Identity formation of Dutch rabbis : anti-Semitism, victimization and Netanyahu’s call for migration

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Identity formation of Dutch rabbis

Anti-Semitism, victimization and Netanyahu’s call for migration

by Aron Woonink

MSc Thesis – Political Science, International Relations

Research project: Researching the Middle East: power, politics and change

Supervisor: Dr. Vivienne Matthies-Boon

2nd_reader: _{Dr. Jeroen Doomernik}

Date of completion: June 26th_{, 2015}

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Abstract

“Israel is your home”, “Once again Jews are being murdered in Europe just for being Jews”, and “We are calling for a wave of mass aliyah from Europe” were some of the comments made by Benjamin Netanyahu after two terrorist attacks on Jews in Paris and Copenhagen shocked the world. Through a narrative analysis of qualitative interviews, this thesis examines how Netanyahu’s call for increased migration influences the identity formation of Dutch rabbis. There is special attention for the role of (the history of) anti-‐Semitism, Zionism, interreligious dialogue and the rabbis’ and their

communities’ responses to Netanyahu’s appeal. The overarching theme, however, is victimhood in general and the politization of victimhood in particular. This study

demonstrates that Netanyahu’s attempt to victimize Western European Jews is based on a false claim, namely that Jews are safer in Israel than they are in Europe. For the rabbis, who nearly unanimously confirmed this fallacy, this entails that if they would make

aliyah, they wouldn’t leave Europe because Netanyahu said so.

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List of abbreviations and vocabulary

Aliyah “Ascent”, migration of Jews from the diasporas to Israel

CIDI Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israël

Center for Information and Documentation on Israel

Halakhah An interpretation of Jewish Religious laws

Jewish State Bill Controversial proposal to officially rename Israel to the “Jewish State of Israel”

Marechaussee Dutch military police

Pogrom(s) Massacre(s) of Jews in 19th_{and
20}th_{century
Eastern
Europe}

(Yom ha)Shoah The Holocaust (Remembrance Day)

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Acknowledgements

All generalizations are false, including this one – Mark Twain

If I had to name anything that I’ve learned during the process of interviewing rabbis and reporting on the things they shared, it would be that everyone has his or her own, unique story. There is no univocal answer to the question what ‘the rabbis’ think about the themes that were discussed, as the variation of their characters and of their stories makes generalization, indeed, impossible. But isn’t that what makes all people so interesting? But now I’m generalizing…

First, I would like express my gratitude to dr. Vivienne Matthies-‐Boon for the essential guidance she has provided throughout the period I have written this thesis.

Furthermore, I want to thank Mirjam Aly for our useful cooperation and the support she offered me during the process of writing. Finally, this study would not have come into existence without the seven rabbis’ willingness to participate in the interviews. I would like to sincerely thank them for this.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction of the topic: Netanyahu and the Jewish diasporas

Between the 7th_{and
9}th_{of
January
2015,
radical
Islamist-‐inspired
extremists
shocked}

Paris and the rest of the world with a series of terrorist attacks, which left a total of 20 people dead, including three perpetrators. The majority of the victims were members of the editorial office of Charlie Hebdo, a satirical newspaper known for their depiction of the Prophet Muhammad. Among the 17 deaths were also four Jews, who were killed in a Jewish supermarket (CNN, 2015). Referring to them, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu turned himself to the Jewish population of France, stating that:

“[t]he State of Israel is not just the place to which you turn in prayer. The State of Israel is also your home. This week, a special team of ministers will convene to advance steps to increase immigration from France and other countries in Europe that are suffering from terrible anti-‐ Semitism. All Jews who want to immigrate to Israel will be welcomed here warmly and with open arms. We will help you in your absorption here in our country, which is also your country.” (The

Jerusalem Post, 2015)

Only a month later, on the 15th_{of
February,
a
Jewish
security
guard
protecting
a}

synagogue in Copenhagen was murdered a few hours after the same suspect attempted to assassinate an artist also known for his Muhammad cartoons, killing another person in the process (The Times of Israel, 2015). Again, Netanyahu reacted:

“Obviously Jews deserve protection in every country, but we say to the Jews, our brothers and sisters: ‘Israel is your home.’ […] We are preparing for a wave of mass aliya [Jewish immigration] from Europe; we are calling for a wave of mass aliya from Europe. I want to tell all the Jews of Europe, and Jews wherever they may be: ‘Israel is the home of every Jew…Israel awaits you with open arms.’” (Ibid)

Netanyahu’s comments about a potential exodus of Jews from Western European countries are peculiar, because the people he addresses his speech to are primarily French and Danish citizens, respectively, and merely Jewish of religion or ethnicity. In this thesis, I will aim to assess how Netanyahu’s diaspora policy, entailing the attraction of Jewish Europeans in general and his comments listed above particularly, influences the identity formation of Dutch rabbis.

1.2 Problem statement and research aims

The problem that is at the center of this thesis, is that very little is known about the ways in which Jews living in Europe, and more specifically rabbis, respond to Israel’s diaspora

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policy; even though this policy is not a new phenomenon, as Israel has seen large influxes of immigrants since its establishment. Moreover, I think it is highly interesting to analyze the comments by Netanyahu in terms of preference and identity formation of people who live thousands of miles away in another country, and, particularly, to examine them in light of the by Netanyahu implied growth of anti-‐Semitism and Islamism. Do rabbis feel that they are chased away from their home country? Or are they attracted to Israel for other reasons? Are they even attracted to Israel as a country to potentially migrate to? In one of his speeches, Netanyahu referred to the past: “Once again Jews are murdered on the soil of Europe just for being Jews” (The Times of Israel, 2015). How does this, for the rabbis, relate to the history of anti-‐Semitism, including the Holocaust, or Shoah? Has anti-‐Semitism changed, as is often suggested in scientific literature? How do these comments relate to the role of Jews as victims? Is Zionism still a relevant concept to describe Jews’ relation to Israel? In this thesis, I twill try to provide answers to these questions.

Through the use of qualitative in-‐depth interviews, this study attempts to explore the relationship between Netanyahu’s comments, also including his controversial plan to officially rename Israel to the “Jewish State of Israel” (The Jerusalem Post, 2014) on the one hand, and identity formation of Dutch rabbis on the other hand. Until now, it is not even clear if the rabbis are even taking these words seriously, let alone if they take action as a result of them. Moreover, different kinds of rabbis may respond diversely: Liberal/Reformed rabbis may have a weaker connection to Israel than their Orthodox/Traditional counterparts, and they may also be more critical of Netanyahu. Orthodox rabbis may be more loyal to the State of Israel, and may therefore welcome Netanyahu’s comments and agree with them, while Liberals may find them strange or fear mongering. Therefore, the main goal of my research is to analyze if and how Netanyahu’s comments about Israelis living in the diasporas influences the identity formation of Dutch rabbis. With this being the overall aim, a number of sub-‐goals can be distinguished1_{.
First,
I
will
try
to
find
out
how
the
rabbis
relate
to
the
Holocaust;
and
also}

what role it has played in their upbringing. Another goal of this thesis is to investigate what the rabbis think about contemporary anti-‐Semitism, and if they perceive a growth of this phenomenon. Moreover, I will try to explore how the rabbis see adherents of other religions in Dutch society and interreligious activities and dialogue. The next

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target is to assess what the rabbis think about political representation of Jews in the Netherlands. Furthermore, I will attempt to shed more light on how the rabbis see the State of Israel and what they think about the entanglement of religion and politics in the country. Then, explicitly relating to the main goal, there will be an analysis of how the rabbis respond to Netanyahu’s call to Western European Jews to come “home” to Israel. Also, the issue of migration will be discussed, inquiring whether rabbis are considering to move to Israel and if so, what their motivations are. Correspondingly, migration as a topic in the rabbis’ communities will be explored, trying to find out whether this is a recurring theme within those communities. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I will try to assess what role the paradigm “Jews as victims” plays in all of these processes, picturing how victimhood may be used as a political tool.

1.3 Social and scientific relevance

I argue that this topic is socially relevant because the prominent role for Jews living in the diaspora in Netanyahu’s rhetoric seems to be a key policy choice, intentionally made by Netanyahu’s government. In my opinion, it is highly interesting to assess how this possible policy choice influences societies and potentially politics abroad, as European rabbis may enjoy a high degree of religious legitimacy and have the potential to affect their followers’ – European Jews – political or religious preferences. This thesis’s topic is also relevant because Netanyahu’s comments may very well contribute to or increase “us vs. them-‐thinking” in Europe, as those words might frame Jews – willingly or unwillingly – as “those more or less Israeli citizens”. More generally, Netanyahu’s statements may harm political processes in Europe, because outside interference in a sovereign democracy’s political system can be dangerous. Finally, I think that this study could provide us more insight in what can be seen as the larger goal of Netanyahu here: the (potentially destructive?) process of symbolically turning Israel into a “Jewish state”, rather than the current Israeli state. The “recruitment” of immigrants from Europe and elsewhere may constitute a part of this strategy, both in terms of population (increasing the Jewish percentage of Israel) as well as a tool of legitimization of marking Israel as the state of the Jews (The Jerusalem Post, 2014). In turn, this process of making Israel a “Jewish State” potentially disturbs the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians, and may lead to (increased) ethnic discrimination of the many Arab Israelis.

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Scientifically, the topic is relevant because it attempts to make a connection between domestic (Jews in European polities) and transnational (Netanyahu’s Jewish immigration policies and his statements) political processes. The fact that not a lot is known (see theory section) about contemporary identity formation of European Jews in general and rabbis in specific also contributes to this relevance. This thesis attempts to make the possible link between Jewish identity formation, (growing?) anti-‐Semitism, Jewish migration and Israel’s (or Netanyahu’s?) foreign policy more explicit through the use of qualitative interviews. As The Economist argued, Jewish migration to Israel is very low; only 0.3% of the total Jewish people living in the diasporas migrated to Israel in 2014. From France, though, immigration doubled, which may indicate a different process (The Economist 2015). This illustrates that there are quite a number of ambiguous claims about potential aliyah, let alone what these migrants’ motivations are. This thesis aims to provide us more insight in this complex situation by conducting of interviews with Dutch rabbis. Finally, it is very interesting to see Jewish diaspora politics and Netanyahu’s words in light of the anti-‐Semitism and victimization of Jews, in which the “Jews as victims” may sometimes be used as a political tool.

1.4 Organization of the study

First, in the next chapter, there will be a comprehensive theoretical overview of concepts related to the goals of this study that were described above. Anti-‐Semitism, Zionism, the State of Israel and victimization will all have a part in this overview, which also includes theories on transnational identity formation itself. There will also be a concrete description of the Dutch situation in terms of cooperation (or the lack thereof) between the three main religions in the Netherlands (Christianity, Islam and Judaism)2_.

Third, there will be a chapter dedicated to the methods used to attain the main research goal and the sub-‐goals – qualitative interviews – including issues on self-‐reflexivity, reliability and validity. After that, the interviews that have been conducted will be analyzed, simultaneously connecting these findings to the theoretical insights described earlier. Finally, a concluding chapter will assess the findings, relating back to the sub-‐ goals and the main research target. I will also evaluate these results in a more generic

2_{In
terms
of
percentage,
Judaism
may
not
be
one
of
the
three
largest
religions
in
the
Netherlands,
but}

interreligious dialogue and relations are mostly situated in a context of these three faiths. Moreover, “main”, in this light, doesn’t say anything about importance, as Buddhism or Hinduism are not more or less important than the other religions.

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way, stating where this research can contribute to existing knowledge, fill theoretical gaps or challenge conventional wisdoms.

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2. Theoretical framework: identity formation in the Jewish diasporas

2.1 Introduction: the conceptual puzzle of identity formation of Dutch rabbis

The concrete goal of this thesis is to answer the question if and how Dutch rabbis’ individual identities, in a social context, are influenced by Netanyahu’s statements. Put in general terms, this research explores, through the study of diasporas, if and how an individual politician influences actions and preferences of individuals who live in and are nationals of other countries. It will thus address the recent diaspora politics of Israel under Netanyahu’s government. Diasporas have been studied extensively in the past. The concept is very old and for a long period, it referred almost exclusively to Jews (Cohen 2004:88-‐89; Faist 2010:12). They have been described, for instance, as “ethnic lobbies in liberal hostlands” (Shain & Barth 2003:450) and they can act as mediators between “home” and “host” societies (Ibid). Yet, there are negative effects of diasporas as well, as they can sustain insurgencies, spoil peace processes or broaden conflicts (Ibid). Regarding the case of Israel, this is no less the same. For example, the massive influx of Jewish migrants from the (former) Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s led to serious ethnic, cultural and demographic problems, and these Russian Jews became a sort of alienated community within Israel, as they maintained an intense connection to their homeland (Remennick 2013:480-‐481). Unsurprisingly, this led to relative dissatisfaction among this group as opposed to other Israeli immigrants (Amit 2012:1291-‐1292). Another example of dissatisfaction within Israel is the case of Ethiopian Israelis, who, due to discrimination and a failed assimilation process, suffer from poverty and alienation (Lev-‐Aladgem 2008:277-‐278).

We do know that in general, diasporic Jews different from Israeli Jews. They speak different languages, have distinct religious preferences and adhere to other cultural norms (Gold 2004:337). Also, despite both groups’ support for Israel, they have a different political commitment to Israel. The early Zionists failed to convince the majority of the diasporic Jews to come to Israel. Instead, the latter contribute politically and financially to the country, arguably making them fiercer supporters of Israel than true Zionists themselves (Ibid). Some early Zionist accounts (e.g. work by Hess, Pinsker and Herzl) themselves do in a way describe and reproduce the connection between Jewish diasporas and Israel; as they often analyze “the consequences of exterritorial existence of the Jewish people, the complex relationship of this people with their states

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and societies of residence, and their longtime attachment to their historical homeland, the land of Israel” (Rubin & Rubin 2014:740).

The present study, however, is not concerned with internal Israeli diaspora politics, but rather with current issues surrounding relations between Israel and the Dutch Jewish diaspora; in this case Netanyahu’s call to Western European Jews to migrate to Israel, accompanied by an, in Netanyahu’s opinion, increase of anti-‐Semitism in those diasporas. A lot has been written about Dutch Jewry, although the main focus has not really been on the contemporary period. For example, the Amsterdam Sephardic Jews in the Dutch Golden Age are perhaps among the most studied Jewish people in history (Sutcliffe 2007:417-‐418). Centuries later, the Holocaust, or Shoah, befell Europe. The Netherlands was disproportionately damaged by this destructive event, for it lost 75% of its Jewish inhabitants, opposed to, for example, 25% in France and 40% in Belgium (Brasz 2001:150-‐151). Unsurprisingly, the War has strongly affected the collective consciousness of Dutch Jews, affecting their identity in such a way that it made them become more aware of their descent (Rietveld-‐Van Wingerden 2008:186).

These studies, however, only slightly touch on what I would like to demonstrate in this thesis, which is how the identities of Jewish Dutchmen are influenced by a

transnational actor, in this case Netanyahu. Taking into account what has been

described above, this research is novel because, so far, the contemporary Jewish community in the Netherlands has not been investigated in relation to their transnational ties, let alone how their identities are influenced by a foreign actor. I have also not been able to find similar attempts for other Western European Jewish diasporic communities. Furthermore, the perceived growth of violent anti-‐Semitism in Western Europe, combined with Netanyahu’s efforts to attract more Jewish people from diasporas as a result of this, presents us with a new context, which has thus far remained unexplored. Finally, as was already mentioned, politicians such as Netanyahu do not hesitate to refer to the past, most notably the Holocaust, to encourage Jews to take on the role of the victim. Although the political dimension to victimhood is a frequently investigated phenomenon (see 2.6), I have not found a scientific account that makes the explicit connection between this current and ongoing process of victimization on the one hand, and identity formation of diasporic Jews on the other hand. The interviews that will be analyzed later demonstrate that, implicitly, victimhood forms a

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“red line” throughout many topics that were discussed and also the rabbis’ narratives themselves.

The remainder of this chapter will provide a theoretical framework of how Jews’ identities may be constructed and reconstructed, and in which contexts these processes occur. First, the current composition of the Israeli state and its complex relationship with Judaism will be discussed. After that, there will be an overview of Zionism, which preceded the State of Israel, including some remarks about the Jewish diasporas and transnationalism. Thirdly, this chapter will provide a short account on anti-‐Semitism, including the Holocaust and contemporary anti-‐Semitism. Afterwards, there will be special attention for the Dutch context, displaying the incidence of anti-‐Semitism and analyzing the nature if interreligious relations in the Netherlands. Then, moving towards more theoretical issues, the phenomenon of victimhood, and the politics of victimization will be briefly addressed. Next, the main theoretical subject of this study, identity formation, will be theoretically elaborated. Finally, connected to identity formation, the role of narratives will be explained, offering us an interesting instrument, which enables us to analyze the interviews.

2.2 Judaism and the religious ethnocracy of Israel

It can reasonably be presumed that many Jewish people maintain connections to Israel, be it philosophically, religious-‐spiritually, financially or politically. Therefore, both the structure of the contemporary State of Israel and the way it operates deserve special attention. The State of Israel was established as a democracy in accordance with some of the same principles of liberal democracies that already existed (Kimmerling 1999:339; Cohen-‐Almagor 1995:461). There are regular elections in which multiple parties compete; people have basic freedoms, such as speech, demonstration and religion; the political culture is based on open debate, legitimacy and tolerance (Cohen-‐Almagor 1995:461); and the powers are separated (Kimmerling 1999:339). Yet, the Israeli government is often criticized for its behavior towards the Palestinian population (Kimmerling 1999:339; Cohen-‐Almagor 1995:462; Baumgart-‐Ochse 2014:401, 405-‐ 406). Formally, all Israeli inhabitants are equal before the law, no matter what their religious or political beliefs are. In this context, however, one can distinguish between that formal type of citizenship, and full citizenship. Israeli Jews can be said to enjoy full citizenship: they are treated equally by law and government. Israeli Palestinians,

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however, formally have those same equal liberties, but in practice, don’t enjoy the same rights as Israeli Jews (Cohen-‐Almagor 1995:462).

It is difficult to label Israel as a true liberal-‐democratic state because it has thus far been unable to separate religion from nationalism, as “Jewishness” is so heavily intertwined with Israeli nationalism (Kimmerling 1999:339-‐340; Gans 2011:4). Generally, the Jewish religion and the nation of Israel are regarded as equivalent. Most Jewish Israelis, even the secular, describe their collective national identity by values, symbols and collective memories connected to Judaism (Kimmerling 1999:340). The self-‐evidence of this is so natural, that it is accepted and unquestioned by the ones who are included. Only the excluded ones, the Palestinians, truly feel the consequences of the Jewish-‐Israeli hegemony (Ibid). Therefore, Israel can officially be seen as a democracy, although the characteristics of a democratic society only apply within the hegemonic framework. Israel is, thus, “a regime continuously fluctuating between democracy and nationalist-‐theocracy” (Ibid:340-‐341). This religious ethnocratic configuration of the Israeli polity seriously contradicts the more pluralist versions of democracy we see in other developed countries and is thus quite problematic.

Moreover, there is the issue of the role of the ultra-‐Orthodox Jews vis-‐à-‐vis Israeli democracy in general and the Palestinian citizens more particularly. The wrongdoings of the State towards the Palestinian part of Israel’s population are often attributed to this group of fanatic religious nationalists, who are seen as a threat to the liberal, secular and democratic character of the Israel. This way of thinking suggests that Israel is continuously on the verge of becoming a theocracy. The country is said to be hijacked by religious fanatics who want to arrange the State in accordance with their particular version of Judaism (Baumgart-‐Ochse 2014:406). This fanatic religious nationalism, that can be seen as anti-‐Zionist, manifests itself in two ways. First, the establishment of Israel is criticized and even regarded as sinful, because it was not founded in line with the “613 commandments of the halakhah [an interpretation of Jewish law]” and officially promoted secularization (Kimmerling 1999:357). Furthermore, the State of Israel was not created in the “expected and envisioned divine-‐messianic way” (Ibid). Yet, religious nationalists de facto recognize the State, as it guarantees a certain degree of holiness, and the possibility that the Jewish citizens would turn it into a halakhic state remains very much alive. Second, connected to this holiness, the ultra-‐Orthodox argue that it is forbidden to relinquish any area of the ‘Holy Land’ to the control of non-‐Jews, especially

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Muslims (Ibid). For a certain group, this type of Judaism spurs the hate of strangers and “a master-‐slave attitude towards the Arabs” (Ibid). Unsurprisingly, adherents of this type of religious nationalism also question the Jewishness of secular Jews (Ibid). In general, this group is associated with “religious settlement politics”, which entails the building of settlements in the areas on the West Bank occupied by Israel after the 1967 war (Gaumgart-‐Ochse 2014:406) and is deemed illegal by the UN Security Council (UN 1979).

2.3 Zionism

Although the State of Israel was established almost 70 years ago, Zionism is still a frequently heard term. As will be shown later, anti-‐Zionism and anti-‐Israelism are often, also for political reasons, seen as synonyms for anti-‐Semitism. This section will briefly outline what Zionism actually is and how it may or may not contribute to the identity of Jews living in the Western European diasporas.

2.3.1 Zionism, the State of Israel and the Land of Israel

Zionism emerged at the end of the 19th_{century,
when
Herzl
published
his
Judenstaat.}3

Yet, the idea of Zionism existed before it was labeled as such (Laqueur 2003:xxv; Prior 1999:2-‐3). The “longing for the ancient homeland, the anomaly of Jewish existence in central, and the need to find a solution for the ‘Jewish question’” were all themes that were already present in writings before Herzl’s time (Laqueur 2003:xxv). One may say that Zionism is “completed”, because the State of Israel had been established by 1948 (see Prior 1999:29). However, this is only the case if one were to regard Zionism as a nationalist ideology, separate from religious considerations. Zionism is, in fact a form of “ethnocultural nationalism”, in which “groups sharing a common history and culture have fundamental and morally significant interests in adhering to their culture and in sustaining it for generations” (Gans 2011:3). Cultural nationalism stressed, in this case, cultural autonomy for the Jews in the countries where they were living, whereas Zionism intended to adhere to the Jewish culture and the right to self-‐determination in the Land of Israel, which had special significance to the history for the Jewish people (Ibid:3-‐4). A common expression in this context is “the historical right of the Jews to the

3_{Around
that
time,
the
idea
of
establishing
a
Jewish
state
in
non-‐Jewish
places
such
as
Uganda
or}

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Land of Israel” (Ibid:4). It can therefore be argued that Zionism has ethno-‐cultural and religious roots, but that it turned into an essentially non-‐, or even anti-‐religious, political movement (Prior 1999:45), perhaps demonstrated by the opposition to Zionism by a vast number of Orthodox Israeli Jews (Brown 2003:316). This, indeed, indicates a paradox: Zionism as a political movement focused on a nationalist identity, based on nationalist – thus, secular – aspects, such as land, language and culture. By some, therefore, Zionism was seen as a threat to Judaism, and the proposed Jewish state as an instrument to secularize Jewish identity. A religious argument against the establishment of the State of Israel was that Judaism forbids any effort to found a state before the arrival of the Messiah (Ibid:316-‐317; Prior 1999:214).

2.3.2 Zionism and diasporas

Diasporas commonly refer to the experience of being scattered across the world, while attempting to maintain a connection with the country of origin. Although the term was once almost exclusively limited to describe Jews, “it is used today to describe practically any population…which has originated in a land other than which it currently resides, and whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders of nation-‐states, or, indeed, span the world” (Cohen 2004:88-‐89). The concept, thus, also includes “a certain social structure, a type of consciousness, and a mode of cultural production” (Ibid:89). It is not clear how prominent these overlapping networks are for diasporic Jews, which is actually a key component of this research. It remains yet to be seen how, and most importantly if the European Jews’ social (in this case also religious), economic and political networks “cross the borders of nations”. Actually, if this thesis shows that this is not the case, I argue that it would empirically contest the very act of classifying Jews who live in Europe along the term “diaspora”.

For this thesis, only European diasporic Jews and the ways their identities are influenced are of primary importance. Although Jews have faced a long history of exile and living in diasporas (Rabinovitch 2012: xvii-‐xxi), the context of contemporary Jewish life in diasporas is the main concern here. For diasporic Jews, Zionism has been, since Israel was established in 1948, the most dominant form of Jewish diaspora nationalism (Ibid:xv-‐xvi). Zionism, aiming to create a Jewish political identity in a geographical space in which Jews would truly be safe, also intended to end the two thousand year-‐exile of Jews who lived in countries other than Israel. It is for that reason that, in 1950, Israel

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designed the quite remarkable “Right of Return” law, which automatically grants Israeli citizenship to any Jew in the world who wishes to migrate to Israel. Now that the State was created, the question was: “would all Jews from around the world now move to Israel?” (Aviv & Shneer 2005:9-‐11; Safran 2005:44). The fact that most Jews are currently residing outside Israel (The Economist, 2015), demonstrates that this is not the case. For Jews who did not migrate to Israel, the least they were expected to do was to “recognize and celebrate Israel as the center of Jewish culture and as an emerging and viable source of Jewish identity”, and, of course, support the Israeli efforts financially (Aviv & Shneer 2005:11) and diplomatically (Safran 2005:44). On the other hand, Israel, apart from being the “homeland” for all the Jews, “constitutes a source of pride for its achievements and provides a refutation of several negative stereotypes about the diaspora Jews that have existed for many years” (Safran 2005:45). This pattern, however, goes both ways, as Jews living in the diasporas are often blamed for perceived wrongdoings of Israel (Ibid). For a number of Jews, consequently, this led to a feeling of aversion vis-‐à-‐vis Israel, arguing that the current State of Israel does not correspond with the ideal version, with some (albeit few) even questioning whether the State should exist at all. They join an increasing number of non-‐Jews who believe that the establishment of Israel was a mistake. Thus: on the one hand, for many Jews Israel is regarded as very favorable and as “fixing” Jewish identity, whereas on the other hand, the country is a negative factor for some other Jews (Ibid).

Many Jewish people have, for many centuries, maintained a core sense of common kinship, religion and culture across boundaries, while they simultaneously adapted to the societies they lived in. The “Israeli” culture is a relative recent phenomenon (Cohen 2004:90). Of course, differences between diasporic and Israeli Jews originate in their specific cultural/national contexts (Gold 2004:337). Early Zionists saw the diasporas as “a place of degradation and exile”, and failed to convince the majority of the diasporic Jews to migrate to Israel. In turn, diasporic Jews stayed, contributing financial and political support from outside Israel. Israelis see their ethnic identity in secular and nationalist terms. They celebrate Jewish holidays and speak Hebrew, but they perceive this behavior more as part of their “Israeliness”, rather than their “Jewishness”. Diasporic Jews are more used to participate in religious activities. Secular Israeli Jews are sometimes even hostile to religion, as they are against the political and religious agendas of the Orthodox parties in the Israeli parliament (Ibid).

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Jewish identities are thus ambiguous. It is clear, however, that the idea of return to the homeland has always been a part of the collective identities of Jews who live outside Israel (Safran 2005:37)

2.3.3 Transnationalism, citizenship and identity formation

Although the individuals under investigation in this thesis are not necessarily migrants (as most diaspora Jews’ roots actually lie in “host” countries themselves4_{),
it
is
relevant}

to discuss the transnationality of identity formation, because Judaism has a specific connection to the land of Israel, as was shown above. For Israel is such a relatively new state, the Jews who live in diasporic communities are not migrants coming from Israel but “ordinary” citizens of their countries of residence, who may potentially establish relations to Israel. Collins (2009) offers an overview of existing theory on how transnational identities interact with citizenship. In the 1990s, “transnationalism” became a more popular term, accompanied by a growth of academic attention (Collins 2009:1-‐2, 9). Although it is not a new phenomenon, the last few decades have seen an enormous increase in the possibilities of links between migrant communities and their place of origin (Carruthers 2013:217; Nagel & Staeheli 2003:6). Transnationalism has problematized the assumed connection between residence, citizenship and identity, and the phenomenon therefore has an effect on the perception and perhaps the reality of the nation-‐state (Collins 2009:9). Until recently, most models of citizenship presumed a connection between a sense of belonging and a “territorialized political community”, most commonly the nation-‐state. Although immigrants and other so-‐called “deviant” groups can have formal citizenship, they can still be substantively excluded from (the advantages of) citizenship and representation. It is therefore helpful to distinguish5

between those two types of citizenship, in which formal citizenship is defined as one’s legal status and substantive citizenship as one’s ability to realize the ability to reap the benefits from being a member of society (Nagel & Staeheli 2003:5). The shift towards transnationalism or even post-‐nationalism as a result of globalization is often seen as the cause of changes in citizenship, although actions of states themselves have also contributed, as is illustrated on the one hand by the situation in which “sending” states

4_{Although
it
can,
on
the
other
hand,
also
be
said
that
relatively
few
Jews
live
in
the
countries
where
their}

ancestors were born (De Lange 2000:6).

5_{Which
is
actually
the
same
kind
of
distinction
as
the
one
that
that
was
already
mentioned
earlier
in
the}

Identity formation of Dutch rabbis : anti-Semitism, victimization and Netanyahu’s call for migration