NORMATIVE RIGHTS OF POSTCOLONIAL
MIGRANTS
Exploring grounds for a legitimate claim to citizenship in
former colonizing nations
Master Thesis – MSc Political Science Leiden University
Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences
Student: Robin Metiary Student nr.: 2683911 Supervisor: Dr. T. Theuns Second reader: Dr. M. Verschoor
Track: Political Legitimacy & Justice Date: August 28th 2020
Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the discussion about the grounds for the right to citizenship and to whom this applies. The focus here is on the postcolonial migrant, for this is the logical first step in acknowledging differences and inequalities within societies. Through analyzing the relationship between the postcolonial migrant and the former ruling nation I claim that the postcolonial migrant has a legitimate moral claim to citizenship in the former colonizing nation, the ‘motherland’. The legitimacy of this claim stems from grievances, an intertwined relationship and gratitude. Which together form the base of a new ground for the right to citizenship, which I propose to call jus paribus. This right to citizenship is a dormant right which should be given to first- and second-generation postcolonial migrants. By
granting these generations a path to citizenship former colonizing nations can begin repaying their historical wrongs.
Table of Content
ABSTRACT ... 1
TABLE OF CONTENT ... 2
1. INTRODUCTION ... 3
2. POSTCOLONIAL MIGRANT ... 7
3. CLAIM FOR CITIZENSHIP ... 17
4. PATH TO CITIZENSHIP ... 23
5. CONCLUSION ... 28
1.
Introduction
Contemporary debates about citizenship range from Zapata-Barrero’s focus on the role of culture in enhancing (equal) citizenship (p. 534, 2016), to Horst’s exploration of what
‘active’ citizenship (should) entail(s) (Horst, Erdal & Jdid, 2020), and Tuitt’s use of Brexit as an example to show that EU Member States (still) view the world and citizenship through a colonial lens (p. 210, 2020). Although their focus and expertise differ their discussions do provide an opportunity to revisit the notion of citizenship, to whom the status should apply and for what reasons.
Citizenship refers to “the character of connection between persons who are full
members of the State” (Zilbershats, 2001, p.695). Although the definition provided by
Zilbershats is quite clear, citizenship is a much debated upon concept on which a consensus is yet to be reached (Leydet, 2017). What does citizenship entail? To whom does the status apply? Are we using it as a source of belonging, and are we thereby excluding others, is this exclusion justified? These questions reflect the ambiguousness of the notion, and the
challenge to define the concept. In light of present-day social movements these questions become increasingly important (Cash & Kinnvall, 2017; Tuitt, 2020). How do you
normatively determine who has a legitimate claim, and for what reasons, to the concept of citizenship whilst taking inequalities into consideration? Is it even possible? This thesis aims to answer part of this question by focusing on a specific group namely, postcolonial migrants. Contemporary social movements such as the Black Lives Matter movement, and discussions about the role of citizenship provide an incentive to revisit the notion from a postcolonial perspective. The reason I single out the postcolonial migrant here is because the foundation in these debates is, I believe, the strive for inclusion. By acknowledging one’s colonial past you open up the debate for inclusiveness in society for postcolonial migrants and perhaps in the
future for others as well. My argument here is that societies should first address their colonial past, and thus the postcolonial migrant, if they wish to address the feelings of inequality that are apparent in groups within society. For the postcolonial migrant is perhaps not at the center of this contemporary public discussion, but he is the beginning of the discussion on inclusion.
The debate about inclusion should not be limited to the public but should be held in academia as well. I found that current literature rarely considers this specific and special group of migrants when contemplating inclusion in the concept of citizenship. This is why I advocate that this specific (minority) group, the postcolonial migrant, should be granted special attention in the theoretical debate about inclusion of citizenship. For postcolonial migrants are intertwined with their former ruling-nation to the extend, that they are, in essence, already part of that nation. I will attempt to further the theoretical discussion of citizenship in relation to the postcolonial migrant by reflecting upon the following main research question “When, and for what reasons, should postcolonial migrants be granted
legal citizenship in their former ruling nation?”. In answering this question, I aim to
contribute to the theoretical debate and finally include this specific group of migrants in the discussion. Because, as this thesis will show, this specific group of migrants hold a special and particular moral claim to citizenship in their former ruling nation.
My research question has two components, I will first defend the normative right of postcolonial migrants and their claim to legal citizenship in the former ruling nation, by establishing the reasons why the postcolonial migrant has this claim to citizenship in the motherland. The motherland here, refers to the former colonizing nation and is a name coined by Amighetti & Nutti (2016). I will establish the why through discussing the concept of citizenship and linking it to the postcolonial migrant’s normative rights, based on a)
legitimacy. Secondly, I will address the when part of my research question by proposing a path to citizenship for first- and second-generation postcolonial migrants.
A way to analyze citizenship is by approaching it on the basis of three different dimensions (Cohen, 1999; Kymlicka, 2000). The first of these dimensions is the legal aspect of citizenship, this dimension concerns the civil, political and social rights of a citizen. The second dimension is that of the political agent, which is to say the person who is actively participating in a society’s political institutions. The third dimension considers membership in a political community that provides a source of identity, sometimes referred to as the psychological dimension (Carens, 2000; Leydet, 2017). Neither the dimensions presented here, nor the concept of citizenship itself has a generally agreed upon definition (Leydet, 2017). Throughout this thesis I will, however, choose to use the dimensions described here as a valid frame of reference, for my argument is not concerned with the construct of the
dimensions but rather with the limitations of their interpretations. More specifically I will concern myself with the definition of the first dimension, the legal dimension. Here I find that it neglects to consider a specific group of people, postcolonial migrants, who should, so I clam, have the right and access to legal citizenship in their motherland. When I refer to citizenship in this thesis, I thus refer to legal citizenship which constitutes of rights and obligations for the free legal person (citizen) in a country (Leydet, 2017). By scrutinizing the interpretation of the legal dimension in relation to postcolonial migrants, I aim to convince the reader that this specific (minority) group has a claim towards inclusion in this dimension that is not sufficiently been met in theoretical discussions.
There is one assumption I make throughout this thesis, which is that the colonial wrongs should, in some way, be repaid. My suggestion is to do this through providing access to citizenship for those who wish to acquire it. In the next chapter I will provide a clear definition of the postcolonial migrant and argue why this group warrants specific attention. I
will do so by discussing the wrongness of colonialism and establishing, and defining, a relationship between postcolonial migrants and the motherland. This chapter forms the base for the third chapter of this thesis, in which I will reflect upon the theoretical discussion for the grounds of citizenship and carefully construct my arguments including and defining what a legitimate claim is and when. The arguments in chapter three show that postcolonial
migrants have a legitimate normative claim to legal citizenship in the motherland based on a),
grievances: as in a way to repair the wrongs of colonialism, b) relationship: a significant and
legitimate claim for interconnectedness, and c) reciprocity: through which the service to the motherland is repaid. It is in this chapter that I suggest citizenship for postcolonial migrants should be granted based on jus paribus, or the right to be equal. In chapter four I provide room for counterarguments against my claims such as Miller’s (2000) concern with the commonality factor of citizenship and engage with them. In the fifth and final chapter, I reflect upon my thesis, review my thesis statement and consider potential further research in this area. It is in this chapter that I hope to answer my research question, “when, and for what
reasons, should postcolonial migrants be granted legal citizenship in their former ruling nation?” from which my thesis statement naturally follows “postcolonial migrants should have a normative right to legal citizenship in their motherland.”
By theoretically analyzing my claim throughout this thesis and by answering my question in the conclusion, I hope to provide a different insight in the discussion of grounds to the rights of citizenship and perhaps incite a renewed conversation about it. Because I believe that current public discussion warrants a new critical examination of these grounds. Which have not sufficiently considered the postcolonial migrant and its legitimate claim to legal citizenship in the former colonizing nation. In focusing on this minority group, society will not only acknowledge the past wrongs, and show a form of gratitude, but the
motherland’s society will also acknowledge their historical relationship through which they are intertwined.
2.
Postcolonial Migrant
This chapter addresses the significance of including postcolonial migrants in relation to their normative claim to legal citizenship in the motherland. It does so by first analyzing the reasons why colonialism is wrong (I), second by discussing and demarcating the concept of postcolonial migration (II) which allows me to, thirdly, establish and define a sufficient relationship between the postcolonial migrant and the motherland (III). I will underline that colonialism is wrong whilst providing room for a potential counterargument, that there are beneficial sides to colonialism as well. By stressing the reasons why colonialism is wrong, what constitutes a postcolonial migrant and by addressing the significance of postcolonial migrants’ ties to the motherland, this chapter defends the focus on this specific group in this thesis and serves as a base for the discussion in the subsequent chapters.
“The problem of colonialization comprises not only the intersection of historical and objective conditions but also man’s attitude toward these conditions.”
(Fanon, p.65, 1952).
I. Wrongness of Colonialism
connotations of colonialism, the relationship between the migrant and the motherland is better understood. This in turn allows for a better understanding of the push and pull factors that are formed because of these colonial ties. I will, nevertheless, briefly engage in a
potential counterargument against this point by discussing the beneficial side of colonialism. Before I delve into the reasons why colonialism is wrong, it is wise to address the definition of the concept. As Kohn & Reddy (2017) already describe, it is hard to actually define the concept because it is quite often used as a synonym for imperialism. The distinction between the two lies in the inhabitation of the conquered territory. The term colonialism is often used when the foreign powers actually settled in the newly acclaimed territory. Imperialism is used when the foreign powers ‘merely’ govern in the new territory without large parts of their populations moving (Kohn & Reddy 2017). Throughout this thesis I will use the term colonialism when referring to settlement practices, and imperialism when referring to political and economic domination as suggested by both Ypi (2013a) and Kohn & Reddy (2017).
Ypi (2013a) also discusses the difference in the views on why colonialism is indeed wrong (p.158). She distinguished arguments from the nationalist point of view and arguments of the territorial point of view. In determining why colonialism is wrong, nationalism
suggests that “(…) cultural groups have a prima farcie claim to self-determination.” (Ypi, 2013a, p.159). This argument was, for instance, used in the speech of the former Dutch Queen Juliana after the independence of Suriname. She stated:
“All the people have a right to self-determination.”
Queen Juliana, November 25th 1975
This statement of the right to self-determination is exactly the argument put forth through nationalism in determining why colonialism is wrong. Because whether a foreign country settles in the claimed territory or not, the subjugation of another land prevents the inhabitants of that land the right for self-determination. I claim that if said right is infringed for
sometimes centuries at a time, by a specific State there is a sufficiently strong relationship between the colonizing and colonized nation. This in turn is, I believe, important when establishing the push and pull factors of postcolonial migrants to the motherland. For once your right to self-determination is given back to you, you should be allowed to exercise that right in the land to which you can claim a sufficiently strong relationship. It is not the right of the land to self-determine, but the right of the people.
In addition to the nationalism argument against colonialism, there is the argument of territorial rights (Ypi, 2013b). In these arguments the focus is not necessarily on the right to self-determination, but on the normative claim to a specific part of land, or resources (Ypi, 2013b). This argument is often used in debates for rights for original inhabitants of a land. The territorial argument hereby shows that colonialism can be considered wrong based on the fact that original inhabitants have a stronger moral claim to live in a certain territory than others. This argument is interesting if looking at the view that postcolonial migrants should have a moral claim to citizenship in the motherland. Because if the postcolonial migrant chooses to live in for instance Belgium rather than Congo, does he then infringe on the right of the born- and raised Flemish person’s territorial claim to live in Bruges? I would argue that in this example the Congolese postcolonial migrant has the same claim to live in Flemish territory as the Walonian for they were part of the same system. I thus put forth the claim that within a certain State, a State that upheld the colonial system, the postcolonial migrant should be granted the same opportunity to settle as people who already reside in the motherland. The
motherland’s citizens’ territorial claim is not morally stronger than that of the postcolonial citizen for they were essentially inhabitants of the same system.
Here a careful distinction must be made between the postcolonial migrant exercising his equal rights to move freely within the former ruling system, and the colonizer. It could be argued that a Flemish person would, following my reasoning, have an equal right to move freely within the former system and thus migrate to Congo. However, because colonialism is a wrong done by the colonizing party, not the colonized, there cannot be an equal
consideration of rights when discussing the free movement of citizens. In part II of this chapter I will further elaborate on the reasons why the former colonizing citizen should be treated differently than the postcolonial migrant.
Ypi (2013a) goes beyond these arguments of nationalism and territorial claims. She states that it does not matter whether or not the colonized were occupied through settlement; but rather the political relations that were created and forced on the colonized make
colonialism a wrongful practice. She argues “(…) a political association that denies its
members equal and reciprocal terms of cooperation (…)” (Ypi, 2013a, p. 158), determines
the fact that colonialism is indeed wrong. In this sense the free movement within the former colonial system would indeed apply to the postcolonial migrant, and not necessarily to the citizen of the motherland. Through the cooperation argument the postcolonial migrant could be granted access based on the fact that, during colonial reign, the citizen of the motherland had this same right. It thus serves as a cooperation based on previous practice. Where the argument from nationalism determines that the wrongness is based on the right to self-determination (Simpson, 1996), the territorial arguments focus on the rights to specific attributes and land (Ypi, 2013b). Ypi adds to this discussion that the wrongness itself is (also) highlighted through the unequal cooperation between members within a political community (2013a, p.158). It is an administrative or procedural wrongness. Valentini does not agree with
Ypi on this ‘procedural wrongness’ of colonialism. She underlines the fact that colonialism is wrong in a number of different ways but finds that this wrongness does not stem from
procedures (2015, p. 331).
A counterargument against my claim that colonialism is wrong, is that colonialism could be considered beneficial and a repayment in the form of citizenship, or otherwise, is therefore unnecessary. In his highly controversial paper ‘The Case for Colonialism’ (2018) Gilley argues along these lines by stating three main points, that colonialism has been
beneficial rather than harmful, legitimate rather than illegitimate, and that colonialism should therefore be, under certain conditions, practiced again (p.169). It is important to note that this paper has been retracted by the publisher, and that it received a great amount of criticism in academia. For an elaborate review on this matter I would suggest Tom Young’s article ‘The
Gilley ‘debate’’ (2019). Although I do not deny that colonialism could have been beneficial
for original inhabitants of certain territories, I do not go as far as to say that these benefits outweigh the harmfulness of the practice. The fact that some economies have advanced through colonialism does not mean that the right to self-govern is to be surpassed. I would argue that the nationalist and territorial arguments presented earlier, prevail over potential and assumed economic benefits for a certain territory. The main reason for this is that the ‘pro-colonialism’ argument seems to center around a society or community rather than the individual inhabitant. In other words, the argument focusses on western economic standards rather than the individual’s right to land and self-govern as he sees fit.
In terms of my suggestion, access to citizenship in the motherland for postcolonial migrants as a form of repayment, the discussion about the wrongfulness of colonialism is important. This is one of the reasons I opted to include Gilley in this discussion albeit acknowledging the fact that his work is disputed. Nevertheless, this discussion shows that there are those who might argue for colonialism and would therefore state that a form of
repayment is not necessary. However, I have not found, not in Gilley nor elsewhere, an author that dismisses the harmful side of colonialism in its entirety. It is that side which warrants a form of repayment, a repayment I suggest, be done in the form of access
citizenship. But before I scrutinize that argument in the next chapter, I will now discuss what I believe constitutes a postcolonial migrant.
II. Defining Postcolonial Migrant
Here I will discuss what the concept of postcolonial migrant entails, because the definition of this concept is perhaps somewhat unclear. Throughout this thesis I will use the following definition: the postcolonial migrant is the migrant who migrated to a former- ruling nation, to the motherland. That is to say, the concept will include the native Angolan who migrated to Portugal, but not the native Portuguese migrating during or after Portugal’s imperial reign over Angola. It is thus the former ‘subject’ migrating to the motherland and not the imperial citizen moving within the (former) Empire. The reason for this distinction is that I want to separate the colonizer, and the person who has been colonized. For their motives to migrate are presumably different. These different incentives can be seen in the way that citizenship was awarded during colonial times, where the Englishmen was a citizen of the British
Empire, the Indian was a ‘subject’ to the British Empire (Sadiq, 2017). During colonial, or in this case imperial, rule the non-European resident within the Empire was thus subjected to a racialized sub-status of citizenship (Sadiq, 2017, p. 182). Racialized because it only applied to the non-European (non-white) subjects. These differences may have disappeared once independence was achieved, but it still underlines the importance in distinction between the Portuguese migrating to Angola, and the Angolan migrating to Portugal.
This distinction is important because, in this example, the Angolan was always part of the Portuguese Empire but never enjoyed the rights and duties of a Portuguese citizen. Giving
the fact that the Angolan never enjoyed the status and rights that come with citizenship during imperial reign, the migration to the motherland has different consequences then the imperial citizen migrating to a former part of the Empire. However, there is perhaps an interest to Angolan citizenship of the native Portuguese migrating to Angola right after Angolan independence; but this requires a different research and paper and as Amighetti & Nuti state “(…) colonialism was an unequal relation and unequal relations do not give rise to
equal obligations.” (2016, p.560). In this thesis I will limit my focus on the postcolonial
migrant. The postcolonial migrant is however, not to be confused with the postcolonial citizen. For the postcolonial citizen is in turn the native Angolan obtaining the status of Angolan citizenship after independence from Portugal (Sadiq, 2017).
There is a second distinction I would like to make whilst demarcating the concept of postcolonial migration; although the moment of migration can be disputed (Sadiq, 2017) the focus in this thesis will be on the first-generation migrant. For the first-generation migrant it is highly likely to migrate – if they would migrate at all – to the former ruling nation (Mains, Gilmartin, Cullen, Mohammad, Tolia-Kelly, Raghuram & Winders, 2013). This is not to say that the second and third generation postcolonial migrants have a weaker claim towards legal citizenship in the motherland. However, I assert that by establishing the moral claim of the first generation, the discussion for the subsequent generations is less imperative for it then has already been established. Nevertheless, I will when appropriate, distinguish between the first- and other-generation postcolonial migrant for especially their relationship towards the motherland is different. Later in this thesis I will, however, argue that the second-generation postcolonial migrant should have the same access to citizenship as the first-generation. This is based on the fact that the second-generation experienced the wrongness of colonialism through their parents’ eyes. Which affected the second-generation (Sadiq, 2017), to an extend that I believe established and shaped their relationship with the motherland as well. However
different their relationship to the motherland might be from the first-generation, the second-generation holds a significant tight relationship to the motherland because of the effects of colonialism on their parents. It is that relationship which was established through colonialism that pulls (or pushes?) the first-generation postcolonial migrant to the motherland (Amighetti & Nuti, 2015). In that sense it would be hard to speak of the second-, third- or perhaps even fourth-generation postcolonial migrant. For they were perhaps even born in the so-called motherland. To describe them as a postcolonial migrant would only underline their difference from native Europeans, their otherness as Kristeva (1991) coins it.
My concern with this otherness is exactly the reason I opted to focus on the
postcolonial migrant’s moral claim to citizenship in the motherland. Because I claim that this specific migrant group is already part of the nation and should therefore not be treated as an outsider, or other, but be treated on equal ground. I believe that if society starts to accept this particular group as part of the self, and start to repay the recent wrongs of colonialism, the public debate about inclusion is advanced.
III. Colonial ties
In this part, I will explore the relationship between the postcolonial migrant and the
motherland further. In doing so, I aim to show the importance of the postcolonial ties which will not only serve as a justification for my focus in this thesis, but also provide a basis for my arguments in respect to the normative claim of postcolonial migrants towards citizenship in the motherland. These arguments will be discussed in the next chapters.
An important note in this discussion about the relationship between the postcolonial migrant and the motherland is, as stated in the introduction of this thesis, my assumption that the wrongness of colonialism should be repaid. Through the rest of this paper I will suggest that this repayment be done through access to citizenship in the motherland. That is not to say
that this is the only or best way to repay the wrongs of colonialism. The reason I suggest citizenship as a form of repayment is because it provides a form of equal protection under law, something that the colonized people often did not enjoy under colonial rule. This form of repayment is a suggestion and only applies to countries that were under imperial or colonial rule until recently, for I suggest the right be applicable to first- and second-generation postcolonial migrants only. I acknowledge the fact that this means numerous potential
postcolonial migrants would not benefit from this form of repayment. That is not to say that I claim that they do not have the right to access a path to citizenship in the motherland, but their motives and ties are presumably different than of those who had a first-hand experience – or indirectly through their parents – of living under colonial rule. By limiting the focus to this specific group of postcolonial migrants, the justification of this moral claim is enhanced, for if you or your parents experienced colonial rule, the citizens of the motherland, or their parents, were the ones who inserted it. The countries who have enjoyed their independence longer, should be awarded a form of repayment. However, the reasons I pose here do not (always) apply to those countries and they should be recognized through a different paper and reflection.
I believe the term motherland already provides a form of connection between the colonizing country and the country that has been colonized. It suggests a preexisting relationship between the country of residence and the country of birth. This relationship is what Said refers to as ‘intertwined histories’ (1994). The histories of, if we take the example given earlier, both Angola and Portugal are intertwined and cannot be seen separate from each other because of colonialism. Their shared history thus provides at the very least a historical reason for migration. Let me now discuss what these relationships, these
intertwined histories, entail. In his book Imagined Communities, Anderson (1983) explains these intertwined histories in his own way by sharing that European imperial powers, in their
former colonies, made a habit of inserting European history – the history of the motherland – in the educational systems of their colonies. In doing so the intertwined history that Said (1994) refers to is actually institutionalized through the practice of colonialism. During colonial reign the Algerian was taught to be French, to speak the language and learn the history of the motherland, the Parisian was taught to be French as well. There is, thus, some form of overlap between the Algerian and the Parisian under – in this case – imperial rule. This overlap suggests that a relationship has been established, at the very least, during colonial or imperial reign.
Amighetti and Nuti (2016) use this argument to claim that contemporary postcolonial citizens are intertwined and thus have a significant reason to move to their former ruling nation; thereby becoming postcolonial migrants instead. Whom, I suggest, in turn have a legitimate normative claim to citizenship. Amighetti & Nuti even claim that it is the
postcolonial citizen’s right to migrate to the motherland. Because, so they state, they are an intertwined part of the motherland’s history, they are part of the ‘self’ of the former ruling nation (2016, p.552). I go further and state that the right to migrate, as suggested by
Amighetti & Nuti (2016), grands them the grounds for the right to citizenship. The Brit who eats curry, and the Dutchmen who eats nasi, is all a byproduct of colonialization. In providing room for their postcolonial counterparts, they in fact acknowledge a part of their society’s
self.
It is evident that postcolonial migrants due to a shared colonial history, have a special relationship with the motherland. It is this relationship which warrants the need for specific attention to this group in the discussion for a normative claim of citizenship in the
motherland. This chapter showed the importance of focusing on postcolonial migrants in this discussion. It did so by showing the wrongfulness of colonialism and establishing sufficient
ties between the postcolonial migrant and the motherland. In the next chapter I will argue on which grounds postcolonial migrants have a legitimate normative claim to citizenship in the motherland.
3.
Claim for Citizenship
The previous chapter showed the relevance in focusing on postcolonial migrants in this theoretical debate. In this chapter I argue that the postcolonial migrant has a legitimate normative claim to legal citizenship in the motherland. I will do this based on three major motives: a) grievances, b) relationship, and c) reciprocity. By arranging my arguments in this way, I believe I provide significant, and compelling, theoretical evidence that this specific group holds a legitimate moral claim to citizenship in the motherland. However, I will provide room in the next chapter for counterarguments and in turn my rebuttal, which should make my argument all the more convincing. The path to citizenship will also be explored in the subsequent chapter.
Before analyzing the legitimate normative claim to citizenship, I feel that it is necessary to first discuss the concept of legitimacy, as to provide understanding to what I mean when I say legitimate claim. When discussing a concept, it is easy to first present the etymology of the word in question, for it often provides a clear starting point for deliberation.
Legitimate stems from the Latin word legitimatus which was used to refer to ‘make legal’
(Lexico, n.d.). It was thus used primarily as a legal concept. Although later use of the word could also refer to something being ‘genuine’ or ‘rightful’. The lawfulness of something thus became interchangeable with the rightfulness of something. This change in use of the word
this discussion is converted into a descriptive interpretation of political legitimacy, and a normative interpretation of political legitimacy. The descriptive interpretation of political legitimacy focusses on society’s belief in a system, or political authority (Peters, 2017). The normative interpretation of political legitimacy concerns itself with the question whether or not a political authority is justified (Peters, 2017). You can see that the descriptive version of political legitimacy roughly corresponds with the ‘genuine’ or ‘rightful’ use of the word legitimate, whereas the normative interpretation is perhaps more aligned with the
‘lawfulness’ of the word. I propose to use the normative interpretation for my thesis – that postcolonial migrants have a legitimate normative claim to citizenship in the motherland – since I argue for a normative claim.
A. Grievances
In this section, I argue that grievances contribute to the normative claim to legal citizenship in the motherland of postcolonial migrants. I claim that the wrongfulness of colonialism should be repaid through access to legal citizenship in the motherland. Having established this wrongness, I want to discuss a sensitive topic, repayment. I say sensitive because the colonial past of certain European countries still seems a difficult political discussion (Finegan, 2018). Recently, the Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte stated that the Dutch Government would not apologize for its role in slavery (in NOS Nieuws July 1st 2020). The
King of Belgium expressed his remorse for Belgium’s actions in Congo during their colonial reign (in NOS Nieuws, June 30th 2020). These examples show that even though there is a
form of consensus, theoretically, that colonialism is wrong (Ypi, 2013; Valentini, 2015), the political debate shows that there is room for other interpretations. Nevertheless, as I stated in the introduction of this thesis, I assume that the wrongness of colonialization should be repaid. This could be done in a form by providing reparations to the former colonized people.
I claim that these reparations should be paid in the form of access to citizenship to those who wish to obtain it.
Granting citizenship to those former colonial ‘subjects’ that now wish to obtain citizenship, provides a way to replace the institutional inequality that was discussed by Ypi (2013a). This line of reasoning certainly holds for the first-generation postcolonial migrant, for they experienced the wrongfulness of colonialism firsthand. I would, however, argue that the wrongfulness of colonialism does not disappear over time and is still quite apparent in other generations. The current discussion in society on slavery and the role of the former colonizers attests to this (in NOS Nieuws, July 1st 2020). The normative claim to citizenship
in the motherland should thus also apply to generations other than the first. As explained earlier, I suggest including the second-generation as well, for they suffered from colonialism through their parents. The injustice that was done by the ancestors of the colonizing nation cannot be undone, society can, however, acknowledge the damage it caused and still costs. By granting postcolonial migrants access to citizenship in the motherland, or how Bosniak phrases it by providing a ‘path to citizenship’ (2016), society addresses the grievances of cross-generational wrongness.
By focusing on first- and second-generation postcolonial migrants the cross-generational wrongness is perhaps somewhat overlooked. For there are many people who reside in a country that might enjoy independence for more than a few decades and would thus not fall within this specific category. I am not stating that the grievances of those people are less than those of people who themselves were subjected to colonial rule. Focusing on these specific generations supports the claim of repayment by the motherland’s current society. This form of repayment only applies to those who wish to obtain legal citizenship in the motherland and is not to say that this form of repayment is sufficient to right the wrongs of colonialism. I am merely suggesting that it is a justified repayment for those who wish to
accept it. This justification supports my argument for a legitimate normative claim to legal citizenship for postcolonial migrants; because, the grievances that were caused by
colonialism should be repaid and providing a path to citizenship is a legitimate way to do this.
B. Relationship
In the previous chapter I discussed the relationship between the postcolonial migrant and the motherland. In this section I argue that this relationship is sufficient enough for a legitimate normative claim to legal citizenship in the motherland. I will do so by arguing that the relationship between the postcolonial migrant and the motherland is in fact so tight, that they are intertwined, which I pose warrants a legitimate claim to legal citizenship. In this section I will thus argue that the established relationship in chapter two provides a legitimate reason for the normative claim to citizenship in the motherland.
Relationship to a nation is often deemed necessary when discussing a claim for citizenship to a nation (Perina, 2006). There are several claims on this relationship, the first is
jus soli, or citizenship granted through birthplace, the second is jus sanguinis which is
citizenship based on descent (Perina, 2006). There is another version, which can be used as a supplement or even alternative for jus soli; namely, jus nexi which requires a sufficient link to the political community or State (Leydet, 2017). Through which relationship one can require citizenship is dependent on the State in question. I state that the intertwined relationship of the postcolonial migrant warrants a sufficient claim that transcends these (legal) interpretations of relationship. Because the intertwined relationship, I believe, incorporates of all these rights. The first-generation postcolonial migrant might have very well been born in a territory which belonged to the motherland, does this not warrant a claim based on jus soli? And what of the second-generation postcolonial migrant who is actually
born in the motherland? Should he not automatically be granted citizenship based on jus
sanguinis? Although the stakeholder principle, jus nexi, (Leydet, 2017), might not directly
apply to most postcolonial migrants, I am certain that in some cases, for instance in those where the postcolonial migrant is (illegally-) residing in the motherland, it does. I am not arguing for or against the established rightful claims to citizenship. I am, however, stating that the relationship of the postcolonial migrant transcends the particularity of these notions. Especially because each State determines access to its membership based on a different relationship, there is thus no universal interpretation on which the postcolonial migrant could – if they wanted to – rely.
For this reason, I propose a right based on a new ground which is specific for this intertwined relation between the postcolonial migrant and the motherland. I suggest that the relationship between them should grant the postcolonial migrant access to citizenship based a new concept, jus paribus, or right to be equal. This right to be equal is especially salient for the first- and second-generation postcolonial migrants who experienced colonial reign
themselves. By being subjected to unequal treatment themselves, through legal practices such as second-class citizenship (Sadiq, 2017), they have a moral claim to equal treatment under postcolonial law, which should be granted through access to citizenship based on jus paribus.
This is not a legal discussion and I would refer to legal scholars on the exact wording and international law application of this suggestion. But the core of my argument here is that the postcolonial migrant, no matter what specific rule their motherland has, should be
awarded access to citizenship based on this relationship, which is as justifiable as any other base mentioned earlier. The transition from ‘subject’ during colonial reign to citizen in the motherland, should be made easy, accessible and possible based on the right to be equal, based on jus paribus.
C. Reciprocity
Here I will discuss why postcolonial migrants have a legitimate normative claim to
citizenship in the motherland based on reciprocity. This argument is especially valid for the legitimacy of the claim for the first-generation postcolonial migrant because they are more likely to have actually given something to the former colonial power. This, I believe, warrants something in return, I suggest it be citizenship for those who wish to obtain it.
What the former ‘subjects’ often gave during colonial reign was their service to the Empire (Killingray, 2008). It was not uncommon for colonizers to inspire ‘subjects’ to enlist in colonial armies (Killingray, 2008, p. 368) which they could then deploy at their will. Many native Indians died in the battlefield defending the British interest without actually enjoying British rights through citizenship (Killingray, 2008). The imperial ‘subjects’ were not granted the status of citizenship, nor was this status given to them after their native land acquired independence. They were never repaid for their service to the empire. In contemplating the many reasons why nations should repay their debts because of colonial wrongness, I find that this group deserves special attention. They deserve special attention because these veterans did not enjoy the same rights as their colleagues from the motherland. Nevertheless, they enlisted in the military thereby risking their lives without the protection that comes with the status of legal citizenship. To this day there are African veterans awaiting French citizenship approval (Kuo, 2017). These people risked their lives in the same way as native French people did, they should therefore be awarded the same rights. Or at least the very same legal protections. These protections and rights can be granted through citizenship and they should therefore, based on jus paribus, receive the same form of citizenship. Receive access to a path to citizenship in the motherland.
In this chapter I constructed my arguments in defense of the legitimate normative claim to citizenship for postcolonial migrants. This was based on the wrongness of colonialism, the intertwined relation between the postcolonial migrant and the motherland, and in some cases the service to the former Empire. Through this analysis I arrived at the conclusion that postcolonial migrants should, based on jus paribus, be granted access to citizenship in the motherland. The next chapter will provide room for possible counter arguments against my claim and I will also propose a path towards citizenship for the postcolonial migrant.
4.
Path to Citizenship
In the previous chapter I defended my thesis that postcolonial migrants have a legitimate claim to legal citizenship in the motherland based on grievances, relationship, and
reciprocity. These arguments provide the right to citizenship based on jus paribus. In the first part of this chapter I deliberate on possible counterarguments against my claim, such as Miller’s (2000) concern with the uniformity of citizenship, and aim to sufficiently respond to them. In doing so I hope to provide compelling arguments to support my thesis. In the second part of this chapter I propose a radical interpretation of this claim by suggesting that the right to citizenship for the postcolonial migrant is a dormant right which is activated upon arrival in the motherland. Furthermore, I suggest that this right is a cross-generational right for at least one generation after the generation who actually experienced colonialism first-hand. By arguing for these dormant rights for two generations postcolonial migrants I hope to further the theoretical discussion about the ways in which society should provide postcolonial migrants access to citizenship in their motherland.
Part 1
One of the counter arguments against my claim for the normative right to citizenship in the motherland, could be Miller’s argument that citizenship is a reference point and a unifying force (2000, p. 41). Miller poses the following question: “(…) if fragmentation is as
far-reaching as the premise implies, how is it possible for us to share a common identity as citizens?’’ (Miller, 2000, p.41). Less commonality between citizens may give rise to
fundamental questions as to what the role of identity is within citizenship and society and I believe these questions are important; however, they do not fall within the scope of this thesis and I will therefore limit my engagement in this discussion. Nevertheless, I would pose that the Moluccan soldier would not be obligated to adjust to Dutch society norms entirely for he was – before reaching the Dutch shores – already part of the Dutch Empire and therefore already part of that greater imperial society.
Another argument that can be made when discussing commonality as grounds for citizenship, is the issue of language. When debating on a national identity and common citizenship the practice of speaking the same language as a unifying factor is often put forth (Anderson, 1983; Beiner, 1995). However, as discussed previously, in their need to expand a lot of European colonial powers inserted their own language in the colonized education systems (Anderson, 1983). Certain countries were under colonial rule for so many centuries that the motherland’s language had effectively become their own mother tongue (Anderson, 1983). Of course, this cannot be said for all former colonized nations, there were certain countries that did not pursue linguistic domination as much as others. Nevertheless, I do not disagree with the argument that language has as a unifying ability which furthers the concept of common identity. I am however stating that it is not a sufficient ground to reject my claim that postcolonial migrants have a legitimate right to legal citizenship in the motherland. Not
only because a large part of this cohort would already master the motherland’s language, but also because it does not take away from the wrongness of colonialism and sufficient
relationship with the motherland. My argument is thus that mastering the same language is perhaps practical, but not a requirement for common citizenship.
If you continue to seek for commonality what then should be a requirement to achieve this? Bosniak phrases this question as follows:
“The strategy of dividing normative commitments between inside and outside always depends on the resolution of prior questions about where the lines between inside and outside are drawn.”
(Bosniak, p. 125, 2006).
Her assessment is related to my claim in the way that the postcolonial migrant should be granted access towards citizenship in the motherland. For I state that the postcolonial migrant might reside outside the lines Bosniak (2006) describes in the quote above, but through the relationship with the motherland is part of the inside and therefore holds a legitimate normative claim for citizenship in the motherland. There are those, however, that state that because the postcolonial migrant resides outside the motherland, they are in fact outsiders (Wellman, 2020) and thus contend my claim. I believe this would not hold; residency is only relevant when disputing the borders of the territory. I claim that because Congo was part of the colonial system of Belgium, the borders were essentially shared. The Congolese thus resided within the Belgium empire, for which he should be granted the same, equal, treatment as the Flemish resident in Bruges.
Another question that could be posed is if the relationship that I established and defined between the postcolonial migrant and the motherland is sufficiently tight for a
legitimate claim to citizenship. To answer this question, I would suggest using the analogy of Walzer, in Spheres of Justice where he describes admission to membership of a State as admission to membership of a neighborhood, club or family (1983, p.36). Admission to membership of a neighborhood or club does not apply in my thesis for they are established through choice (Walzer, 1983). I suggest that the postcolonial migrant should be admissible based on their membership to the family. Membership of a family is something that is established through descent and thus not a choice. Zilbershats connects this form of membership to citizenship based on nexus of the past, which implies a common history (2001, p. 696). I claim that the relationship between the postcolonial migrant and the motherland is sufficiently tight because of their shared and intertwined histories, thus based on nexus of the past.
Part 2
In this part I will consider some of the implications for my claim and suggest what the path to citizenship for a postcolonial migrant in their motherland, should look like. Let me first state that, considering the discussion in this chapter, I believe my thesis holds: postcolonial migrants have a legitimate normative claim to citizenship in their motherland. This claim is legitimate because the relationship between the postcolonial migrant and their motherland is a base for commonality, they are intertwined to the degree that they should have the same legal status, which citizenship provides. Furthermore, based on the grievances and reciprocity argument, former-colonial nations owe postcolonial migrants a form of repayment. This repayment should be, as I suggested earlier, in the form of citizenship. My claim affects many different people with different motherlands, these motherlands all have their own regulations when it comes to granting outsiders a path to citizenship. However, because of the established intertwinedness, I proposed a new universal ground for citizenship,
citizenship based on jus paribus, or equal right. Thereby bypassing the (administrative) differences between the former-colonial rulers.
My suggestion for the pathway to citizenship is as follows: I propose that the established right to citizenship, jus paribus, is a dormant right. Which is to say that it is an inactive right which is only activated when the postcolonial migrant wishes to acquire citizenship in the motherland whilst residing there. They would, thereafter, hold the same rights and obligations as all the other citizens of the motherland. I would thus not suggest special rules and regulations for the postcolonial migrant when they have actually acquired the status of citizenship. The reason I propose this right to be a dormant right is because it should not be an obligation to use this right. For if this right would be an active right it would be imposed on people. It would be paradoxical to impose something on people as a form of repayment for the suppressive nature of colonialism.
This dormant right should, as suggested earlier, be a right for first- and second-generation postcolonial migrants only. It is their specific bond to the colonial past which justifies this particular form of repayment. There are of course those who reside in the former colony who might have a particularly tight bond with the motherland as well but do not fall within the category I suggest. I am not denying those people, or any other migrant group, access to citizenship in the motherland. I am merely suggesting that this particular group warrants particular access based on jus paribus, which is specifically created for them.
In their inspiring paper A Nation’s Right to Exclude and the Colonies (2016), Amighetti & Nuti argue that this right should not be limited to a certain generation. They would, I believe, disagree with my suggestion to limit the dormant right to the second-generation postcolonial migrant for the transgression that was imposed on the former colony is felt over multiple generations. Although this is true, I propose a limitation on the dormant right because of the special relationship of the first- and second-generation postcolonial
migrant. To grant those who come after them the same rights would I believe undermine the uniqueness of their relationship. This is not to say that other generations should not be granted access to citizenship in the motherland. I am however suggesting that the right to citizenship based on jus paribus does not apply directly to them.
While I established that there is a specifically tight relationship between the postcolonial migrant and the motherland that warrants access to citizenship, some other groups of migrants might assert that their bond is sufficiently tight as well. Especially groups such as migrant workers who, arguably, have a special relation as well. Although I do not deny these groups access to citizenship, for the migrant worker might hold a claim based on my reciprocity argument, the postcolonial migrant is unique for his relationship with the motherland incorporates all the previously discussed arguments. It is this uniqueness that triggers the moral claim to equal treatment. The uniqueness of this bond can no longer be ignored and should therefore be addressed through a special new base for citizenship. A base of rights which is only applicable to the postcolonial migrant of the first- and second
generation. For their unique story warrants a legitimate moral claim to access to citizenship in the motherland.
5.
Conclusion
Contemporary debates about belonging and equality have provided me with an opportunity to revisit the relation to the right to citizenship and postcolonial migrants. I showed that the relationship between the postcolonial migrant and the motherland is, due to colonialism, a special relationship because of the intertwined histories. This special relationship supports the
citizenship in the motherland. This ground for citizenship is based on grievances, relationship and reciprocity. Furthermore, I proposed that the right should be a dormant right for first- and second-generation postcolonial migrants. The research for this thesis allowed me to answer my research question: “When, and for what reasons, should postcolonial migrants be granted
legal citizenship in their former ruling nation?”.
The reasons are largely based on the special relationship, the intertwined histories, of the postcolonial migrant and the motherland. However, the wrongfulness of colonialism also provides a sufficient reason for granting citizenship. For those first-generation postcolonial migrants that served the colonial ruler, i.e. in forms of military service, citizenship should be provided by the motherland as a form of gratitude. These special reasons, repayment for wrongness, sufficiently tight relationship and gratitude, create a new ground for claiming citizenship, which I suggest be referred to as jus paribus. The right to citizenship provided on the base of jus paribus, is a dormant right. It is only activated when the postcolonial migrant (wants to) reside(s) in the motherland. It is not the postcolonial citizen’s duty to migrate to the motherland, to turn into a postcolonial migrant. Neither am I claiming that this option is indeed desirable for all postcolonial migrants, nor am I claiming that it rights the wrongs of the (colonial) past. By suggesting this path to citizenship, I establish the moment that the dormant right becomes an active right and thus answer the when part of my research question.
This right is thus granted as a form of repayment and recognition. This is not to say that other minority groups should not be granted the same recognition. However, the postcolonial migrant does not only face issues in relation to the migration itself, be it the Indian scholar moving to Britain, or the Moluccan soldier shipped off to the Netherlands, but is also faced with the imperial oppressor and the historical grievances that come with this special relation. It is precisely because of this special relation that the struggles of the
postcolonial migrant must be taken into consideration through a special right, the right to citizenship based on jus paribus. For the postcolonial migrant is, willingly or not, part of the imperial society’s DNA which warrants a different approach than other groups of migrants.
One of the limitations of this thesis is that I only contemplated the legitimate
normative claim to citizenship in the motherland for postcolonial migrants. More specifically for first- and second-generation postcolonial migrants. This dormant right is merely an option for repayment and is not to say that other options or a system of choice should not be
considered. I would suggest investigating this in a different paper. If this dormant right were to be granted based on jus paribus, there would certainly be implications for other
generations as well. Although I feel like I presented sound arguments for focusing on these generations in particular – for the wrongness of colonialism is especially evident for them – I would suggest further contemplation on the potential impact on subsequent generations. I will also acknowledge that the suggestions I made for the path to citizenship would benefit from consideration from a legal perspective.
In this thesis I have not analyzed the concept of citizenship itself for that warrants an entirely different research for which there have been numerous contributions. My goal was to discuss the claim to citizenship, as it stands, for postcolonial migrants in their motherland. Because I believe there was a need to address this not only as a society but also in the theoretical debate. No longer can the philosophical discussion ignore this specific group when contemplating grounds of citizenship. Social movements, such as the Black Lives Matter and Kick-out Black Pete, show that there is a desperate need to discuss inclusiveness when contemplating citizenship and to whom that status applies. This thesis is perhaps a small but important step in changing that, in incorporating a specific migrant group when discussing who should have access to citizenship. For the postcolonial migrant is an intricate part of the motherland’s, identity and society and should be treated equally due to colonial
ties. By legally including the postcolonial migrant in its society, the motherland takes the first steps towards inclusion and finally faces its (colonial) past.
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