“Freedom to be Responsible:” Journalists’ Interpretations of Press Freedom in a Post-Communist Context
Draško Vlahović
Graduate School of Communication
Master’s Thesis Student number: 11081783
Supervisor: Judith Möller
Master’s programme Communication Science Amsterdam, May 27, 2016
Abstract
Journalistic cultures across the world are characterized both by convergence trends and by differences that are contingent upon characteristics of social context. One of the concepts that journalists use for understanding their role and position within a society is press freedom. Its meaning is contested both in theory and practice. Political discussions among different social actors in new democracies address it as one of the core issues with regards to democratization processes. This paper aims to contribute to the emerging literature on how press freedom is understood in new democracies by focusing on Montenegro as a distinct post-communist setting. Semi-structured interviews with Montenegrin journalists (N=13) show that they see freedom as inseparable of responsibility. In that sense, there is a strong presence of the responsibility paradigm in their narratives. They see following certain professional values and working in the public interest as expressions of press freedom. One respondent, who is a tabloid editor,
expressed radically different views, which are completely in line with the libertarian paradigm. While Western narratives are prominent in all responses, there are some elements in them that could be related to endogenous cultural influences.
“Freedom to be Responsible”: Journalists’ Interpretations of Press Freedom in a Post-Communist Context
With the fall of communism, radical social changes took place in the former Eastern bloc and Yugoslavia, along with changes in terms of press freedom (Roy, 2015). Problems with establishing healthy media environments have been persistent in those countries since, with strong political and business pressures as well as attacks on journalists, including murders (The Economist, 2014). Changes in this regard are regularly monitored by organizations such as Freedom House, Reporters without Borders, International Research and Exchanges Board and the Committee to Protect Journalists (Becker, Vlad, & Nusser, 2007). Some of these measures are based on assessments by journalists. But if journalists in one country interpret press freedom differently than journalists in another country, this poses a problem for comparing levels of press freedom across countries. Secondly, the meaning of press freedom, as well as the role of the media and journalists, is usually contested in new democracies among different social actors (Voltmer & Wasserman, 2014; Wasserman, 2010a, 2010b). While some interpretations are heavily influenced by Western discourses related to freedom, such as the notion of free marketplace of ideas, others emphasize country- or culture- specific elements such as
preservation of national unity and anti-colonialism. Nevertheless, not much scholarly research has looked into how journalists in new democracies understand press freedom.
Interpreting abstract and fluid concepts such as press freedom depends on the values of interpreters, which means that they are understood differently in different socio-political contexts (Willnat & Weaver, 2012). This paper aims to contribute to the emerging literature on
post-communist context. Democratic transition in the countries of former Yugoslavia was different from the transition in other post-communist countries in Europe, and Montenegro stands out as the only ex-Yugoslav state that has been governed by the same party since the introduction of multi-party system, which is a unique phenomenon in the entire post-communist Europe (Vuković, 2012). It is characterized by a deeply polarized media landscape, divided by the fault lines of partisan support (Centar za građansko obrazovanje, 2015). Accordingly, this paper aims to explore how Montenegrin journalists understand press freedom.
Press Freedom as a Social Construct
Research on journalistic norms and practices has shown that there are differences in how journalists in different countries understand their job and their own role in a society (Plaisance, Skewes, & Hanitzsch, 2012; Voltmer & Wasserman, 2014). Their role conceptions seem to be significantly influenced by the political climate and press freedom in their countries (Hanitzsch et al., 2011). But because of specific social settings, journalists can also have different
interpretations of press freedom itself (Voltmer & Wasserman, 2014), as press freedom is one of such abstract contexts that are not fixed, but culturally negotiated (Willnat & Weaver, 2012). The meaning of the concept of press freedom and the role of the media in a society are heavily
contested aspects of democratization discussions in many new democracies (Wasserman, 2010b).
Defining and Measuring Press Freedom
There have been many attempts to define press freedom and there are different
methodologies to measure it. Shortly after the Second World War, definitions of press freedom focused on freedom from government interference (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956), which was later amended by freedom from non-governmental restraints, and freedom to disseminate information to large audiences (Weaver, 1977). A distinction between negative and positive
press freedom was subsequently suggested by several authors, such as Piccard (as cited in Becker et al., 2007). Concepts that were later emphasized as crucial for understanding press freedom are independence and diversity, while authors such as McQuail noted that press freedom has to incorporate not only freedom of the media, but also citizens’ access to media content (McQuail, 2010). International law, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Constitution of UNESCO and the Millennium Declaration suggest a notion of positive freedom, or freedom to, with regards to journalism and the media (Nordenstreng, 2013). Most influential measurements of press freedom include indexes developed by Freedom House, Reporters sans Frontieres (RSF), International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), and Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). Empirical analysis shows that the first three are rather similar in their general conclusions, but also points to a nationality bias expressed through a higher correlation between the IREX measure and that of Freedom House, which are both based in the United States (Becker et al., 2007). The study authors criticize these organizations for failing to clearly define central theoretical concepts behind their methodologies. Additionally, they fail to include the diversity argument suggested by McQuail, as well as broader concepts of press freedom suggested by Curran and Rozumilowicz (Becker et al., 2007). Other authors have criticized such measures for ideological or cultural bias and inaccuracy (Nordenstreng, 2013; Yin, 2008). Yin noted that Japan ranked very well in terms of press freedom in Freedom House reports because the government did not take direct actions against journalists or the media often. However, government control was exerted through the so-called press club system that resulted in
widespread self-censorship, so there was no reason for the government to directly interfere (Yin, 2008). Yin suggested a new model for the world press, one that integrates two dimensions: freedom and responsibility.
Western Paradigms of Press Freedom
The Western perspectives on press freedom can be divided into two major paradigms: the libertarian paradigm and the responsibility paradigm (Voltmer & Wasserman, 2014). The
libertarian paradigm entails as little restrictions for the media as possible. From this perspective, journalistic practice should only be limited by legal constraints in the area of basic human rights, for instance, child protection and privacy. In libertarian paradigm, state is seen as a main
adversary, and therefore the watchdog function of the media is of utmost importance. This paradigm is rooted in Hobbesian-Galilean philosophical tradition, and is often linked today to classics of liberalism, such as Milton and Mill (Nordenstreng, 2013). However, as Nordenstreng demonstrated, the original liberal thought is different than what libertarian paradigm later came to represent, as it includes the freedom for, as Nordenstreng writes, or freedom to, which is the term that will be used in this paper. The term free marketplace of ideas did not occur before the first half of the twentieth century, and was later used for ideological purposes. However, freedom from has to exist in order to make freedom to possible, which is why some authors wrote that the social responsibility theory is derived from libertarian theory (Yin, 2008).
In the responsibility paradigm, on the other hand, press freedom is meant to serve the public good (Voltmer & Wasserman, 2014). It is closer to the “communitarian tradition” and Hegelian-Marxist philosophical roots as opposed to the Hobbesian-Galilean thought
(Nordenstreng, 2013). Unlike the libertarian paradigm, the responsibility paradigm does not assert that a competitive market will necessarily bring forth the best outcomes, but instead suggests that there should be certain restrictions to insure that journalism serves its purpose. Institutional form of this line of thinking is expressed in the idea of public broadcasting (Voltmer & Wasserman, 2014).
These two paradigms somewhat overlap with Strömbäck’s descriptions of the role of journalism and the media within different models of democracy. He argued that there are four models of democracy, each with specific normative implications for journalism and the media (Strömbäck, 2005). Those models are the procedural, the competitive, the participatory, and the deliberative model. The procedural model draws on the notion of a free marketplace of ideas in which market forces, rather than normative demands, will guarantee the most desirable outcomes for a democracy. Journalists in this model adhere to Zaller’s Burglar Alarm Standard of news that emphasizes the need to report urgent matters, whereby sensationalism and dramatization are allowed, assuming that truth will win in the marketplace of ideas (Strömbäck, 2005, p. 338). This is in line with the libertarian paradigm. In the competitive model, however, journalists would follow the Full News Standard, which includes more nuanced reporting and insists on factuality. This model also requires being critical towards news sources, being proportional and impartial. In the participatory model, the normative expectations include giving space to popular voices and particular care for the needs of everyday citizens and their opinion, while the deliberative model requires journalists who are active participants in political discussions. This classification is hierarchical in a sense that it puts increasingly demanding normative expectations with each step of moving from the procedural to the deliberative model.
Each of these normative expectations are accordingly enshrined in certain professional values. But some authors believe that journalistic values like objectivity can limit the freedom of journalists to report facts as they see them (Stoker, 1995). The concept of objectivity is criticized for the potential of creating bias towards official sources and more powerful sources in general. Therefore, Stoker suggested rethinking this concept and introduced the notion of “existential objectivity” and returning it to its “ideological roots”, which would make journalists more
critical towards official sources and allow them to take on the role of a monitor and a conscience for society (Stoker, 1995).
Culturally Dependent Interpretations of Press Freedom
Apart from the theories presented above, there are endogenous interpretations of press freedom in different societies across the world that are derived from their cultural roots.
Examples include the philosophy of Ubuntu and struggle for independence from colonial powers in Southern Africa, or Confucianism and the ideal of social harmony in East Asia (Voltmer & Wasserman, 2014; Yin, 2008). In such contexts, the watchdog function of the media can carry negative connotations since it is believed that it can undermine national unity or social harmony, and the media are instead expected to use their freedom for upholding these values. However, invoking these ideals is often abused by the power elites, and sometimes journalists themselves differ in their opinions with regards to this (Amin, 2002; Wasserman, 2010a; Yin, 2008). In Arab countries, the term “responsible freedom” is often misused by journalists and mentioned in relation to such ideas as Arab values, national interest, and national security, which are supposedly enshrined in the ruling institutions (Amin, 2002). In some of those countries, preservation of the state is the central argument used to legitimize restrictions to the freedom of expression. This often results in self-censorship, while some journalists “are no different from the authoritarians who take on the role of protectors of the state” (Amin, 2002, p. 128). Similar phenomenon is present in Israel. Shamir (1988) found that most Israeli journalists were willing to subordinate basic professional values to such ideals as national interest, national morale and national image of Israel. These values were seen as more important than the values traditionally treasured within the social responsibility paradigm, and they were far less prominent among the American counterparts. A more recent study found that Israeli journalists tended to
agree that the media were “too patriotic, in a way that compromises their professionalism” (Tsfati, Meyers, & Peri, 2006), but there were differences among them that call for more research.
In Poland, different narratives are present in journalists’ interpretations of press freedom. Some journalists express feelings of having a mission within their society, with many of them, especially older journalists, talking about their duty to participate in shaping the public opinion, as well as advising politicians what to do (Voltmer & Wasserman, 2014). Such perspectives seem to fit into Strömbäck’s model of deliberative democracy. In narratives of Bulgarian journalists, on the other hand, libertarian paradigm was dominant, and they expressed direct rejection of the responsibility model (Voltmer & Wasserman, 2014). This indicates that journalists in some post-communist countries rely on Western narratives when talking about press freedom. However, salience of two major Western paradigms across countries varies, and it is combined with endogenous elements.
This study focuses on Montenegro as a specific post-communist context that has certain characteristics which might render different findings than those in other new democracies, including the post-communist ones. Consequently, the principal research question is: how do journalists in this context understand press freedom?
Montenegro: Recent Political History and Basic Social Divides
In order to understand responses that are analyzed in this study, one has to first understand their context. Therefore, this section provides a brief background of recent
Montenegrin political history, as this can help us understand the nature of public discourse and possible repercussions for interpretation(s) of press freedom in Montenegro.
Since the introduction of multi-party system, the Montenegrin political scene has been dominated by one party, which makes it unique in post-communist Europe (Vuković, 2015a). This party was the only legal party during the communist period, and its electoral win in the first multi-party elections in 1990 was a curious case, as communist parties in Eastern Europe were losing by a large margin at the time (Darmanović, 2007, p. 85). After the elections, the party changed its name to Demokratska partija socijalista (DPS) and used its dominant position and monopolies of power to dominate the political landscape, exerting tight control over the economy and the media (Vuković, 2010). It supported the regime of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia, with Serbia and Montenegro remaining in a federation while other republics of ex-Yugoslavia opted for independence.
In 1997, the Prime Minister Milo Đukanović turned against Milošević together with roughly half of DPS, and remained in the same party while keeping the same name. The other half formed their own party (Vujović & Komar, 2008). After Slobodan Milošević was
overthrown in 2000, DPS and its leader Đukanović stood out as the advocates of Montenegrin independence and the idea of a distinct Montenegrin national identity (Džankić, 2015).
The last critical juncture in Montenegrin history that had the function of “freezing” an existing social divide and reproducing it as an ethno-cultural and political cleavage took place in 2006, when Montenegro became an independent state following a referendum (Džankić, 2013). Today, pre-referendum divisions are still persistent among political elites in Montenegro (Vuković-Ćalasan & Đečević, 2015). Threats to the statehood of Montenegro have been often invoked in recent history of Montenegro, including references to the responsibility of the media.
The 1997 split sparked old divisions which manifested through separation on how national identity of the majority Orthodox Christian population was understood by those who
belonged to it – whether as Montenegrin or Serb (Vuković, 2015b). A form of this divide emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century, and resulted in what Darmanović dubbed “national homo duplex” (Džankić, 2013; Komar, 2013). This basic division has always been related to powerful interests, and is reflected in all areas of social life: religious, intellectual, and the media sphere (Komar, 2013).
Since the introduction of multi-party system, DPS has been the most powerful party in Montenegro and the backbone of every government, and its leader Milo Đukanović has been either the Prime Minister or the President of Montenegro since, with very brief and negligible interruptions. Given the role that Đukanović and DPS played in recent Montenegrin history, it is no wonder that they have been presenting themselves as the “protectors of the state,” as Amin (2002, p. 128) put it when referring to some Arab leaders and journalists who perpetuate their narratives. The association of this “state-building” narrative with one party and one leader can only be understood by looking at the political culture in Montenegro.
Political Culture in Montenegro
The political and social landscape of Montenegro since the 1990s has been characterized by state clientelism, unequal electoral competition, and legal nihilism (Komar, 2013, p. 53). Additionally, Montenegro is a small country of 625,266 inhabitants according to the census from 2011, which makes it a specific political system. It is a non-anonymous society with thick
networks of familial and friendly relationships, which minimize significance of other relations, such as relations of responsibility (Džankić, 2015, p. 136; Komar, 2013, pp. 51-52). Montenegro can be put into a category of so-called status societies, which are characterized by family
relations as key determinants of both private and public life, whereby the private dominates the public, which has a strong impact on political culture (Komar, 2013, p. 113). Komar thus argues
that Banfield’s theory of amoral familism can be applied to Montenegro, meaning that there are strong family bonds that produce cynicism and skepticism towards working for the benefit of general population. People in such communities are interested in public affairs only insofar as that can help them advance personal or family interests, which is a mindset that prevents
formation of a civil society. The media can be important agents for change in this regard, but it is still not clear whether and how journalists themselves incorporate these contextual characteristics in their narratives about press freedom, or how they relate their idea of press freedom to such social phenomena.
Montenegrin Media Landscape
As Komar notes, political communication is one of the key segments of developing a participatory political culture in Montenegro, as opposed to the current mixture of participatory and subject political cultures. Responsibility for this lies upon political actors and the media. However, Montenegrin citizens are usually informed in a manner that is emotionally saturated, sharply divided in support for or criticism of the government, and full of personal insults (Komar, 2013, p. 132). The media landscape is, Komar argues, characterized by a lack of
substantive debates and constant public presence of a few individuals discussing different topics, while most informed citizens do not feel encouraged to participate. It is therefore important to explore how Montenegrin journalists themselves understand press freedom, as their narratives might help us explain these characteristics of the media landscape and point to possibilities for change.
As a post-communist country, Montenegro is in many regards similar to its neighbors, as well as other post-communist countries in Europe. For instance, Peruško noted that Croatia fits “elegantly” into the Mediterranean or polarized pluralist model of media systems, as suggested
by Hallin and Mancini in their famous book Comparing Media Systems (Peruško, 2013). She points to characteristics such as “weak and late development of the mass press, weak
professionalization of journalism, strong political parallelism, and the strong role of the state” in the Croatian media landscape. Moreover, the Croatian political system is characterized by clientelism, weak rule of law, elites whose communication often excludes ordinary citizens, as well as political culture where public and private interests are not easily distinguished (Peruško, 2013, p. 721). These characteristics are mostly present in Montenegro too, but with some important differences. Namely, Peruško notes that Croatian society used to be politically
polarized in the 1990s, with the media scene accordingly divided into “state building” journalists and “traitors,” but is now moderately plural and homogenous. Croatian state television promoted the ruling party and the government, but that changed with change of power in 2000. Such developments did not take place in Montenegro, as the previous chapter has shown.
Media landscapes of many post-communist countries in Eastern Europe are characterized by political parallelism and media instrumentalization. Unlike the ideal of neutrality within newsrooms that is cherished in the traditional liberal thought, i.e. internal pluralism, political parallelism is characterized by external pluralism (Mancini, 2012). In Central and Eastern Europe, there is also evidence of “business parallelism”, and Colin Sparks suggested the term “political capital” for this overlap between politics, business and the media (as cited in Mancini, 2012). Rather than promoting dialogue through professional journalism or disseminating
information, many media outlets in these countries perform the primary function of serving particularistic interests (Gross, 2003). As Mancini (2012, p. 275) notes, media
instrumentalization occurs in societies where relationships between politicians and citizens are clientelistic and personal, where self-interest prevails over care for public good, and where
distribution of public resources is subordinated to particularistic interests, with little respect for existing rules. A small society like Montenegro, that can be labeled as a status society where amoral familism is at work could be a fertile soil for media instrumentalization.
According to 2016 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters without Borders (RSF), available on their website, Montenegro occupied 106th position of 180 countries included. It performed somewhat better when compared to 2015, but Macedonia was the only country from ex-Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, that had lower score. Freedom House report categorized Montenegro as a “partly free” country overall with a downward trend, and also “partly free” with regards to the Freedom of the Press status. According to the report, restrictions of the freedom to peaceful assembly were the most serious problem, and this included clashes between the police and the opposition protesters, as well as postponing an LGBT pride parade (Freedom House, 2016).
Newspaper Vijesti, which is considered the most critical towards the government along with Dan, was founded in 1997 and initially strongly supported Đukanović and the idea of independence. Dan opposed Đukanović and the idea of independence from the very beginning. After the 2006 referendum, however, Vijesti stopped supporting Đukanović. Ownership of the newspaper Vijesti as well as the television station Vijesti is often connected to an influential individual in Montenegrin public life, Miodrag Perović (Brkić, 2015). One year after the referendum, Perović said that “Mr Đukanović and the DPS have become the main obstacle to development of Montenegro,” as well as that “[h]e, or at least his party, wants to control every aspect of public life” (as cited in Morrison, 2008, p. 226). This change of editorial policy resulted in frequent criticism of Đukanović, as well as bitter exchanges between the editorial staff and Government officials, as Morrison observes. In 2007, the editor of Vijesti, Željko Ivanović, was
attacked by masked men after attending a party celebrating the anniversary of the launch of Vijesti. Ivanović publicly blamed Đukanović for the attacks (Morrison, 2008). In 2013, a bomb exploded in front of this newspaper’s building, just next to the office of the editor-in-chief; in 2014, one of its company vehicles was torched (Knežević, 2015). The Editor-in-chief of Dan was murdered in 2004, and this case, like most other attacks on journalists, has not been completely solved (Vujošević & Vučković, 2015). These are only several examples of outright physical attacks on journalists or property of the media. However, a more frequent method of exerting pressure on the media lies in “hidden censorship”, which entails weakening certain media outlets financially, sometimes even endangering their viability. Misusing public funds and monopolies, abuse of legal and inspection powers, and para-legal pressures are three basic forms of hidden censorship in Montenegro (Vujošević & Vučković, 2015). These authors found that state funds were used selectively on political grounds to financially support certain media outlets and put pressure on others; context in which this is done is characterized by lack of control and transparency, as well as inadequate legal framework. It also has the potential of seriously undermining healthy competition in the media market, which is not in line with the standards of the European Union (Nenezić & Popović, 2015). Allocation of advertising money as a means of selectively rewarding different media outlets by the government is a well-known practice in developing countries across the world, for example, Namibia (Wasserman, 2010a) or Thailand during the mandate of Thaksin Shinawatra (Yin, 2008), who incidentally received Montenegrin citizenship in 2009. This is one of three major forms of media instrumentalization (Mancini, 2012).
As a rule, media outlets with foreign owners in Montenegro have a pro-government editorial policy, which could be indicative of their clientelistic relationship with the government
(Brkić, 2015). One prominent example is that of Petros Stathis, a Greek businessman who, as Brkić demonstrates, has many media outlets in Montenegro under his control, all of them supportive of the government. Official ownership records are often manipulated in order to conceal the media’s true owners. Using “facade” names as official owners is a common practice in Eastern Europe (as cited in Mancini, 2012).
Surveys among journalists in Montenegro have shown that their salaries are lower than average salaries in the country, that very few of them are members of professional associations, as well as that they mostly describe press freedom in Montenegro in negative terms (Centar za demokratiju i ljudska prava, 2011, 2014).
Method
In order to understand how Montenegrin journalists interpret press freedom, this study employed a qualitative approach based on semi-structured interviews. The sampling process aimed to achieve diversity in terms of gender, type of media, political leaning of their outlets, age, and work experience. Therefore, this purposive sample included elements of maximum variation sampling (Bryman, 2012, p. 419). Political leaning of outlets is an important attribute to bear in mind because of characteristics of Montenegrin social context, which were described in the previous chapter. The idea was also to initially select one journalist per outlet, and that explains why there are more journalists from privately owned pro-government media outlets. Such media outlets outnumber those that belong to the other two categories.
All respondents were selected from established, mainstream news organizations that distribute or stream their content across Montenegro. There is arguably one exception to this, as one of the outlets in question might not be regarded as mainstream by some observers. The participant working at this outlet was selected because of previous responses. Such a practice is a
part of theoretical sampling, which is a strategy most commonly associated with grounded theoretical approach (Marshall, 1996). More specifically, theoretical saturation seemed to have been reached after interviewing twelve respondents, but there was also a consensus among them with regards to criticism pointed at one tabloid. In order to capture the full range of
interpretations relevant for this study, an editor from this tabloid was interviewed, and this interview generated valuable data.
Participants were recruited through various online channels. Some of them were recruited using author’s personal and professional connections. Thirteen interviews were conducted in total, some of which were Skype interviews, while others were telephone interviews. The shortest interview lasted 17 minutes, and the longest lasted 64 minutes. Participants were
informed about general aims of the study and their anonymity was granted, with the exception of one interviewee working for a tabloid, who could not be guaranteed full anonymity because of practical reasons. In this paper, pseudonyms are used, along with abbreviations indicating the ownership and political leaning of their outlets (see Table A1 in Appendix A). Respondents were asked to give their comments on different topics with theoretical relevance for this study and encouraged to talk about specific cases. Main issues that were discussed can be found in Appendix B.
Overview of participants’ characteristics can be seen in the tables in Appendix A. Ownership and political leaning of the respective media outlets were merged because state-owned media are considered pro-government by default, which is also confirmed in responses by participants working for these media outlets as well as by other participants, even though they were not asked to make comments specifically on this. It should be noted that some of
while others receive less criticism. In that sense, they are not all equal. The tabloid that was mentioned earlier was categorized as supportive of the government because of its ownership and criticism by other media, politicians, and activists, even though its position might seem
ambiguous at times.
Data analysis was also based on grounded theory, but with elements of iterative analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Tracy, 2012). “Pure” grounded theory is rare in practice of qualitative research, in spite of the fact that it is often cited as a method. Researchers using this approach usually delay literature review until data collection is finished, and they seek to build theory from the data rather than set any limits by research questions and existing theory. Iterative approach essentially relies on grounded theory, but also encourages consulting current literature and existing theories throughout the research process, so we might call it an alternative emic/etic approach (Tracy, 2012, p. 184).
The interviews were fully transcribed and first-cycle coding was conducted using ATLAS.ti. First-cycle codes with similar characteristics were subsequently grouped and merged in wider categories. Those categories later served as sensitizing concepts. They were clustered together in families, based on their thematic focus which partly overlapped with responses to specific questions. Within these families, sensitizing concepts indicated characteristics of journalists’ interpretations of press freedom. In this stage, two crucial super-categories that emerged were freedom from and freedom to. There were overlaps in different families of codes, which were then merged in one network of core significance for this study, where connections between categories could be observed. This core network, not including the first-cycle codes, is included in Appendix C. Other networks facilitated the analysis and explanations of the core network.
Findings
Montenegrin journalists in this sample agree in many regards, but there are certain differences that should be highlighted. Those are mostly related to how much they emphasize pressures on them and their work coming from different instances. An exception can be found in the interview with a tabloid editor, whose responses were very different.
Positive Freedom and Negative Freedom
As noted earlier, the way journalists talk about press freedom can be clustered into two major categories, or super-categories, which were comprised of second-cycle codes (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Wilkinson, 2002). One can be tentatively identified as negative freedom, or freedom from. The other category can be labeled freedom to, or positive freedom. However, it should be clarified that these are only elements of understanding press freedom in a certain way, and they are not in themselves indicative of a coherent system of interpretation. Sensitizing concepts indicative of one or other category are not mutually exclusive. In fact, both groups are often present in one respondent’s responses. Therefore, after breaking the data into smaller pieces, all these elements should be analyzed from a holistic perspective in order to understand the interpretations in journalists’ narratives.
The criteria for classifying individual concepts as belonging to the positive or negative freedom category was based on whether journalists talked about concepts and ideas that necessarily entailed their own responsibility with regards to a higher purpose, or not. For
example, concepts such as access to information, protection from attacks, financial freedom, and freedom from powerful interests were classified as negative freedom, because they do not ipso facto entail any particular actions on behalf of journalists or the media as an expression of their responsibility. On the other hand, positive freedom entailed categories such as working in the
public interest and observing professional standards. Using these sensitizing concepts, a network was generated for a clearer overview. Two other networks were made separately based on super-categories responsibility and threat. Those three networks were then merged into one, where we can clearly see overlaps between different categories.
It is clear that journalists in this sample talk about press freedom as being inextricably linked to responsibility. For them, those concepts are inseparable, and press freedom entails responsible journalism. AG journalists stressed the need to be protected from attacks somewhat more than journalists working for the pro-government outlets. But the way they related such observations to their overall narrative indicates ties to responsibility. Negative freedom, such as freedom from attacks or pressure by more powerful instances, is seen as a necessary, but not sufficient condition for press freedom. However, their understanding of press freedom does not translate into practice.
I’m telling you, we can’t talk about the responsibility of a journalist as a journalist, because a Montenegrin journalist doesn’t have enough freedom to be responsible. As soon as a journalist steps out of those boundaries of his own censorship, i.e. self-censorship of his outlet, he gets rebuked, and hardly ever will he go beyond those boundaries again. (Miloš, PPG, italics mine)
Some journalists talk about press freedom as being able to present events “faithfully”,
“truthfully” and “accurately”. The phenomenon of relating professional values to press freedom is a recurring pattern among all interviews but one that will be discussed separately. They see respecting these values as an expression of press freedom. As one respondent put it: “Press freedom, above all, in my personal opinion, means a possibility to do one’s work professionally” (Nađa, SPG).
Impartiality and Balance
A set of interrelated ideas that is perhaps most prominently featured in the respondents’ narratives consists of objectivity, impartiality, balance, and presenting both sides of a story. This entails maintaining a certain level of professional distance from people and topics that are
reported on. In doing so, the respondents believe that it is important to have a critical approach to different sources, and try to include different perspectives. These ideas were grouped and treated as one sensitizing concept named impartiality and balance as a value related to press freedom.
Journalists believe that relevant issues should be reported with some minimal level of interpretation that would help citizens understand how those issues can affect their lives.
However, in doing so, journalists should avoid imposing their own opinion and their own biases. They should focus on including all relevant sides of a story instead.
For example, press freedom is, if I’m investigating a story, that I include all the possible sides in it, which is a problem, because often, when we’re working on some topic… it’s not that someone doesn’t want to cooperate , but you simply get instructions [from editors] on who to call in order to do it. (…) There aren’t many journalists in Montenegro who wouldn’t respect press freedom, who would impose their own opinion of some sort. The problem lies with owners and those who are dictating policy. (Jelena, PPG, italics mine)
This quote implies that journalists in Montenegro are, in practice, forced to include bias imposed from higher instances in their work. They believe, however, that one of the most important expressions of press freedom is trying to avoid bias, regardless of whether it comes from their editors, or their own bias.
The Watchdog Function and Investigative Journalism
Another commonly mentioned value that is seen as an important expression of press freedom is related to the watchdog function and investigative journalism. This always occurs in pair with working in the public interest, and is also connected to impartiality and balance. The following excerpt illustrates connection between the watchdog function and impartiality:
Freedom itself would be a completely unbiased and completely clear and
uncompromising dealing with some affairs, misconduct, corruption, connections of power and corruption, but in Montenegro, you have very little people and even very little media outlets who are capable of doing something like that. (Dušan, AG, italics mine) Ivana, a PPG respondent, talked about press freedom as “finding that balance between the public interest and not violating the right to privacy, and all the other things related to the Journalistic code of ethics.” The following quote succinctly demonstrates how journalists establish links between freedom from and freedom to, whereby freedom to is understood as performing the watchdog function for the sake of public interest.
The most important thing would be that simply a journalist, whatever story comes to his mind, or whatever investigative story, that he can publish it without any restrictions. So, in a sense that the story, of course, has value, that it has some sense, some significance, that it is of public interest that people know about this. So, that he never even thinks about having problems because of publishing that. Because only when we reach that level, we can talk about real press freedom. (Janko, SPG, italics mine)
Solidarity and Self-Regulation
Journalists also mentioned professional solidarity and establishing a powerful system of self-regulation mechanisms as expressions of press freedom. They agree that self-regulatory
bodies should monitor the media, condemn unacceptable practices, and contribute to legally sanctioning those outlets that commit serious violations. This should be done consistently and the same rules should apply to everyone. But with very limited job opportunities, journalists are “stuck” in their newsrooms, as one respondent put it (Ana, AG). As the media landscape is sharply polarized, journalists become identified with their media outlets, which is seen as an obstacle to achieving solidarity, and consequently an obstacle to forming a legitimate and
powerful press council. Additionally, solidarity is seen as an important element of press freedom because of protecting journalists from powerful interests. The following quote is an example of how solidarity is related to both the watchdog function and respecting professional standards.
Editorial staff are often not there to protect their employees (…) Another problem of the Montenegrin media is that very few people working in the media have the feeling that someone would really stand up for them – not in that sense when they do something that is not in line with professional norms, or something illegal – but if they really pull something that’s a little bit risky, that someone powerful doesn’t like. (…) It’s an entire string [of responsibility]: the journalists, the editorial staffs, the media outlets, regulatory bodies as well. (Nađa, SPG).
The Market vs. the Code
One exception when it comes to interpretations of press freedom, responsibility of
journalists, as well as opinions on legitimate sanctions and restrictions, can be found in responses given by the tabloid editor. First of all, while other respondents often talk about professional standards and mention respecting the Journalistic code of ethics as a praiseworthy goal, this respondent criticized the Code for not being liberal enough, for being outdated and not in line with emerging social changes. He also criticized invoking the Code overall, because in his
opinion, the Code is substantially irrelevant. This is the only respondent in the entire sample who talked about responsibility almost exclusively in legal terms. At the same time, he emphasized several times that he supported imposing “as little limitations and rules as possible.” While Marija (PPG) criticized Charlie Hebdo for unacceptable practices, Filip defended their right to exist and said that the paper would have probably been shut down if it operated in Montenegro. He also praised Iceland for passing a law that allowed ridiculing religion.
Another feature that is unique for this respondent is the importance that he assigns to market forces with regards to sanctions and restrictions that should be imposed on journalists and the media.
The best measure of that is market, you know. Market is something that rewards and sanctions in the best way. And that’s the only way. (…) So, I’m saying, market is that which should regulate it the best, definitely, since the media sector is typical business. (Filip, tabloid)
Finally, a noteworthy observation when it comes to Filip’s responses is a blurred line between celebrities and public officials regarding newsworthiness. This respondent does mention “public interest,” but only because he believes it should be redefined.
Responsibility Towards the State(hood) of Montenegro
The independence of Montenegro and its statehood are country-specific characteristics that might be related to how journalists understand press freedom. As noted in the literature review, positive freedom can be understood in a sense that puts emphasis on national unity, preservation of the state, or social harmony, rather than professional values or freedom from interference by the government (Amin, 2002; Shamir, 1988; Yin, 2008). The 2006 referendum in Montenegro and subsequent state independence had a function of reproducing existing political
cleavages, and this might have had repercussions for journalists’ views on freedom and responsibility.
Attempts to equate such grand ideas as national interest and preservation of the state with those who currently occupy positions of executive power are not uncommon in new democracies (Amin, 2002; Voltmer & Wasserman, 2014; Wasserman, 2010a, 2010b; Yin, 2008), where journalists are accused of working against state interests. One journalist from our sample said:
I work for one of those outlets that have a critical approach to reality, and they
immediately label that as some opposition, anti-state outlet, unfortunately. And there is also this other, so to speak, block, that is very often called the state [block], or pro-government [block] (…)” (Petar, AG)
Likewise, his colleagues from PPG outlets noted that they worked for the “so-called regime media” (Miloš, PPG). Journalists in this study were asked to comment on the idea of
responsibility towards the state and statehood of Montenegro in order to explore how their narratives incorporate it with regards to their own role in the society and press freedom.
As noted by several respondents, the issue of responsibility towards the statehood of Montenegro used to be relevant in the past, but its significance has been decreasing since. When talking about this issue, all journalists quickly stress that politicians, particularly those from the ruling coalition, use it to promote their agendas. More specifically, respondents noticed that there was a tendency of equating the ruling party, DPS, or people in power, with the state. Therefore, criticism related to responsibility towards the state(hood) of Montenegro is clearly recognized as a red herring, as a means of manipulation that politicians use, rather than something that is related to national security threats from “traitors” or regional powers such as Serbia. Jelena, a PPG respondent, noted that “this narrative is constantly abused” by some political parties. The
respondents mostly noted that responsibility towards the state is expressed through care for citizens’ needs. This line of reasoning is present and prominent in all responses. One journalist working for the public broadcaster noted:
Those people in power can say what they like, and that’s always when someone attacks them, it’s attacking the state. It’s like they’re the only ones supporting Montenegro, while the rest of us, who are in between, are aliens of some sort. (Janko, SPG)
However, there is some nuisance to this. First of all, one PPG respondent recognized that some media are “a bit irresponsible” towards the state, and “lack a little bit of patriotism,” but he stressed that this was irrelevant when compared to the irresponsibility of equating the state with the ruling party and Milo Đukanović, which was something he said that PPG outlets did. Several respondents mentioned that this “lack of patriotism” used to be an issue in the past, while today it is not relevant.
When talking about this topic, Filip, who is a tabloid editor, constantly pointed out to alleged connections between the AG media outlets and certain high government officials, while Miloš, a PPG journalist, mentioned “a sick symbiosis” between one AG outlet and the Prime Minister Đukanović. Filip believed that there were media outlets who showed unacceptable disrespect for the state understood as the legal system, but were allowed to do so because they had powerful backing from certain state officials, among others.
Country Size and Cultural Characteristics
The respondents recognized that size of the media market in Montenegro can be an obstacle for financial viability of the media, making press freedom difficult to exercise in practice. As noted earlier, journalists saw this as directly linked to the problem of self-censorship, lack of solidarity, and therefore lack of powerful mechanisms of self-regulation.
They talk about a “very close relationship between editorial staff and journalists”, which is “perhaps more pronounced in Montenegro than anywhere else in the region” (Dušan, AG), and being “stuck” in their newsrooms (Ana, AG). This poses serious threats to internal pluralism, while at the same time journalists see the level of internal pluralism as positively correlated with the level of press freedom.
Another thing that was mentioned by some respondents is that people in Montenegro generally know each other, and personal elements of public attacks on those who think
differently are commonplace in the media and popular among audience. Journalists also noted that the media in Montenegro engaged in conflicts, or “media wars” among each other. When asked to comment on two specific controversial cases of confrontations in the media, responses included sentences such as “I know them both,” “I don’t like reading [his] texts,” “I think it was a personal conflict” etc.
Personal insults are considered a big problem by Montenegrin journalists, and they see fostering civility in public discourse as an integral element of press freedom. Janko (SPG) criticized reality shows for “degrading culture”, while Miloš (PPG) talked about “polluting” and “purifying the public space”. When making comments about one tabloid in Montenegro and its practices, their criticism involved phrases like “rude,” “a matter of one’s upbringing,” and “violation of everything that’s right in Montenegro.” Additionally, they agreed that this kind of practices should be banned and/or sanctioned, which implies that they see something that we might call morality as an aspect of their positive freedom. Additionally, several respondents talked about uneducated journalists as a threat to press freedom.
The editor of a tabloid noted that people who are mentioned in his stories try to exercise influence on his work through personal connections.
Montenegro has this problem, we’re a small country, everyone knows everyone. I’ve personally had situations when, in relation to certain texts, they call more my brother, my best man, my friend, than myself. That’s how some people think they can influence that certain content or certain topic is not treated in my newspaper. (Filip, tabloid)
When talking about biggest threats to press freedom, one respondent complained about the tendency to understand criticism personally, which is also related to cultural characteristics of the context that have been tackled earlier in this paper. This mindset is also common among Arab leaders, for instance (Amin, 2002). Miloš (PPG) similarly noted that people in Montenegro are not rebellious, and that they do not have a developed critical and civic awareness. These characteristics are referred to as “mentality” by some respondents.
Dušan (AG) thought that Montenegro should look up to Italy when it comes to press freedom because of cultural similarities, while Filip, a tabloid editor, said that Montenegro should look up to Iceland because of its size.
Discussion and Conclusion
The way journalists understand their role within society can vary depending on social context, but it is also marked by a certain level of convergence. This also applies to
interpretations of press freedom, a concept that is contested both in theory and practice.
Conflicting interpretations of press freedom are a pervasive aspect of political discussions among different social actors in many new democracies. In order to determine how democratization processes in new democracies can be influenced, we first need to understand how the most important social actors, such as politicians and media workers, interpret concepts that are at the core of political discussions in those countries.
For the journalists from Montenegro that I interviewed, press freedom does not only entail the absence of restrictions, pressures, and protection from attacks. It also entails following professional standards in their work. Their reasoning seems to largely be in line with the
responsibility paradigm (Voltmer & Wasserman, 2014). The respondents’ normative ideals with regards to press freedom include elements of Strömbäck’s models of competitive and
participatory democracy. Negative freedom is seen as a necessary, but not sufficient precondition for press freedom. Impartiality and presenting both sides of a story seem to be the core values that these journalists see as expressions of press freedom. They insist on accuracy and truth, as well as respecting the Code of ethics. They believe they should advocate public good, which might be seen as a remnant of the period of socialism, as journalists were considered public workers back then; however, the public is not equated with the state today (Peruško, 2013). Remnants of this mindset are arguably incorporated into a somewhat compatible Western responsibility paradigm, together with elements of morality that might be related to culture-specific characteristics. On the other hand, characteristics of the Montenegrin society associated with status society and amoral familism, are seen by these journalists as something that should be left aside in their work, and a potential threat to press freedom.
Professional values, some of which have been mentioned already, are seen as inextricably linked to press freedom. Accordingly, Montenegrin journalists in this sample particularly value internal pluralism, while their society is marked by media instrumentalization and polarization. In Russia, journalists report increasing internal autonomy and decreasing external autonomy (Nygren & Degtereva, 2012), and it would be interesting to follow the corresponding trends in Montenegro, because in spite of some external pluralism, autonomy seems to be under severe pressure both externally and internally.
Other elements that they see as inseparable of press freedom include investigative journalism and performing the watchdog function. The watchdog function is associated with the libertarian paradigm. It should be stressed, however, that respondents in this study recognize that this should be related to public interest understood as serving the citizens’ needs, while at the same time respecting the individual human rights of public officials and other persons who are subject to scrutiny in the media. Sensationalism and dramatization are not seen as legitimate means of journalistic practice, and insults and personal attacks are particularly condemned, while civility and emphasis on substantial issues of relevance for policy are cherished. This is in line with Zaller’s Full News Standard (Strömbäck, 2005). In that sense, the responses seem to be closer to the narratives used by Polish than by Bulgarian journalists. The Journalistic code of ethics is often invoked and practices following it are seen as praiseworthy. Establishing a strong and legitimate mechanism of self-regulation is seen as an expression of press freedom. Existence of a strong public broadcaster is not seen as bad, but its current journalistic practices are. The government is criticized for treating some media outlets unfairly, but powerful state is seen not as a problem in itself. This implies a strong presence of the responsibility paradigm in
journalists’ narratives. A commonly mentioned example of state abuse is rewarding some and punishing other media outlets through selective allocation of public funds, which is a widespread phenomenon in developing countries (Wasserman, 2010a; Yin, 2008).
Responsibility towards the state and statehood of Montenegro is clearly identified by the respondents as a red herring used by politicians, especially those in power, to promote their own interests. Some respondents accused pro-government outlets for reinforcing such narrative. Prominence of narratives about the responsibility towards the state and national interests can be found in many developing countries across the world, as well as some developed countries, such
as Israel (Amin, 2002; Shamir, 1988; Wasserman, 2010a; Yin, 2008). This is often abused by those who occupy positions of executive power. Some journalists implied that certain anti-government outlets sometimes lacked patriotism, but such observations were identified as
irrelevant when compared to other problems mentioned in previous sentences. Ten years after the referendum, narratives invoking national interests, traitors, and danger from Serbia are fading in how journalists see their responsibility. Responsibility towards the state is often equated with working in the public interest and for all citizens, including performing the watchdog function. Consequentially, some criticism was pointed at PPG outlets, including journalists working for those outlets, for not performing the watchdog function. Some outlets, mostly one tabloid, were criticized for being too critical and unfair to critics of the government, and therefore acting as, so to speak, the Government’s watchdogs. Such a situation is expected in a society where media instrumentalization is present. Just like in many other developing countries such as South Africa and Namibia (Wasserman, 2010a), many journalists responded to criticism related to their responsibility by accusing those who criticize them, usually politicians, for being irresponsible themselves, and trying to divert attention from that fact by attacking journalists. The similarity in responses in these three countries is evident.
Montenegrin journalists have not reached the level of being limited by professional standards in the way that Stoker (1995) wrote about. They do mention objectivity as an important principle, but they see it as related to impartiality and balance. However, these journalists often do not get a chance to practice objectivity even in the sense that Stoker saw as problematic, let alone to follow his suggestions to practice “existential objectivity”. In fact, they are often forced to do their job in a way that they perceive as irresponsible. While Stoker wrote about the need to include journalists’ considerations that go beyond the narrowly understood idea of objectivity,
journalists interviewed in this study have to not only exclude such considerations, but they often have to go against them. This is particularly pronounced when journalists have to cover events that bear significance for the political situation in the country.
If we apply Yin’s (2008) freedom-responsibility coordinate grid to Montenegrin journalists’ responses, we can reach the conclusion that they see themselves as situated in the “not free – not responsible” quadrant, while they recognize that the “free – responsible” quadrant is something they should strive for.
Responses given by Filip, the tabloid editor, are an exception, as his narrative completely corresponds with the expectations of journalism and the media set forth within the procedural democracy model that Strömbäck (2005) wrote about. Filip thinks that market should be seen as a guide for journalistic practice, rather than normative demands. His perspective is close to the Burglar Alarm Standard, whereby dramatization and sensationalism in the news can be
legitimate in journalism. Filip talked about the responsibility of journalists as a legal category. He advocated the need to make the Code of ethics more liberal, while emphasizing that it was insignificant, and talked about deregulation in every sense as a desirable, or, more precisely, necessary goal to strive for. These responses are in line with the libertarian paradigm that Voltmer and Wasserman (2014), Yin (2008), Nordenstreng (2013) and other authors wrote about. However, there is one very significant difference. The aforementioned normative ideals include criticism of the state as one of their crucial points. But when talking about biggest problems in terms of press freedom, Filip points most of his criticism towards the so-called anti-government media outlets rather than the state or the existing legal framework. He believes their owners are connected to criminal circles as well as powerful individuals from the spheres of business and politics, and he accuses them of unfair business practices in the media market. This
might be attributed to the specific Montenegrin context where “anomalies” that are
commonplace in post-communist Europe, such as political capital, political parallelism, business parallelism, and media instrumentalization are arguably exacerbated by the combination of its small size, cultural characteristics such as status society and amoral familism, and political history that has never seen a change of power in democratic elections. Other factors that might be at play here are occupying an editorial role and working at a tabloid. This should be addressed in further research. Another suggestion would be to employ longitudinal studies in order to observe trends in journalists’ interpretations of press freedom, role conceptions and professional values over time, as this can help us learn about the process of democratization and changes in political culture in new democracies. Such research should also include other important social actors, such as politicians and civil society members.
The study has limitations. First of all, the sample cannot be rendered representative of the entire population in question. This research aimed to generate in-depth understanding of
narratives that are present in journalists’ interpretations of press freedom, and therefore serve as a contribution towards refining existing theories and potentially building a new theory that can be tested. Therefore, generalizability was not pursued. Secondly, qualitative research like this one by its nature can involve a certain level of subjectivity that might influence the analysis in spite of researcher’s best efforts to perform it conscientiously and honestly. Thirdly, the
responses might have been subject to the so-called social desirability bias to a certain degree, as I personally contacted and interviewed the respondents.
This study should serve as a contribution to understanding how press freedom is interpreted in new democracies by those social actors who have the greatest responsibility for changing political culture and therefore democratization and overall progress in society. The
results show that journalists in Montenegro see working in the public interest and adhering to professional values as inseparable elements of press freedom. They want more freedom in order to be more responsible, as they are forced to engage in what they see as biased, one-sided
reporting, and irresponsible practices. One of Altschull’s (1984) “laws of journalism” asserts that “the contents of the media always reflect the interests of those who finance them” (as cited in McQuail, 2010, p. 226). However, it seems that the influence of such interests is ubiquitous in the Montenegrin media. It penetrates much deeper into the newsrooms and the mainstream media content than it does in Western democracies. Particularism prevails over universalism, as
Mancini (2012, p. 276) put it. This study shows that particularism prevails over journalistic professionalism as well. It confirms that Montenegrin journalists have a very negative opinion on the media landscape in their country. But if they could do their job the way they wanted to, the situation would probably be completely different. Apparently, the culprits ought to be sought elsewhere.
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Appendix A Sample characteristics Table A1
Table A2
Participants’ Outlets: Media Types Media Outlets by Type n
Online 3 Print 4 Radio 2 Television 3 Table A3 Gender of Participants Gender n Male 6 Female 7
Participants’ Outlets: Ownership and Political Leaning
Ownership and Political Leaning n
Private, pro-government (PPG) 6
State, pro-government (SPG) 3
Table A4
Age Groups of Participants
Age Group n
21-29 4
30-39 7
