Home closure as a weapon in the Dutch war on drugs: Does judicial review function as a safety net?

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University of Groningen

Home closure as a weapon in the Dutch war on drugs

Bruijn, Larissa Michelle; Vols, Michel; Brouwer, Jan G.

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International Journal of Drug Policy

DOI:

10.1016/j.drugpo.2017.08.003

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2018

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Bruijn, L. M., Vols, M., & Brouwer, J. G. (2018). Home closure as a weapon in the Dutch war on drugs:

Does judicial review function as a safety net? International Journal of Drug Policy, 51, 137-147.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2017.08.003

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Home

closure

as

a

weapon

in

the

Dutch

war

on

drugs:

Does

judicial

review

function

as

a

safety

net?

L. Michelle

Bruijn

*

,

Michel

Vols,

Jan

G. Brouwer

DepartmentofLegalMethods,FacultyofLaw,UniversityofGroningen,OudeKijkin‘tJatstraat26,9712EKGroningen,TheNetherlands

ARTICLE INFO Articlehistory: Received7March2017

Receivedinrevisedform26July2017 Accepted3August2017

Keywords: Warondrugs Dutchdrugpolicy Homeclosures Eviction Judicialreview Empiricallegalresearch Cultureofcontrol

ABSTRACT

Background:Awidespreadsenseofafailingcriminaljusticesystemandincreasedfeelingsofinsecurity changedtheresponsetocrimeintoacultureofcontrol,whichischaracterizedbypoliciesthatpunishand exclude. In theNetherlands, theseinﬂuences can be witnessed in the waron drugs where local authoritiesusetheiradministrativepowertoclosehomesinvolvedindrug-relatedcrime.Citizenscan invokejudicialreviewovertheseadministrativeinterferencesbyclaimingthatsuchclosureresultsinan unfairbalancebetweenpurposes,meansandconsequences.Thispaperassesseswhetherjudicialreview functionsasasafetynetagainstlosingone’shomeduetodrug-relatedcrime.

Methods:Weuseddoctrinallegalresearchmethodstoexaminethe“lawinthebooks”andempiricallegal researchmethodstoanalysethe“lawinaction”.Weusedasurveytoinvestigatehowoftenthe drug-relatedclosurepowerwasusedin2015,andwestatisticallyanalysedallpublishedcaselawofDutch lowercourtsbetween2007and2016.

Results:Thescopeoftheclosurepowerbroadenedovertheyearsandourdatashowthatlocalauthorities ﬁercelymakeuseofthisinstrument.In41.4%ofthecases,citizensaresuccessfulinﬁghtingtheclosure. While scholarly literature indicates that judicial courts function assafeguards byquestioning the proportionalityofadministrativeaction,raisingaproportionalitydefencedoesnotnecessarilyresultina morefavourableoutcomeforcitizens.Infact,raisingaproportionalitydefencemakesitmorelikelyto resultindismissaloftheappeal.

Conclusion: Thestretched scopeofthedrug-relatedclosurepowertogetherwiththerelativelylow successrateofcitizenswhoﬁghtthelossoftheirhomeandaseeminglymeaninglessproportionality checkshownosignofasafetynetagainstthelossofone’shomeatthesuitofalocalauthority.

Introduction

Theglobalwarondrugsispredominantlyfoughtusingcriminal law;those who sellor possessillicit drugs are arrestedby the police,prosecuted, andﬁned orimprisonedbyacriminalcourt (Trebach,1988; Stevenson, 2011). Nevertheless,researchshows thatcurrentrelianceoncriminallawenforcementisresultinginan arrayofnegativeunintendedconsequences(ICSDP,2010)suchas theincreaseofriskstopublichealth,thecreationofa criminal market, the subversion of social and economic growth, the enrichmentofcriminals,andthestigmatisationand discrimina-tionofpeoplewhousedrugs(UNODC,2008;Rollesetal.,2016). Unsurprisingly, many countries are moving towards less punitive regimes (Room, Fischer, Hall, Lenton, & Reuter, 2010,

pp. 74–106) and consider alternative approaches and policies (GlobalCommissiononDrugPolicy,2016).Portugal,forexample, nolongerresortstocriminalpenaltieswhenitcomestolow-level drugpossession(GlobalCommissiononDrugPolicy,2016), and Canada is takingserious stepstolegalizerecreational cannabis (GlobalCommissiononDrugPolicy,2016;Austin,2017).Moreover, jurisdictions suchas Uruguay and several states in theUnited States already ofﬁcially allow recreational cannabis markets (Davies,2016; GlobalCommissiononDrugPolicy,2016;Godlee & Hurley, 2016). The Netherlands drew away from a punitive prohibitionstylefourdecadesagobydefactolegalizingpersonal possessionofalldrugsandsmallretailforcannabis(WODC,2009). Thesewidespreaddevelopmentscombinedwithrecentcallsfora globaldrugpolicyreform suggestthat theglobalwarondrugs mightbesputteringtoaclose(Godlee&Hurley,2016;UNGASS, 2016a,2016b;GlobalCommissiononDrugPolicy,2016;APPGDPR, 2017).

Anotherwidespreadreactiontotheshortcomingsofcriminal lawhas takenthe opposite direction of thetrend towards less * Correspondingauthor.

E-mailaddresses:l.m.bruijn@rug.nl(L.M.Bruijn),m.vols@rug.nl(M.Vols),

j.g.brouwer@rug.nl(J.G. Brouwer).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2017.08.003

International

Journal

of

Drug

Policy

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punitive drug policies. High crime rates, increased feelings of insecurity, and a widespreadsense of a failing criminaljustice systemchangedthediscourseoncrimeandcrimecontroloverthe lastthirty yearsand resultedin a“culture ofcontrol”(Garland, 2001).Thecultureofcontrolis,amongstothers,characterizedby policies that punish and exclude, and measures that seriously interveneinindividual’sfreedomsandautonomy(Garland,2001). Thischangeddiscourseoncrimeandcrimecontrolleadstosocial andracialdivision,decreasedtoleranceandmassimprisonment (Garland,2001).

While Garland (2001),in his book “The Culture ofControl”, focussesontheUnited Kingdomand theUnitedStates, myriad scholarsillustratethatacultureofcontroliswitnessedthroughout manyWesterncountries,forexampleinContinentalEurope(for the Netherlands and Belgium see e.g., Van Swaaningen, 2004;

Snacken,2007;Devroe,2012;Devroe,Bruinsma,&VanderBeken, 2017;forbroader–comparative–analysesoncountriessuchas Germany,Italy,France,Denmarkseee.g.,Welch&Schuster,2005;

Muncie,2008).Moreover,thoughGarlanddescribesthecultureof controlfromacriminallawperspective,histheoryisoftenusedto interprettheorigins andsubsequent developmentsoftough on crimepoliciesbuilt aroundcivilor administrative law(Devroe, 2012;DiRonco&Persâk,2014;Devroeetal.,2017).

The use of civil or administrative law to tackle crime or disorderly behaviour relates towhat Garland (2001) calls the “responsibilisation strategy”. This is a widespread regulatory trendtomobilizeotheractorsthanjudicialauthoritiesandthe policetotacklecriminalordisorderlybehaviour(Garland,2001;

Beckett&Herbert,2009; Devroe,2012).Inmanyjurisdictions, local authorities have increasingly been empowered with intrusiveandsometimesevenpunitivemeasurestocircumvent criminallawsafeguardsandtime-consumingcriminal proceed-ings(for theNetherlandsseee.g.,Ferdinandusse,2016;Tops& Tromp, 2017; De Meijer, 2017; for United Kingdom see e.g.,

Burney,1999;Hansen,Bill,&Pease,2003;Crawford,2009; for theUnitedStatesseee.g.,Cheh,1991;Beckett&Herbert,2009;

Torres, Apkarian, & Hawdon, 2016). In the United States, for example, local authorities and criminal justice ofﬁcials have drawnuponvarious“banishmentstrategies”toaddresscriminal behaviour(Cheh,1991; Beckett&Herbert, 2009; Torres et al., 2016).Comparabletacticsaredeployedin theUnitedKingdom using Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (Burney, 1999; Crawford, 2009; Crawford, 2011). Germany (Von Mahs, 2005; Belina, 2007),Belgium (Devroe,2012;Peršak,2016),South-Africaand theNetherlands (Fick&Vols,2016;Vols&Fick,2017)allhave similar exclusion-based instruments. Especially the use of eviction1 for excluding or banishing people to combat crime and disorderly behaviour has become increasingly popular (Hunter &Nixon, 2001; Hunter,Nixon, & Slatter, 2005; Flint, 2006; Varady &Schulman, 2007; Flint & Pawson, 2009; Yau, 2011; Silva, 2015; Vols, Tassenaar, & Jacobs, 2015; Fée, 2016;

Kenna,Benjaminsen,Busch-Geertsema,&Nasarre-Aznar,2016;

Vols&Fick,2017).

Ourpaperholdsthatthesein_ﬂuencesofthecultureofcontrol (i.e.theshifttonon-criminallawsanctionsandtheaccompanying responsibilisationstrategy)canalsobewitnessedinthewaron drugs.Manyjurisdictionsuseintrusiveand/orpunitivemeasures based on civil or administrative law as an alternative or supplement to criminal justice intervention (for the United States see e.g., Fagan, Davies, Holland, & Dumanovsky, 2005;

Lebovits & Seidman, 2007; Dickinson, 2015; for the United

Kingdomseee.g.,Flint,2002;Brown,2004;Eastwood,2015).In theNetherlands,onesuchjurisdictionandthefocusofthispaper, theresponsibilityfordrug-relatedcrimecontrolhas progressive-lyshifted towardslocal authorities.2 _Under _Article _13b _of _the

Dutchanti-drugsAct–theOpiumAct–localauthoritieshavethe power toclose homes andother premises if they are used as illegal sites for drug-related crime (Vols & Bruijn, 2015). This instrumentaddressesalltypesofdrugsandistenureneutralas bothrentalandowner-occupiedpremisesaresubjecttoclosure. Moreover,Article13bOpiumActsubjectsbothpublicand non-publicpremisestoclosure.Yet,thispaperfocussesmerelyonthe closureofhomes.3

Aclosureischaracterizedasarestorativemeasureinsteadofa punitive sanction and is therefore temporary – about three to twelvemonths(Vols&Bruijn,2015).Intheory,thismeansthatone can continue his or her residence after the closure period has expired. Yet, despite the provisional natureof the closure, the consequencesarenotnecessarilytemporary.Closingone’shome and the following eviction can have immense negative con-sequences.Anemergingbodyofresearchfocussesonthenegative effectsofevictiononone’sphysicalandmentalhealthandshow how losing one’s home often causes stress, unhappiness, and disrupts thelives of theresidents (Kearns, Hiscock, Ellaway, & Macintyre,2000; Nettleton,2001; Bright, 2010;Currie &Tekin, 2015;Burgard,Seefeldt,&Zelner,2012;Desmond&Kimbro,2015;

Desmond,2016).Moreover,closingone’shomeduetodrug-related crime can lead to placement on a tenant blacklist, or even homelessness as local authorities are not required to provide alternativelivingarrangementsafterclosingone’shome(ECLI:NL: RVS:2016:2464; ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:2840).4 _{Additionally,} _housing

associationsmaycancelaleasewithoutjudicialinterventionafter a drug-related closure (Brouwer &Schilder, 2011, p. 322; Vols, 2015), and in case of anowner-occupiedresidence, banksmay requirethathomeownerspayofftheirmortgageloanatonceafter adrug-relatedclosure.Thehousewillbeauctionediftheowneris ﬁnanciallyunable todo so (GemeenteRotterdam, 2003).Thus, while theclosurelaststemporarily, theconsequencesare often continuous.

Aclosureordercanbefoughtbyﬁlinganoticeofobjectionwith the local authority that issued the order (Article 7:1 General AdministrativeLawAct).Thelocalauthoritywillthenreconsider the closure order. If it considers theobjection unfounded, the citizen maythen ﬁle a notice of appealwith thedistrictcourt (Article 8:1GeneralAdministrativeLawAct). Rulingsof district courts areopen tohigher appeal at thehighest administrative

1

In this paper, eviction refers the permanent or temporary removal of individuals,familiesorcommunitiesfromtheirhomesagainsttheirwill( UN-HABITAT,2007).

2

Throughoutthearticle,theterm“localauthority”willbeusedtodescribethe authorityentitledwiththispowerwhileitisofﬁciallythe(inDutch:)burgemeester. In the Netherlands, a burgemeester is a non-electedadministrative authority appointedbythenationalgovernment.Theburgemeesterchairsboththeexecutive boardandlegislativecouncilofamunicipality,andisresponsibleforsafetyand publicorder.Thetitleforburgemeesterissometimestranslatedas“mayor”oras “burgomaster”toemphasizethesigniﬁcantdifferencebetweentheDutchmayor andtheBritishmayor.However,unfamiliarityoftheDutchconceptburgemeesterin internationalcontextandthe–inourview–lackofpropertranslationinducedusto usethetermlocalauthoritiesthroughoutthearticle.

3 _In_2016,_the_housing_stock_in_the_Netherlands_included_7.641.323_premises; 56.2%wereowner-occupiedandtheotherpartofthehousingmarketweremainly rental premises. Roughly 30%of all rental premises wereowned by private landlords,andthevastmajoritywererentoutbyhousingassociations(StatlineCBS, 2016).AccordingtotheHousingAct2015,allhousingassociationsmustrentthe majorityoftheirpremisestopeoplewitharelativelylowannualincome.

4 _Throughout_this_paper,_all_case_law_is_referred_to_using_the_European_Case_Law Identifier(ECLI).ECLIisanidentifierforcaselawinEuropaandconsistsoffive components.Thefirstpartistheacronym“ECLI”,thesecondpartisthecountry code,followedbythecodeofthecourt,yearofthedecision,anduniqueidentifying number.FormoreinformationontheECLI,visittheofficialwebsiteoftheEuropean UniononEuropeanUnionlaw(eur-lex.europe.eu).

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courtintheNetherlands,theAdministrativeJurisdictionDivision oftheCouncilofState(theCouncilofState).

As this instrument operates under administrative law the closurepowerwillnotbeencumberedbycriminallawsafeguards. The presumption of innocence (Article 6 of the European Convention onHuman Rights) is, for instance, bypassed when operatingunderadministrative law,and theburden ofproofin administrativelawislessstrictthanundercriminallaw(Bröring& Jurgens,2006; Ashworth &Zedner, 2008, p. 48).However, the consequences of closingone’s homeshowsigns of endangered individual’s rights and freedoms, and despite the fewer legal safeguardsunderadministrativelawitisstillthetaskofjudicial courts to protect these rights and freedoms (Ewing, 2010; De Waard,2016).

In response to the emerging culture of control and the subsequentempowermentoflocalauthoritiestosubjectcriminal ordisorderlybehaviourtointrusivemeasures,previousscholarly researchfocusedonlegalprotectionprovidedbyjudicial courts againstinterferencesbylocalauthoritiesinindividual’srightsand freedoms.For example, DiRonco and Peršak (2014) showthat courtsprovidecertainlegalprotection,arising,interalia,fromcase lawoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(EuropeanCourt).The EuropeanCourtdeemsthatanypersonattheriskoflosingone’s homeshould“inprinciplebeabletohavetheproportionalityand reasonableness of themeasure determined byan independent tribunalinthelightoftherelevantprinciplesunderArticle8ofthe Convention,notwithstandingthat,underdomesticlaw,hisrightof occupation has come to an end” ( ECLI:CE:ECHR:2008:0513-JUD001900904).

In lightof theabove, wewillassess whetherDutchjudicial courts function as a substantial safeguard against losing one’s homeduetodrug-relatedcrimeatthesuitofalocalauthority.In ordertodothis,weapplytwodifferentresearchmethods.First,we usedoctrinallegalresearchmethodstoexaminethe“lawinthe books”(Pound,1910).WewillgiveanoverviewoftheDutchdrug policyandtheuseoftheclosurepowerunderArticle13bOpium Acttodeepenourunderstandingofthisrelativelyunknownaspect oftheDutchwarondrugs.Whereasmuch researchhasalready been conducted on the drug policy in the Netherlands (e.g.,

Erickson, Leuw, & Marshall, 1994; MacCoun & Reuter, 1997;

Ossebaard&VandeWijngaart,1998;BoekhoutvanSolinge,1999;

Korf, 2002; Uitermark, 2004; Reinarman, 2009; Van Ooyen-Houben&Kleemans,2015;VanLaar,VanderPol,&Niesink,2016;

VanOoyen-Houben,Bieleman, &Korf,2016), thepoweroflocal authoritiestoﬁghtthewarondrugs byclosinghomesreceived littletonoattentionwithininternationalscholarlyliterature.

Secondly,weuseempiricallegalresearchmethodstoexamine the“lawinaction”(Pound,1910).Weusedasurveytoinvestigate howoftentheclosure powerunder Article13bOpiumActwas utilizedin2015.Moreover,westatisticallyanalysedallpublished caselawofDutchlowercourtstoexaminejudicialbehaviourin caseswherecitizensappealtheirclosureorder.WhileArticle13b OpiumActcanbeusedtoclosedownanytypeofpremises(Bruijn &Vols,2017),thispaperfocussesmerelyontheclosureofhomes. Lawinthebooks:analysisoftheDutchdrugpolicyand legislation

Researchmethods

The analysis below is based on doctrinal legal research (Westerman,2011),whichmeansthatwestudiedlawandlegal conceptsbyreadingandanalysingliterature,legislation,andcase lawtoestablish“thenatureandparameters”ofthelawandlegal issuesinvolved(Hutchinson&Duncan,2012;Hutchinson,2010,p. 37).Doctrinallegalresearchdistinguishesitselffromquantitative

researchsincelawisnotdatumthatcanbepresentednumerically orsubjectedtostatisticaltestinglikequantitativeresearchdoes withdata(McCrudden,2006;Walter,2010).Doctrinalanalysisis alsodifferentfromcontentanalysisastheroleoftheresearcheris important to synthesise meaning from texts (Hutchinson, & Duncan, 2012). Doctrinal research can use content analysis to deconstructtexts,butitismorethanan“analysisofdocuments andtextsthatseekstoquantifycontentintermsofpredetermined categories”(Bryman,2008,p.692).Theimportanceoftheroleof theresearcherand theneedforinterpretationand analysingto construct meaning are qualitative aspects of doctrinal legal research(Hutchinson&Duncan,2012).Yet,doctrinalmethodology isuniqueanddifferentfromallothersocialscientificmethodsasit focusses on legal principles developed by the courts and the legislature(Bartie,2010,p.350).Doctrinalresearchmakesaclear distinctionbetweenlegalnormsorstandardsandthefactsofthe situation. Moreover, in contrast to most other social sciences, doctrinalresearchlacksanindependenttheoreticalperspective; thelawisseenasboththeobjectofresearchandthetheoretical perspectivefromwhichtheobjectisstudied(Westerman,2011). In this paper, we critically assessed essential features of legislation,legalpolicydocuments,andcaselaw,afterwhichall therelevantelementsweresynthesised“toestablishanarguably correctandcompletestatementofthelawonthematterinhand” (Hutchinson,2013,p.9–10).Ourdoctrinalanalysisconsistsofthree elements. First, relevant Dutch legislation was gathered and analysedusingthewebsitehttps://zoek.officielebekendmakingen. nl, which contains all legislation from 1995 until present. Legislationbefore1995wasfoundusingDutchonlinedatabases suchasLegalIntelligence,KluwerNavigator,andRechtsorde.These databases were searched using keywords such as “Article 13b OpiumAct”and“drugpolicy”.Second,wecollectedandanalysed therelevantresearchliteratureusingelectronicdatabasessuchas Lexis-Nexis,GoogleScholar,Elsevier,andWiley,aswellasarticle reference lists. Search terms included “war on drugs”, “drug-relatedeviction(s)”,“drug-relatedcrime”,“Article13bOpiumAct”, “Damocles Act”, and “right to housing”. Each database was searched for Englishand Dutchlanguagearticles ontheDutch drugpolicyandthefightoflocalauthoritiesagainstdrug-related crime.Thedatabasesweresearchedfromitsinceptiontoitsmost recentupdateasofJanuary2017.Third,theonlinedatabaseofthe Dutch judiciary, www.rechtspraak.nl; was used to gather all relevant published Dutch case law, using the following search terms: “Article 13b Opium Act”, “eviction” and “drug-related closure”.AllindicatedsearchtermsareEnglishtranslationsofthe Dutchterms.

Dutchtolerancepolicy

Thekeyelementof theDutchdrugpolicyisthatany person abovetheageof18canbuycannabisintoleratedoutletsknownas coffeeshops.Yet,whilecitiessuchasAmsterdamandMaastricht arefamousfortheircoffeeshops,cannabissaleandpossessionare of_ﬁciallycriminaloffencesunderDutchlaw(Article3OpiumAct). This illustrates a system of de facto legalization and de jure prohibition (Ossebaard & Van de Wijngaart, 1998; De Kort & Cramer,1999).

Thispolicy,alsoknownas“thetolerancepolicy”,hasitsrootsin a desire to separate cannabis (soft drugs5₎ _from _drugs _with

unacceptable risks for public health (hard drugs). To prevent cannabisfrombecomingagatewaydrug,theDutchgovernment

5

Forlong,cannabiswastheonly“softdrug”,butnowadaystheOpiumAct includesmorethan250differentsoftdrugs.Yet,coffeeshopsareonlyallowedtosell cannabisproducts.

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decidedin1976 toofﬁciallytolerate thesaleand possessionof cannabis(WODC,2009,pp.50–51).Suchpolicyispossibleunder the legal “expediency principle”. This principle empowers the PublicProsecutorintheNetherlandstorefrainfromprosecutionif itis“inthepublicinterest”(Duncan&Nicholson,1997;Chatwin, 2003;Corstens,2014,p.41).Thismeansthatillegalitydoesnot automatically result in repressive law enforcement (Uitermark, 2004). The expediency principle, hence, enables the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from investigation and prosecution of cannabis sale and possession (Ossebaard & Van de Wijngaart, 1998).Thus,thesaleandpossessionofcannabisremainofﬁcially illegal under Dutch law, but are tolerated as a matter of governmentpolicy.

Under current national drug policy, drug possession for personal use is tolerated up to a maximum of half a gram of hard drugs, five grams of soft drugs, or five cannabis plants (Aanwijzing, 2015). Moreover, coffeeshop owners will not be prosecutedforsellingcannabisaslongastheycomplywiththe following set of rules: they must refrain from advertising and marketing,sellingharddrugsandalcohol,causingpublic distur-bance in their vicinity, and selling to minors and non-Dutch residents.Moreover,acoffeeshop’sstockshouldbelimitedtofive hundredgrams,andsaletransactionsshouldnotexceedfivegrams per costumer per day (Wouters, Benschop, & Korf, 2010;

Aanwijzing,2015;Bruijn&Vols,2017).Theseruleshavedeveloped overanumberofyearsbythenationallegislature,local govern-mentsandthePublicProsecutionService(VanderVeen,2002).

Intheearlydaysofthetolerancepolicy,fewrulesregulatingthe upcoming drugmarket existed and the number of coffeeshops grewexponentially, which in turnhad a signiﬁcant impact on publicorderandthequalityoflifeinlocalcommunities(Breunese, Brouwer, &Schilder,1996; Van Rest&Visser,1996;Uitermark, 2004).Manypeoplecomplainedaboutunpleasantsmells,higher trafﬁcvolume,pollution,unlawfulassembly,noisenuisance,and feelingsofinsecurity(Bieleman,Schakel,DeBie,&Snippe,1995). Consequently, rules on coffeeshops became more stringent (Uitermark, 2004; MacCoun, 2011, p. 1900) and enforcement becamesubjecttoadministrativepublicorderlaw.Assuch,local authoritiesstartedtoplaya keyrole intheenforcementofthe nationaldrugpolicy(Breuneseetal.,1996).

Theseseriousproblemscausedbycoffeeshopsledin1996toa change in the national drug policy, which empowered local authoritiestobancoffeeshopswithintheirjurisdictions(Breunese etal.,1996;Bruijn&Post,2017).Furthermore,thelegislature entitled local authorities in 1999 to close down coffeeshops for non-compliancewiththerulesunderwhichtheyaretolerated.Thissame provision,Article13bOpiumAct,authorizeslocalauthoritiestoclose public premises used for illegal drug trades (Richtlijnen, 1996;

Aanwijzing,2000).Thepossibilitytoban coffeeshopsandtheclosure powerintroducedin1999(Article13bOpiumAct)seemedtocausea rapiddeclineinthenumberofcoffeeshops.Thepeakinthenumber ofcoffeeshopsisestimatedat1450,butbytheendof 1999the numberofcoffeeshopsdroppedto846(Bieleman&Goeree,2000;

Bieleman,Mennes,&Sijtstra,2014).

Despitethisdeclineinnumberofcoffeeshopsandthepowerto tackleillegaldrugstores,thequalityoflifeinresidentialareaswas stilldegrading(Kamerstukken,2005/2006;Kamerstukken,2006/ 2007).According tothegovernment, residentialpremises were increasingly used as drug outlets, which led to nuisance, disturbanceofpublicorder,andunsafelivingconditions( Kamer-stukken, 2005/2006; Kamerstukken, 2006/2007). This was an incentivefor the legislature toextent the scopeof the closure powerunderArticle13bOpiumActin2007withhomesandother non-publicpremises(Kamerstukken,2005/2006).Eversince,local authoritiesareentitledtoclosedownbothpublicandnon-public premises, including private housing, if illicit drugs are sold,

delivered,provided,orpresentforoneofthesepurposesinornear aproperty.

Article13bOpiumAct:closingillegaldrugoutlets

BoththeintroductionoftheclosurepowerunderArticle13b OpiumActin1999andthesubsequentamendmentin2007were originallyintendedtoclosesitesinvolvedinillegaldrugtradeand to tackle coffeeshops that violate the tolerance conditions (Kamerstukken,1996/1997;Kamerstukken,2005/2006).Yet,case lawshowsthatthescopeoftheclosurepowerhasbroadenedand thatitsuseintensi_fiedoverthepastyears(Brouwer&Bruijn,2016). UndercurrentDutchlaw,theclosurepowerisnolongerlimited toillegaldrugoutlets;localauthoritiesmayissueaclosureorderif thequantityofdiscovereddrugsexceedsthetoleratedamountfor personaluse(halfagramofharddrugs,fivegramsofsoftdrugs,or fivecannabisplants).Accordingtothehighestadministrativecourt in theNetherlands(the Council ofState), any amountofdrugs abovethesethresholdsforpersonaluseisatradingvolumeused for commercialactivitiessuchas dealing ortransporting drugs (ECLI:NL:RVS:2015:130).

Furthermore, fromits inception Article 13b Opium Act was explicitlynotintendedasaninstrumenttoclosedowncannabis farms or marijuana growing facilities (Kamerstukken, 2006/ 2007a).Yet,in 2013,theCouncilof Stateheldthat anyamount ofcannabisplantsabovethetoleratedamountforpersonaluse– ﬁveplants–isprobablyusedforcommercialactivitiesandhence subjecttotheclosurepowerunderArticle13bOpiumAct(ECLI:NL: RVS:2013:2362).Sincethen,thisprovisionhasbeenusedtotackle growingfacilities(Brouwer&Bruijn,2016).

Similarly, when Article 13b Opium Act was introduced the legislatureclariﬁedthattheclosurepowershouldbeusedasalast resort. A less intrusive measure, such as a ﬁnal warning or a penalty,shouldalwaysprecedeaclosureorder.Theonlyaccepted exemption is a “serious offense” (Kamerstukken, 2006/2007b;

Kamerstukken, 2006/2007c). Yet, in 2012, the Council of State approveda“onestrikeyouareout-policy”withregardtoharddrug violations. This policy of the municipality of Kerkrade is to immediately closea buildingafter thediscoveryof hard drugs withouta priorwarning.TheCouncilofStatereasonedthatany activityrelatingtoharddrugsisaseriousoffence,whichjustiﬁes suchimmediateclosures(ECLI:NL:RVS:2012:BY4412).In2015,the Council of State approved the policy of a municipality that abandonstherequirementofapriorwarningincaseswheremore than twenty cannabis plants are discovered (ECLI:NL: RVS:2015:130).In2016,theCouncilofStatetookitastepfurther andapprovedalocalonestrikeyouareout-policywithregardtoall drugs. The Council of Stateapproved this policy by reasoning, analogoustoitsjudgementin2012,thatcommercialpossessionof soft drugs isa serious offenceand hencesubject toimmediate closure(ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:950).

Thesedevelopments incase lawshowthatthescopeof the drug-related closure power has broadened over the years and illustratethecontradictionsbetweenitsinitialpurposeanditsuse in practice. Whilst this increased scope together with the acceptance of a one strike-policy created an instrument that quicklytacklesallsortsofdrug-relatedactivities,italsocreateda seeminglyharshmeasureconsideringthattheuseofthispower resultsintheevictionofentirehouseholdsregardlessofwhether the drug-related activity was engaged in by tenants, owner occupiers, or other residents including minors (Vols & Bruijn, 2015). Yet, as the closure power under Article 13b Opium Act operatesunderadministrativelaw,citizenslacklegalsafeguards providedbycriminallaw.Thisraisesthequestionwhetheralegal barrierexistsagainstthisrepressiveinstrumentusedtoﬁghtthe warondrugs.

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Courtsasapotentialbarrieragainstdrug-relatedclosures

The waron drugs in the Netherlands is increasingly fought without the use of criminal law as drug-related crime is increasinglysubjecttotheadministrativeclosurepoweroflocal authorities.Thisisproblematicfromalegalpointofviewaslosing one’s home is characterized as “a most extreme form of interference with the right to respect for the home” by the European Court (ECLI:CE:ECHR:2008:0513JUD001900904). According totheEuropeanCourt, everyhomeoccupier derives protectionfromtherighttorespectforthehomefoundinArticle 8ECHR.ContractingpartiestotheECHRshouldensurethatanyone whoisatriskofbeingevictedfromhisorherhomeatthesuitofa local authority should have the right to raise the question of proportionalityandreasonablenessofthemeasureinfrontofan independent tribunal in light of Article 8 ECHR (ECLI:CE: ECHR:2008:0513JUD001900904; ECLI:CE:ECHR:2009:1022-JUD000357206; ECLI:CE:ECHR:2011:0203JUD000657104). All Member States of the Council of Europe have to comply with this minimumlevel of protection against thelossof the home (Kenna&Gailiute,2013;Vols,Kiehl,&SidolidelCeno,2015).

Inthesecases,theEuropeanCourtreferredtothe proportion-alityprinciple,whichis,inshort,agatewayforcitizenstorequest legalprotectionagainsttheuseofadministrativepowerssuchas the closure power under Article 13b Opium Act. The German scholar Fleiner clariﬁed the meaning of the proportionality principlewiththefamousexample“thepoliceshouldnotshoot atsparrowswithcannons”(Fleiner,1928,p.440).Althoughthe exact meaning of proportionality is subject of ﬁerce academic debate(Barak,2012),thegeneralunderlyingideaof proportional-ityisthatpurposes,means,andconsequencesshouldbebalanced (Fick&Vols, 2016).Forinstance,thepurposeofclosing ahome afterdrugsarediscoveredistoterminatetheillegalactivity,to preventfurtherviolations,andrestorethepeaceandpublicorder intheneighbourhood(Vols&Bruijn,2015;Bröringetal.,2016,p. 599). If the closure extends further than these purposes, one speaksof“disproportionality”betweenthesanctionimposedand the offence committed (De Waard, 2016). Furthermore, a proportionality review involves balancing the public interests against the interests and rights of the individuals involved (Ranchordás&deWaard,2016).

UnderadministrativeDutchlaw,citizensarerequiredtofollow a preliminary administrative procedure before they have the possibilityofhavingtheproportionalityandreasonablenessofthe evictiondeterminedbyanindependentcourtin lightofArticle 8ECHR.Citizensshouldcomplainabouttheclosureordertothe localauthoritywhoissuedtheclosureorderbeforetheycanappeal theorderinfront ofa judicialcourt(Article 7:1of theGeneral AdministrativeLawAct). Thisiscalled theobjectionprocedure. Afterthelocalauthorityreconsidereditsorder,citizensareentitled toinvokejudicialreviewandhavethepossibilityofa proportion-alitycheckbyajudicialcourtundertheGeneralAdministrative LawAct(Article3:4(2)).Yet,itisunclearhowDutchcourtshandle proportionalitydefencesincaseswherecitizensappealtheir drug-relatedclosureorders.Hence,nextpartofthepaperfocusseson thelawinactionbystatisticallyanalysingallpublishedcaselawof DutchlowercourtsontheuseofArticle13bOpiumAct. Lawinaction:judicialbehaviourontheadministrativewaron drugs

Analysisofthelawinthebooksshowedthatlocalauthoritiesin the Netherlands are empowered toﬁght the war on drugs by immediately closing homes involved in drug-related crime. In return,citizenshavethepossibilitytorequestjudicialreviewof suchadministrativeactionsunderbothDutchandEuropeanlaw.

One of the most important grounds for judicial review is the proportionality principle. Previousscholarly literatureindicated thatjudicialcourts“maywellberegardedasfundamentaltothe safeguarding of individual rights and freedoms” by, amongst others, questioning the proportionality of the interferences by localauthorities(DiRonco&Peršak,2014).Toexamineifcourts indeedfunctionasasafetynetagainstthelossofone’shomeatthe suitofalocalauthority,thefollowingpartofthepaperfocusseson thelawinactionbyusingquantitativeempirical(legal)research methods(Loevinger,1948; Epstein&King,2002;Hall&Wright, 2008;Epstein&Martin,2010;Lawless,Robbennolt,&Ulen,2010;

Epstein&Martin,2014). Researchmethods

Theﬁrstempiricalresearchmethodweusedwasasurveyto indicate how oftenlocal authorities usetheirclosure power. A surveywassenttofortymunicipalitieswiththelargestpopulation intheNetherlandsandtenrandomlyselectedmunicipalities(Vols, Hof,&Brouwer,2017).Thesemunicipalitieswere,interalia,asked toprovidedataontheusagefrequencyoftheclosurepowerunder Article13bOpiumActover2015.Thisresultedinthedataon drug-related closures from 46 municipalities (not all municipalities responded).

The second empirical research method we used was a quantitative analysisofDutchcaselawregardingtheclosure of homes based on Article 13b Opium Act. We collected and statisticallyanalysedallpublishedcase lawbetweenNovember 2007 and January2016onhomeclosuresbased onArticle13b OpiumAct.WechoseNovember2007asastartingpointsincethe scopeoftheprovisionwasformallyexpandedwiththepowerto close homes and other non-public premises at that time. We searched the online database of the Dutch judiciary (www. rechtspraak.nl) with ﬁxed search terms in order to ensure reproducibility.Weusedthefollowingterms:“13bOpiumAct”, “closure”,“13bOpiumActclosure”.Thisdatabaseallowedusto automaticallyﬁlteronalljudgementsofthelowestcourts–the districtcourts–onadministrativelaw,andwemanuallyselected alljudgementsonhomeclosures.Thissearchyielded87relevant court decisions on the closure of homes based on Article 13b OpiumActintheperiodfromNovember2007toJanuary2016.

Thissampleof87courtdecisionsisaselectionoftheoverall populationofjudgementsfrom2007to2016asdistrictcourtsin theNetherlandsdonotpublisheverysinglejudgement.Toassess the representativenessofour sample,we examined theofﬁcial policyofwww.rechtspraak.nl(Besluitselectiecriteria,2012).We discoveredthatthejudiciaryitselfselectswhichcourtdecisionwill bepublishedandthattherulesforpublicationarerathervague. Until 2012, court decisions were published on the basis of qualitative criteria including media attention, importance for public life, consequences for application of regulations, and interestsofparties. Asof2012,certain decisionsshouldalways bepublished,forexamplejudgmentsofallhighestcourts“ifthe case is notunfoundedor inadmissibleand/ordismissedwitha standard reasoning” (Besluit selectiecriteria, 2012). A court decision should also be published if a case received attention fromthemediaorifthedecisionholdsasigniﬁcantimportancefor further rulings. The rules on publication contain some more selectioncriteria,andcourtsarealsoallowedtodevelopadditional rulesandselectioncriteria.

Wehand-codedallcasestodocumentthetrendsincaselaw andthefactorsthatmightappearimportanttotheoutcomesof cases(Hall&Wright,2008;Lawlessetal.,2010).Eachcasewas codedbythesameauthortopreventmultipleinterpretations.All publishedcaselawwasprintedoutandcodedintoacomputer.We developedacodebookbasedonourreadingsofcaselaw,which

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containsalistofallvariablesforwhichinformationwasavailable, suchasthetypeofdrug-relatedcrime,thedefencesadvancedby thecitizens,andthereasoningofthecourt.Thecodebookincludes a detailed description of how to code, read and interpret the judgements.

Lastly,thecollecteddatawerestatisticallyanalysed.Weused Fisher’s Exact Test (two-tailed) because of the relatively small sample(N=87)todeterminetheprobability(p-value)thatagiven patterninthedataisobtainedmerelybychance.Fisher’sExactTest calculatesthedeviationfromthenullhypothesisassumingthereis norelationshipbetweenvariables.Thenullhypothesisisrejectedif thep-valueisbelow0.05(Lawlessetal.,2010;Epstein&Martin, 2014).Weusedthephicoefﬁcient(

F

)todeterminethestrengthof a relationship between variables as phi is commonly used in 22 contingencytables (Ellis,2010). Phi rangesin valuefrom 1to1,where 1isaperfectrelationshipandindicatesthatmost ofthedataareintheoff-diagonalcells,0indicatesnorelationship and1indicatesaperfectrelationshipwithmostofthedatainthe diagonalcells(Sirkin,2006).

Resultsofsurvey

Fig.1 showsthat 39 of the46 (84.8%) municipalitiesin our sampleusedtheclosure powerunderArticle13bOpiumActin 2015.In total, theselocal authorities closed 602 premises.The frequencyofusingthisclosurepowerdifferentiatesheavilyamong themunicipalities(M=13.09Mdn=3.00,SD=19.13).

Local authorities can usethe closure power to close public premises,suchascoffeeshopsandrestaurants,aswellasprivate premisessuchashomes.Ofthe46municipalitieswhoresponded tothesurvey,38providedinformationonthenumberofhomes theyclosed.Fig.2showsthedistributionofhomeclosuresin2015.

The38municipalitiesthatprovidedtheirdataonhomeclosures closed239homesin2015usingtheclosurepowerunderArticle 13bOpiumAct.Thefrequencyofusingtheclosurepowerdiffers heavilyamongthemunicipalities(M=6.29,Mdn=0.50,SD=11.49).

Fig. 2 shows that half of the 38 municipalities in our sample refrainedfromclosinghomesin2015.Consequently,19 municipal-itiesareresponsibleforthe239homeclosuresin2015.

Resultsofquantitativeanalysisofcaselaw

OursampleofDutchcaselawcontains87courtdecisionsfrom November2007toJanuary2016ondrug-relatedhomeclosures. Thelengthof theclosuresin oursample variesbetween3and 12months(M=6.45,Mdn=6.00,SD=4.83).

Table1showsthatlocalauthoritiesrefertofivetypesof drug-related activities to support their closure order: possession of drugsforcommercialpurposes,growingoverfivecannabisplants, dealingdrugs fromor aroundthepremises,keeping acannabis “stash”foracoffeeshop,andproducingdrugsinaso-calleddrug lab. Drug possessionis seen as commercialpossession once it exceedsthetoleratedamountforpersonaluse(halfagramofhard drugs, five grams of soft drugs, or five cannabis plants). Commercialpossessionisthereasontoclosea homein almost halfofthecases(seeTable1),anddealingdrugsfromoraroundthe houseleadstoaclosureorderin10.3%ofthecases.

Citizens usedifferent arguments tooppose a closure order.

Table2showsthatin45casescitizensarguethattherequirements ofArticle13bOpiumActwerenotmet,i.e.thelocalauthoritywas notentitledtoissueaclosureorder.Moreover,thetableshowsthat citizensconsidertheclosureaspunishmentin17cases;citizens claimthatclosingtheirhomeisapunitivesanctionintendedto punishthemratherthanarestorativemeasureintendedtoendthe violation.Thecourtacceptsthisdefencein1case, asshownin

Table2.

Furthermore,citizens argue that the closure order is inade-quately reasoned by the local authority. They claim that the decisionlackssupportingsubstantiationontheurgencytoclose their home and claim that the local authority should have mentionedthereasonswhyalessdrasticremedyisinsufficient. Theinsufficientreasoningoftheclosureorderisareasontoallow theappealin22casesoutof36allowedappeals.Itsroleindeciding to allow an appeal is marginally statistically significant in comparisontootherdefences(p=0.09).

As illustratedin our doctrinallegal analysis, proportionality defencesareagatewaytojudicialreviewofadministrativeactions. Ouranalysisshowsthatcitizensraiseaproportionalitydefencein thevastmajorityofthecases(78outof87cases).However,Table2

shows that this defence convincesthe court in only 11 out of 78cases.

Table3showsthatthecourtallowstheclaimofthecitizensin 36cases(41.4%),whichmeansthattheappealsaredismissedin morethanhalfofallcases(51casesof87cases).Moreover,Table3

shows the impact of a proportionality defence on the court’s reasoningintheirjudgements.Here,_“impact”meansthatthecourt Fig.1.Distributionofclosedpremisesamongmunicipalitiesin2015(n=46).

Fig.2. Distributionofclosedhomesamongmunicipalitiesin2015(n=38).

Table1

Reasonsforclosureandcorrespondingcourtdecisionsasapercentageofthe sample(N=87). Reason n(%) %Appeal Allowed Dismissed Commercialpossession 42(48.3) 37.5 67.5 Growingcannabis 33(37.9) 54.5 45.5 Dealingdrugs 9(10.3) 33.3 66.7 Druglab 1(1.2) 0.0 100.0 Unknown 2(2.3) 0.0 100.0

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includestheproportionalitydefenceinitsreasoningandexplicitly mentionesthe (dis)proportionality of theclosure orderand its consequences as a reason for its ﬁnal decision. Although a proportionalitydefencegotacceptedin only11outof 78cases (14.1%),thereisamoderatepositiverelationshipbetweenraisinga proportionalitydefenceanditsimpactonthereasoninginaﬁnal courtdecision(p=0.009,

F

=0.31).

Raisingaproportionalitydefenceisreasonforthecourttoallow theappealin11outof28casesinwhichthedefencewasraised, andin50outof50casesreasontodismisstheappeal.Inaddition to the positive relationship between raising a proportionality defenceanditsimpactonthereasoninginacourtdecision,we found a signiﬁcant substantial negative relationship between raisingaproportionalitydefenceandallowedappeals(p<0.0001,

F

= 0.53).

Discussion

Wecollecteddataonthenumberofdrug-relatedclosuresin 2015 toprovide some insights onthe usage frequency of this instrument. We also conducted a statistical analysis of all published case law on the use of the closure power between November 2007 and January 2016 to examine whether courts functionasasafetynetagainstlosingone’shomeatthesuitofa local authority. We speciﬁcally focused on the proportionality principleasoneofthemostimportantgroundsforjudicialreview. On thewhole, theresults fromoursurvey showed that the closurepowerunderArticle13bOpiumActisfrequentlyusedin 2015.Oursampleof46municipalitiesconstitutesonly11.8%ofall municipalities in the Netherlands but nonetheless closed 602premisesovera periodof oneyear.6The numberofclosed premisesvariesheavilyamongthemunicipalitiesinoursample. These differencesmay beexplained bythe composition of our sample.MunicipalitiessuchasAmsterdamandMaastrichtwitha highcoffeeshopdensityaremorelikelytoencounterdrug-related crimethanothers. Thisissimilarformunicipalitiesclosetothe internationalbordersthatdrawmanydrugtouristsfromGermany,

BelgiumandFrance(Woutersetal.,2010;MacCoun,2011),andfor municipalitiesintheSouthernpartoftheNetherlandswherethe authoritiesencounterextremeformsofdrugcrimeandnuisance (Tops & Tromp, 2017). This might explain why, for example, Amsterdam,with173coffeeshops (Bieleman,Mennes, &Sijstra, 2017)andmuchdrugtourism,closed51premisesin2015,while Deventer,situatedinthemiddleoftheNetherlandswithonlyfour coffeeshops (Bielemanetal.,2017), closedonlyone buildingin 2015.Thisdoesnot necessarily suggestthat there isless drug-relatedcrimeinDeventerthaninAmsterdam,butitmightbethat Deventersufferslessfromdrug-nuisanceandthatlocalauthorities arehenceless concernedwithtacklingdrug-relatedcrimethan thoseinAmsterdam.Anotherexplanationmightbethedifferences in local policies. For example, local authorities in the one municipalitymight seethemselvesascrime_ﬁghtersmore than others(Misérus&Zoetbrood,2017).

Thedatashowedthathomeclosuresconstituteaboutathirdof allclosuresin2015.Apossibleexplanationforthisrelativelylow numbermightbethathomesarelessoftenusedassitesfor drug-relatedcrimethanpublicpremises.Anotherexplanationmightbe thatlocalauthoritiesaremorelikelytorefrainfromclosinghomes astheinterestsatstakeareoftenhigherforindividualswhowill losetheirhomecomparedtotheinterestsatstakeforsomeone who’srestaurantorstorewillbeclosed.Nevertheless,thefactthat only19municipalitiesaccountfor239closedhomesandjust11.8% (46)ofallDutchmunicipalitiesaccountforatotalof602closed premisesoveraperiodof oneyear,proveshowimmersedlocal authorities areinthewarondrugs.Subsequently, theseresults illustratetheimportanceofamoredetailedstudyontheuseofthis closurepower.

Although thequantitative case lawanalysistellsus nothing aboutthelegaldisputesthatwereneverﬁledincourt,andthose thathavenotbeenpublished,webelievethattheanalysedcaselaw is a valuable source,revealing information about an important portion of the law in action. Moreover, we believe that an examinationofoursampleisusefulandincreasesourknowledge and understandingoncourt legalreasoningandthefunctionof courtsassafetynetsincasesregardingdrug-relatedclosuresinthe Netherlands. Nevertheless, given the above, the imprecise publication policy of www.rechtspraak.nl and the role of the Table2

Advanceddefencesversusfrequencyofacceptancebycourt,andnumberoftimessimilardefenceisreasontoallowtheappeal(N=87).

Defence Advanced/Accepted Reasontoallowappeal(n=36)(%)

Disproportionalconsequences 78/11 14(38.9)

Localauthorityhasnojurisdiction 45/5 10(27.8)

Insufﬁcientreasoning 18/7 22(61.1)

Closureisapunitivesanction 17/1 1(2.8)

Table3

Proportionalitydefenceanditsimpactoncourtdecisionsasapercentageofthesample.

Courtdecision Impactofproportionalitydefenceoncourtdecision Proportionalitydefenceraised(%)

Yes No Total

Appealallowed(n=36) Impact 11(30.6) 3(8.3) 14(38.9)

Noimpact 17(47.2) 5(13.9) 22(61.1)

Total 28(77.8) 8(22.2) 36(100.0)

Appealdismissed(n=51) Impact 50(100.0) 0(0.0) 50(98.0)

Noimpact 0(0.0) 1(2.0) 1(2.0) Total 50(98.0) 1(2.0) 51(100.0) All(N=87) Impact 61(70.1)* 3(3.4)* 64(73.6) Noimpact 17(19.5)* 6(6.9)* 23(26.4) Total 78(89.7) 9(10.3) 87(100.0) * p=0.0092. 6

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judiciary’sjudgmentinpublishingcaselaw,cautionneedstobe applied when generalizing the results beyond the sample examinedinthispaper.

Ourquantitativeanalysisofcaselawshowedthat41.4%ofall casesresultedinallowedappeals.Thissuccessrateforcitizensis especiallyinterestinginrelationtothebroadenedscopeoflocal authorities’ closure power. Whilst thedoctrinal analysisshows that Article 13b Opium Act was originally intended as an instrument to ﬁght illegal drug outlets, our empirical analysis showsthatonlya smallportionofallcasesinvolve actualdrug dealing.Almosthalfofallcasesinvolvedcommercialpossession andaslightlysmallerportioninvolvedgrowingcannabis.While the legislature never intended for commercial possession and growingcannabis tofallunder thescopeof theclosurepower, todaytheyaccountforalmostallpublishedcasesbroughtbefore court.

Therelativelylowsuccessrateforcitizensisstrikingbothwith respecttotheunderlying drug-relatedactivitiesof aclosure,as wellasthenumberofreceivedwarnings.Closureorderswereonly precededbywarningsorotherlessintrusivemeasuresin5.7%ofall cases,andlackofapriorwarningorothermeasurewasonlyreason toendaclosurein4.6%ofallcases.Theseﬁndingsnotonlyshow thatlocalauthoritiesapplyaonestrikeyouareout-approach,but alsothatcourtsdonotdisapproveofsuchanapproach.Lackof priorwarningsintheanalysedcasesmightindicatethatserious violationswithlargequantitiesofdrugsareoverrepresentedinour sample.However,theCouncilofStateactivelyapprovedtheone strikeyouareout-policyofthemunicipalityofVenloin2016(ECLI: NL:RVS:2016:950), which supports the idea that, despite the legislature’sintention,immediateclosureisdeveloping intothe ruleratherthantheexception.Thisdevelopment,togetherwith theotherdevelopmentsshownbythedoctrinalanalysisregarding theongoingwideningofthescopeoftheclosurepower,willlikely resultinadecreaseofsuccessfuldefencesforcitizens.Thismakes us draw the cautious prediction that the number of allowed appealsmaydropinthefuture.

Table2showedthedefencesputforwardbycitizensincourt. Wespeciﬁcallyfocussedontheimpactofproportionalitydefences aspreviousscholarlyliteratureindicatedthattheproportionality principleisoneofthemostimportantgroundsforjudicialreview and oneof the mostimportant factorsin protectingindividual rights and freedoms against excessive interference by local authorities (DiRonco &Peršak,2014).The resultsshowed that proportionalitydefencesareputforwardinthevastmajorityofall cases.Ouranalysisofcaselawandearlierstudiesondrug-related closures(Vols&Bruijn,2015; Bruijn&Vols, 2017)showthat a proportionalitydefencebreaks-upinawiderangeofarguments suchasphysicalormentalhealthproblems,lackofapriorwarning, andﬁnancialimplicationsoftheclosure.Aproportionalitydefence can also include the consequences of the closure for minor children,ortheargumentthataclosurewillresultin homeless-ness,placementonatenantblacklist,orboth.

Ourdatashowedthatnoneofthedefencesseemstatistically signi_ﬁcantly successful in court, not even a proportionality defence.Proportionalitydefenceswereonlysuccessfulin11out of78cases(14.1%)inwhichthedefencewasputforward.Yet,our analysis shows that, despite the case outcome, raising a proportionality defence makes it more likely that the court explicitlymentionsthe(dis)proportionalityoftheclosureandits consequencesasareasonforitsﬁnaldecision.Thisdoesnotonly meanthatthecourtbalancestheconsequencesoftheclosureand interestsofthecitizenagainstthepurposeoftheclosuretodecide whethertheclosureisproportionalinaparticularcase,butalso thattheoutcomeofthisbalancingwilldirectlyimpactthecourt decision. Moreover, while the court can decide to review the proportionalityoftheclosureonitsowninitiative,notraisinga

proportionalitydefencemakesitmorelikelythatthejudgedoes not assess the proportionality of the closure order and its consequences at all. In other words, it is likely that the proportionalityoftheclosureanditsconsequenceswillnothave anyimpactonthecourtdecisionifaproportionalitydefenceisnot putforward.

Thus,despiteitsfunctionasagatewaytojudicialreview,the factthatitwasputforwardinthevastmajorityoftheanalysed cases,anditsimpactoncourtdecisions,aproportionalitydefence does not necessarily result in a more favourable outcome for citizens.Infact,ouranalysissuggeststheexactopposite.Contrary toourexpectations,wefoundasubstantialrelationshipbetween raisingaproportionalitydefenceandthedismissalofanappeal.In otherwords,raisingaproportionalitydefencemakesitmorelikely thatanappealwillbedismissed.

Apossiblereasonisthatlocalauthoritiesprobablyrefrainfrom closingahomeiftheybelievethattheclosureanditsconsequences arenotinproportiontotheoffencecommitted.The proportionali-typrinciplewillhencefunctionasabarrierorthresholdforthe localauthoritytoissueaclosureorder.Thispresumableroleofthe proportionalityprinciple isprobablymoreapparentincaseson homeclosuresthanincasesontheclosedownofpublicpremises as thenegativeconsequences of evictiononsomeone’s life are immense (Kearns et al., 2000; Nettleton, 2001; Bright, 2010;

Burgardetal.,2012;Currie &Tekin,2015; Desmond&Kimbro, 2015;Desmond,2016).Thiswouldalsoexplainthedifferencesin numberofclosuresbetweenpublicpremisesandhomesasshown bythesurvey.

Asimilarexplanationfor therelationshipbetweena propor-tionalitydefenceandthedismissalofanappealrelatestothe set-up of Dutch administrative law procedures. Under Dutch administrative law, an intermediate stage – the objection procedure – exists betweenissuing a closure orderand access to judicial review in which the local authority reconsiders its closure order. It is possible that local authorities decide to terminatetheclosureorderiftheybelievethatclosingthehome willresultinanunfairbalancebetweenthepurposeoftheclosure andtheinterestsofthecitizen(s)involved.

Hence,theproportionalityprinciplemightﬁlteroutcasesthat areevidentlydisproportionatebeforeissuinga closureorder or during the objection procedure. This could explain why a proportionality defence does not lead to a successful outcome forcitizensincourt;advancingaproportionalitydefenceatsucha latestagemightjustfunctionasalaststrawthatcitizensgraspto defendtheircase.

Anotherexplanation might bethat the cases in oursample mainlyinvolveseriousviolationswithlargequantitiesofcannabis thatjustifytheoutcomeofaproportionalityreview.Thissuggests theneedforfurtherresearchinvolvinganalysesofmorefactors thatmayrelatetothecaseoutcomesuchasthetypeandquantity ofdiscovereddrugs.

Nonetheless,currentanalysisseemstoindicatethat,oncethe case is taken tocourt,a proportionality review is a procedural hurdle rather than a substantial safeguard protecting citizens againsttheharshlawandorderapproach thatreliesonclosing homes.

Conclusion

Thisstudycombineddoctrinalandempiricallegalanalysesto exploreand reveal a hiddenaspectof thewarondrugs in the Netherlands:theuseofhomeclosurestotackledrug-relatedcrime inresidentialareas.AlthoughthedrugpolicyintheNetherlandsis knownforitstolerance,thispaperdemonstratedthattheDutch havedevelopedanaggressiveenforcementmethodagainst drug-relatedcrimewithoutbringingcriminallawintoplay.Theresults

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from the survey showed that only a small portion of the municipalitiesinthe Netherlandsalreadyaccountfor hundreds of closed premises in 2015. Thisalternative war ondrugs is a perfectexampleofhowtheresponsetocrimehaschangedintoa cultureofcontrol.

Whileananalysisofthelawinthebooksshowedthatcitizens havethepossibilitytorequestjudicialreview ofadministrative actionunderbothDutchandEuropeanlaw,theanalysisofthelaw inactionshowedthatjudicialcourtsdonotseemtocounterthis repressiveapproach. Our ﬁndings showthatcitizens advancea proportionalitydefenceinthevastmajorityofallcasesandthat raisingsuchdefence is likely toimpact thecase outcome.Yet, raising a proportionality defence will not result in a more favourableoutcomeforcitizensand willmostlikelyevenresult in thedismissal of the appeal. Thisseems toindicate that the judicialproportionalityreviewisofproceduralimportancerather thanasafetynettoprotectindividual’srightsandinterestsagainst theexcessiveuseofclosureordersandfollowingevictioninthe warondrugs.

Theongoingwideningofthescopeoftheclosurepower,the approvedonestrikeyouareout-policy,relativelylowsuccessrate ofcitizenswhoﬁghtthelossoftheirhome,lackofsigniﬁcantly successful defences together with a seemingly meaningless proportionalitycheckshownosignofa legalsafetynetagainst thelossofone’shomeduetodrug-relatedcrimeatthesuitofa localauthority.Thismakesithardtobelievethatthewarondrugs intheNetherlandsissputteringtoaclose.

Conﬂictofintereststatement

Wewishtoconfirmthattherearenoknownconflictsofinterest associatedwiththispublicationand therehasbeennofinancial supportforthisworkthatcouldhaveinfluenceditsoutcome.The manuscripthasbeenreadandapprovedbyallnamedauthors. Acknowledgments

TheauthorsaregratefultoJudithMildnerandSuzanneSchot fortheircontributionduringthewritingprocess.

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