The Transatlantic Relationship after the US Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal

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The Transatlantic Relationship after the US

Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal

University of Amsterdam

Graduate School of Social Sciences

MSc Thesis Political Science: Political Economy

Conflict: Political Economy, Colonial Legacy and Foreign Policy

Date: June 25, 2020

Eline W. Jansen Supervisor: Dr. Said Rezaeiejan 12661929 Second Reader: Dr. Mehdi P. Amineh

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses the consequences of the US unilateral withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal on both the security and economic level of the transatlantic relationship. In May of 2018, the United States decided to step out of the Iran nuclear deal, also known as the JCPOA, and re-impose extraterritorial economic sanctions on Iran. The deal is a major international diplomatic achievement for the parties involved (the US, the EU plus the E3, China, Russia and Iran). This is why Trump’s decision to step out of the deal has affected the level of trust of the EU in the transatlantic partnership. The US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal is a good case study to show the diverging trend in the transatlantic alliance. It clearly demonstrates how the US and EU differ in their foreign policies, as the US has implemented a ‘maximum pressure’ strategy towards Iran, whereas the EU prefers more diplomatic strategies. The foreign policy differences will be laid out against the background of theoretical role concepts. Regarding the EU, the focus is on Normative Power Europe and Market Power Europe. For the US, the four foreign policy traditions (Jacksonian, Jeffersonian, Wilsonian, Hamiltonian) will be analysed. The transatlantic security relation will be analysed by focussing on the current tensions between the US and Iran in the Middle East and the impact of these tensions on the stability of the region, as well as on the security of Europe. For the transatlantic economic relation, the focus is on the impact of the US secondary sanctions on the EU-Iran trade relation. Furthermore, the EU’s dependency on the US market is emphasised. The results show that, in terms of security, the US unilateral decision has increased instability in the Middle East and has affected the global coalition in the fight against terrorist organisations. On the economic level, the US withdrawal from the deal and the re-imposed secondary sanctions have been a wake-up call for the EU to become less dependent on the US market. As a response to this realisation, the EU has implemented mechanisms to decrease its dependency on the US. This shows cracks in the transatlantic economic relationship and has diminished the levels of trust by the EU Member States in the US as a trustworthy partner. The thesis, however, also shows the dependency of the US and the EU on each other and the unlikeliness for the alliance to break down. As the thesis focuses only on the indicators most relevant for this research, future studies can incorporate other indicators to create an even more elaborate outline of the current transatlantic security and economic relation.

Keywords: transatlantic relationship - Iran nuclear deal - foreign policy – geopolitics - security – economics

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I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Said Rezaeiejan, for his guidance and critical perspective during the process of writing this thesis. He has motivated me to think critically and to improve my theoretical skills. I have enjoyed the process of writing this thesis and appreciate his support. Also, I would like to thank the second reader, Dr. Mehdi P. Amineh, for his time and effort in reading and assessing this thesis.

Eline Jansen

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ABBREVIATIONS

AQAP al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula E3 France, Germany, the United Kingdom EEAS EU External Action Service

EIA US Energy Information Administration EU European Union

EU/E4 European Union, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

HR/VP High Representative/ Vice President IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IEA International Energy Agency

INSTEX Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanged IOC International Oil Company

IR International Relations

IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action MPE Market Power Europe

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NPE Normative Power Europe

OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

P5+1 China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany SPV Special Purpose Vehicle

SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication TCA Trade and Cooperation Agreement

UN United Nations US United States

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The transatlantic relationship is one of the most powerful and most important alliances in the world. This is why it is of great importance to foster this relation and prevent it from breaking apart. The relationship has survived multiple crises. The complex security and economic relationship, as well as the shared threat perception is what has always helped the alliance to work. However, in recent years the level of cooperation has been questioned frequently. United States President Donald Trump’s unpredictable and sometimes even hostile attitude towards his European allies is claimed to be unprecedent (Kanat, 2018, p.77). The European support for an American president has, therefore not surprisingly, seen a historical low since Trump took office. The current US foreign interests are conflicting with those of the EU on many issue areas, including climate change, migration, trade agreements and non-proliferation (Wickett, 2018, p.iv). The focus of this thesis will be on the transatlantic differences in terms of dealing with Iran. This thesis will concentrate on the Iran nuclear deal and what the US’ unilateral decision to step out of the deal has meant for the transatlantic relationship on security and economic level. Both allies want to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon and both want to preserve stability in the Middle East. They, however, have different strategies and tools in order to achieve these goals. This is concerning, because cooperation between the two allies to approach Middle Eastern issues is of huge importance in order to achieve global security.

In the case of Iran, the biggest concern for the transatlantic allies is the country developing a nuclear weapon. Which is why a lot of effort has been made to prevent this from happening. After twelve years of negotiations, an agreement was established in July 2015 involving France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the EU, Russia, China, the US (P5 +1) on the one side and Iran on the other side. This agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)1_{or simply the Iran nuclear deal, holds that Iran limits its nuclear activities}

to a level where it is unable to make a nuclear weapon (Oppermann & Spencer, 2018, p.268-269). The activities are monitored and verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency

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(IAEA)2_{, who then reports back to the other actors involved in the agreement. In return, most}

of the economic sanctions that were imposed on Iran by the US, the EU and the UN are lifted. This makes Iran able to trade with western economies again and become more involved with the international system (Cronberg, 2017, p.251; Fitzpatrick, 2019, p.21-22). Since the deal’s conception, there have been political debates about whether it is a success or a failure. While former US president Barack Obama and the European actors involved see the deal as a very important achievement and as the strongest non-proliferation agreement ever negotiated, the Trump administration has a very different opinion (Oppermann & Spencer, 2018, p.269). On several occasions, Trump has called the deal a “horrible, one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made” (Trump, 2018b). This is why, on May 8th_{2018, Trump announced the}

US’ unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran (Ibid). The withdrawal from the deal was accompanied by the re-imposition of secondary economic sanctions.3_{These sanctions cut}

off every company that is involved in doing business with Iran from the US market and financial system. This also affects European companies, who have to choose between the Iranian economy or the biggest economy in the world (Geranmayeh, 2017, p.4). The European allies have been disappointed with the US decision to step out of the nuclear deal, as it is the most important diplomatic foreign policy achievement of the EU and a key mechanism to negotiate other regional issues that Iran is involved in. This is why the US decision to withdraw has led to serious tensions and shows lack of unity between the transatlantic allies (Schwammenthal, 2018, p.218). To investigate what the exact consequences have been of the US withdrawal on both the security and economic level, the thesis will answer the following research question:

What has the US unilateral withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018 meant for the transatlantic relationship in terms of security and economic implications?

2_{The IAEA is an autonomic international organization, seeking to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy.}

The organization reports its findings on countries nuclear activities to the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. It provides safeguards against the misuse of nuclear technology and nuclear material. For more information see the IAES website: https://www.iaea.org/

3_{The US secondary sanctions are relating to Iran’s trade in gold, automotive sector, petroleum and energy sector.}

Firms outside the US who have any US exposure and continue doing business with Iran in violation of the sanctions receive major fines and/or criminal charges in the US. Foreign companies who continue trade with Iran can be cut off from the US banking and financial systems.

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The period that the thesis focuses on begins at the moment the US withdrew from the deal in May 2018 until the current situation of June 2020. Data from the period before the US withdrawal from the deal when it was implemented in 2015 is also used in order to see the differences compared to after the US withdrawal. The thesis focuses on the case study of Iran and the Iran nuclear deal, because it highlights the sharp contrast in the current foreign policies of the transatlantic allies. Looking at the responses to Trump’s decision to withdraw from the deal gives an understanding of how this unilateral action has influenced the transatlantic relationship. Moreover, focusing on the US and EU foreign policies towards the Middle East and especially towards Iran gives a good impression of the transatlantic relationship in general. Iran has a lot of influence in the Middle Eastern region. The country is involved, either directly or indirectly, in the majority of the current occurring conflicts in the region. Due to Iran’s key role in the stability of the Middle East, it demands a lot of attention (van Leeuwen, 2018). The thesis focuses on security and economic implications as these are the main components incorporated on in the Iran nuclear deal.

As the research question is very topical, not much has been written yet about the actual consequences of the US withdrawal on the transatlantic relation in terms of security and economics. Most scientific research so far has focused on the deal itself or on the impact of it on the relationship between the US and Iran. When focusing on the security implications, the emphasis will be on the current evolvement of the conflict between the US and Iran in the Gulf region that started in 2019, as well as on the proxy wars that Iran is involved in in the region.4_{Instability in the Middle East also has consequences for its neighbouring region}

Europe.5_{Differences in foreign policies can therefore negatively affect security cooperation}

between the transatlantic partners. In terms of the economic implications focus will be on the impact of the secondary sanctions on the EU-Iran trade relation and on the EU’s reaction to the US extraterritorial application of these sanctions. The impact that these sanctions have on European companies have made the EU realise how dependent it is on the US market and the dollar. The combination of both security and economic implications makes the research topic

4_{A proxy war is an armed conflict between states or non-state actors who fight on behalf of a party not directly}

involved in the conflict. Iran is indirectly involved in multiple conflicts in the Middle East, including in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, through the support of states and non-state militia groups. This support usually takes the form of funding, military training, arms, or other military assistance.

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scientifically relevant. The study fills a scientific gap as it combines the most recent available data on the current tensions in the Middle East with the theoretical outline of EU and US foreign policies to explain how their different strategies are affecting the transatlantic alliance. Theorizing their foreign policies helps to clarify and comprehend the different characteristics of their approach. Knowledge on this topic is also politically relevant, because a strong transatlantic alliance is of great importance in order to stimulate effective cooperation in the Middle East. The US decision to withdraw from the deal has political impact, as it may change the EU’s political strategy.

The next chapter will outline the current debate about the opinions concerning Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and what this means for the transatlantic relationship. The chapter will be divided between those in favour of the US withdrawal and those opposed to this unilateral decision. In the third chapter a theoretical framework will be created to outline the characteristics of EU and US foreign policy. The section on EU foreign policy will focus on role concepts to explain EU foreign strategies, including Normative Power Europe and Market Power Europe. The US section will focus on the four traditions of US foreign policy (Jacksonian, Jeffersonian, Wilsonian and Hamiltonian), in order to better understand its strategy towards Iran. Furthermore, four main concepts (power, trust, security and economics) necessary to answer the research question will be conceptualized in this chapter. In the fourth chapter the methodology will be displayed, describing the research process. It will lay out the data and variables that will be used in the research. The fifth chapter is the analysis in order to provide the answer to the research question. Lastly, the thesis will close with a conclusion and recommendations for possible future research.

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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

In order to answer the research question, it is necessary to look at the existing debate first. The literature review will discuss what has been said about the Iran nuclear deal, as well as what the response have been towards Trump’s decision to withdraw from the deal, and its implications on transatlantic relations.

The literature review includes the scholars Norell and Gerecht, as well as scholar and former government official Kroenig to show the arguments made against the JCPOA. Furthermore, arguments made by current US government officials, including president Trump, are used. The deal is said to have many shortcomings. Furthermore, the lifting of sanctions under the deal have increased Iran’s resources, which are said to be invested in Iran’s regional militia groups, increasing its influence in the region. This is argued to cause more instability in the Middle East. The US withdrawal from the deal is justified by the fact that containing Iran through deterrence and economic sanctions is more effective than through diplomatic means. The transatlantic relation is believed to be damaged, but this is not so much due to the fact that the US unilaterally decided to step out, but rather because the EU is not following US strategy and is implementing mechanisms to attempt to become less dependent on the US economy.

The scholars included in the literature review who argue in favour of the JCPOA and against US withdrawal from the deal are Mearsheimer, Welt, Fitzpatrick, Rezaei, Cronberg, Geranmayeh, Valášek, Sokolsky and Miller, and the International Crisis Group. They argue that the JCPOA helps to prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon, as Iran has thus far always complied with its end of the deal. The decision of the US to withdraw from the deal is said to not only increase tension in the Middle East, but also between the transatlantic allies. The EU’s trust in the US as a reliable partner has been diminished. The two actors clash on their Iran strategy, because they have very different goals and tools to achieve these goals.

Below, the thesis will elaborate systematically on these different arguments concerning the impact of the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal on the transatlantic security

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and economic relations. Furthermore, this thesis will provide a critical view on the arguments made and examines where arguments are incomplete.

2.2 Arguments in favour of US withdrawal from the nuclear deal

Transatlantic relation

The main priority of both the US and the EU is to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, as this could lead to a lot of unrest in the Middle East. President Trump, as well as US government officials who support him, are against the Iran nuclear deal, as the deal is said to have many shortcomings. Some say that the European allies need to acknowledge these shortcomings and need to understand the legal and political context of Trump’s withdrawal from the deal. As European leaders have also expressed their concern regarding Iran’s behaviour and have admitted some of the flaws that the deal contains, they should, according to Trump, cooperate with the US to contain Iran and come up with a better deal (Trump, 2018a).

Those opposing Trump’s decision see the withdrawal from the deal as an example of the US ignoring the interests of its allies and as a violation of international law. However, this is according to those in favour of the US withdrawal argued to be a Eurocentric view of international relations, as the US is not ignoring its allies in the Middle East. The fact that the transatlantic alliance is of great importance does not mean that Europe is always the most important ally. In terms of Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia are the allies whose interests the US takes into account most. The concerns of these Middle Eastern allies, who are geographically closer to Iran and therefore immediately threatened, weigh more than the concerns of allies geographically further removed (Geranmayeh, 2017, p.5). The main importance for Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as for many other countries in the region, is to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. The leaders in these countries show disapproval of the JCPOA, as they believe Iran can easily continue their nuclear programme in secret, despite the IAEA controls. They also argue that Iran can easily re-launch their nuclear programme after the JCPOA has ended. Trump has fully agreed with this standpoint taken by Israel and Saudi Arabia (Trump, 2018a; Rezaei, 2019, p.52; Sokolsky & Miller, 2019; Peterson, 2018, p.641-642). However, even though priority is given to the interests of the Middle Eastern allies over the

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European allies, the transatlantic relationship is believed not to break. The EU continues to be very dependent on the US in terms of both security and economics. The withdrawal from the JCPOA has, among other unilateral actions taken by the US, affected the EU’s trust in the transatlantic alliance, but the EU is unlikely to go their own way without the US (Kanat, 2018, p.86-87).

Security implications

The biggest flaw of the nuclear deal that is mentioned is the fact that it only focuses on Iran’s nuclear programme and not on Iran’s ‘aggressive’ behaviour in the region. Whereas the EU and the E3 (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) point out that Iran’s behaviour must be handled separately, this is exactly what Trump’s administration sees as the big problem (Coates, February 2019; Cronberg, 2017, p.255). The White House, as well as scholars like Norell, Gerecht and Kroenig, mention that lifting the previously imposed sanctions has led to Iran’s economy flourishing again and has given Iran the necessary means to support its so-called criminal activities in the region. These activities include Iran’s support for Hezbollah and other non-state actors in the Middle East, Iran’s accused involvement with terrorists, human-rights abuses, the imprisonment of foreign citizens and its hostility towards Israel and Saudi Arabia (Trump, 2018a; Norell, 2015, p.287; Gerecht, 2018; Kroenig, 2018, p.96). According to Trump (2018a), Iran is the leading state sponsor of terrorism and the main source of the region’s instability. Norell (2015) even argues that building a nuclear bomb has never been Iran’s main priority. Instead, the country only agreed to the JCPOA in order to get sanction relief and pursue their regional hegemonic ambitions (p.289). The believe that the JCPOA could be the solution to conflicts in the Middle East, as well as improve US-Iran relations, is said to be based rather on wishful thinking than on hard evidence proving that Iran has actually changed its position towards the US and its allies in the region (Norell, 2015, p.288; Gerecht, 2018). Iran’s involvement in proxies needs to be countered, as these activities can affect the stability in the region, which has a great impact on the security of the transatalantic allies, as well as the rest of the world. The European actors involved in the deal believe that the JCPOA gives opportunity for further diplomacy regarding the regional issues Iran is currently involved in. President Trump, however, believes that the way to deal with these issues is to stop funding Iran which was made possible under the deal, as well as use military deterrence (Trump, 2018a). The fear expressed by European countries of a looming war between the US and Iran

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after the US’ withdrawal from the deal is said to be an oversimplification. As Walter Russell Mead (2018) argues: Trump’s political base is for the most part Jacksonian6_{, who believe that}

the US needs to respond with military force to attacks conducted by Iran, but they reject endless war. Trump’s foreign policy involves both threats and coercion, but also offers of peace. The Trump administration is not focused on making Iran a failed state, as this would only further destabilize the region (Trump, 2018a).

The second shortcoming of the deal is the so-called sunset clause, which sets out that the most important restrictions included in the JCPOA and in the UN sanctions will expire after 15 years. This means the deal will end after a rather short period of time and Iran will then be able to continue its production of nuclear weapons (Trump, 2018a; Gerecht, 2018; Kroenig, 2018, p.95). The third shortcoming is the fact that the deal does not include a prohibition of the production of ballistic missiles, which is a main component for the creation of a nuclear weapon. This means that Iran’s ballistic missile tests are no longer a violation of international law. Since the nuclear deal has come into place, Iran has even increased its frequency with which it performs missile tests. These shortcomings are argued to affect the stability and security in the Middle East and therefore should be included in a new deal. In order to do so, the EU needs to withdraw from the JCPOA and join the US strategy of containing Iran through force and economic sanctions, pressuring Iran into negotiating a better deal (Trump, 2018a; Gerecht, 2018; Kroenig, 2018, p.96).

Economic implications

Arguments made concerning the economic implications are mainly focused on the impact of the secondary economic sanctions on the trade relations between the EU and Iran and on the transatlantic economic relationship. Economic sanctions are argued to be a very effective tool for the containment of Iran, as well as a tool to help force Iran to renegotiate the deal, as sanctions are what brought Iran to the negotiation table in the first place. The deal has led to billions of frozen dollars being freed, which Iran can use to increase its influence in the region, thereby destabilising other countries. Economic sanctions are, according to those opposed to the JCPOA, the only effective measure to counter these ills (Norell, 2015, p.285-287). Those in

6_{The Jacksonian tradition is one of the four US foreign policy traditions. See chapter 3.3 for more information}

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favour of the economic sanctions believe that European governments and businesses will choose to preserve their ties with the US over doing business with Iran, as European export to Iran only accounts for around 1% of its total export. They also believe that this will coerce Europe into following the US strategy of economic sanctions, and start renegotiating the nuclear deal or demanding Iran to change its regional behaviour (Kroenig, 2018, p.100). However, even when the EU does not choose to follow the US strategy, the EU remains very much dependent on the US economic market. The US remains the largest trading partner of the EU, and therefore the unilateral decision to withdraw from the deal and re-impose economic sanctions are unlikely to break the transatlantic relation (Martin, 2018). Furthermore, the implementation of the Blocking Statute7_{and the creation of the Special}

Purpose Vehicle INSTEX8_{by the EU are, according to US vice-president Mike Pence (2019),}

very ineffective as they will “only strengthen Iran, weaken the EU and create more distance between Europe and the United States”.

Criticism

The main criticism concerning the arguments made in favour of US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, is that little attention has been given to the possible impact it might have on the transatlantic security and economic relations. It is argued that the unilateral decisions to withdraw will not break the transatlantic alliance, as the EU is too dependent on the US’ economy and security. However, nothing is said about the impact of the decision on the EU’s level of trust in the alliance and thus in the effective transatlantic cooperation. Also, those in favour of US withdrawal do not consider the possibility that this unilateral action can lead to more unrest in the Middle Eastern region, which in turn has severe impact on EU security, as well as on US interests. Furthermore, the arguments made against the JCPOA are very one-sided. It is said that the deal gives Iran resources, which it can use to invest in its proxies. However, nothing is said about the fact that the IAEA has confirmed multiple times that Iran

7_{The Blocking Statute was first introduced in 1996 to counter unlawful effects of US sanctions imposed on}

Cuba, Iran and Libya. Recent update also includes the secondary sanctions re-imposed on Iran. A blocking statute protects companies in their jurisdiction against sanctions by prohibiting them to obey the sanctions.

8_{The Special Purpose Vehicle named INSTEX was created by the E3, aimed at facilitating legitimate trade with}

Iran after the US had re-imposed secondary sanctions against Iran. The E3 wants to preserve the economic provisions of the JCPOA. INSTEX focuses on trade in the most vital sectors for Iranian population, including the pharmaceutical, medical devices, and agricultural foods. It facilitates non-dollar and non-SWIFT transactions with Iran to bypass US sanctions (Binder, 2018, p.2).

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is actually adhering to its obligations of the deal. The prevention of Iran developing a nuclear weapon is most important for Western powers. However, those in favour of the US withdrawal do not admit to the fact that the deal is actually working in preventing that from happening.

2.3 Arguments against US withdrawal from the nuclear deal

Transatlantic relation

Those who argue in favour of the deal and against Trump’s unilateral policy, show great concern about the future of the transatlantic relationship. Since Trump became president, a diverging trend can be seen at the policy level of the transatlantic relationship. The US withdrawal from the JCPOA was a decision that contradicted to the interests and priorities of its European allies (Kanat, 2018, p.82). Furthermore, it is seen as one of Trump’s many actions in order to be an anti-Obama leader. The nuclear deal, as well as the improvement of the US-Cuba relation, the Paris climate agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership are main achievements of the Obama administration. As Obama and his policies received great support from its European allies, the counter actions taken by Trump are receiving contrary reactions (Cherkaoui, 2018, p.4). Because the EU is a great supporter of multilateralism, the US withdrawal from multilateral agreements leads to a worsening of the transatlantic relation. Furthermore, by aligning the US priorities with those of its allies in the Middle East instead of listening to European demands, has damaged Europe’s trust in the US as a partner in foreign policy (Cronberg ,2017, p.254; Geranmayeh, 2017, p.2).

The EU shares the same concerns as the US about Iran, but they differentiate on two issues: they disagree on the goals they try to achieve with Iran and on the tools to use in order to achieve these goals. The EU uses diplomatic and economic tools to achieve change through rapprochement. The Trump administration uses sanctions and deterrence to contain and isolate Iran. This is where the transatlantic allies clash (Geranmayeh, 2017, p.4; Cronberg, 2017, p.259). However, the anger among the European actors about the US withdrawal from the deal goes deeper than solely about the difference in strategy to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The Iran nuclear deal is of great value to the EU, as it is a major joint foreign policy achievement and shows that the EU is capable of being a strong united global power. This is why the US withdrawal does not only make the Middle East more unstable, but it also strips

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the EU from one of its greatest achievements (Valášek, 2018). After Trump announced the US withdrawal from the deal, the E3 have tried very hard to come to an agreement with Iran that would satisfy Trump’s demands, including a stop on ballistic missile tests and addressing Iran’s activities in the region. However, no consensus could be reached on these restrictions. This confirms the argument made by Stephen Walt that it would not be possible to include other issues besides the nuclear programme in the deal (Walt, 2017). Those who believe Trump can persuade Iran into agreeing on a new deal, assume that the US has unlimited leverage over Iran. But this is argued to be a false hope, as showing willingness to accept some of Iran’s demands is believed to be the only way to come to an agreement (Walt, 2017; Geranmayeh, 2017, p.3). The transatlantic allies are likely to continue cooperation on areas of common interests like trade and counterterrorism. However, their shared world vision, as created after the world wars, is argued to be damaged (Martin, 2018).

Security implications

Trump’s priority is to make sure Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. However, according to those scholars in favour of the nuclear deal, including John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, Trump’s policy is having the opposite effect. Withdrawing from the nuclear deal and re-imposing economic sanctions gives Iran strong incentives to create a nuclear weapon or to use deterrence and force. It also makes it more difficult to control Iran’s nuclear programme and supervise its financial transactions (Mearsheimer, 2019; Walt, 2017; Geranmayeh, 2017, p.2). Trump’s maximum pressure approach is argued not to work as Iran will not surrender itself, creating only more instability in the Middle East. The relation between the US and Iran is currently balancing between no peace and no war. Steps taken by each side are increasing the possibility of military conflict. This can be affirmed by the recent military attacks on Saudi Arabian oil fields and tankers in the Persian Gulf, as well as on US military bases in Iraq (Mearsheimer, 2019; Sokolsky & Miller, 2019; International Crisis Group, 2019b, p.27).

Those in favour of the JCPOA give counter-arguments concerning the shortcomings of the deal. They mention that the fifteen-year duration of the deal is not favourable per se, as they would also prefer seeing the deal to last indefinitely. However, these scholars and experts do argue that it does not mean that after the fifteen years have passed Iran can immediately develop a nuclear weapon (Mearsheimer, 2019; Walt, 2017; Sokolsky & Miller, 2019).

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Furthermore, there never would have been a deal if there was no compromise concerning the duration of it. Demanding nuclear limits in perpetuity, which is not required of any other sovereign states, is something Iran would never have accepted (Fitzpatrick, 2019, p.26). Furthermore, including other worrying regional issues that Iran is involved in would have made the deal too complicated. These issues are of great concern to the West, but have lower priorities compared to Iran’s potential production of a nuclear weapon. The permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (p5+1), therefore decided to only focus on the nuclear weapon issue, but believed that the implementation of the JCPOA would eventually have positive contribution to regional peace and security. This is the optimistic view that the deal might serve as a confidence-building measure and improves the relation between Iran and the West (Idem, p.27). As the withdrawal has led to increasing resentment from Iran towards the US, the opportunity to diplomatically resolve regional issues is limited (Geranmayeh, 2017, p.1). Confrontation between US and Iranian-backed forces, especially in Iraq and Syria, will create more costs for Europe. Military escalation leads to an increasing flow of refugees and can increase the threat of terrorism (Geranmayeh, 2017, p.2). Sokolsky and Miller (2019) argue that Trump should not follow advice from Israel and Saudi Arabia, as that would only raise the risk of war with Iran. Successfully persuading Trump in 2018 to withdraw from the deal has only been in their own national interests and has decreased the diplomatic power of the US to negotiate a new deal.

Economic implications

European leaders are doubting whether the re-imposition of economic sanctions would lead to solutions. The re-imposed economic sanctions have proven to be effective in the way that they have rapidly decreased Iran’s oil revenue and contributed to increasing inflation. However, as Sokolsky and Miller (2019) mention, strangling Iran’s economy does not mean that it will achieve the goal of containment nor prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The International Crisis Group argues that groups like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps9_,

9_{The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is part of the Iranian Armed Forces and was founded after the}

Iranian Revolution in 1979 by Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini. It has strong ties to the economic system and is intended to protect the country’s Islamic republic political system. The IRGC has taken a big role in Iranian society, expanding its social, political, military and economic role. The organization is alleged to be involved in illegal smuggling and trade activities. The US under president Trump has called it a foreign terrorist organization. As terrorist organizations are by definition non-state actors, calling a foreign governments’

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which have a lot of access to state privileges, will be less affected by the economic sanctions compared to the middle class and the poor civilians in Iran. These groups can still continue their activities in the region, even after economic sanctions have been implemented (International Crisis Group, 2019b, p.10). Sokolsky and Miller (2019) agree by saying that Iran’s influence in the Middle East has increased after the US withdrawal. Furthermore, the real impact of the economic sanctions will depend on how countries like China, a large Iranian oil importer, will react to US demands of limiting trade with Iran (International Crisis Group, 2019b, p.12).

Trade with Iran has never been a very large percentage of EU export and import. The importance of continuing business with Iran is therefore not to so much to improve economic benefits, but rather to encourage Iran to remain in the nuclear agreement. However, the potential of a growing trade relation should not be underestimated. As the American secondary economic sanctions also affect European companies doing business with Iran, this has, as confirmed by multiple scholars, a negative effect on the transatlantic relationship. Multinationals cannot risk to be cut off from the American market and many have therefore announced their withdrawal from the Iranian market (Valášek, 2018; Cherkaoui, 2018, p.6; Cronberg, 2017, p.257; Geranmayeh, 2017, p.3). In order to continue trade with Iran, the EU imposed the blocking statute, which makes it illegal for all European companies to comply with US extraterritorial sanctions law. The EU also invented the Special Purpose Vehicle, known as INSTEX, which makes it possible to trade in euros instead of dollars. Doing business in euros means companies are not dependent on the American financial system and can continue doing business with Iran. Whether these mechanisms will work is very much doubted, but it does show how the EU is attempting to break free from its dependence on the US (International Crisis Group, 2019b, p.23-24; Fitzpatrick, 2019, p.57).

Criticism

It is argued that regional issues that Iran is involved in need to be solved separately from the deal and that the deal provides diplomatic strength to increase the chance of resolving these

military a terrorist organization was a first on the international stage. This announcement by Trump has worsened its relationship with Iran immensely.

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issues. However, as it is a very recent topic, not much is yet written about whether the deal has actually ensured more stability in the Middle East. Focusing on how the US withdrawal from the deal has affected the regional stability shows what actual impact this action has had and still has on EU’s economy and security.

2.4 Conclusion

The literature review has discussed the main points made in the debate about the impact of the US decision to withdraw from the JCPOA on the transatlantic security and economic relations. The scholars Norell, Gerecht and Kroenig have argued that the nuclear deal is an inadequate deal, as it has many shortcomings. The Trump administration justifies their decision to withdraw from the deal by arguing that the deal has given Iran the resources to increase its investment in pro-Iranian militia in the Middle East, leading to increased instability which also affects Europe. The EU therefore needs to follow the strategy of the US in order to fully contain Iran. The scholars arguing against the US withdrawal, however, mention that the deal is of great importance to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and to create more stability in the Middle East. The US unilateral withdrawal has affected the EU’s trust in the US as a reliable partner. However, none of the parties involved in the debate elaborate on what the exact consequences have been of the US withdrawal on the transatlantic relationship on both the economic and security level. What have been the differences in US-Iran policy and EU-Iran policy? In what way have tensions in the Middle East actually increased in recent years? What impact do the secondary economic sanctions have on the European economy? In order to answer these questions, certain key concepts need to be theoretically elaborated. This is why the next section, the theoretical framework, will theorize the EU and US foreign policy. Furthermore, the concepts of power, trust, security and economy will be conceptualized.

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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter the theoretical framework will be laying out the key variables that play a role in answering the research question. To understand how and why the transatlantic allies differ in their Iran strategy, it is important to look at their foreign policy characteristics through a theoretical lens. The international relation theories of liberalism, realism and constructivism are, however, too general to clearly lay out the foreign policy identities of the US and the EU. Therefore, the theoretical framework will be based on role concepts. Role concepts are more detailed than the international relations theories and make it possible to look at the foreign policies from different perspectives and to analyse its characteristics more precisely (Rezaeiejan, 2012, p.16). For the EU, the role concepts that will be used are Normative Power Europe and Market Power Europe. For the US, four traditions of foreign policy will be looked at: Jacksonian, Jeffersonian, Wilsonian, and Hamiltonian. The four traditions show resemblance to the IR theories, but are less general in theorizing US foreign policy. This is because they look back far into American history and show characteristics of American foreign policy that are still present today (Mead, 2002, p.xvi). After looking at the EU and the US separately in terms of their world views and foreign policy strategies, there will be focused on the transatlantic relationship. This way it will become clear how the differences in foreign policies affect the transatlantic relationship. In the last part of the theoretical framework four main concepts related to the research question, being power, trust, security and economics, will be conceptualized. This is needed in order to make these general and abstract ideas more understandable by laying out the matching indicators to measure it.

The importance of the transatlantic relationship

Before focusing on theorizing the foreign policies of the US and the EU and the differences between the transatlantic allies, first the importance and uniqueness of the relationship needs to be pointed out. After the Second World War, a Western liberal order was built by the United States and its allies. This order incorporates the notions of economic openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation and democratic solidarity. In this liberal order, the United States became a hegemonic leader, making sure the alliance was secured, the world economy

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stabilized, cooperation fostered and the values of the free world defended. With the end of the Cold War, the liberal world order spread beyond Western Europe and Japanese partners to incorporate countries in East Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America. Additional to this expansion, governance institutions, such as NATO and the WTO, also expanded (Ikenberry, 2018, p.7). As Ikenberry (2018) mentions, whether the liberal order will survive in the future depends mainly on the ability of the United States and Europe to lead and support it. In order to do so, these liberal democracies need to remain stable, well-functioning and internationalist. It is important for these powers to regain their legitimacy and find solutions to twenty-first-century problems (p.22). The transatlantic allies share the same self-image of promoting vital aims, including the promotion of peace and stability, democracy and development, contribution to world trade and closer economic relations. The two allies also share the same values, including freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights (Steinmo & Kopstein, 2008, p.1). Shared value of democracy and market economy has created a deeper security community (Risse, 2008, p.1). The transatlantic alliance is held together through its military alliance, economic integration, the shared values and its political and diplomatic network (Ikenberry, 2008, p.8). On issues of common interests, the transatlantic allies are believed to continue cooperation (Smith, 2018). The US and the EU remain each other’s greatest trading partners and provide each other with a large number of jobs and high levels of investments. The two blocs even count for around one third of the global GDP (Steinmo & Kopstein, 2008, p.20). This all points out the importance of a well-functioning transatlantic alliance. But against the background of this special relationship, they also differentiate from one another. In order to investigate how the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal has impacted this special relationships, the foreign policies need to be looked at through a theoretical lens. This helps understanding their differences in foreign policy towards Iran.

3.2 EU foreign policy

Because the EU contains multiple member states, there is much debate concerning the power of the EU, referring to what the EU claims as a power, what it does as a power and how it is ought to be. This has led to the EU’s power being labelled in many different ways, including as a civilian power, normative power, market power, gentle power, superpower, and so on.

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This theoretical section will focus on the currently most popular role concept of EU power, being Normative Power Europe (NPE). The concept of normative power moves beyond the traditional notion of military and civilian power. The second concept that will be focused on is Market Power Europe (MPE). The debate over EU power contributes to our understanding of the EU’s role and power in international affairs (Damro, 2012, p.682-683). The role concepts of normative and market power Europe will help to understand the EU’s strategy and role in the transatlantic alliance in the case of the Iran nuclear deal. Characteristics of NPE and MPE will be made clear when focusing on how the EU has reacted to the US unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal.

Normative Power Europe (NPE)

Currently one of the most popular ways of describing the European Union’s power and its role as an actor in world politics is through the concept of Normative Power Europe (Savorskaya, 2015, p.66). Normative power is often compared to the notion of civilian power Europe, which was first described by Duchêne in 1972, creating an image of the EU as a benign actor (Maull, 2005, p.778; Pace, 2007, p.1042). Civilian power is mainly known for its preference of civil over military methods of exerting influence on other states. Furthermore, it refers to the importance of economic and non-military power of the EU (Maull, 2005, p.781; Whitman, 2013, p.174; Savorskaya, 2015, p.67). Ian Manners was first to make a distinction between civilian power and normative power in an article from 2002. The main component of normative power, according to Manners, is that “it exists as being different to pre-existing political forms, and that this particular difference pre-disposes it to act in a normative way” (Manners, 2002, p.242). Normative power Europe refers to “the ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations” (Idem, p.239). With the normative power concept, Manners wants to replace the state at the centre of concern, as in civilian and military power, and focus more on the power of norms as the basis of EU policy (Manners, 2002, p.236; Whitman, 2013, p.172). Furthermore, civilian power argues there is a connection between the material and non-material sources of power, whereas the normative power concept points out the importance of the power of ideas over material sources of power (Savorskaya, 2015, p.69). Theorising normative power goes beyond acknowledging the EU as an actor in international politics. It is more interested in the aim of setting standards for others by the spreading of norms (Whitman, 2013, p.174).

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According to Manners (2002), the EU normative power is derived from its historical context, referring to the two world wars, its hybrid polity, and its political-legal constitution (p.240). The five main principles of normative power Europe are: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Manners, 2002, p.242; Pace, 2007, p.1045). The concepts of peace and liberty have a historical context as they were defined in the immediate post-war period. The historical events increased the commitment to place universal norms and principles like the preservation and strengthening of peace and liberty at the centre of EU policy (Manners, 2002, p.240-241). The other three concepts were defined later when distinguishing western democracies from eastern communists became important (Idem, p.243). After the Cold War, the debate concerning civilian power included the assertion that democracy and ethical foreign policy had to become the basis of the European Union’s global reach (Pace, 2007, p.1042; Savorskaya, 2015, p.68). Liberal democracy was again seen as the standard of European legitimacy. Democratic peace and multilateral cooperation also became the basic purpose of the EU (Pace, 2007, p.1045). However, the emphasis on norms, values and ideas and the spread of it to other countries is not exclusive characterizable to the EU’s foreign policy. Other powers, like the United States, also include normative undertones in their foreign policy, such as the focus on human rights and democratic principles. This is why, even though the promotion of certain norms and values instead of the promotion of the EU’s own interests is an important characteristic of the EU’s foreign policy, it is not enough to conclude the EU to be a normative power (Sjursen, 2006, p.239-240). In order to act normatively, it is necessary to have legal principles that are respected at any time. This would legitimize the pursuit of norms, as it would make it consistent with legal norms. This is in compliance with the EU’s strong emphasis on international law and multilateralism. Main objectives of the EU are the development of a strong international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order (Idem, p.245). The basis of the EU’s identity is constituted by the common values of the EU that are formulated in the founding treaties (Savorskaya, 2015, p.71).

Focusing on the EU’s normative power in cases of conflict makes it clear what the appropriate actions are according to the actors involved in the EU foreign policy (Pace, 2007, p.1044). In conflict areas, the EU establishes financial and humanitarian aid and trade programmes, as these are considered vital for peaceful resolution and for the civil societies in

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these areas to flourish. For the EU, a peaceful and stable periphery is very important, as this creates more security for Europe. Financial assistance is believed to help economic and social development in conflict areas, which is important for the return to peaceful coexistence. EU actors believe that when a community does not have social or economic development, the chances of conflict are higher (Idem, p.1046). Furthermore, EU actors consider dialogue with the parties involved in the conflict to be a key pillar of normative power and an important diplomatic means for managing conflict situations (Idem, p.1051). The EU is therefore perceived as a soft power, as it prefers negotiation over the deployment of military means. The increase of military capabilities under the European Security and Defence Policy does not damage EU’s normative power per se, as long as it does not become a priority (Whitman, 2013, p.180-181). In the case of Iran, the EU’s normative power can be mainly recognized through its effort to construct dialogue with Iran, in an effort to prevent the country from developing a nuclear weapon and in order to deal with regional tensions. The Iran nuclear deal is a key characteristic of EU’s normative power, as it is a multilateral agreement constructed through diplomacy. Furthermore, the EU’s normative power is also recognized in its relationship with the US, in which the EU is perceived as the soft power focused on diplomacy and multilateralism. How the EU uses its normative power since the US decided to withdraw from the nuclear deal will be clarified in the analysis.

Market Power Europe (MPE)

Another important way to describe the EU is as a market power. According to this role concept, the power of the EU depends on its economic strength, thereby referring to its relative internal market size and the overall performance of its economy (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006, p.908). This role concept is focused more on material factors. The EU is one of the biggest economic powers in the world. It is a fundamentally large single market with significant institutional characteristics and numerous interest groups (European Commission, 2019a, p.1; Damro, 2012, p.682). The size of the market and the long experience of negotiating international trade agreements is what makes the EU a very powerful trading bloc. Furthermore, trade liberalization, external trade policy and its single market have made Europe an important actor in international trade negotiations (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006, p.906-907). According to the concept of Market Power Europe (MPE), European integration and EU identity have been shaped by the common market and the common commercial policy

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(Damro, 2012, p.685). The focus on the EU as a market power does not explain how it uses military and physical force through its security and defence policy, but it does give a clear sense of the EU as a power and how it influences the international system (Idem, p.697). Within the theories of international relations, the concept of market power is closely related to neoliberalism. It refers to economic interdependence instead of economic autarky or autonomy. It supports economic and political integration within its region and worldwide (Rezaeiejan, 2012, p.35).

There are three independent characteristics that provide the basis of EU’s identity as a market power, namely the material existence, institutional features, and interest contestation. Focusing on these characteristics helps to understand the position of the EU in the international sphere and to identify the institutions and actors that are involved. As the EU is a large market, it is capable of using its power to affect material incentives and other actors’ perception over possible outcomes. The institutional features determine the actors and the rules that these actors need to follow. The EU has been known to exercise power through rules and regulations, and is therefore also known as a regulatory state. These rules and regulations can either liberalize or restrict market activities (Damro, 2012, p.686-687). The importance of internal rules, like those focusing on which official actors are involved in decision-making, are important characteristics of market power Europe. The characterization of interest contestation refers to the unity as well as diversity among EU member states (Idem, p.687-688). What makes the EU power problematic is the fact that different member states have their own views on how to obtain power through trade (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006, p.907). This, however, does not necessarily lead to less influence in negotiations. The collective representation requirement makes that the EU is united and able to strongly negotiate, even though there are internal divides (Idem, p.909).

The EU is not only a strong power in trade, as it has also become a power through trade. Using access to its market as a bargaining tool to persuade its trading partners to change their behaviour and domestic policies, as well as to externalize EU internal policies (Drezner, 2007, p.32; Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006, p.907; Damro, 2012, p.684). This shows how power in trade can become power in another area, like foreign affairs. This can include the export of EU’s laws and standards, and even its norms and ideas (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006, p.910).

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This use of trade to achieve non-trade objectives is an important way for Europe to gain geopolitical power (Idem, p.912). Market Power Europe uses its power and its institutional features to externalise economic and social market related policies and regulatory measures. This means that, in contrast to normative power Europe, the EU as a market power is capable of using persuasive and coercive tools to influence international affairs (Drezner, 2007, p.32-33; Damro, 2012, p.682). Whereas normative power is about the development of shared norms through consensus and co-operation, market power is said to be about the use of carrots and sticks to enforce these shared norms on trading powers (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006, p.920). These characteristics of MPE can also be seen in the case study of Iran. In 2002, after a period of constructive dialogue, the EU constructed a trade and cooperation agreement (TCA) with Iran. The idea behind this TCA was to extract trade concessions from Iran in order to create a closer economic and political bond with Iran (Rezaeiejan, 2012, p.213). This shows the EU’s use of its market power to gain a better relationship with Iran. Currently, the EU uses its market power to try to influence Iran to stay in the JCPOA. Furthermore, the EU’s attempts to become less dependent on the US economy as a reaction to the secondary sanctions are showing characteristics of MPE. The extraterritorial implementation of third country laws is perceived by the EU as not being in line with international law and thus are not recognized. Whether the EU’s market power is strong enough to develop its own independent economic foreign policy towards Iran will be investigated in the analysis.

3.3 US foreign policy

Walter Russell Mead (2002) lays out the US foreign policy through a useful classification of US foreign policy traditions. These traditions can help to systematically analyse the most important characteristics of the US foreign policy (p.90). The idea of the four traditional schools of US foreign policy helps to understand and sometimes even predict decisions taken by American presidents as a reaction to international events. Furthermore, it helps to understand the reactions of the society (Nau, 2018, p.13). All four schools are deeply rooted in American history and experience. Even though there is a constantly shifting landscape with new presidents and major events occurring, it is possible to make certain generalisations. This is because certain fundamental characteristics or themes remain vivid throughout the years. The traditions therefore help to better understand the American reaction to past, present and

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future foreign policy challenges. In order to outline and understand US foreign policy, it is necessary to explain all four traditions as they emphasise different aspects that emerge out of distinct cultural, social and economic element of American society (Mead, 2002, p.176; Nau, 2018, p.14). It is important to note that the four traditions are not independent from one another. Most leaders, as well as American citizens, combine different elements, ideas and values of the four different schools. Furthermore, people can shift from one school to showing more characteristics of another one over time (Mead, 2002, p.87).

There are two main distinctions that can be made between the four traditions. First is the one that divides internationalists from nationalists and realists. This distinction refers to the preference of either security and status quo, or regime change and the spread of democracy. The second distinction is between conservative internationalists and liberal internationalists. This distinction refers to the preference of either military force or diplomacy as the primary means of foreign policy (Nau, 2018, p.1-2). Hamiltonians are considered conservative internationalists and Wilsonians are liberal internationalist. Jacksonians are seen as conservative nationalist and Jeffersonians as liberal nationalists (Brands, 2001-2002, p.144). Due to their universal values, Hamiltonian and Wilsonian traditions are often more internationally accepted. They believe that in order for the world to become more like the US, the US also needs to accommodate better to the rest of the world. Jacksonians and Jeffersonians differ from this, as they resist the thought of the US becoming more like the rest of the world. They believe that foreign policy should be used to protect the American values at home rather than to extend them abroad (Mead, 2002, p.175).

Brief outline of US-Iran relations

Before going into detail on these four traditions of US foreign policy, a brief outline needs to be given on the history of US-Iran relations. Together with the outline of the four traditions, this will help to understand Trump’s current policy towards Iran better. When it comes to Iran, the US foreign policy has seen many changes over the decades. There are both material and non-material factors that have influenced or still influence the US policy towards Iran. It is important to take these factors into account in order to make the current US-Iran relations and the US foreign policy to Iran more understandable. The biggest change in their relationship occurred after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, also known as the Islamic

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Revolution. Before the revolution, Iran was considered to be one of America’s closest allies in the region. The US traded a large amount of military equipment to Iran in return for oil and other resources. Their economic relationship was based on the oil industry, the military industry, the banking industry and the capital goods market (Fatemi, 1980, p.304). The revolution included a series of events that eventually led to the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty and the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who was very much supported by the US and some European countries (Murray, 2010, p.3). The Iranian government was reformed into the Islamic republic of Iran with its new leader being Ayatollah Khomeini. The shift to a more anti-Western theocracy was worrying to western countries dependent on Iranian oil and resources (Murray, 2010, p.5; Frazee, 2020). The Iranian hostage crisis that followed the Iranian revolution sharply worsened the relationship. A total of 52 American citizens and diplomats were held hostage by Iranian pro-revolution students for 444 days at the American embassy in Tehran. The hostage crisis was also a response to the knowledge that the Shah was granted asylum in the US even though he was accused of committing crimes against Iranian citizens (Houghton & Patrick, 2001, p.5; Frazee, 2020). The hostage crisis shattered diplomatic relations and is therefore perceived as a pivotal event in the US-Iran relations. In response to the crisis, as well as to the ongoing Iran-Iraq war, the US imposed economic sanctions against Iran, thereby worsening the relation even more (Fayazmanesh, 2008, p.2). Despite Iran once being one of America’s closest allies, it was later called part of an ‘Axis of Evil’ and a rogue state by the Bush administration in 2002 (Bush, 2002). Iran became one of the main targets of US economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation (Murray, 2010, p.8-90). These events together with other incidents, like the shooting down of the Iranian airplane killing 290 passengers, and the most recent event where Iran’s top general Soleimani was killed, are all non-material factors that have had, and still have an influence on the US foreign policy towards Iran (Frazee, 2020). Material factors that have influence on the relationship between the US and Iran are related to Iran’s military capabilities, its threat in the Middle East and its regional and political allies. Oil used to be a key factor in US foreign policy towards Iran, but as the US has become less dependent on energy imports, Iran’s oil and gas is not the key component in their relationship anymore. Different US presidents have had different foreign strategies to work with Iran, influenced by material and non-material factors and events occurring in both the US, Iran and the wider region. The diverse types of foreign policies show characteristics of one or more of the four US traditions which will be outlined below.

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Jacksonian tradition

The Jacksonian tradition is named after the 7th_{president Andrew Jackson and can be}

characterized by principles of populism, individualism, honour, equality, financial spirit and courage (Mead, 1999, p.12-14; Clarke & Ricketts, 2017, p.367). The populist notion refers to the emergence of democracy from the people themselves, rather than from elite top-down. The middle class is believed to be at the heart of American society and they need to be defended above all else (Mead, 1999, p.16; Brands, 2001-2002, p.143). The Jacksonian tradition is, like the Jeffersonian tradition, more inward focused on the nation itself, whereas the Wilsonian and Hamiltonian traditions are more outward looking, seeking to remake the world according to their vision (Clarke & Ricketts, 2017, p.366; Hamilton, 2017, p.1). Jacksonians resemble Jeffersonians in the way that both are very suspicious of elites and prefer power to be retained by states and local governments. Both are very much in favour of the Constitution and the preservation of liberties of American citizens. However, whereas Jeffersonians are devoted to the First Amendment of freedom of speech and religion, Jacksonians see the Second Amendment of the right to bear arms as the most important form of liberty. According to Mead (1999w), Jacksonians are seen as the most obstructionist, as they are least likely to understand the other schools and their initiatives. Yet, the US would be a much weaker power without Jacksonians (p.8-9).

The Jacksonian school is perceived as nationalist, with its main importance being the physical security and economic well-being of America. Military strength is necessary in order to secure American interests (Mead, 2002, p.88). Governments should do anything they can to promote the well-being of its people, both political, economic and moral (Clarke & Ricketts, 2017, p.369). The biggest goal for the US is to defend its independence. As other countries are believed to do the same, there is no need for the US to interfere in these countries to help them defend their independence or form alliances. Unilateralism is given preference over multilateralism because Jacksonian Americans do not want international institutions to constrain them in their freedom (Hamilton, 2017, p.3). Alliances are only needed when there is a serious threat to the nation’s independence. Nationalists do not see the need to balance power around the world in order to defend the country. However, when the country is being attacked, nationalists do not hesitate to fiercely strike back and destroy the enemy. National honour and national interests are of great importance in war, and victory is the only possible

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outcome. However, once victory is perceived, it is not necessary to remain in foreign territory, since nation building is not a priority (Nau, 2018, p.5). Jacksonians have always supported large military spending, with the aim of fighting for American victory rather than for the salvation of the world (Brand, 2001-2002, p.144). President Trump shows most resemblance with the Jacksonian tradition of American foreign policy. An example is Trump’s very nationalist ‘America first’ slogan. His main concern is the safety of the country and is thereby willing to use military force to protect American national interests (Clarke & Ricketts, 2017, p.373-374; Hamilton, 2017, p.3). Defending the American borders against terrorists and illegal immigrants is a high priority for Trump (Nau, 2018, p.15). In the case study of Iran and the nuclear deal, Trump’s Jacksonian characteristics are evident. His lack of support of the multilateral nuclear agreement and his maximum pressure strategy of economic sanctions and military containment are most linked to the Jacksonian nationalist tradition. Trump’s willingness to use force but reluctant to start an endless war against Iran is also a key characteristic of the Jacksonian tradition.

Jeffersonian tradition

Jeffersonians perceive the preservation of democracy to be the most pressing and vital interest of the US and its people. However, they do not see the necessity in spreading it around the world. On the contrary, they prefer safeguarding democracy at home. The focus is on defending American independence in the least dangerous and costly way, rather than imposing American values on other nations (Mead, 2002, p.88). This is why the Jeffersonian school has often opposed Hamiltonian and Wilsonian policies, which are more focused on the spread of certain values around the world. Furthermore, whereas Hamiltonians and Wilsonians see a strong central government as the key to national freedom, Jeffersonians see it as the great enemy of freedom and argue that the people should govern themselves (Idem, p.178). Jeffersonian tradition believes that democracy only occurs through careful cultivation, and not as a happy side effect of commerce, as Hamiltonians belief. They have more trust in human nature than in institutions of commerce. This is also the reason why Jeffersonians have been sceptical of interference with other nations (Brands, 2001-2002, p.143). Jeffersonianism has little faith in the effectiveness of international institutions for creating cooperation between countries. This is because non-democracies are also part of international institutions and these countries have no interest in adopting democratic habits or reducing their use of

The Transatlantic Relationship after the US Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal