Institute for Security and Global Affairs Leiden University
Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs
An Emerging Security State?
The Netherlands and the emergence of a preventative
paradigm
Program: Master Crisis and Security Management
Student: Nick Ruis
Student number: S1168509 Date of admission: 10 June 2018
Email: Nick.Ruis@gmail.com
Phone number: 0031634224538
Thesis Supervisor: Drs. S. Wittendorp Second Reader: Dr. G.M. van Buuren Word Count: 19.423
Abstract
This research analyses safety and security developments in the Netherlands on the basis of Hallsworth and Lea’s framework on the emerging contours of the security state. In this research it is argued that several policy developments in the Netherlands show similarities with the described framework of the emergence of the security state, a process that is visible in several western-European countries. This research analyses one of the three areas in which Hallsworth and Lea see the contours of an emerging security state: the transition of the welfare state towards workfare and risk management. It analyses the fusion of crime prevention and criminal justice, the criminalization of social policy and welfare, and the cooperation of state and non-state actors regarding crime control. The research concludes with the notion that the emergence of the security state in the Netherlands is a complex process. Policy and legislation are adapting to multiple societal, economic and political developments with the aim of ensuring the safety and security of the Dutch society.
Table of Contents
Abstract ____________________________________________________________ 3 1. Introduction ______________________________________________________ 6 1.1 Academic Relevance _____________________________________________ 6 1.2 Research Question _______________________________________________ 7 1.3 Social Relevance ________________________________________________ 8 1.4 Reading Guide __________________________________________________ 8 2. Theory ___________________________________________________________ 9 2.1 Prevention ____________________________________________________ 11 2.2 The Framework of Hallsworth and Lea ______________________________ 12 2.2.1 From Welfare to Workfare and Risk Management __________________ 12 2.2.2 Crime Control ______________________________________________ 13 2.2.3 Combat Powerful Offenders ___________________________________ 13 2.2.4 Reinforcing and Diffusion ____________________________________ 14 2.3 Securitization __________________________________________________ 14 3. Method _________________________________________________________ 16 3.1 Approach _____________________________________________________ 16 3.2 Method Reflection ______________________________________________ 17 4. The Rise of the Welfare State _______________________________________ 19 4.1 The Welfare State ______________________________________________ 19 4.2 The Development of the Welfare State ______________________________ 20 4.3 From Welfare to Workfare and Risk Management _____________________ 21 5. Blurring lines? Crime and Social Control in the Netherlands ____________ 23 5.1 The Rising Importance of Criminal Justice ___________________________ 23 5.2 Progressively Politicization of Criminal Justice _______________________ 24 5.3 Crime Control as Core Task of Politics ______________________________ 255.4 Crime Control and Government Competence _________________________ 27 5.5 Crime Control, a New Hegemonic Perspective? _______________________ 28 6. Criminalization of Social Policy and Welfare __________________________ 30 6.1 The Unsustainable Welfare State ___________________________________ 30 6.2 A Process of Authoritarian Renewal for Poorer Communities ____________ 31 6.3 A Coercive Form of Workfare _____________________________________ 34 6.4 Social and Urban Policy, Progressively Criminalized? __________________ 35 7. Crime Control Through State and Non-State Actors ____________________ 36 7.1 State and Non-state Actors ________________________________________ 36 7.2 From Reactive to Preventative _____________________________________ 39 7.3 Extending Towards Pre-crime and Post-punishment. ___________________ 40 7.4 An Expanding Range of Custodial Sentences. ________________________ 42 7.5 Penalization of Non-criminal Security Issues. _________________________ 43 7.6 Re-orientation of Criminal Justice. _________________________________ 43 7.7 Widened Prolonged Incapacitation _________________________________ 46 7.8 Crime Control Through Cooperation and Distribution? _________________ 47 8. Conclusion ______________________________________________________ 50 Further Research __________________________________________________ 51 9. References _______________________________________________________ 53
1. Introduction
Security has always been one of the most important tasks of government. Criminal justice, and law and order are important foundations in providing security by the state. As of late, and most notably after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, ‘security’ has become an even more important point on the Dutch political agenda (De Graaf, 2011).
These developments are not without possible side effects. It is accompanied by the restriction of privacy and the dilution of civil rights, both unwanted in a democratic rule of law. Especially after the terrorist attacks on 9/11 security and early interventions of possible threats became top priority for European states, marking the change of a fundamentally different authoritarian paradigm of the state (Fekete, 2004, 4). This new paradigm clashes with civil rights like privacy and justice, mainly due to profound civil anti-terrorism laws (Fekete, 2004, 4). Anti-terrorism laws such as the retraction of someone’s nationality and penalization regarding the preparation of a terrorist act affect privacy and freedom of movement. This raises the question of how far governments are allowed to go in the trade-off between security and privacy?
In their 2011 article Reconstructing Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state observe Hallsworth and Lea the ‘rising security state’ in several western societies. According to them is the emergence of the security state visible in three areas. They state that there is a shift away from the welfare state towards a state of workfare and risk management, that new combat and terrorism measures are emerging, and that warfare and crime control are blurring.
1.1 Academic Relevance
Hallsworth and Lea (2011) specifically focus on Great Britain and do not specify which western societies are partaking in this development. However, they mention that some societies have resisted aspects of this development, especially Scandinavian countries. Policy developments regarding safety and security issues are not limited to Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries. Triggered by terrorist attacks in Paris (2015) and Nice (2016), French lawmakers where urging a security overhaul, by improving communication, better coordination and a clear line of authority (Vinocur, 2016). The interior minister of Germany Thomas de Maizière outlined a similar security overhaul after a van ploughed through a Berlin Christmas market in December 2016 (Oltermann, 2017).
Despite the absence of comparable terrorist attacks in the Netherlands, security policies have become the focal point of discussion between privacy and security. A recent example is the new law on the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) in the Netherlands. According to the Dutch government, new legislation was necessary to ensure the security of the Netherlands and its citizens in today’s modern age.
The new law provides the AIVD with more power in data surveillance and makes massive interception possible. Opponents argue that the law is too intrusive on citizens’ privacy and has come to known as the ‘trawl-law’, due to the unintended ‘by-catch’ of information on innocent citizens (ANP/Het Parool, 2017). Critics and privacy organizations point out the possible ‘slippery slope’ of certain measures, which they consider a danger to the everyday life of citizens (Mos, 2013).
Policy changes regarding safety and security such as surveillance and data storage result in an increase in the debate about the role of safety and security in a society and how far the government can go to provide it. An example of this is the debate about encryption on cell phones, and to what extent companies have to adjust to the will of the government to be able to read encrypted messages (Lanzing, 2016).
Academics such as Hallsworth and Lea, but also David Garland (2001) and Lucia Zedner (2009), notice the drift away from the traditional welfare state towards a society that is more concerned with concepts like control, safety, and security. How this development is happening in the Netherlands is only partially researched It has been less researched. This research aims to provide a broad view on the possible emergence of the security state in the Netherlands by analysing legislation, and social and urban policies on the basis of a broad academic framework.
1.2 Research Question
It is unclear what the position is of the Netherlands within the development of the rising security state. Hallsworth and Lea focus on the rise of the security state in Great Britain, whereas others looked at the Scandinavian countries (Pratt, 2008, 275) or at the security state in the United States in the light of masculine protection (Young, 2003).
This provides an opportunity to research to what extent the development of security polices in the Netherlands contributed to changes in how the state operates. This study aims to fill this gap by researching developments in legislation, and social and urban policy in the Netherlands to determine to what extent changes in legislation,
and social and urban policy have contributed to the emergence of a security state in the Netherlands in 2017?
To do this, this research will address three sub-questions. These derive from Hallsworth and Lea’s three areas within the shift from welfare to workfare and risk management framework. These consist of crime control becoming the pre-eminent paradigm for social control, the progressively criminalization of social policy and welfare, and the distribution of state functions through an assemblage of state and non-state actors. Within these three areas Hallsworth and Lea mention several factors that they see as contributors to an emerging security state in their respective areas. It is the intention of this research to test those factors and look to what extent they are visible in Dutch legislation, and social and urban policy.
1.3 Social Relevance
The social relevance of this research derives from a clearer view on the development of the welfare state, and how politics, legislation and policy regarding security shapes society. It aims to provide a better understanding of the process securitization in the Netherlands, the concept of the security state, the developments within crime control, and how society actively and passively participates within these changes.
1.4 Reading Guide
This research is divided into two parts. The first part will look into the theories around the emergence of the security state in western societies, the process of securitization, and the welfare state. The second part goes further into the shift from welfare to workfare and risk management, and Hallsworth and Lea’s three fundamental changes: the developments resulting in crime control becoming the pre-eminent paradigm for social control, the analysis of the criminalization of social policy and welfare, and increasingly distributed functions of the state through an assemblage of state and non-state actors. This research will conclude by looking at how law and policy developments in the Netherlands fit within the concept of the rising security state.
2. Theory
It is important to look at the different dimensions of the security state to come to a thorough view of its developments and position within the field of crisis and security management. To do so this introductory part will consist of two parts. First, the security state will be dissected in two parts: security and state. Both will be briefly discussed to provide a better understanding of both concepts and their features. Second, the concept of the security state will be explained on the basis of ideas, theories and definition.
The concept of security has multiple meanings. It can for example refer to social, economic or political security. Welfare, minimum wages, and human rights fall within the different security areas. Security can be individual, national or international. Individuals need protection against malicious intents, such as robbery, theft and violence, while nations try to protect themselves from other governments and possible international catastrophes such as nuclear warfare and environmental degradation. Throughout the decades security has shifted from predominantly military security to newer directions such as energy and environmental security. For an adequate analysis of the rising security state a clear definition of security is vital. In this research security will be seen as a form of protection by the government to society from both internal and external threats and risks of a different nature (Buzan, 1991).
For this research the state is the main focus point and requires a different approach than individual security. States are larger and more complicated entities than individuals, and the threats states face are less certain than those of individuals (Buzan, 1991, 57). While it is easy to get lost in the multitude of different aspect and fundamentals of a state, it is important to mention that for this research the state will be defined as the operations and concerns of the government of a country as described by the online Merriam-Webster dictionary. It is therefore seen as an active actor and not solely as a geographical territory. This provides a solid starting point for further research on the combination of both state and security, and how this combination is reflected in new developments regarding social policy.
The concept of a security state is rather broad. Researchers as Zedner (2007), Agamben (2005), Beck (2002a), Fekete (2004), Young (2003), and Hallsworth and Lea (2011) have written about the increased attention to security by the state. Their analyses contain core elements like prevention, security, surveillance, power, risk, exception, and protection. These elements provide a sound starting point for further research both
as single elements or about the interrelationship of several of these elements. These elements are interwoven with the nature of safety and security, and therefore important in the research of the security state.
Some of these elements, such as prevention and protection share common ground, while others like power and surveillance are more unique to aspects of the security state they are describing. Studies on the rising security state may focus solely on the increasing role of surveillance in a society, or look at the interplay between surveillance, repression and prevention and its influence on society and government.
Although the angle of the research may differ, they all reserve a prominent role for both state and society, and fundamental changes within both regarding governing security. These changes resulted in pursuing diverse policies from the standpoint of security. This corresponds to the definition of Zedner (2007, 266), which describes the security state as a society governed through security in the sense that diverse policies are pursued from the standpoint of security. According to Hallsworth and Lea (2011, 141) this standpoint heralds a new form of authoritarianism beginning at the periphery, pre-occupied with the management of the marginalized and socially excluded, and towards gradually infecting core social institutions like criminal justice. This corresponds to the idea of the security state as a societal paradigm shift. According to John Lea (2002) a security state is shifting away from the welfare state and describes it as a ‘debilitated authoritarian state’, which contains the contraction of the welfare state and the expansion of the coercive and surveillance aspects of state security.
The contraction of the welfare state and fundamental changes between state and society regarding security gives room for rise to the new state forms. Examples of this are provided by Zedner (2007, 265) who refers to the rise of the ‘security society’, Agamben (2005, 1-2) who named it the ‘state of exception’ and Beck (2002a, 40) who sees the rise of the ‘world risk society’, in which we try to calculate the incalculable. These new developments concerning security, society and state tend towards a shift in which modern societies embrace security as one of its core elements. To ensure security, governments have to manage and contain risks that undermine the desired security. This increasing level of attention to containing and managing risk and its uncontrollable nature has its influence on society (Beck & Levy, 2013, 17).
Various scholars ranging from anthropologists to sociologists studied the development towards this risk society and how this should be managed (Beck, Risk
created and affected in social systems, like organizations and institutions that manage risk activity. Second, the magnitude of the physical risk is related to the quality of social relations and processes. Third, the primary risk is that of social dependency upon institutions and actors who are at a distance of those who are affected by the risks in question. This is also described as a ‘World Risk Society’, which is a world of uncontrollable risk beyond boundaries (Beck, 2002b, 39).
The risk society does not only confine to states. Beck and Levy (2013, 1) argue that modern collectives are increasingly preoccupied with debating and managing risk to be able to prevent more. They even argue that risk is getting cosmopolitanized due to anticipation of endangered futures, which are for the most part communicated by globalized media coverage and results in more emphasis on prevention policy.
2.1 Prevention
Prevention becomes a core element of providing security by the state since security states are becoming preoccupied with the preventability of crime and reducing risks. This is in line with the idea that a security state also focuses on ‘pre-crime’. According to Zedner (2007, 262) pre-crime is a shift in the temporal perspective dedicated to anticipating and forestalling events that have not yet happened, and possibly never do so. This is in contrast with a repressive approach that act on which has already happened. This focus on prevention forms a potential license to prejudicial perceptions and a virtual mandate to heightened racialized ways of looking and judging in the name of national security (Butler, 2004, 77). Meanwhile it is also embracing pre-crime laws and coercive measures to protect state and the individual (McCulloch & Pickering, 2009, 635).
The prevention of crime is associated with more intrusive measures and policies that require special justification to make this prevention possible (Zedner, 2007, 275). Examples of these intrusive measures are more surveillance and earlier interventions to detect criminal intentions and prevent crime. As a result, the focus on prevention, and the coercive measures this contains, results in the security state being seen as Agamben’s ‘state of exception’. This can be seen as a threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and absolutism, or the provisional abolition of the distinction among legislative, executive and judicial powers (Agamben, 2005, 2, 7).
searches for new technologies of power and risk management aimed at the external threats that in a globalized world may come from the next street or from another continent (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011, 142). The aspect of power and justification has an important role in a security state. A security state ‘subordinate citizens to ad hoc surveillance, search, or detention and repress criticism of such arbitrary power, justifying such measures as within the prerogative of those authorities whose primary duty is to maintain security and protect the people’ (Young, 2003, 8). Several threats towards a state, such as terrorism, are both internal and external and are both important parts of the relationships within the security state; threats from an external ‘enemy’ and the ‘enemy’ within the society (Young, 2003, 8).
2.2 The Framework of Hallsworth and Lea
Hallsworth and Lea (2011, 143) developed a more general approach to the rising security states, which include several mutually reinforcing areas that contribute to the alleged rise of the security state. They argue that the new politics of this era should focus on how to detach us from the emerging security state, because it is hollowing out the welfare state and our civil rights.
They identify three key drivers of securitization that are interconnected and affect the development of the security state; the transition from welfare to workfare and risk management, which connects benefit levels to job-seeking behaviour and protection from risk instead of detection, punishment and rehabilitation, new measures for the government to combat terrorism and organized crime, and the blurring of warfare and crime control, wherein social policy, criminal justice and military intervention blur into one flat global terrain and form new mixtures of legal and political categories. They see the three key drivers and the changes they induce as a presage for new technologies of power and the transformation of the whole state system.
2.2.1 From Welfare to Workfare and Risk Management
The first key driver is the change from welfare to workfare and risk management. While crime was a social problem that the welfare state could address by reducing inequality and poverty, slowing economic growth and rising insecurity have made welfare citizenship fractured and social integration faltered (Dorling et al., 2007, 2008). The welfare state addressed social problems by extending social rights and entitlement to
welfare. However, the emerging security state frames problems as risks that require coercive forms of management. These changes are not the result of an abrupt change but occurred step-by-step and are still proceeding today (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011, 144). The welfare state tends to solve social problems by extending social rights and welfare entitlement, while the security state reconstructs social problems to risks that need to be coercively managed. The welfare state wants to end poverty, while the security state criminalizes poverty (Wacquant, 2008, 277).
2.2.2 Crime Control
The shift from a welfare state to a security state is not only visible in the failure of penal welfarism; it is also visible in the transformation of crime and the response to control it (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011, 147). This is reflected by new measures to combat terrorism and organized crime. Hallsworth and Lea (2011) describe terrorists and organized criminals as ‘powerful offenders’ that ‘have always possessed disproportionate resources to obstruct criminal justice through intimidation, corruption and other means.’ As a result, the State sought new powers and measures to combat these new powerful offenders.
These new measures consist of restricting offenders. This is done by rebalancing the judicial system in favour of the victim and trading rights for efficiency regarding criminal entrepreneurs abusing the global, expanding surplus population in urban ghettos to build shadow economies of trafficking drugs, people and arms. It also aims to combating global terrorism such as the Al Qaeda network and more recently ISIS by introducing new and sometimes dubious anti-terrorism laws. For criminal justice it is important to arrest, gather evidence, and prosecute. In contrast warfare is more aimed at the elimination and neutralization of threats.
2.2.3 Combat Powerful Offenders
The measures to combat new powerful offenders influence the last main driver of the development towards the security state; the blurring between warfare and criminality. Hallsworth and Lea (2011, 151) note that warfare and traditional policing have different notions of risk. As a result of the blurring between warfare and criminality, modern policing has adopted more pre-emptive approaches that used to be unthinkable and balance between efficiency and privacy.
2.2.4 Reinforcing and Diffusion
Hallsworth and Lea (2011) argue that the three main drivers on the emerging of the security state are mutually reinforcing. Military thinking in dealing with terrorism, national security, immigrants, and other categories of offenders is being seen as a threat to public security instead of individual cases.
Not only are the three key drivers mutually reinforcing, they also stimulate diffusion. Specific legislation regarding terrorism becomes more widely used, not only to combat terrorism but also to tackle benefit fraud, licensing and environmental health issues. At the same time the paradigm shifts towards a society in which not only politics, but also ordinary people think in terms of security and safety without thinking simultaneously about rights and liberties (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011, 152).
2.3 Securitization
The emergence of the security state entails new risks. Managing these new risks caused by social fragmentation resulted in new forms of state action regarding security: securitization (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011, 144).
Securitization, as part of the securitization theory developed by the professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen Ole Wæver, is the most prominent one in the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. The Copenhagen School of Security Studies focuses on several sectors in which security is important. Those sectors are military, political, economic, societal and environmental security. Securitization emphasizes on the social aspects of security (Wæver, 1995).
Securitization looks at the way certain issues are becoming labelled as security problems by ‘discursive politics’ (Balzacq, 2011, 12). An issue becomes a security issue simply because it is labelled as one (Wæver, 2004, 13). This stems from the idea that security is not a fixed term and can be shaped by politicians, individuals or media. By doing so, the actor claims the right to extraordinary measures to solve the security issue. To justify these extraordinary measures the actor has to convince its audience of its legitimacy, which depends on the power and the capability of the actor to socially and politically construct a threat (Taureck, 2006, 55).
The securitization theory can be used to analyse how civilians and politicians perceive issues as threats, and how and why certain threats get securitized. Likewise, it looks into which areas of political life can be shaped by framing the political debate by
reducing issues to terms of threat and survival (Huysmans, 2006). The concept of securitization can be used to research the rising security state in which issues are increasingly being labelled as a security problem, rather than multiple other forms of problems like social, political or economic.
Securitization can be linked to the concept of the risk society. Issues of social, economic or cultural nature being framed as security issues create the appearance of increasing risks and threats and therewith the need to address them. This leads to a society in which risk and threat management becomes progressively important. A concept that uses the insights of securitization to interpret and clarify developments in society regarding safety and security policies is the crime society. Within the pre-crime society risk and threat management are still core elements of the state, with the difference of focusing on preventing measures to combat risks, threats and crime.
The securitization theory generated points of critique. There is an absence of a normative conceptualization of securitization within the analytical framework of the theory and critique on Wæver’s supposed disregard for any political consequences of his speaking and writing about security (Taureck, 2006, 53), the issue about the form of securitization such as non-verbal communication or silence (Hansen, 2000, 296, 300), and ethico-political assumptions and implications of securitization (Aradau, 2004, 393). While the critique highlights several important questions, it is important to mention that although the securitization theory is apparently deemed to have a normative, or moral/ethics component, this was never intended to be part of the theory (Taureck, 2006, 55).
The research on the change of the welfare state, the new directions it is heading to, and the role of concepts such as the security state and securitization is extensive. In an effort to combine the various aspects Hallsworth and Lea describe a broad framework on the characteristics of the emerging security state.
3. Method
This research will be conducted on the basis of legislation, and social and urban policy in the Netherlands. Both policies and laws will be used to analyse and to what extent the characteristics of the emerging security state are seen, based on the framework of Hallsworth and Lea (2011). They describe several characteristics related to their perceived change from welfare to workfare and risk management. Transforming these characteristics to questions ensures that they can be researched. Researching these characteristics on their presence in Dutch legislation, and social and urban policy will provide, within the scope of this research, a broad view of the possible emergence of the security state in the Netherlands.
3.1 Approach
This research will consist of qualitative research in which legislation and policies will be analysed to determine to what extent they can be placed within Hallsworth and Lea’s three fundamental changes regarding the welfare state. Due to practical limitations, the amount of legislation and policies analysed will be limited. It is not feasible to analyse all possible laws and policies that might contribute to the emerging security state. The various documents that are analysed in this research are selected based on the notion that they reflect to a certain extent legislation and social and urban policy that interfaces with safety and security aspects in the Dutch society. They show notable changes and implementations that reflect important political and societal developments regarding safety and security.
To determine to what extent Dutch policies and law fit within Hallsworth and Lea’s framework, this research is using discourse analysis. This means that the focus will lie on verbal and written expressions of thoughts on a specific subject of security. Discourse analysis is the analysis of speech, writing and other forms of expression to come to an understanding of the world (Jorgenson & Phillips, 2002, 1). This includes the analysis of text both written or spoken to determine its underlying meaning, which can be placed within a certain domain of interest such as the political or social domain. The connection between discourse analysis and securitization derives from text analyses to determine intentions or views and to what extent they are part of a securitization process framing issues as security issues.
Statements and documents regarding legislation, and social and urban policy are in this research considered securitization acts when they are being imposed or implemented for safety aspects that are supposed to be addressed or are wanted to be addressed by the Dutch government. This may arise from the government’s own intention or from societal pressure. It is also considered a securitization act when legislation or social and urban policy consist of, or addresses, safety and security aspects, which said legislation or policy should be able to solve.
The reason why this research focusses on the recent state of affairs in the area of legislation and policy in the Netherlands is mainly related to two issues. Firstly, this period has been chosen to get a better understanding of present day safety and security aspects in the Dutch society and how these relate to developments in legislation, and social and urban policy. This best reflects the current state of the Netherlands regarding legislation and urban and social policy. The second reason is related to the framework of Hallsworth and Lea, which is relatively recent and focuses on more modern developments in Western Europe. This makes it more logical to look at the current state of the Netherlands, because this will fit better with the more contemporary framework from Hallsworth and Lea.
With the use of sources and documents that reflect important and notable political and societal developments in the Netherlands and a contemporary time period that fits the framework of Hallsworth and Lea, this research aims to test the possible emergence of the security state in the Netherlands, and how these possible changes are framed within the context of the shift from welfare to workfare and risk management.
3.2 Method Reflection
This research will be conducted on the basis of legislation, and social and urban policy to analyse to what extent these policies show similarities with the three areas in the development from welfare to workfare and risk management in the framework of Hallsworth and Lea’s emerging security state. By restricting the research to the transition from welfare to workfare and risk management this research will be more detailed and feasible.
A drawback of this restriction is that the other areas described by Hallsworth and Lea are mostly ignored, while being equally important to provide a comprehensive analysis of the rising security state. Interconnections between the different areas are an
important aspect, since the areas are mutually reinforcing each other. It becomes inevitable that by restricting to just one of the areas this research will not provide a complete and conclusive view on all the developments towards the emerging of a security state. While this is important to mention, it does not interfere with the aim of this research.
A second drawback of this approach is the reliability of the research. Since the research aims to provide a broad view of security developments in Dutch legislation, and social and urban policy it is impossible to include all related policy changes. This is why it is impossible to generalise. It will however provide insight on how specific legislation and policies affect the Dutch society and to what extent they influence the development towards a security state.
It is clear that the approach of this research focusses on a specific area and thus does not offer a large-scale overview of all legislation and policy developments, since this would be beyond the feasibility and scope of this research. Statements, legislation and documents in this research are selected because they reflect important and notable developments in Dutch legislation and policy that show similarities with the characteristics in the framework of Hallsworth and Lea. These documents provide within the scope of this research an adequate view on the interaction between legislation, policy and securitization in the Dutch society.
4. The Rise of the Welfare State
One of the three key drivers of securitization in the framework of Hallsworth and Lea (2011, 144) on the emerging security state is the change from the traditional welfare state to a state that forms around workfare and the management of risk. Whereas the welfare state traditionally sought to confront social problems by extending social rights and the entitlement to welfare, the emerging security state intents to link welfare to work and reconstructs problems as risks that require coercive forms of management.
This chapter is an introduction of the first driver and provides background to the development towards a risk-society. By doing so it will provide a starting point for the rest of this research and puts changes into a wider context.
4.1 The Welfare State
Hallsworth and Lea (2011, 141) describe the rise of the security state as the ‘successor of the liberal welfare state’, which ‘heralds a new type of authoritarianism’. This new form of authoritarianism is absorbed with the management of the marginalized, progressively infecting social institutions and the criminal justice system.
The liberal welfare state was characterised by a preference for market solutions to solve welfare problems (Myles, 1998, 342) and was mostly found in Anglo-American countries such as the United States. This in contrast with the more conservative and social democratic welfare states that are more prevalent in Europe. The conservative and social democratic models have less room for market forces and are mainly characterized by extensive social rights (Myles, 1998, 344).
The rise of this new form of authoritarianism that manages the marginalized must be seen as an attitude related to these previous welfare state models and tends towards more centralized power and stricter guidelines regarding providing welfare. To understand this emergence, it is important to look at the concept of the welfare state, how it developed, and how this new authoritarianism manifests itself.
The welfare state in modern Western Europe is a state form in which the government is guaranteeing the provision of a minimum level of services to the population through a system of social protection. It requires an able government to collect and redistribute resources and opportunity to minimize inequality. In addition, it is heavily merging capitalism, democracy and public spending (Van Kersbergen & Vis, 2014, 11). The welfare state differs from other state forms such as the police state,
which the online Merriam-Webster dictionary describes as a state whose main focus is the control of its citizens by using excessive arbitrary power to control social, economic and political life.
The basis for the welfare state system is built on four main pillars (Learn Europe, n.d.). The first pillar provides compulsory and free primary education, and highly subsidized higher education. The second pillar consists of initially universal and free health treatment, which in some areas of Europe is funded by having other citizens contributing to its cost. The third pillar has to do with social security, and insurance schemes that cover several situations, such as sickness. The last pillar focuses on social services, including different types of support to cover the needs of less favoured collectives. The welfare state also shares some other characteristics such as the focus on the tertiary sector, mechanized agriculture, urbanization, bureaucracy, and the critical thinking of citizens (Diederiks, 1987, 21-22).
The welfare state has been de dominant state form in twenty-one European countries.1 It can be divided in three models with each their own characteristics (Learn
Europe, n.d.). First, the social democratic model with high taxes, high income retribution, high level of participation of women in the labour market, high standard of living, and a high level of confidence in the public system. This model is mostly found in Northern European countries such as Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Second, the conservative model that is similar to the social democratic model and is characterized by a low level of women participating in the labour market, dependency on social contributions instead of taxes, moderate redistribution of income, and higher levels of unemployment, especially southern European countries. This model is seen in countries such as France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. The third model is the liberal model, which is characterized by a low level of total state spending, a high level of inequality, and a low level of expenditure on social protection. This model is used in Ireland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
4.2 The Development of the Welfare State
The origin of the welfare state in Europe differs per country. To keep the rise of the welfare state concise, it is much more logical to look at its definitive breakthrough right
1 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
after the Second World War. It is no coincidence that the welfare state took off after the Second World War. The period before the war was characterized by a global economic crisis that was followed by a world war. This caused governments in Western European countries to intervene in social and economic life to prevent repetition of demoralising unemployment (Diederiks, 1987, 351). During the decades after 1945 the welfare state was gaining momentum and resulting in rising prosperity. (Diederiks, 1987, 365). It had to deal with external factors such as the power vacuum after the Second World War that left Europe’s post-war reconstruction subordinate to the United States and the Soviet Union, and internal factors like the affordability of the system. The affordability of the welfare state system became a more urgent problem in the 1980s due to both an increasing need of facilities and compliant regulations (Diederiks, 1987, 359). This ‘affordability problem’ stretches to the modern welfare state that has to deal with an aging European society and immigration (Garssen, 2011).
In the early 1990s European welfare states have seen some substantial changes. It was expected among others that welfare states helped unemployed people back to employment, supported child development, and provided social services for an aging society, which differed from the early post-war welfare state that focused more on reconstruction (Bonoli & Natali, 2012, 3). One of the changes was addressing new social risks that arose within the European welfare states. These new social risks are risks that people face due to current social and economic changes (Taylor-Gooby, 2004, 2-3).
4.3 From Welfare to Workfare and Risk Management
The shift to workfare and risk management is one of the three main areas in which Hallsworth and Lea (2011, 145) see the emergence of the security state in England. One of the three fundamental underlying transformations within this shift is the idea that crime control becomes the pre-eminent paradigm for social control. Hallsworth and Lea describe this development as a change regarding criminal justice. In the welfare state criminal justice mainly existed in the background, whereas in the security state criminal justice has moved to the policy foreground.
Criminal justice not only moved to the policy foreground, it also became progressively politicized (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011, 145). This politicization resulted in crime control becoming a predominant perspective within social and urban policies
(Atkinson & Helms, 2007). Hallsworth and Lea mention the example of the New Labour’s Crime and Disorder Act of 1998, which connected crime and various forms of anti-social behaviour and made local authorities responsibilities for crime prevention (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011, 145).
Hallsworth and Lea mention a second important indicator of the intertwining of crime and social control in England. Crime control has moved to the centre of politics and become crucial in showing governmental competence (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011, 145; Ryan, 2003, 47, 48). At that time in the 1960s, increasing crime rates implicitly challenged the competence to manage criminal justice policy (Ryan, 2003, 47).
John J. Rodgers (2008) reduces the tendency to criminalize social policy to two key processes: the subordination of social policy objectives to criminal justice objectives, and boundary blurring. The former prioritizes crime prevention instead of welfare issues, while the latter emphasizes the adoption of principles of operation between agencies of different policy fields.
These findings relate to social policy development in England but provide a framework to analyse possible similar developments in other countries. Are similar developments visible in the Netherlands and if so, do they correspond with aspects of Hallsworth and Lea’s framework of the rising security state?
5. Blurring lines? Crime and Social Control in the Netherlands
Hallsworth and Lea (2011, 145) mention the ascendancy of crime control and how it influences social and urban control in the United Kingdom. Central in their explanation is the increasing importance of the influence of criminal justice on social and urban policy. They mention five developments regarding the infusing of social and urban policy with crime control elements: the increase importance of crime control in policy making, the progressively politicization of criminal justice as a blueprint for social control, the existence of crime control at the centre of politics, the use of crime control to show governmental competence, and crime control as the hegemonic perspective across social and urban policy.
5.1 The Rising Importance of Criminal Justice
The first point Hallsworth and Lea (2011, 145) establish relates to the position of criminal justice in its position in politics. They conclude that within a rising security state criminal justice has moved to the policy foreground, due to an increased interest by governments and policymaker. Subsequently criminal justice is becoming used as a blueprint for social policy.
When looking at this development in Dutch policies the focus will lie on two parts. Are there discernible changes in the usage and budgeting of criminal justice that could imply a shift towards criminal justice becoming a crucial part of policies? And are there changes in the perspective of Dutch politicians regarding the usefulness and use of criminal justice?
Traditionally, criminal justice was seen as a last resort used by the Dutch government to restore social order (Trommel & Van der Veen, 1999, 255). However, since the mid-1980s, criminal law has developed due to the increased importance of safety and security in the welfare state. This suggests a movement towards a society in which criminal law has become a tool to ensure social order (Trommel & Van der Veen, 1999, 255).
To differentiate a change in the use of criminal justice it is important to include crime figures. Looking at the registered crime numbers between different years provides a general view on the use of criminal justice and changes within this use. These numbers do not relate to unregistered crimes. Between 2007 and 2015 registered crime
numbers declined from 725.500 to 607.400. (CBS, 2016). This decline implies less usage of criminal justice, since there are fewer crimes to prosecute.
The trend of declining crime numbers in the Netherlands is causing a decrease in offenses dealt with by the public prosecutor and judges. Between 2007 and 2016 the amount of offenses dealt with by both the public prosecutor and judges declined from 281.430 to 202.525 (CBS, 2017a). These numbers include transactions, conditional dismissal, unconditional dismissal, and handling by a judge. Since 2009 these numbers also include fines imposed without the intervention of a judge. The decline of offenses handled by both the public prosecution and judges implies less usage of criminal justice in the Netherlands.
Another aspect in analysing the rising importance of criminal justice in policy making is looking at the amount of money assigned to criminal justice in the national budget. In 2007 the total budget of law enforcement in the national budget was €8.348.711.000. This total consists of the budgets of the police, legal order, justice and legal assistance, law enforcement, crime prevention, and counterterrorism (Rijksoverheid, n.d.a; Rijksoverheid, n.d.b). This increased in 2017 to €10.521.611.000 (Rijksoverheid, n.d.c). On first glance show these numbers a large increase in available budget. Based on these numbers alone it could be concluded that law enforcement has become more important or urgent in 2017 due to a higher allocated budget. However, this does not take into account inflation or other external factors, such as the integration of more tasks. This would mean that the budgets of these policy articles are increased because more tasks have been added.
These numbers do show that, although the possibility that the increase might be due to factors beyond the rising importance of criminal justice such as inflation and the addition of more tasks, the budgets for the police, legal order, justice and legal assistance, law enforcement, crime prevention, and counterterrorism have not decreased in 2017.
5.2 Progressively Politicization of Criminal Justice
Hallsworth and Lea (2011) also mention the politicization of criminal justice and how it is becoming interlaced with social policy in a rising security state. Traditionally, social policy in a welfare state is aimed at providing social security and insurances against unforeseen circumstances such as unemployment and absenteeism. The
interlacing of crime control elements with social policy results in crime control becoming an important part of social policy to provide safety and security to a society. To what extent has criminal justice become progressively politicized as a blueprint for social policy in Dutch policy? The progressively politicization of criminal justice consists of two elements. On the one hand it means that criminal justice is increasingly becoming a political tool that is used to achieve political goals regarding safety and security. On the other hand, politicization of criminal justice undermines the independence of the administration of justice.
With the increased exposure of crime to society and emphasis on the victim, crime has become a political problem (Boutellier, 2001, 365). The politicization of criminal justice seems to be a reaction on the revived focus on safety and security in Dutch politics, society and media and facilitates a ‘safety culture’ (Van der Wouden, 2010, 2749). Van der Wouden (2010, 2753-2754) argues that this development should be looked at with caution, since the politicization of criminal justice could have an influence on the creation of new laws and legislation. She explains that new laws and legislation may become based on incomplete and inadequate knowledge just to meet the wishes of the Dutch. This, she argues, erodes the idea of the Rule of law and affects the legitimacy of the democratic constitutional state.
Hallsworth and Lea (2011) also mention the merging of criminal justice and social policy. Using criminal justice as a blueprint for social policy infuses social policy with crime control measures. Boutellier (2001, 373) argues that in the Netherlands social and community services recognize the increasing demand for a safe society and see a role for themselves in this. A program such as Youth and Safety (https://wegwijzerjeugdenveiligheid.nl) combines social policy with criminal justice by focusing on the prevention of crime among youth groups and other forms of anti-social behaviour.
5.3 Crime Control as Core Task of Politics
Hallsworth and Lea (2011, 145) note that in an emerging security state crime control exists at the centre of politics. A viable approach to determine to what extent crime control exists at the centre of Dutch politics is looking at formulated intentions regarding the development and directions of crime control in Dutch policy.
The development of criminal justice within Dutch politics shows to what extent safety, security, and crime control are considered a core task of the Dutch government. This has mainly to do with the attention criminal justice gets within politics and policymaking. Are politicians increasingly concerned with criminal law in such a way that it is becoming predominant in the political debate? And how is this expressed in policy? An example of this dates back to 2013 when Prime Minster of the Netherlands Mark Rutte proclaimed that security is one of the core tasks of the Dutch government. People should feel safe in public areas, their own street and their home (Rijksoverheid, 2013a). Intended steps to be taken in 2013 to make the Netherlands safer were higher punishments for violence committed under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Rijksoverheid, 2013b) and more power to municipalities to improve the quality of life in problem neighbourhoods (Rijksoverheid, 2013c). Higher punishments for violence under influence of substances were an attempt to lower the respective crimes. However, expanding the severity of the punishment is subject to certain conditions. Testing for drugs would only be done when the committed crime is punishable by temporary incarceration.
Advantages of this approach were said to be able to better respond to possible recidivism and addiction. This means that this measure was focussing more on the welfare of the perpetrator than a broader social need of protection. This differed from the second measure, which had to improve quality of life in difficult neighbourhoods. Here it concerned the possibility to be able to set requirements for the behaviour of potential new local residents. This includes certificates of good conduct and available police data. These measures emphasized a broader social need of protection by protecting communities from unwanted residents that could compromise the safety of the neighbourhood.
Naming security as a core task of the government is an interesting development, which implies increasing interest and intention of the government in providing security to the Dutch society. However, to estimate the value of this statement it is essential to look at the position of security in previous governments. If security already had a prominent place in the package of government tasks in previous governments, naming it a core task would not be considered a new development.
In the coalition agreement of 2010 between the VVD and CDA security was labelled a core task of the government (Regeerakkoord, 2010, 39). Civilians should feel
criminal justice. This aim is repeated in the coalition agreement of 2012 between the VVD and PVDA (Regeerakkoord, 2012, 26), and the coalition agreement of 2017 between the VVD, CDA, D66 and ChristenUnie (Regeerakkoord, 2017). Two previous governments in a time span of seven years mention security as a core task of the government, which makes the existence of crime control and security at the centre of Dutch politics not a recent development.
5.4 Crime Control and Government Competence
Hallsworth and Lea (2011) elaborate on the idea that crime control has become a core task of a government by mentioning the use of crime control as a way to show governmental competence. Politics includes a wide variety of topics that all can be used to show competence. This is not only reserved to crime control, but also to topics such as healthcare, housing, and finance.
To what extent crime control is used by the Dutch government to show competence in the Netherlands is unfortunately difficult to determine. Increased politicization of crime control, and emphasis on societal security in the Netherlands shows to a certain extent governmental competence through crime control. However, the earlier mentioned politicizing of crime control indicates two things. First, the Dutch government recognizes the importance of crime control in the Dutch society. Second, by politicizing crime control the Dutch government is showing its competence in tackling present safety and security issues in the Netherlands.
The functioning of the criminal justice system is connected to the legitimacy of a government. Goldstein (2010, 489) argues that the state is both providing security as well as using security to legitimize itself. An adequately operating criminal justice system shows that the government is tackling one of its most important core tasks; providing safety and security. Crime control measures and the securitization of perceived threats are being accepted by a society if it deems the institution imposing those measures legitimate and in power to do so (Goldstein, 2010, 492).
The legitimacy of the state and showing competence are related concepts. Nivette (2014, 95) argues that the criminal justice system applies the most direct form of power to gain compliance from its citizens and that there is some benefit of the criminal justice system in demonstrating the state’s monopoly on the use of force. This
can be explained as a way to show the state’s competence in tackling safety and security issues by using its monopoly of force.
Crime control measures that are deemed not adequate enough by the Dutch society to counter unwanted criminal behaviour, may also influence the view of the Dutch society on government competence and legitimacy. Effective crime control is in this way used as a tool to establish some sort of political legitimacy as the Dutch state is the main provider of societal security. Failing to do so may undermine this legitimacy thus it is in the interest of the Dutch government to show adequate competence.
5.5 Crime Control, a New Hegemonic Perspective?
Hallsworth and Lea (2011, 145) mention crime control becoming the hegemonic perspective in social and urban policy. They explain that within a rising security state the emphasis within both policies tends to lean towards providing safety and security with less emphasis on residential pleasure and accessibility.
The integration of criminal justice in the Dutch society produces dual results. Fewer criminal cases are being held and budgets for the functioning of criminal law are declining. On the other hand, the ‘visibility’ or ‘exposure’ of criminal justice is rising. This is mainly due to the increased exposure of criminal cases in the media and historical developments that led to a renewed emphasis on the rights of the victim. This puts criminal justice in a more prominent place in Dutch society then in earlier decades. Crime control has increased its influence on social and urban policy in the Netherlands. Crime control and criminal justice have become important aspects of the political field and debate. The politicization of criminal justice implies that it has become a political tool to ensure the protection of the Dutch society. In case of the Dutch government social control and criminal justice seem to become more interlaced. Instead of being used as a corrective measure, criminal justice and social control seem to focus on a more preventative approach regarding for example youth groups.
Safety, including crime control and criminal justice, is considered as one of the core tasks of the Dutch government. This is not a new development. Safety and security have always been important tasks of the Dutch government and recent security issues such as terrorism provide a renewed focus on societal safety and security measures. Budgets regarding safety and security such as criminal justice, detection, and detention have been decreased over the last years. This could be due to the economic crisis as
well as budget cuts. It does not seem to relate to a decreased interest or importance of crime control.
It is difficult to precisely measure to what extent crime control is used as a way to show governmental competence. However, governmental competence in crime control and criminal justice affects political legitimacy. It is in the Dutch government’s interest to maintain its legitimacy.
Crime control is an important factor that is taken into account in urban and social policy but does not seem to be the hegemonic perspective. For urban policies economic development and maintaining infrastructure are more important factors. Social policy is becoming intertwined with crime control elements looking at preventative measures that result in quality of life improvements. It is certain that safety and security have become important factors in social and urban policy.
To what extent these developments can be seen as a new hegemonic perspective remains somewhat unclear and makes it difficult to come to a clear conclusion, something that is a limitation in this research. However, it is clear that safety and security have become important issues in the Dutch society. In an attempt to counter those issues effectively the Dutch government emphasis its preventative approach to control crime. Safety and security is described as a core task in coalition agreements and governmental statements, which also include new preventative measures such as higher punishments and quality of life improvements in neighbourhoods. This results in crime control measures gradually infusing social and urban policy, as a result of which the focus will increasingly be on safety aspects and less on other elements within social and urban policy.
6. Criminalization of Social Policy and Welfare
According to Hallsworth and Lea (2011, 145) is the criminalization of social policy a second development that contributes to the emergence of the security state. Within this criminalization of social policy, the welfare state is becoming a penal mechanism instead of pursuing rehabilitation by discipline and reintegration. This results in social policy becoming an important tool in crime prevention and crime control.
To substantiate this conclusion Hallsworth and Lea distinguish three distinctive developments toward the criminalization of social policy and welfare. The poorest communities are becoming subject to a program of authoritarian renewal, community safety and pre-emptive criminalization are used to drive away surplus population whom are defined as security risks, and the transforming of social security welfare into a coercive form of welfare that links entitlement to job seeking behaviour.
The visibility of these three developments in the Netherlands will be analysed based on three areas that are affected by the development towards the criminalization of social policy and welfare: the decline of the welfare state, the process of gentrification, and the implementation of the Participation law.
6.1 The Unsustainable Welfare State
Hallsworth and Lea (2011, 145) describe a profound shift between capital and the state, which exposes a new problem to the welfare state. Whereas the Dutch state was presumed to be able to provide full employment and steer investments into poor areas, globalization and the increased mobility of capital have reduced this possibility. Both influence full employment and subsequently the dependence on state benefits in the Netherlands leading to necessary adjustments.
The coalition agreement of 2017 recognizes the fast pacing changes regarding globalisation, digitalisation, and its effect on the labour market (Rijksoverheid, 2017a, 1). It mentions the dual nature of the changes. Digitalization and globalization may provide opportunities to one, while for another it may render their job obsolete. The high rate of flexibility needed in a fast-changing economy affects high, middle and low incomes (CPB, n.d.).
Flexibility has become a vital part of the Dutch job market (Euwals, De Graaf-Zijl & Van Vuuren, 2016). At the end of 2016 four out of ten workers had a flexible contract. Flexible contracts enable the Dutch economy to adapt to the fast changes of
globalisation and digitalization. However, the increase of flexible employment contracts is mainly visible at lower educational levels (Euwals, De Graaf-Zijl & Van Vuuren, 2016; CPB, n.d.), putting them at a three times higher risk of unemployment and poverty.
A second consequence of globalization and digitalization is the outsourcing of low-level jobs to low-paid workers in other countries or robots and computers. Both processes can cause repression at the bottom of the job market (De Graaf-Zijl et al., 2015, 7, 17). Replacement by robots or computers can cause a decrease in low-skilled jobs, and subsequently a decrease in low-skilled people. This puts pressure on citizens who have completed secondary vocational education. This group is being driven to the bottom part of society (CPB, n.d.).
Fewer jobs available in the Netherlands could increase the dependency on benefits because low-skilled people are less likely to find suitable work anymore. However, recent numbers suggest a different development. In 2017 the unemployment rate declined to 4,4 per cent of those working between the age of fifteen and seventy-five (CBS, 2017b). This percentage does not include people who are unemployed and have not yet searched for new work. It is these two groups of society, the poor and unemployed, that are subject to renewal developments that influence their social environment: gentrification and compulsory participation in the labour market.
6.2 A Process of Authoritarian Renewal for Poorer Communities
Globalisation and digitalization are not the only areas in which lower level incomes are hit. Urban development in Dutch cities over the past decades has shown new developments affecting poorer communities. Among others, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the two biggest cities of the Netherlands, have been undergoing a process of renewal that is changing the position of the poorest communities defining them as a security risk that repels business (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011, 145). Those same communities become subject of a process of authoritarian renewal, marginalized by economic displacement and social exclusion (Scranton, 2004, 155). Poulantzas argued (as cited in Scranton, 2004, 131) that this authoritarianism can be seen as a process of intensified state control over socioeconomic life.
A form of authoritarian renewal that affects socioeconomic life and policy is gentrification. Gentrification is described in the online Merriam-Webster dictionary as
an urban social process of renewal and rebuilding accompanying the influx of middle-class citizens while often displacing poorer residents. Gentrification could be seen as a social process or as a result of social and urban policy. The social process of gentrification occurs naturally through the settlement of wealthy entrepreneurs in historically rough neighbourhoods who use their wealth and creativity to renew the neighbourhood attracting same-minded citizens. On the other hand, gentrification can be stimulated as a part of urban policy. Municipalities will buy neglected real estate to rent it under certain conditions to their target group of middle-class citizens and entrepreneurs.
This development can result in social segregation. Lower-class people can no longer afford to live in gentrified neighbourhoods due to rising real estate prices, especially in combination with cuts in social housing creating a physical separation between middle and lower-class neighbourhoods (Van Engelen, 2015).
While gentrification is mainly seen as a social process, municipalities can stimulate it through urban policy. By buying real estate they can influence the population group, as they can rent it to people who fit their target group. This further influence social segregation, since poorer residents will be unable to meet the requirements. Hochstenbach (2017, 179) argues in his gentrification research about gentrification that the Dutch government is actively pushing gentrification in the social housing area, confirming the importance of state-led gentrification policies.
Does the process of gentrification in the Netherlands drive away the poorer surplus population? Poorer communities are affected by gentrification on social, urban and economic levels, and have to deal with direct and indirect displacement. Dutch policy makers and housing associations deem these forms of displacement necessary to achieve the wanted mix between low-income residents already living in the neighbourhood and new residents of various socio-economic backgrounds such as ‘starters’, ‘hip young residents’, and ‘yuppies’ (Hochstenbach, 2017, 75).
Uitermark, Duyvendak and Kleinhans (2007, 127, 137) argue that gentrification in the Netherlands is a government-led measure that lures the middle-class to poorer areas with the goal to civilize and control these neighbourhoods. They argue that not only social control plays a role in the gentrification process, but also economic motives. This contains the idea that upgrading neighbourhoods through gentrification may boost property prices. Such economic benefits can be an incentive to a more guided approach
of gentrification in which local government is trying to ensure that the economic value of the neighbourhood grows thus making the city more attractive.
A consequence of both forms of gentrification is forced relocation predominantly targeting groups associated with social disorder (Uitermark, Duyvendak & Kleinhans, 2007, 127). Jos Gadet, head of Urban Design at the municipal service ‘space and economy’ argues that gentrification is not only a process of the expulsion of the poorer population. He considers it a positive development for the city of Amsterdam. Gadet contradicts the idea that it is mainly an influx of white, wealthy citizens in coloured, poorer neighbourhoods (Metz, 2015). He mentions rental protection for poorer groups and an increase in revenue for shop owners with different ethnicities. These multi-ethnic shop owners do not fall under the wealthy middle class that gentrification is supposed to attract.
Gadet also argues that gentrification is not imposed by the municipality (Metz, 2015). Both the strategic plan and the structural vision for the city of Amsterdam mention the protection of the lower limits of social renting for lower income households (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2011, 93). The strategy decision of the city of Amsterdam also recognises social rental problems in a changing urban society and aims to preserve a balance between social rental and the free sector (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2016, 17).
The process of gentrification is not only visible in Amsterdam. Rotterdam, the second biggest city in the Netherlands is in the middle of a process of renewal that connects with the influx of highly educated citizens. In the early nineties the municipality of Rotterdam bought several buildings to renew and rent them to desired new entrepreneurs. This process was unnecessary in 2009 since several buildings belonged to the larger corporation of Woonstad Rotterdam that was part of a covenant with the municipality of Rotterdam and local middle-class. This is more of a co-operation than a strictly government led form of gentrification.
Uitermark, Duyvendak and Kleinhans (2007, 125) argue that state-led gentrification by local governments is not pursued to strengthen tax base and profits, or to respond to the housing demands of a new middle class. It is seen as an attempt by a coalition of state actors and housing associations to generate social order, pacify tensions, and to reduce concentrations that pose a problem for authorities.
State-led gentrification through local government policies aims to improve the neighbourhoods social and economic status by attracting the middle-class. Despite local
