A changing development paradigm:
The rise of China in Africa and the validity of the ‘Normative
Power Europe’ discourse
MA Thesis in European Studies
Graduate School for Humanities
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Author: Amber Blom - 10802673
Main Supervisor: mw. dr. Claske Vos
Second Supervisor: mw. dr. Krisztina Lajosi-Moore
July, 2018
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION... 4
1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE ... 8
1.1 THE BIGGER THEORY:CONSTRUCTIVISM ... 8
1.2 MANNER’S NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE... 8
1.2.1 DETERMINING THE IMPACT OF NPE ... 13
1.3 OTHERING AND EMPOWERMENT/DISEMPOWERMENT ... 14
1.4 NORM DIFFUSER ... 17
1.5 NORMATIVE IMPACT ... 19
1.6 NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE AND RISING ACTORS ... 20
1.6.1 NORTH-SOUTH VS.SOUTH-SOUTH... 21
1.6.2 CHALLENGES FOR THE EU ... 23
2. EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH AFRICA BEFORE 2000 AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS ... 25
2.1 THE EU-AFRICA RELATIONSHIP:THE ROAD FROM COLONIALISM TO COTONOU ... 25
2.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF EU DEVELOPMENT TESTED AGAINST THE NPE CHARACTERISTICS ... 30
2.2.1 EMPOWERMENT/DISEMPOWERMENT ... 30
2.2.2 NORM DIFFUSER ... 32
2.2.2.1 Conditionality ... 33
2.2.3 NORMATIVE IMPACT ... 35
CONCLUSION... 36
3. THE RISE OF CHINA AS A DEVELOPMENT ACTOR IN AFRICA ... 38
3.1 RISE OF CHINA IN AFRICA ... 38
3.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE DEVELOPMENT POLICY TESTED AGAINST THE NPE CHARACTERISTICS ... 40
3.2.1 EMPOWERMENT/DISEMPOWERMENT ... 40
3.2.2 NORM DIFFUSER ... 43
3.2.2.1 No strings attached strategy ... 44
3.2.3 NORMATIVE IMPACT ... 46
4. EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH AFRICA SINCE 2000 AND ITS
CHARACTERISTICS ... 50
4.1 EU-AFRICA RELATIONS SINCE 2000... 50
4.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY TESTED AGAINST THE CHARACTERISTICS OF NPE ... 52
4.2.1 EMPOWERMENT/DISEMPOWERMENT ... 52
4.2.2 NORM DIFFUSER ... 55
4.2.2.1 Conditionality ... 57
4.2.3 NORMATIVE IMPACT ... 58
4.2.3.1 Impact of China on the EU ... 60
CONCLUSION... 62
5. AFRICAN PERCEPTIONS ... 64
5.1 AFRICAN PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA ... 64
5.2 AFRICAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE EU ... 66
CONCLUSION ... 71
Introduction
The concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE) has become immensely popular in European Union (EU) studies. Next to academic debates on foreign policy and external relations of the EU, NPE has also been commonly adopted in policy debates. Key EU representatives such as the former European Commission President José Manuel Barroso have endorsed the concept of NPE with immense enthusiasm.1 For example, this stance is evident in his pronouncement: ‘the EU might be one of the most
important normative powers in the world because of its ability to establish normative principles and apply them to different realities.’2 Although the term ‘Normative Power Europe’ is not always as
explicitly used as in the example of Barroso, it is clear that other officials also endorsed the concept of NPE when they put emphasis on more idealistic values in portraying the international image of the Union.3
In academic debates, Manner’s article of 2002 has become a core reference in the literature on NPE. Manners and other followers of the NPE discourse, have defined NPE as the EU’s identity in its external relations. This identity of a normative power should be viewed as a force for good.4 It provides
the EU with a certain place in the global arena and offers direction on the manner by which the EU should behave internationally, for instance in its development policy towards Africa.5 This should be
done on the basis of certain norms that the EU should diffuse to the rest of the world. Thus, the EU should shape conceptions of what is normal in the world.6
However, changes have occurred in the international balance of power. This occurrence has also affected the global landscape of development aid. The external relationship of the EU with Africa is chiefly based on development cooperation with Africa; thus, competition for the EU and its identity as a normative power in its relationship with Africa has emerged.7 Countries such as China, Brazil and
India have experienced rapid economic growth. This event has consequently enhanced the so-called ‘South-South Development Cooperation’ (SSDC). Especially China seems to play an important part in SSDC due to its growing economic and global power which has enabled it to increase its development
1 Tuomas Forsberg (2011), ‘Normative Power Europe, once again: a conceptual analysis of an ideal type’, JCMS
49:6, p. 1186.
2 José Manuel Barroso cited in: Ian Manners (2008), ‘The normative ethics of the European Union’,
International Affairs 84:1, p. 60.
3 Caterina Carta (2008), ‘The EU’s international image as seen by the Commission’s diplomats’, European
Foreign Affairs Review 13, p. 490.
4 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, JCMS 40 ; Thomas Diez (2005),
‘Constructing the self and changing others: reconsidering Normative Power Europe’, Millennium journal of
international studies 33:3 ; Elisabeth De Zutter (2010), ‘Normative power spotting: an ontological and
methodological appraisal’, Journal of European Public Policy 17:8.
5 Sibylle Scheipers, Daniela Sicurelli (2008), ‘Empowering Africa: normative power in EU-Africa relations’,
Journal of European Public Policy 15:4, p. 619.
6 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, p. 239.
7 Sven Grimm, Christine Hackenesch, ‘European engagement with emerging actors in development: forging new
partnerships?’, in: Stefan Ganzle, Sven Grimm, Davina Makhan (eds.), The European Union and Global
assistance and cooperation to African countries.8 China’s development aid to Africa increased from
merely $1 billion in 2002 to $10 billion in 2004, to $25 billion in 2009, and in 2015 this again increased to $60 billion.9
Other academics such as Quadir, Six and Klaasse illustrated this event as a possible change in the international development paradigm, which they have portrayed as the idea of development based on certain interpretations of history, actors, their relationship, and civilizational hierarchies. 10 The
development paradigm is a product of global history which is recognised as a relationship primarily between two poles: one end comprises European societies and economies, whereas the other consists of their non-Western counterparts.11 In recent years, with the rise of new development actors on the donors
side, this development paradigm is subject to changes. The rise of China, as well as the growing power of Africa itself, provides the African continent with a wider variety of options and more room to choose with which actor it intends to cooperate in the field of development.12 Thus, the EU as a traditional donor
faces increased competition.13 Research has already been conducted on this topic, which frequently
questioned why, how and the extent to which the international paradigm is changing.14 Moreover, earlier
research has frequently argued that the Chinese mode of acting in the development field significantly differs much from the European style.15
The current research seeks to add to the research field by further examining the extent to which this changing development paradigm forms a competition for the EU’s approach towards Africa. Importantly, considering that the NPE discourse can be defined as the identity of the EU in its external relations and defines how the EU should act towards other countries and continents such as Africa, this might have consequences for the validity of the NPE discourse.
In this context, this thesis presents the consequences of the rise of China in Africa for the validity of the NPE discourse towards Africa. The research question posed will be what does the rise of China
8 Fahimul Quadir (2013), ‘Rising donors and the new narrative of ‘South-South’ Cooperation: what prospects for
changing the landscape of development assistance programmes?’, Third World Quarterly 34:2, pp. 321-322.
9 Jonathan Witteman (2015), ‘China voert steun aan Afrika op: 60 miljard ontwikkelingshulp’, accessed on 16
June 2018, https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/china-voert-steun-aan-afrika-op-60-miljard-ontwikkelingshulp~be10626c/.
10 Miriam Klaasse (2014), Geopolitics and the international development paradigm, Master Thesis European
Studies UvA. ; Clemens Six (2009), The Rise of Postcolonial States as Donors: a challenge to the development paradigm?, Third World Quarterly 30:6, Fahimul Quadir (2013), ‘Rising donors and the new narrative of ‘South-South’ Cooperation: what prospects for changing the landscape of development assistance programmes?’.
11 Clemens Six (2009), The Rise of Postcolonial States as Donors: a challenge to the development paradigm?, p.
1103.
12 Ibidem, p. 1104.
13 Sven Grimm, Christine Hackenesch, ‘European engagement with emerging actors in development: forging
new partnerships?’, in: Stefan Ganzle, Sven Grimm, Davina Makhan (eds.), The European Union and Global
development, Palgrave Macmillan 2012, p. 217.
14 Erik Lundsgaarde (2012), ‘The future of European development aid’, Elsevier 44. ; Miriam Klaasse (2014),
Geopolitics and the international development paradigm. ; Fahimul Quadir (2013), ‘Rising donors and the new
narrative of ‘South-South’ Cooperation: what prospects for changing the landscape of development assistance programmes?’.
15 Maurizio Carbone (2011), ‘The European Union and China’s rise in Africa: competing visions, external
in Africa mean for the validity of the NPE discourse towards Africa? By the ‘validity of the NPE discourse’, I posit that the EU could still be capable of using the discourse because it still holds valid. This research is regarded as innovative because it explores the African perceptions in order to be able to interpret the answer to the research question. The expectation is that the EU indeed used the NPE discourse in its development relations with Africa before the rise of China as a development actor (<2000), that the rise of China in Africa brought a new development discourse to Africa which differed from the European discourse and formed a competition to the European discourse, and that after the rise of China (>2000) the EU deviated from the NPE discourse because such discourse was no longer perceived as valid by Africans due to the competition of China. Therefore, the NPE discourse does not hold valid because of the rise of China in Africa.
In the first chapter, I provide the theoretical framework for NPE. The chapter explains the concept and provides an overview of the current debate on NPE. It also presents certain aspects that fit with the NPE discourse to ascertain in the subsequent chapters whether the EU acts in accordance with the NPE discourse in its relationship towards Africa and the extent to which the Chinese discourse differs from the NPE discourse.
In the second chapter, I provide an overview of the history of EU-Africa relations from the colonial period until the signing of Cotonou in the first section. The Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement are particularly important in this chapter. I subsequently test the aspects of the NPE discourse as discussed in the theoretical framework against the EU discourse in the development field in Africa to determine whether the EU acts in accordance with the NPE discourse. I primarily examine the rhetoric in official EU documents on the Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement.
In the third chapter, I scrutinise the history of China-Africa relations in the first section. I subsequently test the aspects of the NPE discourse as discussed in the theoretical framework against the Chinese discourse in the development field in Africa to identify the extent to which the latter discourse differs from the NPE discourse. I mainly investigate the rhetoric in documents on China’s Africa policy and speeches of Chinese Presidents.
In the fourth chapter, I present an overview of EU-Africa relations from 2000 until today. The Joint EU-Africa Strategy (JEAS) is in particular important in this chapter. I subsequently test the aspects of the NPE discourse as discussed in the theoretical framework against the EU discourse in the development field in Africa after the rise of China to determine whether the EU continues to act in accordance with the NPE discourse or has deviated from the NPE discourse. I chiefly evaluate the rhetoric in documents on the JEAS Summits from 2007, 2014 and 2017. I also explore European initiatives in the field of development, official documents of the European Commission and the European Parliament and an interview with Jose Costa Pereira of the European External Action Service (EEAS).
In the fifth chapter, I offer an overview of the African perceptions to determine whether Africa continues to recognise the NPE discourse as valid despite the rise of China. This topic is essential
because the capacity of the EU to act in accordance with the NPE discourse, and thus the validity of the NPE discourse, depends on Africa’s continued perception of the NPE discourse as valid. Hence, this chapter helps to interpret the results of chapter four. In this chapter, I principally use data from Afrobarometer: a research network that conducts public attitude surveys in Africa, and previously done research on African perceptions towards China’s and the EU’s official discourses.
Based on these chapters, this research culminates with a conclusion. As will become clear, we should not merely focus on the emergence of China in Africa as a competition for the NPE discourse, but also on the emergence of Africa itself. This observation results in an interesting conclusion to the question what the rise of China in Africa means for the validity of the NPE discourse in Africa? This conclusion will be presented at the end of the thesis.
1. Theoretical Framework: Normative Power Europe 1.1 The bigger theory: Constructivism
In contrast to traditional theories such as liberalism and realism which are material theories in which interests of actors are pre-disposed, social constructivist theory in international relations emphasises the importance of ideas.16 The interests and the values that actors possess are not given, but are socially
constructed.17 Nevertheless, social constructivism should not be perceived as contrary to the traditional
theories of international relations but as a complementary theory, that is more focused on the ideational aspects. The general view in social constructivism is that the structure of the international sphere is built on ideas, which influences the interests and identities of actors. These interests and identities are neither given nor static but are changing depending on the ideational factors. Thus, social constructivism demonstrates a connection between structure and actors and how they do have an effect on each other.18
Norms pertain to ‘understandings that constitute actors interests and identities’. They create expectations while simultaneously outlining the appropriate behaviours. An approach based on norms involves expressing values and defining rights and obligations.19 The role of norms in international
politics has become a frequently investigated subject because of the emergence of social constructivism in international relations.20 As I will discuss later, the normative power argument evokes a social
constructivist tone. The reason is that the concept of normative power suggests that the EU is constructed on a normative basis. This concept focuses on the independent power of norms to influence the behaviour of actors.21
1.2 Manner’s Normative Power Europe
The EU as an actor on the world stage is often described with mixed terms. For example, Europe is depicted as a civilian power22, and an ethical power23. Ian Manners used the term ‘ Normative Power
Europe’ to capture and explain the view of the EU as a new type of actor in international relations. In his 2002 work, Manners emphasised the role of the EU in the international arena as a normative power.24
16 Alexander Wendt (1992), ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics’,
International organizations, p. 407.
17 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink (1999). ‘The socialization of international human rights norms into
domestic practice: introduction’ In: Thomas Risse, Steve C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The power of
human rights: international norms and domestic change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999, pp. 7-9.
18 Alexander Wendt (1992), ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics’, p.
407.
19 Annika Björkdahl (2002). From idea to norm: promoting conflict prevention, Master Thesis Lund University,
p. 43.
20 Thomas Diez (2005), ‘Constructing the self and changing others: reconsidering Normative Power Europe’, p.
616.
21 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, p. 252.
22 Francois Duchêne, ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, in R. Mayne (ed.) Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans
Look Ahead. London: Fontana 1972.
23 Liesbeth Aggestam (2008), ‘Introduction: ethical power Europe?’, International Affairs 84:1, pp. 1-11
With this term, Manners contributed to the theory of Europe as a civilian power and Europe as a military power.25 Duchêne first discussed Europe as a civilian power that uses its economic power to attain
national goals, recognises the primacy of diplomatic co-operation to solve international problems, and willingly uses legally binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress.26 The concept
of Europe as a military power was first used by Bull, who criticised the notion of civilian power because of its lack of self-sufficiency in military power. His solution was to transform the European Community (EC) into a military power Europe.27 Both notions have a few common characteristics. First, both notions
express interest in strengthening the international society, not civil society. Second, they value direct physical power in the form of empirical capabilities. Duchêne depicted direct physical power in the form of long on economic power, whereas Bull portrayed direct physical power in the form of a need for military power. Third, both notions describe the European interests as paramount.28
According to Manners, suggestions of the EU as a civilian or a military power are both located in discussions of capabilities. He added that Europe can be viewed as a ‘normative power’, ‘power over opinion’, idée force, or ‘ideological power’, and as a power with the desire to move beyond the debate over capabilities and focus on cognitive processes with both symbolic and substantive components.29
This focus induces an understanding of the EU’s international identity. Normative power consequently has an ideational nature.30 The concept is ideational in the sense that it is an ideal or in its purest form,
not material or physical. Its use involves normative justification and not the utilisation of material or physical force.31 Therefore, the EU as a civilian power and military power should be improved with a
focus on normative power that is ideational in nature and characterised by common principles.32 This
approach is necessary because the emphasis in civilian and military power is largely on EU policies and institutions. The notion of normative power is capable of shifting the analysis away from the empirical focus on the EU’s policies or institutions and towards the cognitive processes.33 Manners would not
confirm that civilian power or military power is unimportant; however, he advised that greater attention should be given to shaping the conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations.34
Considering the importance of normative justification and the absence of physical force, Manners argued that the most vital factor that shapes the international role of the EU is what the EU is
25 Ibidem, p. 241.
26 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, p. 236 ; Michael Meininger (2007),
‘Everything is dangerous: a critique of normative power Europe’, Security Dialogue 38:4, p. 436 ; Sibylle Scheipers, Daniela Sicurelli (2007), ‘Normative Power Europe: A credible Utopia?’, JCMS 45:2, p. 436.
27 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, p. 237. 28 Ibidem, p. 238.
29 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, p. 239. ; Sibylle Scheipers, Daniela
Sicurelli (2007), ‘Normative Power Europe: A credible Utopia?’, p. 437.
30 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, p. 239. 31 Ibidem, p. 252.
32 Ibidem, p. 239. 33 Ibidem.
34 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, p. 239 ; Elisabeth De Zutter
and not what it does or says.35 This means that most important is that the EU has in the eyes of the Self
and of the Other a normative identity. Therefore, the EU’s actions in international relations should be normatively sustainable or normatively explicable and justifiable to others.36 Here, we come at what
Manners says is his main argument: ‘normative power in general, and the EU’s normative power in particular, is sustainable only if it is felt to be legitimate by those who practise and experience it.’37
Since the 1970s, a tendency to describe the then-called ‘European Community’ (EC) as a progressive international player that followed norms and values has developed. Since the 1990s, the idea that the EU is a different (read: better) international player has emerged: a new form of global player that was different from traditional powers.38 However, this idea does not necessarily make the EU a
distinct normative power.39 Manners and Lucarelli argued that the normative difference of the EU
originates from its distinct political form. First, this difference is evident in the EU’s historical context, which demonstrates that the EU was created in a post-war environment where nationalism was perceived as evil. This factor explained why the aim of Europe changed to the attainment of peace and liberty by pooling the resources of the member states.40 Second, the EU has a hybrid polity that functions as the
source of EU norms. The hybrid polity combines supranationalism and international forms of governance. 41 Moreover, Manners and Falkner contended that the EU is normatively different because
the NPE norms are accepted within the EU’s legal system.42 The components of European identity were
initially formulated in the Copenhagen Declaration of 1973, and European identity became part of European policy for the first time.43 The purpose of the document was to enable the EC members to
’achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs’.44 Europe should achieve a ‘proper role in the world’.45 This
declaration also emphasised that the European member states share certain values and principles. Therefore, the document included these constitutional norms.46 This aspect transformed these
35 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, p. 252. 36 Ian Manners (2009), ‘The concept of normative power in world politics’, DIIS Brief, p. 2. 37 Ian Manners (2008), ‘The normative ethics of the European Union’, p. 46.
38 Sonia Lucarelli, Lorenzo Fioramonti, ‘Introduction: the EU in the eyes of the others – why bother?’, in: Sonia
Lucarelli, Lorenzo Fioramonti (eds.), External perceptions of the European Union as a global actor, London: Routledge 2010, p. 3.
39 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, p. 240.
40 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, p. 240 ; Sonia Lucarelli (2006),
‘Introduction’, in Sonia. Lucarelli and Ian. Manners (eds), Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, London, New York: Routledge, pp. 1–16.
41 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, p. 240.
42 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, p. 241 ; Robert Falkner (2007),
‘The political economy of normative power Europe: EU environmental leadership in international biotechnology regulation’, Journal of European public policy 14:4.
43 L.A. Hindriks (2014), Conceptualising European identity, Master Thesis Utrecht University, pp. 30-31. 44 European Commission, ‘Declaration on European identity (Copenhagen, 1973), accessed on 3 May 2018,
https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/declaration_on_european_identity_copenhagen_14_december_1973-en-02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32.html.
45 Ibidem.
constitutional norms into conditions for the EC’s international identity.47 The norms were subsequently
constitutionalized in the Treaty on European Union (TEU).48As stated in Article 6 of the TEU, certain
principles are common to the member states. These norms comprise democracy, rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights.49
According to Manners, the EU can be viewed as a new political form because of the combination of the historical context, hybrid polity, and legal constitution. Additionally, this new political form allows the EU to act in a normative manner and create a normative difference to other international actors.50 The norms that form the normative basis of the EU are developed by declarations, treaties and
policies. A distinction can be made between five core norms and four minor norms. The core norms cover the acquis communautaire and acquis politique. These norms consist of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights. The four minor norms are manifested in the constitution and practises of the EU. These norms comprise social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance.51 As discussed in the subsequent chapters, these norms are also evident in EU development
policy towards Africa which may imply that the NPE discourse is important for the EU in its development relations with Africa.
In his later work, Manners clearly identified peace as the NPE’s primary norm that guides the external actions of the EU. This norm is later redefined as sustainable peace. However, Manners recognised sustainable peace as a norm that has as building blocks the other norms such as good governance, democratisation, rule of law and respect for human rights.52 This notion is also
acknowledged by Pace who argues that ‘the EU’s discursive practices act as compelling ideas that it seeks to export to conflict areas – adherence to human rights, democracy, rule of law, good governance, social and economic development as the routes out of poverty, violence and conflict’.53
This scholarly image was matched by a self-rhetorical representation in EU documents that describe the EU both as global player with global responsibility and as a player with the purpose ‘to play a stabilizing role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples’.54
Moreover, José Manuel Barroso suggested that ‘the EU might be one of the most important normative powers in the world because of its ability to establish normative principles and apply them to different realities’.55
The combination of this self-representation and academic literature that both support the idea of the EU as a distinctive power had prevailed for some years. However, criticism towards the idea of the
47 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, p. 241. 48 Ibidem.
49 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 6. 50 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, p. 241. 51 Ibidem, p. 242.
52 Ian Manners (2006), ‘Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads’, Journal of European
Public Policy 13:2, p. 186.
53 Michelle Pace (2007), ‘The construction of EU Normative Power’, JCMS 45:5, p. 1054. 54 European Council (2001), European Council meeting in Laeken, Presidency conclusions.
EU as a distinctive international actor has grown at the turn of the century. Diez and Sjursen contended that the EU is not distinctive in its being a normative power because the emphasis on the diffusion of norms, values and ideas is a characteristic that is not unique to the foreign policy of the EU. For example, this case is also evident in the US. However, Diez and Sjursen acknowledged that the EU has a distinct method of acting like a normative power in contrast to the US.56 The US has attempted to project, and
often impose, its own norms while not binding itself to international treaties.57 This approach is different
from that of the EU which, according to Manners, is committed to international law. Manners confirmed this point through a chart that illustrates that the EU member states have the highest number of ratified cosmopolitan international treaties. By contrast, the US scores very low in this factor.58 Furthermore,
Sjursen asserted that US idealism is linked to norms and principles that are imposed through force.59
Diez argued the same point. The US became more reluctant to the military back-up of normative power throughout the years.60 This aspect implies that the EU is not unique in its being a normative power, but
that it has a unique form of normative power.
Moreover, an increasing number of studies began to criticise the applicability of the concept to the EU and the EU’s coherence as a normative power and its effectiveness.61 Bickerton questioned in
his article whether the identity as the power for good that the NPE discourse provides to Europe is legitimate. He underscored a problem at the heart of the concept of normative power, which is the lack of foundation for the ethical choices of the EU. Ian Manners would have taken for granted that the specific set of norms within NPE is legitimate. However, according to Bickerton, Manners never explained why these norms should be regarded as good norms.62 For Sjursen, the focus on the EU as a
promoter of norms does not automatically make the EU a normative power, because many foreign policy goals are based on normative terms. A key requirement is to ‘discriminate between different types of norms and their legitimacy and validity’63 The reason is that acting in a normative manner cannot be
assumed to automatically transform the EU into a legitimate force for good.64 Sjursen highlighted the
importance of cosmopolitan law for a normative power. She indicated that a normative power is one
56 Thomas Diez (2005), ‘Constructing the self and changing others: reconsidering Normative Power Europe’, p.
614 ; Helene Sjursen (2006), ‘The EU as a normative power: how can this be?’, Journal of European Public
Policy 13:2, p. 240
57 Thomas Diez (2005), ‘Constructing the self and changing others: reconsidering Normative Power Europe’, p.
622.
58 Ian Manners (2006), ‘The European Union as a normative power: a response to Thomas Diez’, Journal of
international studies 35:1, p. 173.
59 Ibidem.
60 Thomas Diez (2005), ‘Constructing the self and changing others: reconsidering Normative Power Europe’, p.
622.
61 Thomas Diez (2005), ‘Constructing the self and changing others: reconsidering Normative Power Europe ;
Helene Sjursen (2006), ‘The EU as a normative power: how can this be?’; Sibylle Scheipers, Daniela Sicurelli (2007), ‘Normative Power Europe: A credible Utopia?’.
62 Christopher J. Bickerton (2013), ‘Normative power and the EU’s search for meaning’, European Union
foreign policy, p. 74.
63 Helene Sjursen (2006), ‘The EU as a normative power: how can this be?’, p. 242. 64 Ibidem.
that attempts to overcome power politics through the strengthening of international law as well as cosmopolitan law, in which the rights of individuals, not merely the rights of states, is emphasised.65 On
a more positive note, Forsberg stated that the EU has many characteristics of a normative power. Thus, he recognised the EU as being close to the ideal type of NPE.66 Maull supported this view but preferred
to call the EU a ‘force’ rather than a ‘power’.67
1.2.1 Determining the impact of NPE
The previous section has discussed the concept of NPE. Manners clearly recognises NPE as an identity for the EU. However, several critiques have questioned the distinctiveness and applicability of the concept to the EU. However, I believe that the EU intends to be an NPE but that it differs if the EU acts like an NPE in different cases. For example, the EU has a difficult time in acting like a normative power in its relations with Russia and China.68 Nevertheless, I reckon that the EU should keep acting to
approximate the NPE discourse since I think that the EU cannot succeed in having another international identity and that it can come the closest to a normative power one. Therefore, determining the elements of the NPE discourse is vital for testing whether the EU, before and after the rise of China in Africa, acts like a normative power in Africa or diverges from it.
The first of these criteria which I consider as important for Europe as a normative power is that the identity is constructed with the perception that the EU is a distinct player. Therefore, the concept of Otherness is important.69 Here I believe that the notions of empowering and disempowering are
essential.70 The reason for this is that these notions are essential for the EU to construct its identity as a
normative power in its external relations. Through the mechanisms of disempowering and empowering the Other, the EU can create a distinct normative power of the Self. We will elaborate on this in the subsequent section.71 The second criterion is norm diffuser. After arguing that the EU is a distinct player
and has a normative basis, Manners wrote that this characteristic does not make the EU a normative power.72 In this case, norm diffusion is necessary. Other academics similarly highlighted the importance
of norm diffusion. For De Zutter, an actor can be a normative power if it merely diffuses this norms in the international system.73 Furthermore, Forsberg highlights that normative power is exercised by
65 Ibidem, p. 249.
66 Tuomas Forsberg (2011), ‘Normative Power Europe, once again: a conceptual analysis of an ideal type’, p.
1199.
67 Hanns W. Maull (2005), ‘Europe and the new balance of global order’, International Affairs 81:4, p. 777. 68 Tuomas Forsberg (2011), ‘Normative Power Europe, once again: a conceptual analysis of an ideal type’, p.
1193.
69 Caterina Carta (2008), ‘The EU’s international image as seen by the Commission’s diplomats’, p. 486. 70 These concepts are explained in the following sections.
71 Sybille Scheipers, Daniela Sicurelli (2008), ‘Empowering Africa: normative power in EU-Africa relations’, p.
619.
72 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, p. 244.
73 Elisabeth De Zutter (2010), ‘Normative power spotting: an ontological and methodological appraisal’ , p.
invoking norms.74 Thus, norms and the diffusion of norms are important. Since norms and the diffusion
of these norms are essential for a normative power, I reckon that the extent to which the EU uses norm diffusion as a key aspect of examining whether the EU is a normative power. Therefore, I agree with de Zutter and Manners that norm diffusion is part of the normative identity.75 Moreover, the third criterion
is the normative impact that results from this norm diffusion. I base the importance of this criterion on the definition of a normative power of Tocci, who suggested that ‘in order to have an effective or powerful normative foreign policy an international actor not only needs to pursue normative goals through normative means it also needs to achieve a discernible normative impact’.76 The relationship
between the EU and these three elements (identity construction, norm diffusion and normative impact) is discussed in greater detail in the subsequent sections and will be eventually employed in the main part of this thesis to test the extent to which the EU uses the NPE discourse.
1.3 Othering and empowerment/disempowerment
This section focuses on the mechanism of Othering because this is what I am going to use in the following chapters to ascertain whether the EU provides itself with a distinct NPE identity in the EU-Africa relationship. In this manner, whether the EU continues to view itself as a distinct normative power after the rise of China can be determined.
Diez stated that the concept of NPE can be better perceived as a self-construction and as the establishment of an EU identity against Others, rather than an objective analytical concept.77 This
reading of NPE is based on the poststructuralist work on the constructions of Self and Other.78 Identities
are viewed as a characteristic that constantly requires an Other against which they are constructed. This depiction implies that the Other is thus constructed simultaneously.79 Diez identified several strategies
for constructing Self and Other in international politics. He indicated that these strategies can be traced in the articulations of NPE.80 The first strategy is the representation of the Other as an existential threat.
The second is the depiction of the Other as inferior. The third is the exemplification of the Other as a violator of universal principles. The fourth is the representation of the Other as different.81 In this thesis
we will find out if these strategies of Othering are used to legitimize the strategies of the EU. As this thesis is focused on EU-Africa relations, the second and third strategies are particularly important because of the colonial history between Africa and the EU. The second and third strategies could
74 Tuomas Forsberg (2011), ‘Normative Power Europe, once again: a conceptual analysis of an ideal type’, p.
1184.
75 Ibidem.
76 Nathalie Tocci (2008), The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor, CEPS Working Document
No. 281.
77 Elisabeth De Zutter (2010), ‘Normative power spotting: an ontological and methodological appraisal’, p. 1107. 78 Thomas Diez (2005), ‘Constructing the self and changing others: reconsidering Normative Power Europe’, p.
627.
79 Ibidem. 80 Ibidem, p. 628. 81 Ibidem.
legitimise the European experience as the standard of the world. Europeans should embark on a ‘mission civilisatrice’.82 This European experience as the standard of the world originated from the French
Revolution in which the countries of Europe evolved and developed themselves and the distinction between modern and pre-modern societies was initially made. Europe turned itself into a decisive norm-setter for the rest of the world.83 Europe became the master of history as a ‘modern’ society, with the
absolute knowledge of development and its various stages. Together with colonialism, this event shifted the focus of development from Europe itself, to Others, including Africa.84 According to Edward Said,
the modern European ‘Self’ used the constructed Oriental ‘Other’ to become culturally and politically aware of itself. Given this opposition, European universalism claims to be the controller of universal values such as human rights and development. This occurrence legitimises active intervention against barbarianism.
Before the advent of the concept of normative power, the EU has thus been regarded as a civilian power. This idea of civilian power, which viewed Europe as a power that could primarily rely on civilian means instead of military means, was first formulated by Francois Duchene in the 1970s.85 Diez averred
that the concepts of normative power and the concept of civilian power are closely related to each other. He says that civilian power is a form of normative power because its core is about specific types of norms that are namely civilian.86
However, Manners contended that Diez is incorrect with this assumption and underscored at least six distinctions between civilian power and normative power.87 One distinction involves the
post-colonial concern that Europe as a civilian power is an example of a neo-post-colonial attempt to civilise the world. Civilian power implies that the civilizing of international relations should be promoted. The use of the phrase ‘civilising international relations’ demonstrates Europe’s history of colonialism.88 The
normative power discourse seeks to escape from the civilising missions by opposing the neo-colonial claims that are implicit in civilian power.89 Thus, Europe aims to establish itself as a non-colonial power.
Next to the use of the mechanism of Othering to legitimise the illustration and actions of the Self, Scheipers and Sicurelli argue that the practise of Othering essentially entails disempowering and empowering the Other, which is important for the EU to construct its identity as a normative power in its external relations.90 In the literature on the normative power discourse the idea of Othering is often
82 Ibidem, p. 629.
83 Clemens Six (2009), The Rise of Postcolonial States as Donors: a challenge to the development paradigm? , p.
1105.
84 Ibidem.
85 Thomas Diez (2005), ‘Constructing the self and changing others: reconsidering Normative Power Europe’, p.
617.
86 Ibidem.
87 For all the six distinctions, see Ian Manners (2006), ‘The European Union as a normative power: a response to
Thomas Diez’, pp. 175-177.
88 Karen E. Smith (2005), ‘Beyond the civilian power EU debate’, Politique Eruopéenne 3:17, p. 74. 89 Ian Manners (2006), ‘The European Union as a normative power: a response to Thomas Diez’, p. 175. 90 Sibylle Scheipers, Daniela Sicurelli (2008), ‘Empowering Africa: normative power in EU-Africa relations’, p.
developed in contrast to the US. The US is being disempowered (weakened) by the EU by depicting it as the major opponent of international law and as a laggard in fulfilling international obligations.91 On
the contrary, empowering is identity-based, but it aims to promote the status and recognition of an actor by illustrating it for example as equal or sometimes even similar to the Self. The empowering practise depicts developing countries as partners in international negotiations. This in contrast to disempowering the Other.92 The practise of empowering also involves an array of practices and power resources.
Examples of these practises and power resources are the transfer of expertise, knowledge and material resources and provisions of development chances and trade opportunities.93 Moreover, the empowering
of Others benefits not only the receiving end, but also the providing end. For instance, a donor of development aid will also profit from the provision of aid because its international recognition will increase.94 Scheipers and Sicurelli traced this mechanism of empowering in their analysis of how the
EU promoted the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Kyoto Protocol to African countries. The EU enabled these countries to play an active role in the negotiations related to these institutions and in the institutions themselves.95
As demonstrated in the example of the US, illustrations related to Othering often highlight that the EU has a tendency to disempower Others to enable it to construct its identity as a normative power and a force for good. The manner by which the EU relates to Others in external relations reveals the type of actor that the EU intends to be.96 European Union authorities exhibit a tendency to weaken the
US by illustrating it as the major opponent of international law and as a dawdler in fulfilling international obligations. The opposite tendency is visible in the manner by which the EU relates to developing countries. They illustrate developing countries as partners in international negotiations. This mechanism would prevent the EU from exercising its colonial zeal when presenting itself as a normative power.97
Therefore, the EU engages in discourses of partnerships, solidarity and dialogue towards developing countries.98
However, Six argued that Europe, despite the political rhetoric of partnership, continues to view itself as the standard-setter for any development model and still considers the South or the East as the essential Other.99 Klaasse argues that in European development policy nowadays, justification and the
right of Europe to intervene, helping the Oriental Other with its development, and setting the standards
91 Ibidem. 92 Ibidem, p. 610. 93 Ibidem. 94 Ibidem. 95 Ibidem, pp. 611-617. 96 Ibidem, p. 619. 97 Ibidem, p. 608. 98 Ibidem.
99 Clemens Six (2009), The Rise of Postcolonial States as Donors: a challenge to the development paradigm? p.
and norms to improve underdeveloped or less developed countries are still present.100 This notion would
signify that Europe creates the Other to legitimise the illustration as the Self as a norm setter and diffuser in international relations, and thus provides itself with an identity as a normative power. With the mechanism of Othering the norms of the Other can be rendered inferior. Thus, the Other’s norms become competitors to those of the normative power and must be vanquished.101
Therefore, within the NPE discourse, the mechanism of empowering is vital towards developing countries to prevent the EU from exercising its colonial zeal. Despite the claim that empowering would prevent the EU from exerting its colonial zeal by creating partnerships in the field of development thus allowing the EU to emerge as a non-colonial force for good, the EU also views itself as a norm setter that can impose norms on the inferior Other by helping it with its development. Thus, with the NPE discourse, the EU seeks to empower others while at the same time endeavouring to promote its core values.
1.4 Norm diffuser
In this section, the focus is on the norm diffuser role of the EU because I use this concept in the subsequent chapters to examine the extent to which the NPE discourse is visible in EU-Africa relations.
Manners argued that the NPE norms can be legitimised in world politics because they are based on previously established international treaties, conventions or agreements. For NPE, these norms draw upon the principles of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN Covenants.102
For Manners, these factors shape the legitimacy of the norms within NPE and NPE itself forms the legitimacy for the manner by which the EU acts in its external relations.103 Also within the EU, there is
a widespread agreement that the promotion of human rights and democratic principles is a legitimate objective of foreign policy.104
However, Manners recognised that accepting the normative basis of the EU does not make it a normative power. Therefore, he asks how the norms are diffused. According to Manners this process can be performed in six different modes. The first mode is contagion, in which the diffusion of norms is unintentional but induces the spread of ideas from the EU to other political actors. The second approach is informational diffusion, which is the outcome of strategic communications. The third mode is procedural diffusion, which entails the institutionalization of the relationship between the EU and a third party. The fourth approach is overt diffusion, which occurs when the EU is physically present in
100 Miriam Klaasse (2014), Geopolitics and the international development paradigm, Master Thesis European
Studies UvA, p. 65.
101 Elisabeth De Zutter (2010), ‘Normative power spotting: an ontological and methodological appraisal’ p.
1112.
102 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, p. 234. 103 Ibidem, p. 244.
104 Karen E. Smith (1998), ‘The use of political conditionality in the EU’s relations with third countries: how
third states and international organizations. The fifth mode is cultural filtering, in which norms in third states are learned, adapted or rejected.105 A final approach is transference, which involves the exchange
of goods, trade or aid with third parties, thus resulting in the diffusion of norms.106 Within the EU, it is
acknowledged that to spread the norms the EU should use conditionality.107 The use of sanctions
(suspension) is a form of negative conditionality, contrary to positive conditionality that includes human rights and democracy projects.108
A realist critique on the use of conditionality in aid allocation is that donors perform this action in their own interests, rather than those of the people of developing countries. Conditionality could be a way to force states to undertake good governance reforms that would benefit Western investors. Additionally, the liberal argument posits that democracies do not go to war with each other. Therefore, promoting democratic norms is in the interest of the EU and its member states.109 Another realist critique
from Kagan indicated that in Europe, a Kantian idealist idea exists whereby military means are avoided. On the contrary, in the US a Hobbesian-realist idea with military power prevails. However, according to Kagan, the focus of Europe on a Kantian idealist idea is not a result of choice, as Manners would argue. Such focus is rather a necessity as Europe lacks the military resources to become a military power.110
Another practical critique arises from the believe that the use of conditionality is an illegitimate interference in the domestic affairs of other states.111 However, a counterargument for this critique would
be that human rights are universal principles and that the spread of democracy makes manifest its universal appeal. More than 100 states have ratified the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and Economic, Social and Cultural rights.112 This event prompted the European Council to argue
that ‘expressing concern about violations of human rights, as well as requests designed to secure those rights, cannot be considered as interference in the internal affairs of a State’.113 However, I reckon that
whatever opinion is accurate, it is none the less significant that democratic principles and human rights have been accorded a prominent position in the foreign policy objectives of the EU and that there exist a believe that these norms should be spread. The extent to which this is important because of self-interests or normative self-interests is subsequently examined when considering the normative impact.
105 Ian Manners (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, pp. 244-245. 106 Ibidem.
107 Karen E. Smith (1998), ‘The use of political conditionality in the EU’s relations with third countries: how
effective?’, p. 265.
108 Marjorie Lister, ‘Europe’s new development policy’, in: Marjorie Lister (ed.), European Union development
policy, Palgrave 1998, p. 31.
109 Karen E. Smith (1998), ‘The use of political conditionality in the EU’s relations with third countries: how
effective?’, p. 255.
110 Robert Kagan, Of paradise and power, New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2003, p. 24.
111 Karen E. Smith (1998), ‘The use of political conditionality in the EU’s relations with third countries: how
effective?’, p. 256.
112 Ibidem.
Thus, the diffusion of values is essential within NPE. The most preferable factor in spreading values is conditionality. Conditionality consists of two forms: negative conditionality and positive conditionality. Some critiques have emerged against norm diffusion through conditionality. For this thesis, the key critique is that norm diffusion through conditionality is a challenge to state sovereignty and therefore a practise of colonialism.
1.5 Normative impact
The mechanisms of norm diffusion as instruments that the EU uses in its external relations can confirm the thesis of NPE; however, these mechanisms can also exhibit a mixed image of the EU. In particular, the adoption of conditionality measures to diffuse its (EU) norms shows possible contradictions between how the EU represents itself and what the EU does. The EU represents itself as a non-colonial force for good; meanwhile norm diffusion can be experienced by recipients as a coercive form of power.114
To overcome this feeling the actions of the EU (norm diffusion) should have a normative impact.115 Scheipers and Sicurelli argue that the limits of the EU’s impact may result in the colonial
image of the EU prevailing over the image of the EU as a political partner. In this case, the EU may undermine its international identity as a normative power.116 This because as Forsberg explained,
normative impact is related to interests.117 Del Biondo suggested that a conflict generally exists between
normative interests and self-interests. Self-interests can be divided into three categories: historical, commercial and security interests.118 As discussed in chapter 2, in particular the historical self-interests
may conflict with the normative interests of the EU in Africa. Historical self-interests are related to the desire of EU member states to maintain their sphere of influence in Africa. A sphere of influence is a region over which a state or organisation has a level of cultural, military, economic or political exclusivity, which accommodates to the interests of the power beyond the borders of the state that is in control. The country within the sphere of influence of another can become the subsidiary of the controller state. This condition can therefore be linked to colonial ties.119 Del Biondo highlighted that
this conflict can contradict the representation of the EU as a Normative Power or a force for good.120
Therefore, the EU should have a normative impact to signify that the EU has normative interests instead
114 Isabel Ferreira Nunes (2011), ‘Civilian, normative, and ethical power Europe: role claims and EU discourses’,
European Foreign Affairs Review 16, p. 6.
115 Tuomas Forsberg (2011), ‘Normative Power Europe, once again: a conceptual analysis of an ideal type’, p.
1191.
116 Sibylle Scheipers, Daniela Sicurelli (2008), ‘Empowering Africa: normative power in EU-Africa relations’, p.
620.
117 Tuomas Forsberg (2011), ‘Normative Power Europe, once again: a conceptual analysis of an ideal type’, p.
1194.
118 Karen Del Biondo (2012), ‘Norms,-self-interest and effectiveness: explaining double standards in EU
reactions to violations of democratic principles in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Afrika Focus 25:2, p. 113.
119 Ibidem. 120 Ibidem.
of historical self-interests: to illustrate that the EU acts not because of colonial considerations but because of normative considerations.
The foregoing points raise questions about the significance of a normative impact. Manners explained that impact is important according to consequentialist ethics. This means that actions should be judged on the consequences of action or inaction for guidance. Thus, the impact of EU actions on others is analysed to determine whether the EU’s actions are normative. Manners argues that consequentialist ethics should be viewed in terms of doing the least harm.121 Hence, outcomes should
do least harm. Doing the least harm involves ensuring that the EU considers the impact of its policies on partner countries. The key aspect in this case is that local ownership should be maintained by encouraging positive conditionality.122 In the EU’s use of conditionality, positive measures are preferred
to negative ones. Positive measures are desirable for several reasons. Firstly, positive measures seem to challenge sovereignty less than sanctions do. Moreover, donors are less likely to be inconsistent in applying positive measures than negative measures and positive measures are more effective. The positive measures of the EU are supposed to include granting more aid to countries that are making progress in promoting human rights and democratic reforms.123
Local ownership is important for my later analysis because according to Buiter, unless a development programme and the conditionality it embodies are country-owned, the programme will fail.124 In other words, if local ownership is not guaranteed, then a colonial image of the EU will prevail
and the programme will not be sustainable. Although the EU views the diffusion of human rights and democratic principles as an universal appeal, Buiter emphasised that even the impact of these practises should be focused on local ownership in order to avoid the colonial image of the EU.125
Thus, within the NPE discourse, the focus on a normative impact is important because a wrong impact can induce the colonial image of the EU prevailing over its image as a political normative partner in which it does not pursue normative interests but historical self-interests. A normative impact should do the least harm and therefore it should guarantee local ownership.
1.6 Normative Power Europe and rising actors
According to Manners, the concept of normative power not only suggests that the EU is constructed on a normative basis, but also importantly predisposes the EU to act in a normative manner in world politics. The international role of the EU is not built on what it does or says, but on what it is (a normative power).126 I agree with Manners that the EU can be viewed as a normative power, that contains the
121 Ian Manners (2008), ‘The normative ethics of the European Union’, p. 58. 122 Ibidem, p. 59.
123 Karen E. Smith (1998), ‘The use of political conditionality in the EU’s relations with third countries: how
effective?’, p. 265-266
124 Willem H. Buiter (2007), ‘Country ownership’: a term whose time has gone, Development in Practice 17:4,
p. 650.
125 Ibidem.
elements of normative identity, norm diffuser and normative impact, which are discussed in the previous section. However, I believe that the EU as a normative power encounters some difficulties in certain instances, such as in situations with Russia or China. Furthermore, I reckon that that the EU faces challenges with its normative power in Africa because of their colonial history and that these challenges increased due to emerging countries such as China. Grimm and Hackenesh confirmed this postulation by claiming that the rapidly increasing cooperation of emerging powers with other developing countries has consequences for European development policy towards these countries.127
In contrast to the EU, most of the emerging ‘new powers’ do have a traditional understanding of sovereignty, which might affect the European instruments for promoting democracy, human rights and good governance.128 A distinction can be made between the five categories of emerging actors in
international development. The most important category is that of emerging global powers. Part of this category are India and China. Their policies of cooperation take the form of package deals, that combine aid, trade, security policy and investments, among others, and they are, or intend to be, global in reach. Consequently, the challenges that these possible future world powers are posing tot the EU are more substantial than other categories.129 Chinese soft power might create challenges for the value driven side
of engagement of European actors.130 These possible challenges coming from China that the EU
encounters are related to the changing development paradigm. North-South development cooperation increasingly faces competition from South-South development cooperation. The subsequent section will give an overview of these notions to get an understanding of the difference between these notions.
1.6.1 North-South vs. South-South
Since the creation of development cooperation, the landscape of development aid has been mostly a North-South phenomenon, with donors being Western industrialised countries of the North and the recipient countries being underdeveloped countries in the South. However, since in particular 2000, this traditional landscape of development aid has changed with the emergence of non-traditional donors such as Brazil, India and China and the increasing popularity of South-South Cooperation. Thus, emerging donors are now offering alternatives to other aid-receiving countries, which spurred more choices for developing countries as they now have the option to choose between more countries and donors with which to cooperate. This shift has triggered a new form of competition which exerts pressure on the existing development system. The Western development paradigm, which has long prevailed, is seen to be in decline because of the emerging donors.131
127 Sven Grimm, Christine Hackenesch, ‘European engagement with emerging actors in development: forging
new partnerships?’, in: Stefan Ganzle, Sven Grimm, Davina Makhan (eds.), The European Union and Global
development, Palgrave Macmillan 2012, p. 211.
128 Ibidem, p. 212. 129 Ibidem, p. 213. 130 Ibidem, p. 217.
131 Clemens Six, (2009) ‘The rise of postcolonial states as donors: a challenge to the development paradigm’, p.
South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) is a broad concept with many elements that consists of all types of financial flows and cooperation. It includes political and economic exchange between countries, enterprises and civil society organisations and involves investment, technology and trade.132 Therefore, it is hard to formulate a single definition of SSDC. Nevertheless, the United Nations
(UN) which is one of the essential organisations guiding global development, provides the following general definition of SSDC which I find the most useful and appropriate.
“(SSDC is) a process whereby two or more developing countries pursue their individual and/or shared national capacity development objectives through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how, and through regional and interregional collective actions, including partnerships involving Governments, regional organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector, for their individual and/or mutual benefit within and across regions. South-South cooperation is not a substitute for, but rather a complement to, North-South cooperation. 133
Thus, the South is a term which should point to the developing countries of the South. I have selected this definition because it clarifies that two or more developing countries in the South are willing to cooperate to help each other develop or let at least each other benefit from their own recent development and experiences.
This is not really contrary to North-South cooperation, yet, what makes it different is the reason why Southern countries desire to help each other develop in contrast to North-South cooperation. For example, Southern countries adopt the assertion of a shared experience of colonial exploitation, present vulnerability to uneven neoliberal globalisation and postcolonial inequality. A shared identity as developing nations would eventually emerge. Based on this shared experience, these nations would acquire a specific expertise in fitting development technologies and approaches.134 Related to this notion is a certain rhetoric that is not used in North-South
cooperation. This rhetoric consists of the rejection of donor-recipient terminology or foreign aid. Southern partners talk about ‘horizontal’ relations instead of ‘vertical’ relations and terms such as equals, mutual opportunity and reciprocity are often present in the rhetoric of the South.135
Cooperation between Southern countries can therefore be seen as based on symmetric relations
132 Miriam Klaasse (2014), Geopolitics and the international development paradigm, Master Thesis European
Studies UvA, p. 10.
133 High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation, (2012) Framework of operational guidelines on United
Nations support to South-South and triangular cooperation, SSC/17/3, 12 April 2012, p. 4.
134 Emma Mawdsley, (2011) ‘The changing geographies of foreign aid and development cooperation’,
Transactions 37:2, p. 263.
and it is even sometimes called ‘soft power’.136 This depiction contrasts with the menace rooted
in the remainders of colonial rule within North-South development cooperation.137
However, I regard the use of ‘developing countries’ as problematic to the above mentioned UN definition of South-South cooperation. This because also China falls under the category of South-South cooperation, yet, although China still views itself and is ranked by the World Bank as a developing country138, I am not of the opinion that China can be identified as a
true developing country. This because of their rapid economic growth and its status as the second largest economy playing an influential role in the global economy. Therefore, I intend to expand the above mentioned definition to include not only the ‘developing countries’ of the South, but also the ‘emerging economies’ in the South.139
Development cooperation between countries in the South began decades ago. For example The Arab Bank for Economic Development was established in Africa in 1961. Another example is China, which is further discussed in the subsequent section. The end of World War II (WWII) and the demise of colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s constituted a vital trigger for Southern countries to start their cooperation. Most of these Southern countries had struggled to overcome their colonial past. Moreover, they had to choose a side between the opposing powers of the Cold War. Developing countries consequently started to recognise their common interests and possible mutual benefits of cooperation. Developing countries in the South began to question the system of international economic relations and proposed to change the structure and management of the existing system.140 This understanding resulted
in the establishment of the framework for South-South cooperation.
1.6.2 Challenges for the EU
Manners argues that one of the challenges for the EU in practicing normative power is that the EU has copied some of the habits and technologies of other actors in world politics over the past decade to rival other great powers in international relations. Thus, the EU seems to follow the practices and patterns of great powers instead of using normative power in a more justifiable manner, in which the use of normative power is prioritised alongside the utilisation of physical force and material incentives.141
136 Ibidem. 137 Ibidem.
138 The World Bank, ‘The World Bank in China’, accessed on 16 June 2018,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview .
139 K.S. Amanor, (2013) ‘South-South Cooperation in Africa: Historical, Geopolitical and Political Economy
Dimensions of International Development’, IDS Bulletin, 44:4, p. 20.
140 Miriam Klaasse (2014), Geopolitics and the international development paradigm, Master Thesis European
Studies UvA, p. 12.
