Energy security and human security in a Dutch gasquake context: A case of localized performative politics

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University of Groningen

Energy security and human security in a Dutch gasquake context

Kester, Johannes

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Energy Research & Social Science

DOI:

10.1016/j.erss.2016.12.019

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Kester, J. (2017). Energy security and human security in a Dutch gasquake context: A case of localized

performative politics. Energy Research & Social Science, 24, 12-20.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.12.019

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EnergyResearch&SocialScience24(2017)12–20

ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect

Energy

Research

&

Social

Science

j ou rn a l h o m epa g e :w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / e r s s

Original

research

article

Energy

security

and

human

security

in

a

Dutch

gasquake

context:

A

case

of

localized

performative

politics

Johannes

Kester

1

DepartmentofInternationalRelationsandInternationalOrganizations,UniversityofGroningen,OudeKijkin’tJatstraat26,9712EKGroningen,The Netherlands

a

r

t

i

c

l

e

i

n

f

o

Articlehistory: Received31May2016 Receivedinrevisedform 13December2016 Accepted22December2016 Availableonline16January2017 Keywords: Energysecurity Inducedearthquakes Knowledgepolitics Securitylogics

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b

s

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a

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Fromthelate1980s,thenaturalgasextractionintheNetherlandshasexperiencedanincreasingnumber ofeverstrongergasquakes(inducedearthquakesduetogasextraction).Thispaperoffersasecurity analysisoftheaccompanyingdebateonthematerialconsequencesandorganizationofthegasextraction betweenthethreatenedlocalpopulation,theknowledgeinstitutesanalyzingthegasquakes,andthe governmentandextractionindustry.Thispaperstudieshowthesepartiesmakesenseofthegasquakes throughacombinationofsecuritizationtheoryandtheﬂatrelationalityofferedbynewmaterialism, whichforcesthetwoconﬂictingsecuritizationclaimstobeanalyzedintheirlocalsociotechnicaland materialcontext.Theresultinganalysisshowshowthegasdebateisstructuredbyasharedsecurity ofsupplyunderstanding.Anunderstandingwhichforalongtimehasbeenquestionedbythelocal populationonitssafetyandcostimplications.However,ittook25yearsuntiltheirclaimswereaccepted andthesecurityofsupplyunderstandingshiftedtoafocusonminimalextractionvolumes.Anacceptance thatcanonlybeexplainedthroughaself-reinforcingcombinationofsecurityclaims,actualmaterial events,increasingmeasurements(followingsecuritycalls),shiftingvaluejudgementsandincreasing audienceacceptance(creatingadditionalspeechactors).

1. Introduction

TheNetherlandshasbeendevelopingnaturalgasfieldssincethe discoveryofalargefieldintheregionofGroningeninthe1950s.By 2015,thishasresultedin275billioneuroofstaterevenueaswellas aninfrastructurethatconnectsalmostalloftheDutchhouseholds tothesegasfieldsforheatingandcookingpurposes. Simultane-ously,theGroningengasfieldisdrainedtoroughlyone-thirdof itsoriginallowcalorificreserves(680ofitsoriginal2800billion m3_)._{Unfortunately,}_from_the_mid-1980s_onwards_the_areas_above

theﬁeldshave experiencedlightearthquakes,which havebeen increasinginmagnitudeandfrequency(Fig.1).Forlocalresidents, theeverydayexperienceand(potentialdeadly)consequencesof theseearthquakesareconﬂictingwiththelong-standingnational economicandsecurityofsupply concernsoftheDutch govern-mentandEuropeanenergymarkets.Foralongtime,theconcerns forearthquakesremainedlimitedtoasmallnumberof Gronin-geninhabitants.Thischangedwiththe2012Huizingeearthquake,

E-mailaddress:j.kester@btech.au.dk

1 _Present_address:_Center_for_Energy_{Technologies,}_Department_of_Business

Devel-opmentandTechnology,AarhusUniversity,BirkCenterpark15,DK-7400Herning, Denmark.

which,asthestrongestandmostheavilyexperiencedearthquake intheGroningenareatodate,ledtoalargepublicdebateanda stringofreportsonallaspectsoftheDutchnaturalgasextraction andultimatelytoacaponextractionasof2014.Consequently,the questionis,why,afteryearsofneglect,thesecurityconcernsof aninitiallysmallnumberoflocalresidentssuddenlysuperseded theenergysecurityconcernsofpolicymakersandenergy schol-arsworkingontheDutchgasandenergysupplies.Inotherwords, thispaperstudiesthesecuritypoliticsbehindanunderstandingof energysecurity.

Withintheliterature,energysecurityhasbeendescribedasa ‘slippery’,‘fuzzy’and‘multidimensional’concept[1,2].Deﬁnitions vary widely,but simultaneouslyoften sharecommonpoints of interestbuildingaroundnotionsofsecurityofsupply,vitalsystems, and environmentaland economic energy (in)security concerns

[3,4].Assuch‘theenergysecurityconceptnicelyweavestogether

disparatepolicyissuesintoonebasket([5]p.152).’ Consequen-tially,thediscussiononhowenergysecurityisusedanddeﬁned seemsultimatelyacontextboundone[1,6].AsPasqualetti([7]p. 278)remarksinhisreﬂectiononatwo-daymeetingof40energy securityexperts:‘Anydiscussionofenergysecuritymustrecognize thatitvariesfromoneplaceandoneculturetoanother,especiallyat thehouseholdlevel’.Thisisresolvedinmultipleways.More tradi-tionalhistoricalandgeopoliticalpolicyanalysesdrawconclusions

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.12.019

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Fig.1.GroningenEarthquakesandExtractionVolumeuntilOctober2015. Source:AfterNAM[39,50],withdatafromKNMI[40]andNAM[39,50]

fromthedebatestheydescribe[8,9].Anotherprevalentapproachis tomapanddeveloptherangeofindicatorsandmetricsusedto ana-lyzeenergysecurity[3,10,11].Inasimilarline,CherpandJewell([6] p.334),twostrongproponentsofacontextualapproach,conﬁrm theimportanceof‘socialrealityinshapingperceptionsoftruth’ andidentifyarangeofstorylinesaboutenergysecurity,which theythencategorizeintoaframeworkthatcanbeusedforfurther analysis.

Elsewhere, they argue that ‘energy security is an instance of security in general’ ([84] p. 415) and thus needsto inquire abouttheoftentakenforgrantedvaluesandassumptionsbehind energysecurity.Thispaperfollowsthenotionthatenergysecurity, whetherdefinedbyscholarsorasasharedunderstandingof par-ticipants,ispartofawiderpoliticalspectrum.However,insteadof definingwhatenergysecurityis,itapproachesthecontextbound natureofenergysecuritybystudyinghowitworks.Howoneof itselements,inthiscasesecurityofsupply,becomeswhatthose involvedunderstandittobe,howitchangesovertimeandhowit shapesdebatesaboutenergyproduction,transportand consump-tioninthemeantime.‘Theneedforempiricalinvestigationintothe ramificationsofusing(...)energysecurity[claims],forwhat pur-poseandbywhom([5]p.153)’isnotanewquestion,butduetoits relativelysmallsamplesizeremainsanimperativeone.Withinthe energysecurityliteratureitisstudiedmainlyfromaconstructivist perspectiveonlanguageanddiscourse[12,13]orfrom Securitiza-tionTheory[5,14–18].

Thediscussionbelowbuildsonthesestudiesintwoways.First, thegasquakedebateoffersananalysisofacentralenergysecurity concept,securityofsupply,initsbroadersocietalcontext[15].As such,itdoesnotstudycompetingunderstandingsofenergy secu-rity[5]orthelinguisticconstructionofaspeciﬁcenergysecurity understanding[12,17].InsteaditshowshowtheDutchsecurity ofsupplyunderstandingisinﬂuencingthedebateandinturnis shapedbytheresistanceitfacescomingfromthesafetyconcerns ofthelocalpopulation.Thisrepetitiveinteractionbetweenthese twosecurityconcernsbuildsonabroaderrelationalunderstanding thatisattheheartofthispaper.Itisarelationalitythat,second, extendsthediscursivefocusabovebyincorporatingideasof

securi-tizationintotheﬂatrelationalityofferedbyNewMaterialiststudies

[19–21],inparticularActor-NetworkTheory[22,23].Aﬂat

rela-tionalityputsthesharedunderstandingsofsecurityofsupplyand safetyonanequal footingtothematerialityoftheearthquakes andthemodelsusedbytheknowledgeinstitutes.Inotherwords, itreducestheanalyticalimportanceofthesecurityclaimsby forc-ingtheobservertostudythesecurityclaimsaspartoftheirwider constantlychangingcontext.

Theanalysisitselfbuildsonmediacoverage,newsbriefs,(court) statementsandanumberofreports,amongthemthe2015report bytheDutchSafetyBoard(DSB)onthedecision-makingprocess behindtheDutchnaturalgasextractionfrom1959until2014[24]. Althoughthedebateisstillongoing,thispaperfocussesspeciﬁcally ontheperiodfollowingtheHuizingeearthquakein2012uptothe autumnof2015,asbythenmostofthemajorpolicychangeshad takenplace,includingthedecisiontocaptheextractionvolume

[25].

ThispapercontinuesinSection2withanexplicationofthe the-oryandsubsequentcontributionofthispaper.Section3introduces theHuizingeearthquakeanditsconsequences.Besidesadiscussion ofthegasquakeitself,thissectiontouchesinparticularonareport fromthe mainregulatorybody, the StateSupervision ofMines (SSM),which studied theHuizinge earthquakeand shows how itisthisreportthatactuallyshiftedthevaluejudgementbehind theassessmentsof thedecision-makers.Section4 discussesthe internationallyencapsulatedpositionof thegas-industrial com-plex,whileSection5looksmorecloselyatthesafetyandsecurity claimsofthelocals.Section6movesontodiscusstheknowledge politicsbehindtheearthquakesinordertohighlightthestruggle overtheuncertaintybehindthescientiﬁcmodelsandhow secu-rityconsiderationsplayaroleinthisprocess.Thereﬂectionbrings theselinestogether.

2. Contextualizingsecurityaspartofasituatedandﬂat performativerelationality

Thispaperandthegasquakedebateoffersfourmainadditions totheliteraturementioned above.First,it completelyconﬂates

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14 J.Kester/EnergyResearch&SocialScience24(2017)12–20

thedistinction betweensecurityandpolitics.Second,itoffersa long-termillustrationthatenforcesadynamicsecuritization anal-ysis.Third,byplacingsecurityofsupply inoppositiontosafety arguments,thisdebatenotonlystudiestwocompeting securitiza-tionprocessesbutalsoplacestheresistanceagainstcurrentenergy extractionpractices in a Western context (contrary to insights fromdevelopmentstudiesonmininginLatin-AmericaorAfrica

[26])withanimmediacyandgeographicalfocusthatisnotalways presentwhenenergysecurityisforexamplestudiedinrelationto climatesecurity.Lastly,thedebatestudiesthisimmediacyitself andhowitincreasedovertimebyanalyzingthesecurityclaimsin relationtotheactualgasquakesandthescientiﬁcknowledgeabout them.Thereinforcinginteractionbetweentheseelementsandthe actualmaterialpresenceoftheqasquakes(Sections3and6) sup-portsthetheoreticalargumentthatsecurityshouldbeplacedina ﬂatrelationality.2

First,duringthereviewofthisarticle,thequestionwasraised whether the below offered a discussion of energy security or insteadwasaboutenergypolitics.3_The_relation_between_security

andpoliticshasinfactlongbeenacoreissuewithincritical secu-ritystudies,andonethatisgaining tractiononceagain[27,28]. ItstandsatthecenterofSecuritizationTheory,developedinthe 1990s,which sees securityas a categoryseparate fromregular politicalandnon-politicalissues([14]pp.23–24).Inthistheory, securityisreservedforthoseextraordinaryissues,likewar,where anexistentialthreatisbelievedtoexistandextraordinaryaction aretakenwithoutconcernforothersocialparties(e.g.outside nor-malpoliticalandeconomicroutines)([14]p.26).Energysecurity doesnotoftenfallinthatcategoryandifitdoesitissubjectto eco-nomic,climate,ormilitarysecurity([14],[15]pp.509–510;[17]p. 74).Inthissenseadiscussiononenergysecurity(contributingto itsconceptsandtheories)asremovedfromadiscussiononenergy politicsmakeslittlesenseastheformerisalwayspartofthelatter and−asperthequestionabove−theinteractionitselfdeserves closerstudy.

Thisisreflectedinothersecuritytheories,wherethe distinc-tionismoreconflated.Forinstance,inFoucault’sbiopolitics[29]or thesecuritypracticesliterature[30]securityisnottakenasa sepa-rateexceptionalitybutasathoroughlyroutinizedpoliticalprocess closelylinkedtoknowledgepractices(thewayspeopletrytogain knowledgeoftheworld)andtheexerciseofpower.Whilethese threetheoriesapproachtherelationbetweensecurityandpolitics differently,allsharetheviewthatsecurityactsasacallforurgency basedondistinctionsbetweenfriendandenemy,safeandunsafe, riskandnorisk,insecurityandsecurity[31].Theyalsosharean understandingthatthreatimagesareperformative.First,because thewordingofthesethreatshelpshapetheworldweliveinby defininganevent(indoingsonotonlydefiningtheeventorenemy, butalsooneselfandthe(referent)objectinneedofsecurity).And second,becausepeopleactinthepresenttopreventtheseimagined futurerealitiesandthroughtheseactsmaterializeanalternative future.4_On_a_political_level,_this_implies_that_policy_makers,

schol-arsandotheractorsarenotonlyresponsibleforafailuretocounter threats,butalsoforthethreatsthattheyproposethemselves:for thedistinctionsbetweenfriend/enemy,thechoiceofwhatto pro-tect,andfortheresourcesdrawnfromotherareasintermsofactual resourcesandagendasetting([32]p.xiii).

2 _This_comes_with_a_strong_moral_{responsibility}_for_the_observer,_as_it_is_s/he_who

decideswhattostudyaspartofthisrelationalityornetwork[85].

3 _Many_thanks_to_an_anonymous_reviewer_for_bringing_this_up.

4 _These_insights_are_related_to_a_performative_reading_of_energy_security_(see_also

[86]),whereactorsareseentobedirectedinhowtheyapproachtheworldbyearlier practicesandunderstandings,andsubsequently,whenacting(re)producethoseor othernewsocialandmaterialpracticesandeffects.

Second,thispaperalsomovesbeyondthestaticnatureof Secu-ritizationTheorywithitsimplicitfocusonasecurityclaimmade byaspeechactortowardsasingleaudience[33,34].Withitsfocus onthespeechact,themomentwhena(securitizing)actor identi-ﬁesandpresentsafutureeventasathreatandsubsequentlyasks theaudienceforsupporttocounterit,thetheoryispredicatedto singleactsfromtheperspectiveofthespeechactor.Whileitwould befairlysimpletowritetheGroningengasquakedebatesolelyin termsofthelocalpopulationsecuritizingtheirsafetyconcerns,it wouldofferadescriptionofoneactor(arepresentativeofthelocal population)whocallsforthethreat(futureconsequencesofmore gasquakes)inthehopetoconvincetherespectiveaudience (deci-sionmaker).However,theillustrationbelowshowshowboththe speechactorandtheaudiencewerenotsingleentitiesandthat theyconstantlyevolved,asthegrowingaudienceacceptanceof thegasquakethreatsubsequentlymeantagrowingmassofspeech actors,eachcallingforthegasquakethreatsintheirownwayand wording(seeSection5).

Third,eventhoughamoredynamiclongtermreadingof Secu-ritizationTheorywouldpickuponthis,itwouldstillonlyfocuson oneeventanditsaccompanyingsecurityclaim(thethreatoffuture gasquakes).Whilethereissomeworkdoneonconﬂictingenergy securityclaimsandinterpretations[16] andcompetingsecurity claimsareoneofthemainreasonsforissuestolosetheirurgency

[35],mostoftheworkdoneonhowenergysecurityrelatestoother concernsseesenergysecurityassubjecttomilitaryandeconomic concerns(above)orinvolvesnegotiationsinlinewiththeenergy trilemma[36].Incontrast,thegasquakedebateoffersacasewith twoactivesecurityprocesses.Acasewherethesecuritizationof thesafetyconcernsinteractswiththe(institutionalized)securityof supplyconcernsthatdominatethedebate.5_For_even_though

secu-rityofsupplyconsiderationsoftenremainedimplicit,asthedebate primarilyfocusedonsafetyconcerns,compensationand extrac-tionvolumes,itwascentraltoit.Forthegoverningbodiesandgas industry,forwhomsecurityofsupplywasoneofthecorereasonsto continuewithbusinessasusual.Andsubsequently,itwasalso cen-traltothelocalpopulation,forwhomsecurityofsupplypresented theboundaryofwhattheycouldachieve.Irrespectivepopularcalls foracompletehaltofextraction,onapoliticalandlegallevelthe argumentrevolvedaroundsafeextractionandaminimalizationof volumes(seeSection5).Indoingso,thenegotiationsand subse-quentactionsoftheactorsinvolvedreproducedsecurityofsupply asacentralmotif,butwitharedefinedunderstandingofwhatit meant.Incontrasttoanearliershiftinthemeaningofsecurityof supplyfromitsinitialunlimitedextractiontothestrategic‘small gasfieldpolicy’,whichresultedinequalmeasurefromeconomic andsecurityofsupplyreasoning(Section4),thisredefined under-standingstemsprimarilyfroma securitydebate.A debatethat resultedinanadaptationoftheDutchsecurityofsupply under-standingawayfromeconomicgaintowardsafocusontheminimal extractionnecessaryforacontinuationofenergydemandwithin theexistingsociotechnicalinfrastructure.

Lastly, thedebatenuances thediscursivenature ofsecurity, somethingthatcomesacrossmoststronglyintheideain Secu-ritizationTheorythatsecurityis‘aself-referentialpractice’([14]p. 24)andthatthreatsarealwaysimaginary(astheyhavenot hap-penedyet)andhencehavenomaterialstanding.AsVanWijkand Fischhendler([37]p.22quotingAdamandVanLoon,2000)argue

5_This_can_be_read_as_implying_that_safety_concerns_about_energy_production_are

notpartofenergysecurityitself,whichIwouldargueagainstinlinewiththefocus onthesocial/environmentalacceptabilityofvitalenergysystems.Here,however, Imakeananalyticaldistinctiontobettercontrastthepositionsofthetwoparties (whichtogetherwiththechoiceforspeciﬁcspokespersonsisanotheranalytical choicetosimplifythedebate).

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inrelationtorisk:‘thequestionofwhetherriskisgenuineornotis irrelevant.Whatmattersinsteadistheactualisationofriskin pol-icyprocessesingeneral....’Yetevenwhenagreeingthatthreats areimaginary,thegasquakedebatealsoofferstwowaysinwhich materialelementsplayedanactiverole.Ontheonehand,the sup-portforthesafetyclaimsofthelocalpopulationgrewwiththe tangibleexperienceofevermoreandstrongergasquakes.Intime itwasacceptedthattheqasquakesthreatenedlocallivesand liveli-hoods(aclearsharablereferentobjectevenwiththosenotdirectly threatened),thatareductionofextractionvolumeswasaneffective (ifnottheonly)solution,andmostofallthatthecausal relation-shipbetweenextraction,gasquakesand increasingdamagewas undisputable([17]p.74).Ontheotherhand,thesecurityofsupply understandinghasalwaysbeencloselyrelatedtotheexistinggas infrastructureintheNetherlands.Itistheexistinginfrastructure, includingtheconversionandextractioncapacityandthegasﬁred boilers(withresultingdemandforgas),andtheexpectedrateof changeofthatinfrastructure,whichofferstheboundariesof mini-mumextractioncapacityandtherebythecurrentboundaryofthe localsafetyclaim.

In other words, the debate highlights the need for security scholarstofocusontheinteractionbetweenthreatimages, mate-rialeventsand especiallytheknowledgepracticesthatmediate betweenthese two. Contrary tothe facilitating conditions that SecuritizationTheoryoffers,wherematerialelementsaresubject tosecurity([14][14]p.33),thispaperplacestheminaflat rela-tionalontologythatequalizesthemtosecurityimages.Suchaflat relationalontologyisproposedinthefieldwhichbylackofa bet-tertermiscalled‘newmaterialism’[19–21].Scholarsinthisbroad fieldhavelongbeenuneasywithasolefocusonlinguistic expla-nationsinconstructivistwork,whilenotwillingtoreferbackto moretraditionalrealistandobjectivistapproaches astheselose theperformativeinsightthatoursharedsocialunderstandingsof theworldhelpshapeit.WhileIprefertheworkofBaradand Fou-cault,forsimplicity’ssakeandtheintentofthisspecialissueIwill usetheindicativeandverypopularrelationalalternativeofferedby Actor-NetworkTheory(ANT)[22,23].Thistheorydepictstheworld toexistoutofnetworksofnodes,whichthemselvesarenetworks, andsoon.Thesenetworksareirreducibleandflat,meaningthatone shouldnotandcannotpreferoneelementoveranother.Whether thatelementisasocialexplanation(energysecurity),something material(agaswell),alaworanewspaperarticle,allthese ele-mentstogetherformourcurrentworld.Importantly,aseachnode existsoutoftheirownnetworks,theoretically,ifanyofthesenodes ismissing,theworldisnotthesame.Inotherwords,securityclaims andimagesareonlyoneelementoutofmanyandtheyonlyhave theirspecificmeaningaspartofabroader‘securityapparatus’([29]; c.f.[38]).AsLatoursummarizesthegoalofANT:‘Itsimplymeans nottoimposeapriorisomespuriousasymmetryamonghuman intentionalactionandamaterialworldofcausalrelations([22]p. 76).’Insteadofassumingwhoacts(thespeechactor)theideaisto actuallystudywhoactsbyobservingthetracesthatareleftwhen relationschange(thedamageafterangasquake,achanged inter-pretationinreports,anewscientificmodel,etc.).Luckily,thecore assumptionisthatnetworksareconstantlychangingandthat sta-bilityisactuallyaproductofhardwork.Inthissense,asecurity argumentistheassociativeworkdonetocreatesomesemblance ofstabilityinanever-changingenvironment.

Thereadingbelowshowshowthelocalinhabitants,the Grun-ningersintheirdialect,hererepresentedbytheGroningerBodem Beweging(GBB,whichtranslatesasGroningenGroundMovement), havebeenincreasinglysuccessfulinsecuritizingthegasquakesas athreattotheirlivelihood.Theyhavemanagedtoputtheinduced earthquakesonthepoliticalagendawithasenseofurgency,while achievinga reductioningasextractionandanincreasein mon-etarycompensation. Thelesson however isthat theywere not

believeduntilthenumberofmeasurementsincreased–whichonly occurredafterrepeatedsecurityclaims–norgrantedtheirurgency untilthematerialityofthegasquakesbecamevisiblethroughthose measurementsandmaterialeffects.Justcallingforthethreatof thegasquakeshadlittleeffect,asshown bytheduration ofthe debate,butincludingthescientificuncertaintyinthosesafety argu-mentsultimatelydid.Especially,astheuncertaintyledtomore seismographs,which ledtomore measuredgasquakes,thereby strengtheningtheclaimsofthelocalpopulation.Simultaneously, onecanwitnesswithingovernmentandindustryadebategeared towardstheweighingofthebenefitsofnaturalgasextractionand theriskandconsequencesoftheseearthquakes.Forthese insti-tutions,thedebateitselfhardlychangedsomuchasthenumbers andvaluationbehindthem.Consequently,theseassessments(the weighingofsecurityofsupply,safetyandprofit)andthe uncer-taintybehindthescientificknowledgeover thesetremorslieat the coreof thestruggle betweenthe local populationand the gas-industrial complex(het Gasgebouw)6_: _the _small_and _closely

connectedgroupofcompaniesandinstitutionsinchargeofDutch naturalgasextraction.7

3. TheHuizingeearthquakeandsubsequentreactions

Withascoreof 3.6ontheRichterscale,theHuizinge earth-quakeof16August2012wasthestrongesteverexperiencedin theGroningenarea.8 _To_understand_its_impact,_it_is_necessary_to

placeitintheongoingdebateonthepotentialrelationbetween gasextractionandearthquakes.Thisincludesthehistorythatthe Grunningershavewithanincreasingnumberofsuchearthquakes, whichalsohavebeenofsteadilyhighermagnitude(seeFig.1),and theirstruggleforacknowledgementofthesequakes.Moreover,it includesthepublicpressurethatresulted ayearlater fromthe newsthat2013turnedouttobearecordyear.Bothintermsofan exceptionallyhighextractionvolume(upto54billionNm3:[39]), withsubsequentrevenues,andarecordnumberof119tremors ofwhichabout20couldbefeltbyinhabitants(outof133total intheNetherlands:[40]).Withinthedebateonthegasquakesin Groningen,theHuizingeearthquakethusactsasaturningpoint.

6_All_translations_from_Dutch_are_by_the_author,_but_I_am_grateful_to_the_editors

andreviewersforofferingabettertranslationofthisterm.

7_The_Netherlands_has_a_framework_that_distributes_the_legal_ownership,

extrac-tionrightsandprofitsharingbetweentheDutchstateandthecompaniesinvolved, througharangeoflegalentitiesandsubsidiaries,whichnowadaysisbundledunder theheadinghetGasgebouw(seeforexample[87]).Inthistightnetwork,Shelland ExxonMobilhavethelicensetooperatetheGroningennaturalgasfieldthroughtheir ownershipoftheNederlandseAardolieMaatschappij(NAM).Bothalsoownshares ofGasTerra,thecompanyresponsibleforthesaleofthenaturalgas.TheDutchstate (readtheMinistryofEconomicAffairs)pullsitsweightthroughalegalentitycalled EBN.TheNAMandEBNbothcooperateinandowntheMaatschapGroningen,which isresponsiblefortheactualexploitationofthenaturalgasfields.TheDutchstate alsoownssharesofGasTerrabothdirectly(viatheMinistryofFinance)and indi-rectly(throughEBN).Allinall,theDutchSafetyBoard([21]p.8,75,88)concludes that,throughtheseconstructionsandtheclosepersonalconnectionsbetweenthe boardsofGasTerraandtheMaatschapGroningen,thedecision-makingonDutch naturalgasismadeinaclosedsystemthatiseffectivelyownedbyShell, ExxonMo-bilandtheDutchState:asystemdevoidofoppositionandruledbytenpersonsat most.

8_Although_not_the_strongest_ever_experienced_in_the_Netherlands_(a_natural

earth-quakeinRoermond1992),andnotnearlyclosetothemagnitudeofsomeofthe recentUSshalegasinducedearthquakes.TheRichterscaleislogarithmicandwith itsmagnitudehighlightstheenergyreleased.Everythingbelow3ontheRichter scaleishardlyperceptible.Thatsaid,theactualexperiencedmagnitudedependson multiplefactors(energyreleased,wavespeed,groundconditions,force,duration, depth,andsoon),notallofwhichrelateoneononetotheearthquakesinGroningen. Inparticular,theminimaldepthbetween1and3km,thegroundconditions(clay, highgroundwaterlevels)andthefastspeedofthegroundwavesmeanthatpeople experiencethemearlierthantheRichterscalewouldindicate.Othercomplicating factorsaretheuncertaintywithintheRichterscaleitself(+−0,1)andthedelayof aboutayearbetweenthegasextractionandtheearthquakes.

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Notonlybecauseitsmagnitudeandsubsequentpublicattention madetheGrunningersstarttoprotestinearnest(whileallowing themamediaplatform),butalsobecauseitturnedouttobethe eventthatmadeofﬁcialsacknowledgetheneedforashiftintheir values.Inthisrespect,theunsolicitedreportoftheState Supervi-sionofMines(SSM)inresponsetotheHuizingeearthquake[41]

turnedoutespeciallyimportant.

Astheofﬁcialsupervisorybody,theSSMisresponsibletoensure thatanyminingactivitiesin theNetherlands arein accordance withthemininglaw[42].EventhoughtheHuizingeearthquakefell belowthemaximumof3.9ontheRichterscalethatwascalculated inearlierriskassessments,theSSMinitiatedastudyinresponseto thegrowingunrestunderthelocalpopulation([41];seealso[24]p. 66;[43]).Inthisunsolicitedreport,theSSM,until2015stillpartof theMinistryofEconomicAffairs(andthuspartofthegas-industrial complex),openlyandstronglyquestionstheconstantadjustments andincreasesinthemaximummagnitudethatriskassessments haveputforwardsincetheearly1990s.TheSSMcombinedthiswith earlierdiscussionsonmethodologicaluncertainties (seeSection

6),and,fortheﬁrsttime,puttheseuncertaintiesupfront. Subse-quently,itconcludedthatitisimpossibletoestimateapossible maximummagnitudefortheinducedearthquakesinGroningen, evengoingsofarastotakeamagnitudeof5.0asavalidpossibility. Topreventthis,itadvisedtheMinisterofEconomicAffairstoreduce theoutputoftheGroningengasﬁeldasquicklyanddrasticallyas possible.

TheSSM’sshiftcameasasurprisefortheotherpartieswithinthe gas-industrialcomplex([24]p.77)anditsadvisewasnot imme-diatelyacceptedbytheMinistryofEconomicAffairs.Insteadthe Ministercalledformoreresearchontherelationandeffectsofthe earthquakesandthegasextraction(15differentstudiesintotal, amongthemoneontheminimallevelneededtoupholdsecurity ofsupply,see:[44]).Hedidthis,eventhoughheacknowledgedthe chanceforhighermagnitudequakesandagreedwiththeNAMon asumof100millioneurosforpreventiveconstructionmeasures

[45–48].TheSSMreportmeanwhileinﬂuencedthesub-national

ProvinceofGroningentoinitiateitsown study,whichrepeated themainconclusionsoftheSSMandtherebyconﬁrmedthelocal concerns.Thelocalpopulation,inturn,usedthesereportsintheir protests[45,49].

Late2013thedebateheateduponcemorefollowingtherange ofreportsrequestedbytheMinister,whichconﬁrmedmanyofthe concernsvoiceduptothatmoment,aswellasthenewsthat2013 turnedouttobearecordyear[39,40,50–52].Thistimethe gov-ernmentheededtheconcernsanddecidedona rangeofissues. Theseincluded,amongothers,theorganizationofanopendialogue amongallaffectedprivateandpublicparties[53].Thegovernment alsotaskedtheNAMtoconductafull-scalebelowgroundsurvey (whichwasmissingsofar)andtoreducetheextractioninthemost effectedclusters(whilemakingupforthelossesinotherclusters). Simultaneously,itincreasedconstructionstandardsand preventa-tivemeasures,whilealsoimprovingtheadministrativeprocedures behindthecompensationclaims.Anditofferedtheregionan over-allpackagetoimproveitseconomicandemploymentperspectives

[54].Thesemeasureswerereinforcedinthewinterof2014–2015, atwhichpointtheMinisterofEconomicAffairsinitiatedaﬁrst pro-visionalcaponthetotalgasextractionfromtheGroningenﬁeld, whichhassincebeenextended[55,56].

4. Balancingsecurityofsupply,proﬁtsandtheimpactsof gasquakes

EventhoughtheMinistryofEconomicAffairsreduced produc-tionatspeciﬁcclustersandinitiatedacaponthetotalextracted volume,thereremainsastrongpoliticaldebateaboutthe

installa-tionofpermanentextractionquotas.Currently,thesafetyconcerns oftheGrunningersareacknowledged.However,theparties respon-sibleforgasextractionarearguingthattheyareboundtoproduce whatever is needed in response to contractual and seasonal demandfromtheDutchconsumersand theEuropeancountries thathaveboughtGroningengasonlongtermcontracts,andas suchcannotlimitthemselvesbyinstallingadeﬁniteextractioncap

[25,56].

Forinstance,inits2013reactiontothereportsfromtheSSMand otherinstitutesontheHuizingeEarthquaketheministryargued that:

In the near future, the Groningen gasextraction cannot be substitutedbygasimportsor othermeasures.A diminished availability of the Groningen natural gas will have serious consequencesfor theDutchsociety and thesocieties in our surroundingcountries([46]p.4).

Likewisein2015,aftertheinitialdecisiontocapthevolume,the ministrystatedthat:

TheconsequencesoflongtermgasextractioninGroningenhave becomeincreasinglyclearinrecentyears....Simultaneously, thegasextractionisofessentialimportancefortheenergy sup-plyintheNetherlands.Boththemixtureofthegasandthefact thatthegasfromGroningen,duetoitssize,canbeused ﬂexi-bly,makesthatareductionfromtheGroningengasﬁeldcould leadtoproblemswiththeheatingofbuildingsorotherusages.In addition,formultipledecadesthegasextractionisanimportant sourceofincomefortheDutchstate([57]p.4).

Thispositionhassince beenconfirmed–butsimultaneously limited−witharulingfromthehighestadministrativecourtin theNetherlands[58,59].Initsruling,thecourtarguedthatinthe assessmentof thebalancebetweenthesafety ofthelocal pop-ulationand securityof supply (which thecourt defines asthe low-calorificnaturalgasneededtocomplywiththedemandfor thistypeofgas)theMinisterhadnotexplainedwhyhechosethe demandfromaharshwinterscenariothatGasunieTransport Ser-vicesB.V.(GTS)calculatedasthebenchmarkfortheminimalsupply needed[44].Assuch,thecourtconsideredthatthelowestminimal productionwasnot30bn.Nm3asfavoredbyEconomicAffairs,but thatitshouldfollowamoreaveragescenarioof27bn.Nm3(with upwardallowancesforharshwinters).

Thisdebatecanbeplacedinanenergysecuritycontextwhere the role of gas is already shifting for the Netherlands. Before the1960s, theDutchdidnot experience gasinsecurity,simply becausethelevelofgasconsumptionwasminimal.Nowadays,the Netherlandsishighlygasdependent,butnotseenasgasinsecure becausemostofitsgasisextracteddomestically.Withthedraining oftheGroningengasfieldandotherDutchnaturalgasreservesthis isexpectedtochange.Inthenearfuture,theDutchwillbegas inse-curepreciselybecausetheyhavecometorelyonit.Similarly,while theNetherlandsisoneoftheleastdependentEuropeancountries onRussiangas,itdoesimportRussiangasandexpectstoincrease itsimportsinthefuturetobalancethereduction (andcapping) ofitsemptyingdomesticfields–negativelyinfluencingits secu-rityofsupplyposition.Tocounterthispositioninthepost-gasera, theDutchstatehaslaunchedanambitiousstrategytobecomethe “gasroundabout”ofNorth-WesternEurope,combiningitscentral positionandtheemptygasfieldsasitsnaturalstoragefacilities

[60].Thisgasroundabout ideaaimstoprofitfromthematerial (emptygasfields,pipelinesandpumpingandconversion capac-ity),legal(nationalandEuropeanlong-termcontractlawandother regulations)andsocial(knowledgeableandinfluentialgaselites) infrastructurethatsupportscurrentgasextractionpractices.

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It isespecially thelattersocial framework and thepractices resultingfromitthattheDutchSafetyBoarddescribesas encum-bering the incorporation of the everyday safety of individual citizensinthegasextractiondecisions.Theboarddescribesthe everydaydecision-makingoftheseorganizationsasdrivenbythree mainparadigms:(1)maximumprofitsandwinnings,(2)anoptimal andstrategicuseofthenaturalresources,and(3)acontinuityof Dutchgassuppliesforbothcitizensandindustry([24]pp.70–71; comparable:[51]p.4).Allthreearecapturedinthe1974smallfields policythatreplacedtheinitialunstructuredpumpingofgasinthe early1960swithamorestrategicandeconomiclongtermvision, basedonanoptimaldevelopmentofnewsmallgasfieldsby giv-ingthosefieldspriorityontheDutchgasmarketwhileusingthe Groningenfieldmoresparinglyasaswingfieldtofulfilltherestof demand[61].Inaddition,theboardalsoconcludesthat‘allefforts withinthegas-industrialcomplexareaimedtowardsan imper-ceptibleextractionofnaturalgas’([24]p.74).Togetherthesefour maximsforalongtimestructuredtheeverydaypracticeswithin thegas-industrialcomplextowardstheGroningennaturalgasfield. Importantly,theyexcludethesafetyandinsecurityconcernsofthe locals,exceptasaconditiontobemetfortheothergoals([24]p. 71;[62]).This,inturn,preconditionedtheinitialresponsefrom theorganizationstoclaimsofinsecuritybylocals,anditexplains whytheseresponses,foralongtime,havebeensoothinginstead ofinformativeandwhytheyonlyfollowedthescientificupdates ofthemagnitude–withoutrepeatingthementioneduncertainties andknowledgegaps([24]pp.81–82,86).

Upuntilthedebatefollowing theSSMreport,thegasquakes wereconsideredanexternalityofthegasextraction,tobepaidoff throughdamagepayments.Securityofsupplyargumentssimply meantbusinessasusualandanoptimalutilizationoftheDutchgas ﬁelds.WiththeSSMreportandtheincreasingpressureofthe Grun-ningers,mediaandotherparties(likelocalgovernments,safety regions,environmentalgroupings,andsoon),thediscussionfor thegas-industrialcomplexshiftedtomoreextensivecompensatory measuresandmitigationpractices,whileopeningupthequestion whenpreciselytheNetherlandswouldbegassecure?Lookingback, thegasquakeprotestsandsubsequentshiftfromtheSSMandother knowledgeinstitutesforcedthegovernmenttolookcloseratits understandingofsecurityof supply.In doingso,it renewedits securityofsupplyconsiderationsthatstructuretheenergydebates intheNetherlands,butthistimeinterpreteditnolongerin eco-nomicorstrategicterms,butintermsofaminimalgasextraction. Theminimalextractionthatisrequiredtofulﬁllexpecteddemand withinthecurrentsociotechnicalgasinfrastructureincludingthe technicalcapacitytodeliverthisthroughalternativemeans.

5. Callingonsafetyconcernsandscientiﬁcuncertaintyto securitizethegasquakes

The local inhabitants above the Groningen gas field do not primarilydealwithenergysecurityconcerns,contractual obliga-tionsandotherriskassessments.Instead,theydealwithasteady increase in frequency and magnitude of induced earthquakes causedbythenaturalgasextraction,areluctantacknowledgement ofthecausalitybetweenextraction,quakesanddamages,the dif-ficultiesingettingtheirdirectand indirectearthquakedamages reimbursed,decreasinghouseprices,asoothingcommunication bythegas-industrialcomplexandtheperceivedunequal distri-butionofthegasbenefits([63–65],[66]pp.7–9).Thesegrievances andconcernsarebeingvoicedthroughmediachannels,legal proce-duresandlettersofcomplainttoofficialinstitutionsbothregionally (likethesafetyregionofGroningenandmunicipalitieswhichin turnalsostartedtopetition)andnationally(theSSM,parliament, theMinisterofEconomicAffairs,andotherregulatoryand

polit-icalinstitutions).Inaddition,thestreetprotestsgrewinnumber andsizetogatheringsofhundredsofpeoplelate2014[67].These protestsmainlyfocusedonthreeclaims.First,anoveralldemand formoreattentionandacceptanceoftheurgencyoftheirproblems withbannerslike‘Groningenatickingtimebomb’[68].Second, especiallylaterinthedebate,showcasingtheirdistrusttowardsthe gas-industrialcomplexandinparticulartheNAMandtheMinister ofEconomicAffairswithbannerslike‘Groningentremors,butThe Haguewillquiver’[69].Andofcourse,theneedtopreventfurther gasquakesbycallingforareductionofgasextraction,with ban-nersreading‘KampGasTerugNu’,callingonKamp,theministerof EconomicAffairs,totakehisfootofthegasthrottle[70].

Obviously,someGrunningershavebeenawareofthegasquakes sincetheearly1990sandhavetriedtomakethemselvesheardover time,eitherasindividuals(see[71]onVanderSluis;ormorerecent

[72])or throughwell-organized associations liketheGroninger GroundMovement[63,73]orthemoreactivistShocking Gronin-gen[74].Lookingbackearlierintothedebateitisillustrativethat ittook7yearsand alargeinterdisciplinarystudyafterthefirst earthquakein1986forthegovernmentandtheNAMtoofficially acknowledgethatthequakesweredirectlylinkedtothegas extrac-tion[75].Untilthatstudyin1993,theNAMridiculedanyclaims fromindividualsandorganizationsthatproposedsuchalink[71]. Oncerecognized,ittookanother20yearsfortheofficialpartiesto starttakingtherisksandpotentialconsequencesoftheseinduced earthquakesseriousenoughtoadapttheirextractionvolumes.In those20years,everycoupleofyearsNAM,governmentand knowl-edgeinstituteshavebeenforcedtoincreasetheirestimatesonthe frequencyandmagnitudeofpotentialquakes.

This eventful material reality and the decades of uncertain knowledgeclaimsthataccompanyit(onlyreinforcedbytheslow responseanddelayingtacticsofthegas-industrialcomplexsince theHuizingeearthquake[76])haveledtofeelingsofinsecurity anddistrust[66].Thatittookuntil2013fortheuncertaintybehind theearthquakestobecomewidespreadpublicknowledge,canbe explained,sotheargumentgoes,bytheideathattheGrunningers wereloyal and felta senseof pride for helpingthe countryto developaswhole([45]p.21).Somethingthatslowlychangedin timewiththeconstantadjustmentoftheriskanalysesand max-imummagnitudeoftheearthquakes.Intheirsearchforanswers, evermorepeoplestartedtoreadtheactualreports.Theycalledon theuncertaintyitself–indepth–intheirlettersofcomplaintto ofﬁcialinstitutions,forexampletoparliament(see[77]).TheSSM reportcanbedescribedasaturningpointinthisrespectaswell,as itnotonlyinformedthegas-industrialcomplexontheuncertainty intheanalysesusedsofar,butalsosupportedandlegitimized ear-lierreadingsoftheGrunningers.AsVanderVoort&Vanclayargue: ‘[t]hepublicationoftheSSMreportwasanimpactinitselfwith peoplebecomingmoreanxiousaboutwhatwillhappentothem (2015,p.8).’Withthereportandthemediaattentionfollowingit, abroadergroupofpeoplelearnedthattherewasnocertaintyin storeforthem.Whatismore,thesubsequentdecisionofthe Min-isterofEconomicAffairstonotdirectlyfollowtheadvicefromthe SSMgavethelocalpopulationfurtherammunitionandaclearfocus fortheirgrievances.

OneofthelargestandmostorganizedinterestgroupsistheGBB, whichisactivelylobbying,securitizingandlitigatingagainstthe gas-industrialcomplex.Intermsofsecurityofsupply,theGBBhas constantlymaintainedthat‘theextractionisreducedorhalteduntil independentresearchshowsatwhatlevelextractioncantakeplace safelyandsecurely([78]p.4).’Moreimportant,‘if“safeextraction” istechnicalimpossible,theGBBdemandsa totalhalttothegas extraction([63]p.1)’.TheGBB,togetherwithotherinterested par-ties,madethistangibleintheirappealtothehighestadministrative courtintheNetherlands[79].Buildingontheirearliercallthatthe Ministerwasnotacting,heretheyarguedthatEconomicAffairshad

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notsufﬁcientlysubstantiatedthedecisiontocapthegasextraction. Itbaseditsdecisionsonthecertaintiesithad(thebudgetary neces-sityofthegasbeneﬁtsandsecurityofsupply),asopposedtothe manyuncertaintiesthataccompanythegasextraction([62]p.7). Duringthehearing,theycalledforapreferredreductionto12bn. Nm3,whichtheSSMin2013arguedwasasafeextractionlevel

[43],onlyaccepting21bn.Nm3ifpracticalcircumstances(read minimalsecurityofsupplyandinternationalcontractual obliga-tions)dictatedotherwiseinlinewiththebottombandwidthofthe GTS[44]report.Althoughtheywereunhappywiththelegal rul-ingwhichconﬁrmedtheprevalenceofsecurityofsupplyconcerns andsetthelevelat27bn.Nm3[80],thesecondoptionsshowsthat theGBBisforcedtoacceptsecurityofsupplyasaprimary consid-erationinthedebate.Inotherwords,whilethelocalpopulation doesnotprimarilydiscussthegasquakesintermsofsecurityof supply,thegovernments’securityofsupplyconsiderationsarea constantabsentpresenceintheirclaimsforrecognition,safetyand areductionofnaturalgasextraction.

6. Thepoliticsbehindthegasquakescience

Behindthedebateontheminimalextractionvolume,liesthe lackofknowledgeoverthetremors;bothintermsofthe availabil-ityofseismographstoactuallymonitorthemandintermsofthe uncertaintyofthescientificmodelsthatareusedtoanalyzeand predictthegasquakes.Inthisrespect,theGroningengasdebate shows(1) thatwhat isnot monitoredand measuredcannotbe known,(2)thatresearchershadlittleincentivestoworkonthe uncertaintiesintheirmodels,especially(3)whentheinstitutions usingandsponsoringtheresultsarehappywiththeoutcomes.For theargumentofthispaper,thedebateshowsthatthedecisionto monitorisjustaspoliticalasthedecisiontocaptheextraction. Meaningthatthesedecisionsareheavilyinfluencedbythe inter-estsand(energy)securitypositionsofthepartiesinvolved,while simultaneouslythepartiesfeeljustifiedintheirpositionsbythe subsequentoutcomesofthestudies.

Theonlyreasonwhythe1986earthquakenearAssen,atown justbelowtheProvinceofGroningenwithitsownsmallgasfield, wasidentifiedasanearthquake,contrarytootherorallyreported “air”tremors[65],wasbecauseitwasstrongenoughtobepicked upbythesensorsoftheRoyalNetherlandsMeteorological Institu-tion(KNMI)inthemiddleofthecountry.Oneofthemainresults ofthedebatethatfollowedwasthattheDutchParliament influ-encedtheMinister ofEconomicAffairs toordertheKNMI–for whichtheearthquakewasunexplainableasitlackedanydata–to installanumberofseismographsaroundtheAssenfieldin1989 andaroundtheGroningenfieldin1992[45,64,65,81].Thisbrings upthequestionwhetherthestartofFig.1resultedfromthefirst trueGroningergasquakeorwasactuallyaresultofthecapacityto monitorthem.

Eitherway, new waves of attention and research followed, amongothersin1993,1995,1997,2000,2003,2004,2006and2009 duetobothearthquakesandregulatorychanges.Ofthese,2004is ofinterestontwoaccounts.First,becausetheNAMfortheﬁrst timepubliclyacknowledgedthatthemaximummagnitudecould becorrectedifnecessary,therebyimplyingthatthesecannotbe estimatedupfront.Andsecond,becausethe2004KNMIreportnot onlyincreasedthemaximummagnitudeto3.9afteranupdateofits database,butalsoacknowledgedthatitwasusingstaticmodelsfor asituationthatwasnotstatic(astheearthquakesresultfrom shift-inglevelsofgasextraction).However,itstatedthatitsimplylacked thetoolsandsub-surfaceinformationtocopewiththeﬂuctuating gasextractionanditsrelationwiththeinducedearthquakes([82]; seealso[83];forasimilarstudyaftertheHuizingeearthquake;or the[75]reportforapredecessor).

It tookuntilthe Huizingeearthquake and thereportbythe SSMfor thenumber ofstudiesto increasedramatically (asdid thenumberofseismographsandtherebythenumberofpreviously undetectedgasquakes).Manyofthesereportswerecommissioned aspartof thelargeinterdisciplinarystudyonthegas chainby theMinistryofEconomicAffairs,whichwasreceivingconflicting advicefromtheparties involved.Before2013,EconomicAffairs reliedonthereportsoftheKNMIandotherknowledgeinstitutes anditexpectedthesereportstobepaidforbytheNAMafterits legalobligationtotakethenecessarysafetyprecautions.However, astheDutchSafetyBoardconcludes,theNAM,astheexploitermost knowledgeableofthegasfields,welcomedtheresultsfromthese reportsthattheearthquakeswouldonlyhaveaminimumimpact andhencesawnocausetoorderadditionalstudiesonthe uncer-taintiesmentionedinthereports([24]pp.65–66).Italsotookthe semi-independentSSMuntil2012toputforwardtheuncertainties behindthescientificmodelsandriskassessments.

WiththeNAMunwillingtostudythescientificuncertainties,the MinistrypassivelyrelyingonadviceandtheSSM(andotherexpert councils)confirmingtheofficialreports,therewaslittleincentive fortheKNMIandotherknowledgeinstitutestobuildalternative models.Theytried,inpartbylookingatinternationalresearch,but thenquicklyranintotheuniquematerialqualitiesofthe Gronin-gengasfield(see note3;[24]p. 64).Whatremainedwerethe staticmodelsandtheiroutcomes,which‘focusedonthenumber, theestimatedmaximummagnitude([24]p.63).’Intheend,this focusonthenumberworkedbothways.Itsimplifiedmattersfor thegas-industrialcomplexasitconstantlyreinforcedtheir posi-tionthatthegasquakesdidnot posea safetyconcern,but over timealsofueledthedistrustanduncertaintyoftheGrunningers forwhomthemessagenottoworrycontrastedwiththeconstant adjustmentsandtheirexperienceoftheactualearthquakes.The 2013SSMreportinthissenseisinterestingasitshowsthe impor-tanceofreflexivitywithinanenergysecurityandsafetydebate,in particulartheacknowledgementthatsecurityofsupplystillneeds avaluejudgement.Clearly,theGrunningerswiththeirfocuson safety(andtheirsearchforanswers)judgedthisthreshold differ-entlythanthegas-industrialcomplexthatlookedatthebalance betweencosts,profits,legalobligationsandsecurityofsupply.

7. Reﬂection

TheGroningengasquakedebateoffersanexampleofa secu-ritydebatein a developedcountrythat putssecurityof supply considerationsinthecontextofhumansecurityarguments.The analysisbuildsontheinteractionbetweenthreelinesofenquiry. First, it takes seriouslythe material realityof the earthquakes, theirimpacts,but alsothegasﬁeld itselfandtheinfrastructure aroundit,whichkeepsthedebatelocalized(noearthquakesoutside Groningen)andsituatedinaNorthern-Europeanmarketthrough itspipelinesat thesame time.Second,it highlightsthepolitics overtheseearthquakesintermsoftheiroriginandtheirpotential impact,as wellas theknowledge politics related tothe scien-tiﬁcuncertaintyofthemodelsbehindtheearthquakesandtheir futuretrends.Third,itillustratesthestrugglebytheGrunningers toattributeasenseofurgencytoboththematerialityofthe earth-quakesandtheirfutureuncertainty.Whilesuccessful,theabove alsoshowsthatthelocalpopulationcouldnotescapethe assess-mentsofthegas-industrialcomplex.

In fact, in order tobreak with theconservativeforce stem-mingfromanunreflectiveuseofsecurityofsupplyandinorder toincreasetheaudienceacceptanceoftheirsafetyclaim,thelocal populationneeded,firstly(andironically),thefrequencyand mag-nitudeoftheearthquakesaswellasthevisibilityoftheirimpact. Secondly,theyhelpedspeedthisupbyfocusingonthescientific

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uncertaintiesinthereports,slowlyconvincingneighborsandlocal authoritiesandthenmedia,semi-regulatoryinstitutions,andsoon. Thirdly,oncetheSSMacceptedtheclaimandpublishedthereport thatlegitimizedthesafetyclaim,thefocusshiftedtothedecisions oftheMinisterofEconomicAffairs.Initiallythedecisionnottoact, thereaftertothedecisionaboutthelevelatwhichthenaturalgas extractionwascapped.Thatsaid,whiledecidingtowait,the min-isterdidalreadydemandthereportfromtheGTSontheminimal securityofsupplylevelsindicatinganearlyacceptancetoreview theDutchsecurityofsupplyposition.

In reflection,this illustration highlights theimportance of a contextualunderstandingofsecurity ofsupply. Throughoutthe debate,thegas-industrialcomplexslowlyincreaseditswillingness toacceptandcompensatefortheconsequencesofthegas extrac-tion.Itwasnotuntilithadcompromisedonallmostallaspectsof thegassupplychainthatitwaswillingtoconsideracloserlookat themeaningofsecurityofsupplyandreducetheextractedvolume forsafetyconcerns.Similarly,thecaseshowsthatwhilethe Grun-ningerscallforafurtherreduction,theyultimatelytakeapragmatic legalstancetowardsaminimumextractionvolumebasedon secu-rity of supply considerations. Thedebate thus centered onthe meaningofsecurityofsupplyasitrelatestothelowcalorific nat-uralgasoftheGroningengasfield,theestimateddemandandthe availabletechnicalcapacitytosubstitutetheGroningengas.From asecurityperspective,however,thelocalpopulationthroughtheir resistanceagainstthegasextractionpracticeshelpedreifythe prin-cipleofsecurityofsupply.Eventhoughtheirconcernsfitapotential widerunderstandingofhumanenergysecurity,theyneverreally successfullyquestionedthesecurityofsupply principlesbehind thedecision-making processes.Consequently,securityofsupply hasbeenreproducedwhileitstructuredthedebatebysettingthe outermostboundariesofacceptableactionsandreductions.That said,ithasnotbeenreproducedthesame:thegasquakeshave chal-lengedtheDutchnotionofsecurityofsupply,withnaturalgasno longerseenasasilentandbountifulresourcebutasanecessityto whichthecountryisaddicted.

Fromthiswecandrawthreelessons.First,theneedtostudy theuseofsecurityandthreatimagesintheirwidercontext.This shouldincludethesociotechnicalenergyinfrastructure,material causalevents,andespeciallyhowsecuritypracticesrelatetoother knowledgepracticesthatareusedtomakesenseoftheseevents. Second,besidestheinsightthatpeoplewhousesecuritylanguage aremorallyresponsibleforthedistinctionstheymake,theagenda settingpowertheyexertandtheresourcesthataredrawnfrom otheroptions,thereisthelessonthatsecurityissimultaneously abouturgencyand conservation.Itis aboutprotectingand con-servingacertainsituation,exceptthatitalwaysfailsassecurity changesthingsitself.Protectingtheexistinggasextractionvolumes hadclearimpacts,justasarguingforthesafetyandliving stan-dardshadanimpactontheactualgasextraction.Securityisnever staticandthesearchforthedeﬁnitionofwhatenergysecurityis canthereforeonlybedescribedasanactivepoliticalintervention itself.Energysecurityscholarsshouldbeawareofthisandnotonly study“new”securitythreatsorcategorizeoldones,butexplicitly focusonexistingenergysecuritypractices,theirdistinctionsand theconstantrenegotiationandhardworkthatkeepthemstable.

Acknowledgements

Thispaperisanabbreviatedversionofadissertationchapter conductedattheUniversityofGroningenentitledSecuring Abun-dance: The Politics of EnergySecurity. I would liketo thankthe participantsanddiscussantatthe2015EverydayInsecuritiesand VulnerabilitiesWorkshopat theUniversity ofGlasgow, Jaapde Wilde,BenjaminHerborth,BenjaminK.Sovacool, theeditorsof

thisspecialissueandespeciallythetwoanonymousreviewersfor theirrigorouscomments andadvice.Thisworkis supportedby theUniversityofGroningenandtheDanishCouncilfor Indepen-dentResearch(DFF)[SapereAudeGrant4182–00033B].Theviews expressedarethoseoftheauthor.

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