From rejection to acceptance
The establishment of regional coordination centres for a
secure Pan-European electricity network
Joycelynne Bal S1288822
Thesis Crisis & Security Management First reader: Dr. L. Cabane
Second reader: Dr. J. Wolbers Word count: 14204
Abstract
European integration is a phenomenon which has been ongoing since 1952 specifically with regards to the integration of coal and steal markets. Since then European integration has expanded and now covers myriad domains, among which recently, the security of critical infrastructures, and more specifically the security of electricity networks. This integration took place through the establishment of RCCs, an intensively debated regulation element due to its authority related structure. This research has mapped out the evolvements during the policy making process regarding RCCs. It has also zoomed in on the evolvement of the positions of the European Commission, European Council, European Parliament, national parliaments and ENTSO-E in relation to the RCCs. In order to come to an explanatory account for the adoption of RCCs the policy process has been analysed in light of three European integration theories; neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism and the core state power theory. Specifically, the research has shown that the adoption of RCCs can be best explained by means of the neofunctionalist approach of European integration.
List of abbreviations
ECR European Committee of the Regions
EESC European Economic and Social Committee
ENTSO-E European Networks of Transmission System Operators for Electricity
EU European Union
ITRE Industry, Research and Energy Committee
RCC Regional Coordination Centre
ROC Regional Operational Centre
RSC Regional Security Coordinator
Table of contents Abstract
Abbreviations
1. Introduction 1
1.1 The issue of ‘ROCs’ 1
1.2 Research question 3
1.3 Academic and societal relevance 3
1.4 Thesis outline 4
2. Theoretical framework 6
2.1 The neofunctionalist explanation for European integration 7 2.2 The intergovernmentalist explanation for European integration 8 2.3 The core state power theory in light of critical infrastructures 9
3. Methodology 14
3.1 Research design and case selection 15
3.2 Data collection 17
3.3 Limitations 17
4. Analysis 19
4.1 The policy evolvement: from ROCs to RCCs 19
4.2 The evolvement of positions 26
4.2.1 The position of the European Commission 28
4.2.2 The position of the European Council 28
4.2.3 The position of the European Parliament 29
4.2.4 The position of national parliaments 30
4.2.5 The position of ENTSO-E 32
4.3 Assessing the positions and policy process in light of European integration
theories 33
4.3.1 Positions in light of European integration theories 34 4.3.2 Alternating different templates: European integration theories 35
4.3.2.1 The core state power theory 35
4.3.2.2 Neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, or both? 36
5. Conclusion 38
Chapter 1. Introduction
Recently, energy markets are undergoing a substantial change; the energy transition towards clean energy. In light of the changing markets, in November 2016, the European Commission presented the ‘Clean energy for all’ package. This package constitutes changes for the European energy market in terms of production diversification (from grey to green energy) but will also change the landscape of the energy market due to the integration of the markets of the individual member states (European Commission, n.d.). The package also includes the so called ‘risk-preparedness’ regulation which is focussed on ensuring a resilient energy system by providing prevention, preparation and management of possible electricity crises (European Commission, 2018). A much debated component of this regulation is that of the creation of regional operational centres (ROCs), which have raised a number of issues among member states and other relevant actors involved in the field of electricity networks.
Electricity plays a vital role within contemporary society and influences many aspects of daily life; from facilities such as light and heating to transportation and healthcare, without electricity one is not able to make use of such facilities. This makes the electricity networks vital, if not paramount, and therefore an inadmissible infrastructure in society which has to be organised and operated in an adequate manner. Considering its importance to society it is important that a deeper understanding is created as to how an agreement can be reached in order to facilitate the security of networks.
1.1 The issue of ‘ROCs’
The ROCs, as introduced in the ‘risk preparedness’ proposal are to become a new entity which operates on a regional level with binding decision-making power over member states’ transmission system operators (TSOs). A TSO is a legal entity, often owned by the member state it covers, which is responsible for developing, operating and maintaining the transmission system in a certain geographical area (Glowacki, 2018). The cooperation of TSOs has been present from the 1950s onwards. The current cooperation of TSOs emerged as an association consisting of several TSOs; from 2008 these separate associations were replaced with the establishment of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), which have been acknowledged and empowered by the Commission (ENTSO-E, n.d-a; 2009). Under the ENTSO-E cooperation between the TSOs takes place in the form of Regional Security Coordinators (RSC). The RSCs, of which there are several across Europe, are set up by different interconnected TSOs with the goal of maintaining operational security of the electricity systems involved. In order to ensure
security, the TSOs supply the RSCs with data on the functioning of their transmission system. This data is then analysed by the RSCs which then shares the results and possible recommendations regarding the systems with the TSOs. Ultimately, the decision-making power then lies with the TSOs which decide whether or not to implement the suggested recommendations (ENTSO-E, n.d.-d).
With the diversification of electricity production and the expansion of cross-national electricity flows, there is an elevated need for cooperation between national TSOs (ENTSO-E, n.d.-b). Due to this increase in cross-national electricity flows, the energy market within the EU is increasingly interconnected. TSOs belonging to different member states have to effectively cooperate in order to ensure the transmission of electricity across borders (Glowacki, 2018). Blackouts such as the 2016 winter crisis in central South-Eastern Europe (Egenhofer & Stroia, 2017, p.2-5) fittingly demonstrate the necessity of cooperation among TSOs but also illustrate that the level of cooperation is not yet sufficient. This crisis was triggered by a cold spell that crossed South-Eastern Europe during the winter of 2016; due to the adverse weather conditions, the demand for electricity surged while the supply of electricity declined due to a decrease in the supply of renewable energy sources. In a reaction to these developments, the Bulgarian government feared that an energy shortage would occur and consequently decided to drastically reduce the cross border flow of electricity to Greece (Egenhofer & Stroia, 2017, p.2-3). This affected the security of electricity supply in Greece, who in turn decided to likewise, diminish the cross border flows of electricity to Albania, Macedonia, Turkey and Bulgaria. In retrospect, it has become clear that there was no electricity shortage during this cold spell, but that, due to the non-coordinated responses of states, serious issues with the supply of electricity occurred (Egenhofer & Stroia, 2017, p.5-6). So, by means of the introduction of ROCs the European Commission aims to ensure sufficient regional cooperation between interconnected TSOs leading to an efficient, secure and reliable interconnected network (Glowacki, 2018).
However the proposition of such ROCs has raised a number of issues among TSOs and member states, because as mentioned before, TSOs have been cooperating since the 1950s and this cooperation overall, was on a voluntary basis. However, with the introduction of the new regulation cooperation will become mandatory and will be organised through the EU instead of the TSOs (European Commission, 2017, p.6, 9). This new approach is considered to hamper the development of coordination between TSOs and could, according to the ENTSO-E (2016), lead to conflict over the responsibility of electricity networks. There has also been resistance at member state level regarding the binding decision-making powers
of ROCs (ENTSO-E, 2016). Member states would have to transfer part of their authority over their own national electricity network to the EU. This is undesirable for them because electricity networks are critical infrastructures for which states bear responsibility. States therefore, predominantly prefer to retain power at a national level and insist that the security of critical infrastructures (such as electricity networks), remain a national competency (Boin, Rhinard & Ekengren, 2014, p.138). However, according to Genschel & Jachtenfuchs (2017), they seem to be willing to integrate their authority over core state powers if this lead to better possibilities for coping with issues affecting multiple member states. In light of Genschels & Jachtenfuchs’ (2017) approach of European integration the taking measures to facilitate and ensure the security of electricity networks does seem coherent as past crises, such as the Icelandic ash cloud crisis, have proven that the EU can adequately manage European crises (Kuipers & Boin, 2015).
1.2 Research Question
Despite the opposition towards the proposed establishment of ROCs, in March 2019 (European Parliament, 2019a) the Parliament officially adopted the ‘risk preparedness’ and ‘internal market for electricity’ regulation, which together comprised the ROCs. However, here regional centres have been established under the name of regional cooperation centres (RCCs). As mentioned before, the proposal of ROCs was heavily debated due to the new authority structures it would bring about. Taking into account this opposition towards the proposed establishment of ROCs, this raises the question as to why the establishment of RCCs, in the end was approved? Consequently, this thesis will research how the final acceptance of RCCs came into being. To do so, the central research question will be formulated as follows:
How can the final adoption of RCCs be explained, in spite of the initial opposition?
1.3 Academic and societal relevance
Previous research has shown that the EU has the capacity to deal with transboundary crises although these capacities are rarely used (Boin, et al., 2014). As member states wish to maintain their autonomy, the use of such EU capacities is rather limited (Boin, et al., 2014). So bearing in mind that in the case of the proposed ROCs, TSOs (and thus indirectly member states) would have to give up part of their authority over the security of electricity systems this research can contribute to comprehending why transboundary crisis management
becomes more integrated. It will also add to the academic field of crisis management since it will form a theoretical framework that takes into account the main theories on European integration (neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism and core state power theory) and combines this with the mechanisms deemed necessary for adequate transboundary crisis management (Ansell, Boin & Keller, 2010). This theoretical framework can be relevant for further research on the integration of the security of critical infrastructures other than electricity networks.
On a societal level this research is relevant due to the pertinence of the topic of transboundary crisis management. Interconnected networks, such as energy networks, are increasingly present within contemporary society. This interconnectedness makes that these networks are more prone to the occurrence of transboundary crises, in which case a crisis crosses geographical or judicial borders (Boin, 2018, p.94). Such a transboundary crisis can have significant consequences for societies. Despite this, governments are not yet adequately prepared to deal with these transboundary crises as the crisis prevention and response policies currently in place are predominantly based on bounded crises (Boin, 2018, p.94-95). Considering that these interconnected networks, such as electricity networks, most often are critical infrastructures, it is important that states are able to take preventive measures and prepare for potential transboundary crises. As a result of the energy transition the main energy sources will be renewable, such as solar and wind energy. However, considering that weather conditions are not consistent, the supply of electricity can at times be more volatile, resulting in a higher probability of electricity crises. In order to cope with this, coordination and cooperation is needed, and this research could elucidate as to how such coordination and cooperation can be established. Hence, since electricity, as a critical infrastructure, is vastly important for society but supply is increasingly volatile it is socially relevant to research this topic.
1.4 Thesis outline
In order to explain the acceptance of the establishment of RCCs, this thesis will, in the following chapter provide a theoretical framework through which the adoption of both the ‘risk preparedness’ and ‘internal market for electricity’ regulation can be illustrated. This theoretical framework will focus on explanatory theories on the process of European integration. The third chapter will elaborate on the methods that will be deployed in answering the central research question. Thereafter, the fourth chapter will provide an overview of the policy process which the initial proposal of ROCs has gone through and the
position that various actors (European Commission, European Council, European Parliament, national parliaments and ENTSO-E) had on this topic. Following this overview, it will be assessed as to what extent the theoretical framework provides an explanation for the establishment of RCCs. Lastly, the conclusion will provide an answer to the research question and will explore avenues for future research.
Chapter 2. Theoretical framework
As mentioned in the introduction, the Commission had proposed the establishment of ROCs to ensure the security of the interconnected European electricity networks. This proposal did not just move onward willingly, rather it appeared to be a controversial proposal due to the shifting authority structures that it would bring about. Despite the debates that existed in relation to ROCs, agreement has been reached on the establishment of regional centres, which have been renamed RCCs. This then raises the question as to why, despite the ongoing debate, the establishment of regional centres is about to be officially adopted EU law? In the coming chapter a theoretical framework will be composed through which the process of EU law making will be analysed and a theoretical explanation will be sought after. This framework will focus on three theoretical explanations of European integration; the core state power theory, the neofunctionalist theory and the intergovernmentalist theory. First, the link between European integration and ROCs will be elaborated upon. Thereafter, explanatory European integration theories will be elaborated upon and for each theory an expectation will be formed as to how each theory explains the acceptance of the establishment of RCCs.
European integration can be seen as process in which new institutions are created in order to resolve ‘European issues’ (Georgakakis, 2018, p.1083). Past electricity crises such as the 2016 winter crisis, have shown that the interconnectedness of electricity networks has affected the security of European networks. Due to the rising interconnectedness of networks an electricity crisis is no longer a so called ‘bounded crisis’ (Boin, 2018, p.94) that confines to a certain geographical border. Rather these crises have become transboundary in nature which entails that a relatively small interruption can evolve into a crisis that reaches beyond geographical and functional borders (Boin, 2018, p.94). The transboundary nature of electricity crises thus makes it a European issue since it can affect multiple member states. The proposed solution of ROCs can thus be seen as the process of European integration, since it involves the establishment of a new institution which is better equipped to cope with the specific European issue of the security of electricity networks. As mentioned, there are various theoretical approaches that aim to provide an explanatory account for this process of European integration. For the specific case of the proposed ROCs the following three theories will be applied to explain European integration in the case of ROCs: the core state power theory, the neofunctionalist theory and the intergovernmentalist theory. These theories have been chosen because they provide an explanation as to why states agree with integration, albeit through different approaches.
2.1 The neofunctionalist explanation for European integration
Neofunctionalism was first introduced by Ernst Haas (1985), other scholars such as Lindberg & Scheingold (1970) also contributed to the further establishment of this theory. Essentially, neofunctionalism is based on the notion of spillovers, and regards those as the driver of European integration. Haas (1985) addresses two types of spillovers, namely functional and political spillovers. A functional spillover occurs when states decide to integrate a specific policy area, authority is then transferred from individual states to a more central EU institution (Pollack, 2005, p.359). Due to the interdependence of policy areas the adequate functioning of a certain policy is often conditional to the functioning of adjoining policies. Therefore, integration in one policy area might lead to pressures to facilitate integration on other policy areas in order to ensure that these policies will function adequately (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p.198).
Functional spillovers are often reinforced by political spillovers, which are created by political pressures originating from supranational institutions, such as the European Commission, and subnational actors belonging to integrated policy fields such as interest groups within states (Pollack, 2005, p.359-360). These institutions often come to realise that certain paramount issues cannot be resolved adequately at national level, but rather are of the opinion that further integration should be established in order to address them (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p.198-199). As these institutions have already experienced the benefits that integration can bring about, they are likely to promote further integration, leading to more pressure on other policy fields to integrate in addition to the pressures originating from functional spillovers (Pollack, 2005, p.359). This process of increased pressure to integrate is seen as a self-sustaining process; as integration is established in one policy field spillovers will then lead to integration of another policy field which will consecutively create pressure for integration of yet another adjoining policy field (Pollack, 2005, p.360).
Following the neofunctionalist approach of European integration, the proposal of ROCs and the final establishment of RCCs can be explained by both functional as well as, political spillovers. A functional spillover is present; the integration of electricity markets has led to issues regarding the security of electricity networks, and has moreover, increased the likelihood of a transboundary electricity crisis. In order to ensure that the integrated networks will function adequately the need has risen to also integrate the neighbouring policy field of network security. This functional spillover is strengthened by a political spillover, namely the Commission promoting this next step of integration with the proposal of ROCs (European Commission, 2016c), which would entail a transfer of authority over the security of networks
from TSOs towards the ROCs. Overall, according to the neofunctionalist approach of European integration the adoption can be explained by the presence of a functional, and a political spillover which is driven by the European Commission. The self-sustaining process driven by spillovers has led to the establishment of RCCs
2.2 The intergovernmentalist explanation for European integration
As a reaction to neofunctionalism, a new intergovernmentalist approach towards integration was developed by Stanley Hoffmann in 1966. In contrast to neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism does not approach integration as a self-sustaining process on which states have no influence. Rather it recognizes that states can influence the process of European integration; as they can enforce further integration or oppose it (Pollack, 2005, p.360). Thus states are not seen as subject to the development and expansion of functional and political spillovers but rather as the drivers of integration. According to intergovernmentalism, states always aim to protect their own national interest over others and are thus likely to reject transferring their sovereignty to another institution. It is therefore preferable for states to function within intergovernmental institutions since this would imply that they still control their own sovereignty (Moga, 2009, p.802). With the idea of maintaining sovereignty, the intergovernmental foundation of the European Commission ensured that states maintained power in the decision-making process (Pollack, 2005, p.360). In that respect, if European integration does occur it is likely because member states wish to do so, and not due to a process that they do not control, such as spillovers (Moga, 2009, p.802).
As an expansion of the intergovernmentalist approach, the liberal intergovernmentalism theory was developed by Andrew Moravcsik (1993), which emphasizes the power and preferences of states and consists of three stages that account for the evolvement of European integration. The first is an accumulation of national preferences; national leaders gather citizens interest and integrate this with their own interest, after which the EU is then notified of these collective national preferences. Thus, according to this theory, national preferences are decided upon at a domestic level, as opposed to preferences being constructed by the EU as is the case with neofunctionalism (Pollack, 2005, p.360-361). In the second stage, states express their preferences towards one another and negotiate on preferences in policies. The outcomes of these negotiations are determined by the relative power of each state, making that those with relatively more power will have a greater influence on the outcome of negotiations. Thus, in this model, there is no pressure from
supranational actors such as the European Commission, since pressures is exerted by the states with the most bargaining power (Pollack, 2005, p.361). During the third stage, member states pool and delegate sovereignty towards international organisations to ensure the reliability of collective agreements. By delegating some sovereignty the state’s compliance to agreements can be perceived as enhancing the credibility of those agreements (Pollack, 2005, p.361). Thus, intergovernmentalism centralises the member state’s preferences and commitment as leading factors for integration whereas the neofunctionalist approach regards integration as a result of spillovers which cannot be controlled by member states.
Over the past years the Council, which is comprised of member state representatives, has been gaining a more influential role in the policy making process. Research has shown that policy making has obtained a more Council-centric view, implying that the Council obtains more influence over policy outcomes than the Parliament has (Thomson & Hosli, 2006, p.391). This growing influence of the Council shows that member states are likely to have strong bargaining powers in the policy process. Depicting the intergovernmentalist theory in light of EU policy making process, one would expect that since the Council has a powerful bargaining position the preferences of the Council, which depicts member state’s preferences, are likely to be prominent in the policy making process. Hence, an intergovernmentalist explanatory account for the adoption of RCCs would be that further integration was preferred by member states. This is because due to the weighty influence that the Council has, it has successfully bargained for the establishment of RCCs according to member state’s preferences. Taking this into account, the intergovernmentalist explanation for the establishment of RCCs would be that it is prefered by member states. And considering that the Council has gained significant influence over the final outcome of policies, it is deemed likely that it would have successfully bargained for the preferences of member states, which it represents.
2.3 The core state power theory in light of critical infrastructures
As elaborated upon in the previous two sections the integration theories of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism both seem to take a different approach when it comes to giving an exploratory account for European integration. Nonetheless, Genschel & Jachtenfuchs (2018, p.180) argue that these theories seem to share three essential assumptions. First, in both theories interdependencies lead to a demand of integration. Second, in both theories integration is established by regulatory integration which predominantly enables centralised monitoring and enforcement of harmonised regulations. Third, they take a rather optimistic
stand when it comes to the ability of conflict resolution. Genschel & Jachtenfuchs (2018, p.181) hence state that “neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism share a remarkable optimism regarding the supply of integration”.
According to Genschel & Jachtenfuchs (2018, p.181) this ‘functional optimism’ seems to account for European market integration and is less persuasive as an explanation for the integration of core state powers. Market integration, which facilitates the liberalisation of markets, tends to be beneficial for all states participating and seems to be driven by the existence of common interests and a greatest common factor which in turn facilitates conflict resolution (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2018, p.181). However, when the integration initiated involves the so called ‘core state powers’ conflict resolution seems less plausible. The interconnectedness of electricity networks appears to comprise of both market integration and core state power integration; the cross border flows of electricity can be addressed as the integration of markets, however, in light of security it appears to concern the integration of a core state power. Genschel & Jachtenfuchs (2018, p.181) conceptualise core state powers as actions that a state can take due to its monopoly on coercion and taxation, for example: border control, security and public revenue. The integration of such powers comes with distributive conflicts; the availability of resources such as public revenue is limited making it labourious to come to an agreement on how to distribute these. It can be argued that crisis management is likewise a core state power. Since states currently have to ensure the security of supply for which crisis management and prevention play a crucial role, and have the sole ownership and responsibility of the security of networks, the instrument through which they obtain security, crisis management, can be considered to be a core state power.
In order for the integration of core state powers to work Genschel & Jachtenfuchs (2018, p.181-182) suggest that the following two things should be in place. First, there should be some form of burden sharing in terms of the costs for complying to the regulatory burden that develops due to the integration. Second, the capacities that facilitate core state powers at national level should similarly be present if these core state powers were to be integrated at the EU level (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2018, p.181-182). So, zooming in on the execution of crisis management, specifically transboundary crisis management, at the EU level the question can be raised as to what capacities would be needed to ensure adequate crisis management, and whether ROCs can facilitate these capacities. Ansell, et al. (2010) have established four different mechanisms that are necessary for adequate transboundary crises management, namely: distributed sense making, surge capacity, networked coordination and formal boundary-spanning structures.
The first mechanism, distributed sense making, is focused on creating a so called ‘common operating picture’ also known as sense making (Ansell, et al., 2010, p.201). In order to create such a common picture of a crisis various information is needed. However since a transboundary crisis involves many different actors crucial information is distributed across geographical and functional boundaries sense making can become a challenge. According to Ansell et al. (2010, p.201-202) there are four factors that can improve such distributed sense making. The first being an independent central organ that can coordinate and pass on information between different actors. Second, such an organ has to be able to take on a leading role when it comes to linking the available information and decision-making. Third, the organ should operate on such a level that it covers all different actors involved. Fourth, the organ should be able to act within the field of the crisis itself.
The second mechanism, surge capacity, concentrates on what specific capacities enable a quick response that is properly scaled to a crisis. Looking at surge capacity from the perspective of a bounded crisis four main components are needed: professional first responders, supply chain management, fast track procedures and an integrated command centre. However for these components to be effective in the case of a transboundary crisis, organizations have to be able to adapt quickly. In order to ensure this adaptability organizations should establish routines for novel situations by connecting readily available knowledge and skills (Ansell, et al., 2010, p.202).
The third mechanism, networked coordination focusses on cooperation between critical stakeholders. Within a transboundary crisis multiple critical stakeholders can be present such as public and private organisations. Cooperation between critical stakeholders contributes to the establishment of an effective response. To ensure cooperation between these critical stakeholders a coordinative effort is needed. The question of how to coordinate such cooperation is one which is much debated. There are two main opposing stands on how coordination should be set up, the first states that authority structures should be established for organizations and jurisdiction in advance. Whereas the opposing stand is of the believe that crisis response should not be centrally coordinated in a top-down manner because it would not be an appropriate approach to facilitate self-organization . Networked coordination implies a combination of both stands, namely a high degree of self-organization together with low levels of central coordination (Ansell, et al., 2010, p.203).
The fourth mechanism, formal boundary spanning structures, focusses on the dispersion of authority. When a crisis occurs critical decision have to be made, however it is not always clear which actors have the authority to make them. Especially within a
transboundary crisis it is often unclear as authority is widely spread. In order to ensure that decision-making authority is clearly arranged over geographical, policy and time boundaries, through prescriptive formal structures which are set up in advance. By doing so the granulation of authority, present in transboundary crises, can become more organized and any possible lack of ownership can be addressed (Ansell, et al., 2010, p.203-204).
As previous crises, such as the Icelandic ash cloud crisis, have shown the EU has the capacities to facilitate coordination and cooperation (Kuipers & Boin, 2015). The EU has different policies and venues in place which can bring together different actors involved in a crisis and this way assist in the decision-making process and the management of a crisis (Boin, et al. 2014, p.140). Hence, it can be expected that the establishment of the proposed ROCs, which will take place at EU level, can foresee and provide in the needed mechanisms for adequate transboundary crisis management. To conclude, on the basis of the core state power theory the final adoption of RCCs would be explained on the account, that as a consequence of integration adequate transboundary crisis management can be put in place for electricity networks. Thus, the RCCs would have been established on the condition that they can contribute to the establishment of distributed sense making, surge capacity, networked coordination and formal boundary-spanning structures.
To sum up, European integration can be beneficial for tackling European issues. The security of electricity networks can be regarded as a European issue, due to the interconnectedness of networks, and electricity crisis are transboundary of nature making that it can spread towards multiple member states. This chapter has discussed various theories which all give an explanatory account for the process of European integration and has set out what expected explanatory account these theories would have for the final adoption of RCCs. The first theory, neofunctionalism, gives an explanatory account which appoints self-sustaining process of functional and political spillovers as the main driver of European integration (Pollack, 2005; Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). Following this theory the adoption of RCCs can be explained as being the outcome of functional and political spillovers that have occurred as a result of the integration of electricity markets. The second theory, intergovernmentalism, points particularly at the states themselves, as being the drivers of European integration (Pollack, 2005). Following this theory the adoption of RCCs can be explained as the outcome of states’ preferences which are bargained for by the Council which has a strong influence on the formation of policy. The third theory, core state powers, identifies the capacities that European integration can generate in dealing with European issues as being the main driver for integration (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2018). Following
this theory, the adoption of RCCs would then be explained as being due to the contribution it would deliver for the mechanisms needed for transboundary crisis management as constructed by Ansell, et al. (2010).
Chapter 3. Methodology
In the previous chapter, a theoretical framework has been constructed which provides three possible explanations for European integration. In the following chapter the methods used to execute this research will be elaborated upon, followed by a presentation and justification of, the research design. Subsequently, the data collection will be elaborated upon and to conclude, the limitations that surface in this methodology will be discussed.
In order to answer the research question first, a description of the policy process will be composed. This description will give an overview of how the proposal of ROCs has developed and changed overtime, leading to the final establishment of RCCs. Furthermore, the developments in the positions of the European Commission, European Council, European Parliament, national parliaments and ENTSO-E throughout the policy making process will be elaborated upon and subsequently linked to the integration theories. Thereafter, the method of process tracing will be applied to the description of the policy making process in order to arrive at a final answer to the question; how the establishment of RCCs can be explained? Since this method creates explanations by following the process that leads to a certain outcome, instead of explaining variances of an outcome, there will be no fixed dependent and independent variables within this research (Langley, 1999, p.692). Particularly, the process that will be traced for this research is the process of EU law making which has led to the adoption of RCCs to ensure the security of the interconnected electricity networks within Europe.
In general, there are multiple strategies that can be used for process tracing, but specifically, thesis will make use of the ‘alternate template’ strategy, which takes a deductive approach by applying multiple theories and analysing to what extent these different theories are present within the process and whether this makes for an adequate explanation (Langley, 1999, p.692). The theories that will be applied as alternate templates are theories that provide an explanatory account for European integration. As each theory takes on a different approach towards European integration, an adequate interpretation as to why agreement has been reached, regarding the adoption of the implementation of ROCs can be formed. Table 1 provides an overview of these theories; operationalisation of European integration, and how they are each expected to explain the integration of the security of electricity networks. The alternate template strategy is chosen as it can provide an explanatory account as to why the proposal has been accepted while still taking into account the context of the policy process. Furthermore, this strategy makes it possible to map out the different sides of, and arguments
made in, the debate and consequently ascertain to what extent the theories can account for the final establishment of RCCs.
Table 1. Operationalisation of European integration Operationalisation of
European integration
Explanatory account for the adoption of RCCs
Neofunctionalism
A self-sustaining process driven by functional and political spillovers (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015).
The integration of electricity markets has led to a need for further integration in the area of network security.
Intergovernmentalism
A process which is driven by member states
preferences (Pollack, 2005).
Integration because it is a
depiction of MS preferences, due to the strong bargaining power of the Council these preferences are also reflected in the policy outcome.
Core state powers
A process which is driven by the capacities that it creates (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2017).
RCCs can contribute to the establishment of capacities needed for adequate transboundary crisis management of electricity networks.
3.2 Research design and case selection
This thesis takes on the format of a case study on the ‘risk preparedness’ and ‘internal market for electricity’ regulation, in particular the establishment of RCCs. Since this research will make observations and derive an explanation of a single case it will be an explanatory single with-in case study (Toshkov, 2016, p.258). This case study will aim at providing a general overview of the policy process which the risk preparedness regulation and the internal market for electricity regulation have gone through. Furthermore, an overview of the positions that various actors have taken on during the policy process will also be presented. The actors which will be studied are the three main EU law making institutions; the Commission,
Council and parliament. Additionally, the positions and contribution of the national parliaments of Romania (2017), Spain (2017), Czech Republic (2017), Poland (2017) and Austria (2017) will be studied. The position of ENTSO-E will likewise be researched and analysed.
The unit of analysis for this single with-in case study will be the policy process which has led to the final adoption of RCCs. This policy process was marked by a debate on the transfer of decision-making powers to new European regional centres, as unquestionably there was resistance due to the concerns regarding authority over electricity networks (van Renssen, 2018). The above mentioned actors (Commission, Council, European Parliament, national parliaments and ENTSO-E) were selected for the following reasons. First, the three European institutions had been selected due to their role in the establishment of European legislations; the European Commission introduces proposals for new legislations. The Council and the Parliament in turn, study the proposal made by the Commission and thereafter make suggestions for amendments to the proposal (European Union, 2018). Since these three institutions together embody the European policy making process, it is relevant to study their positions and contributions during the policy process which covered the establishment of RCCs, as this process is the unit of analysis.
Second, the national parliaments of Romania, Spain, Czech Republic, Poland and Austria have been selected for two main reasons. The first reason concerns the representativeness of the Council; it consists of the representatives of all member states, but also has the responsibility to aggregate the preferences of all member states. Hence, the position taken by the Council does not always reflect the positions the individual member states take on. Second, since member states can, individually, put forward their views on proposed legislation (European Union, 2019), they could possibly influence the final policy process.
Third, ENTSO-E has been selected due to its role particularly, it represents all TSOs across Europe (ENTSO-E, n.d.-c). In addition, it has the legal mandate to enhance cooperation among the TSOs and facilitate the creation of an internal electricity market (ENTSO-E, n.d.-a). As ENTSO-E is extensively involved in the actual integration of electricity networks they are strongly opinionated on the issue of network security and have adopted a more practical position on the matter of ROCs. Furthermore, as ENTSO-E represents national TSOs it is possible that their position is likely to influence the final policy making, since the policy can affect the function of TSOs.
3.3 Data collection
For this research, the data that will be used is data which originates from secondary sources. To give a general overview of the development of the proposed ROCs, first the proposal of the Clean Energy package as published 30 November 2016 (European Commission, 2016a), containing the proposal of ROCs will be elaborated upon. Furthermore, statements made by both the Council (Council of the European Union, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; 2017d) and the Parliament (European Parliament, 2018; 2019a; 2019b; 2019c) will be deployed in order to ascertain their positions and proposed amendments. The final agreements reached on the ‘risk preparedness’ regulation and the ‘internal market for electricity’ regulation will be assessed in order to analyse what the final establishment of RCCs entails, and how this differs from the initially proposed ROCs. To research the positions of the national parliaments with regards to the proposed ROCs, the reasoned opinions that have been contributed by the Romanian Senate (2017), the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (2017), the Spanish Parliament (2017), the Polish Senate (2017) and the Austrian Bundesrat (2017) will be analysed. Additionally, to manifest the position of ENTSO-E, relevant reports published by the ENTSO-E (2017a; 2017b) will be analysed.
3.4 Limitations
As with all methods, the method of process tracing comes with its limitations. The first limitation regards the generalisability of the outcomes of this research. Considering that this research solely focuses on the adoption of the risk preparedness regulation and the internal market for electricity regulation (specifically the establishment of RCCs), the explanatory account for this acceptance will not be generalisable to a broader population. Hence, the explanation as to why, in this case, European integration has occurred does not explain the occurrence of European integration in other cases. Nevertheless, this limitation does not appear to be troublesome since the aim of this research is not to give a general explanatory account for European integration, but to compose an explanatory account for European integration for this specific case.
The second limitation concerns the access to data. In essence, the EU has a wide range of public documents available, also on the legislative process of the Clean Energy package. Even though the majority of documents coming from the Commission, Council, and Parliament are available through online media such as the Legislative Observatory and EUR-lex, these documents do not cover the entire policy process. To exemplify, meetings held behind closed doors, such as trilogues, are not made publicly available. So, in the case of the
Clean Energy package this entails that the bargaining process which took place during the trilogues (meetings involving the Commission, Council and Parliament with the aim of reaching consensus on the policies) cannot be analysed. Although this does form a limitation for this research, a comparison of the positions of all three institutions before the commencement of the trilogues and the final outcome of the meetings can still provide a good overview of those who have withdrawn from their previous position and those whose position was reinforced particularly after the trilogues. In light of this, an overall appraisal of the bargaining process during the trilogues can still be created.
Chapter 4. Analysis
The coming chapter will provide an analysis of the legislative process through which the Clean Energy package has progressed, specifically focusing on the establishment of ROCs. The first section will give an overview of the evolvement of the proposed establishment of ROCs. The section thereafter, will cover the positions that the European Commission, European Council, European Parliament, national parliaments and ENTSO-E have taken on regarding the establishment of ROCs. This will be elaborated upon, and will be explored in light of European integration theories. The last section will apply the alternate template strategy by analysing which European integration theory can best give an explanatory account for the establishment of RCCs, which will help to construct an answer to the central research question.
4.1 The policy evolvement: from ROCs to RCCs
On 30 November 2016 the Commission introduced the ‘Clean Energy for all Europeans’ package (European Commission, 2016a). This package consisted of various legislation which together form the European energy policy framework. Prior to the formation of the package the Commission had executed an impact assessment, in which became apparent that, among other things, the crisis management of member states’ TSOs abided by uncoordinated national approaches, in which the possible effects of those approaches on neighbouring states was disregarded (European Commission, 2016b). Blackouts such as one in 2003 in Italy and Switzerland, during which a fault in the Swiss transmission system caused a power outage in Italy and also affected Austria, France and Slovenia (Johnson, 2007, p.1) was proof that the then existing cooperation was not adequate enough to ensure functional operational network security. Apparently, the blackout was the result of inadequate cooperation and a lack of links between the electricity networks (European Commission, 2010, p.3). As this examples shows, with the expansion of the interconnectedness of electricity systems throughout the EU the probability of a transboundary electricity crisis has also increased. This led the Commission to propose preparation for, and mitigation of risks anticipated which should be determined at a regional rather than national level. In order to establish this imperative regional cooperation, the Commission has proposed the establishment of ROCs, with the aim of better cooperation between TSOs at a regional level (European Commission, 2016c, p.3-5). The proposal appeared in both the ‘risk preparedness’ and the ‘internal market for electricity’ proposals, whereas the latter covers the in-depth design of ROCs.
As the policy process continued, the regulatory package drafted by the Commission was presented and discussed in an Energy Council meeting on 27 February 2017, after which the members of the Council shared their initial response on the package (Council of the European Union, 2017a). During this meeting the members of the Council recognized that the European electricity markets are changing in terms of the interconnectedness and that regional cooperation should be established. Nonetheless, it was also stressed that in order to establish this cooperation, national decision-making powers should not be appointed at the ROCs as was suggested in the proposal, rather they should be maintained at national level (Council of the European Union, 2017a, p.4-5). During the following Council meeting in June 2017, the Council affirmed its acceptance of the entire legislative package, though some issues of concern regarding the package were raised (Council of the European Union, 2017d). These issues were related to the proposed creation of ROCs; the security of supply was seen as an issue as was the role that ROCs would take on towards the TSOs due to their decision-making powers (Council of the European Union, 2017d, p.7). Also, the security of supply is a responsibility of the member states, however with the allocation of decision-making powers towards the proposed ROCs, their authority over the security of supply would be attenuated (Gonzalez, 2018).
This concern of transition in power from a national to a regional level was also present among the parliaments of various member states. Via reasoned opinions expressed throughout May and June 2017, various national parliaments expressed their major concern that equipping ROCs with binding decision-making powers would be incompatible with the member states’ responsibility of providing security of supply (Romanian Senate, 2017; Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, 2017; Spanish Parliament, 2017; Polish Senate, 2017; Austrian Bundesrat, 2017). Additionally, national parliaments also adduced that the establishment of ROCs as proposed by the Commission would not comply with the subsidiarity principle. The principle entails that first, decision-making in the EU should be done at the closest possible level to EU citizens and second, that the EU will only take action if they can do this in a more effective manner than would be the case if action would be taken at the national level (EUR-Lex, n.d.). According to the national parliaments the establishment of ROCs in the first place, would not seem to provide any improvements on the cooperation mechanisms that were already in place, and second, were deemed as a replacement of the TSOs which already managed the security of supply (Romanian Chamber of Deputies, 2017, p.2; Spanish Parliament, 2017, p.4). Hence, considering that the security of energy supply was already executed at member state level,
upscaling this to the regional level was not seen as being in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.
The disapproving position of the Council continued to be present as it adopted a general approach late 2017 on both the risk preparedness and the internal market for electricity proposal. In great contrast to the initial proposals the general approaches did not agree with the establishment of ROCs. Rather references to ROCs were replaced by references to regional security coordinators (Council of the European Union, 2017b; 2017c). These RSCs were to take over all the tasks and responsibilities that the Commission had originally appointed to the ROCs. This shift towards the RSC seems congruent with the initial disapproving position of the Council. To note, the RSCs are companies owned by TSOs which facilitate coordination between TSOs, so this enables them to ensure the security of the electricity networks (ENTSO-E, n.d.-c). By delegating the tasks and responsibilities towards the RSCs, cooperation in prevention and management of possible crises would be facilitated while member states would still withhold their authority.
Whereas the Council did not approve of the establishment of regional coordinators the European Parliament in its first response, took on a different position. In name of the European Parliament the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the European Committee of the Regions (ECR) carried out an initial inquiry into the proposed policy package. The EESC welcomed the strengthening of regional cooperation and agreed that decision-making powers should be transferred from national to regional levels (EESC, 2017a, p.3; 2017b, p.6). The ECR, however stated that, while it agrees that there should be more focus on coordination at the regional level, it regrets that, in their view, the Commission did not set out clear and distinct rules regarding the role that regional authorities would take on (ECR, 2017, p.1). Taking these results as a reflection of the Parliaments position, it can be said that it first took on a predominantly supportive position towards the Commission’s proposal.
In February 2018, the Parliament presented its general approach which still seemed to be supportive of character towards the Commission’s proposal (European Parliament, 2018). Nonetheless, it simultaneously catered to the issues raised by the Council, thereby bridging the stark contrast that existed between the Commission and the Council. The general idea of the Commission was that ROCs would become upgraded versions of the RSCs, however others perceived this differently; the ROCs would eventually sideline RSCs and take over the operation (as the name implied) of the electricity networks (Van Renssen, 2018). Therefore, the Parliament, in its general approach (European Parliament, 2018), renamed the ROCs,
regional coordination centres so as to emphasize that the TSOs would remain in control of the security operations of the networks while the RCCs would take on the task of enabling cooperation not the execution of operational tasks (Gonzalez, 2018). Nonetheless, the Parliament still emphasized that in light of the increasingly interconnected electricity networks, security coordination at a regional level would be the next logical and necessary step (European Parliament, 2018, p.100-101).
With the adoption of the general approach the Parliaments Industry, Research and Energy Committee (ITRE) initiated interinstitutional negotiations (also known as trilogues) bringing together the Commission, Council and the Parliament in order to negotiate towards an agreement regarding the proposed policy package (European Parliament, n.d.). These trilogue meetings1 began in June 2018, and after six meetings a provisional agreement on a final act for both the risk preparedness regulation and internal electricity market was reached on 19 December 2018, which have been adopted by the European Parliament in March 2019 (European Parliament, 2019a, p.2). The positions of all three institutions can be found back in these final acts (European Parliament, 2019b; European Parliament, 2019c). As suggested by the Parliament the ROCs were renamed RCCs, reassuring that TSOs would remain in control over the operational aspects of the electricity networks. This emphasis on the maintenance of the authority of TSOs, did not merely manifest itself in this renaming of the ROC’s. Other additional changes were made in the final act in terms of the geographical scope and the role the RCCs would take on, also illustrate this. The determination of the geographical scope of RCCs would, as suggested in the proposal package be determined by the ENTSO-E (European Commission, 2017, p.65). However in the final act, the TSOs also gained a say in the determination of the geographical scope; in case a TSO does not agree with the defined scope they can appeal against this decision and propose amendments (European Parliament, 2019c, p.172-174), thereby strengthening their authority over the establishment of RCCs.
Furthermore, in the final acts, especially the act on the internal electricity market, several amendments have been made which changes the nature of the role that RCCs will take on in the future. To begin with, the RCC’s assigned tasks such as identifying regional electricity crisis scenarios and the coordination of regional restoration, to no longer be executed on their own initiative. Rather, they would fulfill a supporting role for the TSOs in execution of these tasks (European Parliament, 2019c, p.176). Next to the main supportive role in the previously proposed tasks, the RCCs additional supportive tasks were appended in
the final act (European Parliament, 2019c, p.176-178). Additionally, the decision-making powers granted to them in line with the proposed package (European Commission, 2017, p.67) were no longer present in the final act. Here, instead of decision-making the emphasis has been redirected towards the establishment of a cooperative process between RCCs and TSOs. Yet, in contrast to these weakened decision-making powers of RCCs the amendments made to the final act foresaw the TSOs with more power, namely, TSOs had obtained the possibility to initiate actions and make recommendations themselves, and thereby gained more influence over how, and what tasks a RCC should execute (European Parliament, 2019c, p.186). Altogether, these amendments depict that the power of RCCs have diminished significantly and instead have been assigned a supportive role towards the TSOs, while the TSOs have been bestowed with more influence on the functioning of RCCs. This increase of influence was also in place for member states; the final act accounted member states as relevant stakeholders who have to be consulted by RCCs and whose recommendations have to be taken into account by them (European Parliament, 2019c, p.183). Consequently, the influence of member states increased with regards to the functioning of RCCs and the execution of their tasks. Despite this growth of the member states’ influence, the final act did stress that RCCs will act independently of the interests of TSOs and individual national interests(European Parliament, 2019c, p.171).
To conclude, the above overview has shown that the initial proposal of the establishment of ROCs has gone through significant changes, which as a result watered down the Commission’s proposal in such a fashion that the final acts are predominantly in accordance with the Council’s initial position on the creation of regional coordination. The ROCs have been renamed RCCs to provide reassurance that these centres would not sideline the authority of the TSOs over the electricity networks (Gonzalez, 2018). Furthermore, the power of the RCCs has diminished considerably while TSOs and member states on the contrary have gained more influence over RCCs. Besides this curtailment of power, they have also been designated a more supporting role towards the TSOs rather than the more authoritative role that the Commission had initially assigned to them in the policy package proposal. These changes show that the Council was successful in the bargaining process during the trilogues. Their main concern, the division in the decision-making powers and network security responsibility (Council of the European Union, 2017a), is handled in these final acts considering that the RCCs no longer have decision-making powers but rather have a supporting role towards the TSOs. Nonetheless, although the Council initially did not agree with the establishment of coordination through the establishment of a new regional entity, but
rather conveyed coordination to the RSCs (Council of the European Union, 2017b), the establishment of such a regional entity did occur in the form of RCCs. Hence, it does seem that, with the establishment of RCCs the Council somewhat did give in on their position, since a new regional entity was created. However, the essence and supportive character of these new entities does reflect the position of the Council. The policy evolvement is depicted in a timeline in figure 1.
Figure 1. Timeline development of the proposal for ROCs
‘Clean energy for all’ package proposed by the Commission
‘Clean energy’ package discussion in Commission
Reasoned opinions national parliaments
Reasoned opinions national parliaments
Council accepts package; but raises some
issues Council adopts general approach
Parliament adopts general approach
Trilogues start
trilogue ends; provisional agreement reached
Nov. 2016 Feb. 2017 Jun. 2017 May-17 Jun. 2017 Dec. 2017 Feb. 2018 Jun. 2018 Dec. 2018
4.2 The evolvement of positions
The previous sub-chapter has shown that the establishment of ROCs as proposed by the Commission has been watered down. Table 2 shows an overview of the bargaining process which has led to establishment of RCCs. What becomes evident from the table is that the composition of the RCCs mostly reflects the position of the Council, resulting in the establishment of a regional entity that are supportive toward national TSO rather than the authority governing them. However, despite the resistance towards the creation of such a new regional entity, the establishment of the RCCs in the end did come through. The coming chapter will analyse the positions of various actors (European Commission, European Council, European Parliament, National Parliaments and ENTSO-E) with the main aim of explaining the establishment of RCCs and the European integration this has brought about. Concluding, the theoretical framework will be reflected upon in light of the positions of the various actors and an answer to the research question will be formulated.
Table 2. Overview of the development of positions
Initial position Further developments position Political implication in terms of integration
Gains and losses after trilogues
European Commission
Facilitate regional cooperation through ROCs.
- More European integration. Gain:
Establishment of a regional entity (RCCs).
Loss:
RCCs did not obtain actual powers to facilitate regional cooperation; rather they support TSOs. European Parliament Facilitate regional cooperation through ROCs.
Facilitate regional cooperation through RCCs while TSOs remain in control over network operations.
More European integration. Gains:
Establishment of RCCs.
TSOs remain in control of network operations.
Loss:
RCCs did not obtain decision-making powers; these remain at TSO level. European Council Regional cooperation is already in place, decision-making powers should remain at national level.
Regional cooperation should be facilitated by existing RSCs.
No further European integration.
Gain:
RCCs did not obtain decision-making powers; these remain at TSO level.
Loss:
Establishment of a new regional entity (RCCs).
4.2.1 The position of the European Commission
Considering that the Commission introduced the proposal which initiated the establishment of ROCs it is clear that they take on a position which comparingly, is in favour of ROCs. The Commission voiced concerns regarding the changing European electricity markets. Electricity networks across Europe have become more and more interconnected. Nonetheless, when it comes to the prevention and management of potential electricity crises member states still tend to operate in a autonomous manner focussing solely on their national context. Hence the manner in which these potential crises are approached varies from state to state (European Commission, 2016c, p.2). With this in mind, potential electricity crises will most likely also affect neighbouring states meaning that these crises will take on a transboundary nature. According to the Commission, the lack of cooperation between member states and the lack of uniformity in rules and regulations regarding crisis management has resulted in a regulatory gap (ENTSO-E, 2016). So, in order to fill this gap, the Commission proposed the formation of ROCs in order to establish regional coordination which could then strengthen the risk preparedness of European electricity networks.
On analysing the position of the Commission on the establishment of ROCs it becomes clear that their position is congruent with the neofunctionalist approach of European integration (Pollack, 2005). The self-sustaining process of European integration as a result of spillovers is seen in the situation where the integration of European electricity markets which have led to the need of further integration in this field. In line with the framework on transboundary crisis management by Ansell, et al. (2010) the Commission has aimed to facilitate more cooperation and coordination to ensure prevention and management of transboundary crises among the European electricity networks. The cooperation and coordination would, in this case, be facilitated by ROCs which would encompass further European integration. So, as a result of the integration of the electricity markets a functional spillover has occurred, which has led to the need for further European integration in the field of electricity crisis management.
4.2.2 The position of the European Council
As opposed to the Commission, the Council seemed to denounce the establishment of ROCs. The Council feared that as a result of the establishment of ROCs they would have to transfer their authority over the security of their electricity networks to the new ROCs (Council of the European Union, 2017a, p.4-5). As the theory on intergovernmentalism describes, states are generally not willing to transfer their sovereignty to other institutions (Moga, 2009, p.802).
The position the Council adopts clearly surfaces the intergovernmentalist theory of European integration. This theory embraces the statement, that states are resistant to further integration as is also present in the specific case of ROCs; the Council is against the establishment of ROCs because this would, in their view, entail the transfer of authority from the national level to the European regional level. Despite the disagreement on part of the Council, it still acknowledged the necessity of cooperation in light of the growing interconnectedness of electricity networks (Council of the European Union, 2017a, p.5). The Council had initially pleaded that cooperation should be reinforced, however, they stated that this should be facilitated by the already existing RSCs.
When looking at the final act it becomes clear that, as expected, the Council has had a significant influence on the outcome of the final acts. Although the proposed approach of the council; appointing RSCs to facilitate cooperation rather than ROCs, the establishment of regional coordinators were nevertheless effected in the final acts (European Parliament, 2019b; 2019c). However, the conditions under which the RCCs are to be established in the final acts clearly resonate the Council’s position. On reviewing the final acts (European Parliament, 2019b; 2019c), it becomes clear that the member states have retained their authority over the security of supply. First of all, the RCCs have obtained a supporting role towards the TSOs while the latter in turn gained influence over the functioning of the RCCs. Since TSO’s fall under the command of member states indirectly, states will still have the authority when it comes to the security of electricity networks. Second, member states have also gained more direct influence on the functioning of the RCCs as influential stakeholders now have to be consulted and taken into account by the RCCs. Thus, taken altogether, it seems that although the integration of electricity markets has consequently led to a need for integration, on the other policy field of electricity crisis management, this integration did not occur at the expense of member state’s authority. Rather, member states have gained significant influence over the functioning of RCCs, this way mitigating their concerns. This demonstrates that indeed, the process of integration was not a self-sustaining process as the neofunctionalist approach suggests (Pollack, 2005, p.360), rather it has been controlled by member states as is in accordance with the intergovernmentalist take on European integration (Moga, 2009, p.802).
4.2.3 The position of the European Parliament
The Parliament took on a more intermediate position towards the establishment of ROCs. It acknowledged that indeed TSOs should retain the final responsibility when it comes to the
