BSc Culturele antropologie en ontwikkelingssociologie Deadline: 14.08.2019
The Kingdom’s Illusion of “Gelijkwaardigheid”
.
How it is possible that these unilateral proposals keep surfacing in the Dutch political sphere, If the charter is based on gelijkwaardigheid and undivided Dutch
citizenship?
Dr. P.T. Peter van Rooden
Stacy Alves 10979034
Stacy.alves@student.uva.nl
Darlingstraat 653 1102 mx Amsterdam
Declaration
"I have read and understood the University of Amsterdam plagiarism policy
[http://student.uva.nl/binaries/content/assets/studentensites/uva-studentensite/nl/a-z/regelingen-en-reglementen/frauen-plagiaatregeling-2010.pdf?1283201371000]. I
de-clare that this assignment is entirely my own work, all sources have been properly acknowl-edged, and that I have not previously submitted this work, or any version of it, for assess-ment in any other paper."
Abstract
Recently there has been several attempts to restrict the citizenship rights of Caribbean Dutch citizens from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin. These proposals aim to end free settlement of Caribbean Dutch citizen in the Netherlands. Not only do they disregard the citizenship rights of these individuals, but they also make discriminatory distinctions between European Dutch citizen and ‘Antillean’ Dutch citizen. By analyzing the Bosman-bill, this essay aims to uncover
how it is possible that these unilateral proposals keep surfacing in the Dutch political sphere, If the charter is based on gelijkwaardigheid and undivided Dutch citizenship? This will be
done by first depicting the historical and discursive background of these proposals. Subse-quently, it will focus on deconstructing the basis of gelijkwaardigheid of the charter and criti-cizing the illusion it creates. Then, it will address the unequal representation and unequal distribution of political power and resources within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Lastly, the revision of the Dutch constitution and its implications for these proposals will be ad-dressed.
Table of Content
Declaration ... II
Abstract... III
Table of Content ... IV
The Kingdom’s Illusion of “Gelijkwaardigheid” ... - 1 -
Methodology ... 3
Theoretical Frame ... 4
-1 The Bosmanbill and Alienation of Caribbean Dutch Citizens ... 5
-1.1 The Bosmann-bill ... - 5 -
1.2 From Model Citizen to Threat ... - 6 -
1.3 The Mythical Core of Dutch Nation ... - 9 -
1.4 The Process of Alienation ... - 10 -
2 The Charters Ambiguity ... 14
-2.1 A Double-edged Charter ... - 14 -
2.2 The Illusion of Gelijkwaardigheid ... 16
-3 Structural Inequality within the Kingdom ... 18
-3.1 Unequal Representation and Distribution ... 18
-3.2 Unequal Distribution of Welfare Structures ... 19
-4 Reciprocity & Gelijkwaardigheid ... 22
-5 Conclusion & Discussion ... 26
-References ... V
The Kingdom’s Illusion of “Gelijkwaardigheid”
Since the 1980’s several attempts are being made to pass proposals to regulate the migra-tion from, Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin (Jones, 2016; Oostindie, 2012). Even though, these countries are still part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, their Dutch citizenship rights is constantly contested in political debates (Jones, 2016; Oostindie, 2012). Member of Par-liament, André Bosman (VVD), proposed a bill on the 4th of July 2012. The aim of the ‘Bosman-bill’: ‘Wet regulering vestiging van Nederlanders van Aruba, Curaçao en Sint Maar-ten in Nederland’1, is to pose stricter immigration laws to restrict the migration from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin to the Netherlands (Second Chamber of Parliament, 2012-2013, 33325 nrs. 1-2). Following the Bosman-bill, which was rejected, another bill was proposed by Fritsma and De Graaf on the first of October 2014, namely; ‘De terugzending van criminele Nederlanders afkomstig uit Aruba, Curaçao en Sint Maarten’2 (Second Chamber of Parlia-ment, 2014- 2015, 34044 nrs. 1-2). This proposal is now being discussed and awaiting its second term. One of the reasons that The Bosman-bill was rejected was because of the dis-criminatory distinctions it made between European Dutch citizens and Caribbean Dutch citi-zens, which he also refers to as “Disadvantaged Antilleans”. Seemingly, Fritsma and Graaf are also criticized on similar grounds and several previous proposals also adhere to these politics of inequality (Jones, 2016; van Houwelingen, 2016). Although, the Bosman-bill was rejected, it should not be overlooked that this was proposed by the largest party in the Neth-erlands, VVD. Furthermore, certain political groups granted their full support, namely SGP and PVV, meanwhile CDA occupied a middle position in the discussion (Jones, 2016). These proposals are two in many attempts to discriminate and problematize “Antilleans”, with the intention to restrict their freedom of movement and other basic citizenship rights, such as welfare assistance (Jones, 2016; van Houwelingen, 2016). Whether or not they were enact-ed, they still send a clear a message to Caribbean Dutch citizens, that their citizenship rights are not protected even though they hold the undivided Dutch nationality and Dutch passport. Considering that populist parties in the Netherlands are gaining more political power, such as Forum van Democratie, which won the most votes in the recent provincial elections, these proposals should not be simply brushed over. For that reason, this essay aims to analyze the discursive and judicial grounds on which these proposals rely on.
1 Translation: ‘Law to regulate settlement of Dutch citizens from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin’ 2 Translation: ‘Return of criminal Dutch citizens from Aruba, Curacao and St martin’
As former Dutch colonies who decided to forge and maintain a new political relation-ship on “equal footing” with their metropolitan power, Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin still form part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018). This post-colonial agreement was concretized by the charter, Het Statuut, which is the constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The charter contains the provisions of the Kingdom (De Jong, 2015; Oostindie, 2012). It explicitly states the undividedness of Dutch citizenship and it also stipulates the “gelijkwaardigheid”, equivalence, of all constituent countries of the King-dom. However, according to several research this gelijkwaardigheid is questionable when considering the actual established political and judicial structures (Veenendaal & Oostindie 2018; De Jong, 2015; Nap, 2005; Broekhuijse, 2012). Even though the charter explicitly states that Dutch citizenship is undivided, these proposals seem to depict a different reality. The main question this essay addresses is: how is it possible that these unilateral proposals keep surfacing in the Dutch political sphere, If the charter is based on gelijkwaardigheid and undivided Dutch citizenship? To understand the recurrence and the implications of these proposals, one should first understand its historical and discursive background. Furthermore, it is also crucial to understand the relation between these proposals and the political and ju-dicial structure of the Kingdom of the Netherlands that facilitate these proposals. Ultimately, this essay aims to illustrate how both the discourse of Dutch politics of citizenship as the un-equal judicial and political structures within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, facilitate the emergence of these discriminatory narratives.
In the first chapter, I start by introducing the Bosman-bill, then I will discuss the histor-ical and polithistor-ical path that eventually led to the problematization of Caribbean Dutch citizens from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin. Lastly, this chapter will discuss the mythical core of the Dutch nation and how the ethnocultural distinctions made Bosman-bill and similar proposals adhere to this narrative.
The second chapter focuses on unveiling the ambiguity and double sidedness of Het Statuut, the charter. This section deconstructs the principle of gelijkwaardigheid that the charter is based on. Furthermore, I also question the undividedness of the Dutch citizenship, as stated in the charter.
The third chapter describes the illusion of the principle of gelijkwaardigheid. Accord-ingly, it will address the unequal power dynamics between the constituent countries. Firstly, this chapter will address the unequal distribution of power and the underrepresentation of Caribbean countries within the political structures of the Kingdom. Subsequently, it address-es the discrepancy in the provision of welfare structuraddress-es between the constituent countriaddress-es. It also calls the implications of the solution offered by the Bosman-bill regarding this issue to the attention.
The last chapter will discuss the power of interpretation and the effect it has in these debates. It will demonstrate how interpretation of both reciprocity as gelijkwaardigheid can be instrumentalized in the debate on migration policies for Caribbean Dutch citizens. To address this issue, the first paragraph will focus on the revision of the Dutch constitution in 1983.
Finally, I will argue that the due to the incongruity of the charter and because it does not offer enough protection for the rights of Dutch citizens from the Caribbean islands it pro-vides the possibility for these discourses to surface in the Dutch political realm.
Methodology
To analyze this issue, this essay will conduct a discourse analysis on the “Bosman-bill”. This bill is a recent case, which has already been discussed and rejected by the Dutch parliament. Because of the similarities between these proposals that target the citizenship rights of free settlement, the Bosman-bill will pose as a representation of their shared discriminatory narra-tive. These proposals all aim to discriminate and problematize “Antilleans”, with the intention to restrict their freedom of movement and other basic citizenship rights of Dutch citizens from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin. To illustrate the commonalities and continuities, I will also address similar proposals throughout this essay. In these debates’ different insights regard-ing the meanregard-ing of the Dutch Kregard-ingdom, Dutch citizenship and its entitlements, emancipation and Dutch nation is inferred (Jones, 2016). Through analyzing the Parliamentary Papers of these proposals in relation to the political structures of the Kingdom, this essay aims to re-veal the political and judicial structures that oppose and support these discriminatory narra-tives. Furthermore, to depict the ways in which these proposals reflect deeper structural ine-qualities within the Kingdom, this essay will also address the political and constitutional rela-tionship between the countries of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the distribution of power and resources. For the purpose of this essay I will use the word “gelijkwaardig”, which translates into equivalence, in Dutch.
Theoretical Frame
In this essay the term Caribbean Dutch citizen refers to Dutch citizens from the Caribbean part of the Kingdom, mainly the targeted island; Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin. This essay will mostly refrain from using ‘Antillean Dutch’, seeing that the Dutch Antilles does not exist anymore. Guno Jones offers a body of work that criticizes Dutch politics of citizenship, which according to him is a relational process that creates time-specific citizens and semi-citizens (Jones, 2016). Citizenship alienism is the symbolic, social, political, and legal processes wherein status citizens are perceived and treated as if they are aliens or semi-citizens by the polity (Jones, 2016).
To analyze the political relationship between the constituent countries of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, this essay will deconstruct the principle of gelijkwaardigheid that the char-ter is based on. To do so, I will employ the definition of Borman (2005), as mentioned in Broekhuijse (2012). Borman’s interpretation holds in that there must be equal appreciation or treatment and judicial structures between constituents cannot contain elements of subordina-tion from one country to the other. Another way of looking at it, he concludes, is by accepting that the term gelijkwaardigheid itself already implies that there Is no equality in the given sit-uation. Thus, differences between constituents must be considered. These differences can be for example, the size of population, human resources and resources, and this should not result into a vertical relationship between countries (Broekhuijse, 2012)
Dumbrava (2012) addresses the issue of ethnocultural preferentialism. He described the ethnocultural myth as a community based on shared descent (ethnicity/race) and culture. Membership in the political community that adhere to the ethnocultural discourse have its criteria that are also rooted in this narrative. These ethnocultural rules of admission to citi-zenship are rules that refer either explicitly or implicitly to characteristic, qualities or capacity that demonstrate membership in a real or imagined ethnocultural community.
1
The Bosman-bill and Alienation of Caribbean Dutch Citizens
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is considered an asymmetric federal state that consisted initially of three autonomous countries; the Netherlands, Suriname and the Netherlands Antil-les (Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018). The Netherlands AntilAntil-les was formed in 1954 and con-stituted of Aruba, Curacao, Bonaire, Saba and Sint Martin. Currently, Suriname is an inde-pendent country, and in the course of time the political structures of the Netherlands Antilles also changed significantly. On 10/10/10 the Netherlands Antilles completely dissolved, this resulted in the status aparte, autonomy within the Kingdom, of Curaçao and Sint Martin. Aru-ba has already attained this status since 1986. While on the other hand, Bonaire and SaAru-ba became overseas territories of the Netherlands after the political restructuring of 2010. Even though, Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin are still part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and have Dutch citizenship, attempts to restrict their migration to the Netherlands by imposing immigration laws are persistently being made by certain Dutch politicians. Both Oostindie (2012) and Jones (2016) confirm that in the past this was not the case, thus the question that plague our minds is how it became so prominent. This chapter describes how Caribbean Dutch citizens went from being considered model citizens to a threat for the Dutch society. Furthermore, it also discusses the discursive backbone of these discriminatory narratives.
1.1
The Bosmann-bill
On the 4th of July 2012 a bill was proposed by member of Parliament and member of the VVD, André Bosman (Second Chamber of Parliament, 2012-2013, 33325, nrs. 1-2). This bill is to be applied to Dutch citizens and their children from Aruba, Curacao and St. Martin who have acquired their Dutch citizenship through descent or naturalization. Thus, the birthplace of the children is not important. According to Bosman this bill is justified as a measure to pro-tect the Netherlands from “Kansloze Antillianen”, disadvantaged Antilleans.
Shortly, this bill aims to end free settlement in the Netherlands by citizens from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin by introducing a residence permit for one year, that must be reap-plied for every year. Only if a person has lived uninterruptedly for an amount of 5 years, can they apply for a permanent residence permit. This law will authorize the Minister to decide on the applications of admittance to temporary or permanent Dutch residence, and if this permit should be extended or not. Furthermore, staying in the country without a permit is considered a crime and could lead to deportation and an entrance ban.
A set of criteria are mentioned in the bill, which determine whether a person is eligible for a residence permit. In these requirements, income is considered as a decisive factor of admission or expulsion. A person is granted residence, if they earn at least as much as the
norm of the ‘Wet werk en bijstand’, Work and Social Assistance Act. If a person earns that amount, they cannot be rejected. If the person stops earning that amount of income, then their citizenship will also be revoked. A person can also be denied If they do not possess basic applicable qualification that meets the requirements of the Dutch labor market. Lastly, residence will not be granted to a person that poses a potential threat to the public order and safety and if this person has had some sort of criminal record or do not have documents to prove it.
In the explanatory memorandum Bosman mentions the Rijkswet personenverkeer as a predecessor of his proposal (Second Chamber of Parliament, 2012-2013, 33325 nr. 4). This law was also an attempt to regulate the migration of Caribbean Dutch citizens from the Caribbean islands to the Netherlands. However, in contrast to the Bosman-bill this law was proposed on a Kingdom level and was intended to be implemented with the collaboration of the Caribbean countries (Second Chamber of Parliament, 2012-2013, 33325 nr. 4). Eventu-ally, this proposal was not carried out, because Aruban and politicians of the former Antilles issued a unanimous motion against this law, criticizing it for being racist and creating second-class citizens (ANP, 2009). Bosman uses this case as an example of past negotiations that were discussed on Kingdom level, thus also involving the Caribbean islands, that did not lead to any results, ignoring the root of the problem which is not the involvement of the islands, but is the discriminatory grounds of these proposals (Second Chamber of Parliament, 2012-2013, 33325 nr. 4).
The Bosman-bill was retracted due to several shortcomings. Firstly, because it cre-ates a distinction between first and second-class citizens based on descent, which would eventually lead to formal inequality regarding the citizenship right of settlement, social rights and street inspections (Jones, 2016; van Houwelingen, 2008). To support these claims, he also made use of false data in order to fix Caribbean Dutch citizens as ‘kansloze antilianen’ Disadvantaged Antilleans. Secondly, it creates a class of Caribbean Dutch citizens that would become deportable, even though the Netherlands does not have the power to do so considering that these individuals hold the Dutch nationality and passport.
1.2
From Model Citizen to Threat
Before the 80’s, the Dutch citizenship of citizens from the Caribbean islands was not prob-lematized as now, especially not on the political sphere (Oostindie, 2012; Jones, 2016). However, since the 1980’s, the Dutch citizenship of Caribbean Dutch citizens has been in-creasingly contested (Oostindie, 2012; Jones, 2016). Eventually in the 1990’s this has fos-tered recurrent political debates to end free settlements of Caribbean Dutch citizens in the Netherlands (Jones, 2016). Several of these attempts were withdrawn due to ‘constitutional obstacles’ and the conclusion that ‘the majority of the Antillean Dutch is doing well’ (Jones,
2016, p.615). Even though these attempts were discriminatory and judicially unjustified, prominent political parties are still submitting similar proposals. Both Jones (2016) and Oost-indie (2012) address the emergence of this discriminatory narrative in the Dutch political con-text. Oostindie (2012) gives a historical depiction of the political relationship and the way in which this transformed throughout the years, while Jones (2016) provides a post-colonial critique on the Dutch politics of citizenship.
Combining these two insights illustrate that both the economic and political relationship be-tween the countries, as the (pre-)existent discriminatory narrative of Dutch politics of citizen-ship shape these debates on migration policies.
Oostindie (2012) describes the political and economic relationship between the Neth-erlands and the former Antilles. In Gedeelde Koninkrijk he delineates how the initial approach of the Netherlands shifted from assisting the Caribbean islands with financial aid, to prob-lematizing Caribbean Dutch migration (Oostindie, 2012). According to him and De Jong (2015) the Caribbean islands, especially Curacao, did not meet the expectations of economic growth that the Netherlands had in mind. As their aid dependency increased and their eco-nomic state did not improve, the islands were caught in a financial crisis, which resulted in an increase of the amount of people moving from the Antilles to the Netherlands (Oostindie, 2012). This development was regarded as the “Antilliaanse exodus en een
integratie-problematiek in Nederland” (Oostindie, 2012). Consequently, debates around migration and
integration of Caribbean Dutch citizens became more prominent and rigid, resulting into overt expression of discontent towards “Antilliaanse risicojongeren” and the demand of deportation (Oostindie, 2012). This was followed by the proposal to force a unilateral separation from the Caribbean islands by the Netherlands, which is not permitted by the charter (Oostindie, 2012). According to Oostindie (2012) these discourses were already present in the vox
popu-li but were new in the parpopu-liamentary sphere.
On the other hand, Jones critique refutes the notion of these discourses as ‘novelty’. Instead, he argues that from a historical perspective, these politics of inequality, as proposed by Dutch populists in the Netherlands for the last 15 years, are an integral part of a longer Dutch history. Thus, these attempts to delegitimize and problematize the citizenship of Car-ibbean Dutch citizens are a manifestation of a wider dominant discourse surrounding the Dutch politics of citizenship (Jones, 2016). He approaches this critique by depicting the course of the development of Dutch modern citizenship.
The political development of modern citizenship in the Netherlands, which constituted the expansion of civil and political rights in the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries, was not extended to the overseas Dutch colonies. During this development in the motherland, the institution of slavery prevailed in the Dutch colonies till 1862 (Dutch East Indies) and 1863
(West Indies). Up to then, the colonies were denied access to Dutch citizenship and their main concern was whether the human body was recognized as a person or not (Jones, 2016). The Dutch West Indies could participate in this development until after the abolish-ment of slavery. This took even longer for the Dutch East Indies (Jones, 2016). It is with this in mind that Jones (2016, p. 609) poses the question: “In this connection, we might also
wonder to what extent the fruits of hundreds of years of legal anti-citizenship was helpful in not only creating the (material) conditions for the development of Dutch capitalism but the extension of social rights and the welfare state in the twentieth century Netherlands as well”.
After the abolishment of slavery, all enslaved subjects were recognized as people. However, this did not signify the path to equal citizenship. In 1892 the Dutch government introduced first- and second-class citizenship in the colonial nationality law of the Dutch East Indies (Jones, 2016). This law separated the population into ‘native’ Dutch subjects and ‘Eu-ropean’ Dutch citizens (Jones, 2016). “Dutch citizens” held certain political rights such as acquiring leading socioeconomic, military and political positions in the colony, while “native subjects” were legally excluded from these positions (Jones 2007). Jones (2016) also notices that contrary to present-day politics, these regulations that target a specific race or ethnicity did not require populist rhetoric to justify the legislation of first- and second-class citizenship, since racialized grammars of thinking were deeply entrenched in the nineteenth century. Through these racialized grammars of thinking the “other” is constructed as antithetical to Dutch; whether it be the Mollucan other, Surinamese other, the Muslim other or the Antillean other, they all follow the same racist discourse (Wekker, 2016; Jones, 2016). Accordingly, the discursive hierarchies that are constructed between “us” and “them” and their negative effect on equal citizenship are materialized by these proposals.
Thus, by analyzing the Bosman-bill and similar proposals the coherent ways in which they construct Dutch citizens from the Caribbean islands as the “Antillean-other” becomes evident. On several occasions throughout the proposal and debate of the Bosman-bill, Car-ibbean Dutch citizens are referred to as “kansloze antilianen”, “Disadvantaged Antilleans” (Jones, 2016). All these proposals problematize the presence of Caribbean Dutch citizens from the targeted islands in the Netherlands and depicts this category of citizens as a threat to the Dutch society and public order. Similarly, these proposals reproduce discriminatory narratives, which were also the backbone of the first- and second-class citizenship act in the Dutch East Indies (Jones, 2016). Instead of targeting the former Dutch East Indies, present discourses are reifying discriminatory distinction between European Dutch and Caribbean Dutch citizen.
1.3
The Mythical Core of Dutch Nation
To understand the conception of the mythical core that Jones refers to in the quote above, this paragraph will draw on Dumbrava´s analysis on ´Nationality, citizenship and ethnocultur-al admission, preferentiethnocultur-al admission policies of EU countries´. Dumbrava (2012) distin-guishes between two myths that constitute the two major ordering principles of modern politi-cal imagination namely; ethno-cultural and civic-territorial. The ethno-cultural myth describes the political community based on shared descent (ethnicity) and culture. On the other hand, civic-territorial narrative depicts the political community based on shared political institutions and territory. When it comes to attaining membership to the political community, the two myths encompass different criteria. While membership in an ethno-cultural community re-sides on descent or confirmed acculturation/integration, in a civic community it is considered an expression of attachment and commitment to shared political institutions (Dumbrava, 2012).
Both myths have their own sets of rules that sustain the principle to which it adheres. However, this does not mean that they are mutually exclusive. Dumbrava (2012) defines ‘ethnocultural rules of admission to citizenship’ as rules that explicitly or implicitly refer to characteristics, qualities or capacities that demonstrate membership in a (real or imagined) ethno-cultural community. By analyzing these rules, he tries to identify features of citizenship regulations that are linked to ethnocultural narratives. If a rule explicitly targets either a group or individual by referring to their “ethnicity”, it is evidently a narrative of common ethnicity that supports this rule. However, the lines become blurred when rules refer to “origin, native, as-sociation etc.” (Dumbrava, 2012). Which is exactly what the Bosman-bill and similar pro-posals does by referring to “nationale afkomst” or “herkomst”, origin (Second Chamber of Parliament, 2012-2013, 33325 nr. 6). Dumbrava (2012) clarifies that in these cases it is the
power of interpretation that determines whether this is based on nationalistic logic or if it is
referring to ethnic markers (Dumbrava, 2012). In the case of the Bosman-bill, it was heavily criticized by several institutions and was rejected because of its discriminatory regulations targeting citizens from the Caribbean islands.
The Bosman-bill did not pass the proportionality test (Second Chamber of Parliament, 2012-2013, 33325, nr. 6). This test is to ensure that laws that affect human rights are propor-tionate and reasonable, which is done by analyzing the bill according to three subprinciples; adequacy, necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu (Cianciardo 2010). Adequacy entails that the laws must be suitable to achieve the aim that is mentioned by the legislator. Necessi-ty; is questioning if the petitioner did not overlook other ways to achieve the same outcome but is less restrictive of the human rights. Lastly, proportionality is an examination of the bal-ance between advantages and disadvantages that will result from this law. The means to achieve a goal should not be unreasonable in its reciprocal relationships. This interpretation
lies in the hands of the interpreters (Cianciardo, 2010). Thus, providing that the Bosman-bill did not give a valid justification for the discriminatory distinctions, the proposed measures were not considered as proportionate and the council did not find that these regulations will solve the issue at hand (Second Chamber of Parliament 33325, 2013-2014, nr. 11). Cianciardo (2010) stresses this test can result into human rights losing their characteristic of impassable barrier for the state. If the legislator can balance the weight of the human right and the motives for the restriction of this right, then the idea of proportionality does not pre-vent the petitioner from violating human rights (Cianciardo, 2010). In this case it seems that human rights, which are supposed to be universally protected are subjected to the power of interpretation. Thus, the ones that are authorized to interpret are also ascribed significant power in these debates. Adequate representation of Dutch citizens from the Caribbean is-lands within political structures that are entrusted with the power of interpretation in cases that effect these islands is of great importance.
1.4
The Process of Alienation
According to the Bosman-bill, both Dutch citizens and their children from Aruba, Cu-racao and Sint Martin who have acquired their Dutch citizenship through descent or naturali-zation will fall under the jurisdiction of this law (Second Chamber of Parliament, 2012-2013, 33325 nr. 2). Thus, the birthplace of the children themselves does not matter. Consequently, it will result in a biased situation on the islands, where children of Dutch citizens from the European side of the Kingdom can freely move and reside in the Netherlands, meanwhile children of Dutch citizens whose “origin” is from the Caribbean islands do not have the free-dom nor privilege to do so (Jones, 2016). In his proposal, Bosman solidifies the imagined Dutch community based on racialized/ ethnic distinctions by constructing laws that target Dutch citizens from the Caribbean Islands Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin. Furthermore, this proposal aims to regulate permanent or temporary residence of ‘disadvantaged’ Dutch citi-zens from the islands, by mirroring regulations that apply to ‘aliens’ (Second Chamber of Par-liament, 2012-2013, 33325 nr. 3).
This proposal contains regulations that are stipulated in the Vreemdelingenwet 2000, Aliens Act the Netherlands 2000 (Second Chamber of Parliament, 2015-2016, 33325, nr. 3). By including laws that are initially established for “aliens”, in this case referring to people who are not considered Dutch citizens, it clearly draws a parallel between ‘alien/foreigner’ and Caribbean Dutch citizens. Similarly, the proposal from Fritsma and de Graaf also include a method borrowed from article 3.86 of the Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000 the sliding scale, as a decisive instrument to measure for the penalty (Second Chamber of Parliament 34044, nr. 3, 01/10/2014). Moreover, this proposal is not limited by age, meaning that each Dutch citizen from Aruba, Curacao and St Martin that are convicted can be sent back regardless if they have lived in the Netherlands for their entire adult life. The proposal from Fritma and de
Graaf was influenced by a previous proposal of minister Verdonk (VVD) in 2006:
‘Aanvullen-de maatregelen inzake on‘Aanvullen-der meer ‘Aanvullen-de terugzending van Antilliaanse en Arubaanse risico-jongeren’, which also incorporated regulations from the Vreemdelingenwet (Second
Cham-ber Parliament, 2006–2007, 30 962, nr. 4).
Although, citizens from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin also share the undivided Dutch citizenship, these proposals seem to negate that through this process of alienation. This process of othering, whereby ‘the symbolic, social, political and legal processes in which the polity effectively renders status citizens as aliens or semi-citizens’ is termed citizenship alienation by Jones (2016). Jones (2016) analysis, similarly to other scholars such as Gloria Wekker, Philomena Essed and Ellie Vasta, address the issue in the Netherlands, that citi-zens from former Dutch colonies are not considered as belonging to the ethno-nation. Con-sequently, their citizenship status is not safe, and their rights are constantly contested (Jones, 2016). He demonstrates that due to these instabilities, even people who have ‘inher-ited’ the undivided Dutch citizenship through long ancestral lines are in danger of losing their citizenship rights. Discourses on national community depend on an implicitly normalized ac-cepted group and an explicitly marker group or ‘the others’, or in this case the semi-members (Jones, 2016). In moments perceived as crisis or for political agenda these dominant dis-courses of semi-citizenship surface. This process constructs the ‘real citizen’ which enjoys of the privileges that come with the status, and the semi-citizens whose rights are constantly contested. These distinctions reinforce the discriminatory discourse of the superiority of European citizen vis a vis the Caribbean subject. In this narrative the subject regardless of its nationality or affinity with the nation is not considered as a full-fledged Dutch citizen. An illustration of this, is the debate between the Council and Bosman on the fact that the target-ed Dutch citizens also have EU-citizenship. According to EU-citizenship rights the state has an obligation to receive anyone who holds it passport and nationality. To this note, Bosman argues that due to the political restructuring of the Kingdom in 10-10-10 the islands are now independent countries and should be treated as such. Meaning that citizens from the Carib-bean islands Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin could be send back to their ‘home’ country. This argument shows that this proposal completely disregards the political membership of the Caribbean islands in the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the fact that have both the Dutch citizenship rights as the EU-citizenship rights. The council replied by stating that Dutch citizens from the former Antilles are still EU-citizens (Second Chamber of Parliament, 2012-2013, 33325 nr. 4). The fact that they are living in overseas countries and territories does not alter that. Therefore, Dutch citizens from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin have the same rights and obligations as stated in article 20 of the VWEU, as any other EU-citizen has (VWEU, 1957). Including the right to travel and reside in the territory of the member states, while only being subjected to the limitation that are established by EU treaties. Moreover, in
the initial proposal Caribbean Dutch citizens would be in a more disadvantaged position than EU-citizens (Second Chamber of Parliament, 2012-2013, 33325 nr. 4).
By questioning “open to whom?”, Dumbrava (2012, p. 19) critiques the notion of
“open” regimes that stand for liberal citizenship rules. Although it is true that citizenship laws
have become more inclusive and less discriminatory than in the past, this should not be con-sidered the norm to measure contemporary citizenship policies (Dumbrava, 2012). While citizenship rules are generous to certain people, this is not the case for everyone. Analyzing these rules will grant insight into the discursive grounds on which they lie. If you are not con-sidered as belonging to the ethno-nation, your citizenship status is not secure (Jones, 2016). “The instabilities of citizenship that the colonized and their offspring experienced reveal un-der-researched dynamics of citizenship” (Jones, 2016, p.606). This instability of citizenship surfaces in Dutch debates, policies and bills that contest citizenship rights of Dutch citizens from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin. Clearly, even basic citizenship rights, such as the right to move and reside in the country of nationality, are disputed for people whose Dutch citizen-ship is inherited and who has never possessed another nationality (Jones, 2016). Because of the comparatively lower number of Antillean migration to the Netherlands before the eighties, this group was not considered a problem for the Dutch society in that time (Jones ,2007; Oostindie & Klinkers, 2001). Therefore, Dutch citizens from the (former) Netherlands Antilles were not problematized as nowadays. At that time, the focus was on the Surinamese popula-tion (Jones, 2016, Oostindie & Klinkers, 2012). According to Jones (2016), the restricpopula-tion of migration of the “Antillean Dutch” to the Netherlands became the center of political debates, when the Dutch citizenship trajectory of other former colonial territories, the Eurasian Dutch, Moluccan Dutch and Surinamese Dutch, were considered a closed matter to the Nether-lands. Moreover, both Oostindie & Klinkers (2012) and Jones (2016) assert that the increase in migration of Caribbean working-class citizens in the 1980's and 1990’s led to the intensifi-cation of the political debate regarding the migration of Dutch citizens from the Caribbean islands. Citizens from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin who were once considered model citi-zen, became increasingly problematized by Dutch politicians (Jones, 2016; Oostindie & Klinkers ,2012). These debates reflect both the persistent discriminatory discourse in Dutch political sphere as the inherent inequality between the Netherlands and the other constituent countries of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The unequal distribution of wealth and re-sources between the countries within the Kingdom creates dependency and a continued state of subjection to the metropole, by maintaining unequal power dynamics that ensure that one side of the Kingdom (the Netherlands) functions as a source of resources that would otherwise not be accessible for the other constituent countries, such as adequate welfare structures (Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018; Jones, 2016; De Jong, 2015).
J
ones (2016) state that the construct of the subject of “Disadvantaged Antillean” in the Bosman-bill, shows thatthe emancipation within the Dutch Kingdom is both territorialized and ethno-nationalized. Especially considering that Dutch citizens from less rich province can move freely to the rich-er area, while citizens from the less rich ovrich-erseas trich-erritories, Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin would be denied. Furthermore, by depicting the position of these individuals as static and
“kansloos”, this narrative does not leave space for socioeconomic mobility. However, this is
subject to change and might improve when one moves to the richer part of the Kingdom (Jones, 2016).
In short, Dutch citizenship of citizens from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin has been increas-ingly problematized since 1980’s. Both Oostindie & Kinkers (2012) as Jones (2016) state that the migration of working-class Caribbean Dutch citizens to the Netherlands intensified the debate around limiting their freedom of movement within the borders of the Kingdom. The Bosman-bill is one in several attempts to restrict the citizenship rights, by instilling migration regulations for Dutch citizens from these targeted islands. While Oostindie & Klinkers (2012) state that these narratives were new in the political sphere, Jones (2016) argues that these exclusivist narratives of Dutch citizenship are recurrent discourses that shift target depending on the historical context. From onset, Dutch colonies and their inhabitants were deprived of the development of modern citizenship. Even though, citizenship regulations have become more inclusive after decolonization, it is evident that the citizenship rights of Caribbean Dutch citizens are still being contested based on discriminatory distinctions. By analyzing these postcolonial ethno-cultural narratives, it seems that proposals such as the Bosman-bill reify colonial distinctions between European and Caribbean subject. These narratives lead to the alienation of Caribbean Dutch citizens. Moreover, the course of these proposals is partly de-termined by the power of interpretation, thus it is important to question who is authorized to interpret these proposals.
2
The Charters Ambiguity
This chapter illustrates the two-sidedness of the charter. On one hand, it advocates for the
gelijkwaardigheid, equivalence, of all constituent countries in the Kingdom and it emphasizes
the undivided quality of Dutch citizenship (Broekhuijse, 2012, Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018). While on the other hand, it does not grant enough protection for the citizenship rights of Caribbean Dutch citizens, who are from the countries in the kingdom that have less re-sources compared the Netherlands (van Houwelingen, 2016, Jones, 2016 ; Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018; Jong, 2015). Even though, most attempts to limit the freedom of movement of Dutch citizens from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin has not been implemented, the possi-bility for this to be concretized still exists. The first paragraph of this chapter illustrates the ambiguity of the charter by deconstructing the principle of gelijkwaardigheid that it is based on. Subsequently, the next paragraph addresses the political structures of the Kingdom that demonstrate that this gelijkwaardigheid does not signify equality.
2.1
A Double-edged Charter
Het Statuut, the charter of the Dutch Kingdom, was officially confirmed in 1954 on the 15th of
December. The charter describes the relationship between the Netherlands and the former Antilles, which has now dissolved into Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin (Broekhuijse, 2012). Together, they constitute the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The charter has more legal power than the constitution of the Netherlands and the separate countries (Broekhuijse, 2012).
Fundamentally, Het Statuut was designed to establish a relationship between the countries based on the principle of gelijkwaardigheid (Broekhuijse, 2012). As Broekhuijse (2012) describes, this document is the manifestation of the shared desire to dismantle preex-isting colonial relationship, in order to forge a new equal political relationship. To ensure that this principle is preserved, the charter contains the judicial construction, Rijskniveau, of the policies and elements of lawmaking that involve Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin (Broekhuijse, 2012; Nap, 2005; Oostindie & Klinkers, 2012). The subjects that are not explic-itly mentioned as Kingdom affair, are matters that each country is independently responsible for. In this political structure communal affairs are intended to be discussed in the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom, Rijksministerraad. This Council consists of representatives from the constituent countries, Aruba, Curacao, St Martin and the Netherlands, whereby the meet-ings are chaired by The Prime Minister of the Netherlands (Nap, 2005).
After the constitutional restructuring of 10/10/2010 the political dynamics between the Netherlands and the former Antilles changed significantly (Oostindie & Klinkers, 2012). Cur-rently, Curacao and Sint Martin also followed Aruba’s path towards ‘status aparte’. Hence,
all three countries are now autonomous countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. By contrast, Bonaire, St. Eustatius, and Saba have become “overseas municipalities” of the Netherlands. Despite the significant changes throughout the years in the political relationship between the islands and The Netherlands, the charter remained the same (Oostindie & Klinkers, 2012; Broekhuijse, 2012; De Jong, 2015). The fixed character of the charter is part-ly because adjustments to the charter can onpart-ly established if all member states agree (Oost-indie & Klinkers, 2012, Broekhuijse, 2012). Essential to the charter is the basis of
gelijkwaar-digheid, which it is founded on. Moreover, the preamble 3of the charter states:
“De grondbeginselen van de inhoud van de nieuwe rechtsorde van het Koninkrijk kunnen aldus worden samengevat, dat in deze rechtsorde de landen zelfstandig de eigen belan-gen behartibelan-gen en dat zij op de voet van gelijkwaardigheid verbonden zijn tot verzorging van de gemeenschappelijke belangen en tot wederkerige bijstand.”
According to the preamble the constituent countries should pursue their own interests inde-pendently, take care of their common interest on equal footing and grant each other assis-tance. Thus, according to the preamble, the constituent countries are to manage communal affairs on equal footing (Veenendaal & Oostindie 2009). A question that comes to mind is: To what extent is the principle of gelijkwaardigheid, the foundation of the charter, an illusion?
Broekhuijse (2012) analyzes the basis of gelijkwaardigheid, ‘equivalence’, that the charter is based on. She argues that gelijkwaardigheid is a convoluted term that carries vari-ous ways of interpretation. As the meaning is not explicitly established in the Charter, it has been left open to interpretation because of the Charter’s ambiguity. Even though the pream-ble emphasizes gelijkwaardigeid between the constituent countries, in practice this is not the case (Broekhuijse, 2012; Oostindie & Veenendaal, 2018; De Jong, 2015). In the analysis of Broekhuijse (2012), she outlines the different factors that obstruct the equality between the countries within the Kingdom, while emphasizing that specifically the unilateral interpretation of the charter’s stipulations forms a significant barrier. By purposely misinterpreting the stipu-lations that are articulated in the charter, Dutch politicians bend the interpretation of
gelijkwaardigheid to their advantage (Broekhuijse, 2012). She points out that before, when
the constitution and the charter were not interwoven, this was less of an issue. In that time the Kingdom was a political neutral subject in the Netherlands, and as a result of that the theory coincided with the practice. As a result of the merging of the influence that the consti-tutional law has increased on Kingdom level. Consequently, this has brought an end to the judicial equality in the Kingdom of The Netherlands (Broekhuijse, 2012)
In her analysis she uses definition of the term gelijkwaardigheid as defined by Borman (2005). Borman describes that for there to be equality, there must be from a constitutional
standpoint equal appreciation or treatment and the judicial structure cannot contain elements of subordination from one country to another (Broekhuijse, 2012). On the other hand, he phi-losophizes, that the term gelijkwaardighed indicates that there is no equality, but that there are differences between entities that must be considered (Broekhuijse, 2012). These differ-ences can be for example, the size of population, human resources and resources, and this should not result into a vertical relationship between countries (Broekhuijse, 2012). However, Research show that in the case of the Kingdom there does exist a vertical relationship, whereby the Netherlands is ascribed more power within the structures of the Kingdom (Broekhuisje, 2012; Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018; Nap, 2005)
Het Statuut, the charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, is the enactment of a postcolonial
agreement between the Netherlands and its former colonies. It solidifies a postcolonial politi-cal relationship based on the principle of gelijkwaardigheid, equivalence. Broekhuijse´s anal-ysis refuted the idea of the principle of gelijkwaardigheid as being defined as equality, in-stead she argues that it is a convoluted term that is contextually defined by to the power of interpretation. Accordingly, this power is used by Dutch politicians to their advantage. Re-gardless of the various political developments that the Kingdom have undergone, the charter remained the same since its construction in 1954. To ensure the gelijkwaardigheid of all con-stituent countries the charter makes a distinction between different levels of administrative bodies, each with its own jurisdictions. Regulations that affect the constituent countries of the Kingdom are intended to be dealt with on the Kingdom level. However, the Bosman-bill and similar proposals in the past are not proposed as a Kingdom affair, but as a unilateral discus-sion that should be held in the borders of the Netherlands. In addition to the unequal power dynamics within the Kingdom, these proposals also try to exclude the targeted Caribbean islands from participating in this debate.
2.2
The Illusion of Gelijkwaardigheid
“Furthermore, the populations of some of these non-sovereign jurisdictions, especially those in the Caribbean, look back on a colonial history marked by denigration and negli-gence at best, brutal exploitation, racism, and slavery at worst. In the contemporary fed-eracy arrangements, they are still subsumed in one way or another under metropolitan authority and have to deal with recurrent metropolitan interventions and officials.” (Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018, p. 26)
This paragraph discusses the question that was formulated in the previous paragraph name-ly; To what extent does the gelijkwaardigheid between the constituent countries as con-structed by the charter can be considered an illusion. Several studies address the structural problems in the relationship between the Caribbean islands and the Netherlands, which ulti-mately leads to an imbalance in power dynamics between the metropole and its overseas counterparts (Broekhuijse, 2012; Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018; De Jong, 2015).
In “Head versus heart: The ambiguities of non-sovereignty in the Dutch Caribbean” Oostindie and Veenendaal (2018) discuss the “federal” relationship between the Caribbean countries and The Netherlands. In this research they describe the “advantages and disad-vantages of non-sovereignty that the populations of these jurisdictions identify, perceive, and recognize” (Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2017). The Dutch Kingdom is an asymmetric federal-ism between a larger state, The Netherlands, and smaller peripheral entities; Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin. Veenendaal and Oostindie (2017) explain that these types of arrangements usually exist between former colonial powers and their smaller former colonial territories. According to their research, former colonial territories do not follow the expected decoloniza-tion route of state sovereignty, since mid-1980’s. Instead these territories have forged new constitutional and political bond with their metropolitan power (Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018). Thea also explain the reasons why these former colonies chose to maintain this rela-tionship. They assert that according to history “non-sovereign territories are economically more prosperous” (Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018). Moreover, their citizens also possess the passport, hence citizenship, of the metropolis, which makes it possible for them to reside and benefit from the economic capital that the metropole can offer (Veenendaal & Oostindie,
2018). The material resources that the Netherlands can offer its former colonial territories
outweighs the burden to having to deal with higher supervision of the metropole and the un-equal power dynamics (Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018). The scale of the countries is crucial in these dynamics, providing that the size of the peripheral territories determine the level of dependency (Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018). Small peripheral countries grow more de-pendent to a larger metropole. Which is evident because of the benefits that comes with a smaller country having political relationship with a larger power.
Former colonial territories do not follow the expected decolonization route of state sovereign-ty as before. Instead territories such as the former Netherlands Antilles, create and maintain new constitutional and political bonds with their metropolitan power (Veenendaal, Oostindie, 2018). Although these relationships are characterized by recurrent political interference, ne-glect and disrespect for cultural differences, and deficient or inadequate political representa-tion in the institurepresenta-tions of the central state, these small peripheral territories continue to main-tain these relationships in order to benefit from the socio-economic opportunities that the metropole can offer (Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018). Possessing the passport, hence the citizenship, of the metropole is considered of great importance for the maintenance of this political relationship. In these cases, the passport functions as access to economic re-sources, which are otherwise not accessible for citizens from the periphery. Considering the socio-economic opportunities that the Netherlands offer to Caribbean Dutch citizens, who are also part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, it is alarming that the Bosman-bill alongside
other proposals seem to disregard their rights to move and reside in the Netherlands. By constructing these individuals as static beings by referring to them as ´kansloos´ (literal defi-nition: ‘without a chance’), which also means hopeless, this proposal is denying them access to resources (Jones, 2016). Meanwhile, Dutch citizens who are considered legitimate and deserving are not contested in these narratives.
3
Structural Inequality within the Kingdom
The illusion of gelijkwaardigheid that the charter creates, obscures the structural inequality within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This chapter unveils the unequal distribution of pow-er, and resources within the borders of the Kingdom. In the first paragraph, I will address the unequal representation of Caribbean Dutch citizens in the political structures of the Kingdom. Subsequently, the reasoning behind the use of gelijkwaardigheid, equivalence, instead of gelijkheid, equality, will be discussed. The second paragraph will focus on the unequal distri-bution of welfare structures and the implications of the solutions that Bosman offers.
3.1
Unequal Representation and Distribution
According to de Jong (2015) the Netherlands occupy a position within the Kingdom, as a constituent country, while simultaneously superseding the other partners in this relationship. The lack of institutions pertaining to the Kingdom has led to a convoluted dynamic, in which institutions and regulations of the Netherlands are also considered as institutions and regula-tions of the Kingdom (de Jong, 2015; Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018; Oostindie, 2012). Con-sequently, the former colonial territories have maintained a post-colonial political relationship in which they are once again under the authority of the lager metropolitan state (Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018). Due to the overlap of Dutch institutions into Kingdom institutions, Carib-bean countries started questioning who is in charge. Whether this is the Netherlands, or the government of the Kingdom (de Jong, 2015).
Aside from Dutch institutions being implanted as Kingdom institutions, the lack of rep-resentation of the Caribbean islands in the institutions of the metropolitan power is also a structural problem (De Jong, 2015). Meanwhile, the Caribbean islands must deal with super-vision and Dutch officials from the metropole in their institutions (Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018; Broekhuijse, 2012; De Jong, 2015). Another example of the inequality due to lack of representation within the Kingdom structures is the delegation of the Council of ministers. This Council is responsible for reconsidering decisions made that were objected due to an
intern appel. An intern appel is when the Caribbean islands do not agree with a decision
made. According to Nap (2005) the fact that the charter talks about gelijkwaardigheid, equiv-alence, instead of gelijkheid, equality, has numerical consequences for the composition of the Kingdom organs. Neither the Council of ministers, nor the Council of state are an ade-quate representation of the all constituent countries of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Most
of the Council of ministers composes of ministers of the Netherlands, which causes that is-sues that concern the Caribbean islands can be undermined (Nap, 2005). These structures continue to subvert the political autonomy of these territories (Veenendaal & Oostindie 2018).
The Kingdom government also seems to be an expansion of the Dutch government, as it consists predominantly of the Dutch cabinet, which in attempts to account for the
gelijkwaardigheid, includes only one representative of each Caribbean country. In addition,
the Kingdom government does not follow democratic guidelines, considering that the King-dom government does not have a KingKing-dom parliament to which it is held accountable by (Veenendaal, Oostindie, 2018). In fact, this role is fulfilled by the Dutch parliament itself (Broekhuijse, 2012). Thus, the Caribbean countries are not represented in this legislature and the Kingdom of the Netherlands does not have a true division of power. The Kingdom organs and the organs of the country of the Netherlands overlap in such a way that it cannot be considered a federation (Hillebrink, 2008).
The basis of gelijkwaardigheid of the Charter, seems to be an illusion. In practice, most of the Kingdom institutions are merged with those of the (European) Netherlands, which shows that the Netherlands is politically dominant within the Kingdom. Aside from Kingdom institution overlapping with Dutch institutions, the Caribbean countries are also underrepre-sented in Kingdom institutions and there is no true division of power. Nap (2015) argues that it is exactly due to this inherent inequality within the political structures of the Kingdom, that the charter refers to gelijkwaardigheid, equivalence, and not gelijkheid, equality. Moreover, the Kingdom does not have true division of power, providing that there is no separate King-dom parliament and it is held accountable by the Dutch parliament itself. Therefore, Hillebrink (2008) argues that the Kingdom cannot be considered a federation around democratic lines. According to Veenendaal & Oostindie (2018), inequality is common in federacies, however the difference between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and other federacy arrangements is that in Het Statuut it is judicially established that the Caribbean islands are constitutionally equivalent, gelijkwaardig, to the Netherlands.
3.2
Unequal Distribution of Welfare Structures
De Jong (2015) mentions the difference between the condition of life of Dutch citizens in Eu-rope and those living on the Caribbean side of the Kingdom. He writes that the Caribbean islands are characterized by a disparity in education, social security, public safety, as well as social housing and environmental practices when compared to the Netherlands (De Jong, 2015). Furthermore, he also states that living on welfare is tougher for people on Caribbean welfare. In fact, welfare institutions are unequally distributed within the Kingdom (De Jong, 2015; Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2008; Jones, 2016).
The unequal provision of governmental institutions has recently been brought to the attention in political debates (De Jong, 2015). Despite, the clear discrepancy between the welfare structures that are available and accessible on the islands and those existent within the European borders of Netherlands, the charter does not specify on the provision of gov-ernmental services (De Jong, 2015). Thus, the Kingdom is not responsible for a standardized provision or a baseline for governmental services, such as education, public health and so-cial welfare in the Caribbean Islands (De Jong, 2015). Veenendaal & Oostindie (2018) also emphasize the importance of the possibility to reside in the Netherlands and other EU-countries, which grants access to higher education, larger labor market and extensive medi-cal and welfare provision of the metropole. Especially for those in need of financial assis-tance, living on the island’s welfare system. Holding the right citizenship in terms of being able to have certain social benefits and avoiding deportation is considered a great asset (Dumbrava, 2012). However, Jones (2016) criticism on Dutch politics of citizenship demon-strates that even while having the right citizenship, it still does not secure these privileges. Although, citizens from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin are Dutch citizens, their citizenship status is still not safe (Jones, 2016).
Bosman goes so far as to denying Caribbean Dutch citizens from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin access to the Dutch welfare (Second Chamber of Parliament, 2012-2013, 33325 nr. 4) The discrepancy between welfare structures on the islands compared to those in the Netherlands is very evident (Jones, 2016; De Jong, 2005; Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018). This situation functions as an incentive for people to move to the Netherlands in search for better economic standing (Jones, 2016; Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2018).
Up to the 90’s, the idea of a general safety net and a notion of communal care formed the backbone of the welfare state (Vasta, 2007). Afterwards, this ideology changed and moved away from state protection towards self-sufficiency and responsibility. This discursive shift that took place in the Netherlands, amongst other European countries, also influences policies of integration (Vasta, 2007). This ideology of self-sufficiency and responsibility is also visible in the claims and regulations in the Bosman-bill. This is evident to Bosman’s response to The Council’s critique that the Netherlands does not have enough power to expel Dutch citizens from The Netherlands once they have extended their stay, providing that they hold the Dutch nationality and passport. The return arrangement can only be applied in case the person poses a threat to the public order. As a solution, Bosman proposed to complicate residency in the Netherlands to such an extent that returning to the country of origin would be more attractive than staying in the Netherlands (Second Chamber of Parliament, 2012-2013, 33325 nr. 4). In that country, contrary to the Netherlands, they will be eligible for permanent residency and social welfare. “In andere gevallen zal de bemoeilijking tot vestiging in
het land van herkomst binnen het Koninkrijk. In dit land zal betrokkene immers wel in aan-merking komen voor permanente vestiging en sociale voorzieningen.” (Second Chamber of
Parliament, 2012-2013, 33325, nr. 4, p. 13). By selectively depriving certain Dutch citizens; citizens from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Martin, from their right to reside in the Netherlands and denying them access to economic support from the nation state that they belong to, this bill is clearly alienating Caribbean Dutch citizens (Jones, 2016). In relation to the material and legal security that comes with having Dutch nationality and citizenship rights, Jones (2016) state that equating political decolonization only with freedom, does not ensure equal distribution of means of existence. He asserts that the politics of citizenship instead should be viewed as legal-symbolic-material matrix. If the charter is based on gelijkwaardigheid and undivided Dutch citizenship, then citizenship rights of Caribbean Dutch citizens to move freely within the Kingdom and to have access to Dutch welfare should be equally protected as European Dutch citizens.
Several researches address and criticize the substantial difference in social welfare provision between the constituent countries of the Kingdom. While the Kingdom is character-ized by unequal distribution of power and resources, Dutch politicians are increasingly con-testing the citizenship rights of Caribbean Dutch citizens. Considering that the welfare struc-tures on the islands are not as adequate and developed as the Dutch welfare strucstruc-tures, the outcome of these debates have considerable effect on the lives and opportunities of Dutch citizens from the targeted islands.
4
Reciprocity & Gelijkwaardigheid
The Bosman bill was not the first attempt to limit the citizenship rights of Dutch citizens from the Caribbean islands. Past and present proposals also utilize similar arguements in at-tempts to restrict the rights of these citizens and create a class of deportable Caribbean Dutch citizens. Although most of these attempts did not succeed, one of them did lead to concrete constitutional change. This chapter will adress the revision of the Dutch constitution in 1983, its results and implications for future proposals. The second paragraph will be de-voted to the shortcomings of the charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and how these relate to its aplicability and relevance in the current political structures.
Revision of Dutch Constitution
“De Grondwet kent geen recht op toelating van Nederlanders tot Nederlands
grondge-bied. Een dergelijke bepaling is tijdens de algehele grondwetsherziening van 1983 be-wust achterwege gelatte om de mogelijkheid van een toelatingsregeling voor Antilliaanse Nederlanders niet uit te sluiten” (Second Chamber of Parliament, 2012-2013, 33325 nr.
6, p. 5).
In his proposal, Bosman recurrently refers to the fact that there is no law in the Dutch consti-tution that assures the freedom of movement for Dutch citizens within the Kingdom. This de-cision was consciously made by the Dutch government during the revisioning of the constitu-tion in 1983. There, they discussed the possibility of introducing a strict integraconstitu-tion policy for ‘Dutch Antilleans’ (Second Chamber of Parliament, 2012-2013, 33325 nr. 6, p. 5). In this dis-cussion the questions of admittance and reciprocity were discussed.
On October 28, 1976, The minister of internal affairs de Gaay Fortman (CDA) pro-posed a “ Declaration of the existent grounds for considering a proposal to change the
Con-stitution of the provisions regarding admission, expulsion and extradition, the Dutch nationali-ty and residency” (Second Chamber of Parliament, 1976-1977,14200 (R 1048), nrs. 1-5)4. The second reading of this proposal took place through the bill “Change of the provisions in the Constitution regarding admission, expulsion and extradition, Dutch nationality and resi-dency"5, which was proposed on the 15th of June 1981 by Van Agt (CDA), minister of
gen-eral affairs, Wiegel (VVD), minister of internal affairs and Haars, State secretary of Justice (Second Chamber of Parliament, 1981, 16906 (R 1169), nr. 1-3).
The Declaration and the following bill’s aim were to impede the establishment of the right of admittance and guaranteed non-expulsion for Dutch citizens from other parts of the
4 See: https://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/id/vjsjhj4pgnyd/14200_r1048_verklaring_dat_er_grond
