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EULEX-KFOR COOPERATION IN
POST-CONFLICT KOSOVO
A
CASE FOR
EU-NATO
INFORMAL COOPERATION
Name Mariana Sofia Guedes da Silva
Student number s2237717
Supervisor Prof. Dr. J. A. Koops
Second reader Prof. Dr. A. L. Dimitrova
Master Thesis
Crisis and Security Management MSc 2018/2019
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BSTRACTThis thesis’ purpose is to contribute to the analysis of inter-organizational relations, especially regarding the cooperation dynamics embedded in the relationship between inter-governmental organizations. An essential concept is overlap, which can occur when the organizations start performing in the same policy area and the same region. When this happens, one can consider domain similarity. Cooperation is not a given, though, as other factors contribute for the character of the relationship, such as compatibility of interests and perceptions on the advantages of engaging with the other organizations. The EU and NATO form a case study in their interaction in Kosovo, where both have crisis management tasks, from training of security forces to deployment of security forces. Despite the joint statements and the reassurances of matching interests in the Balkans, the reality might feature some level of rivalry, considering the functional convergence of both organizations and the potential conflict the theory indicates might arise.
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ABLE OF CONTENTS List of abbreviations 4 1. Introduction 6 2. Literature review 9 2.1. Inter-organizational relations 9 2.1.1. Domain 13 2.1.2. Collaboration 15 2.1.3. Levels of interaction 16 2.1.4. Summary 17 2.2. EU-NATO 172.2.1. Post-conflict stabilization and state-building 18
2.2.2. Background of EU-NATO relations 21
2.3. Kosovo – a case of EU-NATO interaction 27
2.3.1. The Kosovo conflict in brief 27
2.3.2. Deployment of international missions 29
2.3.3. EULEX and KFOR in Kosovo – mandates 34
3. Methodology 38 3.1. Data gathering 38 3.2. Limitations 39 4. Empirical analysis 40 4.1.Missions 40 4.1.1. EULEX 40 4.1.2. KFOR 44
4.2.Functional overlap in Kosovo 46
4.2.1. Policing and border control 47
4.2.2. Northern Kosovo and dialogue with Serbia 50
4.2.3. Protection of human and minority rights and multi-ethnic
representation in Kosovo institutions 54
4.2.4. Summary 56
4.3.Features of EULEX-KFOR interaction 57
4.3.1. Political framework 57
4.3.2. Strategic and operational levels 59
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5. Concluding remarks 68
5.1. Linking theory and case-study 68
5.2. Recommendations 72 6. References 73 7. Annexes 90 Annex A 90 Annex B 91 Annex C 93
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IST OF ABBREVIATIONSCCP Common Crossing Points
CEPC Civil Emergency Planning Committee
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
COM Commander
CRC Crowd and riot control
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EDC European Defence Community
EEM Elections Expert Mission
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
EU European Union
EULEX EU Rule of Law mission
EUPT EU Planning Team
FOM Freedom of movement
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
HOM Head of Mission
IBM Integrated Border management
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICO International Civilian Office
ICR International Civilian Representative
IGO International Governmental Organization
IOR Inter-organizational relations
JOR Joint operations room
KBP Kosovo Border Police
KFOR Kosovo Force
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
KP Kosovo Police
KPC Kosovo Protection Corps
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KSF Kosovo Security Forces
KTRBN KFOR Tactical Reserve Battalion
KVM Kosovo Verification Mission
LMT Liaison Monitoring Teams
MKSF Ministry of Kosovo Security Forces
MSU Multinational Specialized Unit
MTA Military Technical Agreement
NAC North-Atlantic Council
NATO North-Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-governmental Organization
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe OSU Kosovo Police Regional Operational Support Units
PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation
PISG Provisional Institutions of Self- Government
PSC Political and Security Committee
RDT Resource Dependence Theory
SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAF Serbian Armed Forces
SAP Stabilization and Association Process
SASE Safe and secure environment
SHADE Shared Awareness and Deconfliction
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
TAIEX Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Office
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSG United Nations Secretary-General
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1. I
NTRODUCTIONThe European Union (EU) and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have common features beyond a similar membership - indeed, 22 out of 29 NATO members are EU members as well. Since the 1990s that both organizations have been involved in crisis management,1 deploying in post-conflict state-building peacebuilding missions.2
To perform its foreign policy, the EU has mostly resorted to economic and political assets such as trade agreements and prospects of membership, establishing itself as a “soft power” global actor. Nevertheless, diverse means, including military, are deployed into Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) peacebuilding missions (cf. Zielonka, 1998; Larsen, 2002, Piskorska, 2018).
NATO is a collective defence organization. This principle is consecrated in article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that “the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all” (NATO, 2019a) and therefore, a collective military response be deployed if a member invokes article 5. However, the “non-article 5” crisis response operations can be deployed if authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (NATO, 2018d). Despite the distinct nature and the core capabilities of these organizations, since the end of the Cold War, they have strived for new institutional structures that diversify their capabilities and allow them to engage in the international (security) arena in a more autonomous and flexible way (Smith & Gebhard, 2017). For examples, NATO has been adapting its structures to new challenges related to reconstruction and humanitarian relief, namely, by deploying “smaller, restructured, highly mobile and versatile forces to be used in a more flexible way” (Touzovskaia, 2006, p. 243).The EU has been encouraging its member-states to invest in their armed forces, and has indeed, deployed military missions abroad since the early 2000’s, Operation Concordia being the first of such, deployed in 2003.3 Indeed, the EU has not established itself as a “hard power” actor, leaving NATO with its traditional role of military defence (Smith & Gebhard, 2017). The employment of military assets was to broaden the range of available crisis management instruments, depending on the case, e.g., training related to mine dismantlement (Larsen, 2002). The
1 See sub-section 2.2.1. for definitions. 2 See sub-section 2.2.1. for definitions.
3 Cf. Palm (2012) for insights on the EU’s involvement in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
namely through the deployment of Operation Concordia, and on the character of the EU’s foreign involvement, especially regarding the employment of military and non-military means.
7 EU’s CSDP was not developed to replace NATO,4 but to enable a more active role in European security in the form of crisis management (Raik & Jarvenpaa, 2017).
The growing complexity of crisis management5 is better met if there are diverse instruments and actors involved to reach a “successful and sustainable crisis response” (Major & Mölling, 2009, p. 22), making it possible for both NATO and the EU to deploy missions concomitantly, within the realm of expertise, i.e., military and civilian, respectively, notwithstanding the possibility of employing diverse assets.This shows not only a convergence in terms of tasks, but also considering the neighbouring areas and the concern over maintain stability and security in those areas (cf. Touzovskaia, 2006; Zyla, 2011; Mesterhazy, 2017).
Kosovo is a setting where both organizations have missions deployed, engaged in post-conflict state-building and stabilization, and their activities are quite distinct at first sight (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2009). NATO, through the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission, deployed in 1999, has a general task of maintaining a secure environment to the international and national institutions to work and the EU is concerned with the promotion of the Rule of Law and the development of law enforcement institutions, i.e., judiciary, police and customs, through the EU Rule of Law (EULEX) mission, which started in 2008, and is the largest CSDP civilian mission ever deployed.
According to Inter-organizational relations (IOR)6 theories, as organizations interact in a certain context, there are many factors that contribute for that relationship to be characterized within the cooperating/competition spectrum.7 For the organizations to interact, there is the requisite for some functional overlap (Brosig, 2011), but if organizations become too similar, the perspectives on competitive advantage and even survival can contribute to a conflicting relationship (cf. Oliver, 1990; Vangen & Huxham,
4 The regular mentioning of NATO’s importance in EU security strategy related documents is often
concomitant with calls for the development of integrated military capabilities of the member-states, as well as of the CSDP instruments. The St. Malo Declaration, the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU Battlegroups and, more recently, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) are examples of the autonomization and diversification efforts within the CSDP. Furthermore, France is one of the EU countries that has strived for the development of military capabilities within the EU, promoting these initiatives, representing the political will within the EU to develop military capabilities in equivalent ways to NATO, e.g., the EU Battlegroups and NATO’s Response Force are rapid reaction forces (Varwick & Koops, 2009).
5 Cf. Gilpin & Murphy (2008) for an approach to crisis management based on complexity theory and
focused on interaction within complex systems.
6 See section 2.1.
7 Cf. Pfeffer & Salancik (2003), Davis & Cobb (2009) and Dress & Heugens (2013) for insights on the
Resource Dependence Theory (RDT). Biermann and Koops (2017a), provides a vast IOR background, then delivering several practice-oriented studies on IOR in various policy areas in “world politics.”
8 2003). An important factor is scarcity of resources and how it defines interaction that aims at having access to necessary assets, hence, searching for complementary capabilities so that the focal organization’s goals can be achieved without duplication of work and better allocating resources (Oliver, 1990).
There is a call for more studies on IOR, specifically between inter-governmental organizations, notably considering the effects of overlap, regarding how it spurs cooperation/competition and how it shapes the relationship on the ground. Indeed, there is a lack of empirical focus in the cooperation/competition dynamics of IOR. According to Koops (2017), “more research is needed on the facilitating conditions and factors under which overlap might lead to either cooperation, competition, division of labour or mutual neglect” (p. 326). Furthermore, Smith and Gebhard (2017) note that “no special issue has yet been devoted to investigating interactions between [the EU and NATO] (p. 303).
The aim of this study is thus to contribute to the understanding of IOR in general, by studying NATO-EU interactions in Kosovo, identifying cooperation/rivalry dynamics, at the strategic level, as well as on the ground. It aims to analyse the main features of
EU-NATO IOR in the specific case of post-conflict state-building and stabilization in Kosovo,
also addressing the obstacles that feature in the on the ground interaction between missions and how those were surpassed, and how can the Kosovo case contribute to a better understanding of the EU-NATO relationship, in theory and in practice.
The first section will consist of a literature review, firstly providing a theoretical framework on IOR, followed by insights on the EU and NATO crisis management activities, the background of their relationship and the conflict in Kosovo that led to the deployment of international organizations within the authorizing UNSC mandate. The methodology section will then clarify the research and data gathering methods used in this study.
A third section will be dedicated to the empirical analysis of the EU and NATO missions’ interaction in Kosovo, by describing them separately in a first stage and then analysing the intervention areas where they have overlapping tasks and how the lack of formal framework for interaction was surpassed by informal channels of communication. Finally, in a concluding tone, the findings will be discussed by resorting to the theory section and some practical recommendations will be provided.
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2. L
ITERATURE REVIEWIn this chapter, a theoretical framework and a background on the case-study will be provided, including definitions of the most relevant concepts.
2.1.INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS8
Inter-organizational relations (IOR) is a field of research that focuses on the “relationships between and among organizations” and it is “concerned with understanding the character and pattern, origins, rationale, and consequences of such relationships” (Cropper, Ebers, Huxham & Smith Ring, 2008, p. 2). Hence, IOR addresses the relationships between two or more organizations. Originally, it focused mainly on corporate and overall non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but it is today broadly applied to institutions engaged in global governance, including International NGOs and International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) (Biermann & Koops, 2017). IGOs are “composed primarily of sovereign states, or of other international organizations” (Biermann & Koops, 2017, p. 5).
There is an essential interactive dimension to understand IOR, namely between international institutions and especially in cases where there is overlap in terms of policy field. As Brosig (2010) puts it, “Obviously, without overlap in policy fields any form of interaction would lack its minimum requirement” (p. 37). Interaction is more than action/reaction dynamics, as none of the involved actors are in full control of the processes, entailing reciprocity, in the sense that participants exert influence and are influenced by others. It is important to understand the context and the actors involved, and the various (mutable) factors (Melin & Axelsson, 2013).
In introducing an issue on resource interaction in inter-organizational networks, Baraldi, Gressetvold and Harrison (2012)9 focus on specific types of interaction processes that stem from the existence of resources, i.e., “that shape, combine, and use resources across organizational boundaries” (p. 123). In this perspective, the relationship itself
8 Most of the concepts and theories that will be addressed to in this section are commonly used in studies
within business research fields, focusing on firms and the relationships between them as study objects. As this research will address the relation between two inter-governmental organizations - the EU and NATO-, the applicability of the theoretical insights is implied and will be supported by examples. The Palgrave Handbook of inter-organizational relations in world politics, by Biermann and Koops (2017), is an example of a handbook that provides a vast IOR background, followed by studies on cooperation and rivalry dynamics between organizations in various policy areas.
9 Cf. special issue of the Journal of Business Research on resource interaction in inter-organizational
networks in https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/journal-of-business-research/vol/65/issue/2. Baraldi, E., Gressetvold, E., & Harrison, D. (Eds.) (2012). Resource interaction in inter-organizational networks. Journal of Business research, 65(2).
10 becomes a resource, worth the investment, for “developing, managing and exchanging” (p. 124) physical resources, as well as intangible resources, e.g., knowledge and reputation.
Indeed, research on strategy in the business world finds that the organization seeks to obtain a competitive advantage within its industry by specializing in a certain capability. The resource-based view focuses on the firm and its strategy to protect core capabilities (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Baraldi et al., 2012). Nevertheless, conjugated with assets of other organizations, these resources can be enhanced to fulfil institutional goals, by investing in cooperative relationships that will allow the focal organization to resort to external resources (Dyer & Singh, 1998) - a perspective that is closer to the Resource Dependence Theory (RDT), which will be addressed in this section.
The concept of strategy, i.e., “the development, organization and the use of means to achieve the aims of an actor” (Major & Mölling, 2013, p. 47) is relevant to studies within the IOR to help to clarify the polling of means and engagement with other organizations. There is a rationality logic behind a more relational strategic approach, which may be challenging due to the necessary calculations to become aware of the potential advantages of engaging with other organizations (Dyer & Singh, 1998). In the business world, as well as in global governance, interdependences must be taken into account in the decision-making processes. The complexity of societies today entails some coordination with other entities, and that engagement requires a transaction cost calculation not only to decide whether to interact, but also the terms of that interaction (Lane, 2011).
Hence, considering a neo-functionalist approach to study interactions between IGOs, which considers that the organizations have their own agendas and are motors of regional (dis-)integration, IGO’s can be assumed as rational actors when interacting with other organizations (Galbreath & Gebhard, 2010; Brosig, 2010). Member-states are important as they provide the resources and establish the functions of the organizations. Nevertheless, the organizational bureaucrats and elites can put on the “organizational hat”10 and strive for control over its activities as well as the agenda, notably, considering other IGOs (Galbreath & Gebhard, 2010).
According to Hölz (2012), cooperation is interaction with the underlying intention of (mutual) benefit. He resorts to Axelrod to show the rational dimension of cooperating, as well as the logic behind the efforts to achieve goals by cooperating. In The evolution of
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cooperation of 1984, Axelrod notes that for cooperation to start, there must be
expectations of long-term interaction, as it provides a mechanism for accountability and increases trust amongst participants and diminishes fears of opportunistic engagement. To be able to identify partners, in the specific case of IGO’s, it matters who the member-states are and how the chain of command works, as well as what constitutes the mandate. Furthermore, it helps if there is a record of cooperation, as behaviours become more expectable (Vangen & Huxham, 2003; Hölz, 2012; Axelrod, 1984).
However, Karapin & Feldman (2017), note that cooperation is hardly ever absolute, as there might be some underpinning rivalry, namely, regarding certain goals of the participants. Rivalry may further cooperation if the benefits for interaction justify a problem-solving effort considering the conflicting goals (Vangen & Huxham, 2003; Akinbode & Clark, 1976), but if there is no successful communication and negotiation, rivalry may lead to competition, as the effort to maximize the focal organization’s benefits and minimize costs, even if it implies drawbacks for the other participants (Johnson & Johnson, 2015). Hence, cooperation entails aiming at joint benefits and competition entails irreconcilable desired outcomes.
Research on inter-firm competition notes that rivalry appears amongst organizations in the same industry, which become competitors and their strategies consider attaining leverage over the other, notwithstanding external variations and interdependencies, which also play into the equation (Chen, 1996). Kilduff, Elfenbein and Staw (2010) approach rivalry as variant, potentially leading to competing relationships. They consider it as a relational factor, dependent on perceptions, as the downfalls of interaction get more attention than the benefits.
The interaction processes have been the focus of IOR, particularly the cooperation/rivalry dynamics of material and immaterial exchanges between international organizations (Biermann & Koops, 2017).
The RDT is often used to analyse the dynamics of interactions between IGO’s. The focal organization is the unit of analysis in the RDT, which provides a frame to study interactions with its environment. It provides explanations on how the other organizations’ resources are resorted to, to achieve institutional goals, expecting an advantageous relationship (cf. Davis & Cobb, 2010). According to Biermann and Harsch (2017), “RDT starts from the premise that organizations are embedded in their environments and depend on external resources to operate and survive” (p. 138); hence, RDT approaches the organization as an open system, considering the relational character
12 of its institutional strategies, looking for opportunities “outside,” e.g., raw materials and equipment, as well as legitimacy and know-how, hence, material and symbolic resources. On this issue, a relevant example would be the “Berlin Plus” framework,11 concluded between NATO and the EU, which formalized the EU’s access to NATO assets, in order to maximize the employment of those resources (cf. Richard, 2006). The adoption of the “Berlin Plus” agreements in March 2003 settled a basis for EU-NATO cooperation by allowing the EU to access NATO’s strategic, operational and tactical assets and resort to the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in EU-led operations of military nature (NATO, 2004; Acikmese & Triantaphyllou, 2012).
One of the most important pieces of work about RDT is Pfeffer and Salancik’s “The External Control of Organizations.” It focuses on how organizations turn to their environment in search for the resources, managing “contingencies and constraints deriving from that environment” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, p. 3). If there is disagreement over the outcomes of the cooperation – i.e., “goals of the social system” (p. 66) -, the path is set for a conflicting relationship. Conflict might arise, if interests and/or the working methods are/become somehow incompatible. It does not mean, however, that the relationship would end, as there is space for problem-solving and balance contingencies such as interdependence, reciprocity, and overall perceived advantages (Akinbode & Clark, 1976). Conflict can prompt coordination if there is unavoidable dependence. Resource scarcity and unpredictability in the relationship, e.g., derivative of power shifts in resource control, can make coordination efforts the way to still make sure the established goals are achieved, as it has a forecasting effect that can diminish uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).
Other approaches, such as the Population Ecology theory, take aggregates of organizations, populations, as units of analysis, and meets the RDT in the external environment setting of interaction. For example, a population would consist of Europe’s (regional attribute) security (functional attribute) international organizations, forming an environmental niche because they can provide relevant resources, as well as benefit from the general pool of resources. There are thus similarities between the organizations that
11 The “Berlin Plus” refers to classified documents of technical nature that constituted a formal framework
for exchange of resources between NATO and the EU. This arrangement was very similar to the WEU-NATO Berlin Accords of 1996 (Richard, 2004; Varwick & Koops. 2009). Its major elements included exchange of classified information, EU’s access to NATO’s planning capabilities for EU—led crisis management operations, availability of NATO operational assets, access to the command of the SACEUR, consultation arrangements and incorporation of EU’s requirements for EU-led operations in the NATO structures (NATO, 2004). Cf. section 2.2.2.
13 are part of the population, essential for the organizations to consider engaging with others (Ries, 2017).
According to Biermann (2008), “inter-organizational cooperation presupposes domain similarity and common interests” (p. 155). This can be related to the “functional convergence” that was evident in Europe after the Cold War, as the agendas of organizations such as NATO, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) started focusing on similar “norms, interests and objectives” namely by including similar issues in their agendas, notably, “security, democracy promotion and human rights protection” (Galbreath & Gebhard 2010, p. 1).
2.1.1. DOMAIN
As aforementioned, some overlap in the same policy area is necessary for interaction, allowing the observer to make conclusions on domain similarity when studying IOR.
According to Akinbode and Clark (1976), a domain consists of the “programs or subject areas covered, the clienteles served, and the services rendered” (p. 102), and functional convergence within these areas adds up for domain “similarity”; considering IGO’s, they would start operating within the same policy area, e.g., crisis management (Biermann & Koops, 2017). According to Biermann and Koops (2017), domain similarity can be part of organizational overlap through functional and geographical overlap, i.e., “when organizations pursue the same or very similar tasks and mandates” and “when organizations are active in the same regions” (p. 17). Other dimensions outside domain similarity include overlap of membership and resources.12 In turn, Hofmann (2009) identifies three institutional dimensions through which overlap occurs: “membership, mandate and resources” (p. 46).
Another essential feature of cooperation is domain “consensus,” defined by Oliver (1990) as “the degree to which organizations accept each other's claims to specific goals and functions” (p. 250) – a reciprocal acceptance that precedes the establishment of a relationship, and, eventually, a common pool of resources, considering that none of the organizations provides the total of the necessary resources; hence, interdependence and reciprocity are primary determinants of a IOR (Akinbode & Clark, 1976; Oliver, 1990). An emerging competing relationship implies lack of domain consensus, even if similarity is maintained, as the organizations within the same policy realm start to
12 According to Aldrich (1972), resources include “personnel, information, products and services and
14 perceive the other’s presence as detrimental and become more protective of their resources (Akinbode & Clark, 1976). Internal and external shifts can have an impact in power relations and on institutional goals and contribute to trust/mistrust and changes in accountability mechanisms, diminishing the domain consensus (Huxham & Vangen, 2000, p. 799). Challenges that contribute to a fading perception of collaborative advantage - i.e., “to achieve outcomes that could not be reached by any of the organizations acting alone” (p. 772) -, include incompatibility of purposes and operational models, difficulties in communication and mismanage of power relations and obstacles to trust.
Overlap can thus also be a premonition of conflict if one organization considers its core capabilities as the competitive advantage and as essential for the organization’s survival. If the partner organization has similar resources, the focal organization is expected to be more protective of its knowledge; besides, when capabilities are similar, the “absorptive capacity” is bigger, hence, the danger to lose competitive advantage increases (Norman, 2002, p. 183).
Despite its utmost importance to start interaction processes, according to Brosig (2010), overlap does not have an explanatory power, merely providing the “innate field of activity” the focal organization perceives and is perceived to belong (p. 37), allowing for conclusions on domain similarity, but not on domain consensus, and the character of the relationship. Hence, other dimensions must be addressed. Brosig (2010) uses a model that also includes congruence of interests and profit of interaction as preconditions for an international organization to engage in IOR, leading to cooperation, division of labour or competition.
In this regard, overlap corresponds to a policy field where the organizations are engaged in. It can vary as a core or peripheral field, within which certain resources can be developed and tasks attributed. Mandates and historical background can be used as indicators to determine an organization’s fields of competence (Brosig, 2010).
Congruence of interests is a precondition that follows a rational approach to
interaction, considering that the desired outcomes will be achieved if there is strategic coordination of the material and/or immaterial resources of the participant organizations. Nevertheless, to have similar interests within a policy area is not enough to understand what underlies a cooperative/competing relationship. The structural capabilities of the organization must be considered to understand the motivation to engage with another organization to fulfil the institutional objectives (and participate in resource pooling with the environment) (Brosig, 2010).
15 The rationality behind the organizations’ decision to interact will envisage the
interaction profit. Calculations by the organizations consider the (material and
immaterial) costs and gains perceived in a potential cooperation effort. These perceptions can change over time, depending on external, as well as internal, changes, e.g., in terms of institutional goals or aims of autonomy (Brosig, 2010).
Table 1 indicates the conjectures and the dimensions, as well as some applicable indicators.
Table 1. Interaction modes between international organizations and their preconditions
(Adapted from Brosig, 2010, p. 39)
Modes
Preconditions
Cooperation Division of labour
Competition Indicators
Overlap overlap outside
their core fields of competence or at least in a peripheral area in one
organization and a core area in another overlap in their core competence fields overlap in core competence field or one core area of one organization threatens to dominate a peripheral policy area of another organization - mandates; - international treaties; - organization’s development. Congruence of interests High congruence of interests in a policy area and low structural ability to achieve policy goals Low congruence of interests in a policy area and high structural ability to achieve policy goals High congruence of interests in a policy area and high structural ability to achieve policy goals - interests; - interdependence (material/immateri al resources). Interaction profit Interaction prompts efficiency gains
Neutral cost Interaction is costly
- perceptions of efficiency and legitimacy
2.1.2. COLLABORATION
Communication is essential for trust in IOR. It is especially important when there are fewer formal mechanisms structuring the relationship. According to Hill et al., collaboration corresponds to ‘‘interactive and relational behaviours that occur between
16 members of a work group and that are directed at task achievement’’ (as cited in Chen, Lin & Yen, 2014, p. 571), being thus characterized by coordination and communication channels that are more adaptable to environmental changes. The factors that add up to trustful relationships diminish uncertainty and allow positive anticipation, facilitating resource sharing (Chen, Lin & Yen, 2014).
Considering the importance of trust in inter-organizational relations and since NATO-EU cooperation mainly occurs through informal, ongoing communication, predictability and goodwill should be inherent to their relationship. Especially when there is contextual power imbalance, communication should embed (symbolic) commonalities that signal trustworthiness and diminish opportunistic perspectives on the relationship (Hardy, Phillips & Lawrence, 1998). Hence, their interaction is more tangible “at the tactical and operational levels”, making their cooperative efforts dependent on communication and ad hoc interaction (Mesterhazy, 2017, p. 2, 15).
Huxham and Vangen (2000) consider “the question of the extent to which collaboration actually does take place between individuals or between organizations” (p. 781) and the importance of the individual, since an individual, in a certain position in a certain moment, can play a critical role in shaping the collaboration. They also consider sub-structures of the organization and the external environment as contributors to the framework of collaborations, considering them to be “highly fragile structures” (p. 792).
2.1.3. LEVELS OF INTERACTION
Interactions between organizations can occur at different levels, and a multilevel analysis as part of methodology to study IOR makes up for a profound and nuanced investigation (Koops, 2017b). International Relations studies normally focus on three levels of analysis, i.e., “the international system, the state and the individual” (p. 194). For IOR analysis, two other levels are relevant: bureaucratic and inter-institutional/inter-secretariat, and particularly for IGOs, the relevant levels of analysis are “individuals, international bureaucracies and the member-states” (Biermann, 2017, p. 243).
The individual level particularly important in the “informal outreach” by either “mid-level bureaucrats” or “executive heads” (Koops, 2017b, p. 193). The relevance of interpersonal interaction to analyse IOR, especially in their onset stage is often illustrated by the EU High Representative and former NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, and its successor, George Robertson, in the late 1990’s, which personal relationship and common interests were essential to spur approximation between the EU and NATO,
17 which culminated in the “Berlin Plus” arrangement in 2003, and the operations within this framework (Koops, 2017).
As mentioned above, the bureaucratic level engages in the materialization of the tasks, derivative from the mandate(s). IGOs, according to the institutionalist approach have autonomy and their agents act in accordance to the “hat” they have on – the organizational one. This does not mean, however, that states don’t find posting in IGOs an advantage to their national strategies of exerting some control over the IGO’s activities through posting. Bierman (2017) mentions “conflicting royalties” (p. 247) in the international bureaucracies’ staff, which, despite merit, quotas and other principles, may imply partiality and thus hinder the creation of organisms completely independent and acting (exclusively) on behalf of the organization’s interests. Hence, when an IGO engages in cooperation, there are many instances fighting for more control over the path the relationship will be taking, i.e., “between more or less concerned member-states, between the member-states and the international bureaucracies (or their relevant functional units), and within the bureaucracies where officials of diverging national and international loyalties struggle to assert their preferences” (Biermann, 2017, p. 248).
Resource scarcity is an important part of the organization strategic planning and resorting to the environment to search for complementarity in terms of (im)material resources, in which the officials play a crucial role in terms of decision-making. However, as Major and Mölling note, “international organizations can only be as effective as their members allow them to be” (p. 20), making the organization activities dependent on their member’s disposition to provide funding, as well as their political will to be involved in the organization’s activities.
2.1.4. SUMMARY
Organizations often strategically look to their environment in order to find complementary resources to effectively perform their activities and achieve their goals. Considering IGOs in particular, other organizations perform in the same policy field, be it core or peripheral, and interaction is possible if organizations overlap in policy area – or domain -, opening up the possibility of cooperation, as well of some degree of rivalry. Hence, domain similarity doesn’t assure domain consensus. It is thus important to look beyond overlap to explain and thoroughly analyse IOR.
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2.2. EU-NATO
NATO and the EU both engage in crisis management and have cooperated in the field. In EU-NATO relations the prominent trend in crisis management is a clear differentiation between “soft/civilian and hard/military security” tasks (Raik & Jarvenpaa, 2017, p. 6). The trend, however, has been to develop “common characteristics,” increasingly notorious since the 1990’s (Touzovskaia, 2006, p. 242), namely, in crisis management in the Balkans, which clarifies a relevant level of domain similarity between NATO and the EU.
2.2.1. POST-CONFLICT STABILIZATION AND STATE-BUILDING
In the Agenda for Peace of 1992, former UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutros-Ghali responded to a request from the UNSC to provide insights on how the international community could improve its efforts on “preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping,” (UN, 1992), considering conflicts and its devastating consequences, as well as the need to support peace, not only during the conflict, but also in a posterior phase.
To undertake these international efforts, regional agreements and/or groups of States can take on “specific political, economic or social issue of current concern” (UN, 1992, no 61), on a complementarity, flexibility and creativity logic (cf. Houben, 2005).13
Call and Cousens (2008) provide definitions of concepts related to peacebuilding, which they define as “actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict and a modicum of participatory politics,” to which they add a post-conflict dimension as continuation “after the termination of armed hostilities” (p. 4) (cf. (Major & Mölling, 2013). In a post-conflict phase, diverse structures of the society become target of (re)construction and development, not only security forces and government, but also essential water and electricity supply, organization of elections, repatriation of refugees, and other endeavours (UN, 1992; Major & Mölling, 2013). Thus, many actors become present in a peacebuilding context, performing many activities - a complex environment that involves significant coordination efforts (Major & Mölling, 2013).
Stabilization has a long-term dimension as “actions undertaken by international actors to reach a termination of hostilities and consolidate peace, understood as the
13 The no. 1, article 53, chapter VIII of the UN Charter states that “The Security Council shall, where
appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority” (retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/).
19 absence of armed conflict” (Call & Cousens, 2008, p. 4), most relevant, notably, considering a civil conflict. A post-conflict peacebuilding effort comprises civilian and military components, as Dobbins (2014) notes, “the military responsible for security issues and the civilian institutions responsible for governance and reconstruction” (p. 47; cf. Rietjens & Bollen, 2008; Brzoska & Ehrhart, 2008). In turn, Tsagourias and White (2013) attribute supporting functions to military components, as a deterrent force, active in the “withdrawal and disarmament of faction” (p. 210), while supporting the implementation of the peace agreement that launched the “post” phase. The civilian dimension includes “political, electoral, human rights and humanitarian functions”14 and a police function, potentially featuring military elements in “maintenance of public order, crowd control, law enforcement, and training local police officers” (p. 210). These functions are related to state-building, as “actions undertaken by international or national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state” (Call & Cousens, 2008, p. 4), featuring dimensions ranging from the rule of law to involvement with local communities (Tsagourias &White, 2013).
Organizations can be called upon to participate in peacebuilding in relevant areas of intervention for a specific case, depending on the capabilities they possess, i.e., related to crisis management, ideally, consolidated and ready to deploy (Major & Mölling, 2013).15 Broadly, crisis management relates to the resources that can be deployed to address a crisis, depending on the policy area, encompassing civil and military measures (Frisell & Oredsson, 2006). There are “pre-” and “post-“ dimensions to crisis management, as it “ranges from actions taken before a crisis to prevent and reduce the vulnerability to the crisis, to actions taken to avert a crisis, manage its consequences and reconstruct what has been damaged” (p. 17).16 It is thus a peacebuilding instrument in terms of prevention of (re)escalation of conflicts, through tools such as mediation and humanitarian aid, as well as security, through military and police units (Major & Mölling, 2013).
NATO recognizes itself as capable of participating in international stabilization and reconstruction efforts in an international conflict situation, by assuming military tasks, as
14 Tsagourias and White (2013) specify functions within these intervention areas: The political function
included overall guidance in the peace process and help with rebuilding or developing political institutions. The electoral function included advice, education, monitoring and verification of the electoral process. The human rights function consisted of promoting, educating, monitoring, and investigating abuses. Third, the humanitarian function included the delivery of aid, the implementation of the right of return for refugees, and the reintegration of former combatants (p. 210).
15 Cf. supra note 13.
20 well as performing in the civil-political area, by, e.g., providing security (military and police), rendering basic services, and facilitating reconciliation (Milkoreit, 2007). For NATO, it is important to adapt the organization’s structures to adequate responses, in terms of scale, but also capabilities and derivative tasks. Assuming a relevant role in crisis management, considering the diverse nature of international crises, and an holistic approach, the “non-Article 5” activities, e.g., authorized UNSC international missions, became part of the organization’s endeavours, especially considering the dismantlement of the Soviet Union and the independence wave that followed, and the featuring remerging hostilities, especially inter-ethnic (NATO, 2018d).
In turn, the EU assumed an international role in crisis management when in 1999 the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (former denomination of the CSDP) was established within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),17 making it an area of the EU’s foreign policy. The establishment of the CFSP with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 aimed at creating a framework for joint action in a “all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy” (European Union, 1992, article J.4, 1.), of which the Western European Union (WEU)18 “is an integral part of the development of the Union” (article J.4, 2.). However, the effects of the dismantlement of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), would clarify that civilian instruments, such as humanitarian aid, economic support and
17 The CFSP was created as the second pillar of the “pillar system” that comprised the policy areas of the
EU. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) established the three pillars as the “European Communities”, the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” and the “Cooperation in Justice and Home.” The CFSP would include promotion of peace, democracy, Rule of Law and human rights, as well as the EU Battlegroups and the ESDP (European Parliament, 2019). Today, it is a policy area in which national diplomats and EU officials conduct what is often referred to a EU’s foreign policy, namely the issues that fall inside the scope of security and defence, within the CSDP framework. The EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy– a post created with the Treaty of Lisbon, as the equivalent of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, created by the Treaty of Amsterdam - is the “face and voice” of CFSP and is supported by the European External Action Office and the EU delegations’ network around the world (Dijkstra & Vanhoonacker, 2017).
18 The WEU was created as a response to the growing Soviet threat. The Brussels Treaty was signed in
1948 by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK in an attempt to create the European Defence Community, which was unsuccessful. The revision of the Treaty in 1954 stablished the WEU. Similarly to NATO, its core purpose was to deploy a collective defence response in case one of the signatories would suffer an armed attack, as well as European economic development and integration. The creation of NATO and the merger of military deployment procedures turned the WEU into a forum for consultations on security issues. In 1992, the Petersberg tasks were agreed upon. According to the 1992 Petersberg Declaration, military WEU deployments would encompass “humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” (WEU, n.d., no. 4). These tasks would later form an important part of the ESDP, with the Treaty of Amsterdam. The WEU completely dismantled in 2011, as the operations and political structures had been absorbed by the EU, through the EDSP (European External Action Service [EEAS], 2016b; cf. Whitman, 2004; Bailes & Messervy-Whitting, 2011).
21 facilitation of diplomatic channels, were insufficient to avoid conflicts (Arikan, 2012). As Wivel (2005) noted, “the EU failed to prevent war and thereby proved its inability to act effectively in security affairs” (p. 400). The development and diversification of comprehensive and effective instruments within the CFSP framework was important to improve peace processes and reconstruction in the Balkans, and indeed, despite the relative success of the employment of civilian instruments, the lack of military assets was showing as an imperfection in the CFSP (Arikan, 2012). 19
In the St. Malo declaration of 1998, the United Kingdom (UK) and France expressed willingness to develop EU military capacity, notwithstanding the importance of NATO and its collective defence principle, and “without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU” (Franco– British St. Malo Declaration, 2015, no. 3; cf. Aybet, 2004).20 The development of a EU defence policy envisaged in Cologne would lead to the formalization of the ESDP in the 1999 European Council meeting in Helsinki (Whitman, 2004), where it was established that “with the enhancement and concertation of military and civilian crisis response tools, the Union will be able to resort to the whole range of instruments from diplomatic activity, humanitarian assistance and economic measures to civilian policing and military crisis management operations” (European Parliament, 1999, Annex IV).
The post-Cold War focus on peacekeeping and peacebuilding within the UN and bringing regional organizations into the picture, matched the EU’s development of a foreign policy that included responding to UNSC mandates, adopting a “political commitment to prevent violent conflicts” (Malešič, 2011, p. 158), its crisis management functions encompassing a wide range of instruments and policies.
2.2.2. BACKGROUND OF EU-NATO RELATIONS
As addressed in the previous sub-section, the increasing effort of the UN to foster international forces for peacebuilding met diversification of crisis management capabilities and instruments by NATO and the EU. Both organizations recognize the UN’s primary role in maintaining international peace and security. In the beginning of 19 Cf. Keil & Arkan (2014) for case studies of EU’s policies towards the Western Balkan countries and the
prospects of membership.
20 The incorporation of the WEU operational and political structures into the ESDP would be implemented
after the 1999 Cologne European Council Declaration on the common policy on security and defence. The inclusion of the Petersberg tasks into the Amsterdam treaty was justified so that the EU “has at its disposal the necessary capabilities (including military capabilities) and appropriate structures for effective EU decision making in crisis management” (European Union, 2015, p. 7).
22 the new century, the EU acknowledged the primacy of the UN Charter and the importance of EU-UN cooperation, and the importance of ensuring its “evolving military and civilian capacities provide real added value for UN crisis management activities” (European Council, 2001, no. 53), as well as the strength of the cooperation in crisis management with NATO and the importance of “arrangements permitting EU access to NATO assets and capabilities” (no. 49). In turn, NATO reiterated its commitment to the UN Charter and to the “transatlantic link” (NATO, 2002, no. 1), in which NATO and the EU “share common strategic interests” on “security, defence, and crisis management, so that crises can be met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management ensured” (no. 11).
In the field of “crisis management”, the four main security organizations in Europe – the EU, NATO, OSCE and the WEU - grew closer in informal cooperation when the violence in the Balkans in the 1990’s to effectively tackle the crises; a trend later boosted by the EU’s foreign policy approach of “effective multilateralism,” embedded in the CSDP. These interactions were thus mainly “staff to staff contacts and ad hoc interactions in the field” (Koops, 2013, p. 72).
After the Second World War, the separation of functions between NATO - a military alliance created in 1949, as a reaction to a growing Soviet threat - and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – created in 1952, so that France and the Benelux countries could supervise the German industrial development and avoid its remilitarization - was clear; notwithstanding France’s persistent advocacy for more European integration, namely in the military field – in fact, until today (Koops, n.d.) - and the attempt of creating military capacity within the EU, also as a counterbalance to the Soviet power, through the European Defence Community (EDC)21 (cf. Lunz, 1953). However, the end of the Cold-War prompted a functional convergence between organizations in Europe, “especiallyin three core areas: security, democracy, and human rights” (Galbreath & Gebhard, 2010, p. 2).The end of the Soviet Union made NATO allies reflect on the organization’s raison
d’être and the EU looked with concern to Eastern Europe as aconflicting neighbouring area. Hence, NATO needed a renewed purpose and the EU was starting to engage in
21 The European Defence Community was an initiative of 1952 that intended to build a European army,
also with the intention to create a mechanism to control Germany’s rearmament in the same logic as the ECSC, as well as a response to the Soviet threat. The idea was to provide a common structure for the mobilization, equipment and training of the national units. The treaty, signed in 1952 by Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries would never come into force due to factors such as dependence on the US funding, volatility of French governments and discord on Germany’s autonomy. (Fleisher, 2012).
23 “crisis management” and willing to develop a more integratedapproach to the member-states’ military capacity (Smith & Gebhard, 2017). This prompted a post-Cold War relationship embedded in strategic approximation, supported by a political discourse on aburden-sharing logic to tackle security challenges - increasingly complexand requiring the employment of a panoply of assets, e.g., technology, know-how, to createeffective solutions, and instruments beyond coercive, such as sanctions, humanitarian aid, assistance in rule of law, policing and economic development (Zyla, 2011).
As engagement in crisis management became an interest, NATO diversified its capabilities namely through focusing on stability by deploying smaller more flexible forces, contrasting with the defensive, reactive focus of more most its missions. In turn, the EU started developing growing military capabilities, with particular enthusiasm from France, which spurred concerns over competition between the organizations since the military capabilities would be drawn from the same pool of resources, considering the similar membership (Touzovskaia, 2006).
The call for the development of EU’s military capacity in the 1998 Franco-British St. Malo Declaration was received with some apprehension, opening up the possibility of competition. The issue of role definition between the two organizations was to be addressed, and the US saw the European military capability as a possible conflicting capability overlap visa- vis NATO, as demonstrated by Madeleine Albright’s “3 D’s”22 (duplication, discrimination and decoupling) “US statement”, published on December 7, 1998, in the Financial Times (Varwick & Koops, 2009, p. 104). The idea of the EU members developing their military capabilities outside of the NATO framework and of the EU becoming more engaging in defence activities was received with some apprehension due to the prospects of the emergence of a “military counterweight” (Larik, 2017, para. 8), risking a deterioration of NATO’s international role.
Despite this political discourse, the “Berlin Plus” technical agreements were signed in 2001 and adopted in 2003. NATO’s Secretary-General considered it a “milestone in the history of relations between NATO and the EU” (Gherghisan, 2002, para. 3), with structural implications, considering the EU being allowed to access NATO’s logistics and the SHAPE planning base.23 Part of the “Berlin Plus” framework was, e.g., the NATO -
22 The article can be consulted in a compilation by Rutten (2011) on European defence related documents. 23 The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is the NATO’s headquarters for the Allied
Command Operations, located in Mons, Belgium, and is tasked to prepare and conduct NATO’s operations. It is under the command of the SACEUR, who exerts strategic military orientation over the subordinate commanders (USANATO, 2018a).
24 EU Agreement on the Security of Information, which would “enable full and effective consultations and co-operation between NATO and the EU on the basis of classified information and related materiel exchanged between both parties” (NATO, 2003b, para. 2), an essential procedure, especially considering the “taking over” dynamics in the Balkans: two EU military missions were initiated under “Berlin Plus”: Concordia, in the Republic of Macedonia, and Althea, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, replacing the operating NATO (Raik & Jarvenpaa, 2017). This formal framework of cooperation would comprise “assured EU access to NATO operational planning; presumption of availability to the EU of NATO capabilities and common assets; NATO European command options for EU-led operations, including the European role of Deputy SACEUR; adaptation of the NATO defence planning system to incorporate the availability of forces for EU operations” (NATO, 2003c, para. 3).
However, in 2004, after an EU enlargement, which included Cyprus, the “participation problem” (Smith & Gebhard, 2017) arises and the Berlin Plus operations face unavoidable political blockage by Turkey and Cyprus, which prompted an informal continuation of the EU-NATO cooperation (Koops, 2017).
Any attempt in NATO-EU approximation in terms of strategic cooperation is blocked by Cyprus and Turkey, implying, e.g., non-exchange of classified information, e.g., regarding Kosovo or Afghanistan, where both organizations have missions deployed. Formal communication and discussions other than related to the Berlin Plus – i.e., related to operation Althea, in Bosnia Herzegovina, operational since 2004 - are hindered and the potential platform for NATO-EU strategic cooperation becomes “ineffectual” (Acikmese & Triantaphyllou, 2012, p. 564). Formal advances between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) - the most important political decision making body of NATO, and the EU body that exercises political control over the CSFP and, particularly, CSDP missions, respectively - would be subjected to vetoes from Cyprus and/or Turkey (Acikmese & Triantaphyllou, 2012).
With hindered formal channels, cooperation would be much dependent on ad hoc, staff to staff, in the field, communication (Græger, 2016).
EU-NATO cooperation has been, “traditionally,” “roughly” divided “along the lines of soft/civilian and hard/military security” (Raik & Jarvenpaa, 2017, p. 6), respectively. Indeed, the EU has not established itself as a “hard power” actor, preferring to develop a foreign policy based on soft power and civilian engagement, leaving NATO with its traditional role of military defence (Smith & Gebhard, 2017). Indeed, that’s the informal
25 division that characterizes the division of labour in Afghanistan and Kosovo, in terms of nature of activities performed there (Koenig, 2019).
It is worth noting that within the military dimension of crisis management, there are activities that “differ from traditional war-fighting or openly coercive operations” (Tardy, 2015, p. 10). Despite cases of a tenuous line between coercion and crisis management, the military means deployed in crisis management normally serve tasks such as training and institutional development (Tardy, 2015).
The EU’s ESDP (former CSDP) was not developed in order to replace NATO,24 but to take a more active role in European security in the form of crisis management, in which division of labour would be clear, even if informally established (Raik & Jarvenpaa, 2017), e.g., a first stabilization with military resources, maintained with the concomitant deployment of law enforcement and police training missions (Lindstrom, 2005). Nevertheless, EU missions such as operation Artemis undermine this idea. It was first exclusively EU-led military mission, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, launched in 2003, when the “Berlin Plus” arrangements were still politically viable. The French were particularly keen on emphasizing not only the (military) capacity to deploy missions overseas, but also the autonomy from NATO and the US to do so25 (Hendrickson, Strand & Raney, 2007; János, 2015).
Hence, missions within the CSDP framework can have a military nature - such as EUTM Mali, EUTM Somalia and EUTM Central African Republic (CAR), ongoing, engaged in training and monitoring, mentoring and advising the military sector, as well as the EUFOR (CAR), a military operation that aimed at creating a safe environment providing humanitarian aid, concluded in 2015 -, and be deployed concomitantly to civilian missions –, as is the current case of Somalia (EEAS, 2018).
Despite the deployment of operations of military nature, the cooperation with NATO is also part of the 2016 Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, which states that “our Union will work to strengthen our partners: we will keep deepening the transatlantic bond and our partnership with NATO, while we will also connect to new players and explore new formats” (EEAS, 2016a, p. 4), hence, the potential for complementarity is recognized as well as NATO as the “primary framework” for
24 Cf. supra note 4.
25 In August, 2003, Michèle Alliot-Marie, the French Defence Minister during the deployment of the
Artemis mission, commented on the Concordia and Artemis missions as follows: “Today we demonstrate in Macedonia with NATO, and especially in Ituri autonomously that the European defense exists” (as cited in Türke, 2008, p. 32).
26 collective defence to the members that are also NATO allies (p. 20) and acknowledges that furthering “defence planning and capability development” is in the best interest of NATO (p. 46) (cf. Bandiek, 2016).
This political discourse, which paints a positive picture of the relationship, can be hindered at the operational level due to, e.g., lack of formal structure that make cooperation dependent on “on the ground” staff to staff communication to deal with potential duplication of tasks considering overlapping mandates (Græger, 2016). Furthermore, the Trump administration seems to sometimes deviate from the established lines of US foreign policy, leaving the EU “alone” on international stances.26 In terms of perspectives of legitimacy of operations and the weight the present states have on the local entities, these hurdles may affect the effectiveness of the operations (Koppa, 2019). They may also contribute to an inconsistency between the institutional political level and the reality of the cooperation, due to, for example, lack of funding
Afghanistan and Somalia, as well as Kosovo, are settings where NATO and the EU had/have operations deployed. In Afghanistan, the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) was committed to assist in the development of the Afghan law enforcement and justice institutions and personnel, whereas NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was in charge of providing security, namely, counterinsurgency, as well as developing Afghan security forces (Mesterhazy, 2017; NATO, 2015b). In Somalia, the EU NAVFOR Atalanta is an EU military operation in Somalia supports NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield in countering piracy activity in the coast of Somalia. These missions did not have a formal framework but are examples of cooperation at the operational level, propelling mechanism such as the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE)27– in the Somalia case, where both missions are military -, as well as a record for information sharing and coordination (Mesterhazy, 2017).
26 For example, the US’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known
as the “Iran nuclear deal,” concluded between the US, Iran, Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany, through which Iran would be subjugated to inspections from international staff from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify if their uranium enrichment programme was limited to the established by the JCPOA. Without evidence from the IAEA, the Trump administration affirmed that Iran was non-compliant with the JCPOA and withdrew, in 2018. The other signing parties still abide by the agreement, but the US’s move has provoked criticism over the administration’s move and revived tensions between actors in the Middle East, notably, Iran and Israel, over nuclear power (cf. Katzman, Kerr & Heitshusen, 2018).
27 SHADE was established in December of 2008 as an informal platform to share best practices and
exchange information on counter-piracy efforts. Originally, the US Combined Maritime Forces, the European Union Naval Force and NATO were the sole participants, but other entities have joined this mechanism and meet often. The SHADE MED - Shared Awareness and De-Confliction mechanism in the
27 In 2016, the EU-NATO strategic relationship was reiterated by a Joint Declaration, which stated that the common challenges would better be addressed if the tools applied came from diverse, multiple sources, thus affirming that “a stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing” (NATO, 2016a, para. 5).28 For successful cooperation, some further efforts must be made, namely, on operational cooperation and coordination, e.g., in the cyber realm, including joint exercises and education and training, and on developing “coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities” (para. 8).
The question remains, what is the potential for conflict between NATO and the EU? At the political level, both organizations, separately and jointly, recognize the other’s importance and the potential for complementarity in crisis management. However, two dimensions may contradict this. Fist, the national positions on the organizations’ diversification in terms of capabilities, e.g., US’s growing pressure for more expenditure from the European NATO member-states, and France pushing towards autonomous EU military capacity and leading a Europeanist approach to global security vis-à-vis transatlantic. Second, the operational reality of the interaction between NATO and EU missions may not be as complementary and cooperative as desired, due to a lack of formal stances of e.g., information exchange.
2.3. KOSOVO – A CASE OF EU-NATO INTERACTION
2.3.1. THE KOSOVO CONFLICT IN BRIEF
The Kosovo conflict is part of a series of violent episodes in the territory of the former FRY. During the Croatia (1991-1995) and Bosnia (1992–1995)29 wars, Serbia – as heir to the former FRY - had shown it intended to maintain the former Yugoslav territories
Mediterranean – has become a platform for enhanced NATO-EU cooperation through the cooperation and coordination between EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia and Operation Sea Guardian, by the EU since 2015 and NATO since 2016, respectively (Geiβ & Petrig, 2011; EEAS, 2019).
28 A relevant area where NATO and EU cooperate and jointly engage in developing capabilities is cyber
defence and countering hybrid threats. Indeed, countering hybrid threats has pushed for the development of NATO civil capabilities and expertise through its Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC), namely, to coordinate civil help to assist NATO’s military operations (NATO, 2011). In September 2018, an informal meeting was held between the NAC and the PSC, which “included a hybrid scenario-based discussion facilitated by the [European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats]” (NATO, 2018a, para. 13), as well as the potential planning of related joint exercises. Cyber defence is one of the areas where the EU and NATO share best practices and overall knowledge; for example, NATO’s Secretary General went to Estonia to attend CYBRID, a cyber defence exercise, and the EU participated in NATO’s Crisis Management Exercise – more focused on strategic decision-making, involving civil and military staffs (NATO, 2017a) - and the cyber defence exercise Cyber Coalition (NATO, 2019b).
29 Cf. Baker, 2015, for an historical overview of the conflicts in the Balkans, from the 1980’s, until recent
