The changing perception of the AIVD: A comparative research into the public’s perception of the AIVD between 2007 and 2019

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09-6-2019

The changing

perception of the AIVD

A comparative research into the public’s

perception of the AIVD between 2007 and 2019

Program: Master Crisis- and Security Management

Student: Montse van Schie

Student number: s2370921

Supervisor: Willemijn Aerdts

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1. Introduction

The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service, named the Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (from now: AIVD), is often referred to as the secret service. This is hardly surprising, as this organization barely provides any information about their working methods because of safety reasons (Abels, 2018). However, when information about the AIVD is made public, it is normally published in the mass media. In short, the AIVD does not regularly bring out information, but when it does, the mass media will quickly pick it up and make it public, therefore it is stated that there’s a major media coverage on intelligence in many countries (Shpiro, 2001).

The amount of media attention the AIVD received in the past years has also been noticed by the organization itself. This is illustrated in their 2018 annual report, presented to the public in April 2019, where the AIVD mentions this media-attention in the first sentence. The report states: “Not often has the AIVD received so much public attention as in 2018”1_{(AIVD, 2019).}

For an organization that mainly acts in secret, this can be seen as a remarkable first sentence. The organization, however, seems to prefer to get rid of this reputation. For example, in the same report Dick Schoof2_{states that the AIVD: “…is trying to offer the possibility to provide}

insight into what the services, with more than two thousand employees, overall have been engaged in and what they do every day”3_{(AIVD, 2019). Schoof argues that the AIVD is ‘not}

a secret service, but mainly a service with secrets’4_{(AIVD, 2019). This argument raises the}

question whether the Dutch public shares Schoof’s perception of the AIVD. This argument can also be regarded the other way around: does the AIVD have a clear image of the Dutch public’s perception of their organization?

More than twelve years ago, these questions were addressed in a research into the Dutch public’s perception of the AIVD. At the time, the AIVD had a clear objective that showed how the AIVD wanted the public perception to be. The AIVD stated: “The AIVD wants to be

seen as reliable and strives for openness where possible”5_{(TNS/NIPO, 2007). Based on this}

clear objective of the AIVD in 2006, the instruction was given to map the current perception of the Dutch public of the AIVD. This research was meant to determine what the public’s perception of the AIVD was and to investigate to what extent the AIVD succeeded in perceiving the objectives that they mentioned themselves. After the research had been conducted, it showed that the knowledge of the Dutch public about the organization of security in the Netherlands, and about the AIVD itself, was very limited. People seemed to want to believe that the AIVD was a very professional organization but could not always maintain this image of the services for the public because of incidents with involvement of the AIVD that had been in the news at that time. People were aware of the communication

dilemma of the AIVD and appreciated certain information about results of the AIVD, but on

1_{Own translation: “Niet vaak heeft de AIVD zo nadrukkelijk in de belangstelling gestaan als in 2018” (AIVD, 2019)} 2_{In November 2018 Dick Schoof succeeded Rob Bertholee and became Director-General of the AIVD (AD, 2018).} 3_{Own translation: “…probeert de mogelijkheid te bieden om inzicht te geven in waar zij zich, met twee duizend werknemers,}

globaal iedere dag mee bezig hebben gehouden en zich houden” (AIVD, 2019)

4_{Own translation: “De AIVD is geen geheime dienst, maar een dienst met geheimen” (AID, 2019)}

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the contrary often indicated that they didn’t even want to know anything about the AIVD’s actions (TNS/NIPO, 2007).

Although, it has been almost twelve years since this research was conducted, the objectives that gave rise to the research of 2007 can still be recognised in the annual report of 2019 of the AIVD (AIVD, 2019). However, in the last years the organization of Dick Schoof has faced some turbulent years and it is clearly visible that in the last year, they have received a huge amount of media attention. For example, the media-attention following the crucial role the AIVD played in preventing a major terrorist attack in the Netherlands, of which the suspects were arrested in September (Volkskrant, 2018-b). In addition, a new chief executive was appointed, namely Dick Schoof, former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (AD, 2018). Still, the main reason for the large amount of attention for the AIVD was the new Act on Intelligence- and Security Services 2017 (Wet Inlichtingen- en

Veiligheidsdiensten 2017, WIV 2017), on which in March 2018, Dutch voters were asked for their opinion in an advisory referendum (AIVD, 2019). The implementation of the WIV has led to an enormous discussion about the intelligence services, safety and privacy in the Netherlands.

Could these developments or any other events in the meantime, have led to a shift in the Dutch public’s perception about the AIVD since 2007? During a meeting at the University of Leiden, Dick Schoof stated that: “The intelligence services have a fairly recent history of

openness this openness is still considered as closed” (Personal communication, 2019, May

07). Does this statement correspond to the current perception of the AIVD? How does the perception of the Dutch public about the AIVD nowadays relate to the perception of the Dutch public in 2007? And what factors contribute to the perception that people have about intelligence services?

1.1 Objective and Research question

This research compares the public’s perception of the AIVD in 2019, with the public’s

perception of the AVID in 2007. This research has been conducted in order to see whether the public’s perception has changed, and if, what factors contributed to this change. Therefore, this research first investigates the current public’s perception of the AIVD in a qualitative way. Subsequently, a comparison between the 2019 research and the TNS/NIPO research in 2007 is made on the basis of theoretical concepts from the current literature and the context of both researches. Therefore, the central research question is:

To what extent has the Dutch public’s perception of the AIVD changed in 2019 compared to 2007?

The central research question will be constructed by four sub-questions:

1. What does the literature say about public perception of intelligence services? 2. What is the Dutch public’s perception of the AIVD in 2019?

3. Does this perception differ from the public’s perception of the AIVD in 2007? 4. To what extent can similarities and differences be explained by the literature or context?

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1.2 Scientific relevance

Researching and answering the above questions has scientific relevance. Nowadays it is of great importance for intelligence services to find a constant balance between on the one hand upholding the authority of the organization as experts in the field and on the other hand keeping their ‘license to operate’ in a context of public perception and high expectations (Peterson, 2019). If intelligence services are not able to keep the balance between the public perception and the legitimacy of their organization, and the gap between both keeps

increasing, this could lead to a ‘legitimatization crisis’ (Peterson, 2019). In this situation a large part of the public will question the legitimacy of the intelligence services, what may result in a loss of power for the intelligence services or even worse, their right to exist (Schulze, 2015). The field of research around the perception of intelligence services and the factors that contribute to the perception, is very limited and needs to be supplemented. This research provides a first step in the direction of a more advanced research field, by providing insights into- and analysis on a relatively unknown subject. It therefore aims at filling a gap in the literature of what factors can contribute to keeping the balance between the public perception and the legitimacy of intelligence services. The research examines the perception of the Dutch public about the AIVD in 2019 in a qualitative way, provides a comparison between the public’s perception in 2007 and the current public’s perception, tries to explain possible differences on the basis of literature and context and also tries to

supplement the literature from the data of this empirical research. As this research compares the public perception of an intelligence services at two different moments in time, it is possible to measure the influence of different factors on the public perception of intelligence services. This kind of research has not been conducted before and is therefore relevant for the current literature. An exploratory character has been retained to establish an initial framework that can serve as a basis for follow-up research because in this way new insights are gathered that can be useful for other researchers (Knopf, 2006).

1.3 Societal Relevance

As described above, this research fills a gap in current literature about the public’s perception of Intelligence Services. This does not only have scientific relevance but can also be of great importance for society. The outcomes of this research may be of great value not only to society, but also to the AIVD.

The results of this research provide a picture of the current situation regarding the public’s perception of the AIVD, including the public’s trust in the AIVD. This research provides a first look at the current state of affairs on these topics. The outcome of this research is of great value for the services, because these topics represent two main objectives of the services. Moreover, the fact that the TNS/NIPO 2007 research is re-examined in the same way as the first time, offers the AIVD a chance to put the perception that the Dutch people have of the AIVD in a context of time. Thereby, this research can be used as a tool for the AIVD to reflect on events and policy goals in the last twelve years and as a tool to possibly adjust to the new perception that Dutch people have on the intelligence services. In addition, this research maps out the public’s need for information of the AIVD and is therefore socially relevant because this can help the AIVD to respond to these needs.

Finally, this research is socially relevant because of the current debate concerning the Act on intelligence and security services 2017 (WIV 2017). The intelligence services and their

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methods are regularly discredited, what has led to a highly media-framed discussion (NRC, 2018-d). This research aims at mapping the perception that the Dutch people have about intelligence services, well after the implementation of the WIV 2017. This is of great relevance as this research assesses whether this discussion has had any influence on the perception of the AIVD.

1.4 Reading guide

The next chapter addresses the theoretical framework with the current literature on intelligence accountability, the importance of maintaining the public’s perception for the legitimacy of the intelligence services and different factors that contribute to this perception. After that, the research method chapter discusses the research design, the respondent

selection, the data selection, the analysis method, the operationalization of concepts and the reliability and validity of this research. The context chapter discusses the context and the results of the TNS/NIPO research in 2007 and the context of this research. The results chapter describes the main results of this empirical research. The analysis chapter discusses the analysis of the results by comparing these with the results of the 2007 research and explains the similarities and differences through literature and context. The conclusion answers the central research question of this research and focuses on the main results of this research. Finally, the discussion chapter discusses the societal relevance of the results of this research, the limitations of this research and the possibilities for further research. The appendices consist of the topic lists of the focus groups, the transcripts of the focus groups, additional information about the respondents of the focus groups and information about the media clips used.

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2. Theoretical Framework

This chapter discusses the theoretical framework of this research, focusing on the current literature and consisting theories on public imaging on intelligence services. First of all, this discusses the reasons why intelligence services are gaining more public attention. Therefore, it discusses the influence of the democratization on the accountability of intelligence services and the influence of the emergence of the risk society. Subsequently, this research aims at unravelling why it is of great importance for the intelligence services to be aware of the public’s perception and the importance of maintaining this perception. Therefore, this chapter discusses the concept of legitimatization crisis and the arguments given by the opponents of open intelligence services. Finally, this chapter focusses on different factors that influenced the Dutch public’s perception.

2.1 Increasing attention for intelligence services

This paragraph discusses the factors that contributed to the increasing attention for intelligence services, focusing on the current literature and consisting theories on public imaging on intelligence services. First of all, it discusses the concepts of intelligence accountability and the influence of the democratization. Subsequently it discusses the influence of the emergence of the risk society.

Intelligence accountability and democratization

Although espionage is one of the oldest professions in the world, intelligence accountability is a relatively new concept (Born & Leigh, 2005). Until the nineteen eighties, there was hardly any attention for the intelligence services, neither was there any attention paid to the oversight on the intelligence services. The responsibility of supervising the intelligence services was not considered to be a public concern, but a problem for the executive (Born & Leigh, 2005). However, the parliamentarians also had little information about the intelligence service or nearly any influence on the intelligence services. Therefore, the intelligence services were quite “separate” of the state and lacked any oversight.

This situation of a lacking intelligence accountability has changed since the influences of the democratic constitutional state. A fundamental basis of the democratic constitutional state is maintaining public satisfaction in the various activities of the state (Caparini, 2008). Recent developments, particularly in the field of safety but also in the field of information- and communication technologies, demand that the intelligence services in a democratic state are nowadays charged with a new task. The intelligence services are expected to undertake the task of assuring the public, which has even less insight into the intelligence services than the government itself, that they perform their work in a lawful and efficient manner (Vitkauskas, 1999). In this way, the intelligence services need to ensure the public trust in order to

maintain the public perception of the intelligence services and, as will be explained later on in this chapter, to maintain the legitimacy of the intelligence services. To fulfil the relevant fundamental basis of a democratic constitutional state and to ensure public trust, the most important requirements for public organizations are that they need to operate openly, transparent and publicly (Martin & Rzeplinski, 1997). In the case of intelligence services, openness and transparency are seen as the most important requirements to ensure the public

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trust. Ensuring public trust through openness and transparency normally means that the intelligence services need to ensure society that they do not violate the human rights and democratic principles of the state (Martin & Rzeplinski, 1997). Within the context of safety and more concrete, within the context of intelligence services, this fundamental basis becomes more and more difficult to pursue. As a consequence of the democratization of the rule of law, the intelligence services are increasingly under the scrutiny of the public.

The risk society

In addition to the emergence of the democratic constitutional state, the theory of Beck (2002) can be seen as the basis of a second reason for the increasing public attention on

governmental institutions. In this case it is aimed at the intelligence services and the increasing attention on the oversight that might have to be held on them.

According to the German sociologist Beck (2002) the increased public attention is a consequence of the development of the risk society. Beck (2002, p.41) argues that ‘risk’ nowadays inherently contains the concept of control because it presumes decision-making. Prior to the risk society, the state used to have the task of protecting civilians against two kinds of threats: threats caused by different dangers from the outside and threats caused by fellow citizens. Nowadays, in the risk society, the government has been given many more tasks. When Beck introduced the term Risk Society, he showed the hidden central issue in this society: the need to how to feign control over the uncontrollable (Adam, 2002; Beck, 1992, 1999; Featherstone, 2000; Giddens, 1994; Latour, 2002; van Loon, 2000 in Beck, 2002). Beck argues that at least three different conflicts can be differentiated in the world risk society: ecological conflicts, global financial crises and, in this case the most important one, the intentional threat of global terror networks states (Beck, 2002, p.41). While in the past, the use of the term ‘risk’ only came up in specific contexts, the concept risk nowadays has grown into a container term for many social issues (Boutellier et al., 2006, p.9). As soon as we speak in terms of ‘risk’ nowadays, we are talking about calculating the incalculable and dealing with risks. Therefore, the risk society ensures that in the context of safety, the public nowadays has higher expectations of the governmental institutions and the range of tasks of the institutions has grown. People see more and more risks and desire the governmental institutions to react to them.

2.2 The relevance of the public perception

The preceding paragraph focused on different theories on the increased attention for

intelligence services in general. To build on these theoretical concepts this paragraph focusses on the reasons why intelligence accountability is of great importance nowadays and the relevance of maintaining the public perception. First of all, it discusses the concept of

legitimatization crisis. After that, it discusses different arguments that are given by opponents of open and transparent intelligence services.

Public perception and legitimatization crisis

Where the previous paragraphs clarified the reasons why intelligence services are gaining more public attention, this paragraph aims at unravelling why it is of great importance for the intelligence services to be aware of the public’s perception of the intelligence services and the importance of maintaining this perception.

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It is of great importance for intelligence services to be aware of the public’s dominating perception of the intelligence services, because this perception determines to a great extent what expectations the public has of (the functioning of) the intelligence services (Commissie Havermans, 2004, p.40). Besides, being aware of the public perception and maintaining the public perception about intelligence services is of great importance for the legitimacy of the intelligence services because the public, and also the medias, carry out a sort of informal oversight which carry legitimacy and, in the end, may ultimately determine policy (Caparini, 2008, p.24). Therefore, intelligence services need to find a balance by on the one hand upholding the authority of the organization as experts in the field and on the other hand keeping legitimacy within a context of many different perceptions and high expectations (Petersen, 2019).

The bureaucratic challenge that lays within finding this balance, is also called ‘the

performativity gap’ within the literature. In his article, Petersen defines this gap as: “a gap between the outside’s expectations of control and effective solutions and the capacity of institutions and administrations to actually satisfy those expectations” (Petersen, 2019,

p.318). If a big performativity gap arises between the expectations of the public and the capacity of the intelligence services to meet these expectations, this may lead to a

legitimatization crisis (Petersen, 2019). In such a legitimatization crisis, the public could

develop an increased need for information in different forms, such as: “documentation,

evaluation and inspection of management procedures” (Power et al. in Peterson, 2019, p.318). The eventual effect of such a legitimatization crisis could be that a large part of the public questions the legitimacy of the intelligence services, which could lead to a critical point for the intelligence services because it could directly lead to disempowerment (Schulze, 2015, p.198). Also, a reduction of legitimacy could lead to reduction of powers and different privileges, all of which could normally just be used by the intelligence services (Reus-Smit 2007:161-63 in Schulze, 2015, p.198). Therefore, it is of great importance for the intelligence services that the public sees them as an organization that provides a necessary service, in the most efficient and effective way and that they can be held accountable for their actions, in order to keep their legitimacy (Caparini, 2008).

Opponents of openness and transparency of intelligence services

The previous paragraphs explain the importance of intelligence services being open and transparent within a democratic constitutional state, both for the intelligence services and for the public. Although the fact that the requirements of openness and transparency apply to all governmental bodies within a democratic state, these requirements provide a major conflict for intelligence services. Logically, the current literature also provides arguments against openness and transparency of intelligence services. The opponents argue that openness and transparency are no requirements that can be seen as ‘normal’ for intelligence services, since these organizations are performing in an area that, by definition, signifies working in a certain secrecy (Martin & Rzeplinski, 1997). The opponents argue that the state needs to find a balance between the requirements of security and the requirements of democracy (Vitkauskas, 1999). The opponents of the open policy requirement of intelligence services, argue that these requirements are ridiculous to apply to intelligence services, because these services need to be ‘inward-looking’ and have the emphasis on the ‘need to know’ requirement. Therefore, they will not release information quickly without knowing the usefulness of making the

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information public. In addition, they argue that making intelligence services more open and transparent could actually have adverse effects. When it becomes known that an intelligence service makes much of their information public or that their information would often leak out unexpectedly, foreign intelligence services or other sources of information may lose their interest in cooperating with this intelligence service, because they would fear that their information would also be shared publicly (Vitkauskas, 1999). Martin & Rzeplinski (1997) argue that the discussion is about intelligence services and the fear of them violating human rights. Martin & Rzeplinski (1997) state in their article that this discussion is based on facts that happened in the past: “given the necessary requirement of secrecy and the history of

abuses carried out under the cloak of secrecy, it is essential to establish limits on the

authority and methods of such secret services in order to provide the greatest possible degree of oversight and accountability to protect the rule of law and human rights, while still

allowing for effective intelligence-gathering” (Martin & Rzeplinski, 1997, p.1).

2.3 Factors that contribute to the Dutch public’s perception of the AIVD

The preceding paragraphs focused on different theories on public perceptions of intelligence services in general. The reasons why intelligence accountability is of great importance nowadays and the relevance of maintaining the public perception have been explained. To build on these theoretical concepts, this paragraph focusses on the situation of the public perception in the Netherlands. How have the above-mentioned causes influenced the public perception of the AIVD in the Netherlands? And which other factors play a role in the development of the Dutch public's perception of the AIVD?

When looking at the Dutch public’s perception of the Dutch intelligence service, the AIVD, it can be concluded that this service has been trapped in ‘public imaging’ for decades (Graaf & Hijzen, 2018). For example, the intelligence services are said to be characterized as

‘everlasting mushrooms’, as ‘barbed wire barriers’ that would cause democracy to get stuck in it and as ‘James Bonds on clogs’ (Hijzen, 2018)6_{. Hijzen (2018) argues that the use of these}

kinds of metaphors for the intelligence services demonstrates two things. First of all, the use of these metaphors shows how, over time, politicians, civil servants, journalists and citizens look at the secret phenomenon of the intelligence work and espionage. In addition, the use of these metaphors also shows how these actors think of the work of intelligence services. According to Hijzen (2018) this phenomenon shows, in the case of the Dutch intelligence services, that the Dutch services have been a plaything of political, bureaucratic and social interests and opinions (Mintzberg 1985, p.133: in Hijzen, 2018).

In the past, in the days of the Dutch pillarized society, the intelligence services could be less easily characterized as a plaything of political, bureaucratic and social interests and opinions. The intelligence services were part of the “pillar” of the Minister of Home Affairs and when the minister argued that the services where in safe hands, little discussion of the services was possible (Graaff & Hijzen, 2018, p.151). Nowadays, a much more critical look at the

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intelligence services dominates in the Netherlands. This influences the public’s perception of the services.

According to Graaff & Hijzen (2018) there are three reasons for the emergence of the critical look at the intelligence services in the Netherlands. The first reason given by Graaff & Hijzen (2018) is the fact that the democratization in the Netherlands has led to an almost all and everything pervading populism. Because of this, there is no more room for natural authority. Nowadays, authority must be legitimized and argued for. When services operate entirely in secret, the population may find this suspicious. This shift has led to a situation in which the citizens call for a more transparent government and therefore, the intelligence services can no longer be hidden in the ‘back room’ of the minister. The second reason given by Graaf & Hijzen (2018) is the upcoming threat of terrorism and radicalization. This threat has led to the fact that the method of the AIVD has changed and that the AIVD needs to penetrate to the capillaries of society more. The third reason given by Graaff & Hijzen (2018) is the progress of technology and therefore the changing technology, which makes the citizens more and more sensitive to what the AIVD does and is allowed to do.

In addition, according to Abels (2018), the challenge regarding the public perception of the AIVD lies not only in the political-social outer world of the AIVD, but also in the closed inner world. Both worlds have become more complex and more technical according to Abels (2018), whereby a major role is played by the new requirement: transparency. Because the employees of the AIVD may not go public, due to safety reasons it is automatically the responsibility of the head of the services to deal smoothly with both worlds. He is, after all, the representative, public face and public voice of the intelligence services and therefore able to contribute to the public image of the services (Abels, 2018).

Finally, research conducted by the ‘Committee on Administrative Evaluation of General Intelligence and Security Services’7_{(2004) has shown another factor that influences the}

public’s perception. The Commission Havermans (2004) argues that the Dutch public’s perception of the AIVD is largely determined by important and notable events (Commissie Havermans, 2004). If there are any changes in the perceived threats of the Netherlands, or any events occur that make those threats known to the general public, the media attention plays a major role in the development of the public perception of the intelligence services

(Commissie Havermans, 2004, p.37). Shpiro (2001) argues in his article that there’s a major media coverage on intelligence in many countries. He argues in his article that this is due to three reasons.

First of all, Shpiro (2001) mentions both the media’s fascination as the public’s fascination with intelligence services because of their secrecy as a reason for the extensive media coverage on intelligence related issues in many countries.

Secondly, Shpiro (2001) mentions the democratic responsibility that the media has nowadays in unravelling the official wrongdoing of intelligence services as intelligence services deal with subjects that interest the wider public, such as national security, crime and violence. The last reason given by Shpiro (2001) relates the two previous reasons. The fact that these subjects interest a wider public and the fact that people are fascinated with intelligence

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services means that the media attention given to these subjects will attract a lot of attention and is therefore a ‘lucrative business’.

The Commissie Havermans (2004) argues that this extensive media coverage has direct influence on the Dutch public’s perception of the AIVD. The Commissie Havermans (2004) state that the combination of events happening, the media coverage and the importance given to these events by the media influences the Dutch public’s perception of the AIVD. While, at the same time, the ability of the intelligence services to influence this perception is limited because of the confidentiality of their work (Commissie Havermans, 2004).

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3. Method

This chapter discusses the methodology used in this research. First, it discusses the research design of this research. Subsequently, it discusses the research methods by clarifying the decisions of using focus groups and media clips. After that, it focusses on the selection of the research population and the data analysis method. Next, it discusses the operationalization of the concepts of the theoretical framework. Finally, it addresses the different quality criteria and the way in which the quality of this research is guaranteed.

3.1 Research Design

This research uses a qualitative research strategy. This design focusses on the relation between extracting information from existing theories, and extracting information from empirical observations order to reveal new findings (Bryman, 2012, p.36). First of all, the current literature into the public perception of intelligence services is discussed in the theoretical framework. Subsequently, new data is gathered on the basis of focus groups in order to compare the results from this research with the results of the TNS/NIPO research. Finally, relevant conclusions are drawn from the research data in order to see whether these conclusions can improve, confirm, dispute against or add findings to the current literature. The qualitative research strategy makes it possible to look deep into the opinions, perspectives and experiences of the respondents (Boeije, 2014, p.22). For this research, this strategy is vital in order to research the factors that have influence on the public’s perspective.

This research uses the interpretative approach. In this approach research is conducted at the spot, in person, for example by participating in a conversation with people. The researcher examines the differences and similarities between the conversations in order to get to the heart of the question and be able to draw conclusions (Bryman, 2012). In this research, the

interpretative approach is chosen because it allows to research the public perception and people’s motivations behind their perception of the AIVD. The interpretative approach is a perfect approach to unravel the public perception because it focusses on the different interpretations of people, not only to explain- but also to understand why people think in a certain way (Bryman, 2012).

3.2 Data gathering

Focus groups

The data of this research is collected by conducting focus groups. The focus group technique is a method that involves interviews with more than one, usually at least four respondents and that can be used to emphasize a specific theme or topic that will be explored in depth

(Bryman, 2012, p.501). In this case the specific themes of the focus groups are security in general and the organization of the AIVD. The topic list of the focus groups is attached in the appendix (see Appendix 1).

The use of a focus group gives the researcher the possibility to examine the way in which the group participants interact with one another and construe the general topics in which the researcher is interested (Bryman, 2012, p.503). A focus group setting makes it possible for the researcher to understand why people feel the way they feel about a certain topic, in this case

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the intelligence services, because it gives the participants the opportunity to discuss and confront each other with a wide variety of different views.

In addition, a focus group setting gives the participants the opportunity to bring up several related topics or issues that that they deem to be important or significant (Bryman, 2012, p.503). This setting fits this research perfectly, because this research aims at discovering the perception that the participants have about the AIVD. Therefore, several questions are being asked, where the focus group technique gives the researcher the opportunity to ask further questions if it is not directly clear what a participant means. Also, the ways in which individuals collectively make sense of a phenomenon and construct meanings around it are examined (Bryman, 2012, p.504).

The focus group sessions are guided by a moderator. The moderator is concerned with unravelling the views of the group participants, by asking small guiding questions (Bryman, 2012, p.501,508). The moderator used a topic list with different questions sorted by different topics (see Appendix 1). This topic list is the same as the one that has been used in the TNS/NIPO research (TNS/NIPO, 2007). The topic list consists several open questions and also a semi-structured part for the focus groups. Using a semi-structured focus group means that not all questions have been prepared prior to the focus groups, but only the topics are (Reulink & Lindeman, 2005). Given the fact that the questionnaire used in the research of TNO/NIPO does not contain any time-related questions, there was no reason to adjust the questionnaire.

Media clips

The reason for using focus groups was also the option to use ‘audience reception’: the moderator of the focus group shows a fragment of media or television programs, films or newspaper articles and can thereby examine how the audience responds to these fragments (McGuigan 1992; Fenton et al. 1998:ch 1, in Bryman, 2012). This research used this method by presenting two different media fragments in order to examine the audience’s response to these fragments Two media fragments are selected on the basis of the media fragments that the TNS/NIPO research used.

The clips that were used by TNS/NIPO in 2007, were both clips from the Dutch news

broadcast NOS (TNS/NIPO, 2007). To replicate the TNS/NIPO research as good as possible, this research also used two clips from the NOS database (See Appendix 2). Using a

comparable kind of clip contributes to the reliability of the research. The content of media clips from the NOS journal, strongly depends on the news at the time of the research. In order to be able to compare the results of this research to the results of the 2007 research, the media clips have to be comparable. The objective of this research is mapping the Dutch public’s perception of the AIVD in 2019 and therefore it is important to choose media clips that are representative for the NOS journal media clips about the AIVD in 2019. In this way, the reaction of the respondents to the media clips is representative for their perception in 2019 and comparable to the 2007 research.

The first clip in the TNS/NIPO research showed the press conference following the

publication of the annual report of the AIVD (TNS/NIPO, 2007). As the previous research had their focus groups on the 8th_{and 16}th_{of December 2006 (TNS/NIPO, 2007), they}

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copied with a clip of the same kind, namely the publication of the annual report of the AIVD of 2018, that has been released on the second of April this year (AIVD, 2019).

The second clip in the TNS/NIPO research was a press conference of the AIVD, which showed the publication of the Jihad report of the AIVD (TNS/NIPO, 2007). This clip was of great importance at the time, because the AIVD had openly expressed their concerns about the growing influences of jihadists in the Netherlands (AIVD, 2006-b). The report of the AIVD, ‘The violent Jihad in the Netherlands’ (2006-b), shows that at the time of the TNS/NIPO research there was a clear threat of Jihadi on local, autonomous networks. The choice of this media fragment in 2007 is therefore a visualization of a realistic threat at the time. In addition, in this media clip a reporter of the NOS openly criticized the AIVD by saying that the AIVD scares people unnecessarily by speaking out their concerns in the way the AIVD did in the Jihad report (TNS/NIPO, 2007). In this research the first fragment, the publication of the annual report of 2018, already shows the presentation of a current threat according to the AIVD. The choice for the second media clip is based on showing a current topic about the AIVD in which the AIVD received criticism namely, the implementation of the WIV 2017. The second media clip is therefore a NOS fragment in which the AIVD received criticism from the supervision committee about not complying with the rules based in WIV half a year after the implementation of the WIV 2017.

3.3 Respondent selection

Prior to the research, the research population is determined: the persons, groups, departments or organizations that are relevant for the research (Boeije, 2014, p.58). Hereby, the research objective had to be kept in mind (Bryman, 2012, p.418). Within this research, the objective is to unravel the perception that the Dutch public has of the AIVD in 2019 and compare this perception with the perception that the Dutch public had of the AIVD in 2007. For this reason, the research population is composed in a way that it is both representative, but also comparable to the research population of the research in 2007, in order to make it possible to compare the results of both researches. Therefore, this research determined the research population on the basis of the same criteria that were applied in the research of TNS/NIPO (2007).

In 2007, TNS/NIPO decided to conduct the research on the basis of four different focus groups with each eight respondents. Morgan (1998; in Bryman, 2012, p.507) suggests that the typical group size of focus groups should be from six to ten members. Therefore, the group size of eight members is significant enough to reach sufficient data. Due to practical reasons, two of the four focus groups within this research consisted of 7 respondents, instead of 8. This number is still in line with the theory of Morgan (Bryman, 2012). The four different focus groups are homogenously composed by segmenting people by two characteristics. The first characteristic that the respondents are segmented by is age. From the four focus groups, two groups consisted of people aged beneath 35 and two groups consisted of people aged above 35. The second characteristic that the respondents are segmented by is education. A

distinction is made between high-educated people (their lowest level of diploma obtained, is Higher Professional education (from now: HBO)) and low-educated people (their highest level of diploma obtained is lower than HBO). The final distribution of participants between the focus groups is shown in the table below (table 1) and more detailed in the appendix (see appendix 4).

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Table 1: Respondent characteristics and division per focus group

Number of persons Age Education

F1: Focus group 1 8 (R1-R8) < 35 High educated

F2: Focus group 2 8 (R9-R16) < 35 Low educated

F3: Focus group 3 7 (R17-R23) > 35 High educated

F4: Focus group 4 7 (R24-R30) > 35 Low educated

The research of TNS/NIPO in 2007 selected the respondents on the basis of a database of an external recruitment- and selection agency, located in Amsterdam. From this database, the thirty-two respondents were selected. No more information about the sampling of the respondents in 2007 in known, except that the focus groups were held in Amsterdam and therefore the respondents worked- or lived in- or close to Amsterdam. This means that the research population sampling had a very low degree of geographical spread (Bryman, 2012) in the sample. Using the same database for this research as was used in the previous research by TNS/NIPO 2007 was not possible because of practical reasons.

Therefore, all respondents in this research are selected based on purposive sampling, which means a purposive sample of thirty-two respondents. Purposive sampling presupposes that all respondents are selected on the basis of their availability for this research, requiring that they can contribute to answering the research question of this research (Bryman, 2012). In this research this means that all respondents meet the same inclusion requirements as in the TNS/NIPO research. In addition, this research maintained the low degree of geographical spread within the sampling, by selecting thirty people that live- or work close enough to a large city in the Netherlands, namely Utrecht, to be able to participate in the focus groups. In addition, this research used Snowball sampling, which means that “the researcher samples initially a small group of people relevant to the research questions, and these sampled

participants propose other participants who have had the experience or characteristics relevant to the research” (Bryman, 2012, p.424). The snowball sampling method was of great

importance for this research because all respondents of one focus group had to be able to be at one place, at the same time for almost two hours. If respondents suggested other respondents to participate into a focus group, the appointments were more easily made.

Finally, it is notable to mention that it was not possible to determine any more inclusion criteria out of the TNS/NIPO research than age and education level. Therefore, the exact same research population has possibly not been met.

3.4 Data analysis

Regarding the reliability and validity of this research, it is important that the data gathering and data analysis is carried out in the same way as the TNS/NIPO research. The TNS/NIPO research not only recorded the audio of the focus groups, but also the motion picture in order to be able to process the detailed results. Therefore, this research also recorded the focus groups. Recording focus group sessions had the preference because of many reasons. First of all, it makes it easier to write down (transcribe) not only what people said in the focus groups, but also who said it and how they said it (Bryman, 2012, p.504). As this research consists of four different focus groups, the recordings of the groups are of great importance because not every word or intonation could be remembered. Besides, recording the different focus groups

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made it possible to examine the different group dynamics and the different processes in which the ideas are collectively constructed. In addition, recordings make it possible to make a comparison between the different groups (Bryman, 2012). This is important in this research because this research compares the different focus groups in order to better understand the results.

After transcribing the collected data, the data is structured in order to manage it effectively. The method used for this is coding. With coding, the researcher distinguishes different themes within the transcripts and sorts the collected data into these different themes and categories and links them to a code (Boeije, 2014, p.111). First, the data is sorted into the themes and categories that were used in the TNS/NIPO research. This is a deductive approach to the data (Bryman, 2012). By sorting out the data into the same themes, makes it possible to easily compare the results of both researches. After that, an inductive approach was used in order to possibly find new categories or themes. As the analysis is done in the same way as the researchers did twelve years ago, it becomes possible to compare the results of the different researches with one another, in order to answer the sub-questions of this research.

3.5 Operationalization of concepts

The preceding paragraphs described how the public perception of 2019 is researched. To identify what factors played a role in the changing perception of the AIVD this research seeks to examine to what extent the different concepts of the theoretical framework can be

recognized. This paragraph describes the operationalization of the concepts that are used for the comparison and explains how the concepts were measured in the focus groups.

Literature shows that level of intelligence accountability is rising because the recent

development of democratization demands that intelligence services in a democratic state are nowadays charged with the new task of assuring the public, that they perform their work in a lawful and efficient manner (Vitkauskas, 1999) in order to ensure public trust. This research examines whether the intelligence accountability has stabilized or increased in the past twelve years. The literature shows that to ensure public trust, public organizations are expected to operate openly, transparent and publicly to ensure society that they do not violate the human rights and democratic principles of the state (Martin & Rzeplinski, 1997). To measure the presence of these indicators the respondents of the focus groups have been asked several questions about their expectations of the AIVD:

1. What can you expect of the AIVD in terms of communication? 2. And how would you ideally like it?

3. How do you assess the AIVD when it comes to openness?

In addition to the democratization, literature shows that the emergence of the risk society also plays a role in the public’s perception of intelligence services (Beck, 2002). This research seeks to determine the level at which the emergence of the risk society influences the public’s perception of the AIVD by checking whether the respondents mention any indicators as stated by Beck (2002). According to Beck (2002) the emergence of the risk society has led to a situation in which the public authorities have been given many more tasks because people see more and more risks and desire the public organizations to react to them. Beck (2002)

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mentions that ecological conflicts, financial crises and, also mentioned by Graaff & Hijzen (2018), the threat of terrorism play a major part in this. This research therefore focusses on these indicators and checks whether the respondents show higher expectations of the AIVD by asking questions, such as:

1. What tasks do the AIVD have?

2. What task do you think that belong to the AIVD? 3. What do you hope that they do?

4. What should they do even more?

5. To what extent do people feel safe? What is the AIVD’s share in this?

If the answers of these questions show a gap between the public’s expectations of control and effective solutions and the capacity of the AIVD to actually satisfy those expectations, a

performativity gap as stated by Petersen (2019) can be recognised.

The theoretical framework also showed different factors that according to literature contribute specifically to the perception of the AIVD in the Netherlands. Graaff &Hijzen (2018) argued that the Dutch public’s perception on intelligence services has become more critical over years. This research aims at seeking whether the public’s perception has become more critical in the last twelve years. Graaff & Hijzen (2018) mentioned three factors that play a role in the Dutch public’s perception, this research therefore examines to what extent these factors contributed to the public’s perception of 2019.

The first factor given by Graaff & Hijzen (2018) is democratization in according to the general literature and is therefore already discussed.

The second factor given by Graaff & Hijzen (2018) that is already mentioned before is the upcoming threat of terrorism and radicalization. Therefore, this research examines to what extent terrorism and radicalization play a role in the public’s perception in 2019.

The third factor given by Graaff & Hijzen (2018) is the progress of- and changing technology. Graaff & hijzen (2018) argue that this factor made citizens more sensitive to what the AIVD does and is allowed to do. In the focus groups different questions were asked about the exercise of the AIVD’s powers:

1. What are they allowed to do? 2. What are they not allowed to do? 3. What do you hope that they do? 4. What are the dangers of the AIVD?

In addition, a fragment is shown in which the AIVD receives criticism on their working method. This fragment is shown in order to stimulate discussion about the AIVD’s working method and the invasion of privacy. Therefore, questions are asked:

5. How do you assess the AIVD when it comes to dangers to privacy?

Finally, literature show that notable events and the reaction of the media have major influence on the Dutch public’s perception of intelligence services (Commissie Havermans, 2004). This research therefore maps in the next chapter what events gained the most media attention before- and during both researches of 2007 and 2019 in order to be able to determine whether the respondents bring up a large number of notable events during the focus groups that influenced their public perception.

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In addition, the respondents are asked about the influence of media fragments, before and after showing the fragments:

1. What image do you think the media sketches out of the AIVD? 2. Does this match your own opinion?

[Showing fragments]

3. What is your first reaction and what do you think of it? 4. How is the AIVD displayed in this fragment?

5. To what extent does this say something about the AIVD?

6. To what extent does this match the image that you currently have about the AIVD?

3.6 Quality criteria

This research took several measures in order to guarantee the quality of the research, because the way in which the research is conducted and the role that a researcher plays influences the quality of the research. Therefore, it is important that the objectivity of a study is guaranteed when doing “good research” (Boeije, 2014, p.150). The quality of this research is guaranteed by complying with the four quality criteria as stated by Lincoln & Guba (1985). Lincoln & Guba (1985) argue that a good qualitative research should comply with the four different criteria of trustworthiness, namely: credibility, transferability, dependability and

confirmability. They argue that qualitative, interpretative research does not assume that there is one reality but more than one and possibly several accounts because of the selection of participants of the research (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The theory of Lincoln & Guba also applies for this research because of the qualitative, interpretative research method. Therefore, the four criteria of Lincoln & Guba (1985) are discussed below.

Credibility: According to Lincoln & Guba (1985) credibility, also known as internal validity,

is the most important criterion of trustworthiness: “How can one establish confidence in the "truth" of the findings of a particular inquiry for the subjects(respondents) with which and the context in which the inquiry was carried out?” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 290). To guarantee credibility, the research must measure what the researcher claims to measure. In this research thus, the data has to measure the public perception of the AIVD. To establish a high internal validity of the focus groups, the groups started by ensuring the anonymity of the focus groups. This prevents that the participants only give answers that are considered desirable from a social point of view. Besides, both an ‘open’ and ‘semi-structured’ interview methods are used, so the moderator is able to ask further questions when it expects that the given answers do not measure wat the researcher claims to measure.

Transferability: The second criterion, also known as external validity, describes the general

nature of the findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.290). This means that if the focus groups would be organised with another selection of participants, the same results should be produced. To guarantee this criteria, several homogeneous focus groups are organised to achieve a higher transferability. However, generalizing a research always remains difficult (Bryman, 2012). In addition, this research aims at giving an insight into the aspects on which imaging in the field of intelligence services may or may not depend by comparing two researches that were conducted at a different point in time. Therefore, the results of the

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comparison are dependent of events and incidents occurring in between the two researches and not only dependent of the research population.

Conformability: The third criterion, also known as internal reliability, demands that the

findings are the result of the experiences and ideas of the participants, rather than the preferences of the researcher (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). If a research is conducted by one researcher, it is important to prevent incorrect conclusions being drawn from the data by the researcher. This research guaranteed a high internal reliability by making DVD recordings of the focus groups. These recordings made possible to take transparent notes, transcribing and coding the data in a steady pace after the focus groups have already finished. This guarantees a high internal reliability because the possible interpretations of the researcher can be checked with these recordings. In addition, a high internal reliability is guaranteed by the fact that the transcripts were not translated before the results chapter was written. In this way, discrepancy between the data and the researcher’s translation is prevented.

Dependability: The fourth criterion, also known as external reliability, demands that similar

results would be obtained if the research is repeated in the same context, using the same research methods and by selecting the same respondents (Boeije, 2014, p.150). This criterion is problematic within qualitative research (Boeije, 2012). In order to reach a high level of dependability, this research described exactly how data was collected and how decisions were made throughout the research. Therefore, it is clear how this research should be repeated in order to obtain the same results.

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4. Context

This research compares the current Dutch public’s perception of the AIVD with the public’s perception twelve years ago. The theoretical framework of this research already discussed the major influence that notable events and media-attention has on the public’s perception of intelligence services. Therefore, to be able to put this research in a proper context with the 2007 research and to be able to make a proper comparison between the two researches, it is crucial to create a clear image of the threats and events at the time of the two researches. This chapter discusses the context of the research of 2007 and the context of the research in 2019. To determine the media-attention that the intelligence services received at the time of both researches, in order to address the context of both researches, a small document analysis has been conducted. In order to do so, data of the four largest national newspapers in the

Netherlands was collected. These were the same newspapers in 2007 as in 2019, namely: het

Algemeen Dagblad, NRC Handelsblad, de Telegraaf and de Volkskrant (Mediamonitor, n.d.;

NOM Media, 2019). By doing so, the four newspapers with the greatest reach in the

Netherlands have been selected. These newspapers are therefore expected to have the greatest influence on the Dutch public’s perception of the AIVD. In order to collect the news articles that were most relevant during the research periods, the database of Nexis Uni was used. This is a database that provides access to all the news

articles of these newspapers. The final research data is selected on based on different key words within

Nexis Uni. The key words that were used to

determine the final selection of news articles were the terms ‘AIVD’ and ‘Inlichtingendienst’ (in English: intelligence service). Subsequently, the timeframe of the document analysis was adjusted. For both researches the time frame was adjusted on a timeframe of 1,5 years prior to the latest

organized focus group. The latest focus group of the research in 2007 was held on 14-12-2006 and therefore the time frame of the document analysis

is determined from 14-06-2005 until 14-12-2006. This resulted in the selection of 260 unique news articles. The latest focus group of the research in 2019 was held from 10-05-2019 and therefore the time frame of the document analysis is determined on 10-11-2017 until 10-05-2019. This resulted in the selection of 194 unique news articles.

4.1 The context of the 2007 research

The literature in the theoretical framework shows that threats, crucial events and the media have influence on the public perception. Therefore, different threats that received a lot of media-attention during the TNS/NIPO-research are discussed in order to be able to understand the results of the research. Besides the relevant news articles, as explained in the previous paragraph, the annual report of the AIVD is used to understand the result of the research. The TNS/NIPO research came out in 2007, however, the focus groups were organized in

December 2006. For that reason, the 2006 annual report has been used. In addition, the

Figure 1: Based on the four largest payed national newspapers in the Netherlands. Source: Nexis Uni

2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 Timeline of the amount of news

articles containing the term AIVD or Intelligence service

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‘Terrorist Threat Assessment’8_{(DTN) progress report, that was released by the ‘National}

Coordinator of Counterterrorism’9_{(NCTb) on the 20}th_{of December 2006, has been used.}

The first thing that stands out is that, during the 2007 research, the terrorist attacks in New York (2002) and Madrid (2004) happened a while ago but according to the media the

influence of these terrorist attacks on the intelligence services were still noticeable. The NRC Handelsblad (2006-b) writes that after the attacks in New York and Madrid, a rapid expansion of the AIVD’s powers had to be achieved. The Dutch government freed 46,5 million euros to accomplish this goal. To be able to achieve the goal of minister Remkes, to let the AIVD reach 1500 employees in 2009, the intelligence services had to hire twenty new employees each month (NRC, 2006-b). The media also shows that the assassination of Theo van Gogh (2004) was still fresh in the people’s memory at the time of the research. The Volkskrant argues that the assassination of Theo van Gogh painfully exposed the lack of communication between the different contra terrorism organizations in the Netherlands (Volkskrant, 2005-b). The assassination made the Dutch public aware of the fact that the liberal thoughts in the Netherlands were endangered (Volkskrant, 2005-c). In another article the Volkskrant asks its readers why the AIVD didn’t have Mohammed B, the assassin of Theo van Gogh, in sight during the investigation of the so-called Hofstadnetwerk (Volkskrant, 2006-b).

In the 2006 AIVD annual report (AIVD, 2007) the final court ruling against the Hofstadgroep, wherein the Hofdstadgroep was seen as a terrorist group, was described as an important event concerning jihadism in the Netherlands (AIVD, 2007, p. 28). The annual report firstly

describes jihadi terrorism as a threat for the Netherlands (AIVD, 2007). In 2006, multiple western countries had to deal with the threat of jihadi terrorism. However, the AIVD argued that there were no concrete indications for a terrorist threat in the Netherlands despite the fact that the threats were undiminished substantial. The AIVD brought out a report called ‘The violent Jihad in the Netherlands’ that was supposed to give insight in the transition of the jihadi terrorism as mainly an external threat to a home-grown phenomena (AIVD, 2006-b). The AIVD was occupied with weakening terrorist networks, but warned that the threat was a real, existing danger that had to be taken seriously. Besides that, the conviction of Samir A for the preparation of a terrorist attack, played a major role in this threat (AIVD, 2007, p. 28). The second threat that is discussed within the AIVD annual report of 2006 is radicalization. Attention is paid both to religious radicalization, and to politically- or ethically motivated radicalization (AIVD, 2007). The third threat that is discussed within the annual report is the threat of left- and right-wing extremism. According to the AIVD it is the latter, the right-wing extremism that has become more fragmented in 2006. However, both the left- and right-wing extremist groups have caused disturbances of public order and have committed violent crimes in 2006 (AIVD, 2007). The NCTb states that the polarization was strongly present in the field of extremism in the Netherlands and that the way of thinking in an ‘us versus them’ manner seemed to become more and more deeply rooted in the Dutch society (NCTb, 2006). Finally, the AIVD mentions the involvement of foreign powers such as foreign intelligence services

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and governments in the Netherlands and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as a major threat to safety in the Netherlands (AIVD, 2007).

In addition to the above mentioned media-attention and threats, the intelligence services also received extra media-attention during the TNS/NIPO research for other reasons. First of all, the AIVD got a vast amount of media-attention because of a so-called “flop” of the AIVD. In 2004, one of the AIVD employee’s laptop got stolen on the train (Volkskrant, 2005). In the following year, one of the AIVD employees left a number of computer diskettes unattended in his lease vehicle (AD, 2005-a). The diskettes were then forgotten, the car was handed in and as a result several “state secrets” were leaked and ultimately came in the hands of crime reporter Peter R. De Vries (AD, 2005-b). This was not the only media attention concerning the leakage of information from the AIVD in a short period of time, for the AIVD gained a lot of attention on different cases of AIVD-employees leaking information. For example, a former employee was sentenced to four and half years to prison for leaking relevant research data to the Hofstadgroep (NRC, 2005). In another case, a secret file containing bribery attempts by a top criminal became public (NRC, 2006-a). These cases even led to several arrests for deliberate leaks of state secrets and caused embarrassment to the responsible Minister Remkes and the head of the AIVD at the time, Van Hulst (NRC, 2006-c; Volkskrant, 2006-a).

4.2 The context of the 2019 research

This research examines the Dutch public’s perception of the AIVD in 2019 and compares this perception with the public’s perception twelve years ago. To be able to put this research in a proper context with the 2007 TNS/NIPO research, and therefore to be able to make a proper comparison between the two researches, it is important to create a clear image of the different threats and events at the time of this research. The theoretical framework of this research already discussed the major influence that the media possibly has on the public’s perception of intelligence services. Therefore, the context of this research is determined on the basis of news articles of the four largest newspapers up to 18 months prior to this research, the AIVD annual report of 2018 and the DTN 49 from February 2019 of the National Coordinator of Contra terrorism and Safety10_{(from now: NCTV).}

The 2018 AIVD annual report starts with three chapters outlining three concrete threats in the Netherlands: espionage and unwanted

involvement of foreign powers, (jihadist)

terrorism and radical Islam and lastly, extremism (AIVD, 2019). The DTN of 2019 has been determined on the level of fourth level: substantial, which means that the chance of a terrorist attack in the Netherlands is still realistic (NCTV, 2019.

10_{Own translation: Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV)}

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In the past 18 months, the threat of a terrorist attack in the Netherlands has generated a lot of media attention for the AIVD. In this period, a trend of news articles that report about the prevention of terrorist attacks with the help of the AIVD can be seen. This trend started in January 2018 with Rob Bertholee, former director of the AIVD, who stated in an episode of ‘College Tour’ that the AIVD had prevented three to four terrorist attacks since 2011 (NRC, 2018-a). In June 2018 it became known that, thanks to the AIVD, two men were arrested on suspicion of preparing terrorist attacks in the Netherlands (NRC, 2018-e). A few months later, seven more men were arrested after AIVD investigations. After this action, the Public

Prosecutor stated that a major attack had been prevented (Volkskrant, 2019).

However, in September 2018 a stabbing attack at Amsterdam Central station caused media attention that stated that the Netherlands could not always avoid Islamic-inspire acts of terrorism (Telegraaf, 2018-a). Dick Schoof, the current director of the AIVD, spoke critically about the past 18 months. He called 2018 “the worst year since the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004” and stated that 2019 started even worse, referring to the attack on a tram in Utrecht (AD, 2019). However, in the media the AIVD is hardly associated with this incident.

Because of recent warnings by the AIVD, the threat of (jihadi) terrorism and radical Islam as described in the AIVD annual report of 2018 has gained a lot of media-attention (AIVD, 2019). First of all, the AIVD stated that they expected more people to return from the IS conflict area (NRC, 2018-c). The AIVD warned that they mainly expect women and children to return from the caliphate and stated that these persons pose a serious threat to the

Netherlands (NRC, 2018-c). The AIVD also warned the public about the Islamic Cornelius Haga Lyceum in Amsterdam, a school where anti-democratic behavior is taking place because of different head masters that are linked to terrorists (NRC, 2019-a). The purpose of the warning was giving parents information in order to prevent them sending their children to this school. However, the Muslim community in Amsterdam showed solidarity with the school and as a result they are turning against the municipality (NRC, 2019-b).

Besides the threat of (jihadist) terrorism and radical Islam, the threat of espionage and unwanted involvement of foreign powers also regularly gained media-attention (AIVD, 2019). News articles mainly write about the way the AIVD monitors how Russia has been stepping up their espionage activities in the Netherlands, but also about the way that the AIVD tries to spy on the Russians by themselves (Volkskrant, 2018). The news articles show that the AIVD has been spying on Russian hackers for years (NRC, 2018-b) and warn that the Netherlands has been in Russia’s sights for years (NRC, 2018-f). Strikingly, the Russian Embassy in The Hague appeared to be involved in a cyber-attack on the OPCW (NRC, 2018-f). A lot of media attention has also been given to Chinese threats (AIVD, 2019). The AIVD called for a better protection of the Dutch digital infrastructure against Chinese involvement (NRC, 2019-c). According to the AIVD, China had already made several attempts at

corporate espionage (Volkskrant, 2018-b).

Finally, the AIVD itself has been the subject of commotion in the past 18 months. This was due to the implementation of the new Intelligence and Security Services Act (WIV), which is of utter importance for the AIVD’s legal framework and competences. In its 2018 annual report, the AIVD devotes an entire chapter to the implementation of the WIV (AIVD, 2019).