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Drawing the Line:
The Effects of the People’s Republic of
China’s National Focus on its Strategy in
Territorial Disputes
Master Thesis – China’s International Political Economy
Supervisor: Dr. Jue Wang
Asian Studies PSE, Leiden University
2019 - 2020
Final Version
15 July 2020
Word count: 15000
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Contents:
1. Introduction
4
1.1 Literature Review
5
2. Analytical Framework
9
2.1 The Concept of a Territorial Dispute
9
2.2 Strategies of Dispute Resolution
12
3. Data Analysis
17
3.1 Methodology
17
3.2 Overview of the PRC’s Territorial Disputes
19
3.3 The PRC’s National Focus
25
3.4 Case Study – Sino-Indian Dispute
34
3.4.1 Context
34
3.4.2 Analysis
38
4. Conclusion
42
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List of Tables and Figures:
Figures:
Figure 1: Subdivision of Territorial Dispute
11
Figure 2: Dispute Strategy Flowchart
13
Figure 3: Qing Dynasty and Current PRC Borders
22
Figure 4: Dispute Strategy Timelines
26
Figure 5: Strategy Usage in Numbers
28
Figure 6: PRC’s General Strategy Timeline
29
Figure 7: Sino-Indian Dispute Claims Layout
35
Figure 8: Sino-Indian Dispute Strategy Timeline
38
Tables:
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1. Introduction:
On June 15, 2020 a large-scale brawl broke out between the Indian army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the Galwan Valley. The Galwan Valley is located along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) established in the Sino-Indian border’s Western sector. It is part of the disputed territory claimed by both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India, whose dispute encompasses almost the entire border. Although the situation is still developing, this clash is significant as it marks the first time in 45 years that soldiers died fighting over the Sino-Indian border.1 This escalation merits concern as, historically, territorial disputes are the leading cause of war.2 Even if a territorial dispute does not lead to war, it may still carry long-reaching consequences. Millions could be impacted by the location of a border, determining everything from the language their children are taught in school to the army they may be drafted into.3 It is therefore paramount that territorial disputes are properly studied and
understood.
Aside from raising concerns, this clash also raises some interesting questions. After all, this clash seems to be a far cry from how the dispute has been handled in the past, as several agreements regarding the peaceful management of border incidents have been made since 1988 (some even as recent as 2013).4 It shows that strategies regarding territorial disputes can change, begging the questions of what strategies the PRC uses in territorial disputes and what that choice of strategy is based on. These questions are especially relevant today considering the heightened tensions on the Sino-Indian border. That is why, in this thesis, I will be
answering the following research question: “How does the PRC’s National Focus influence its strategy in territorial disputes?”. With National Focus I mean the priorities of Chinese
leadership(s) in regard to national identity and domestic development. During this research I have paid particular attention to the temporal factor; how the PRC’s strategy changes over time as priorities change. Using this lens, I have been able to divide the PRC’s history into 3 distinct periods where the PRC prefers a specific strategy. Moreover, these periods almost perfectly coincide with drastic changes in the PRC’s priorities as well as its outlook on itself. These are, what I call, the Ideological Period, the Pragmatic Period and the Competitive Period. The Ideological Period covers the Mao Zedong (毛泽东) era and is characterized by a
1 Safi, “20 soldiers killed”, The Guardian. 2 Fravel, Strong Borders, 3.
3 Cukwurah, Settlement of Boundary Disputes, 228-229.
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radical adherence to communist ideology, with the PRC believing itself to be the bastion of Communism. The Pragmatic Period covers the Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) and Jiang Zemin (江 泽民) eras. Though still important, ideology took a backseat as the PRC prioritized economic development and saw itself as a developing nation, applying lessons learned from successful Western states (albeit adjusted to Chinese circumstances). The Competitive Period covers the Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) and Xi Jinping (习近平) eras and is defined by a growing sense of
confidence. The PRC’s development was so successful that it considers itself and its methods to be a competitor to the West, prioritizing its spread and influence over the rest of the world. In this thesis, I will argue that a purely realistic approach, 1 of the main theories of
International Relations (IR), is inadequate to explain the PRC’s behavior in territorial disputes. Instead, more consideration should be given to domestic factors like national identity and domestic development. This thesis will show that there is a link between these domestic factors and the PRC’s preferred strategy in territorial disputes. I propose that drastic shifts in the PRC’s National Focus can best explain the PRC’s changing behavior, as
illustrated by these 3 periods. I will do that by first explaining why I chose this particular angle for my research in the literature review following this introduction. I will then introduce my analytical framework while I go over the basics of territorial dispute theory in chapter 2, breaking down the term and discussing possible strategies. In chapter 3, I will explain my methodology before providing an overview of the PRC’s territorial disputes. In this overview, I will prove that a purely realistic approach is lacking by comparing the PRC’s disputes and analyzing relevant patterns. Next, I will examine the PRC’s strategy during its disputes to determine the PRC’s preferred strategy throughout time, explaining the 3 periods and how they tie into the PRC’s National Focus. Then, I will prove this concept holds up by taking the Sino-Indian dispute as case study. Finally, I will finish with some concluding remarks.
1.1
Literature Review:
While reading up on the available literature on the PRC’s territorial disputes, I noticed that these are often framed within the context of a much larger debate. Although they do not say it outright, all these studies seem to indirectly engage in the overarching debate on whether the PRC’s rise poses a threat to the current international system or not. On one side you have people like Jung and Mearsheimer who subscribe to the China threat theory. This theory claims that the PRC aims to challenge the United States (US) and take its place as the
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hegemon.5 According to them, the PRC’s rise of the last decades has granted it more wealth,
power and influence facilitating this challenge and allowing it to take more initiative in territorial disputes. Arguments supporting this side include that the PRC has become increasingly assertive, especially since President Xi took over (Tweed, Zhang)6; and the PRC’s ballooning military expenses and developments (Jung, Mearsheimer).7
The other side of the debate consist of people like Bhakal and Brzezinski who subscribe to the theory of China’s peaceful rise. This theory claims that the PRC would need a peaceful
international environment to maintain its rise. To that end, it would not destabilize the international system nor oppress its neighbors while rising to superpower status. Instead, the PRC would aim to play an active part in the development, stability and prosperity of all other Asian countries.8 Subscribers to this theory claim that the PRC’s rise was only possible by assimilating in and adhering to the current international system. Thus, the PRC has no incentive to destabilize the region. Common arguments supporting this side include that the PRC has relinquished a lot of its claims onto former territory, offering considerable
concessions during negotiations (Fravel, Voronin)9; and that the PRC prioritizes economic development over issues of sovereignty (Bhakal, Brzezinski).10
It is important to also address the possibility of bias regarding the PRC’s territorial disputes. Although a minor part of the debate, both sides have addressed this issue. This resulted in a spectrum of viewpoints ranging from the PRC manipulating the facts surrounding a territorial dispute, via censorship and propaganda, to discredit any form of criticism; to the PRC being a target of a defamation campaign orchestrated by the US as part of its containment strategy.11
Unfortunately, it is very hard to find, research, or prove intent. Therefore, it is impossible to know for sure whether certain analyses and reports are based on biased interpretations of events. Nevertheless, the extent of this debate and the sensitivity of this subject demonstrates that one needs to be cautious when tackling this subject.
5 Jung, “Realists Are Not Wrong”, 103-106; Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans”, Foreign Policy. 6 Tweed, “China’s Territorial Disputes”, Bloomberg; Zhang, “Is China an Exception”, 1.
7 Jung, “Realists Are Not Wrong”, 90-93; Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans”, Foreign Policy. 8 Suettinger, “Rise and Decent”, 2-5.
9 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 81-83; Voronin “A Comparative Analysis”, 51-52.
10 Bhakal, “Five Reasons”, India’s China Blog; Brzezinski, “Clash of the Titans”, Foreign Policy. 11 Allen-Ebrahimain, “How China Won”, Foreign Policy; Bhakal, “Five Reasons”, India’s China Blog.
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Concerning methodology, many scholars have studied these territorial disputes through 1 of the theoretical lenses of IR. There is, however, a noticeable disparity among the different IR theories as there seems to be an overabundance of focus on realist arguments. Zero-sum arguments like power politics, strategic value and natural resources are brought up often to explain the PRC’s behavior in territorial disputes.12 Realists view the world as a rational place where states act in self-interest, aiming to become as strong as possible in order to survive. They argue that the basis of all power lies in territory, as generally the bigger countries are also more powerful. Control over a territory gives a state access to its resources, strengthening its (war) economy and denying other states the same. Strategically speaking, it also allows a state to establish a military base, extending their military reach and thereby allowing them to better control, contest and/or defend the region. Because of these reasons, irredentist claims are seen as attempts of a growing state to gain more power at the expense of weaker ones. This competition expresses itself in the form of territorial disputes.13 Although I do think that realism has its merits, it does not seem able to explain why states shift strategy within the same territorial dispute. It lacks nuance, and yet their arguments permeate the literature. Because of this, I feel that the field is suffering from tunnel-vision. There is a need for
alternative approaches to the PRC’s territorial disputes, in order to correct the overreliance on realism.
Fortunately, I am not alone in recognizing this disparity as some scholars have provided alternative approaches. For example, Wei approaches the PRC’s territorial disputes from a legal perspective, arguing that there is a relationship between legal choices and policy considerations.14 Forsberg proposes a normative approach to explain territorial disputes,
linking the concept of (in)justice to a state’s behavior.15 Huth modified a realist approach with
constructivist elements and argues, among other things, the impact of democratic institutions and norms on behavior in territorial disputes.16 Still, these alternative approaches seem to have remained limited in number, constituting a gap, or at least a weakness, in the literature.
12 Forsberg, “Explaining Territorial Disputes”, 433-435. 13 Ibid., 433-435.
14 Wei, “China and its neighbors”, 107.
15 Forsberg, “Explaining Territorial Disputes”, 433-434. 16 Huth, Standing Your Ground, 33, 187.
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Another pattern that I found while reading the available literature is segmentation. Generally speaking, whenever scholars research territorial disputes they focus their research on either the characteristics of the state or of the disputed territory, and rarely combine them.17 The
problem with this is that territorial disputes do not exist in a vacuum. As leaders have to balance the resolution of a territorial dispute with other interests, external factors are bound to have an impact. There is a precedent for this line of thought in the literature. Fravel claims that the PRC’s willingness to compromise is heavily tied to regime security.18 Wang
hypothesizes that, aside from economic and military value, a territory’s symbolic value can also dictate the PRC’s behavior.19 Zhang researches the relationship between the PRC’s
economic engagement and the militarization of its territorial disputes.20
Considering this, I believe it merits further investigation to see if and how domestic factors affect the PRC’s behavior in territorial disputes. After all, this concept also has a precedent. Ananda Bikash claims that because ethnic identity issues can evoke intense commitments from individuals and groups alike, it can force state leaders to be uncompromising. He concludes that states tend to take a more hardline approach to disputes about territories that are tied to the state’s ethnic identity.21 Putnam’s theory, on the other hand, claims that the
assumption of a unitary-actor is often false. Instead, foreign and domestic policy are entangled as leaders try to accommodate foreign and domestic needs simultaneously. The preference and ideology at home are therefore instrumental in determining the state’s behavior in disputes.22 Hence, this angle may provide an explanation to the PRC’s behavior in territorial
disputes that conventional theories have been unable to.
To summarize, my main issues with the state of the field is that it seems to be suffering from tunnel-vision in its argumentation and it tends to study territorial disputes in a vacuum. The purpose of this thesis is to help fill this gap by adding to the limited library of alternative approaches while taking a critical yet objective look at characteristics of the state as well as of the disputed territories. This thesis aims to contribute to the literature by highlighting the impact of domestic factors, specifically the National Focus, on the PRC’s strategy choice in territorial disputes.
17 Wang, “Rethinking Chinese Territorial Disputes”, 12. 18 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 46-51.
19 Wang, “Rethinking Chinese Territorial Disputes”, 10-11. 20 Zhang, “Is China an Exception”, 192.
21 Ananda Bikash, “Interstate Dyadic Interaction Patterns”, ii, 298-301. 22 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics”, 433, 459-460.
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2. Analytical Framework:
In this chapter I will introduce my analytical framework and discuss the basics of territorial dispute theory; what exactly defines a territorial dispute, what constitutes as a resolution and what strategies are there to resolve them. I will, however, not go into the theory of strategy itself, as the complexity surrounding the term is not relevant to my research. For the context of this thesis it is enough to know that a strategy is all about improving one’s situation. It is a plan to turn a situation in one’s favor, whilst making sure that others, with opposing interests and concerns, cannot thwart that plan.23
2.1. The Concept of a Territorial Dispute:
In order to research how the PRC’s strategy in territorial disputes may have been influenced, one first needs to have a proper understanding of what a territorial dispute exactly is.
Although many definitions are slight variations, there is not 1 commonly agreed upon definition.24 Moreover, these definitions tend to be quite simplistic, overlooking some important details.25 Thus, I first want to thoroughly break the term down.
The term ‘territorial dispute’ consists of 2 parts; ‘territorial’ and ‘dispute’. ‘Territorial’ refers to ‘territory’ which, according to Merriam-Webster, is defined as: the geographical area belonging to, or under the jurisdiction of a state.26 In this context, it means everything where the state exercises effective control and therefore has sovereignty over. This not only includes the land within their borders but also any islands and territorial waters. The term ‘dispute’ is often left undefined or simplistically put away as just a ‘disagreement’.27 This overlooks an important part of what constitutes a dispute according to international law. In order to be considered a dispute there needs to be an official challenge or claim which is then denied by the targeted party.28 Putting these parts together I have devised my own definition: a
disagreement where 2 or more states have official conflicting claims over the ownership of a
23 Freedman, Strategy: A History, xi-xii.
24 Fravel, Strong Borders, 10, 45; Guo, Territorial Disputes and Conflict Management, 1-2; Huth, Standing Your
Ground, 19.
25 Brownlie, African Boundaries, 12.
26 “Territory”, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary.
27 Brownlie, African Boundaries, 12-13; Guo, Territorial Disputes and Conflict Management, 1-2; Huth, Standing
Your Ground, 19.
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certain territory. ‘Official’ being the key word. Because even though a state might feel that they should have sovereignty over a territory, it is not considered a dispute until an official claim has been made, and subsequently rejected.
Using my definition, Huth’s 5 situations still apply. In his book, Huth explains 5 situations that constitute a territorial dispute. The first situation is where at least 1 state disputes where the current border is fixed, while the other side considers it the legal border as defined by a previously signed treaty or document. The second situation is when there is an imprecise treaty and/or demarcation or when there is no commonly agreed upon treaty to work off of. In this situation both sides have opposing views on where the border should lie.29 In both of these situations the existence of a border between the 2 states is not put into question. The dispute is merely about its location. Note that these situations are an issue of border delimitation and not demarcation, as there is an important distinction between the 2 terms. Delimitation is the process of determining the limits of a border in an official treaty. Demarcation is the process of physically marking where the border lies via markers, structures or by appointing natural features like a river.30 Just because a border is not demarcated does not necessarily mean that the location of the border is in dispute. The third of Huth’s situations is when a state has an unwelcome military presence in the territory of another state and, despite demands to withdrawal, refuses to leave. This includes foreign occupations as well as established military bases within other state’s borders. In this case both parties are challenging the status quo, 1 by its demands for the other to leave and the other by its refusal to do so. In its essence this situation is about sovereignty and the ability to exercise effective control over one’s territory. This theme is echoed in the fourth situation where a state does not recognize the sovereignty of another state over part of its own territory. Finally, the fifth situation is where a state does not recognize the independence and
sovereignty of the opposing state at all.31 In these last 3 situations, the discussion on border delimitation has not even started yet as the challenging party puts the target’s sovereignty into question.
Huth points out that these 5 situations show a progression of complexity and severity in the dispute. The first 2 situations are relatively straightforward, as there is no question about the existence of the border nor about who owns the territory along it. The third and fourth
29 Huth, Standing Your Ground, 19-21.
30 Brownlie, African Boundaries, 4; Huth, Standing Your Ground, 20. 31 Huth, Standing Your Ground, 21-22.
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situations are already a bit more complex as 1 party puts the sovereignty of the other party into question. These situations are not necessarily about a border but more-so about the ability and right to exercise effective control over the territory. The fifth situation is even more complex. It too is a dispute about sovereignty, however the challenging party goes so far as to refuse the very existence of the other party.32
Seeing the broad range of Huth’s situations, I have made a subdivision of his concept to avoid confusion. Thus, from here on out, I will be using the term ‘border dispute’ to refer to the 2 situations focused on border delimitation and ‘territorial dispute’ when I refer to the 3
situations centered around challenges of sovereignty. In case of any confusion, I have made a model further showcasing my breakdown of the term (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Subdivision of Territorial Dispute
Finally, there are maritime disputes. As the name implies, maritime disputes are disputes about the ownership of (parts of) bodies of water. Borders at sea are physically impossible to demarcate, making it hard to clearly differentiate the territorial waters of 2 states. This also adds an additional security concern as warships can maneuver and attack but do not defend any water, unlike troops and fortifications dug-in near a land border. Moreover, the
delimitation of maritime borders and zones follow an entirely different set of laws and
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conventions, principally the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).33
Considering these differences, ‘maritime disputes’ constitute their own separate type of territorial dispute. Accordingly, in my subdivision, the term ‘maritime dispute’ will refer to disputes concerning maritime borders and zones. Islands, on the other hand, are a bit more tricky to categorize. Disputes concerning islands are about the sovereignty over the island and are therefore by my definition ‘territorial disputes’. However, the disputed islands are often not that valuable by themselves. Rather it is the role they play in the delimitation of maritime borders and zones that make these islands so coveted.34 Thus, disputes concerning islands at sea will be categorized by a combination of a ‘territorial dispute’ and a ‘maritime dispute’. A similar conundrum exists in border disputes concerning rivers and their islands, which I will categorize by a combination of a ‘border dispute’ and a ‘maritime dispute’.
Now that I have established the different types of territorial disputes, I will discuss what constitutes a resolution to these disputes and the various strategies of dispute resolution available.
2.2
Strategies of Dispute Resolution:
As my definition states, a situation only constitutes a dispute when there are official
conflicting claims. Consequently, in order to resolve a dispute the 2 disputing states need to officially come to a consensus in regard to these claims. This happens in 1 of 3 ways. Either the targeted party formally recognizes the challenging claims, the challenging party formally renounces its claims, or both parties sign a treaty containing a compromise satisfactory to both parties. States can employ several strategies to get to 1 of these end resolutions which,
according to Fravel, can be grouped into 3 general types: delaying, cooperation and escalation strategies. In a delaying strategy, the state decides to do nothing but maintain its claims
through public declarations. A cooperation strategy involves offering to find a compromise by dividing control of the disputed territory or dropping its claims entirely and an escalating strategy involves the use of force or threat thereof as a way to force the issue.35 To illustrate how these strategies work, I have made a flowchart which I included below (Figure 2).
33 Prescott, Maritime Political Boundaries, 9, 217, 255. 34 Storey, South China Sea Dispute, 2-3; UNCLOS – Article 121. 35 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 52-53; Fravel, Strong Borders, 5.
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Figure 2: Dispute Strategy Flowchart
The existence of these 3 general types already demonstrates the limits of a purely realistic approach. Many realist arguments are based on characteristics of the territory, like strategic value or the presence of natural resources. Though these characteristics can change over time as technology advances (for instance trivializing defensive terrain or making previously impossible to reach deposits accessible) the arguments based on them are usually very rigid. The territory has it and therefore a state wants it, and the more of it there is, the more
important the territory is. However, this is a very crude way of looking at these disputes. It may sometimes explain the claim but it does not account for the strategy used to resolve them. In fact, it completely neglects the nuances involved in choosing a strategy. According to Fravel, each of these strategies has its own advantages and disadvantages, making some better suited to certain situations than others.36 That means that, regardless of the territory, choosing
a strategy is a careful consideration of the circumstances surrounding the dispute.
Furthermore, external factors can play an important role in shaping these circumstances, as can be seen from the advantages and disadvantages of the different strategies.
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Of the 3 strategies, states will most often use the delaying strategy as it usually carries the fewest risks. The state only maintains its claims but does not act on them in any way.
Delaying can be a valid strategy as it buys the state time to improve its (bargaining) position by strengthening its military or gaining more support abroad and/or at home. Additionally, a state that occupies the disputed territory can use a delaying strategy to consolidate the situation and become the de facto owner. Delaying strategies do still negatively impact the relationship between the 2 countries though, as it generates grievances which can make cooperation in other areas, like the economy, less likely. This negative impact is also not limited to the relationship between the disputing parties but could even tarnish the overall reputation of the challenging party.37
The cooperation strategy is the most successful strategy of the 3. About half of the world’s existing territorial disputes have been settled via this strategy.38 Also, having to negotiate and find a satisfying resolution together often yields additional benefits. The relationship
improves which could in turn, increase trade or stimulate other mutually beneficial projects. Nevertheless, a cooperation strategy usually involves concessions by 1 or both parties.39 Therefore, most likely neither state will have sole ownership of the entire disputed territory. This can be risky as, aside from losing some of the benefits of the territory, any concessions could lead to backlash domestically, causing unrest and weakening a leader’s position. Escalation, on the other hand, is not only resource-intensive but also has a lot of uncertainty associated with it. Military conflicts are unpredictable and any defeats can have great political consequences at home.40 Moreover escalation is generally frowned upon by the international
community, as all members of the United Nations (UN) are bound by its charter to try to find peaceful solutions to international disputes.41 Still, an escalation strategy would allow a
stronger state to use its military capabilities and force a resolution in their favor. Oftentimes a state will shift its strategy once the costs/risks of their current strategy outweigh the potential benefits it may procure. Given that states often keep sovereignty and territory in high regard, only drastic shifts are likely to change a state’s strategy. For example, the Soviet Union (USSR) dropped its claims on territory in Turkey in 1953 and Iran in 1954. In the new
37 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 52-53; Fravel, Strong Borders, 16; Guo, Territorial Disputes and Conflict
Management, 3.
38 Guo, Territorial Disputes and Conflict Management, 3. 39 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 52.
40 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 52-53; Fravel, Strong Borders, 5.
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international landscape of the Cold War, the USSR found that it could no longer afford to alienate these potential allies. The territory was simply not worth the deteriorating
relationship.42
All 3 strategies manifest themselves is their own ways. The delaying strategy is characterized by a lack of initiative. Though the state maintains its claims on the territory, it does not take any actions aimed at finding a resolution to the dispute. It is relatively content with the status quo and does not want to change that. The escalation strategy mainly manifests itself through the military, which can be utilized in 3 ways. It can be used by threatening its use, showing a display of force or actually using it. Usually it is the goal of these actions to coerce the other party into accepting their claims without going to war. But, occasionally, these escalation strategies can and have led to war.43 Both of these strategies are relatively straightforward in their execution, the cooperation strategy is, however, a bit more complicated as there are several possible avenues to be taken. The preferred method of the cooperation strategy is by direct negotiations as they allow both parties to keep full control over the resolution process. Negotiations also serve as the foundation on which other peaceful resolutions are built.44 But it is not an infallible strategy, negotiations do fail sometimes when a settlement satisfactory to both parties cannot be reached. In which case, other avenues can be explored.
As I said before, territorial disputes do not exist in a vacuum. The involvement of third parties is therefore not out of the question. Third parties can help in the pursuit of a resolution by good offices and mediation. Good offices are calls to action aimed at the disputing parties, to start negotiations or keep them going. They can also mediate between the disputing parties by joining the negotiations directly or forming a bridge through which the disputing parties can continue negotiating. This type of involvement is aimed at urging the disputing parties to move to, or continue with a cooperation strategy. Alternatively, the disputing parties can call upon third parties for conciliation or enquiry. Conciliation is a more formal variation of mediation. In this case, the disputing parties establish a commission of neutral third parties that is tasked to make recommendations regarding terms of settlement. An enquiry, on the other hand, is a fact-finding investigation conducted by a third party to establish the facts of
42 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 52-53; Fravel, Strong Borders, 16, 19. 43 Prescott, Maritime Political Boundaries, 256-257.
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the dispute.45 These are all non-binding procedures to help the disputing parties find a
compromise, though the disputing parties are free to disregard them entirely.
The dispute can also be submitted for adjudication by an international tribunal, like the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or an ad hoc arbitration body. Although adjudication does provide some form of settlement to the dispute, is has proven to be less successful than direct negotiations. In order to find a satisfactory settlement, concessions by both parties (territorial or otherwise) are simply unavoidable. These concessions are a lot harder to swallow if a party is forced to give them rather than if it agrees to them. Moreover, these tribunals’ rulings may be legally binding but can only be enforced by international pressure. Oftentimes the
disputing parties use the tribunal’s ruling as a basis and modify it on grounds of mutual convenience and common interest. In fact, disputing parties have, on several occasions, agreed to disregard all of the tribunal’s ruling.46
Nevertheless, third party involvement can also have a negative impact on a dispute,
particularly when it favors 1 side of the dispute over the other. States opting for delaying or escalation strategies can be subjected to sanctions (economic or otherwise), or receive
assistance through funds and material or by direct intervention. This type of involvement can not only cause the dispute to last longer, it can also increase the dispute’s intensity and cause it to spill over into other areas.47
Finally, in recent years 2 alternative methods have been developed: confidence building measures and joint development arrangements. These alternatives are meant to help foster a better environment in which a settlement can be struck, while bypassing the dispute for the time being. Confidence building measures try to stimulate cooperation between disputing states by creating consensus on issues besides jurisdiction, like the environment. Joint
development arrangements, on the other hand, allows both parties to move forward with their development plans while maintaining their claims. It also fairly divides the resources in the area (including undiscovered resources) among the parties. Both alternatives seem particularly popular in maritime disputes.48 Although these alternatives seem promising, I believe their success should not be seen as a replacement for an actual solution as the dispute still exists.
45 Cukwurah, Settlement of Boundary Disputes, 151-152; Prescott, Maritime Political Boundaries, 257-258. 46 Cukwurah, Settlement of Boundary Disputes, 200, 230-231; Prescott, Maritime Political Boundaries, 258-264. 47 Fravel, Strong Borders, 8.
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3. Data Analysis:
In this chapter I will present the findings of my research and further analyze them. My research is divided into 3 parts: a comparative study of all the PRC’s territorial disputes, an analysis of the PRC’s strategy during those disputes through time, and a case study on the Sino-Indian dispute. Before discussing the results of these 3 parts, I will first explain my methodology.
3.1
Methodology:
This thesis has adopted a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches in its research to determine the influence of the PRC’s National Focus on its strategy in territorial disputes. For this thesis, I conducted a comparative study of all the PRC’s territorial disputes. Next, I analyzed the PRC’s strategy in those disputes through time and linked them to the PRC’s national identity and domestic developments. Finally, I put this concept to the test by taking the Sino-Indian dispute as a case study.
I have limited the comparative study to a set of variables that I deemed relevant in discerning the PRC’s strategy. These are: the type of dispute, the duration of the dispute, the concessions made (represented by the PRC’s take of the disputed territory), and the use of force. My parameters for determining these values are that I determined the type using the subdivision provided in chapter 2. I measured the duration from the first official claim to official
delimitation of the border, either by treaty or by official transfer of territory. The PRC’s take is based on the final agreement or, if there is none, on the latest known offering. In which case it will be indicated within brackets. Finally, I have only counted coordinated military action that was directly related to the dispute, or threats thereof, as use of force. The only exceptions being minor border violations. Since both parties disagree on the location of the border, one state’s regular patrol can easily be regarded as an intrusion by the other. This makes it hard to determine whether these patrols are meant as an escalation or not. Moreover, I have also included variables that showcase important characteristics of the disputed territory like the approximate size, the presence of a permanent population and natural resources, whether it is considered a strategic location and whether the PRC has an identity based connection with the territory (sharing a common ethnicity, language, religion etc. with Han-Chinese).
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Of course, this limited choice of variables does not provide the entire picture of the disputes in question, but that is not the intent of this overview. Instead, this overview aims to reveal noticeable patterns in timing and behavior. Most of the data used in this comparative study was drawn from Fravel’s studies in “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes.” and Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes, Huth’s study in Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict, Zhang’s study in “Is China an Exception to the Commercial Peace?” (all similar comparative studies), and the datasets Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) v1.20 and Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) v4.3.49 Any leftover gaps were filled with additional issue specific literature, like proclamations and the 15th edition of The Times comprehensive atlas of the world.50 The data found was cross-referenced between the aforementioned sources to check for accuracy.
I then analyzed the PRC’s behavior during their disputes, the results of which I used to create timelines for all disputes. For simplicities sake, I have divided the timelines into 5 year
intervals. Furthermore, as the National Focus is about the priorities of Chinese leadership(s) in regard to national identity and domestic development, I also added the PRC’s leadership eras to the timelines, dividing it into 5 sections. The data used in this comparison is coming from the same sources as the comparative study described above and the results were determined as follows: the PRC was employing a cooperation strategy any time the PRC entered and
maintained negotiations (blue). It utilized an escalation strategy any time the PRC conducted a coordinated military action or threatened to do so (red). Finally, if the PRC maintained its claim but did not employ either of the other 2 strategies it was using a delaying strategy (yellow). In cases where negotiations and coordinated military action overlap, the escalation strategy overrode the cooperation strategy, because a cooperation strategy requires the absence of the use of force.51 Unfortunately, at the time of writing this thesis, the data
regarding the PRC’s other peaceful settlement attempts is unreleased, and could therefore not be used in this research.52 Considering the situation, I still feel this is a viable method of determining the PRC’s strategy.
49 Hensel, “Issue Correlates of War”; Palmer, “Militarized Interstate Dispute Data”.
50 Collins Bartholomew, Times Comprehensive Atlas; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROK), “Sending Data”; Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (PRC), “Declaration”.
51 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 52.
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In regard to the case study, I narrowed it down to only 1, as it would be impossible to tackle them all in this thesis. The absence of a comparative study is made up for by the depth of this analysis as I will explain the context and background of why the PRC chose the strategies it did. I specifically chose the Sino-Indian dispute as my case study because it is a long running and complex dispute that has spanned all 5 leadership eras. This allows me to research the PRC’s behavior over a long stretch of time, providing more opportunities to study the impact of its National Focus. Moreover, the PRC has utilized all 3 types of strategies over the course of this dispute, giving me the chance to properly compare their usage.
3.2
Overview of the PRC’s Territorial Disputes:
Currently, the PRC is the 4th biggest country in the world by area. It covers about 9,600,000 km² and shares its borders with 14 countries on land and an additional 7 at sea.53
This thesis found that the PRC has been involved in 23 territorial disputes. I have compiled all 23 disputes in the table below (Table 1), showcasing them alongside several interesting
variables. The patterns established from this table (which will all be discussed later in this section) will show that a purely realistic approach is lacking as it is unable to explain many of them. But first, a keen eye will notice that some of these disputes started even before the PRC was founded in 1949.54 That is because these disputes were started by the Republic of China (ROC) or sometimes even the Qing Dynasty but could not be resolved before their downfall. As their successor state, the PRC has inherited and pursued the same claims starting from their founding. In these cases, I have only included the engagement of the PRC (its actions and the parties that they were in dispute with) but still displayed the original start of the dispute. For instance, the Chinese already claimed Arunachal Pradesh when India was still a colony of the United Kingdom (UK) in the late 19th century. However, since India gained its independence in 1947, the only party that the PRC had to engage in this dispute was India, thus the UK was left out of the overview.
53 Collins Bartholomew, Times comprehensive atlas, 35, Plate 15. 54 Ter Haar, Hemels Mandaat, 538.
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From this table, several observations can be made. For one, the PRC seems to have had a dispute with all its neighbors, though that is not surprising. Qing-China lost a lot of territory due to what the Chinese deem ‘unequal treaties’, treaties forced onto them after a war or by threat thereof. These treaties were seen as humiliating as they greatly diminished Chinese sovereignty.55 Therefore, it stands to reason that the PRC would attempt to undo these treaties. In fact, both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomindang (KMT) ran on a platform of abolishing the unequal treaties during the Chinese Civil War.56 Considering this, the extent of the PRC’s claims is probably more surprising. The PRC has claimed about 236,187 km² in total. In absolute numbers that is a vast amount of land, constituting a bigger area than the country of Laos.57 However, compared to the 3,400,000 km² lost to unequal
treaties since the Qing dynasty (Figure 3) it is rather insignificant, constituting only 6.9%.58
55 Wang, “China’s Unequal Treaties”, 10; Wang, Unequal Treaties and China, 2-14. 56 Wang, “China’s Unequal Treaties”, 88-92.
57 Collins Bartholomew, Times Comprehensive Atlas, 37. 58 Fravel, Strong Borders, 1-2.
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Figure 3: Qing Dynasty and Current PRC Borders
Furthermore, this thesis found that 15 of the 23 disputes have been resolved, with the PRC oftentimes offering considerable concessions and relinquishing their claims on their former territories. On average, the final agreements leave only about 37.5% to the PRC. Using the information provided in this table, I calculated that the PRC received about 15,877 km² in their resolved territorial disputes and relinquished their claims on about 59,899 km². That means that the PRC has relinquished over 3.77 times more territory than it had gained in these disputes. These numbers show that despite the PRC’s disdain of the unequal treaties it has for the most part accepted their territorial consequences. Even now as the PRC has grown
stronger it has seemingly chosen to only pursue a small part of its former territory. A behavior that realism has trouble to explain.
Looking at the territories’ characteristics, this thesis argues that the PRC seems to hold the territories with natural resources or with a connection to their identity in higher regard than those without these features. This is evident from the fact that these territories are often subject to more extensive claims of the PRC, both in area and severity. As can be seen from the table, none of the border disputes have any of these features, but many territorial disputes do. Furthermore, these territorial disputes include some of the biggest disputed territories in size. That being said, there does not seem to be a pattern that the presence of natural resources
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nor its strategic location inhibit the PRC’s willingness to compromise. Despite these factors, the PRC has consistently offered substantial concessions in these disputes. Thus, even though realism may explain the increased importance of these territories/claims, it misses the mark when it comes to the PRC’s behavior in these disputes. In fact, the only disputes where the PRC does not seem willing to compromise at all are those concerning Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Coincidentally, these are also the only territories that seem to have an identity based connection with the PRC. Interestingly, this noticeable more hardline approach for these heartland territories does not necessarily lead to a more violent approach. Although Taiwan is the textbook example of military aggression and the escalation strategy, both Hong Kong and Macao were returned to the PRC without violence or compromise. This proves that the choice of strategy is not entirely depended on the territories’ characteristics, something that realism does not account for.
The table further emphasizes this argument. If one looks at the PRC’s use of force it becomes apparent that PRC has used force in several disputes concerning natural resources but did not do so for all of them. Yet, it did use force in 2 border disputes that did not have natural resources. The use of force also does not seem to have a pattern related to the PRC’s relative power to the other party, as the PRC has used force against both big and strong countries as well as small and weaker ones. However, it is interesting that the PRC did not use coordinated military action against the former Soviet states on its Western border. In 1969 the PRC and the USSR were engaged in a border conflict. Though not the focus of the conflict, fighting also broke out over the Western section of the border, near the Tielieketi area (Yumin county, Xinjiang). This is around the same area that would become part of the dispute with
Kazakhstan after the fall of the USSR in 1991.59 So, despite being the same territory, the PRC utilized military actions in the dispute with the USSR, a very powerful opponent, and yet did not do so in the dispute with Kazakhstan, which was much weaker. This implies that timing in general plays a factor into the PRC’s decision to use force, rather than it being based on the territory or the opposing party.
Looking more specifically at the temporal distribution of these disputes, this thesis finds that there are some noticeable patterns. 6 of the 23 disputes were inherited by the PRC as they were already in motion before its founding in October of 1949. Disputes with Taiwan, the Koreas and Russia (USSR back then) all started within 5 years of the PRC’s founding. All
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other disputes started in the next few decades, with the disputes with the Republic of Vietnam, Nepal, Vietnam and Indonesia starting in the mid to late-50s. Those with Bhutan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Pakistan and Tajikistan starting in the early to mid-60s (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan disputes started when they were still a part of the USSR). And those with Portugal, UK and Japan in the early-70s. Thus all 23 disputes were already active a little over 20 years after the PRC’s founding.
Although the beginnings of the disputes can be traced back to 1 big block of time (1949-1972), the resolutions to the resolved disputes could fit into 2 distinct periods with 1 outlier. Of the 15 resolved disputes, 1 was resolved in the late-50s (Republic of Vietnam), 6 were solved in the early-60s (Afghanistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, North Korea and Mongolia) and 8 were solved in the late-90s to early-2000s (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Vietnam, Portugal, UK, Tajikistan and Russia). This temporal distribution suggests that something happened before or in the early-60s and the late-90s that caused the PRC to make an effort to resolve its territorial disputes. I believe it is very likely that this change has happened on the Chinese side of the disputes, considering that such a large amount of disputes were resolved in that short amount of time, at 2 different times no less. I think that if the change had happened on the non-PRC side, these resolutions would have been more spread out over a longer period.
These patterns show that a purely realistic approach cannot adequately explain everything about the PRC’s territorial disputes (though it can explain some, like the interest in territories with natural resources). They reinforce the idea that alternative approaches are needed to properly study territorial disputes. The patterns also heavily suggest that there is a temporal factor at play. Especially considering that there are only a few consistent patterns established through characteristics of the territory itself. Now that I have found these patterns, I will take a deeper look at the PRC’s National Focus during these disputes to see whether they can provide an explanation for the patterns described above.
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3.3
The PRC’s National Focus:
The PRC is a one-party, socialist republic and has been under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since its founding in 1949. The CCP has managed to maintain control by continuously adapting to the ever-changing circumstances of its domestic situation. In particular, its ideology has played an important role in this evolution. During the Chinese Civil War, the CCP fought to overthrow the capitalist exploiters, with the goal of turning China into a socialist, and later, communist state. Though this goal has remained consistent all throughout its existence, the method of getting there has changed a lot.60 Over the years, several different leadership groups have ruled the CCP, each with their own distinct party ideology. In fact, the PRC’s political history can be divided into 5 eras all named after the ‘core leader’ of their leadership group; the Mao era, the Deng era, the Jiang era, the Hu era and the Xi era.61 As will be explained in this section, among the key differences between the 5
ideologies are its National Focus, the priorities of these leadership groups in regard to national identity and domestic development. Using these eras to frame the disputes discussed in the overview, I created individual timelines that showcase the PRC’s strategy at various times in the disputes (Figure 4).
The patterns established from these timelines will show that the PRC has a preferred strategy in territorial disputes. Moreover, it will show that this preference has changed over time, creating 3 periods. This thesis argues that there is a connection between these changes in the PRC’s preferred strategy and changes in the PRC’s National Focus. Because, as this section will show, not only does the timing of these changes line up almost perfectly, the changes seem to be motivated by the same mindset. There is a logic to why there is a preference to a certain strategy as it best fits the National Focus of the time.
60 Lawrence, “Understanding China”, 1, 11. 61 Lams, “Examining Strategic Narratives”, 388.
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Taking a closer look at the strategies themselves, this thesis finds that there are some patterns concerning their usage. For instance, the period from 1965 to 1980 is a relatively calm period in regard to territorial disputes. Not in the sense that there were no disputes, but that the PRC consistently utilized delaying strategies for many of them. During this period the PRC only used the ‘active strategies’ in 2 to 3 disputes and used the delaying strategy in all others. This implies that the territorial disputes were not a priority during this period as there was even a lull in the escalation of the Taiwan dispute. Then, starting from 1980, the PRC seems to slowly phase out the delaying strategy in favor of the other 2, especially cooperation strategies. Note that the PRC started a great number of negotiations in quick succession, culminating in the late-90s when the PRC was maintaining negotiations in all its border and territorial disputes except for Taiwan. Conversely, barely any cooperation strategies are used in offshore disputes (only 1 in island disputes and 0 in maritime disputes), suggesting that the PRC has a different approach to land and sea based disputes.
For a slightly different perspective I plotted a graph using the frequency of the strategies’ usage (Figure 5). This graph supports many of the patterns described above. It reaffirms the pattern that the territorial disputes have gained importance starting with 1980, as the PRC started taking more active strategies in the disputes. It also re-establishes that the cooperation strategy primarily happened in the 2 aforementioned periods. Interestingly though, the graph shows that the instances of an escalation strategy has remained relatively consistent, despite the changing numbers of total disputes. Currently, the PRC is at its lowest amount of active disputes ever, but escalation has been the most employed strategy for basically the last 20 years, which had also never happened before. This larger share of escalation strategies could be an explanation why the PRC is considered more assertive in recent years.
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Figure 5: Strategy Usage in Numbers
From all these patterns this thesis concludes that the PRC has generally favored delaying strategies from its establishment up until 1980, with the only exception being the early-60s. It favored cooperation strategies during the early-60s and the 1990s, and favored escalation strategies from 2000 onwards. For the 1980s it is a more difficult to call what the preferred strategy was. Although the most employed strategy during these years was the delaying strategy, they show the first signs of a surge in cooperation strategy usage, setting the stage for the trends of the 1990s. Because of this, I consider them favoring the cooperation strategy rather than the delaying strategy. Putting them all together, they form the following general strategy timeline (Figure 6).
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Figure 6: PRC’s General Strategy Timeline
As can be seen from this timeline, the PRC’s favored choice of strategy has remained quite consistent for long stretches of time, with the only deviation being the early-60s. It also closely follows the different eras, showing a preference for delaying strategies under Mao, cooperation strategies under Deng and Jiang, and escalation strategies under Hu and Xi. The only deviations from this pattern are the early-60s, the late-70s and the early-2000s. This consistency supports the idea that states do not change their strategy randomly, rather a drastic shift is needed for that. Which begs the question: are there any drastic shifts in the PRC’s National Focus around the time of these changes? This thesis argues there are. These changes not only sync-up almost perfectly to changes in the PRC’s National Focus but also seem to follow the same line of thinking. I propose that viewing these changes from this perspective and dividing the timeline into the Ideological Period (1949-1980), the Pragmatic Period (1980-2000) and the Competitive Period (2000-Present) provides the best explanation for the PRC’s changes in strategy.
After the Chinese Civil War, the CCP emerged victorious and founded the PRC in 1949 with the ultimate goal of turning China into a socialist, and later communist, state.62 Under Mao this became the defining characteristic of the PRC. For him, making the transition into socialism was the top priority. The Mao era would last from the establishment of the PRC to Mao’s death in 1976. Its party ideology was focused on Marxism-Leninism and the Mao Zedong Thought (Maoism). Mao firmly believed that continuous revolution would allow China to make the transition into socialism and that the PRC would lead the rest of the world in doing the same. Accordingly, this period was characterized by a constant state of
revolution, enacting radical social and economic movements like the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.63 Mao’s vision for the PRC was a proper socialist state, self-reliant and free of foreign influences. But his obsession with this ideal made him ignore warning signs and those who spoke out against him were branded contra-revolutionaries and enemies
62 Fenby, History of Modern China, 351-353; Hsiung, “Revolutionary Regime”, 32; Ter Haar, Hemels Mandaat,
538.
63 Fenby, History of Modern China, 351-352; Hsiung, “Revolutionary Regime”, 30, 34; Westcott, “Poliheuristic
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of the state. Under the motto: “better red than expert”, any sound scientific method that did not support this ideal was not just wrong but an attempt to sabotage his revolution. Realism (the word not the theory) had no place in Mao’s China, ideology took prominence over everything.64
As the general strategy timeline shows, the preferred strategy during the Mao era was the delaying strategy. This makes sense from a National Focus perspective as Mao prioritized the PRC’s transition into socialism above all else. His attention was solely focused on this
process, and he saw other matters like these disputes as nothing more than distractions. Accordingly, he made few attempts to resolve the territorial disputes. In fact, he used them in his discourse, and even escalated them on occasion, to motivate the masses, ignite their national spirit and strengthen their resolve.65 Furthermore, in Mao’s view there was no reason to try and resolve them. As discussed before, territorial disputes hurt the relationship between the disputing parties. But Mao was primarily looking inwards, trying to create an independent and self-reliant China. Thus, leaving these disputes linger would not hurt Mao’s goal in any way. This is supported by the fact that Mao’s focus on the PRC itself and his obsession with protecting communism resulted in it gradually closing itself off from the rest of the world.66 He was just not concerned about the relationships with other countries. For its radical adherence to communist ideology that drove this strategy choice, I named this period the Ideological Period.
In the following era under Deng, the CCP would change its direction. Seeing the destruction that Mao’s radicalism had brought, Deng chose to take a step back. Whereas Mao had
proclaimed that the PRC had successfully made the transition into socialism, Deng stated that the PRC was still only in the first stage of its transition. In his view, the PRC first had to learn from the outside world and become economically viable before it could make the transition. Therefore, he reversed a lot of Mao’s policies and allowed a mixed economy to exist. The Deng era would last from 1976 to 1992 when Deng retreated from politics. The new party ideology became the Deng Xiaoping Theory, which focused primarily on fostering economic development through pragmatism while ideology took a backseat. Deng prioritized the economy, believing that political liberalization before economic reforms would only result in chaos.67 Deng’s liberalization and re-integration policies proved successful. His immediate
64 Fenby, History of Modern China, 351-353, 392-400; Hsiung, “Revolutionary Regime”, 32, 35. 65 Fenby, History of Modern China, 403; Kuisong, “Sino-Soviet Border Clash”, 30.
66 Fenby, History of Modern China, 365, 422-423.
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successor Jiang continued where Deng left off. He incorporated the same rational rhetoric in his Three Represents thesis, officially recognizing and legitimizing the role that business men were playing in the development of the PRC. In doing so, Jiang doubled-down on Deng’s vision, making economic growth the absolute priority.68
The general strategy timeline shows that the cooperation strategy was the preferred strategy during both these eras. Like with Mao, this choice of strategy makes sense from a National Focus perspective. Because in order to facilitate liberalization and economic development the PRC would need to interact with the outside world. Seeing that territorial disputes hurt these relationships, it makes finding a resolution to these disputes that much more important. Accordingly, more than half of the resolved disputes were solved in this period. Furthermore, many of those disputes were resolved by offering considerable concessions (Table 1). This willingness to compromise is echoed in the pragmatic way that the PRC has handled its domestic development following the Mao era. Despite ideology taking a backseat, it remained integral to the CCP’s rule. Deng reaffirmed the importance of Marxism-Leninism and
enshrined it and Maoism in the CCP’s history and constitution. He also personally stressed the importance of basic Marxist tenets. He just did not believe in blind faith. Instead, his approach was based on rational reasoning and a sense of responsibility.69 This can be seen from his economic reforms. Among other things, the PRC liberalized its economy and introduced a (limited) market system. These capitalist mechanics diametrically oppose Marxism-Leninism. Under Deng (and Jiang), the PRC was willing to compromise on their ideology in order to pursue economic development. For its pragmatic approach to its ideology that drove this strategy choice, I named this period the Pragmatic Period.
Although the economic reforms were already quite successful during the Deng and Jiang eras, their successors would continue to maintain, and add to this approach leading to the PRC’s economy developing at an unprecedented pace. Under Hu and Xi, the PRC has become the worlds’ largest exporter and its 2nd largest importer, while its Gross Domestic Product
averaged a yearly growth of about 9.5%.70 This enormous success has made the PRC increasingly self-confident, to the point that it started taking a more active role in global governance and started promoting their own Chinese solutions as an alternative to the West. It advocated for the internationalization of the renminbi. It started new initiatives like the Belt
68 Fenby, History of Modern China, 667; Hsiung, “Revolutionary Regime”, 33, 37-39. 69 Hsiung, “Revolutionary Regime”, 31-35.
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and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Even Confucianism returned and was used as an ideological tool to promote the greatness of China.71 This
confidence was further expounded by the fact that the PRC managed to navigate the 2008 global financial crisis much smoother than developed Western countries. As the competition between these countries intensified, these Chinese alternatives became integral for the PRC in order to maintain its economic growth.72 Consequently, the spread and influence of these alternatives became the PRC’s new priority.
Finally, the general strategy timeline shows that both these eras preferred the escalation strategy. Again, from a National Focus perspective this makes sense. Now that the PRC considered itself to be a competitor to the West, both Hu and Xi started using anti-western rhetoric. This created a volatile situation where any criticism leveled at the PRC and/or CCP was seen as an attack.73 As mentioned prior, national pride can greatly inhibit a states’ willingness to compromise. The PRC’s competitive stance had created a situation that would no longer allow the PRC to compromise in territorial disputes. Still, a solution to these disputes was needed, leaving escalation strategies as the only option available. For its competitive stance to the Western world that drove this strategy choice, I named this period the Competitive Period.
If this theory is true then what can explain the inconsistencies of the early-60s, late-70s and early-2000s within the general timeline? Well, in the late-50s Mao enacted the Great Leap Forward, which was his plan to collectivize the agricultural sector. The plan was meant to multiply yields but failed miserably and was therefore quickly scrapped. This failure caused Mao to lose a lot of influence and he relinquished day-to-day leadership to Liu Shaoqi (刘少 奇) in 1959. Though Mao would regain his power and consolidate his position a few years later (through the Socialist Education Movement and Cultural Revolution), he was effectively temporarily replaced. Liu attempted to reverse the PRC back to the pre-leap situation and among the policies that were implemented during this time were smaller forms of
liberalization, foreshadowing Deng’s future reforms.74 Regarding the late-70s, even though it
is officially considered part of the Deng era, Deng did not take power until 1978. At first, Mao was succeeded by Hua Guofeng (华国锋), but he was cast aside because he intended to
71 Hsiung, “Revolutionary Regime”, 40-41; Kennedy, Global Governance, 3, 61; Lams, “Examining Strategic
Narratives”, 395.
72 Kennedy, Global Governance, 56.
73 Lams, “Examining Strategic Narratives”, 391, 400-402.
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continue Mao’s Cultural Revolution.75 Therefore, I argue that the late-70s (at least partially)
still carried the ideology of the Mao era. Finally, many of the PRC’s Chinese alternatives are an extension from its new approach to global governance. Although the PRC had already joined various international (economic) institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund during the Deng and Jiang eras, it had remained a passive member. The PRC did not start taking a more active, and even leading, role until its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001.76 Its accession also marks the point that the PRC’s competition with the West intensified and its economic development soared to new heights.77 So you see, the not-so-perfect alignment with the eras actually strengthens this theory instead of weakening it. Thus, the PRC’s National Focus changed in 3 significant ways. First, the PRC was
reintegrated into the world at large after the Mao era, making the search for resolutions to the territorial disputes that much more important. This signified the transition from using delaying strategies to more ‘active strategies’. Second, the pragmatism associated with the
liberalization initiated by Liu and Deng showed that the PRC was not ruled solely by its ideology. It was open to compromise. This same ethos was carried over to their handling of territorial disputes, as shown by their preference for cooperation strategies. Third, the PRC’s unprecedented economic success translated into an increasingly confident PRC, viewing itself as in competition with the West. This competition translated to an increase in escalation strategies as compromise was no longer an option. Now that I have found a possible
explanation, I will put these findings to the test by conducting a case study on the Sino-Indian dispute.
75 Fenby, History of Modern China, 533-540. 76 Kennedy, Global Governance, 4.
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3.4
Case study – Sino-Indian Dispute:
In this section, I will put the patterns found in the comparative study and the analysis to the test, by conducting a case study on the Sino-Indian dispute. In this case study, I will take an in-depth look at the context and the events of the dispute as well as any changes in the PRC’s behavior and domestic situation.
3.4.1 Context:
The PRC and India share a border of about 3,488 km, connecting the PRC’s Western and Southwestern autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet directly to several of India’s Northern states. The border largely follows the Himalayas and is interrupted twice, once by Nepal and Bhutan each. To this date most of the border is still in dispute, but the Sino-Indian dispute is mainly centered around 2 specific territories: Arunachal Pradesh in the East and Aksai Chin in the West (Figure 7). Currently, Arunachal Pradesh is governed by India whereas Aksai Chin is controlled by China.78 Arunachal Pradesh is a mountainous region, home to a culture heavily influenced by Tibet as well as many ethnic Tibetans. Furthermore, the region is considered to have great economic and energy potential due to its fertility and many natural resources. Aksai Chin, on the other hand, is a high elevation salt desert, largely uninhabited and possessing little to no natural resources. It does, however, house the only road connecting Xinjiang to Tibet, making it of strategic importance to the PRC.79
78 Purohit, “Can India and China”, South China Morning Post; Zhang, “Is China an Exception”, 94-95. 79 Wang, “Rethinking Chinese Territorial Disputes”, 122-129.
