Justice and Security Sector Reform in Liberia
An analysis of UN discourse
Benthe Priester 11010738
First reader: Dr. Jana Krause Second reader: Dr. Nel Vandekerckhove Peacebuilding and International Relations
25-06-2018 9440 words
ABSTRACT: In this thesis, it will be researched how the UN approached local ownership in the Justice and Security Sector Reform in Liberia. By executing a discourse and document analysis of the progress reports of the Secretary-General, it will be analysed what actors were involved in the reform processes and how these actors were involved. This thesis will argue that UNMIL predominantly involved elitist actors, causing the choice of actors to be highly selective. The local, nonstate actors that were involved merely gained token ownership. Moreover, international actors set the parameters of the reforms, by providing the Government with policy options. This undermined the two main goals of local ownership, namely enhancing the sustainability and legitimacy of peace efforts.
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Index
1. Introduction ………... 3
2. Literature review ... 5
3. Theoretical Framework ... 7
§3.1 How discourse can influence peacebuilding missions ……….. 7
§3.2 Local ownership ... 8
4. Method and documents ……….. 12
§4..1 Methods ……….. 10
§4.2 Documents ……….. 13
5. Case description ………... 14
6. Analysis ………... 16
§6.1 The reform of the LNP ………. 16
§6.2 The reform of the AFL ………... 20
§6.3 The reform of the justice system ………..….. 24
7. Conclusion and discussion ……….……….…….. 30
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1. Introduction
On the 30th of March this year, the United Nations Mission in Liberia successfully completed its
mandate. After fifteen years, the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission left Liberia. Newly elected President George Weah thanked UNMIL for contributing to the restoration of peace and stability in Liberia. During his inaugural address in January he said “In our darkest days, the UN stood with us […] We salute the men and women in blue helmets who came from far and near, some of whom paid the ultimate price for peace” (UN News 2018, Reuters 2018). During the mission, the first woman in Africa was elected President and more than a million internally displaced persons and refugees returned home after two civil wars (UN News 2018). Moreover, 100,000 combatants were disarmed and reintegrated. UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed said “The youth are taking ownership as the custodians of peace”.
Although the mission is considered successful by the UN, there has been a lot of criticism on one of the core elements of the mission, the security sector reform (SSR). A major critique is that there has been little to no local ownership in the reform of Liberia’s security sector. According to the UN, local ownership will protect the self-determination and minimize the extent of external imposition on the host country (Billerbeck 2015: 299). The significance of this is based on the belief that peacebuilding processes cannot be imposed externally, they must be home-grown in order to be successful. However, there is a contradiction between the discourse and the practical approach of the UN. On the one hand, the UN deems local ownership as essential in contributing to a more legitimate and sustainable. On the other hand, the UN considers local ownership to endangers two operational goals, namely the liberalization of the postconflict state and the delivery of demonstrable outputs in the short term (idem: 299).
This thesis will study how the UN approached local ownership in Liberia, therefore it will analyse the UN discourse on three components. Firstly, the restructuring of the Liberian National Police (LNP), secondly the reform of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and thirdly the justice reform. For many Liberians there is no distinction between transitional justice and SSR, as for them the SSR process relates to addressing abuses of the past and preventing future abuses. Therefore, the International Centre for Transitional Justice advocated the implementation of a justice sensitive SSR process (Loden 2007: 302). Because of the interdependent relation between SSR and justice reform (Carlowitz 2011: 1-2), it is relevant to analyse these three components. By analysing the UN discourse on the reform of the LNP, ALF and the justice system, it will answer the following question ‘how did the UN approach local ownership in SSR and justice reform in Liberia?”. This thesis will argue that UNMIL predominantly involved elitist actors, causing the selection of actors to be highly selective. The local, nonstate actors that were involved merely gained token ownership. Moreover, international actors set the parameters of the reforms, by providing the
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Government with policy options. This undermined the two main goals of local ownership, namely enhancing the sustainability and legitimacy of peace efforts.
This thesis will makes two scientific contributions. Firstly, by analysing the UN discourse, it will attempt to provide an addition to the debate on local ownership and shed light on how the UN implements local ownership in practice. Secondly, in spite of the important and interesting relationship between local ownership in justice reform and SSR, there is barely research which analyses both (Carlowitz 2011: 3). This thesis will attempt to fill this gap in the literature. Furthermore, this thesis is socially relevant. Local ownership is seen as a critical condition for enhancing the legitimacy and sustainability of a peace mission. Therefore, it is relevant to research how the UN implemented local ownership in the UNMIL, in order to assess if the mission was successful. Moreover, it will provide lessons to be learned for future peacebuilding missions on implementing local ownership.
In order to answer the research question, this thesis will adhere to the following outline. Firstly, the literature on local ownership in Liberia will be shortly outlined. Then, a theoretical framework will explain the relationship between discourse and the shaping of peacebuilding missions and will set forth the relevant theories on local ownership. Thereafter, the method and data will be explained. Fourthly, the conflict in Liberia will be shortly described, in order to provide some background information on the conflict and the establishment of the UNMIL mission. Then, the UN discourse will be analysed using the theories described in the theoretical framework. Lastly, a conclusion of the results and a discussion for further research will follow.
2. Literature review
In this chapter, the state of the literature on SSR and justice reform in Liberia will be shortly outlined. Firstly, the literature on local ownership in the reform of the police. Although police reform has been an elemental component of many international peacekeeping missions, the focus has long been on military reform (Zanker 2015: 2). The reform of the LNP has hardly been analysed. However, there is consensus on the inclusiveness of women in the police reform. Bacon has researched the gender-sensitiveness of the police reform in relation to local ownership. She states that local ownership of gender initiatives created some positive outcomes. However, the results were mixed partly because of a broken judicial system (Bacon 2015: 373-378). In short, there is no consensus if there was local ownership of the police reform, because this topic has hardly been studied.
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Secondly, the literature on the restructuring of the AFL. This component of the SSR in Liberia has been criticised. The consensus is that the international community failed to ensure local ownership, because the SSR was largely driven by external experts (Bendix and Stanley 2008: 99). The United States took the lead in the restructuring of the AFL and outsourced it to US-based private companies. This has undermined local ownership and the legitimacy of the process and its outputs (Ebo 2007: 83). Both the Liberian legislature as civil society groups have expressed displeasure with their involvement in the SSR. They have not been involved in a meaningful and adequate way in the SSR process. They call for a ‘Liberianisering’ of the SSR process and voice their concern for a lack of local ownership (Bendix and Stanley 2008: 100, Ebo 2007: 83). Bøås and Stig argue that if local ownership would have been present, it could have “diminished the gap between the external approach of the SSR and the civilian’s experience of security and it would have made the process of policy implementation more transparent” (2010: 289).
Lastly, the state of the literature on justice reform in Liberia. The reform of the judiciary has not attracted a lot of scholarly attention. Moreover, justice reform in relation to local ownership has hardly been studied. There is no consensus if local actors were adequately and meaningful involved in the reformation of the judicial and correction system. The UN assisted the Liberian Government and the Ministry of Justice in reviewing and redrafting laws while executive and legislative responsibility rested with the Liberian Government. Thus, UNMIL did not have executive power and bared no responsibility for the reform of the justice system. Moreover, the Liberian Government emphasized national sovereignty (Carlowitz 2011: 5). Therefore, local ownership could be presumed in principle. However, Carlowitz questions in how far this ownership is just formal, symbolical in nature. He argues that potential domination of international expertise or possible conditionality of international aid makes this uncertain (Carlowitz 2011:5). While justice reforms by UN peace missions are described as merely ‘assisting national Governments’, often a substantial amount of new laws are drafted with help of international actors (Sannerholm 2007: 80-81). In short, there is no consensus if this was the case in Liberia, and if so, in how far there was local ownership of the reform process.
3. Theoretical Framework
Now, the theories used to analyse the UN discourse will be set forth. Firstly, it will be explained how discourse can influence and shape peacebuilding missions, by setting forth theories by Autesserre (2017) and Paris (2003). Secondly, the debate on local ownership will be outlined. How is local ownership defined? What actors to involve in the reform processes? How to involve these actors in order to realize local ownership?
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§3.1 How discourse can influence peacebuilding missions
This thesis builds on theories by Autesserre (2017) and Paris (2003), which link peacebuilding to global culture and assumptions. According to Paris, peacebuilding efforts are influenced by a global culture which consists of the norms, customs and widely held beliefs of human societies. This culture compromises the formal and informal rules of international life, defining who the principal actors in world politics should be, how they should organize themselves and how they should behave (Paris 2003: 441-442). Moreover, most foreign peacebuilders share a common culture, consisting of shared practices, habits, narratives and assumptions (Autesserre 2017: 120). Policymakers and practitioners base the design of missions on these shared assumptions. This shared culture influences the actions undertaken in mission in multiple ways. Firstly, the norms of global culture legitimize certain policies while delegitimizing other policies. Secondly, it shapes how people within organizations interpret and respond to the outside world (idem: 442-443, 461). Therefore, the design of these missions reflect not only the interest of key parties and the perceived lessons from previous peace efforts, but also the prevailing norms of global culture. Secondly, assumptions shape the design of peace efforts, by “making the choice of certain strategies seem natural, appropriate, and effective, while others appear inappropriate, illegitimate, or even unthinkable”(Autesserre 2017: 122). They influence what events will be noticed and how these events are interpreted. In this way, they affect what people view as problems and what they do not view as a problem.
§3.2 Local ownership
Local ownership has attracted much scholarly attention. The concept of local ownership emerged as a response to the criticism of the failures of the peace missions in the 1990s (Richmond 2012: 356). The UN shifted its focus to building legitimate, efficient governmental institutions which made state building an elemental part of peacebuilding efforts. The importance of the inclusion of local arenas for legitimacy was acknowledged and concepts such as local governance, local capacity and local ownership became central in peacebuilding discourse (Leonardsson and Rudd 2015: 827). Local ownership is seen as a critical condition for the success of international peace efforts and it is an elemental objective in the peace missions of the UN and many other agencies. The belief is that the local actors know the political, social, economic, cultural and social conditions and that they therefore should have input into the construction of their own polity.
However, there is no consensus on how to define local ownership. There are multiple approaches on how to understand local ownership. Some scholars argue for the importance of understanding local circumstances when initiating peacekeeping efforts, others emphasize how increased sustainability may be achieved as an effect of local actors’ engagement and personal stakes in reconstruction activities (Carvalho and Nagelhus Schia 2011: 6). Moreover, local ownership is
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often used interchangeably with the terms country ownership, government ownership or national ownership (Bendix and Stanley 2008: 96). This understanding of local ownership refers to actors and institutions within the recipient country. However, according to Ebo (2007) this understanding “conceives the actors within the recipient country to be united in goals and purpose” (Ebo 2007: 83). He argues for a deconstruction of the concept of local ownership. Furthermore, there is a distinction between the communitarian version of local ownership and a cosmopolitan version of local ownership, as argued by Donais (2009) and Richmond (2011). The communitarian versions of local ownership focuses on the institutional and normative dynamics that emerge from state-level or lower politics and institutions. Local actors set the framework for local ownership, according to their traditions, structures and interests (Donais 2009, Richmond 2011: 358). In the cosmopolitan view of local ownership, international actors set the parameters of local ownership (idem: 358).
Next to this debate on how to define local ownership, there is no consensus on who ‘the local’ is and how to involve ‘the local’ (ibid, Richmond 2012: 356). There are two central questions regarding local ownership: whom to select as local partners and how to involve these partners (Carlowitz 2011: 50). The following two paragraphs will provide an overview of this debate.
Defining ‘the local’
Martin and Wilson set forth multiple possible local actors to involve. First of all, it is possible to work with elite members. A second option is to work with nonstate security or justice systems. Martin and Wilson state that although these actors are more rooted in local structures, traditions and preferences than elite members, they are often majoritarian and lack concern for fundamental rights and minority interests. This is because “the two values of “liberal” and “democratic” may be in conflict rather than mutually-reinforcing in many developing and post-conflict countries” (idem: 101-102). Furthermore, it is possible to work with civil society (Martin and Wilson 2008: 84). Civil society is seen as a watchdog, a counterbalance to those holding the formal political power (Ebo 2007: 46, Donais 2009: 13). Civil society is “often seen to carry the best hopes for a genuine democratic counterweight to the power-brokers, economic exploiters, and warlords who tend to predominate in conflict-ridden, weak or failed state” (Pouligny 2005: 496). Thus, it is argued that civil society is an important actor to involve in the reform process.
Billerbeck (2015) states that the UN discourse supports the involvement of a wide range of local actors in the peacebuilding efforts, which will ensure the legitimacy and the sustainability of the missions. Involving a broad range of local actors, including marginalized and vulnerable groups, is seen as morally correct and appropriate (Billerbeck 2015: 301). The UN selects the actors based on two criteria: values and capacity. These criteria lead to two different approaches for selecting
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local partners. Firstly, liberal ownership. In this approach the UN selects local actors based on their values, specifically the extent to which they support the liberal principles encompassed by the UN’s approach to peacebuilding. The UN supports the inclusion of actors at the subnational, provincial, municipal and village level and nonstate actors including civil society groups and underrepresented or marginalized groups. They avoid including actors who are associated with violence, corruption or human rights abuses, in order to liberalize the war torn country and avert the danger of conflict recidivism (idem: 305). The second approach is elite ownership, in which actors are selected on their technical capacities to help efficiently deliver concrete outputs. This approach often involves high-level state political, economic and military elites who have more capacities than vulnerable, marginalized, nonstate groups. It is believed that these actors are more capable of accomplishing outputs such as the disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants, passing legislation and establishing institutions (idem: 306). According to Billerbeck, these two approaches are simultaneously undertaken by the UN.
How to involve ‘the local’
The second question is: ‘how to involve local actors?’. Martin and Wilson (2008) question how the external actor should relate to internal actors. Should the interveners only facilitate a local process or should they also give this process content and direction? According to Martin and Wilson, many SSR practitioners work with elite members. Because this is highly selective, the SSR is not representative or rooted in local structures. Moreover, often agencies understand local ownership as a consulting tactic (Martin and Wilson 2008: 84).
Ebo (2007) argues that SSR should be accommodating demands and interests within society. Therefore it is best defined locally, based on domestic initiatives. If local ownership is understood this way, it will create the foundation for legitimacy, accountability and sustainability (Ebo 2007: 84). Therefore, local ownership should entail donor support for programmes and projects initiated by local actors, instead of local support for donor programmes and projects. He states that “local participation in externally driven initiatives is not synonymous with local ownership. Ownership relates to the source of the security vision that is adopted and implemented” (ibid.). Carlowitz (2011) researches processes of local ownership in Kosovo and Liberia by interviewing actors. Based on this research, he argues that local ownership in new institutions in Liberia and Kosovo was achieved via three possible approaches. The first possibility is a gradual handover of planning, management and oversight competencies to local actors. The second mean to achieve local ownership is local participation in relevant decision-making processes. Lastly, various forms of capacity building were seen as the main means to effect a local appropriation of international programmes and ideas (Carlowitz 2011: 51). However, he argues that real ownership exists when “local actors design, manage and implement institutions or projects themselves” (idem: 50). Thus,
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local actors should have input in the design of the efforts, rather than only participate in the projects.
Billerbeck (2015) sets forth the practices and the specific actions that the UN undertakes to build and maintain local ownership (Billerbeck 2015: 303). She states that UN staff remain vague how they build local ownership, causing the efforts to be unplanned and incoherent. They can include meetings with local actors, public information campaigns or trainings, however there is no reflection if these activities effectively create ownership. Furthermore, the activities are often communicative or symbolic in nature, with little actual agency attached to them. Lastly, the practices are often unidirectional, one-off events in which the UN distributes information to local actors but no opportunities for a response (ibid.). Moreover, the UN often enacts tasks themselves in order to deliver fast results. Therefore, local actors are unable to gain the capacity to formulate their own priorities and to manage and implement technical reconstruction tasks (idem: 304). Local actors often only have ‘token ownership’, because they are not able to influence the design and planning of peacebuilding efforts. This is especially the case with the liberal approach to local ownership, when a larger group of local actors are included in the peacebuilding activities. Elite ownership gives a more exclusive group substantive ownership (idem: 304, 307).
This thesis will use the different approaches outlined above to analyse how the UN implemented local ownership in the mission in Liberia. What actors did they involve? How did they involve these actors?
4. Methodology and documents
In this chapter, the used methods to analyse the UN discourse will be explained. Secondly, the documents that will be analysed will be set forth.
§4.1 Methods
In this thesis, both a quantitative and a qualitative analysis will be conducted with the use of the programme Atlas.ti. The quantitative part will analyse if and how many times there is spoken about local ownership and how many times each actor is mentioned. The qualitative part of the analysis will research the context, how the concept of local ownership is formulated and how the actors are involved. Combining both methods will help getting an encompassing understanding of the UNMIL discourse on local ownership.
Two methods will be used to answer these questions. Firstly, discourse analysis. Discourse analysis sees language as essential to the construction of social reality (Phillips et al. 2004: 637). Discourse is a social practice that both constitutes the social world and is constituted by other
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social practices (Mutlu and Salter 2012: 113). Discourse constitutes the social world by ruling certain ways of talking about subjects. It defines what an acceptable and understandable way to talk, write or conduct oneself is. It rules out and limits other ways of talking, writing and conducting ourselves (Hall 2001: 72). Thus, discourse does not only describe things, it also ‘does things’. Discourses makes sense of the world and gives the world meaning. This ‘sense making’ and the meaning ascribed to the world generate particular experiences and practices (Philips et al. 2004: 636).
Discourse analysis is a useful theoretical framework to illustrate how “textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and to describe, in specific contexts, the implications of this connection for the way we think and act in the contemporary world” (George 1994: 191, Milliken 1999: 225). Foucault argues that we should treat discourses as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak (Foucault 1972: 49, Mutlu and Salter 2012: 113). Moreover, discourse analysis is useful for demonstrating how language impacts discourses and practices of security. It can demonstrate how competing narratives can shape security practices (Mutlu and Salter 2012: 118). It is thus a useful and valuable framework to analyse how the UN discourse on SSR and justice reform and link this to the theories by Autesserre and Paris.
Next to this discourse analysis, a document analysis method is executed. Document analysis is “the collection, review, interrogation, and analysis of various forms of text as a primary source of research data” (O’Leary 2004: 177). There are two techniques to do document analysis, namely the interview technique and noting occurrences. When using the interview technique, the researcher ‘asks the document questions’. When using the noting occurrences technique, the researcher quantifies the use of particular words, phrases and concepts. After determining what is being looked for, the researcher notes the amount, frequency and the context of occurrence (ibid.). These techniques will help answer the questions posed in the theoretical framework:? How are local actors involved? Which local actors are involved?
§4.2 Documents
The documents that will be analysed are collected from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org
and http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents. On these websites, all the progress reports from the
UN Secretary-General to the UN Security Council are stored. The first progress report was published on December 15th 2003 and the last report was published on April 13th 2018. A total
period of fourteen year and three months is analysed in which the Secretary-General wrote 34 progress reports to the UN Security Council. These documents can be defined as authoritative sources, “documents that by their authorship attempt to be unbiased and objective” (O’Leary 2004: 178). Moreover, they contain valuable information about the full range of UNMIL’s efforts to implement the mandate and of the interaction with national and international actors. Moreover,
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these documents also tend to have political agendas, assumptions and goals (Farral 2012: 312). For these two reasons these documents are very interesting to analyse.
5. Case description
In 1980, Master-Sergeant Samuel K. Doe got into power by launching a violent coup which ended the decades of relative stability and longevity in Liberia. President Tolbert and thirteen prominent members of his regime were killed (Farral 2012: 314-315). Before the coup, Liberia was ruled by ‘Americo-Liberians’, freed slaves from the United States, who ruled in the same way as former colonial and imperial governments did. By presenting himself as the representative of the long-oppressed native Liberians, Doe gained widespread popular support. However, by deepening ethnic tensions, driving the country towards economic ruin and implementing oppressive policies, Doe drove Liberia towards a new coup (ibid., Howe 1996: 147). In 1989 Charles Taylor led a rebellion against Doe’s government, backed by Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso. This caught the attention of The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS created a peacekeeping force, the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) which provided a ceasefire (ICG 2002: 2, Farral 2012: 316). In spite of this peacekeeping force, the country remained unstable and several factions kept fighting each other.
Three years later, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to support ECOMOG in implementing the peace agreement. In 1997 elections were held with the help of the UN and ECOMOG. A new government, led by election winner President Taylor, was formed (BBC 2018, unmil.unmissions.org 2018). Therefore UNOMIL’s principal objective was achieved and its mandate was completed. The UN established the successor of UNOMIL, the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) which was tasked with assisting the government in consolidating peace after the elections (ibid.). In spite of this, the stability in Liberia remained elusive. President Taylor was accused of war crimes, because he supported Revolutionary United Front rebels in Sierra Leone. Subsequently, the UN reimposed an arm embargo to punish Taylor for his war crimes. Moreover, in 2000, the first attacks of a new rebel group, the LURD, are reported. Moreover, the UN reports systematic abuses of human rights and the exclusion and harassment of political opponents. Over 50,000 people fled the fighting and the violence. In 2002 president Taylor declared the state of emergency (BBC 2018, unmil.unmissions.org). The fighting intensified as the LURD and MODEL rebels battled for the control over the capital Monrovia and a humanitarian tragedy threatened.
Then, the UN decided to establish a three-phased deployment of international troops in Liberia. This lead to the termination of UNOL, since this operation would encompass more than the UNOL
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mandate encompassed. On the first of August 2003, the Security Council authorized the establishment of the UNMIL mission. Eighteen days later, the warring Liberian parties signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA requested the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force to support the National Transitional Government and assist in the implementation of the peace agreement. After the CPA was signed, the rebels started handing in their weapons and on the first of October the UN deployed their troops, taking over the peacekeeping duties from ECOWAS (BBC 2018).
The initial UNMIL mandate was established for a period of 12 months. The mandate consisted of five elements, namely the protection of civilians, the reform of justice and security institutions, human rights promotion and protection, public information and the protection of United Nations personnel. In the beginning, the mission consisted of 15000 United Nations military personnel. UNMIL was a multidimensional peacekeeping mission, it composed of multiple components, namely political, military, police, criminal justice, civil affairs, human rights, gender, child protection, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, public information, electoral and support components (Fortna 2004: 270, Unmil.unmissions.org 2018).
The reform of justice and security institutions formed one of the four main task of UNMIL. The mandate states:
“to assist the transitional Government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a civilian police training programme, and
to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police, in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations, and interested States
to assist the transitional Government in the formation of a new and restructured Liberian military in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations and interested States” ((UNSC
S/RES/1509: 4)
Regarding the Justice reform, UNMIL merely had an assisting role. Its mandate was to assist the Liberian Government in re-establishing national authority, including a functioning administrative structure, and ‘in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions’ (Carlowitz 2011: 5). The mandate states:
“Support reform of justice and security institutions by assisting the Government of Liberia in implementing its national strategy on Security Sector Reform (SSR) and advising on SSR and the
organization of the Liberia National Police (LNP), Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN) and the justice and corrections sector;” (UNSC S/RES/1509: 4)
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6. Analysis
The analysis of this thesis consists of three elements, namely the reform of the LNP, the restructuring of the AFL and the justice reform.
§6.1 The reform of the LNP
First of all, the reform of the LNP will be analysed. , the term local ownership is not mentioned once. First, it will be analysed what actors were involved in the reform of the justice sector, whereafter it will be analysed how these actors were involved.
What actors?
In the following infographic, the involved actors in the reform process of the LNP are displayed and how many times each actor is mentioned.
44 5
2 7
How many times where the actors mentioned?
National actors Local actors Civil society International actors
29 12 3 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Government Ministry and
Minister President
National actors
2 1 1 1 0 5 10 15 20 25 30Local community Local government
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The most involved actors in the reform of the LNP are categorized as national actors, namely the Government, the Ministries, the Minister and the President. The total amount of national actors mentioned is 44. In this category, the Government is mentioned most, whereas the Ministries and Ministers are respectively mentioned nine and three times. This is in contrast to how many times local actors are mentioned that are involved in the reform of the LNP, namely five times. Moreover, civil society is only mentioned twice.
Now, the discourse will be discussed in more depth, highlighting certain quotes which will provide a better understanding of how these actors were mentioned and in what context. In the third progress report is stated:
“In order to ensure a holistic approach in supporting the reform of Liberia’s security sector, a Rule of Law Implementation Committee has been established to coordinate the reform of the police, the judiciary and correctional institutions. The Committee — which is chaired by the Deputy Special Representative for Rule of Law and comprises the Minister of Justice, the National Security Adviser,
a representative of the Chief Justice, the Director of the Liberian National Police and representatives of the UNMIL civilian police, corrections, judiciary and human rights components — is currently formulating the strategy for the reform and restructuring of the police force, which
has been renamed the Liberian Police Service” (UNSC S/2004/430:7)
This quote describes that the SSR is a coordinated reform of both internal, Liberian actors and external actors. The Minister of Justice, the National Security Adviser, a representative of the Chief Justice and the Director of the Liberian National Police are all national actors. They fit Billerbecks definition of ‘elite ownership’, which selects high-level state political and military elites who have the necessary capacities to bring about change. Nonstate actors such as civil society organizations, local NGO’s or representatives of marginalized and vulnerable groups are not included in coordinating the framework for the reforms of the LNP. The external actors involved are representatives of UNMIL.
Secondly, the involvement of local actors and communities. The Secretary-General barely reports involvement of the local communities in the restructuring of the LNP. The first engagement with communities in this process is stated in the 18th report, on the 10th of February 2009. In the first
seventeen reports before that, communities or local actors are not involved in the reform process. It can be concluded that UNMIL mostly involved national actors. This is in accordance with what Billerbeck describes as an elitist approach to local ownership, in which actors are selected on their capacities to help efficiently deliver output. Involved actors are often high-level state, political, economic and military elites. The other approach to local ownership is liberal ownership, in which actors are selected on their values, often including civil society groups and other nonstate actors.
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Civil society groups are only mentioned twice. Moreover, local non state actors are mentioned four times. This is in stark contrast to government actors, which are mentioned 38 times. Thus, UNMIL did not select actors based on the liberal approach to local ownership.
How where the actors involved?
Now, it will be analysed how these actors were involved. First of all, the national actors.
The national actors are in total thirteen times mentioned in relation to policy, of which the UN was involved five times. In the category ‘other’, statements about ‘addressing challenges’, initiated training, recruitment, information campaigns and allocation of resources and funding are composed. Mostly, the national actors were involved in the recruitment of new police forces (S/2004/430:6, S/2004/972:6). These recruitment were initiated in collaboration with UNMIL. Furthermore, the national actors were involved in decision-making, for example by approving police structure reforms (S/2005/764:7) or appointing a new Director of Police and other leadership positions (S/2006/376:5). However, when national actors were involved in decision-making, this was often in collaboration with or assisted by UNMIL.
Secondly, it will be analysed how the LNP itself was involved in the reform process. The LNP was eight times mentioned in relation to policy. However this was not until later on in the mission. In the beginning, the UN mostly initiated new or reformed policies. During the later years of UNMIL, the LNP did launch some initiatives, mostly campaigns and policies in order to be more inclusive of women and for increasing female representation in the police force (UNSC S/2003479:8). Furthermore, the police formulated policies to promote gender mainstreaming in the education and training of police officers (UNSC S/2004/972:6). Because these actions were initiated by the LNP, they can fit Ebo’s understanding of local ownership of SSR: local ownership should entail
4 7 3 9 6 0 5 10 15 20 25 Policy Other
How was the Government
involved?
Government With UN With International Partners
22 4 2 2 3 1 0 5 10 15 20 25
Policy Other In committee
How were the Ministry
and Minister involved?
Ministry and Minister With UN 5
6 7
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donor support for programmes and projects initiated by local actors (Ebo 2007: 84). These campaigns are primarly owned by the Liberian National Police, UNMIL played an supporting role. Furthermore, the LNP was involved in the recruitment process of new police forces. This process is described as a collaboration of UNMIL with the (National Transitional) Government of Liberia and the Liberian National Police itself. Recruitment campaigns were initiated by UNMIL, whereas the Liberian National Police and the Government merely collaborated. Following Ebo’s definition of local ownership, actions need to be initiated by local actors, there is no local ownership of the recruitment process.
“Thereafter, UNMIL undertook an extensive recruitment drive for new police recruits, in collaboration with the National Transitional Government of Liberia and the Liberian National
Police” (UNSC S/2004/972:6).
“The United Nations Police, in collaboration with the Liberian National Police, recently launched a further countrywide recruitment drive to increase the pool of qualified applicants” (UNSC
S/2006/376:5)
After a few years UNMIL started involving the LNP more in the process. An example is the training of new police recruits. In the first years of the mission, the recruits were trained by the UN. After six years, UNMIL slowly started to include LNP officers in the training of new recruits. In 2009, the training was mostly executed by LNP officers themselves (UNSC S/2009/86:6). Billerbeck (2015) argued that because the UN often enacts tasks themselves to achieve fast results, local actors are unable to build capacity. By allowing LNP instructors to train new recruits, UNMIL started with a gradual handover of responsibilities to the LNP. This is an opportunity for LNP instructors to build capacity. Moreover, the term capacity-building is mentioned three times. UNMIL initiated multiple trainings aimed at capacity-building (UNSC S/2009/411:7, UNSC S/2015:275:11, UNSC S/2015/620:10). This is in accordance with what Carlowitz (2011) describes in his research, that UNMIL tried to realize local ownership in three ways of which capacity building and gradual handover of tasks are two (Carlowitz 2011: 51). However, Carlowitz argues that local ownership is when local actors design, manage and implement projects themselves. Although the LNP was involved, they participated in training and recruitment campaigns, the police did not design these programmes. Therefore, these initiatives were not locally owned. In addition, following Ebo’s definition of local ownership it cannot be concluded that the LNP, nor the Government are the owners, since these training programmes are set up by UNMIL and are dependent on external support.
Now, it will be analysed how local actors are involved in the reform process. As described in the former paragraph, local actors are barely involved in the reform process. The first time they are
17
mentioned is in the 18th report, on the 10th of February 2009. There is stated that community
police forums were established to strengthen the contact between the LNP and local communities.
“As part of the effort to restore public confidence in the police, community police forums were established in all counties to strengthen contacts between the Liberian National Police and local
communities” (UNSC S/2009/86:7)
“The national police held over 600 community police meetings across the country, including 30 outreach programmes involving schools. The public has displayed an increased willingness to
participate in community police meetings and to provide information contributing to the prevention of crime and arrests” (UNSC S/2013/124**:9)
The goal of community police forums is to increase citizen’s participation and for the LNP to take ownership. In 2013, more communicy policing forums were launched, in combination with a community policing leadership training. In these trainings, police officers, community chairpersons, civil society organizations, local government and traditional authorities came together. However, it cannot be concluded that local actors had substantial influence on the reforms via these forums. These community forums and trainings are communicative in nature, there is little real agency attached to them (Billerbeck 2015: 303). Therefore, these initiatives can be seen as an opportunity for the LNP to gain ownership, but not for local actors.
It can be concluded that UNMIL mostly selected national, elitist actors. The Government participated in the design of the new structure of the LNP. Secondly, by focussing on capacity-building and gradually handing over training competencies to the LNP, the police was able to gain some ownership of the security sector latre on in the mission. However, the LNP did not have influence on the design of the new structure. Local actors were not involved in the reform of the police. The few initiatives to engage local actors were mostly communicative or symbolic in nature. This is in accordance with the cosmopolitan view of local ownership, in which international actors set the parameters of local ownership (Richmond 2011: 358). Local actors did not set the framework for the reforms, the framework was mostly set by the UN.
§6.2 The reform of the AFL
Now, the reform of the AFL will be analysed. The term ‘local ownership’ is not mentioned once in the reports of the Secretary-General on the reform of the army. Following the theoretical framework, it will first be analysed what actors were involved and secondly how they were involved.
18
What actors?
In the following infographic, the involved actors in the reform process of the AFL are displayed and how many times they are mentioned.
The most involved actor in the reform of the AFL is the US. The US took the lead in the reform of the AFL, as it was requested in the CPA. The US contracted two US-based private companies, DynCorp and the Pacific Architect and Engineers (PAE). These companies were mentioned respectively five and three times in the report. International organizations were mentioned seven times. After the US, national actors are mentioned most. Local actors, communities, traditional leaders or civil society were not mentioned once in the reports of the Secretary-General on the reform of the AFL. The following infographic gives an overview of what actors are categorised as national and international and how many times each specific actor was mentioned.
34
63
1
How many times where the actors mentioned?
National actors International actors Rebel groups
44 7 8 2 2 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 US IO's DynCorp
and PAEPartners States
International actors
20 7 5 2 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50Government Ministry President Minister
19
Now, the actors which were involved in the reform of the AFL will be discussed more in depth. In the first progress report is stated that a Military Advisory Committee was established, which was tasked with developing proposals for the reform and restructuring of the AFL. Representatives of the rebel groups LURD and MODEL were members of this committee:
“A Military Advisory Committee made up of the Chiefs of Staff of the former government forces, LURD and MODEL has been established and charged with developing proposals for the reform and
the restructuring of Liberia’s armed forces. […] The Committee’s recommendations will be considered by the National Transitional Government before they are submitted to UNMIL and other
interested international partners” (UNSC S/2003/1175:8)
It can be concluded that there was an elitist, state-centred approach to local ownership in the reform of the military. In an elite approach to local ownership, actors are based on technical capacities. In contrast to the liberal approach, the UN does not per se avoid actors whom are associated with violence, corruption or human right abuses (Billerbeck 2015: 305). In the Military and Advisory Committee, military elites were involved, namely the Chiefs of Staff of the former government forces. In addition, LURD and MODEL were involved which can also be seen as elites with the capacities to deliver concrete outputs, since these were the most important rebel groups. Next to the Military and Advisory Committee, the only Liberian actors that were involved were political elites, namely the Government, the Ministries and Ministers and the President. The actors involved were mostly national actors, thus local ownership was defined in a national way. The UN did not select actors based on the liberal approach to local ownership, because nonstate actors and civil society groups are not mentioned in the reports on AFL reform.
How where the actors involved?
In the reform of the AFL, external actors had a big influence. The involvement of these actors will be analysed first, whereafter it will be analysed how the internal actors were involved. First of all, the US. As stated in the previous paragraph, the US contracted Dyncorp and PAE. In the sixth progress report is stated that the US contracted DynCorp (UNSC S/2005/177:6-7). In the fifteenth progress report the tasks of both private companies is outlined. The progress reports do not state how DynCorp and PAE executed their tasks, besides stating how many new soldiers have been recruited and how many have been trained.
“The United States continues to support the building of a new 2,000-strong Armed Forces of Liberia. It has contracted two private companies, DynCorp and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), to
implement this project. DynCorp is responsible for the recruitment and the provision of basic training of the recruits at the Barclay and Camp Ware training centres, while PAE is responsible for
20
providing advanced training of the recruits and the construction of the barracks, as well as the battalion and brigade headquarters, at Camp Kessely near Monrovia” (UNSC S/2007/479:6-7)
Furthermore, international organizations are mentioned in the progress reports. Of these international organizations, ECOWAS mentioned most and in multiple contexts. First of all, ECOWAS and other international organizations were requested to assist the Transitional Government of Liberia in the reform of the AFL, as stated in the CPA and mandate. Secondly, for a long period ECOWAS officers filled key leadership positions in the military (UNSC S/2009/86:6, UNSC S/2010/429:6). Furthermore, ECOWAS provided mentoring and training for the military in the end of the mission in collaboration with the US and other countries (UNSC S/2017/510:11, UNSC S/2018/344:8). Both the involvement of external actors and the outsourcing of the reform to the US based private companies DynCorp and PAE seriously limited the local ownership in the reform of the army, because local actors were not able to design and implement the peace efforts, nor initiate actions.
Despite this, national actors, mostly the Government, did have some influence in the reform process. As the mission progressed and the Government established its legitimacy, it was involved more in the reform of the ALF. This will now be discussed.
The Government is mentioned twenty times, predominantly in relation to the US and DynCorp and PAE. For instance when the US assisted the Government or when there was a collaboration between the Government and UNMIL. Moreover, the Government was mentioned five times in relation to formulating policies or making decisions. For example, the Government formulated a National Security Strategy (UNSC S/2006/376:3, UNSC S/2006/743:6), and discussed the key issues of the reform with the US (UNSC S/2004/430:8). The Government was four times involved in relation to budgetary questions, for example defining the needed resources for certain reform initiatives (UNSC S/2005/391:7). In the 20th progress is report is stated that
on the first of January 2010 the Government assumed official responsibility for the advancement of the AFL (UNSC S/2010/88:6). However, after the US handed over the official responsibility to the Government, the US stayed involved in strengthening the army.
7 4 5 1 1 2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
How was the
government involved?
21
The second national actor is the president. The president is mentioned five times in the progress reports. Four times, the president had some real ownership in the development of the ALF, for example by nominating a new Chief of Staff for the ALF, sending military forces to the mission in Mali and activating the coast guard. However, this was not until later in the mission. In the early years, the president is more symbolically involved, as described by Billerbeck (2015: 304).
“Three rifle companies of the First Infantry Battalion of the Armed Forces of Liberia were activated at a ceremony presided over by President Johnson-Sirleaf” (UNSC S/2008/183:7)
In contrast to the reform of the LNP, there was less focus on capacity-building, which is argued to enhance local ownership (Carlowitz 2011: 51). Capacity-building is mentioned once in the Secretary-General progress reports. The 21st progress reports states that UNMIL supports
capacity-building by participating in training (UNSC S/2010/429:60). Besides this, there was no focus on capacity-building.
It can be concluded that there was no local ownership of the reform of the AFL. By outsourcing the main elements of this task to DynCorp and PAE, local actors were not able to have input in the reforms, nor participate in the management. National actors were mentioned in the progress reports, but mostly in relation to the US or UN. Moreover, local actors, communities and civil society are not mentioned once in the progress reports.
§6.3 the justice reform
Now, the justice reform will be analysed. Similar to the reform of the LNP and AFL, the term local ownership is not mentioned once. First, it will be analysed what actors were involved in the reform of the justice sector, whereafter it will be analysed how these actors were involved.
What actors?
106 14
7 23
How many times were the actors mentioned?
22
National actors are mentioned the most in the reform of the justice sector. This is in line with the UNMIL mandate, which stated that the executive power and responsibility rested with the Government. It is probable that national actors have been mentioned 106 times, since they had executive power. Secondly, international actors have been mentioned 23 times. A broad range of international actors are named in the reports, as shown in the infographic below.
Moreover, a broad range of local actors was involved in the reform of the justice sector. However, the local actors involved are mostly representatives from the national legal and justice system (UNSC S/2004/725:6, UNSC S/2004/972:6). Furthermore, national stakeholders, partners and counterparts are mentioned. Liberian organizations such as the Liberian National Bar Association are also involved in the reform process (UNSC S/2005/560:10). The reports refer once to communities. Lastly, civil society is involved in the reform process. Civil society is mentioned seven times, of which a local nongovernmental organization is mentioned once (UNSC S/2004/430:8).
It can be concluded that in the justice reform the UN involved both actors selected via the elitist liberal approach. The most involved actors were the national actors, namely the Government, Minister, Ministry and president. Since the responsibility of the justice reform rested with the Liberian Government, it is reasonable that they are involved the most. Secondly, civil society and a broad range of local actors were also involved. This group represents the liberal approach to local ownership. 43 43 8 12 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
National actors
8 1 5 3 6 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50International actors
23
How where the actors involved?
Now it will be analysed how the actors were involved. Firstly, the national actors will be analysed. In total, the national actors are mentioned 41 times in relation to policy. For example when drafting laws, formulating strategies or designing new legal frameworks. 21 times it is explicitly stated the national actors were working together with UNMIL personnel, or where supported by UNMIL. 21 times, national actors are mentioned in relation to policy without explicit mentioned UN involvement. Moreover, the category ‘other’ is the collective name for statements about training, initiating workshops or working groups, strengthening institutions, allocation of resources, funding and improving conditions in facilities. In this category, national actors are mentioned 26 times without explicitly mentioned UN support or involvement. 26 times the UN is working together, assisting or supporting the national actors in these activities.
Now, each actor will be analysed in more depth. First of all, the Government. The Government is eight times the sole executive power in policy related actions. For example:
“The Government established a sexual and gender based violence unit combining investigative and prosecutorial response with victim support” (UNSC S/2009/411:8)
“Government-led measures are ongoing to address system-wide weaknesses, including a pilot case management project expected to begin in early 2011” (UNSC S/2011/72:7)
However, the majority of the times the Government mentioned in relation to policy, is with assistance of UNMIL. These quotes show that UNMIL assisted with the design of the reform framework and the formulation of manuals and handbooks which for everyday use in the judiciary. This makes it clear that UNMIL had a great influence on the decision-making processes of the justice reform.
18 26 23 26 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Policy Other
National actors / UN
National actors With UN 41 52 6 16 12 9 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Policy Other
How was the government
involved?
Government With UN 18
24
“The rule of law task force, which was established to develop a strategy on rule of law reform, has submitted its final report to the Government. The report is expected to assist the Government in the
coordination of legal and judicial reforms” (UNSC S/2006/376:9)
“The Mission is helping the Government to elaborate a policy framework for judicial reform” (UNSC S/2007/479:9)
“UNMIL has prepared a guidance bench book for magistrates and is now working in collaboration with the Government in preparing a prosecutorial manual as a reference handbook for prosecutors
“(UNSC S/2008/553:10)
Secondly, it will be analysed how the Minister of Justice and the Ministries were involved in the justice reform.
The Ministries were involved 43 times in total. Firstly, they were consulted by the UN in the beginning of the mission (UNSC S/2004/229:8). Furthermore, the majority of the times a Ministry was mentioned, the Ministry worked together with or was assisted by UNMIL personnel.
“In collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, the Mission is also developing proposals for the revision, harmonization and codification of laws” (UNSC S/2004/972:7)
The Minister of Justice was involved in the justice reform process by being a member of multiple committees, for example the Rule of Law Implementation Committee and the Juvenile Justice Forum. Moreover, the Minister of Justice constituted the Law Reform Commission.
6 10 9 17 1 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Policy Other Consulted
How were the ministries
involved?
Ministry With UN 27 15 6 4 2 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Policy Member of a committeeHow was the Minister of
Justice involved?
Minister of Justice With UN 8
25
“The task force constituted by the Minister of Justice to facilitate the establishment of the Commission organized a series of stakeholders’ symposiums and public interactive forums, following which a draft law for the establishment of the Commission was finalized and submitted to
the Minister of Justice on 25 September” (UNSC S/2006/958:9)
The national actors had substantive ownership in the reform of the justice. However, UN personnel prepared handbooks, drafted policy and designed framework. Mostly, the reports state that these preparations are merely ‘providing the Government with policy options’. Nevertheless, this can be seen as extensive UNMIL influence on decision-making processes in justice reform, since the UN formulates the possibilities. This links to the theories set forth by Autesserre (2017) and Paris (2003), stating that there is a certain global culture or assumption which defines what is seen as possible action, and what is not seen as possible (Autesserre 2017: 122, Paris 2003: 442-443). Therefore, it can be concluded that UNMIL formed the reform of the justice sector in a substantive way in spite of the ‘assisting role’ that was described in the mandate.
Now, it will be analysed how the local actors were involved in the justice reform. UNMIL consulted with civil society and local actors, such as representatives of the legal and judicial institutions, for example on ways and means of strengthening the judicial system. In total, the reports mention seven consultations. Next to the consultations with civil society and representatives, the Secretary-General reports nationwide consultations initiated by the Ministry of Justice (UNSC 2014/123:10). However, the first time these consultations were held was in 2011, eight years after the UNMIL started.
In addition, multiple initiatives were launched to engage the public with the justice reform. For example workshops, public education seminars and civic education activities to inform communities and sensitize the public on the new role of the justice institutions (UNSC S/2004/725:7, UNSC S/2013/124:10). Moreover, there is an emphasize on the public outreach of the justice sector.
“UNMIL continued to provide logistical support to the Commission and launched a programme on UNMIL Radio called “TRC in Action” to enhance public awareness of the activities of the
Commission” (UNSC S/2006/958/7)
“The Law Reform Commission initiated an awareness-raising programme to inform the public about its role and undertook capacity-building initiatives, such as mentoring and training in records management, research and legislative drafting and codification” (UNSC S/2012/641:8)
These activities are mostly initiated by UNMIL, sometimes in collaboration with national actors. Following Ebo’s definition of local ownership, these initiatives are not locally owned. The public education seminars, workshops and the radio programme are unidirectional initiatives, in which
26
UNMIL and national actors distributed information. The local actors had no real opportunity to respond and influence the reforms and therefore this can be seen as token ownership.
It can be concluded that in comparison to the reform of the LNP and AFL, local actors and civil society were more involved. Via consultations, public information campaigns and education seminars, UNMIL tried to involve local actors. However, local actors did not have a real
opportunity at influencing the design of the reforms. Furthermore, national, elitist actors were involved in the reforms. However, by doing most of the preparatory work themselves, the UN decided what the possibilities for the reform of policies and laws were. Therefore, the UN set the parameters for the justice reform. It can be concluded that this is in accordance with the
cosmopolitan view of local ownership.
7. Conclusion and discussion
After analysing the reports of the Secretary-General, it can be concluded that local ownership is not mentioned once on the reform of the LNP, AFL and justice system. This is surprising, since the UN emphasizes the importance of local ownership. It shows a discrepancy between what the UN advocates, and how local ownership is practically approached during missions. This discrepancy is in accordance with what Billerbeck argues, that there is a difference between the UN discourse and the operationalization of local ownership.
Now the results of all three analysed components will be discussed. First of all, the reform of the LNP. In the police reform, UNMIL selected actors via the elitist approach. National actors, including the Government, the President, Ministries and Ministers, were involved in the reform process. National actors were able to give input in the design of the reforms, therefore they had substantive ownership. The LNP itself was involved in the reform process via a gradual handover of management and capacity-building. However, the police was not able to give input in the of the reforms from the start. Local actors, such as civil society and other nonstate actors were engaged in the reforms via actions which were communicative or symbolic in nature. Therefore, local actors gained only token ownership. Secondly, in the reform of the AFL, there was an elitist, state-centred approach to selecting internal actors whom to involve in the reform. Both high-state political elites and military elites were involved. However, there was no substantive local ownership, because the main reform tasks were outsourced. Because of this, local actors were unable to give input in the design of the reform strategy. There was no attention for the civilian’s experience of security. Lastly, in the Justice reform, UNMIL tried to involve both national actors and local actors. National actors had substantive ownership of the reforms. However, UN personnel provided the Government with policy options by doing most of the preparatory work.
27
Therefore, external actors set the parameters for the local reform. Furthermore, local, nonstate actors and civil society groups were engaged. However, this was predominantly via communicative or symbolic actions, which were unidirectional. Local actors gained token ownership, but not substantive ownership.
To answer the research question, ‘how did the UN approach local ownership in SSR and justice reform in Liberia?”, UNMIL mainly selected actors via the elitist approach. The involved actors in the Security Sector and Justice reforms are not representative and the reforms are not rooted in local structures. Moreover, the framework for the reforms and local ownership was not based on local traditions, structures and interests. The parameters were set by international actors. Thus, local ownership was viewed in the cosmopolitan way. This approach to local ownership is highly selective, causing the main objective of local ownership to be undermined. The legitimacy and sustainability of the reforms is undermined by mostly involving high-state, elitist actors and the parameters being set by external actors. In order to realize more legitimacy and sustainability of the Security Sector and Justice reforms, the UN should include a broader range of actors and take the civilian experience of security in account. Not only should the UN involve national, elitist actors, they should also include nonstate actors and civil society in the reform process.
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