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National Identity and State Stability

A Cross-National Analysis of the Effect of Nationbuilding in sub-Saharan

Africa.

By

Katja van der Wal

Student number: 10507884

Supervisor: Michael Eze

Second reader: Francesco Nicoli

June 29, 2018

Master thesis Political Science: International Relations University of Amsterdam

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Abstract

Statebuilding attempts in sub-Saharan Africa have not always created strong and stable states. One suggested explanation is that African states are often ethnically fractionalized and lack a sense of national unity. This results in a lack of support for the state and leads to weak and fragile states. Nationbuilding could strengthen the sense of national unity among African populations and thus strengthen the support for the state. This research shows that nationbuilding through means of modernization -which include urbanization, education and employment opportunities- indeed leads to a stronger national identity in African countries. A stronger national identity does not automatically lead to stronger and more stable states. I find that after controlling for the most common variables, such as GDP per capita and democracy scores, national identity has a negative correlation with state stability. This result is conflicting with results from case studies done in sub-Saharan Africa. Most likely, this is due to omitted variables in the model. A historical analysis of African state structures suggests that social variables should be included in the model, even though, currently, they are not considered important in the existing state- and nationbuilding theory. An expansion of the theory, and eventually of the model, should lead to a more comprehensive understanding of state- and nationbuilding in sub-Saharan Africa.

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Table of contents

1. Introduction and Problem Statement ... 7

2. Theoretical Framework ... 9

2.1 Statebuilding... 9

2.2 The Nation and the Ethnic Group ... 10

2.3 The Amorality of the Publics ... 12

2.4 Nationbuilding and State Stability ... 15

3. Data and Methods ... 18

3.1 Hypothesis One ... 18

3.2 Hypothesis Two ... 20

3.3 Comparison ... 22

4. Results ... 24

4.1 Modernization Theory and the Political Development Argument ... 24

4.2 Nationbuilding as Driver of Stability? ... 27

4.3 National Identity and Political Stability... 29

4.3.1 Historical context ... 30

4.3.2 Socio-political realities ... 31

4.4 Limitations of the Research Design ... 32

5. Conclusion ... 33

5.1 Summary of the Research ... 33

5.2 Relevance and Practical Implications... 34

References ... 33

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1. Introduction and Problem Statement

Many African states are considered weak or fragile in terms of political, economic and social stability. Efforts by international organizations, such as the UN, to create stronger African states have not had an undividedly positive effect. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has conducted at least ten ‘complex peacebuilding operations’ on the African continent (Englebert and Tull 2008, 106). Although the operations in Namibia and Mozambique have been somewhat successful, the majority of the operations has not succeeded in creating sustainable governmental institutions. Countries that have received statebuilding aid still face challenges within their societies (ibid). The question is why African countries, despite the fact that they have received statebuilding aid, still cannot manage to create stable and strong states. One of the suggested explanations that has been given is that African states lack national unity. In other words, they are states without nations (Eze 2010, 70). There are multiple theories about the effect of national identity on state stability, but, to my knowledge, no comparative quantitative research has been done into this effect in Sub-Saharan African states and societies. The goal of this research is to fill the gap in the literature and to take the first steps towards determining the effect of national identity on state stability. My research question is: what is the effect of nationbuilding on statebuilding in sub-Saharan Africa?

This research contributes to the existing literature on state- and nationbuilding by offering new insights into the effect of national identity on state stability using a large-scale quantitative research design. This is important because existing literature has two limitations. One brand of research focuses only on technocratic means of statebuilding, understood as a focus on institution building, without regard for feelings of national unity or national identity within a society. Due to this blind spot for national unity, this approach is not fully equipped to explain variations in state stability and the success of statebuilding. The second branch of literature does focus on national identity and nationbuilding, but it has so far only been mainly of theoretical nature. Very little quantitative research has been done in this research area.

This research also has consequences for the development of policies on state- and nationbuilding. International organizations are in the process of creating the most effective policies to rebuild states that have fallen prey to (internal) conflict, natural disasters or other sorts of stability-undermining events. The more knowledge available on the causes of state stability, the more effective statebuilding aid can be. Furthermore, clear evidence about the most effective measures to create strong and stable states will make it easier to implement these measures. Caution is advisable when international organizations get involved in the business of

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sovereign states. Policies and policy recommendations should be based on the most reliable information available. Even if no international organizations are involved, and it is only the weak state itself trying to become stronger, better information makes it easier to improve state stability. If nationbuilding indeed leads to better statebuilding, this would be invaluable information for policymakers around the globe.

Most of all, this research is relevant because state failure causes human misery. Failed or weak states cannot provide security in any form to their population. Poverty, violence and human rights violations are more likely to occur in these states (Englebert and Tull 2008, 107). The people that try to escape this often end up as refugees in a neighboring country or as internally displaced persons in their own country. Any opportunity that might help to prevent this human suffering should be examined. Strengthening a state through means of nationbuilding is one of those opportunities worth discussing.

This paper starts with a discussion of the existing theory on state- and nationbuilding, and national identity in Sub-Saharan Africa. It introduces the classic Weberian view on the state and points out the shortcomings and obstacles this view poses to statebuilding. It introduces the complementary theory of nationbuilding and discusses why and how this might be beneficial to statebuilding in Africa. The second part discusses the data and methodology used in this paper. Through the use of two separate statistical models, the effects of nationbuilding and national identity on statebuilding are analyzed. The third part is a discussion of the results. Since the thesis does not find irrefutable evidence to support the assumption that nationbuilding leads to better statebuilding the theory on which the models are built are discussed thoroughly. This part also includes a discussion of the possible areas for future research that may shine light on the surprising outcome of this paper. The final part consists of the conclusion.

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2. Theoretical Framework

The goal of this chapter is to give an overview of the existing research and theories on the state, the nation and how they influence each other. I start out with a general conception of the state and statebuilding influenced by Weber. I then move on to explaining the development of the concepts of the “nation” and “nation-state”. I discuss the influence of these considerably Western concepts in African societies before I move on to the last part of the chapter. This last part focuses on the relationship between national and ethnic identities in Africa and their impact on state stability.

2.1 Statebuilding

Contemporary attempts to (re)build African states and societies are rooted in institutional and technocratic theories. A widely accepted approach to the state and statebuilding is based on Weberian logic (see for example Boutros Boutros-Ghali for the United Nations 1995; Paris 1997; Rotberg 2003). In his influential work, Weber (1948, 77) defines the state as “a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”. The way this works, in his opinion, is that one group dominates the rest of the population. To realize this form of organized domination, the population must accept the domination, and the authorities must have the materials necessary for the use of physical violence. “Thus, organized domination requires control of the personal executive staff and the material implements of administration” (Weber 1948, 82). Following Weber’s line of argument then, a weak state is one that does not have a functioning administrative branch and is not capable of providing security. In other words, a weak state lacks institutional capacity (Lemay-Hébert 2015, 4). There are other definitions of the state and state stability in the literature. The definition used here is a narrow one. It focuses solely on the domestic sovereignty -or domestic political authority- within a state (Krasner 1999, 4). Broader definitions of the state often focus on liberal features of a state. This may include freedom of speech, freedom of press and the right to vote. I refrain from using this approach because it does not only measure state stability but diverges to measuring democratic stability. The focus is of this paper is not to measure the level of democracy, but only state stability. Therefore, I apply a narrow definition: the stability of the state is based on its administrative and institutional capacity. The implication for statebuilding is simple: if a weak state lacks institutional capacity, this capacity should be rebuilt to create a strong state. However, this approach has run into several problems, one of which is the lack of attention policymakers have for national identity and the existence of a

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nation. The misconception in which this problem is grounded is that strong institutional capacity is only based on the institutions itself. However, support among the public based on a sense of belonging to the state and its institutions may, in part, determine their effectiveness. Thus, a strong national identity may support state stability. Simply because the state is made up of institutions does not mean that only the institutions are necessary to create stability. In sum, administrative and institutional capacity determine state stability, but a strong national identity may strengthen the institutional capacity.

A critical counterargument is that in some cases a strong national identity might undermine the state instead by using state institutions to mobilize against the “other”. The “other” in this case is the part of the population that does not identify strongly with the state or is seen as not belonging to the state. The crises in Europe in the twentieth century are an example of the destructive powers of this kind of nationalism. That said, the focus here is on nationalism in postcolonial Africa and not on Europe. In African states, nationalism can reduce the fragmentation among the population. As soon as a state becomes civic, and no longer needs nationalism as a foundation for stability, nationalism should recede to prevent the previously described potential dangers of a strong national identity. In the next part, I will discuss the existing literature on national identity in general and the co-existence of national and ethnic identity in Sub-Saharan Africa.

2.2 The Nation and the Ethnic Group

The concept of national identity that I use in this paper is based on the idea of a nation, as formulated by John Stuart Mill. A population is called a nation if the people are:

“united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively” (Mill 2005 [1861], 342).

This approach to national identity is a relative approach. The ties between people of a particular group are stronger than the ties between them and a different group. This is not to say that other ties do not exist. People will always feel connected to more than one group. Their identities always exist of different components, whether they are of religious, ethnic, familial or other grounds. What it does mean is that the level of national identification is relative to the level of identification with another group, such as an ethnic one. Feelings towards the one are stronger

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than towards the other, and that is the difference measured in this research. This is why this definition of national identity proposed by Mill is fitting for my research. I use national identity as: the feeling of belonging to the nation, more than to one’s ethnic group. The definition of a nation is crucial because it is closely linked to how one defines a state and a nation-state. Ultimately it is connected to the concept of institutional statebuilding as I will explain in the next part.

The institutional approach to statebuilding assumes a Western nation-state as the target of statebuilding efforts. The presumption that in Western Europe the state and nation emerged together (Smith 1998, 74) still prevails, even though this was only true for the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. It was, and still is, considered a natural if not a necessary condition that the nation and the state coincided within the same boundaries (Mill 2005 [1861], 347). Furthermore, “nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones” (Gellner 1983, 1). The problem with this view on nationalism and the nation-state is its Western European viewpoint. Statebuilding efforts have also occurred in non-Western societies. For my purposes, I am drawing in fact from the African experience to show that for many African countries, this approach to statebuilding is inadequate. In many of these countries the nation-state, and the nation and state separately, are ‘imported’ and alien concepts, anachronistic sociocultural conditions and historical imagination of the people. These ideals were abruptly implemented in these countries by colonial powers, who drew borders on maps with little regard for the ethnic composition of invaded territories (Del Rosso 2015, 68). After the struggle for independence, the marginalized communities and ethnic groups that had paid the price for independence soon became oppressed by new rulers: the African elites. These elites claimed their power on the basis of “romantic nationalism”–the idea that they were the fathers and liberators of the new nation (Eze 2010, 64). In this sense, they adopted Africa’s European borders, as well as the concept of the nation-state. They tried to create national territories where the colonial territories once existed (Eze 2010, 67). But:

“[i]n advocating for unity through a nationalistic archetype, diverse ethnic groups were unified into a common predicament in contrast to the diversity and plurality represented in these ethnic groupings. Thus understood, the new nation-state became a breeding camp for ethno-cultural loyalties, inventing another legacy: the tribe!” (Eze 2010, 65).

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The tribe, defined as a politicized primordial ethnic identity, is prioritized over the “nation” (Eze 2010, 69-70). This distinction between the primordial group and the nation has implications for the distinction between the private and the public realm within society.

2.3 The Amorality of the Publics

The Nigerian political economist Peter Ekeh in his classic essay Colonialism and the Two

Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement (1975) argues that in Western societies, the private

and public realm are both grounded in common moral foundations. In other words, what is considered morally acceptable in the private realm is acceptable in the public realm and vice versa (Ekeh, Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement 1975, 92). He claims that ideologies of legitimation created the two publics. Two kinds of ideologies exist. The first type of ideology -the colonial ideology- was developed by the European colonizing powers. The goal was to justify their violent and repressive colonial regime to the African people. They would even go as far as trying to convince Africans that colonialism was in their own best interest (ibid, 96). The second type of ideologies Ekeh calls the African bourgeois ideologies. As the title suggests, these ideologies were created by the African bourgeois class. This class used these ideologies to replace the colonial rule and justify their own claim to power. Even though this class was native to Africa, they gained their experience and legitimacy first and foremost from the European colonizers. The bourgeois ideologies were a way of legitimizing their power independently of the colonizers (ibid, 96).

Combined, these two ideologies led to African societies being organized differently than those in the Western world (ibid, 106). Instead of one public realm, these societies have two. The first one is the primordial public. This public consists of traditional ethnic groups, groups with familial ties and small (rural) communities. This primordial public “is moral and operates on the same moral imperatives as the private realm”, and the second one is the civic public. This public is made up of the governmental institutions such as ministries, the military, police and judiciary. The civic public “is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the private realm and primordial public” (ibid, 92). These two publics greatly influence the way African societies are structured today. Especially in terms of citizenship, the difference between the primordial and civic public has great implications. As a citizen of the primordial public, one has both rights and duties toward this public. The duties consist of moral obligations to assist and preserve the primordial public in material terms. In return, one receives certain rights from the primordial public. These rights are not tangible and material, but benefits in the form of “identity and psychological security” (ibid, 107). In other words, the right that is

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received is the right of identity. The civic public has a different relationship with citizenship and rights and duties. Because the civic public is not grounded in moral foundations, the individual feels no obligation to contribute and sustain this public. The benefits that are received do not require compensation in terms of duties, either materially or otherwise (ibid, 107). The consequence of this line of thought is that it is legitimate to undermine the civic public in order to strengthen the primordial one, ultimately weakening the state to strengthen one’s own group.

Even though Ekeh's theory has been highly influential, and some scholars still agree with him (see for example Osaghae 2006), his theory has also been critically examined and assessed. One of the major concerns when it comes to Ekeh’s theory is that it is possibly outdated --Ekeh published his work over four decades ago. The Nigerian society that Ekeh describes has been through a lot since he published his piece: multiple conflicts, political changes and economic crises. This asked for a reexamination of the relevance of his work on the two publics, before moving forward with his theory as groundwork for the research in this paper.

One important scholarly critic of Ekeh’s work is Browne Onuoha. In his piece

Publishing Postcolonial Africa: Nigeria and Ekeh’s Two Publics a Generation Later (2014),

he examines the postcolonial Nigerian society and comes to the conclusion that Ekeh’s theory is inadequate to explain to socio-political and economic processes in the country, and on the African continent more broadly (Onuoha 2014, 326). His first point of critique is that the Nigerian society is and has been in transition since independence. Ekeh presented the Nigerian society of 1975 as a society in its final form, while it was actually going through a transition period. He describes it as:

“A movement from the traditional setting to modern ways of life: […] a flux in a value system which grips or infects people in a period of fundamental social change and which replaces their precious value system thereby generating a motion towards new attitudes and a new value system” (Onuoha 2014, 326).

This transition is still going on. In fact, the Nigerian society has moved from one point on the continuum to the next, ever changing the value system, until it reaches the point when we “refer to the system as developed” (ibid).

Second, Onuoha does not see colonialism as the sole cause of distorted moral values within the civic public. Instead, he sees the combination of three socio-historical events as complementary causes of the lawlessness in the civic public (Onuoha 2014, 326). First, the

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totalitarian military rule in Nigeria that lasted from 1966 until 1979, and then again from 1984 until 1999 influenced the moral norms intensively. The military brought a total lack of respect for the rule of law, widespread corruption, and impunity to the Nigerian society. Second, social and moral norms deteriorated as a consequence of the Nigerian civil war that lasted from 1967 until 1970. Wars leave societies broken and the social fabric of a country shattered. The Nigerian experience was no exception to this rule. Third, the “oil boom” that started after the end of the civil war left the Nigerian government with more resources than they could properly handle. It led to waste and corruption and a general “mismanagement of government affairs” (Onuoha 2014, 327-328). This combination of factors contributed to the decline of morality in the Nigerian society.

Whether Ekeh or Onuoha is right about the development of the amorality in the civic public is hard to say. Societies are never shaped by one single event. It is plausible that both colonialism and the ideologies of legitimation discussed by Ekeh as well as the socio-historical events pointed out by Onuoha have contributed to the amorality of the civic public. The question is what the consequences of these events are and if anything has changed with regards to the morality of the civic public. To answer that question, Onuoha’s theory is more help, because it takes into account changes in society that have happened in the years after Ekeh published his piece. As becomes clear from Onuoha’s description of Nigeria’s recent history, the amorality of the civic public still remains. If anything, amorality runs even deeper through society now than it did in the 1970s. The decades of military rule, the civil war and the oil boom have brought amorality to the primordial public as well. Social and moral structures within the primordial public eroded as a consequence of lawlessness and corruption in the civic public. In fact, the Nigerian society experienced a spillover effect of amorality from the civic to the primordial public.

Bringing it all back together, what does the amorality of the publics mean for national identity in Africa? Ekeh claims that one of the major problems of African societies is the dialectics between the primordial and civic public. In other words, the ethnic group feels no connection or responsibility towards the state, which results in weak African states. Onuoha takes his theory one step further and claims that nowadays even in the primordial public or within ethnic groups people have lost their sense of belonging and responsibility towards others and have chosen an every-man-for-himself approach. In sum, the social ties that bind societies together have deteriorated and almost faded completely.

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2.4 Nationbuilding and State Stability

The theories on the two publics in Africa allows us to identify two problems caused by the division of the primordial and civic public. The first problem is the lack of national unity. The second problem is the weak state stability that a lack of national unity causes. In order to strengthen state stability, going back to the root of the problem is necessary. This means that nationbuilding should serve as a starting point for creating state stability. Nationbuilding is concerned with the socio-political cohesion and inclusion within a state (Wimmer 2014, 2) and more concretely with the “strengthening of a national population’s collective identity, including its sense of national distinctiveness and unity” (Paris and Sisk 2009, 15). This approach can complement statebuilding in post-colonial African societies.

Several theories exist as a causative impulse for the emergence of a strong national identity and the effectiveness of nationbuilding acts and efforts. Robinson (2014, 709-710) has tested the most common ones: classic and second-generation modernization theories, and theories on colonial legacy. Classic modernization theory claims that processes of modernization -often defined in terms of industrialization, education and urbanization- lead to a strong sense of national belonging. Robinson (2014, 713) argues that the mechanisms at work in this theory are threefold. First, due to urbanization and the possibilities that urban areas offer, citizens often choose to exchange their homelands for an urban area, which brings them in contact with individuals from different ethnic backgrounds. These connections would eventually lead to a more homogenized -and less ethnically diverse- country. Second, education promotes a stronger national identity because of the focus on a national history and identity in the classroom. Third, industrialization creates economic ties and opportunities. Second-generation theorists were less optimistic about the consequences of modernization. Modernization would lead to competition for resources, causing ethnic divides to deepen instead of weaken. The third set of theories, those focused on the colonial legacy, appoints Africa a position of exceptionality, claiming that the colonial legacy and independence wars account for the variation in national identity across the continent. Robinson (2014, 723) uses a multilevel model to determine which of these theories have the strongest explanatory power. Based on individual, ethnic group, and country level analysis, she finds support for classic modernization theory. As the other two theories are thoroughly tested but unable to provide insights into the development of national identity, I will focus on classic modernization theory in this paper.

Adding to this classic modernization theory, Wimmer identifies the development of “networks of political alliances” between state elites and the population as another explanatory

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factor for socio-political cohesion and inclusion (Wimmer 2014, 2-3). He calls this the “political development argument” (Wimmer 2014, 5). Three mechanisms characterize and uphold these networks and form the basis for nationbuilding practices. The first one is the political economy aspect. This mechanism focuses on the trade of resources between the actors in the networks. Especially the distribution of public goods -such as healthcare, education and infrastructure- is influential for nationbuilding. A fair distribution can create support for the government among different ethnic groups, while a skewed distribution can exclude certain ethnic groups from the goods distribution and undermine support (Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012, 178). The second one is the organizational mechanism. Whether and how the relationship between actors is institutionalized forms the essence of this mechanism. Wimmer (2014, 3-4) argues that the more voluntary organizations that are present in a country, the greater the chances that relationships will cross ethnic boundaries. The reason is that these organizations are often horizontally oriented, thus including individuals from different groups, as opposed to patronage networks that have a vertical structure and thus more easily exclude ethnic groups and cause ethnic divisions (Wimmer 2014, 3-4). The third mechanism focuses on communications, which means that it is concerned with the exchange and meaning of information within the network of political alliances (Wimmer 2014, 4). His argument -which is based on the theory developed by Knack and Keefer (1997)- is that linguistic homogeneity is an integral part of nationbuilding because it will facilitate ties between ethnic groups.

In short, Robinson finds that a national identity can be strengthened through modernization, or more specifically through urbanization, education and formal employment. This theory is complemented by Wimmer’s theory which states that nationbuilding also works through creating networks between political elites and a country’s population. Combining both Robinson’s and Wimmer’s research on the creation and strengthening of national identity, I hypothesize that:

H1: Nationbuilding leads to a stronger national identity.

The second problem Ekeh (1975, 110) mentions, which results from the weak sense of national identity, is state instability. Unstable or weak states lack institutional capacity (Weber 1948, 82). Ekeh (1975, 108) argues that in societies with a division between the moral primordial public, and an amoral civic public, it is considered legitimate to steal from the state in order to strengthen one’s own group. This leads to high levels of corruption, in the form of embezzling government funds, taking bribes for services, and other possible damages to state structures

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(ibid). What follows from this line of reasoning is that in states with a stronger national identity, interethnic social ties will keeppeople from consciously damaging the state and its institutions.

Current research on identity and solidarity can shed light on this assumption. Mostly done in Europe and with the integration of the European Union in mind, research shows that socialization, or the strengthening of collective identities, can “modify actors” preference formation from idiosyncratic to more collective-orientated” (Kaina and Karolewski 2013, 13). This is relevant for African identity studies as well because it reveals that individuals, after socialization, will not only act in their own interest but very possibly will consider those of others too. These findings are supported by Miguel’s (2004) study of nationbuilding in Tanzania. Nationbuilding has led to an increase in social sanctions. Stronger ties exist between ethnic groups, which in turn leads to stronger interethnic social control and less free riding. Most importantly, it is no longer considered legitimate to benefit one’s own group at the expense of others’. In short, the strengthening of national identity will modify actor’s preferences in such a way that they no longer act solely in their own interest at the expense of the state. This is an important theory because it means that successful statebuilding is, at least in part, dependent upon nationbuilding and the creation or strengthening of a national identity. Based on the aforementioned theory, I hypothesize that:

H2: A stronger national identity leads to better statebuilding.

To clarify the structure of this paper, figure 1 shows the schematic overview of the steps taken to answer the research question. The first step is to determine if nationbuilding is successful in creating a strong national identity. The second step is to determine the effect of national identity on statebuilding.

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3. Data and Methods

The goal of this chapter is to explain the data and methodology used in this paper. I use two quantitative methods to answer the research question. I will come back to the specific methodology shortly. First, I want to explain the choice for a quantitative rather than qualitative approach to this research. Two concerns motivated the choice for a large-scale quantitative approach. First, even though some quantitative research on state stability and statebuilding in Africa exists, little research accounts for the effect of identity -either national, ethnic or otherwise. Second, most research that has been done has been in the form of case studies or comparative studies. Notwithstanding the importance of these research designs and the contributions they have made to the field, a large-scale quantitative analysis may help find patterns in social and political behavior that small-scale qualitative designs are unable to find. I choose a quantitative design to discover these patterns.

3.1 Hypothesis One

To test my first hypothesis, I will expand upon Robinson’s (2014) research into the drivers of a strong national identity using Wimmer’s (2014) theory on nationbuilding. I use a two-level logistic regression model to determine the effect of individual-level and country-level indicators on the individual’s identification with the nation over the ethnic group. This model offers the possibility to incorporate the indicators of both levels and account for the nested nature of the data. I choose not to include an ethnic-group level in my model, as Robinson (2014, 722-723) did. Her theory has tested the explanatory level of second-generation modernization theory on this level. However, she concluded that this theory has little to no explanatory power and that the outcomes of the model on this level only supported first-generation modernization theory. In this paper, I will test the robustness of first-generation modernization theory. Therefore, I will not include indicators for second-generation modernization theory and thus not include the ethnic-group level. The theory on colonial legacy has barely any explanatory power. However, to account for any possible influences of this legacy I do include a variable on the country level: the variable for British colony. In sum, I include two levels of measurement in my model: the individual level and the country level.

This model consists of cross-national data from twenty-eight African countries at the individual level, plus a country-level variable made up of an index and control variables.

The dependent variable in the model is ‘national identity’. To measure this variable, I use data from round six (2014/2015) of the Afrobarometer. This individual survey data was

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collected in twenty-eight sub-Saharan African countries: Benin (2014), Botswana (2014), Burkina Faso (2014), Cameroon (2014), Côte d’Ivoire (2014), Gabon (2015), Ghana (2014), Guinea (2014), Kenya (2014), Lesotho (2014), Liberia (2014), Madagascar (2014), Malawi (2014), Mali (2014), Mauritius (2014), Mozambique (2015), Namibia (2014), Niger (2014), Nigeria (2014), Senegal (2014), Sierra Leone (2014), South Africa (2015), Swaziland (2014), Tanzania (2014), Togo (2014), Uganda (2014), Zambia (2014), and Zimbabwe (2014).1 In this survey, respondents were asked the following question: “Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [ENTER NATIONALITY] and being a ________ [R’s Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?”. The score 1 indicates that they feel only [ethnic group]; 2, that they feel more [ethnic group] than [national identity]; 3, they feel equally [ethnic group] and [national identity]; 4, they feel more [national identity] than [ethnic group]; and 5, they feel only [national identity].

The independent variable in this model is ‘nationbuilding’. I operationalize modernization -or the degree of urbanization, education and industrialization- at the individual level according to Robinson’s (2014) research as living in an urban area, having formal education and being employed in the formal sector. The Afrobarometer collects information on these three indicators. The living situation is part of the sampling stratification of the Afrobarometer and is recorded by the interviewer. The level of education is self-indicated by the respondent on a 9-point scale. A score of 0 indicates no formal education, 8 means having a post-graduate degree. To measure formal education, I create a binary variable to measure whether individuals have completed primary education or not. An alternative measure would be to create a binary variable for individuals that have had some primary education. Since this is a vague term -it could range from having only months of education to years- I chose to create a variable based on completed primary education. Lastly, being employed in a formal sector is measured by combining the answers to two questions. First, the respondent is asked if he is receiving wages for his labor. Second, the respondent is about the specific occupation. Only if a respondent is working in a formal sector (such as business, civil service or clerical work) and is receiving wages, a respondent is considered working in a formal sector. Furthermore, men are more often employed than women. To prevent this from interfering with the modernization effect, gender is used as a control indicator. Furthermore, I add age as a control variable at the individual level. The variables gender come from the Afrobarometer dataset as well.

1 Cape Verde and Sao Tomé and Principe were originally included in the Afrobarometer, but due to their small

population sizes (less than 500 and 200 thousand respectively) I excluded them from this research. Furthermore, Burundi and Sudan are also excluded because the question of identity was not asked in these countries.

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I expand on Robinson’s research by using an index of variables to determine the effect of the networks of political alliances on the individual’s likelihood to identify with the nation over the ethnic group. This index is constructed based on Wimmer’s (2014) research and it is incorporated at the country level. I combine the political economy, organizational and communication mechanisms into one index. For the political economy mechanism, I use the indicator provision of public goods. I will use literacy rates as a measurement. Literacy rates are a good measure of public goods because often the government provides resources to people to learn how to read and write in the form of schools or other educational projects. It is also a commonly used measure (see for example Gennaioli and Rainer 2007) which increases the reliability of the analysis. UNESCO Institute for Statistics keeps a database with information on literacy rates. Their focus is adults over 15 years. Anyone over that age that cannot read and write is considered illiterate. The data is self-reported, which means that individuals have reported on their own literacy rate in UNESCO surveys. The indicator for the organizational pillar is membership of a voluntary association. This data will be collected from the Afrobarometer, which asks this question of its respondents. The respondent can choose between “not a member”, “inactive member”, “active member” and “official leader”, with scores respectively from 0 to 3. For the communication pillar the indicator is the level of linguistic

diversity in a country. The Linguistic Diversity Index (LDI) compiled by Simons and Fennig

(2018) will be used to measure this indicator. The LDI reports the probability that any two people in a country selected randomly have different mother tongues. A score of 0 indicates that there is no linguistic diversity, which means that everyone has the same mother tongue. A score of 1 indicates total linguistic diversity, which means that no one has the same mother tongue. I add multiple common control variables to the model at the country level. These account for the most basic differences between countries that might influence the level of national identity. These are the GDP per capita, if a country was a British colony and the level of ethnic fractionalization in the country. The first variable is based on data from the World Bank (World Bank 2018). The second and third variable come from the dataset composed by Fearon and Laitin (2003).

3.2 Hypothesis Two

To test the second hypothesis, I use panel data to run a random effects linear regression model with robust standard errors. The use of this model is indicated after testing over-identifying restrictions using the Sagan-Hansen test. The model allows me to measure the effect of national identity on state stability for multiple years. This is necessary because the number of cases

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(countries) for one year is too small for a meaningful statistical analysis. In other words, there are not enough countries to determine the effect of national identity on state stability in one year. The model consists of data from four years: 2005, 2008, 2012 and 2015.

The hypothesis focuses on the relationship between national identity and statebuilding. As explained in the first part of this paper, statebuilding -and its goal: state stability- is conceptualized in narrow terms following Weberian state logic: it focuses on the domestic sovereignty or domestic political authority in a state. This means that non-democracies are included in this research too. The concept of statebuilding is operationalized as political stability and the absence of violence. A measure of a stable state does therefore not focus on liberal democratic features of a state, but solely on the ability of a state to control its territory. Measuring the absence of political violence does exactly this. No state, neither democratic nor authoritarian, benefits from illegitimate violence within its borders. This makes the level of violence a good indicator of state stability and ultimately for statebuilding success. The data for this variable comes from the World Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset. The WGI has published yearly updates on governance performance of over two hundred countries since 1996. The dataset consists of six composite indicators that are based on thirty-one data sources that all measure the perception of governance performance. These perceptions are reported by various sources ranging from survey respondents to non-governmental organizations and businesses. For the indicator Political Stability and the Absence of Violence, the WGI composes an estimate of governance based on the likelihood of political stability and politically motivated violence. The estimate ranges from -2.5, to 2.5, with the lowest number indicating a weak governance performance and the highest number indicating a strong governance performance (Kaufmann, Kraay en Mastruzzi 2010, 12).

For the independent variable, I again work with data from the Afrobarometer to measure national identity. The question I use from the survey is the same as used for the first hypothesis: the respondent's sense of national identity relative to their ethnic identity. The Afrobarometer provides the data on national identity for a range of sub-Saharan African countries from different rounds. The four rounds I use are Round 3 (2005), Round 4 (2008), Round 5 (2011-2013) and Round 6 (2016). Due to a lack of data on national identity for every country in every round, the number of countries is smaller than the sample for the first hypothesis. Only for twenty-three countries is data available for all four years. Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Swaziland and Togo are excluded from the sample.

The model also includes various control variables. A well-known indicator for political stability is economic prosperity. Poverty and economic restraints are strong predictors of

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political instability (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 88, Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 588). GDP per capita and life expectancy are included to account for the relationship between economic prosperity and political stability. Another indicator often used to predict political stability is regime type. In this model, the Polity score is used to determine regime type. The Center for Systemic Peace creates the Polity dataset. It ranks countries based on the democratic and autocratic features of their regime. The Polity score ranges from -10, which indicates that the regime is a full autocracy, to +10, indicating a full democracy (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2017, 17). The next control variable is population density. Population density is correlated with the risk of conflict in a country (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 588), which is why this control variable is included in the model. All three variables are obtained from the DataBank – World Development Indicators (2018) -- a dataset made available by the World Bank. Additionally, the model contains two variables related to war. The first is the occurrence of an anticolonial war. Four countries in the dataset have been through an anticolonial war in the past. The data for this variable comes from the dataset created by Fearon and Laitin (2003). The second variable measures if a country has experienced conflict during the years included in the panel data. A conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year” (Thermnér 2017, 2). This information comes from the dataset UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Gledish, et al. 2002, Allansson, Melander and Thermnér 2017). Furthermore, a variable is included to measure the effect of colonial legacy, and more specifically, the effect of British colonization. The last two variables included account for the religious and ethnic fractionalization in African countries. These last three variables are all adopted from the dataset created by Fearon and Laitin (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

3.3 Comparison

To give an indication of the generalizability of this research Table 1 presents comparisons between the sub-Saharan countries included in the research and those that are excluded.2 The comparisons consider four indicators: GDP per capita, ethnic fractionalization, population density and life expectancy at birth. These four indicators cannot capture all the differences between countries, but they do offer a first impression of the (economic) prosperity and ethnic

2 Due to data concerns, not all the countries included in the analysis belonging to the first hypothesis are included

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diversity of the countries and the differences between the groups. The differences between life expectancy and ethnic fractionalization are small. In terms of population density, the differences are slightly more pronounced, but overall still slim. The difference in GDP per capita between the countries included and excluded from the first hypothesis sample is over 25 percent. The difference between countries in- and excluded from the sample used for the second hypothesis is even more significant: almost 43 percent. For the generalizability of this research, it is important to keep these differences in mind.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of countries included and excluded from the sample.

Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Countries included N=28 Countries excluded N=15 Countries included N=23 Countries excluded N=20

Population density (per sq. km) 88.98 93.76 93.79 87.04

GDP per capita (thousands) 2.30 2.89 2.09 2.98

Life expectancy at birth 60.33 59.48 60.73 59.24

Ethnic fractionalization 0.723 0.695 0.695 0.729

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4. Results

This chapter discusses the results found in the models. I start with the first model which analyzes the relationship between nationbuilding and national identity. Some of the results are surprising. Most importantly, the model does not find support for the theory of political development. However, in general, the results do confirm my first hypothesis that nationbuilding leads to a stronger national identity. The second model which analyses the relationship between national identity and state stability does not confirm the second hypothesis that a stronger national identity leads to better statebuilding. Since these results are not what I had expected based on the existing theory on nationalism and statebuilding in Africa, I dedicate the majority of the second half of this chapter to these results. Based on existing case studies, such as Miguel’s (2004) study, I believe that these results are skewed due to omitted variables. Using a historical analysis of the development of state structures in sub-Saharan Africa, I identity characteristics of African states and societies that may influence state stability. In other words, I try to identify the omitted variables. In future research, these variables should be taken into account to come to a more comprehensive model.

4.1 Modernization Theory and the Political Development Argument

The results of the multilevel model are presented in Table 23. The data show partial support for the first hypothesis. Modernization theory predicts that higher levels of education, formal employment and living in an urban area all contribute to stronger identification with the nation. These indicators -all measured at the individual level- are statistically significant and positively correlated with national over ethnic identification. The likelihood of an individual choosing national over ethnic identification increases with eight percentage points when that individual is formally employed. Living in an urban area increases the likelihood with almost three percentage points. Education has the strongest effect. On average, a completed primary education increases the likelihood of identifying with the nation over an ethnic group with fifteen percentage points. The model also controls for the effect of gender on national identification. Males are more likely to be educated, have a job and live in an urban area. However, the results for modernization are robust when adding the gender variable. In sum,

3 Table 1 presents the results for the entire sample of 28 countries, contrary to previous research by Robinson

(2014, 727) that offered models which excluded Tanzania. For Robinson, the choice to exclude Tanzania was based on its outlier position. However, after running the models including and excluding Tanzania, I found only minimal differences, which is why I have included Tanzania in the main model. For reference, a model

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nationbuilding through means of modernization does increase the likelihood of individuals identifying with the nation over an ethnic group.

At the country-level, the Index that is based on the political development argument created by Wimmer (2014, 3-4) is negatively correlated with national over ethnic identification. However, this indicator is not statistically significant. One possible explanation for this result is that Wimmer’s research focuses on “slow moving, domestic processes of political development to understand nation building” (Wimmer 2014, 13). No specific time-frame is given for these slow-moving processes, but it plausible that not enough time has passed for post-colonial African countries to have fully experienced the effect of Wimmer’s nationbuilding indicators. Most African countries have only been independent since the second half of the twentieth century. The political developments that would create a stronger national identity according to Wimmer have thus not been around very long. Even if one would argue that these indicators can be found in Africa pre-independence, -because even before independence there might have been voluntary associations and a certain distribution of public goods- these did not contribute to a sense of national identity. A nation, or even a state belonging to African populations, did not yet exist on the largest part of the continent. One way to reexamine Wimmer’s results would be to include a regional indicator. Wimmer’s research is a global one, including 147 countries. This large sample may have covered up regional differences. Including a regional variable could offer insight into the effect of political development in different regions. Ultimately, it could provide answers about why his indicators for nationbuilding show a negative -although not statistically significant- relationship with national identity in sub-Saharan Africa.

Turning to the control variables, only one indicator at the country level is statistically significant: British colony. Individuals from countries with that have been colonized by the British are less likely to identify with the nation over an ethnic group than individuals from countries that have never been colonized by the British. The indicator for GDP per capita is negatively correlated with national identity, but not statistically significant. This is remarkable because, in the research done by Robinson, GDP was found to be a predictor with statistical significance. Furthermore, the relationship in that research was positive instead of negative. The exact cause of this change is hard to determine. It might be that the index included in this research has taken up some of the explanatory power, despite the variable’s statistical insignificance. It may also be the case that in this specific sample -which is considerably larger than Robinson’s sample- GDP per capita has a different effect because the characteristics of these countries are different. Robinson noted that the countries included in her sample were

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more liberal and prosperous than the countries not included in her sample. Based on the comparison made above between the countries included in and excluded from this research, it is safe to say that for this sample that is not the case. It would be interesting to further examine the relationship between GDP per capita and national identity. The next variable controlled for is ethnic fractionalization. This variable is positively correlated with national over ethnic identification. However, this indicator does not reach statistical significance. This is in line with Robinson’s findings. At the individual level, the model controls for age too. This indicator is statistically significant.

This model tested two theories on the development of national identity. The first theory -modernization theory- claimed that modernizing a country through education and employment

Table 2. Multilevel model of national over ethnic identification

National Identification Model 1

Count

ry

l

ev

el

Index Political Development -0.015

(0.017) Ethnic Fractionalization 0.587 (0.915) British Colony -0.437* (0.238) Ln of GDP per Capita -0.120 (0.124) Indi vi dual L e ve l Formal Employment 0.077** (0.032) Education 0.153*** (0.026) Residence 0.084*** (0.023) Age 0.003*** (0.001) Male 0.090*** (0.021) Constant 1.233 (1.076) Country-Level variance 0.331 (0.091) Country-Level Observations 28 Individual-Level Observations 40,260

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; multilevel logit model with individuals as the unit of analysis; country-level random intercepts.

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opportunities and urbanization would lead to a stronger national identity over ethnic identity. In other words, nationbuilding through modernization would increase national identity. The second theory -the political development theory- claimed that nationbuilding through the creation of stronger ties between the political elites and the people would lead to a stronger national identity. After controlling for several factors such as GDP per capita and the colonial legacy, this model found support for modernization theory. Providing citizens with education, employment and a residence in the city increases their likelihood of identifying with the nation over the ethnic group. Comparing this research to Robinson’s work, a few things are useful to point out. First of all, most results appear to be robust over time. Robinson’s research was done using data from the Afrobarometer from 2005. The data used here is more recent. The surveys were held approximately ten years later, in 2014 and 2015. Second, modernization theory is still the most powerful predictor of the existence and strength of national identity over ethnic identity. Regardless of what has happened on the continent in the past decade, providing certain standards of living still has the same effect on identity.

4.2 Nationbuilding as Driver of Stability?

The next step is to determine how a stronger national identity influences stability in African countries. Table 3 shows the results from the regression model belonging to the panel data. The outcome is surprising: a stronger national identity is negatively correlated with political stability. After reviewing the rest of the results, this outcome will be discussed thoroughly.

Unsurprisingly, the model shows that economic prosperity is positively correlated with political stability: GDP per capita is statistically significant and positive. However, life expectancy does not reach statistical significance. Population density shows precisely the relationship that was expected: a negative correlation with political stability. An increase in population density is thus correlated with higher chances of political instability. The two variables that account for fractionalization, both religious and ethnic, are both positive. However, only the variable for religious fractionalization is statistically significant. This is counterintuitive because it means that the more diverse a country is, the higher the chances of political stability, while for a more homogenous country the chances of experiencing political violence are higher. Unfortunately, no precise explanation can be given here for this finding, but it would be an interesting topic for further research. To measure the effect of colonial legacy, the variables British colony and anticolonial war were included. They are both negative, but once again not statistically significant. This leaves the variables for war and the polity score, which measures regime type. Both of these are statistically significant. War is negatively

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correlated with political stability. Again unsurprisingly, because the mere experience of war indicates that the country experiences violence, often politically motivated. The polity variable is also positively correlated with political stability. Since the polity score measures regime type, and a higher score indicates a more democratic regime, this means that countries that have a more democratic regime are less likely to experience political stability. A note of caution here is appropriate because the polity score is a combined score of democratic and autocratic features of a regime. This means that countries with different democratic and autocratic features may still have the same polity score. The polity score should be taken as an indication, not an irrefutable fact because no perfect distinction can be made between regime types of different countries.

Table 3. Linear regression model with panel data

Political Stability Model 1

National Identification -0.863** (0.345) Ln of GDP per Capita 0.249** (0.127) Life Expectancy -0.011 (0.013) Ln of Population Density -0.207* (0.114) Ethnic Fractionalization 0.190 (0.512) Religious Fractionalization 0.014** (0.005) British Colony -0.018 (0.247) Anticolonial War -0.389 (0.439) War -0.389*** (0.160) Polity 0.083* (0.050) Constant -0.690 (0.945) R2 overall 0.396 Observations 92

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; linear regression model from panel data with country-years as the unit of analysis

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4.3 National Identity and Political Stability

This research started out with the assumption that a stronger national identity would increase political stability in sub-Saharan African countries and is thus beneficial for statebuilding. The divide between the civic and primordial public -or the state and the ethnic group- causes tensions, because individuals only try to strengthen their own primordial public at the expense of the civic. The line of reasoning continued that in order to strengthen the state, it would not be enough to only create and secure political institutions. It would be necessary to strengthen a sense of belonging to the civic public to reduce the existing tensions and would allow the state to grow and consolidate. The model used to examine this relationship showed that national identity does not increase political stability. However, this is not the end of the story. From case-studies done in African countries, it is clear that nationbuilding can contribute profoundly to political stability. Tanzania might be the best example of a country in which political stability was increased through nationbuilding (Miguel 2004, 362). If it is true that nationbuilding can lead to political stability, there must be a reason why this does not show in the model. It is not within the research of this paper to find a definite answer to this puzzle. However, it is valuable to discuss the theory on which the model in this paper was built. Reexamining the theory could point to omitted variables or other obstacles that might have caused this result.

First, the hypothesis that nationbuilding would lead to more political stability and therefore that nationbuilding leads to better statebuilding comes from Ekeh’s theory on the clash between the two publics. It is supported by an example provided by Miguel (2004) who did a comparative case study in Tanzania and Kenya. As such, the assumption made in this paper is grounded not only in political science theory, but in African studies. This is important to note because assumptions about African societies should be made from an African perspective. This does not mean that all African scholars or all African theories are alike. It means that it is essential to consider the situation as it is, and not from a perspective that might limit the observation. More concretely, using a European or Western perspective and theory to understand and explain African societal and political conditions, might lead to problems because African and Western societies work in different ways. The hypothesis is not built on Western theory, which indicates that the starting point of this research is not part of the problem. The theory used to build the model on national identity and political stability, however, is considerably more Western, especially the control variables that are included come from Western theories on political stability and internal conflict. Possibly, this Western approach to political stability does not adequately capture the mechanisms at work in African societies and thus causes the model to show a negative correlation between national identity and political

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stability. To come to a more comprehensive model, the differences between African and Western countries should be examined, as in those differences lies the key to explaining the unexpected results of this research. Examining the historical context of state structures in Africa can shed some light on these differences.

4.3.1 Historical context

To explain the formation of the modern nation-states in Europe, historical events, such as the French Revolution, are essential. For state formation in Africa, it is no different: the historical context is invaluable.

Colonialism has often been mentioned as the cause of the failure of African states. Not only the cruelties of the colonial regimes -mainly slavery and the exploitation of the continent- are assigned blame. The acceptance of the European way of organizing the African continent in the post-colonial era has been found guilty of state destruction as well. In his book The Black Man’s

Burden (1992), Basil Davidson links the failure of African states to the creation of the

nation-state after colonialism. He nation-states that:

“This nation-statism looked like a liberation […] In practice, it was not a restoration of Africa to Africa’s own history, but the onset of a new period of indirect subjection to the history of Europe […] Liberation thus led to its own denial. Liberation led to alienation

(Davidson 1992, 10).

By this he means to say that African nationalism worked within the borders imposed by colonial rulers. Instead of breaking free from colonial rule and using nationalism as a liberating force, it became the continuation of a repressive force.

Peter Ekeh, in his 2011 Lugard Lecture, uses the quote mentioned above to praise Davidson for his “invocation of these constructs of ‘nation-statism’ […] and ‘alienation’” (Ekeh 2011, 8). However, he does not agree with Davidson that the failures of African states started out with colonialism and these post-colonial state structures. He argues that we can trace back these failures to the sixteenth century. By the end of that century, the relationship between Morocco and Songhai -a state in West Africa- turned violent. Up until that point, Songhai had been a well-organized state with trade relations across the continent and inclusive forms of government. When the situation between the two countries escalated, Morocco attacked and subsequently destroyed Songhai. With Songhai, it also destroyed African traditions of statehood (Ekeh 2011, 12).

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This event had far-reaching consequences for the culture of African states. The most notable one is the Fulani Revolution of 1804. This Revolution took place in modern day Nigeria and Cameroon. In a way, it formed the continuation of the leadership style of the Moroccans from the sixteenth century, which did not in the slightest incorporate the inclusive leadership style of Songhai. Even though the Fulani Revolution took place only fifteen years after the French Revolution, they were nothing alike. Where the French Revolution was a campaign against state-power and a demand for more personal freedom, the Fulani revolution did exactly the opposite. African elites restricted the personal freedoms of their populations and banned women from any economic activity. The restrictions imposed after the Fulani Revolution were reinforced by European colonizers a few decades later (ibid, 15).

In sum, Ekeh shows here that nationalism and nation-statism that came out of colonialism are not the drivers of political instability in sub-Saharan Africa. The causes for this instability and state failure are embedded in the socio-political realities constructed before colonialism. Most importantly, where personal freedoms were expanded in Europe as a result of the French Revolution, the exact opposite happened in Africa as a result of the Fulani Revolution, shaping a different socio-political reality than the one created in Europe.

4.3.2 Socio-political realities

The model constructed in this paper includes control variables that are mostly of a political, economic or institutional nature. Existing research on political stability and conflict implicitly suggests that these variables have more explanatory power than social variables (Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2003). No true social indicators have ever been included in this research area. The historical analysis in the previous part of this paper indicates that more socio-political variables should be included. These variables could account for the state structures as well as social structures as they have developed since the Fulani Revolution -mainly the restrictions of personal freedoms. In other words, for many sub-Saharan African countries, these variables could be the missing piece of the puzzle. This raises two questions, which combined lead to a new research agenda on political stability in Africa. First, what are social variables and second, why would they be relevant in African countries today?

This means that subsequent research should focus on the impact that these historical events still have on African societies today. A general understanding that these events still have an impact is not enough. Ideally, this research should pinpoint more or less exactly what parts of society are influenced. Areas in which this could be the case are gender norms, worker’s rights, minority rights or within a country’s justice system. This list is not by far exhaustive,

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