The quest for long-term peace and stability : how youth mobilization shapes conflict transformation in Sierra Leone

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The Quest for Long-Term Peace and Stability

How Youth Mobilization Shapes Conflict Transformation in Sierra Leone

Hannah C. de Vet – 10336125

Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations United Nations and Peacebuilding

Supervisor: Dr. Jana Krause Second reader: Dr. Abbey Steele

Graduate School of Social Sciences University of Amsterdam

21 June 2019

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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my great appreciation to Dr. Jana Krause for her guidance, support, and valuable and constructive suggestions throughout the process of writing my thesis. I would like to acknowledge Dr. Jessica Di Salvatore for instilling my love for academic writing. My interest in Sierra Leone was first spurred three years ago during the course Violence and Order in Civil Wars, which she taught at the University of Amsterdam. Since then, she has been incredibly supportive and encouraging, both as a teacher and through outside conversation. Special thanks are also extended to Dr. Dimitris Bouris for his time, advice and words of encouragement.

To my friends, I would like to thank you all for the support that I have received throughout the year. From living in a jailhouse to finding the cheapest Indonesian food in town. Never a dull moment and an inexhaustible source of humour, laughter, and existential insights. My best friend Koulla G. Solomontos, thank you for your unconditional support, day in day out. Regardless of where we are in the world, you always believe in me. You also made sure I was always hydrated. It is definitely something that is easy to forget. A special thanks to my close friend Daniel Cohen. His ability to tolerate my rambling and making sense out of utter chaos was instrumental to the development of my thought process during the writing of my thesis.

To my family. Mom, thank you for everything that you do for me. I would not have been able to write this thesis without your support, love, kindness, and ability to deal with my outbursts of energy. I promise I will make you proud. Dad, thank you for teaching me to pursue what I am passionate about and to put myself first. My sister Tessa, thank you for always reminding me to take care of myself. Your delicious recipes, yoga poses, and breathing exercises have helped me on so many occasions.

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Abstract

Sierra Leone has been hailed as a peacebuilding success story. However, despite the post-conflict reconstruction processes, the nation has not yet managed to achieve the promised development of a stable and durable peace. This research focuses on how youth mobilization shapes conflict transformation in post-war Sierra Leone. The aim of this study is to provide a better understanding of the role youth can play in conflict transformation in Sierra Leone and in the nation’s quest for a stable and durable peace. Through a mixed methods approach, focusing on youth involvement and mobilization and the occurrence of (non)violent events from 2002-2017, I argue that youth mobilization can have a constructive or destructive effect on conflict transformation, depending on the form of youth mobilization that occurs. Building on concepts of conflict transformation, leadership theory, and nonviolent resistance as part of collective action, I show that a distinction can be made between two forms of youth mobilization in Sierra Leone, namely: youth-initiated mobilization and elite-initiated mobilization. Youth-initiated mobilization has the overall potential to constructively affect conflict transformation by allowing youth to articulate their needs and grievances, and to let their voices be heard. Furthermore, it puts pressure on the government to address structural violence and sees youth actively involved in the development of their nation. On the contrary, elite-initiated mobilization has a destructive effect on conflict transformation in Sierra Leone as it perpetuates the feelings of resentment and fear towards youth as a cohort and youth culture more broadly. This, in turn, stems from the scars left in the wake of the 1991-2002 civil war. Elite-initiated mobilization works as a trigger for conflict legacies and distracts the government from addressing key issues concerned with post-conflict reconstruction, hereby feeding into a vicious cycle of patterns of recurring violence that will ultimately halt the further development of a stable and durable peace in the nation. I find that in order for Sierra Leone to achieve the development of a stable and durable peace, it is of critical importance that the structural violence in society is effectively addressed by the government. Failure to do so, while subsequently maintaining a continuation of elite-initiated mobilization, will halt Sierra Leone’s conflict transformation towards a stable and durable peace, and could even lead to a return to conflict.

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List of Abbreviations

ACLED

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project

APC

All People’s Congress

BRA

Bike Riders Association

BTI

Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index

CSO

Civil Society Organizations

DWS

Drinking Water Sources

FH

Freedom House

FSI

Fragile State Index

HAQI

Health Access and Quality Index

HDI

Human Development Index

MICS

UNICEF Multi Indicator Cluster Surveys

NEC

National Electoral Commission

NGO

Nongovernmental Organizations

NRS

National Recovery Strategy

PCR

Post-Conflict Reconstruction

RD

Restless Development

RUF

Revolutionary United Front

SCAD

Social Conflict Analysis Database

SF

Sanitation Facilities

SLFO

Street Life Family Organization

SLPP

Sierra Leone People’s Party

TI

Transparency International

TRC

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UNDAF

United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

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List of Tables and Figures

Tables

Table 1

Objectives and Priorities for Long-Term Peacebuilding

16 Table 2

Age Structure of Sierra Leone’s Population

32 Table 3

Indicators of Measurement for Conflict Transformation

35 Table 4

Presidential Election Turn Out

41 Table 5

Instigators of Violent Events in Sierra Leone, 2002-2017

47 Table 6

Instigators of Nonviolent Events in Sierra Leone, 2002-2017

48 Figures

Figure 1

Transformation of Protracted Social Conflicts

25 Figure 2

The Extended Concepts of Violence and Peace

27 Figure 3

Development of State Authority and Good Governance

41 Figure 4

Development of Community Circumstances

41 Figure 5

Human Development Index

42 Figure 6

Development of Personal Autonomy, Individual and Civil Rights

42 Figure 7

Development of Economy and Employment Opportunities

42 Figure 8

Overview of Collective Action and Collective Violence in Sierra Leone

43 Figure 9

Violent Events in Sierra Leone, 2002-2017

47 Figure 10

Issues Underlying Violent Events in Sierra Leone, 2002-2017

47 Figure 11

Nonviolent Events in Sierra Leone, 2002-2017

48 Figure 12

Issues Underlying Nonviolent Events in Sierra Leone, 2002-2017

48 Figure 13

Youth Involvement in (Non)Violent Events in Sierra Leone, 2002-2017

49 Figure 14

Youth Involvement, Mobilized or Spontaneous

49 Figure 15

Forms of Youth Mobilization and its Associated Initiators

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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION

On 31 March 2018, Julius Maada Bio of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) was elected president by the people of Sierra Leone (United Nations 2018a). The elections were another demonstration of Sierra Leone’s commitment to democratic governance. On 27 September 2018, President Bio delivered his first speech at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York. He stated that Sierra Leone ‘is a successful model of a stable democracy – one that has evolved and matured in 20 years from the chaos and lawlessness of civil conflict’, adding that ‘… stable democracies must be sustainable’ (Thomas 2018). He emphasizes his assumption that a sustainable, peaceful, democracy can be maintained by further development of the nation (ibid.). Referring to his government’s new, 96-page long, manifesto titled New Direction, Bio stresses that the government’s focus lies on developing Sierra Leone past the phase of peacebuilding and consolidation, as was the primal focus of the government over the past decade (ibid.). By establishing new priorities, such as job creation, access to education, youth empowerment, battling corruption, and transparency, Bio believes that a stable and peaceful democracy can be established and maintained (ibid.). In his inaugural speech, held on 12 May 2018, President Julius Maada Bio voiced his aspirations for the nation. He concurrently addressed the critical state of Sierra Leone’s economy and corrupt governance. More specifically, Bio called upon the youth of Sierra Leone to ‘be at the forefront in promoting our peaceful democratic wars on indiscipline, corruption and poverty’ (ibid.). Affirming the notion that by empowering the youth through the provision of resources and skills training, he stresses that the youth will be able to make meaningful contributions to the future development of Sierra Leone (ibid.).

Youth in Sierra Leone is a contested subject. It hinges both on the definition of what exactly entails ‘youth’ and the extent to which youth can play a role of importance in Sierra Leone’s post-conflict development. There is an overall impression in Sierra Leone of ‘youth’ as being a ‘backward and unenlightened’ cohort of individuals, with a ‘collectively negative attitude, who gravitate naturally toward violence’ (McIntyre et al. 2002: 13). It consistently feeds into the idea that these ‘youths’ have nothing positive to offer to society (ibid.: 13). However, the youth violence that occurred during the Sierra Leonean civil war was in large part due to the absence of social and economic buffers (ibid.: 14). Young people were exposed to political oppression and economic hardship, which effectively narrowed their choices (ibid.: 9). Their resort to violence can be understood as a means of political articulation, and does not necessarily have a causal relation with the assumption of the presence of a violent ‘youth culture’ (McIntyre et al. 2002, McIntyre and Thusi 2003).

Since the cessation of the civil conflict, the Sierra Leonean government, supported by international actors, has developed multiple economic, social and political policies and programs aimed at post-conflict reconstruction (PCR). For both the Sierra Leonean government and the involved international actors, the prevention of direct violence was a primal focus in PCR (McEvoy-Levi 2013). This aligns with the Western model for peacebuilding, wherein pacification within the general population (prevention of direct violence)

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14 is favoured over the pursuance of justice, essentially leaving structural violence systems intact (ibid.: 297). In the case of Sierra Leone, this meant that a large number of peacebuilding programs focused on e.g. the rehabilitation of the local infrastructure and not as much on youth rehabilitation (McIntyre and Thusi 2003). Yet, the reintegration of children and youth is explicitly linked to the nation, its identity and its economic development (Shepler 2005: 201). It is therefore essential that the Sierra Leonean government recognizes the needs of the youth in order to achieve a sustainable peace for its nation (McIntyre and Thusi 2003).

This research addresses the question: how does youth mobilization shape conflict transformation in Sierra Leone? I propose that the effects of youth mobilization on conflict transformation are dependent on the forms of youth mobilization present in society. More specifically, I argue that youth mobilization can have a constructive or destructive effect on conflict transformation, depending on the form of youth mobilization that occurs. I make a distinction between two forms of youth mobilization, namely: youth-initiated mobilization, and elite-youth-initiated mobilization. I will show that youth-youth-initiated mobilization can have a constructive effect on conflict transformation, whereas elite-initiated mobilization affects conflict transformation in a destructive way.

In constructing this argument, I will discuss the concept of conflict transformation and the posited effectiveness of nonviolent resistance as a means of power for achieving change. The research presents a structured analysis of the conflict transformation of Sierra Leone and the impact of collective youth mobilization in society. More specifically, I will look at the socioeconomic and political development of Sierra Leone between 2002-2017, and at the social disturbances that have occurred between 2002 and 2017, to determine the effects of youth mobilization on conflict transformation. The importance and relevance of this research lies in the fact that Sierra Leone – despite being hailed a peacebuilding success story (Lawrence 2014) – has not yet managed to achieve the promised development of the nation (Cubitt 2010). The aim of this research is to provide a better understanding of the role youth can play in conflict transformation in Sierra Leone and in the nation’s quest to long-term peace and stability. Moreover, this research will contribute to our understanding of the constructive contributions youth can make in processes of conflict transformation in post-war environments.

Thesis Outline

The thesis outline is as follows. In Chapter 2, I review the literature on conflict transformation in Sierra Leone, youth in Sierra Leone, and youth mobilization in Africa. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework that will serve as the backbone for my research. It builds on the concepts of conflict transformation, peacebuilding, leadership theory, collective action, and nonviolent resistance. In Chapter 4, I discuss the research design and methodology. Chapter 5 represents the analysis and body of evidence to support the research question and the proposed argument. I present a discussion of the results in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 provides a brief conclusive summary of the study, implications of the findings, and recommendations for further research.

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Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents a review of the existing literature that is of relevance to this research. The first section focuses on conflict transformation in Sierra Leone after the cessation of conflict. The second section discusses youth in Sierra Leone and the influence of conflict legacies on their position in society. The third section elaborates on the subject of youth mobilization in Africa, paying particular attention to the so-called ‘crisis of youth’.

Conflict Transformation in Sierra Leone

On 18 January 2002, the civil war in Sierra Leone was officially declared over by the United Nations (Kaldor and Vincent 2006). The peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone has revolved around two key documents, namely: the Lomé Peace Agreement, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report. The Lomé Peace Agreement was signed on 7 July 1999 and included provisions for power-sharing between the government and rebels, disarmament and demobilization, and the establishment of commissions for human rights, and for truth and reconciliation (ibid.). Despite the fact that the fighting continued after the signing of the initial peace agreement, the agreement established the main aspect of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone (Cubitt 2010). As stated by Christine P. Cubitt, the Lomé Peace Agreement ‘established the genesis of the peace process … and defined the shape of the nation building project …’ (2010: 87).

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, the second key document in Sierra Leone’s process of peacebuilding, is a crucial complement to the Lomé Peace Agreement as it included not just provisions concerning the elite and warring actors, but also provided provisions for the majority (civilian) population of Sierra Leone (ibid.: 88). The report, published in 2004, presented findings, conclusions, and further recommendations that would enable the development of an effective post-conflict recovery for Sierra Leone (ibid.: 89). As stated by Huyse and Salter:

If the TRC’s recommendations are fully implemented, they would without a doubt act as a catalyst for the social and legal reform required to address the impunity and establish a culture of respect for human rights in Sierra Leone, as well as helping the social regeneration of battered communities.

(2008: 131)

For the short-term stabilization of the nation, the National Recovery Strategy (NRS) was developed (Cubitt 2010). The NRS, mandated to lay a foundation for consolidation of peace and the transition towards sustainable development (Moore et al. 2003, in Cubitt 2010), identified three main components for recovery: government, civil society, and the economy (ibid.). Four areas were listed as priorities for Sierra Leone’s

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16 post-conflict reconstruction: the restoration of state authority, the rebuilding of communities, peacebuilding and human rights, and the restoration of the economy. These objectives clearly held potential for the development of long-term peace and stability in the nation. The United Nations, through their United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), complemented the NRS objectives. Table 1 summarises the practical plans for the aforementioned objectives, combined with the conceptual framework for peace as proposed by Christine P. Cubitt (2010).

Table 1 Objectives and Priorities for Long-Term Peacebuilding, adapted from Cubitt (2010: 106) Framework

for peace Priority area of intervention National Recovery Strategy United Nations Development Assistance Framework Good

leadership and good governance

Restoration of

state authority ▪ District council elections ▪ Increased strength and presence of police ▪ JPs and magistrates’ courts

throughout the country ▪ Rehabilitation of

provincial prisons and increased number of prison service staff ▪ Rehabilitate court barriers

and chiefdom police

▪ Improved capacity of law enforcement agents in the respect and protection of human rights and in conflict resolution at national and local levels

▪ Decentralization policies adopted and local government restored and effectively functioning ▪ An effective, efficient and

accountable justice system established

▪ Security institutions and personnel strengthened

Inclusion of marginalized groups

Rebuilding

communities ▪ Child protection and social services to vulnerable groups – child soldiers, disabled and handicapped ▪ Establishment of basic

services: primary education, primary health care, access to water and sanitation, home rehabilitation

▪ Increased access to quality social services, including shelter

▪ Public sector reform for efficient and accountable service delivery Respect for and protection of human rights Peacebuilding and human rights

▪ Human rights sensitization and training

▪ Increased awareness and respect for human rights at the national level, including the adoption/amendments of national laws as per international obligations Economic opportunities Resources diverted to rural areas Restoration of

the economy ▪ Food self-sufficiency, surplus, trading and economic opportunities ▪ Increase official diamond

exports and start production of rutile ▪ Increase microcredit loans,

especially to rural areas ▪ Improved and sustainably

maintained road network throughout the country

▪ Increased access to employment and income generation opportunities for poor people

▪ Increased food production, household food security and farm incomes

▪ Stabilized and competitive economy

▪ Increased private investment and employment

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17 Christine Cubitt (2010) has argued that during the post-conflict reconstruction of Sierra Leone, the nation did not receive what it needed for effective reconstruction of the state in order to attain long-term peace and stability. The NRS and UNDAF placed a large emphasis on capacity building as a priority for Sierra Leone’s post-conflict reconstruction, hereby foregoing the fact that the nation was experiencing a capacity and resource crisis as a result from the devastating civil war. Sierra Leone experienced limited state capacity, yet the international community pushed for ‘overambitious programming’ (Moreno 2000, in Cheru and Bradford 2002: 215), thereby creating a strong state of dependency for Sierra Leone (Cubitt 2010). The prioritization of benchmarks sets by the international community led to an ineffective model for reconstruction for Sierra Leone (ibid.: 290). Peacebuilding should be ‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ (Boutros-Ghali 1992).1_{Sierra Leone evidently did not receive the appropriate structures it needed to develop itself}

into a nation with long-term peace and stability (Cubitt 2010). The newly constructed state was not achieving the desired objectives for post-conflict reconstruction and this had its effects on civil society (ibid.: 270). The development of long-term peace and stability in Sierra Leone has so far been unsuccessful in part because the international intervention was based on liberal peace theory, wherein ‘peace’ is assumed to be a normative concept with outside solutions. In order for long-term peace and stability to be achieved, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives must have their roots in local societies.

More generally, Severine Autesserre has made a strong case for the importance of bottom-up peacebuilding in her work The Trouble With the Congo (2010). She shows that a top-down approach towards peacebuilding, with differing motivations and interests of actors on international, national, and local levels, can and have led to an escalation of local warfare (ibid.). The argument of a grassroots approach towards peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction is corroborated by Richard Fanthorpe and Roy Maconachie (2010) who argue that grassroots associations in post-conflict Sierra Leone are indeed helping to, e.g., accelerate the emancipation of women and young men within the patriarchal structures of Sierra Leone’s society.

Youth in Sierra Leone

The Sierra Leonean civil war began on 23 March 1991, when a group of approximately 100 fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded the eastern district of Kailahun, and another group of RUF fighters invaded the southern district of Pujehun in Sierra Leone (African Confidential 1998). The RUF was composed of multiple groups, with individuals of diverse background (Jang 2012). It is known that the RUF used forceful recruitment of marginalized youths to strengthen their movement (Mitton 2015). They abducted large numbers of youths from rural areas and trained them into brutal warmongers (ibid.). In particular, the RUF targeted a ‘socially-excluded youth underclass’ to form an army to overthrow then President Joseph Momoh (Peters and Richards 1998). However, not all combatants joined forcefully. Krijn Peters and Paul Richards document that some youth joined voluntarily, based on both educational and

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18 socioeconomic aspirations (ibid.). The RUF could serve as a substitute for lost family and provided meals and education for the youngsters (ibid., Mitton 2015).

It is unsurprising that as a result of the extensity of youth participation in the civil war, Sierra Leone’s society has an overall idea of youth as a negative influence on society. This development can be explained by the concept of conflict legacies by Elizabeth Jean Wood (2008). Wood has argued that social processes of civil war leave enduring changes in their wake. These so-called conflict legacies pose challenges for post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding (2015: 460). Conflict legacies can be dormant for extended periods of time and may re-emerge after specific conditions trigger civil society (ibid.). However, Wood out that conflict legacies do not necessarily have negative connotations for civil society. Research by John Bellows and Edward Miguel (2009), for example, has shown that persons exposed to extreme violence during the Sierra Leone civil war were more likely to participate in political and communal arenas of civil society after the cessation of conflict. Similar patterns are witnessed in Burundi (Voors et al. 2012) and Uganda (Blattman 2009).

McIntyre and Thusi (2003) argue that youth occupies a legal grey area wherein their vulnerability and marginalization remains to be a vicious cycle during the conflict, the peacebuilding process and even after the war’s cessation. There seems to be a recurring discourse of youth as either ‘passive victims’ or ‘active threats’ to society in Sierra Leone (Pontalti 2010). This categorization has effectively influenced policy-making with regard to ‘youth rehabilitation’ and has politicized ‘youth’, turning this group into a so-called political currency (McIntyre and Thusi 2003: 74). Contrary to the finding that youth are turned into ‘politicized goods’ (McEvoy-Levi 2013, McIntyre and Thusi 2003), presupposing that they do not have agency, is the assumption that youth are agentic individuals. However, they are viewed through, what Siobhan McEvoy-Levi describes as ‘a master narrative of blurred victim/perpetrators (2013: 299).

The assumption of youth as agentic individuals presents an opportunity for PCR in Sierra Leone as it shows that youth can indeed be operationalized (or mobilized) – depending on context– either for war or peace (ibid.: 300). As aforementioned, the common narrative with regard to ‘youth’ in Sierra Leone is focused on the negative presumptions surrounding this specific societal cohort. For PCR, this means that youth tend to be overlooked as stakeholders in the peace process (McIntyre et al. 2002: 14, McIntyre and Thusi 2003). McIntyre et al. note that there is a need for ‘empathy and understanding of the ongoing vulnerability of young people as well as recognition of their potential as peacemakers, rather than an imagined predisposition to violence’ (2002: 15).

Youth Mobilization in Africa

Since the early 1990s, Peter Mwangi Kagwanja (2005) states, Africa has experienced a wind of change with regard to forms of governance, favouring democratic transitions. These developments put a spotlight on the (rise of) social movements as these became the “embodiments of the spirit of resistance against all forms of tyranny and efforts to liberate and democratize the African ‘public sphere’” (ibid.: 84). The African continent experienced a surge in civil wars, vigilantism, and other forms of violence (ibid.: 84). This resulted

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19 in a shift in scholarly thinking about social movements. Instead of the traditional idea of social movements as being organized around class and national issues, social movements became based on ‘identity’ (ibid.: 84). As this new form of social movements came to encompass ideologies targeted at the “social domain of ‘civil society’” (Cohen 1985: 667), researchers became more interested in the position of youth in these social movements (Kagwanja 2005: 84). Kagwanja argues that the youth category ‘occupies the extreme end of the generational divide between youths and elders as political categories contesting political power’ (2005: 84). Linking it to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, he argues that the primal task of the youths’ struggle for power is the establishment of the hegemony of civil society (ibid.: 86).2

Karel Arnaut has argued that there is a dyadic trap wherein ‘youth’ is reduced to a residual category or their impact on society (as either liberators or destructors) is crudely overstressed (2005: 116). The concept of ‘generation’ and ‘youth’, he states, are ‘discursive constructs in a politics of history and hegemonic struggles’, and should be seen as ‘powerful instruments to ambivalently encompass continuity and rupture, inclusion and exclusion’ (ibid.: 117). Generational identities are an important part of African state’s reality (Kagwanja 2005). There is a ‘generational cleavage’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999: 284), wherein youth has become the focus of rapid shifts in Africa’s postcolonial development on political, economic, and social fronts (Durham 2000). According to Deborah Durham, ‘… the potency and potential of youth are extracted to sustain the power of those in authority while young people themselves feel increasingly unable to attain the promises of the new economy and society’ (2000: 113).

When colonialism came to an end on the African continent, youth were viewed as the ‘torch-bearers of anti-colonialism’ (Jok 2005: 144). Youth came to represent the ‘incarnation of the future’, expected to return nation’s lost identities (ibid.: 144). However, not long after gaining independence, youth began to lose their prestigious status. As a result of economic and political failures at the hands of governments, the role of youth in society began to change (ibid.: 144, Konings 2005: 162). Lack of investment in education and poor maintenance of rites of socialization meant that youth were becoming a controlled and repressed cohort, rather than trained into a position of leadership (ibid.: 144). As Mamadou Diouf states:

Excluded from the arenas of power, work, education, and leisure, young Africans [began to] construct places of socialization and new sociabilities whose function is to show their difference either on the margins of society or at its heart, simultaneously as victims of active agents, and circulating in a geography that escapes the limits of the national territory. (Diouf 2003)

There should be a focus on how youth is constructed and constructs itself (politically, socio-economically, and culturally) at particular moments in time in contested discourses of ‘history, and society, continuity and rupture’ (ibid.: 116). There is a common conception of youth as a unified category acting as a ‘counter-public’

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20 to the hegemony of the elders (Kagwanja 2005: 86). In a reaction to the controlling and repressive governmental overhand, and in a refusal to become ‘lost’ or ‘abandoned’ as a generation (Konings 2005: 162), youth become actively engaged against the political elite responsible for their marginalization and dissent (ibid.: 162). This movement is especially present among students (ibid.). Studies have emphasized that government authorities continuously look down upon students as ‘minors’ that should obey and listen to the elders in society (ibid.: 162). However, it is these same elders that fail to take the ‘minors’, students oftentimes, and their grievances serious, refusing to create any opportunity for dialogue or negotiations (ibid.: 162-163). This standoff has directly led to an increase in student activism, inclining the governmental authorities to perceive students as “countries’ major enemies” (ibid.: 163). As a result of this malicious categorization, youth use their agentic power to act as political saboteurs (ibid.). Paul Richards (1995) has described this phenomenon as ‘the crisis of [African] youth’, whilst other scholars have deemed this form of ‘youth politics’ as politics ‘from below’ (O’Brien 1996), or as ‘politics of powerlessness’ (Bayart et al. 1992). The phenomenon also taps into studies on the ‘rise of the counter-hegemony of powerless youths against the hegemonic elders who dominate the state, political parties and other instruments of power (Kagwanja 2005: 86).

The Crisis of Youth

[T]he future of the African state lies not only in transforming (moral) ethnicity into the foundational myth of modern African political thought, but also in grounding the state in Africa’s multi-ethnic and multi-identity reality.

(Kagwanja 2005: 74)

Peter Mwangi Kagwanja (2005) argues that generational identities are an important part of African state’s reality. Jean and John Comaroff argue for the presence of a ‘generational cleavage’ (1999: 284), wherein youth has become the focus of rapid shifts in Africa’s postcolonial development on political, economic, and social fronts (Durham 2000). I cite Deborah Durham as she states that ‘… the potency and potential of youth are extracted to sustain the power of those in authority while young people themselves feel increasingly unable to attain the promises of the new economy and society’ (2000: 113). As a result, youth use their agentic power to act as political saboteurs (ibid.). Paul Richards (1995) has described this phenomenon as ‘the crisis of [African] youth’.

As stressed by President Bio in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September 2018, long-term peace and stability for Sierra Leone ultimately depends on the ability of the government to provide basic welfare and economic opportunities to youth (United Nations 2018b). This is corroborated by Kieran Mitton in his 2013 article ‘Where is the War? Explaining Peace in Sierra Leone’, wherein he stresses the fact that despite a continuation of the same political, economic and social conditions that made Sierra Leone’s youth vulnerable to mobilization during the 1991-2002 civil war, ex-combatants are restrained from remobilization in contemporary Sierra Leone. A main finding in his work is summed

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21 up in the following quote: ‘If youths were deemed critical to the onset and conduct of civil war, then youths have been deemed equally critical to post-conflict peace and stability’ (Mitton 2013: 322).

Summary

The above literature review allows for an understanding of the complicated processes that surround conflict transformation in post-war Sierra Leone. It briefly states the post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Sierra Leone, emphasizing that Sierra Leone did not receive what it needed for effective reconstruction in order to develop long-term peace and stability. The literature review furthermore highlights the niche which youth in Sierra Leone, and to a larger extent youth in Africa, finds itself in. I have shown how the ‘crisis of youth’ is a reaction to the generational cleavages that have developed in post-colonial Africa, affecting the ways in which youth is perceived in contemporary society. Moreover, the literature demonstrates how the patriarchal and sometimes despotic structure of governance in Sierra Leone has led the government to fail to consider the potential of youth as peacemakers and actors for change and instead perceives and portrays them as political saboteurs.

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Chapter 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter will give an outline of the theoretical framework for this research. I will show how the proposed theoretical framework is placed within a structure that will enable me to look at the contribution of youth mobilization to conflict transformation in Sierra Leone. The logic of my argument builds on previous research into post-conflict reconstruction and the development of a stable and durable peace. My theoretical framework is structured within the core concept of conflict transformation. I will first elaborate on the concept of conflict transformation as it is the main theoretical structure on which this research and its key components are brought together. Subsequently, I will delineate the concepts of peacebuilding and durable peace, and introduce three key components that are used in the analysis of my research, namely leadership theory, collective action, and nonviolent resistance.

Conflict Transformation

The field of conflict intervention distinguishes between three theoretical schools, namely: conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation. These three schools hold different conceptions with regard to the nature of conflict and approaches in conflict intervention. Despite some overlap, it is important to differentiate between the different schools. Conflict management assumes violent conflicts to be a direct consequence of differences of values and interests within and between communities and views the resolving of these conflicts as inherently unrealistic (Miall 2004: 3). In the words of Bloomfield and Reilly:

Conflict management is the positive and constructive handling of difference and divergence. Rather than advocating methods for removing conflict, [it] addresses the more realistic question of managing conflict: how to deal with it in a constructive way, how to bring opposing sides together in a cooperative process how to design a practical, achievable, cooperative system for the constructive management of difference.

(1998: 18, emphasis added, HCV)

Conflict resolution assumes that it is indeed possible to overcome conflict if the warring parties are given help to ‘explore, analyze, question and reframe their positions and interests’ (Miall 2004: 3). A focus point for conflict resolution is the intervention by autonomous – but powerless – third-parties, which will allow the warring actors to develop and create new patterns of thinking and new relationships. More specifically, conflict resolution aims to bring forward possible root causes of the conflict in an attempt to create a positive-sum outcome for civil society (ibid.: 3-4). Miall quotes Azar and Burton by stating that the aim of conflict resolution is to develop ‘processes of conflict resolution that appear to be acceptable to parties in dispute, and effective in resolving conflict’ (Azar and Burton 1986: 1, in Miall 2004: 4).

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24 Conflict transformation is a theoretical approach wherein a reconceptualization of the field of conflict resolution and conflict management is taking place in order to make it more relevant to current day conflicts (Miall 2004: 3). The need for a reconceptualization of the existing schools results from crucial changes in the nature of contemporary conflicts. There is a need for a more comprehensive understanding of the structure of parties and relationships and the way in which these may be embedded in patterns of conflictual relationships that have possibly developed for decades or centuries prior to the current site of conflict (ibid: 4). Hugh Miall argues for at least three distinct changes in the nature of conflicts nowadays. First, he argues, contemporary conflicts are ‘marked by inequalities of power and status’ and are therefore considered to be ‘asymmetric’ (ibid.: 3). Second, contemporary conflicts are ‘protracted’, with regular and continuous surges of violence, hereby defying models of conflict phases that assume cyclical or bell-shaped conflict processes (ibid.: 3). And thirdly, ‘protracted conflicts warp the societies, economies and regions in which they are situated, creating complex emergencies fuelled on the one hand by local struggles and on the other by global factors such as the arms trade and support for regimes or rebels by outside states’ (ibid.: 3). The process of conflict transformation is described as follows:

Conflict transformation must actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily ‘see’ the setting and the people in it as the ‘problem’ and the outsider as the ‘answer’. Rather, we understand the long-term goal of transformation as validating and building on people and resources within the setting.

(Lederach 1995)

An important influence on conflict transformation theory is the work by Edward Azar (1990) on protracted social conflicts. Azar’s work allows for a more comprehensive approach towards understanding (the development of) conflict in civil society. In his model, Azar gives an explanation for the ‘protracted quality’ of contemporary conflicts (Miall 2004: 5). Miall’s developed version of Azar’s model for protracted social conflicts allows for the model to be used as a theory for conflict transformation (see Figure 1). This model goes beyond the structural and behavioural explanations of conflict and instead touches upon patterns of conflict and how these interact with (the satisfaction of) human needs, effective political and economic institutions, and power and agency of political actors (ibid.: 5). Furthermore, it also suggests different outcomes with regard to positive or negative spirals of conflict.

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25 Peacebuilding and Durable Peace

So far, the perspectives on conflict transformation theory have focused on a theoretical understanding of conflicts rather than the practical implications of these understandings on contemporary conflict intervention. John Paul Lederach (1997) has proposed a comprehensive statement on the practicalities of conflict transformation and intervention in reality. His model allows for an inclusive approach towards conflict intervention and peacebuilding, taking into account a wide variety of actors and circumstances in society. Lederach sees peacebuilding as a ‘long-term transformation of a war system into a peace system, inspired by a quest for the values of peace and justice, truth and mercy’ (Miall 2004: 6). As peacebuilding is concerned with ‘changes in the personal, structural, relational and cultural aspects of conflict, brought about over different time-periods … and affecting different system levels at different times’, it can be perceived as a structure-process (ibid.: 6). This stance towards conflict intervention and peacebuilding is further corroborated by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in the Agenda for Peace report (1992), wherein he stated that:

Peacebuilding is a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building, and political, as well as economic transformation.

(Boutros-Ghali 1992, emphasis added, HCV)

Johan Galtung, in his earlier works, has also stated that:

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26 The mechanisms that peace is based on should be built into the structure and be present

as a reservoir for the system itself to draw up … More specifically, structures must be found

that remove causes of war and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur. (Galtung 1976: 297-298, emphasis added, HCV)

A Stable and Durable Peace

It is important to outline what entails a ‘durable’ peace. The concept of peace has been discussed by a myriad of authors. Kenneth Boulding (1978) defines ‘stable peace’ as ‘a situation in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved’. Alexander George et al. distinguish between three forms of peace: stable peace, a relationship between two states ‘in which neither side considers employing force or even making a threat of force, in any dispute between them’ ; precarious peace, wherein there is ‘little more than a temporary absence of armed conflict’ (2000); and conditional peace, defined as ‘a relationship in which general deterrence plays a key role, although the possibility of stronger threats or even actual violence is maintained for crisis situations’ (ibid.).

At the forefront of peace studies is renowned scholar Johan Galtung. Galtung introduced two typologies of peace, namely negative and positive peace (1964). His conception of peace hinges on the assumption that – in any case – peace entails the absence of violence (1969). Arguing that ‘peace is absence of violence’, an elaboration of the concept of violence is indispensable. He defines violence as ‘present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below their potential realisation’ and ‘the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual’ (ibid.: 168). He elaborates:

Thus, the potential level of realization is that which is possible with a given level of insight and resources. If insight and/or resources are monopolized by a group or class or are used for other purposes, then the actual level falls below the potential level, and violence is present in the system. In addition to these types of indirect violence there is also the direct violence where means of realization are not withheld, but directly destroyed. Thus, when a war is fought there is direct violence since killing or hurting a person certainly puts his ‘actual somatic realization’ below his ‘potential somatic realization’. But there is also indirect violence insofar as insight and resources are channelled away from constructive efforts to bring the actual closer to the potential.

(Galtung 1969: 168, emphasis in original)

In this regard, he introduces three typologies of violence: direct violence, structural violence, and cultural violence (Tilahun 2015). Direct violence entails physical or psychological violence that is committed by an actor (Galtung 1969). Structural violence entails violence which is not actor-generated but instead stems from the structure of society (Grewal 2003). It is portrayed by inegalitarian distributions in civil society, and

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27 has an effect of ‘denying peoples important rights, such as economic wellbeing, social, political and sexual equality, a sense of personal fulfilment and self-worth and is expressed with the existence of hunger, political repression, and psychological alienation’ (Galtung 1969: 176, Tilahun 2015). Structural violence could therefore also be defined as ‘social injustice’ (Galtung 1969: 171). Cultural violence is defined as ‘any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural form’ (Galtung 1990).

Galtung’s definition of violence is extensive, which directly leads to an extended definition of peace. As aforementioned, Galtung introduces the concept of negative and positive peace. Negative peace refers to the absence of direct violence, whereas positive peace refers to the absence of structural violence (Galtung 1969: 183) (see Figure 2). Baljit Singh Grewal (2003) summarizes the characteristics of negative and positive peace as follows:

Negative peace Absence of [direct] violence, pessimistic, curative, peace not always by peaceful means.

Positive peace Structural integration, optimistic, preventive, peace by peaceful means.

Galtung finds positive peace to rank higher as an ideal than negative peace (Grewal 2003, Tilahun 2015). As positive peace is concerned with the absence of structural violence, achieving positive peace hinges on not only the reducing or elimination of direct violence but also on developing an understanding of the societal conditions and addressing the root causes of the violence (Tilahun 2015).

Frances Stewart presents two hypotheses for the development of intrastate war, that are directly concerned

with structural violence as a cause. Firstly, the group motivation hypothesis argues that group motives, resentments, and ambitions provide motivation for war (2002: 343). These factors are fortified by differences in distribution and exercise of political power. Secondly, she posits that a state’s failure of the social contract, pertaining worsening state services and economic stagnation, and/or decline, can lead to upset and violence among the population (ibid.). Both hypotheses identify horizontal inequalities (resentments) as a major cause of war (ibid.). As aforementioned, structural violence – or social injustice – refers to the unequal distribution in society. Observing Stewart’s hypotheses, structures of unequal distribution in society can, therefore, be presumed as a root cause for civil conflict and, if not addressed

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28 adequately by the post-war government, can be a threat to the development of stable peace. Therefore, in a post-conflict environment wherein a state is trying to develop a lasting ‘stable’ or ‘positive’ peace, addressing and/or tackling structural violence is of critical importance.

Key Components

Three key components for the analysis in this research are leadership theory, mobilization (as a component of collective action), and the concept of nonviolent resistance by civilians. In order to substantiate the connection between conflict transformation and youth mobilization, I will elaborate on the link between leadership theory, collective action, and nonviolent resistance.

Leadership Theory

Leadership theory concerns the concepts of ‘leadership’ and ‘leaders’. More specifically, it tries to get an understanding of the ‘essential attributes, functions, and circumstances that characterize effective leaders’ (Bass 1981). Leadership is defined as ‘a relational process combining ability (knowledge, skills, and talents) with authority (voice, influence, and decision-making power) to positively influence and impact diverse individuals, organizations, and communities’ (ibid.: 29). This definition directly implies that leadership is (or needs to be) applicable, entailing that it is more than an ability. Simply having the ability of leadership (e.g. government body) does not implicitly determine the actual embodiment of authority (ibid.: 29). A modern trend in leadership theory is the assumption that leadership does not necessarily reside in one individual, but resides in the relationship between and among certain individuals (MacNeil 2006). Bolman and Deal have argued that the relationship and the leadership functions are shaped by both the leaders and the followers (ibid.: 28). This construct determines that leadership is not dependent on a leadership position, as it no longer resides in the person (ibid.: 28).

A framework on youth leadership development that has been suggested by multiple researchers is to focus on the role of youth as ‘problem solvers’, instead of a problem that needs to be solved (ibid.: 31). A large obstacle to this framework, however, is the so-called ‘adultism’ that occurs. Adultism is a form of oppression wherein a negative meaning of ‘youth’ is constructed (ibid.: 32). Carole A. MacNeil states:

Not only does one group (adults) have the power to construct the definition of another group (youth), but they also have the power to act on those definitions, to create structures that reinforce and reconfirm the very beliefs they have constructed.

(2006: 32-33)

Adultism leads to a perception of youth as a ‘problem time’, instead of a positive stage of life development (ibid.: 33). Expectedly, youth are hereby not seen as actors that could be organizational or community leaders (ibid.: 33). However, the responsibility for creating ‘authentic and meaningful’ roles for youth to develop leadership lies in the hands of adults. In order for this development to take place, a renegotiation of power

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29 is necessary. This is obviously heavily subjected to challenges (ibid.: 34). Despite the fact that the mere presence of youth in organizational or community processes in itself does not automatically indicate a transformation of power dynamics or relations (they can still be excluded from effective authority), it has been found that youth responds positively when given the opportunity to make changes and is capable of making significant contributions in these situations (ibid.: 38). Multiple scholars have argued that when youth are actively engaged in opportunities for leadership, pertaining that they are placed in a position of effective authority, their leadership has had a real impact on the situation, organization, or project they are involved with (Zeldin and Camino 1999, Zeldin 2004). Moreover, it has been shown that forms of ‘effective leadership’ are often indicated by shared power and collective action (Astin and Leland 1991).

Collective Action

Collective action, as a form of effective leadership, is concerned with power and politics (Tilly 1977). Among the components of collective action, as described by Charles Tilly, are the concepts mobilization, opportunity, and collective action itself (ibid.: 10). Mobilization3_{is defined as ‘the process by which a group}

acquires collective control over the resources needed for action (ibid.: 10), opportunity is concerned with ‘the relationship between a group and the world around it’ (ibid.: 11), and collective action is consistent of “people’s acting together in pursuit of common interests” (ibid.: 11). Tilly postulates that collective violence serves as a ‘tracer’ of collective action in general (1978: 92). In light of this postulation, this thesis lays emphasis on nonviolent resistance by civilians as a viable alternative to violence.

Nonviolent Resistance

Nonviolent resistance may act as a means of attaining effective leadership and could serve as a force for change in the world (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013: 274). The prevailing view among political scientists is that the use of violent methods by opposition movements are more effective in achieving policy goals than the use of nonviolent methods (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008: 7). However, Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth (2008) have found that major nonviolent campaigns have been more effective in achieving success than violent resistance campaigns. Nonviolent resistance is defined as follows:

… a civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, psychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence. It includes acts of omission, acts of commission, or a combination of both.

(Stephan and Chenoweth 2008: 9)

Stephan and Chenoweth attribute the success of nonviolent resistance campaigns to two reasons: (1) ‘a campaign’s commitment to nonviolent methods enhances its domestic and international legitimacy and encourages more broad-based participation in the resistance’, and (2) ‘whereas governments easily justify

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30 violent counterattacks against armed insurgents, regime violence against nonviolent movements is more likely to backfire against the regime’ (ibid.: 8-9). They make the assertion that nonviolent resistance provides a forceful alternative to political violence as it can pose challenges to (non)democratic opponents, at times in more effective ways then violent resistance (ibid.: 9).

The strategic advantage that nonviolent resistance has over violent resistance is twofold. First, the repressing of nonviolent campaigns by the government may backfire, leading to power shifts and creating dissent and conflicts among the opposition supporters (ibid.: 11), and secondly, it appears that nonviolent resistance campaigns are more open to negotiation and bargaining as these campaigns do not directly threaten the lives or well-being of (members of) the targeted regime (ibid.: 13). In order to explain the appeal of nonviolent resistance to the masses, Stephen and Chenoweth raise the concept of correspondence inference theory. Briefly stated, correspondence inference theory posits that an individual judges another’s man’s actions in order to develop their own response (ibid.: 13). For nonviolent resistance, this means that since public support is crucial, and nonviolent campaigns are not experienced as threatening, the public is more likely to support nonviolent resistance. Violent campaigns, on the other hand, face backlash as they are experienced as threatening and disruptive (ibid.: 13). Furthermore, nonviolent campaigns are more likely to develop loyalty shifts among the public as their ways are not experienced as threatening (ibid.: 13).

Summary

This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework for this research. I have shown that within the framework of conflict transformation, peacebuilding and in particular the establishment and development of a ‘stable’ and ‘durable’ peace are inherently related to (addressing and/or tackling) structural violence in society. Subsequently, I have introduced three concepts, namely: leadership theory, collective action, and nonviolent resistance. Leadership theory emphasizes the potential of youth-initiated leadership, manifested through collective action (mobilization), by means of (primarily) nonviolent resistance. Moreover, nonviolent resistance is presented as a viable alternative to violence and as a potential force for change in society.

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Chapter 4 METHODOLOGY

The goal of this thesis is to determine how youth mobilization shapes conflict transformation in Sierra Leone. The analysis will be a comparison of the proposed theoretical assumptions with findings from the data. Within this approach, I will examine the conflict transformation of Sierra Leone from 2002 to 2017, and how youth mobilization shapes this process.

Methodological Approach

The research entails a case study of youth mobilization in post-conflict Sierra Leone. Alan Bryman has defined a case study as a ‘detailed and intensive analysis of a single case’ (2012: 66). A case study concerns the ‘complexity and particular nature’ of a specific case (Stake 1995), and, as John Gerring has stated: ‘[a case study allows for a] peer into the box of causality to the intermediate causes lying between some cause and its purported effect’ (2004: 348). In this research, the wider context is the conflict transformation of Sierra Leone. The case is the phenomenon of youth mobilization. The central argument I develop will be probabilistic in nature, referring to Gerring’s postulation of probabilistic wherein he states that a cause increases both the likelihood and the magnitude of an outcome (ibid.: 349). I argue that the form of youth mobilization that occurs has either a constructive or destructive effect on the conflict transformation of Sierra Leone and in particular on the development of a stable and durable peace.

Case Study Selection

The aim of this thesis is to develop an understanding of how youth mobilization shapes the process of conflict transformation in Sierra Leone. My interest in Sierra Leone stems from previous research I have conducted with regard to, amongst others, the Sierra Leonean civil war and the forms of violence that occurred. I became specifically interested in the youth in Sierra Leone’s post-conflict reconstruction as I learned about the different perspectives on the role youth can have in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, combined with the fact that Sierra Leone has a strikingly large youth demographic. The presence of such a large youth cohort left me wondering what the influence of this group may be on the process of conflict transformation.

This thesis will look into the involvement of youth in the (non)violent events that have occurred in Sierra Leone between 2002 and 2017. Youth is a socially constructed category that varies tremendously per society (Durham 2000: 114, Van Gyampo 2012: 139). Siobhan McEvoy-Levy’s definition of youth shows that the concept is highly ambiguous. She defines youth as “those people who are customarily considered ‘not yet adults’ by their societies” (2013: 296). This definition taps into the complexity of the concept of youth, linking it to cultural and societal characteristics more than to biological assumptions. Furthermore, Stephanie Schwartz notes that the conceptions of what child- and adulthood curtails are

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32 altered by experiences in conflict, as there is often a loss of innocence through the experience of extreme crisis, such as a civil conflict (2010: 5-6). For example, many of the individuals now labeled as ‘youth’ in Sierra Leone were mere children when being forcibly recruited as combatants by the Revolutionary United Front (Mitton 2015). In this thesis, I use the term youth to refer to young men and women who fall within the age bracket of 15 to 35 years. This corresponds to the definition of youth as argued by the government of Sierra Leone. Since my research is focused on the contribution of youth mobilization to conflict transformation in Sierra Leone, I find it to be crucial to adhere to the same definition of youth as postulated by the Sierra Leone government.4

Sierra Leone has a strikingly large youth demographic. According to the 2015 Sierra Leone Population and Housing Census, the population was estimated at 7.092.113 people (Weekes and Bah 2017). Out of this, 5.687.875 persons, or 80.2%, are under the age of 35 (Forson and Yalancy 2015: 7). Within this number, 2.794.301 people are considered to be ‘youth’ according to the formal definition of youth as persons aged between 15-35 years (Forson and Yalancy 2015: 7, Weekes and Bah 2017: 28). This accounts for approximately 39.4% of the total population (see Table 2).

Operationalization of Variables

The two key variables in this research are youth mobilization (independent variable) and conflict transformation (dependent variable). In the following section, I will discuss the indicators for measurement of both variables.

Youth Mobilization

For a definition of mobilization, I refer to Amitai Etzioni (1968) and Charles Tilly (1978). Tilly argues that if a group gains greater collective control over coercive, utilitarian, or normative resources, than a group has mobilized, whereas if a group loses collective control over aforementioned resources, then it has been demobilized (1978: 69). This definition of mobilization is demonstrated by Amitai Etzioni in the following excerpt:

We refer to the process by which a unit gains significantly in the control of assets it previously did not control as mobilization … By definition, it entails a decline in the assets

4_{The formal definition of youth, according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is persons aged} 15 to 24 years old (Forson and Yalancy 2015: 5). In Sierra Leone, however, the government defines youth as all persons aged 15 to 35 years (ibid: 5; Weekes and Bah 2017: 28). The UNDP has adopted this definition for this specific case, as stated in their ‘Youth Empowerment and Employment Programme’, available at:

http://www.sl.undp.org/content/sierraleone/en/home/operations/projects/poverty_reduction/youth-empowerment-and-employment-programme.html (18/6/2019).

Table 2 Age Structure of Sierra Leone's Population (based on Forson and Yalancy 2015, Weekes and Bah 2017)

Age group Number % National 7.092.113 100

Under 35 5.687.875 80.2

Youth (15-35) 2.794.301 39.4

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33 controlled by subunits, the supraunit of which the unit is a member, or external units,

unless the assets whose control the unit gainer are newly produced ones … A mere increase in the assets of member of subunits, or even of the unit itself does not mean that mobilization has occurred, though it increases the mobilization potential. The change in the capacity to control and to use assets is what is significant.

(1968: 388-389, emphasis added, HCV)

Adding to Etzioni’s definition of mobilization, Tilly defines mobilizations as:

… the acquisition of collective control over resources, rather than the simple accretion of resources … An increase of resources within a unit normally facilitates its mobilization, simply by permitting subunits to keep receiving resources while the larger unit gains control over more than it had before. But it is that increase in collective control itself which constitutes mobilization. Without some mobilization, a group may prosper, but it cannot contend for power; contending for power means employing mobilized resources to influence other groups. (1978: 78, emphasis added, HCV)

Both scholars place an emphasis on the capacity to control resources and the ability to gain and attain power to influence other groups. Whereas Etzioni focuses on the significance of mobilization by way of the capacity to control assets, Tilly develops this argument and adds the dimension of power and influence as a key aspect of mobilization.

Differentiation can be made between three distinct forms of mobilization: defensive mobilization, offensive mobilization, and preparatory mobilization (Tilly 1978). Defensive mobilization induces members of a group to ‘pool their resources’ in order to ‘fight off the enemy’, usually a threat from the outside (ibid.: 73). Offensive mobilization induces a group to ‘pool resources in response to opportunities to realize its interests’ (ibid.: 74). Preparatory mobilization induces a group to ‘pool resources in anticipation of future opportunities and threats’ (ibid.: 74). Whereas defensive mobilization is primarily reactive, offensive and preparatory mobilization require foresight and active scanning of the outside world (ibid.: 74). Furthermore, defensive mobilization is often the starting point for the poor and powerless, whereas elites, the rich and powerful, tend to use offensive and preparatory mobilization (ibid.: 75). I mention this differentiation as it adds to a more comprehensive understanding of what encompasses mobilization.

Tilly postulates that collective violence serves as a ‘tracer’ of collective action in general (ibid.: 92). The likelihood of an event being noticed or recorded increasing with the presence of violence (ibid.: 92). He states: ‘… the pattern of collective violence will yield valuable information about the pattern of collective action as a whole’ (ibid.: 92). In the case of Sierra Leone, I will assume collective action to be, primarily distinguished by, but not limited to, the presence of collective violence, as the determinant of

The quest for long-term peace and stability : how youth mobilization shapes conflict transformation in Sierra Leone