Changing with the times: a case study of the governance of the EU renewable energy regime

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Changing with the times:

A case study of the governance of

the EU renewable energy regime

Author: Bob Kattenbelt

Supervisor: prof. dr. J.H. Zeitlin

Second reader: dr. B. Rangoni

July 2020

Master thesis Political Science

Specialization: Political Economy

22,000 words

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Abstract

This thesis conducts a case study to assess the governance frameworks of EU renewable energy policy and EU policy on state aid for renewable energy, and the significant changes that these frameworks have undergone in the last decade. Using a model that is based on the eight dimensions of governance introduced by Bartolini (2011), this thesis studies the extent to which these

governance frameworks and the changes made to these frameworks follow the logic of either hierarchical, network, or experimentalist governance theory. While existing studies characterize the governance frameworks as a form of network governance, this thesis found much more hierarchical and experimentalist features than network governance features. Furthermore, the changes made to the governance frameworks of EU renewable energy policy and EU policy on state aid for renewable energy in the last decade predominantly indicated a shift towards more hierarchical governance. This thesis also assesses the (possible) effects of these changes, using public documents and interviews with EU and national policy officers. Despite the fact that not all elements of the governance frameworks of EU renewable energy policy and EU policy on state aid for renewable energy have entered into force yet, it is found the changes generally have a positive effect on the functioning of the governance frameworks.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank prof. Zeitlin and dr. Rangoni for their ideas and guidance throughout the writing process of this thesis. Besides renewable energy policy, I have learned a lot about myself, my

shortcomings, and how to deal with these. I would like to thank my girlfriend Merle for helping me in this process and for her trust and patience while doing so. Lastly, I want to thank my manager for allowing me to take time off from work to focus on writing the thesis.

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1. Introduction

To mitigate climate change, the European Union (EU) has set targets to promote the use of

renewable energy. The target to be attained by 2020 was established in the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive (from now on referred to as the 2009 Directive) and required 20 percent of EU energy production to come from renewable energy sources (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2009). In addition to an EU-wide target, the 2009 Directive includes nationally binding targets. These targets take into account the different starting positions in the Member States and their potential to increase the use of renewable energy sources and range from 67.5 percent in Norway to 10 percent in Malta (Eurostat, 2020). The latest statistics published in January 2020 were promising: the share of renewable energy in the EU had reached 18 percent in 2018. Of the 28 EU Member States, 12 had already reached their target, and four were close to meeting their target in 2018 (Eurostat, 2020).

2018 was also the year that the recast Renewable Energy Directive (from now on referred to as the 2018 Directive) was adopted. The 2018 Directive will succeed the 2009 Directive from 2021 onwards and includes an EU-wide renewable energy target of 32 percent to be attained in 2030 (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2018). The 2018 Directive does not, however, include nationally binding targets like there were in the 2009 Directive, which might lead to Member States lagging. A possible solution is provided by the Governance Regulation that was adopted along with the 2018 Directive. This Regulation integrates the planning and reporting obligations on renewable energy, efficiency, energy security, and the internal market that were previously separated as part of several Directives. It obliges Member States to outline a plan to promote the use of renewable energy and to report on the progress it has made. The Governance Regulation also includes a formula with which a reasonable contribution of each Member State to the EU-wide target can be calculated. This calculation takes into account the Member State’s national target for 2020, gross domestic product (GDP), potential, and the level of interconnection through electricity transmission lines (European Parliament and the European Council, 2018).

Some believe the lack of nationally binding targets in the 2018 Directive has weakened the

governance framework and reduced the chances of meeting the EU-wide target (ClientEarth, 2016; Meyer-Ohlendorf, 2015; Meyer-Ohlendorf et al. 2014). Others argue that the governance framework of the 2018 Directive does not fall behind the stringency of the 2009 Directive and is, in theory, capable of achieving the established goals (Oberthür, 2019; Monti & Martinez Romera, 2020). This thesis contributes to this debate and assesses the governance framework of EU renewable energy policy, the changes that were made since the 2009 Directive, and their (possible) effects.

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While many renewable energy sources are already or will soon become cost-competitive (IRENA, 2019), state aid is still widely used by Member States to ensure that renewable energy sources can compete with fossil fuel energy sources. Between 2008 and 2016, the amount of state aid granted in the EU for renewable energy increased threefold from 25 billion euros to 76 billion euros (European Commission, 2019, p. 210). In principle, state aid is prohibited in the European Union because it distorts competition in the internal market. The promotion of renewable energy is one of the forms of state aid that are exempted from this prohibition, however, because they promote the common interest (European Commission, 2019). This allows Member States to subsidize this sector and enables them to contribute towards meeting the renewable energy target. The European

Commission assesses the compatibility of each national support scheme with the internal market. This is a form of negative integration: the Commission eliminates barriers that restrict the movement of goods, services, and factors of production by disallowing any state aid measure that is

incompatible with the internal market.

Through the Guidelines on state aid for environmental protection 2008-2014 (from now on referred to as the 2008 Guidelines), the Commission gave recommendations on the design of national support schemes. With the adoption of the Guidelines on state aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 (from now on referred to as 2014 Guidelines), the Commission put restrictions on the type of support schemes Member States are allowed to use (European Commission, 2014). While the Member States were previously allowed to design the support schemes for renewable energy as they saw fit, under the 2014 Guidelines, they now have to conform to specific ways of allocating and granting state aid.

The Commission has been criticized for overstepping its competences by enforcing its perspective on ‘good’ state aid policy (Blauberger, 2009). Several Member States pointed out that “[t]he

Commission is clearly interested in steering national energy policies via the instrument of state aid control. This approach undermines the decision-making competence of national parliaments and governments” (European Commission, 2013). Others argue that the 2014 Guidelines comply with EU law and flows from the Commission’s discretion on state aid policy (de Catelle, 2018). This thesis weighs in on this debate and assesses the governance framework of EU policy on state aid for renewable energy, the changes that were made since the 2008 Guidelines, and their (possible) effects.

EU renewable energy policy and EU policy on state aid for renewable energy together form the EU renewable energy regime. This thesis assesses the governance frameworks of the Directives, the Governance Regulation, and the Guidelines to understand the many changes made to the EU

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renewable energy regime and their (possible) effects. There is extensive literature on governance in the EU, with several models put forward that can be identified in different sectors of EU policy-making. Hierarchical governance is characterized as the standard way of EU policy-making, and new forms of governance are said to be emerging (Scott & Trubek, 2002). Two of these new forms of governance are network governance (Kohler-Koch, 1999) and experimentalist governance (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008). None of the existing studies compare hierarchical, network, and experimentalist governance to assess the governance frameworks of the interconnected areas of EU renewable energy policy and EU policy on state aid for renewable energy.

This thesis fills this gap in the literature using an assessment model based on the eight dimensions of governance defined by Bartolini (2011). After adaptation of the model to the purpose of this thesis, the following eight dimensions are used: 1) the identity of actors; 2) the level of involvement of central actors; 3) the level of involvement of local actors; 4) the content; 5) the policy-making process; 6) the nature and role of sanctions; 7) the institutional context; and 8) the mode of implementation. These eight dimensions together constitute the governance framework. The governance frameworks of the 2009 Directive and the 2008 Guidelines are assessed using the theories on hierarchical, network, and experimentalist governance. In addition, the changes made to each of these dimensions by the 2018 Directive, the Governance Regulation, and the 2014 Guidelines are characterized in governance-theoretical terms, and their practical effects are studied.

The research question that is answered is: How has the EU renewable energy regime changed, and how do these changes (possibly) affect its functioning? To be able to answer this question, several sub-questions have to be answered first. In the first half of the analytical part, the following three questions are answered: How can the 2009 Directive be characterized in governance-theoretical terms?; How can the changes made by the 2018 Directive and the Governance Regulation be characterized in governance-theoretical terms?; and What are the (possible) effects of these

changes? In the second half of the analytical part, three similar questions are answered: How can the 2008 Guidelines be characterized in governance-theoretical terms?; How can the changes made by the 2014 Guidelines be characterized in governance-theoretical terms?; and What are the practical effects of these changes?

In section 2, the existing literature on governance theories is reviewed. Section 3 discusses the use of the model by Bartolini (2011) along with the theories on hierarchical, network, and experimentalist governance. The research design is elaborated upon in section 4, explaining the use of the case study method, the research questions, and the data that is studied to answer the research questions. Section 5 is the first part of the analysis and is about EU renewable energy policy. Section 6 is the

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second part of the analysis and concerns EU policy on state aid for renewable energy. The thesis ends with a conclusion in section 7.

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2. Literature review

This section reviews the literature on governance in general and the governance of the EU renewable energy regime in specific. Firstly, the literature on governance is introduced. Secondly, three theories are derived from the literature on governance that are used to assess the governance frameworks of the EU renewable energy regime. Thirdly, the existing literature on the governance of the EU

renewable energy regime is reviewed, and its limitations are discussed.

2.1 Introduction of the literature on governance

Since the turn of the century, the governance of the European Union has increasingly been the subject of academic studies. The publication of a White Paper on European governance by the European Commission (2001) can be seen as a reason for the growing interest in this area (Eckert & Börzel, 2012, p. 371) as well as a consequence of it. The architecture laid out in this White Paper, which Scott and Trubek (2002) term the Classic Community Method (CCM), is often taken as the benchmark for hierarchical governance against which new forms of governance can be compared (Scott & Trubek, 2002). The CCM governance framework is based on the exclusive right of legislative initiative and enforcement powers of the Commission and the legislative and budgetary powers of the Council and the Parliament. It gives the Court of Justice of the European Union a central role in guaranteeing respect for the rule of law. At the same time, qualified majority voting is thought to ensure the method's effectiveness (Scott & Trubek, 2002, p. 1). Hierarchical governance has been an important factor in the rise and persistence of nation-states in modern times (Zielonka, 2007, p. 190). It has also been called "the backbone of the modern welfare states that developed in most Western countries in the aftermath of World War II" (Torfing, 2012, p. 99).

From the growing interest in the governance of the European Union, a variety of theories on new forms of governance have sprung up that represent a shift away from hierarchical governance (Craig & de Búrca, 2011). Héritier (2003, p. 106) argues that these new forms of governance are typically guided by the principles of voluntarism (soft law, non-binding targets, no sanctions); subsidiarity (the Member States or private actors decide on policy measures); and inclusion (actors concerned are involved in goal-setting procedures and the choosing of instruments). According to Scott and Trubek, the new forms of governance can be categorized as either being a variation on the CCM or an alternative to it. Variations on the CCM, which Scott and Trubek call "new old governance" (2002, p. 2) can include: the use of more flexible and non-binding legislation; the substitution of procedural prescriptiveness for substantive uniformity; the involvement of new institutional actors in the policy-making process; and the consultation of civil society actors. Other new modes of governance

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the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) (Citi & Rhodes, 2007). Features that set the new modes apart from the CCM include an expansion of participation by civil society actors; the acceptance of the necessity for coordination of action and actors at a multi-level scale; the appreciation of coordinated diversity and the principles of subsidiarity; the fostering of deliberation among

stakeholders as an instrument for problem-solving and as a form of democratic legitimation; the use of open-ended standards, flexible and revisable guidelines and other forms of soft law; the

facilitation of experimentation and the creation of new knowledge (Scott & Trubek, 2002, pp. 3-6). In the vast literature on governance theories, there are two new forms of governance, of which many empirical instances are found: network governance and experimentalist governance.

2.2 Application of governance theories

Theories on hierarchical, network, and experimentalist governance are often used to assess the governance frameworks of EU policy areas. While research into the governance of the renewable energy regime remains limited, some interest in this area has been sparked by the abandonment of nationally binding targets in the 2018 Directive. A study by Veum & Bauknecht is an example of a study that flows from concerns about the “dealignment of targets at the EU level and instruments at Member State level” (2019, p. 299). They argue that the governance framework of both the 2009 Directive and the 2018 Directive can be labeled as Open Method of Coordination (OMC), a form of soft or network governance that does not include binding legislation nor does it require Member States to introduce or amend their laws (Veum & Bauknecht, 2019, p. 300). According to Veum and Bauknecht, the soft governance framework lacks the harder elements necessary to ensure the Member States will contribute to meeting the EU-wide renewable energy target. They find that these harder elements are not present in the current framework (Veum & Bauknecht, 2019, p. 306). Ringel & Knodt (2018) argue that these harder elements are, in fact, present in EU renewable energy policy. The strong tools that the Commission has inserted in the Governance Regulation in case of an ambition or a delivery gap constitute the harder elements in an otherwise soft governance

framework (Ringel & Knodt, 2018, p. 220). These findings have led Knodt (2019) to come up with a new type of governance framework: horizontal decision-making+, which "combines the allocation of authority at the national level in horizontal coordination with limited authority from a higher level" (Knodt, 2019, pp. 180-181). This new type is based on the modes of institutionalized interaction coined by Fritz Scharpf (2001) and is a form of network governance. The "harder elements" (2019, p. 180) Knodt writes about point to what others call a "shadow of hierarchy" (Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2011, p. 50). In the shadow of hierarchy, public actors can threaten to take executive or legislative action if other (lower-level) actors do not change their behavior in ways that meet the public actor's demands.

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2.3 Limitations of existing studies

The studies done on the governance framework of the renewable energy regime focus primarily on the implementation of policy, and their assessment is mostly limited to the binding force of EU legal acts. There are, however, many more ways in which governance frameworks can differ. The various dimensions of a governance framework are identified in an article by Bartolini (2011). He identified eight property spaces of governance co-production: the identity of co-producers; the level of

involvement of public authorities; the level of involvement of partners; the content of co-production; the ways of achieving co-production; the nature and role of sanctions; the institutional context; and the mode of implementation (Bartolini, 2011, p. 13). This thesis uses an assessment model based on this typology by Bartolini.

Furthermore, the theoretical scope of these studies is limited to forms of network governance. The governance frameworks in other areas of energy regulation include features of hierarchical and experimentalist governance. One example is a study done by Eberlein (2010) on the interconnection of national grid systems. He views hierarchical and experimentalist governance as “complementary rule-making avenues with different capacities and scope conditions” (Eberlein, 2010, p. 62). Rangoni and Zeitlin (2020) found evidence of experimentalist governance in electricity regulation from 2009 onwards. While the assessment by Veum and Bauknecht (2019), Ringel and Knodt (2018) and Knodt (2019) of the governance framework of the renewable energy regime as a form of network

governance in the shadow of hierarchy may be correct, they may have overlooked features of hierarchical and experimentalist governance. Using criteria of hierarchical, network, and experimentalist governance in the assessment of the governance frameworks of EU renewable energy policy and EU policy on state aid for renewable energy, this thesis has a broader theoretical scope.

In their article on hierarchical and new forms of governance, Scott and Trubek (2002, p. 4) warn against seeing these two categories as truly distinct and argue that it is better to see them as situated on a continuum in relation to the CCM. Similarly, Craig and de Búrca (2011, p. 160) write that the shift away from hierarchical governance does not imply that in the new forms of governance there are no more hierarchical features, but rather that it means a move away from the hierarchical extreme of the spectrum. That is why governance frameworks can only be expected to conform to a governance theory to a certain extent. The idea of a spectrum is reflected in a study by Rangoni (2019) that looks at the governance framework of energy regulation in the electricity and gas sector. Instead of assessing whether a feature of a certain form of governance can be identified or not, the assessment model used in this study requires an indication of the extent to which such a feature exists in the form of ‘more’ or ‘less.’ This reflects the spectrum on which governance theories are

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positioned. In this thesis, the governance frameworks of EU renewable energy policy and EU state aid policy will be positioned on these spectrums of governance theories.

The studies mentioned above focus on the Directives and the Governance Regulation. They do not include in their assessment the critical role of the Guidelines. EU policy on state aid for renewable energy is, however, an essential part of the current renewable energy regime. It regulates the state aid measures provided to renewable energy sources, essential in a time when renewable energy often still cannot compete against fossil fuel energy. This thesis, therefore, does include the governance framework of the Guidelines.

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3. Theoretical framework

The literature reviewed demonstrates that the existing studies on the governance of the renewable energy regime do not cover all the dimensions of governance frameworks. They are limited to network governance, and their assessment criteria do not reflect the idea of a spectrum of

governance theories. Moreover, they do not include an assessment of the governance framework of the Guidelines, a vital part of the renewable energy regime. This thesis takes a broader and more inclusionary approach. It covers the eight dimensions of governance frameworks based on a model by Bartolini (2011). The thesis assesses governance frameworks on the basis of three main

governance theories and incorporates the concept of a spectrum of theories. Because of its essential role in the renewable energy regime, the governance framework of the Guidelines is also assessed. In this section, the theoretical framework is presented. Firstly, the choice for hierarchical, network, and experimentalist governance is explained. Secondly, the assessment model based on the eight

dimensions of governance frameworks by Bartolini (2011) is discussed. Thirdly, the perspective of each of the three theories is elaborated upon per governance dimension.

3.1 The choice for hierarchical, network and experimentalist governance

In order to assess the governance framework of the Guidelines and the Directives, three possible explanatory theories are applied: network, experimentalist, and hierarchical governance. Firstly, the theory of network governance has previously been applied to the Directives (Knodt, 2019; Ringel & Knodt, 2018; Veum & Bauknecht, 2019). It will also be used for the assessment in this thesis, taking into account the limitations of previous studies. Secondly, empirical evidence of experimentalist governance has been found in other areas of energy regulation (Rangoni & Zeitlin, 2020) (Eberlein, 2010). This theory may, therefore, be able to explain the governance framework of the renewable energy regime as well. Thirdly, the so-called ordinary legislative procedure used in the Directives and the role of the Commission in the establishment of the Guidelines demonstrate features of

hierarchical governance, which is the reason why this form of governance is also used for the assessment in this thesis.

3.2 The eight dimensions of governance

The theories on hierarchical, network, and experimentalist governance are applied using an assessment model by Bartolini (2011). Bartolini identified eight “property spaces” (2011, p. 13) or dimensions of governance. He created this model to define new forms of governance and capture all the possible ways in which new forms of governance can occur. He identifies the following

dimensions in which governance frameworks can vary: the identity of co-producers, the level of involvement of public authorities, the level of involvement of partners, the content of co-production,

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the ways of achieving co-production, the nature and role of sanctions, the institutional context, and the mode of implementation (Bartolini, 2011, p. 13).

The theoretical basis of Bartolini’s model is that governance can entail anything that is not government (Bartolini, 2011, p. 7). Government, as conceptualized by Bartolini, is a form of command and control “characterized by the role of central public institutions, hierarchical relationships, electoral responsibility, hard legal instruments and erga-omnes binding decisions” (2011, p. 7). What Bartolini calls government, others call hierarchical governance (Craig & de Búrca, 2015). The latter is the term that is used in this thesis.

With two changes to the assessment model, the features of hierarchical governance fit as much as the features of other forms of governance. The first changes concern the dimensions ‘identity of co-producers,’ ‘content of co-production,’ and ‘ways of achieving co-production.’ Co- stands for together, and hierarchical governance is characterized by the central actor making policy through little to no cooperation with other actors. To be able to apply hierarchical governance to these governance dimensions too, they are renamed ‘identity of actors involved,’ ‘content’ and ‘policy-making process,’ respectively. The second change is necessary to be able to include hierarchical and experimentalist governance in the model. The two dimensions that assess the level of involvement of public authorities and (private) partners are based on a division between public and private that is irrelevant in experimentalist governance frameworks. In hierarchical forms of governance, the actors that are subject to the policies created by the public authorities can also be public. This relation would not be captured if the model considers all implementing actors to be private. Therefore, ‘level of involvement of public authorities’ is renamed ‘level of involvement of central actors’ and ‘level of involvement of partners’ is now called ‘level of involvement of local actors.’

3.3 The assessment model

In this part of the theoretical framework, the typical features of the three governance theories are identified for each governance dimension based on the model by Bartolini. This will serve as a model for the assessment in the analytical section of the thesis. Table 1 provides a visualization of this assessment model. The criteria used in the model are derived from the literature on hierarchical, network, and experimentalist governance. This model allows us to determine to what extent a governance framework works as theorized, and in which dimensions the empirical findings do not match the criteria. Governance frameworks in the EU exist in many variations, and it is difficult to find one that is entirely along the lines of either hierarchical governance, network governance, or experimentalist governance. Instead, most governance frameworks include a combination of the features of these theories, which make it hard to put a label on them. Nevertheless, these theories

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provide useful benchmarks with which the governance framework of the 2018 Directive and the Governance Regulation and the 2014 Guidelines can be captured in governance-theoretical terms.

3.3.1 The identity of actors involved

The identity of the actors involved refers to the primary actors involved in the Directives and whether these are public or private actors. The first dimension in which governance frameworks can vary is the identity of the actors involved. In hierarchical governance frameworks, only public actors are involved (Craig & de Búrca, 2015, p. 165). This makes sense, considering the rigid bureaucratic institutional context of hierarchical governance. The actors involved in network governance

frameworks interact in issue networks that are much more flexible. These consist of combinations of public and private actors (Kohler-Koch, 1999, p. 24). In contrast to hierarchical and network

governance, experimentalist governance frameworks are not based upon a divide between public and private. The actors involved in these frameworks can be all public or all private, as well as a combination thereof (Eckert & Börzel, 2012, p. 372).

3.3.2 The level of involvement of central actors

More important than the public-private divide is the divide between central and local actors and how they are involved in the governance framework. In hierarchical governance frameworks, the central actors establish goals and policies in the form of binding legislation. They monitor compliance with the legislation by local actors and enforce implementation with sanctions (Craig & de Búrca, 2015, p. 164). The central actors in hierarchical governance frameworks are the ones that revise the

legislation. Their relationship with local actors is one of “domination and subordination, which significantly constrains the autonomy of [local] actors" (Börzel & Risse, 2010, p. 115). Network governance frameworks allow for more participation and power-sharing than hierarchical

governance does. Central actors both coordinate the governance framework and participate in the policy-making process. They coordinate the establishment of issue-specific networks and make sure the relevant central and local actors are involved. In other words, they "organize the arena for political exchange and agreement" (Kohler-Koch, 1999, p. 24). The central actors are vertically and horizontally segmented, and the part that is involved in the relevant policy area participates in the negotiations with the other (local) actors on an equal footing. Compliance with the agreed outcome is ensured through the shadow of hierarchy mechanism (Kohler-Koch, 1999, p. 24). Similar to network governance frameworks, the central actors in experimentalist governance frameworks also have a cooperative relationship with the local actors. Central actors create the governance

framework and establish goals in collaboration with local actors. They are responsible for coordinating the monitoring, peer reviews and revisions. The central actors ensure compliance

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through the penalty default mechanism. They revise the goals collectively with local actors (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2012, p. 170).

3.3.3 The level of involvement of local actors

The involvement of local actors can vary to a great extent depending on the governance framework. In hierarchical governance frameworks, the local actors consult the central actors when this is possible. They are also tasked with the implementation of policies that are established by the central actors. The local actors are “obligated to adopt more uniform solutions that are conventionally developed less inclusively" (Rangoni, 2019, p. 68). In network governance frameworks, the local actors are much more involved in the policy-making process. They participate in negotiations and implement the policies that are jointly agreed upon. There is a great degree of power-sharing; the local actors negotiate with other local actors and central actors on an equal footing. Local actors are involved in the negotiations based on subsidiarity: they are the ones affected by the resulting policies and their support is needed for implementation (Kohler-Koch, 1999, p. 24). In experimentalist

governance frameworks, the local actors establish goals in collaboration with central actors. In the implementation of policies, they are given some discretion. In return, they have to participate in peer reviews to compare their approach with that of others. Together with the central actors, they revise the goals periodically (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2012, p. 170).

3.3.4 The content

A governance framework can have different forms of content. In hierarchical governance

frameworks, the content is binding legislation and uniform prescriptive policies; it does not leave much room for discretion for the implementing actors. It also contains sanctions in case of non-compliance (Craig & de Búrca, 2015, p. 164). The content of network governance frameworks does not contain sanctions. These governance frameworks are based on soft law. This means the agreed outcome is not binding for the implementing actors; adherence to it is voluntary (Héritier, 2002, p. 186). In experimentalist governance frameworks, the content consists of goals and indicators to measure the achievement of goals (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2012, p. 169). Specific policies are not included. Experimentalist governance frameworks are not necessarily voluntaristic, like network governance frameworks. Instead, they can be established through legislation and they can involve legal commitments to the outcome of the policy-making process.

3.3.5 The policy-making process

The policy-making process is structured differently in each governance framework. In hierarchical governance frameworks, central actors initiate and adopt binding legislation after having consulted the local actors. The legislation is only revised when this is deemed necessary by central actors (Craig

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& de Búrca, 2015, p. 165). The policy-making process in network governance frameworks involves negotiations in a specific issue network. All actors, central and local, public and private, interact on an equal footing in these networks. During the negotiations, the actors involved take the common interest into account when pursuing their individual interests. Their interests can evolve and be redefined during the negotiation process. There is a large incentive to behave in a friendly way towards other negotiating actors in network governance frameworks since the goal of the negotiations is to achieve consensus on policy and to equally distribute its benefits (Kohler-Koch, 1999, p. 24). The policy-making process in experimentalist governance frameworks is more structured than that in network governance frameworks and involves following four steps. First, framework goals and the indicators to measure them are collectively established by central and local actors. Second, the local actors implement the policies that they see fit to achieve the established goals. Third, the local actors then participate in peer reviews to compare the other actors’

approaches with theirs. Fourth, the framework goals and the indicators to measure them are revised periodically by the central and local actors. This last step provides the input for another round of implementation, peer review, and revision (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008, pp. 273-274).

3.3.6 The nature and role of sanctions

Sanctions are often used to ensure that the actors involved keep their promises and that the established goals will be achieved, but they come in different forms. Hierarchical governance frameworks involve the use of sanctions that are precise and ex-ante defined. They are used by central actors to enforce the implementation of legislation. In network governance frameworks, the outcome of the negotiations is binding soft law; therefore there are no formal sanctions for non-compliance. Reputational damage could be considered a sanctioning instrument in network

governance frameworks. In addition, a mechanism called the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ that induces the local actors to adhere to the agreed outcome of the negotiations. In the shadow of hierarchy, central actors can threaten to take executive or legislative action if other (local) actors do not change their behavior in ways that meet the central actor's demands and comply with the soft law that was established (Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2008, p. 2). In experimentalist governance frameworks, there are also no sanctions in the traditional sense. Instead, the penalty default mechanism induces local actors to participate in joint problem-solving and respect agreed outcomes. The penalty default typically takes the form of a threat to take away the control from lower-level actors by resorting to more traditional measures, such as court judgments or Commission decisions. This threat is supposed to incentivize these actors to cooperate with others in framework rulemaking and to respect the outcome of this process (Rangoni & Zeitlin, 2020, p. 2). These measures are known to have unpredictable consequences (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2012, p. 176), making cooperation in framework

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rule-making the more appealing option. This penalty default mechanism differs from the shadow of hierarchy because the latter involves the central actors taking back the regulatory powers that were previously delegated to the local actors in case of regulatory failure (Héritier, 2002, p. 194; Bartolini, 2011, p. 8, as cited in Rangoni & Zeitlin, 2020, p. 2). While the shadow of hierarchy mechanism relies on public actors, the penalty default can also be created by non-state actors. An example of this is a consumer boycott in transnational governance (de Búrca, Keohane & Sabel, 2014, p. 479, as cited in Rangoni & Zeitlin 2020, p. 2).

3.3.7 The institutional context

The institutional context of a governance framework is of great importance to its functioning. The highest degree of institutionalization exists in hierarchical governance frameworks. These

frameworks follow rigid bureaucratic procedures embedded in treaties or constitutions. Because of the control the central actors want to exert, the governance framework is relatively closed to new participants. In network governance frameworks, the institutionalization is low. Issue-specific networks can be established ad hoc and are open to new participants in the policy-making process. The framework is established when it is needed for problem-solving and dismantled when it is no longer necessary (Kohler-Koch, 1999, p. 24). If the situation requires many rounds of negotiations or a long term commitment from the actors involved, institutionalization can increase over time. The institutionalization of experimentalist governance frameworks is somewhere in between. Their process with four specific steps to be taken makes experimentalist governance frameworks more structured than network governance ones. However, the institutional design of this process can vary from case to case, which makes it more flexible (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2012, p. 169). It is relatively open to new participants.

3.3.8 The mode of implementation

The mode of implementation tells a lot about governance frameworks. In hierarchical governance frameworks, legislation is implemented by the local actors, often in the form of uniform policies (Craig & de Búrca, 2015, p. 164). The implementation of the agreed outcome in network governance happens by horizontal self-regulation by private actors or co-regulation by private and public actors (Héritier, 2002, p. 186). In experimentalist governance frameworks, the local actors are given some policy discretion, regardless of whether they are public or private. In return, they have to participate in peer reviews to compare their approach with that of others. When peers conclude that one of the actors is not making enough progress towards achieving the common goals, that actor has to

propose ways to improve using the experiences of its peers (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2012, p. 170).

). ( (H éritie r, 2002, p. 19 4) (Ba rtolini, 2011, p. 8) as cited in (Rangoni & Zeitli n, 2020, p. 2) ) ( (de Bú rca, Keohane, & Sabel, G lobal expe rimentalis t gove rnance, 201 4, p. 479) as cited in ( Rangoni & Zeitlin, 2020, p. 2)

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Table 1: The typical features of hierarchical, network and experimentalist governance per governance dimension

Hierarchical governance Network governance Experimentalist governance

Identity of actors involved

• Only public actors • Public and private actors • Public and/or private actors Level of

involvement of central actors

Central actors

• Establish goals, legislation, and policies

• Monitor compliance by local actors

• Enforce implementation with sanctions

• Revise

Central actors

• Coordinate the governance framework

• Participate in the negotiations with local actors on an equal footing • Ensure compliance through the shadow of hierarchy mechanism

Central actors

• Create the governance framework • Establish goals in collaboration with

local actors

• Coordinate monitoring, peer reviews and revisions

• Ensure compliance through the penalty default mechanism

• Revise goals periodically in collaboration with local actors Level of

involvement of local actors

Local actors

• Consult central actors when necessary

• Implement policies established by central actors

Local actors

• Participate in the negotiations with central actors on an equal footing • Implement the policies that are

jointly agreed upon

Local actors

• Establish goals in collaboration with central actors

• Implement policies with some discretion

• Participate in peer reviews to compare own approach with others

• Revise goals periodically in collaboration with central actors

Content • Binding legislation

• Uniform prescriptive policies • Sanctions in case of

non-compliance

• Soft law

• Rules for self-regulation • Public regulation

• Goals

• Indicators to measure the achievement of goals

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process

• Central actors initiate and adopt binding legislation after

consultation of local actors • The legislation is revised when

deemed necessary by central actors

• Central and local actors negotiate on equal footing in a specific issue network

• Interests evolve and are redefined during the negotiation process • Common interest is taken into

account and there is friendly behavior among the actors involved

• The goal of the negotiations is to achieve consensus on policy and to distribute its benefits

• Central and local actors collectively establish goals

• Goals are revised based on the

problems and solutions revealed by the review process

Nature and role of sanctions

• Precise and ex-ante defined sanctions to enforce

implementation of legislation

• No sanctions

• Shadow of hierarchy

• Penalty default mechanism induces local actors to participate in joint problem-solving and respect agreed outcomes

Institutional context • High institutionalization • Rigid bureaucratic procedures • Follows the logic of the Classic

Community Method

• Less open to new participants

• Low institutionalization

• Institutionalization can increase over time

• A framework is established when needed for problem-solving

• A framework is dismantled when no longer necessary

• Medium institutionalization

• A recursive process with specific steps to be taken but the institutional design can vary

• More open to new participants

Mode of

implementation

• Implementation of legislation and uniform policies by local actors

• Horizontal self-regulation or public regulation

• Policy discretion for local actors subject to peer review

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4. Research design

In the previous section, the governance theories and dimensions that serve as the theoretical framework were discussed. This section explains the research design and begins with the motivation behind choosing the EU renewable energy regime as the case of this study. Then, the research questions are specified and the case study method is explained. This section ends with a specification of the data coming from official documents and elite interviews.

4.1 Case selection

The case selected for this study is the EU renewable energy regime. This regime encompasses two policy areas: EU renewable energy policy and EU policy on state aid for renewable energy. These policy areas are connected because of their common objective of promoting renewable energy and because of the influence they have on each other. Renewable energy policy sets the renewable energy targets, while policy on state aid for renewable energy sets conditions for the use of state aid – the only viable instrument that Member States have to promote the use of energy. It is of value to examine these policies in more detail since their (possible) effects are not fully understood yet. Especially in a time when the urgency of climate change mitigation is increasing, it is of public interest to understand the changes made to the governance framework of the renewable energy regime and the effects of these changes. It is important to understand the functioning of EU policies as they are essential for the promotion of renewable energy: while energy policy is traditionally considered a national competence, effective climate change mitigation requires international cooperation. Renewable energy policy and policy on state aid for renewable energy operate on that divide between national sovereignty and international cooperation and harmonization. Next to the intrinsic value of understanding the changes made to the governance of the renewable energy regime and their effects, it allows for better predictions regarding the implications of future changes. This is the reason why an assessment of the governance framework of the renewable energy regime not only contributes to the literature on governance theories as explained in the theoretical

framework but also to policy-making efforts.

4.2 Contribution to the literature

Empirical evidence of features of either hierarchical, network or experimentalist governance in the renewable energy regime can strengthen the validity of these theories. Observations of hierarchical, network or experimentalist governance or a lack thereof can make or break a theory. An increase in observations of one of these theories can strengthen its explanatory power. In addition, with empirical evidence, variations on a governance theory can be identified. Examples of variations on

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network and experimentalist governance are network governance under the shadow of hierarchy (Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2008), or stumbling into experimentalism (de Búrca, 2010), respectively. Existing studies like the ones by Eberlein (2010), Knodt (2019), Ringel and Knodt (2018) and Veum and Bauknecht (2019) that seek to capture the changes made to the renewable energy regime fail to cover all the dimensions of governance frameworks and additionally exclude the role of policy on state aid for renewable energy. Furthermore, their assessment of the governance framework of the renewable energy regime is limited to network governance and does not take into account the idea of governance theories as a spectrum. The research in this thesis covers the eight dimensions of governance frameworks and include an assessment of policy on state aid for renewable energy. It assesses the governance framework of the renewable energy regime using the theories of

hierarchical, network and experimentalist governance. In the assessment, the governance framework is positioned on a spectrum, since it is usually not designed exactly like the ideal type of governance theories. Instead, governance frameworks often contain features linked to multiple governance theories at the same time.

4.3 Research questions

Considering the societal and academic relevance of an assessment of the governance frameworks of the renewable energy regime and the changes made to these frameworks, and the gap that exists in the existing literature, the following research question is answered:

1. How has the EU renewable energy regime changed and how do these changes (possibly) affect its functioning?

The research question mentions the possible effects of changes, because some elements of the 2014 Guidelines, the 2018 Directive and the Governance Regulation have not been employed yet.

Since the renewable energy regime encompasses two separate but connected policy areas with different governance frameworks, the analysis in this thesis consists of two sections. The first is about EU renewable energy policy and assesses the governance frameworks of the 2009 Directive and the changes made through the 2018 Directive and the Governance Regulation. The following sub-questions are answered in section 5:

2. How can the 2009 Directive be characterized in governance-theoretical terms? 3. How can the changes made by the 2018 Directive and the Governance Regulation be

characterized in governance-theoretical terms? 4. What are the (possible) effects of these changes?

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The second section is about EU policy on state aid for renewable energy and assesses the governance frameworks of the 2008 Guidelines and the changes made through the 2014 Guidelines. There are several differences between the two Guidelines. To fully grasp the changes and their implications, the sub-questions for this section are as follows:

5. How can the 2008 Guidelines be characterized in governance-theoretical terms? 6. How can the changes made by the 2014 Guidelines be characterized in

governance-theoretical terms?

7. What are the (possible) effects of these changes?

4.4 Case study method

These leading questions are answered by conducting a case study. The case study is a method widely used in political science research and allows for a more comprehensive study of one particular case. While the increased understanding of context and processes gives case studies a high internal validity, the fact that it only studies one case leaves it with low external validity. The theories of hierarchical governance, network governance, and experimentalist governance are the ideal types that are used to understand the empirics of the governance frameworks of the EU renewable energy regime and how it is similar to or diverges from these theories.

4.5 Data sources

Data is drawn from official documents and elite interviews to get a thorough understanding of the renewable energy regime. The official documents include policy documents, responses to public consultations and impact assessments. For section 5 on the analysis of renewable energy policy, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a policy officer from the unit Renewables, Research and Innovation, Energy Efficiency of the Directorate-General (DG) Energy of the European

Commission (Annex 2). For section 6 on the analysis of policy on state aid for renewable energy, semi-structured interviews were performed with a policy officer and a deputy head of a subunit from the unit Markets and cases 1: Energy and environment of the DG Competition (Annex 4 and 5, respectively). For both sections, interviews were conducted with two employees from the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy: a head of unit national climate policy (Appendix 7) and a senior policy officer Energy SDE+ (Appendix 8). These interviews mainly served as guidance for the research and as clarification of the findings based on documentary research. In order to make this thesis replicable, the set of questions on which the semi-structured interviews were based can be found in Appendices 1, 3 and 6.

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5. Governance of EU renewable energy policy

In this section, the governance of EU renewable energy policy is assessed. EU renewable energy policy is, along with policy on state aid for renewable energy, part of the EU renewable energy regime. The main documents of EU renewable energy policy are the 2009 Directive and the 2018 Directive. A Directive is a “legislative act that sets out a goal that all EU countries must achieve” (European Union, 2019). In the case of the Directives on renewable energy, the goal is the promotion of the use of renewable energy sources, quantified as a percentage share of the energy mix of the EU as a whole or of separate Member States. The 2018 Directive is adopted along with the Governance Regulation that is also a subject of study. The Regulation is not only linked to the 2018 Directive, but also to the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (European Parliament and the Council, 2018) and the revised Energy Efficiency Directive (European Parliament and the Council, 2018). It aims to integrate and simplify the different existing requirements on planning, reporting and monitoring (Council of the EU, 2018).

The eight governance dimensions of the 2009 Directive are assessed in the first part of this section. In the second part, the changes that were made to this framework with the adoption of the 2018 Directive and the Governance Regulation, and their (possible) effects are assessed.

5.1 The identity of actors involved under the 2009 Directive

The European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council and the Member States are the primary actors involved in the Directives. Other actors that play a less significant role in the Directives are the Committee of the Regions (CoR), the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), national parliaments, interest organizations and large corporations . These are not considered to be among the primary actors involved in the Directives, because they can only indirectly influence the policy-making process.

5.1.1 The identity of actors involved under the 2009 Directive in governance-theoretical terms

The fact that all the primary actors that are involved in the Directives are public actors is a typical hierarchical feature. The exclusive participation of public actors can occur in experimentalist governance frameworks as well, but in these cases, it would be the result of a disregard for the division between public actors and private actors. In hierarchical governance frameworks, the exclusion of private actors is a deliberate choice. In the case of the Directives, the choice to only include public actors in the policy-making process is also a deliberate one. This choice is made because the subject matter of the Directives significantly affects private actors like (renewable) energy producers. These private actors have vested interest in the outcome of the policy-making process, and their positioning would be based in large part on short-term economic grounds. The

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urgency of climate change mitigation, however, requires a long-term vision based on solidarity and environmentalism. Therefore, this governance dimension is most similar to hierarchical governance.

5.2 The level of involvement of central actors under the 2009 Directive

The primary central actors involved in the 2009 Directive are the Commission, the Parliament and the Council. The level of involvement of the Commission is relatively high. For both Directives, it has used its right to initiate the policy-making process by drafting a proposal and sending it to the Parliament and the Council. During the negotiations between the Parliament and the Council following the finalization of the proposal, the Commission acts as a mediator. It ensures that the possible amendments made by one of the parties is acceptable to the other, to avoid a deadlock during negotiations. After adoption, the Commission oversees the submission of the national renewable energy plans and progress reports. It can sanction Member States by launching infringement procedures in case of non-compliance. Lastly, the Commission is tasked with the revision of the Directives. The Parliament and the Council are the two legislators involved in the 2009 Directive. They have the right to amend, adopt or reject a proposal for legislation drafted by the Commission. This usually takes place in a series of readings open to the public, in which the Parliament and the Council send the proposal back and forth until they reach an agreement on its content. In the case of the 2009 Directive and the 2018 Directive, however, this process was bypassed by informal tripartite meetings called trialogues. This meant that the negotiations between the Parliament and the Council mediated by the Commission happened behind closed doors (European Parliament, 2020). Before making their decision on a proposal, the Parliament and the Council have to consult the CoR and the EESC (EU Monitor, 2020). After adoption of the legislation, the involvement of the Parliament and the Council ends.

5.2.1 The level of involvement of central actors under the 2009 Directive in

governance-theoretical terms

The level of involvement of central actors in the Directives contains many hierarchical features and one experimentalist feature. It resembles hierarchical governance frameworks because the central actors establish goals and policies in the form of binding legislation, they monitor compliance and enforce implementation with sanctions. One experimentalist feature can be identified; the Directives are established in collaboration with local actors. These local actors, the Member States, are

represented in the Council. The Council, in turn, can amend, approve or reject a proposal by the Commission. Since the local actors only have an indirect influence, they cannot participate on an equal footing with the central actors, as would be the case in a network governance framework. This

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leads to the conclusion that this governance dimension is predominantly hierarchical with one experimentalist feature.

5.3 The level of involvement of local actors under the 2009 Directive

The primary local actors are the Member States. Other relevant local actors are energy producers, their interest organizations and NGOs. Along with the Member States, these actors are asked to express their position on drafts of the Directives in public consultations organized by the

Commission. More informally, stakeholders can lobby to put their positions forward through the national governments or Members of Parliament, who can convey that message in the Council and the Parliament, respectively (Interview with policy officer at DG ENER, 2020). Often stakeholders will try to lobby for their position early in the process during the development of the proposal (Gullberg, 2013, p. 612). In this stage, they will only have to influence a handful of bureaucrats in the

Commission. In a later stage, lobbying involves influencing the bureaucrats and politicians of 28 Member States, something that requires much more resources and a well-developed network. That is why many interest organizations decided to coordinate their efforts by collaborating under the European Renewable Energy Council (Ydersbond, 2012, p. 64). While these local actors are found to have the capacity for information-based lobbying, they lack pressure-based lobbying capacity (Gullberg, 2013, p. 612). This means that these actors can only lobby by transmitting information, without the possibility of threatening with punishments or rewards (Gullberg, 2013, p. 614).

5.3.1 The level of involvement of local actors under the 2009 Directive in

governance-theoretical terms

The level of involvement of local actors in the 2009 Directive has hierarchical as well as

experimentalist aspects. The local actors consult the central actors during public consultations and they implement the legislation established by the central actors. There are, however, two elements that make the governance framework a bit more experimentalist. First, the Member States are the actors that created the governance frameworks of the Directives, since they established the Treaties that stipulate the relevant procedures. Second, the Member States can influence the policy-making process through their representation in the Council. However, they cannot negotiate on an equal footing with the Parliament and the Commission as would be the case in a network governance framework. This is because the Council takes one position, which is a compromise between the positions of 28 Member States. Therefore, it can be concluded that this governance dimension is a mix of hierarchical and experimentalist features.

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5.4 The content under the 2009 Directive

The most important content of the 2009 Directive are the mandatory national overall targets and measures for the use of energy from renewable sources (Article 3); national renewable energy action plans (NREAPs, Article 4); and guarantees of origin (GOs, Article 15) (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2009).

The EU-wide renewable energy target of the 2009 Directive is 20 percent. This means that 20 percent of the total energy needs of the EU has to be fulfilled with renewable energy by 2020. In addition to the EU-wide target, the 2009 Directive establishes nationally binding targets. These targets differ per Member State and take into account their initial use of renewable energy and the potential they have to increase that use. These targets range from 10 percent for Malta to 49 percent in Sweden (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2009). The height of this target was based on two elements: the progress that that Member State had made up to that point and its gross domestic product (GDP). The calculation based on GDP was necessary because of the relatively high cost of renewable energy sources at the time. Member States with a higher GDP had more financial means to support renewable energy sources (Interview with policy officer at DG ENER, 2020).

The 2009 Directive requires Member States to draft National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs) and explain how they intend to meet their nationally binding renewable energy target. In these plans, the Member States have to include, amongst other things, the renewable energy technologies they plan to use and the policy measures that they plan to take on a local, regional, and national level (European Commission, 2020). Using these national reports, the Commission writes a report that gives an overview of the developments in all Member States (European Commission, 2020).

Article 15 of the 2009 Directive enables Member States to issue Guarantees of Origin (GOs) to energy producers. These GOs are proof that a certain amount of energy is produced from renewable energy sources. This provision has helped to create a voluntary consumer-driven market for renewable energy and increased the transparency of renewable energy production (CE Delft, Ecologic Institute, Ricardo-AEA, REKK, E-Bridge, 2015, p. 27). The 2009 Directive does not require Member States to use the GO system. To facilitate mutual recognition of GOs, Member States have established the

Association of Issuing Bodies (AIB). Since not all Member States are members of the AIB and use the European Energy Certificate System (EECS) instead, international trade in GOs is suboptimal.

Furthermore, the GOs are traded separately from the physical flows of renewable energy (Roldán, 2019, p. 20). This creates skepticism among consumers since electricity suppliers can offer renewable energy without being physically connected with a renewable energy producer. Another issue with

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the GOs is that they were incompatible with support schemes. The 2018 Directive improved on this and ensured that renewable energy producers could receive state aid while also receiving GOs. It does not, however, solve the other issues with GOs.

5.4.1 The content under the 2009 Directive in governance-theoretical terms

The content of the 2009 Directive is similar to that of an experimentalist governance network. The 2009 Directive includes binding legislation in the form of renewable energy targets. This does not resemble the content of a network governance framework, which would only include non-binding soft law. Binding legislation can occur in hierarchical and experimentalist governance frameworks. However, in hierarchical governance frameworks, binding legislation includes uniform, prescriptive policies, which is not the case in the 2009 Directive. The local actors have discretion in the policies that they choose to implement to achieve the renewable energy target of the 2009 Directive, like in experimentalist governance frameworks. Another experimentalist feature is the inclusion of

indicators to measure the achievement of goals. Under the 2009 Directive, the renewable energy target serves as the indicator to measure the achievement of the goal of promoting the use of renewable energy. Therefore, this governance dimension most closely resembles that of experimentalist governance networks.

5.5 The policy-making process under the 2009 Directive

Similar to most EU laws, the ordinary legislative procedure is followed in the policy-making process of the Directives. It starts with the drafting of a proposal by the Commission, during which most

disagreements are already sorted out before it is published (Eikeland, 2012, p. 84). The Commission consults many national and European interest groups, public and private, who all publish their proposals. Discussions and debates between experts and analysts make sure that all the possible positions that could be taken during the negotiations in the Council are taken into account in the proposal. The Commission investigates which parts of the Directives may be controversial and tries to reach a compromise between the possible positions the Council, the Parliament and other

stakeholders can take. The proposal made by the Commission recommended the Council to set multiple targets for 2030. Recommendations on the height and the type of these targets were also included (Fitch-Roy & Fairbrass, 2018, p. v). The proposal is then submitted to the Parliament and the Council, who review and possibly amend the text. The standard way to do this is via a series of readings. After the first reading in Parliament in which it can make amendments, the proposal is sent to the Council. The Council can also amend the proposal in its first reading, in that case the proposal is sent back to the Parliament for a second reading. If the Parliament and the Council do not agree at the second reading either, a conciliation committee is set up. This committee consists of

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following negotiations in this committee, the text is sent to the Parliament and the Council for a third reading. If the co-legislators still do not agree, the proposal is dropped and the law will not be

adopted. However, the French Presidency of the Council decided in 2008 not to follow the ordinary legislative procedure and to enter into negotiations with Parliament in a so-called trialogue

(Skjaerseth & Wettestad, 2010). As explained in the paragraph on the level of involvement of central actors, trialogues are negotiations between the Council, the Parliament and the Commission that are organized before the first reading takes place. They are informal, which means that they happen behind closed doors and that no notes are taken. If an agreement is reached, the proposal can easily be adopted in the first reading. The amount of trialogues that are being organized has been

increasing steadily since 2004 (Nielsen, 2017).

5.5.1 The policy-making process under the 2009 Directive in governance-theoretical terms

The policy-making process under the 2009 Directive, also called the ordinary legislative procedure, most closely resembles a hierarchical governance framework. In this process, central actors initiate, adopt and revise binding legislation after having consulted the local actors. It is the Commission that initiates legislation and the Parliament and the Council that adopt it. The Commission is in charge of ultimately revising the legislation, which is binding in both the 2009 Directive (binding national targets) and the Governance Regulation that was adopted along with the 2018 Directive (binding planning and reporting requirements). As mentioned in the paragraph on the level of involvement of local actors, Member States do not negotiate on the Directive on equal footing with the central actors. While Member States are represented in the Council, the position taken by the Council is always a compromise of 28 Member States. Therefore, this governance dimension follows the logic of hierarchical governance.

5.6 The nature and role of sanctions under the 2009 Directive

In addition to an EU-wide renewable energy target of 20 percent, the 2009 Directive specifies nationally binding targets. The infringement procedure, specified in Articles 258 and 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, is used as the primary instrument to ensure compliance with these nationally binding targets. In practice, the binding force of the targets of the 2009 Directive is questionable. It has been characterized as “a mix of more or less unenforceable obligations, hiding behind a façade of mandatory compliance” (Johnston & van der Marel, 2016, p. 176). The Netherlands, for example, has been failing to meet its national target under the 2009 Directive but continues to be unsanctioned for it (Interview with policy officer at DG ENER, 2020). Moreover, the infringement procedure takes a long time; it has an average duration of 38.1 months (European Commission, 2018). Eurostat provides the data needed for the infringement procedures and there is a two-year delay before the data is received, which significantly slows down the process

Changing with the times: a case study of the governance of the EU renewable energy regime