature (Saunders et al., 1997). Interviews are a good means to measure the attitude and interest of interviewees (Tashakkori et al., 2003). Researchers consider it ‘natural’ to make assumptions and expectations. In the present research, there was awareness regarding the risk of judging interpretations before the interview, and openness to outliers and “Black Swans” (Taleb, 2007).
The interviews were supplemented with numerical data. This was done to further investigate the statements of the respondents. The range of these quantitative data is too small to make them
30 generalizable, or reliable according to quantitative research standards. Nevertheless, they are a positive addition to the interviews because they broaden the scope for the reader. These data were collected at the head office, and contains information on absenteeism, employee turnover and incentives for a period of 2.5 years, divided per quartile. The data were transformed to into different ratios to make them more comparable. There are 7 subjects within the data: 1. the number of sick days per location; 2. ratio absenteeism per location; 3. the number of employees leaving the locations; 4. ratio employee turnover per location; 5. productivity per employee per location; 6. amount of incentive per FTE; 7. the average amount of absenteeism, turnover and incentive for 2.5 years.
4. Validity and reliability
In research with the timescale, size and the scope of this one, bias and errors cannot always be prevented. The threat of lack of internal validity and ambiguity about the causal direction was addressed by using different kinds of data. Because the research data was only collected at one organization, the outcomes many not be generalizable. However, there are companies that may have a comparable incentive system, and the outcomes may have an added value for these organizations, and for knowledge in general. Also, the effect of one specific kind of incentive is examined, and this makes the outcomes only valid for this kind of incentive.
The interviews were worked out verbatim and then added to the coding scheme to increase the credibility of the thesis. The thesis was sent to one of the respondents, who was asked if there were any subjects or conclusions that were not recognizable to him. This allowed for external scrutiny, and increases the dependability on the thesis’s trustworthiness.
31 Using these different methods has provided the present work with more depth about the relation of the constructs. The quantitative study gave insight to the development of the constructs, during a 2.5 year time path. The second part, the qualitative research, indicates why there is a relation.
Respondents were selected strategically to investigate the patterns in the first study and had been employed for at least two years. Employees working at least two years within the company were selected, because new employees have less experience with the incentives of this company and were less likely to have experienced an increase or decrease in their incentive within the company. Respondents were informed that the study was only discussed internally at the Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA), to avoid socially desirable answers, participant bias and response bias. Attention was given to an interview “open and without prejudices” to avoid interviewer bias as much as possible (Saunders et al., 1997). The questions of the semi structured interviews were mostly based on previous academic literature and theories to increase the validity of this thesis.
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IV Results
1. Study 1
The first results include a visual inspection of the relation between productivity and incentive. Information about incentives and productivity at a location was transformed into the incentive and the productivity per full time employee (FTE). This was done by dividing group productivity by the amount of FTE working on site. These numbers were entered into SPSS and 70 timelines, for each location were created. One example of a location line is shown, the rest can be found in appendix 2. The pattern lines were analyzed visually and classified into 5 relations. Afterwards, these groups were specified by productivity size, with four different ranges.
Figure 4 shows the timeline of a location over a period of 2.5 years. The horizontal line stands for the time, divided per quartile. The vertical line represents the number of hours per FTE and the size of the group incentive. The green line (V14) shows the productivity per FTE, while the blue shows the incentive. At this specific location a decrease in productivity can be seen, followed by a decrease in incentive size.
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The five groups (relations) of the 70 locations:
1. 16 locations, were found to present no clear relation between incentive and productivity. Visually, no relation can be seen.
2. 12 locations showed a clear relation between incentive and productivity. Upon visual inspection, there seems to be a relation between productivity and the incentive. For example, an increase of the incentive relates to an increase in productivity.
3. At 17 locations a decline in or no incentive were applied, yet steady productivity was steady.
4. 14 locations presented a decline in or no incentive as well as a decrease in productivity. 5. 11 locations saw a decline in or no incentive, paired with an increase in productivity
Categories classified into different ranges (Total average number of hours of temporary work per location, per FTE, per quartile)
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Analysis Till 4000 hours Between
4000-5500 hours Between 5500-8000 hours 8000 hours and more 1 1 8 4 3 2 1 7 1 3 3 6 8 3 0 4 2 3 8 1 5 3 7 1 0
2. Table of visual classified ranges on the total average number of hours of temporary work per location, per FTE, per quartile
The visual inspection shows a large variety in patterns over time. When classifying according to the productivity of locations, places with large productivity mainly have a total distortion or a clear relation. Locations with a low productivity are more likely to stay stable than to decrease further, when employees earn an incentive that is descending or are given no incentive.
2. Study 2
Ten employees, all working at the company for at least two years, were interviewed. All employees were working directly on-site, either as managers or consultants. Eight out of ten interviews were conducted face-to-face, while two where held over the telephone. The interviews were taped and information considered important was noted down. Later, the taped interviews were transcribed 'verbatim'. These verbatim interviews were then coded using a coding scheme (Saunders et al., 1997). The outcomes were bundled into structured topics, related at a later stage to the different theories. Information that was considered important by the respondents was expanded upon. Based on the input of the interviews and the literature, 25 topics were established:
- 1. Importance of the incentive. - 2. Relation and incentive. - 3. Meaning of incentives.
35 - 4. Incentive stimulation.
- 5. Stimulation after getting an incentive. - 6. Relation incentive and performance. - 7. Incentive and control.
- 8. Opinions about goals. - 9. Influence on goals. - 10. Explanation of goals. - 11. Agreement of goals. - 12. Clarity of goals.
- 13. Challenging and reasonable goals. - 14. Honest measuring of performance. - 15. Self-confidence and goals.
- 16. Trust in colleagues. - 17. Sharing knowledge. - 18. Feedback on incentive. - 19. Feedback in general.
- 20. Feedback and the influence motivation. - 21. Environment and the influence on motivation. - 22. Feeling of autonomy.
- 23. Sense of stimulation or retaining of competencies. - 24. Implementing a shadow budget.
- 25. Interesting quotes.
This coding scheme was printed and analyzed per subtheme, to find relations within and between the answers. This was done according to the principle of axial coding (Mortelmans, 2009). The results were further divided into 5 topics:
- 1. The results of employee perceptions about incentives and working with incentive systems.
36 - 3. The results of employee perceptions about feedback
- 4. The results about other elements that could influence motivation
- 5. Employee perceptions of the connections between and within the constructs, such as the relation between incentives and absenteeism.
2.1 General experience of incentives
“The incentive is a nice extra”, one respondent said about incentives. Incentives are seen as an extra reward complementing the employee’s salary. Employees do value their incentive but there employees rate the importance of their incentive rather differently. Respondents say that
incentives and achieving an incentive are not related to their activities and their commitment. An incentive is only stimulating when it can realistically be achieved. In many cases the incentive is not seen as a realistic goal and is therefore not stimulating. As a respondent said: “Sometimes the
goals are very unrealistic. Then you are not stimulated by them. If you are close to the goals, you think ‘come on’ and then go and work a bit harder, because then I get an incentive.However I think that sometimes it seems so far away, how could we ever get it? I do not know if we will be motivated to take an extra step”. An incentive received impacts the employee’s perception of the
probability of receiving the next incentive in a positive manner; it triggers the employee’s desire to try to receive the next incentive. As was stated by a respondent: “if I have had an incentive
before, then it stimulates me more”. The incentive is not perceived as a tool to control employees.
The basic idea is that employees have a job and perceive a base salary for executing that job, the incentive is a nice reward, but not the main focus (in most cases because the lifestyle of the employee is not adjusted to a salary which includes the incentive). This could also be because respondents do not see a direct relation between effort and incentive. Employees feel a strong drive to do their job well and succeed in the realization of positive results; they are intrinsically
37 motivated to thrive professionally. As told by an employee: “but for me it is not motivation, I'm
not going to work even harder. I think it is more important to love your profession, to be driven”.
2.2 Working with targets
Targets are set by both employees and employers, although not all employees feel that they can influence their targets. While they may be able to influence the input targets, they generally cannot influence output targets. As one employee said: “A combination of the two. The major
objective, and what you should do in terms of turnover at the location are actually given. But ‘from where’ you generate turnover, and under what conditions, that’s up to you”. The targets
are clear to the employees and there is agreement when the targets are made. The problem is that too many factors (internal, such as absenteeism and turnover, as well as external) could influence the targets within a relatively short period. When a respondent was asked why he did not find his budget realistic, he said: “That has to do with the internal situation of the establishment, with
attendance”. Because of that, the budget can become unchallenging and/or not reasonable
anymore. Because the budget and targets are not adjusted according to the different factors, the terms of the incentive are not perceived as fair. If a budget is not attainable anymore, some
location managers and their area-managers make a shadow budget. However, there is a difference between the feeling of achievement when it is based on a shadow budget rather than on the real budget, even though achieving a shadow budget is also considered an accomplishment.
Not achieving a budget can influence the self-confidence and self-efficacy of the employee. Even employees, who have been working for the company for a significant number of years, can lose their self-confidence. An experienced manager illustrated this by expressing the following: “I
38
the budget. I've also had years that were less, but at least one thing was on track. This year is the first that it is really bad and I can indeed say that it does something to my self-confidence. Would anyone else in my office be better? Are there factors taking place at my office and around the area? Or am I doing something wrong? I'm curious. I know I'm doing my best and my fellow workers are also doing their best. But that's apparently not enough. Am I missing things? Doing the wrong things? I do not know. And it certainly does something with your confidence”.
Implementing a shadow budget, a realistic achievable one, helps the confidence of the employee increase “To having to go fight hard, you have to set up a goal to work towards”. The shadow budget is not rewarded with an incentive.
When asked whether their goals were challenging and reasonable and if they could influence their goals, there was a distinction made between input and output goals. Most interviewees responded positively to the input goals, but negatively regarding the output goals. There is a time gap between the budget being elaborated (November the previous year) and the realization of the budget (January until December). Over time, it becomes more difficult to predict what the
turnover will be and, because of that, the relation between incentives and activities becomes weaker.
2.3 Feedback
“It will be put in an email with one sentence, congratulations, and the amount”. This, or just “no” is what the respondents generally answered when asked whether there was feedback regarding the incentive. There is no feedback on the incentive, only the amount earned is given in a letter. The feedback in general is perceived as positive, negative criticism is usually brought neutrally. Nevertheless there are also differences between the amounts of feedback per location; some
39 respondents experience more feedback than others. Effort is not always noticed and recognized, and there is a demand for noticing and rewarding individual achievements. As one employee stated it: “Although appreciation will not buy me a new bike, I think that it is just as important,
and I think there is a lack of appreciation within the company”. It is remarkable that when a
location does not realize their goal, there is often another way of communicating and feedback, than when a location is achieving or outperforming the goal. Giving positive feedback stimulates the respondents. Negative feedback is sometimes felt as unfair when does not take into
consideration both external and internal factors, such as absenteeism and turnover. Because feedback is given by different regional managers, there is a difference in how the feedback is given and received. The environment also influences how stimulated employees consider themselves. Employees feel that they have autonomy, which is mostly experienced as positive.
2.4 Other elements
Most employees feel that their development and competences are stimulated by either
management or coaching. Knowledge is shared between locations and within the locations. Co-workers also generally trust each other: “Yes, great confidence, often a good cooperation, and the
locations around me also a great confidence”, said a manager. Recognition and appreciation are
considered very important. By focusing on locations that overachieve, and not taking in account the different factors that influence the results, locations that underachieve feel left out. This negatively impacts the attitudes of the employees. One respondent gave the following advice: “I
believe that for the locations that underachieve, the company should celebrate the little successes and give them positive attention, to get them in a positive flow again”.
40 Employees feel that they are measured by their location outcomes and they miss individual
appraisal. They indicate that locations that do well get appreciation in so many ways (incentives, vacations, words of appreciation) and this stands in such contrast to their own situation, that they feel deprived. This feeling of deprivation was indicated by the respondent when she said the following: “Everything revolves around the best people. The best people, may come into the club,
the best people are allowed on the stage. And the best people are the people who have the best turnover compared to their budget. I believe that this is not always the best people, they may also be people who have had luck with a big customer, who they are delivering well, but they do not generate new business. There are also locations that generate €300,000 with new business, but just do not reach their budget and they get no incentive”.
2.5 General experience of the connections between and within the constructs
The respondents say that incentives do not stimulate the intrinsic motivation and only stimulate extrinsic motivation when their goals are clear and attainable. Not receiving an incentive can be discouraging, according to the respondents. However, there is a distinction regarding how respondents perceive incentives. Respondents who are more used to incentives react strongly towards not getting an incentive. They have adjusted their lifestyle and take into account that they will receive an incentive. If this is not the case, it can lead to inequality and the thought of not getting an incentive in a future period can be discouraging, leading to intentions to leave. The incentive has the effect that respondents can adjust their spending behavior and lifestyle. Some respondents really ‘feel’ that earn less money, as one respondent explained: “That plays an
important role for me, if you get a few hundred extra Euros per month or quarterly, after a while you get accustomed to it. And if you get accustomed to it, and if you don’t get it, it hits you”. The
41 Respondents relate location productivity to the number of productive people at that location. High absenteeism rates and high employee turnover rates are seen as causes of an unstable location. Most respondents view absenteeism and employee turnover from an outsider’s perspective. They do not see their own involvement related to these factors.
When relating the different constructs of this thesis, one relation was repeated on several
occasions by the respondents. Receiving an incentive is related to the budget and the influence of different internal and external factors. Among external factors are influences such as the
economic climate and consumers. According to one respondent: “Well, as an example, last year,
we did not achieve our budget. This was because we included a few customers in the budget who went bankrupt or who did not require our services from the first quarter on to the rest of the year. So from the first quarter we were already behind the facts. Then it also depends on what kind of team you have, how the economic situation is, and what the market does, etc., etc.” Internal
factors, such as a large absenteeism rates and a large employee turnover rates, affect the
probability of getting an incentive. As said by a respondent: “Look, we have a budget for working
with 3 FTE, and we are only 2 FTE for the rest of the year. Who should I call? What do they think? They think we can do the work for 3 FTE with 2 FTE?” The motivation of employees can
be affected by the perception that they have a low probability of getting an incentive. According to a respondent, the goal must be achievable: “It was not realistic to achieve. If we had to do a
few extra steps in order to earn an incentive, we would. But now it is not realistic”. If employees
think that their probability of getting an incentive is zero for the following two years, this could trigger their intentions to leave. To summarize: absenteeism and employee turnover are related to employee perceptions of getting an incentive.
42
2.6 Numerical data of the locations interviewed
The first results indicate that employees consider there is a relation between absenteeism, employee turnover and getting an incentive. Beyond that, other things influence obtaining an incentive, such as the size of the budget. To further examine these findings, more research was done by using numerical data. The purpose of doing more research was to see if these data would confirm or contradict the interview findings. This led to the development of Table 3, which shows a table with an overview of the interviewed locations and the numerical data on absenteeism, employee turnover, productivity and incentives at those locations.
43
Missing Data = MD Between Q1 12012 and Q2 2013
Amount of sick days Amount of FTE Amount of FTE x 5 working days Ratio Absente eism Amount of employees leaving Ratio employee turnover Productivi ty per employee Amount of incentive per FTE Average amount of Absente
eism Turnover Incentive
Interview 2 1 Q 2011 MD 3 15 MD MD MD 4542 2554,33333 2 Q 2011 MD 3 15 MD MD MD 3813 1760,33333 3 Q 2011 MD 3 15 MD MD MD 4244 0 4 Q 2011 MD 3 15 MD MD MD 3993 0 1 Q 2012 MD 3 15 MD 1 33,33333333 3303 983,666667 2 Q 2012 MD 3 15 MD 1 33,33333333 3813 0 3 Q 2012 MD 2 10 MD 2 100 6366 0 4 Q 2012 MD 2 10 MD 0 0 6632 0 1 Q 2013 MD 1,7 8,5 MD 1 58,82352941 7819 2304,11765 2 Q 2013 MD 1 5 MD 1 100 12490 1443 MD 54,24837 788,4641 Interview 3 1 Q 2011 19 6,6 33 4,428904 MD MD 4991 733,484848 2 Q 2011 0 5 25 0 MD MD 9383 1880,8 3 Q 2011 0 5 25 0 MD MD 8682 2682,6 4 Q 2011 47 4,3 21,5 16,81574 MD MD 9713 568,604651 1 Q 2012 10 5 25 3,076923 2 40 5011 0 2 Q 2012 0 5,7 28,5 0 0 0 8231 815,087719 3 Q 2012 9 7 35 1,978022 2 28,57142857 6202 0 4 Q 2012 3 4,3 21,5 1,073345 0 0 7079 0 1 Q 2013 2 4,3 21,5 0,715564 2 46,51162791 13038 0 2 Q 2013 0 4,3 21,5 0 0 0 24986 0 1,140642 19,18051 135,848 Interview 6 #DEEL/0! 1 Q 2011 0 3 15 0 MD MD 2854 934,333333 2 Q 2011 0 3 15 0 MD MD 3076 0 3 Q 2011 1 3 15 0,512821 MD MD 4494 0 4 Q 2011 0 3 15 0 MD MD 4570 451,333333 1 Q 2012 0 2 10 0 1 50 5476 722 2 Q 2012 0 1,3 6,5 0 2 153,8461538 7098 0 3 Q 2012 0 2 10 0 0 0 6741 0 4 Q 2012 0 2 10 0 0 0 4591 0 1 Q 2013 3,2 16 0 1 31,25 1841 1725,3125 2 Q 2013 2,5 12,5 0 0 0 1524 0 0 39,18269 407,8854 interview 9 1 Q 2011 3 3 15 1,538462 MD MD 2995 3266 2 Q 2011 0 3 15 0 MD MD 3721 2238,33333 3 Q 2011 6 3 15 3,076923 MD MD 3868 1800,66667 4 Q 2011 4 3 15 2,051282 MD MD 3312 984,333333 1 Q 2012 5 3,5 17,5 2,197802 1 28,57142857 2006 0 2 Q 2012 3 2,8 14 1,648352 1 35,71428571 3986 0 3 Q 2012 1 2 10 0,769231 1 50 5802 0 4 Q 2012 1 2 10 0,769231 1 50 5006 0 1 Q 2013 7 1,4 7 7,692308 0 0 7198 2607,14286 2 Q 2013 3 1,9 9,5 2,42915 2 105,2631579 5795 2084,73684 2,584345 44,92481 781,9799 Interview 10 1 Q 2011 2 4,5 22,5 0,683761 MD MD 6096 0 2 Q 2011 3 5 25 0,923077 MD MD 5455 1525,8 3 Q 2011 0 5 25 0 MD MD 6859 0 4 Q 2011 9 4 20 3,461538 MD MD 8645 0 1 Q 2012 59 4,8 24 18,91026 1,7 35,41666667 5619 1191,45833 2 Q 2012 22 4 20 8,461538 0 0 6819 1695,75 3 Q 2012 4 4 20 1,538462 0 0 8574 1700 4 Q 2012 3 4 20 1,153846 0 0 7566 1700 1 Q 2013 3 3,6 18 1,282051 0 0 7766 836,666667 2 Q 2013 4 3,6 18 1,709402 0 0 7171 0 5,509259 5,902778 1187,313
