Environmental Change at Lake Chad:
Unravelling the Root Causes for the Rise of Boko Haram
Julia Sandrine Blanken
Bachelor Thesis with Honours Extension Student number: 1780042
Word count: 10.608
Course: Democratization Processes in Contemporary Africa Supervisor: Dr. L. Demarest
ABSTRACT. This research focuses on the connection between environmental change and the
occurrence of conflict by performing a case study on the influence of the environmental change around Lake Chad on the rise of Boko Haram. Lake Chad is one of the lakes in the world with the highest risk of socio-political stress. Since 2009, Boko Haram which was first only active in Nigeria, has spread to all the countries bordering Lake Chad. The combination of the size changes of the Lake, the high risk for socio-political stress and the current
humanitarian crisis, makes it important to research if there is a link between the
environmental change and conflict in the region. The research question is: to what extent is environmental change a root cause for the rise of Boko Haram at Lake Chad? A historical analysis of a case study about the rise of Boko Haram has been conducted. The research consists of three parts. The first part focuses on the period before Boko Haram was founded, from 1960 to 2001. The second part analyzes the rise of Boko Haram, from 2001 till 2009, and the third part focuses on the resurfacing of Boko Haram from 2009 till now. The results show that environmental factors were partly a root cause for the rise of Boko Haram. The contextual foundation for the rise of Boko Haram was constructed in the 19th century with environmental and historical factors. The rise of Boko Haram has been possible due to grievances from the environmental and historical factors. The violent resurfacing of Boko Haram in 2009 has been possible due to state weakness and worsening regional social and economic conditions.
1. Introduction
Africa has increasingly faced the results of climate change, such as floods and droughts. In regions dependent on lakes for food, work and water, the effects of climate change can be disastrous. Many lakes in Africa are transboundary, which is why regulations of these lakes require efficient cooperation. According to Homer-Dixon (1994, p. 6) environmental scarcities of natural resources have contributed to violent conflicts. When the resources become scarce, people will start fighting over them. Freeman (2017, p. 369) argues that other variables influence the link between environmental degradation and violent conflict. An important topic which requires more research is the rise of Islamist terrorist groups. That is why this research will focus on the effects of climate change for violent conflict at Lake Chad. The research question is: To what extent has environmental change been a root cause for the rise of Boko Haram at Lake Chad?
Lake Chad functions as a vital source of fresh water for millions of people who depend on it (Onuoha, 2008, p. 50). Furthermore, the Lake plays an important role in controlling the groundwater and floods. As a result, the importance of the Lake grows with the impacts of climate change. Between the 1970s and 1980s the Lake diminished in size with 90% (IRD le Mag, 2020, March 30). However, in the last twenty years the amount of water has augmented. Lake Chad is one of the lakes in the world with the highest risk of socio-political stress
(Okpara, Stringer, Dougill & Bila, 2015, p. 312). Since 2009, Boko Haram which was first only active in Nigeria, has spread to all the countries bordering Lake Chad: Chad, Niger and Cameroon (Hoinathy, 2019). The combination of the changes of size of the Lake and the high risk for socio-political stress at Lake Chad, makes it important to research if there is a link between both. This case is chosen because of the region’s significant dependency on the Lake and the worrying impact on the future for the region if both conflict and the Lake’s size changes continue. In this paper, the effect of climate change on violent conflict will be
researched, by focusing on the period before the rise of Boko Haram in 2002, the rise of Boko Haram, and Boko Haram’s violent resurfacing after 2009. The main finding of this paper is that environmental and historical factors caused grievances which created the incentives and opportunity for the movement of Boko Haram to rise. Boko Haram’s violent resurfacing after 2009 has been possible due to a weak state and worsening regional social and economic conditions which have contributed to migration and a humanitarian crisis. This research paper will start by giving an overview of the current literature on this topic. Then, the used
2. The Debate on Environmental Change and Conflict
Homer-Dixon’s Theory
Since the 1990s, the neo-Malthusian perspective that environmental scarcity is a significant cause of violent conflicts has gained importance. One of the important contributors to this narrative was Homer-Dixon. Homer-Dixon (1991; 1994) has analyzed earlier case studies and the effect of environmental change on acute conflict in developing countries. According to Homer-Dixon (1994, pp. 8; 19-20) there are three causes leading to scarcity: environmental change, population growth and the distribution of resources. Homer-Dixon thus argues that population growth will lead to scarcity of natural resources which would bring incentives for conflicts. Homer-Dixon (1991, p. 78) states that environmental pressures, which are the driving mechanisms for conflict, can produce four social effects: economic decline, diminished agricultural production, population displacement, and disruption of social relations. These social effects will in theory lead to several types of acute conflict: scarcity disputes between countries, ethnic clashes, civil strife and insurgency.
Three theories of Homer-Dixon (1991, pp. 104-106) argue how environmental change and population pressures can lead to the different conflicts mentioned above. These theories take place on an individual, group, and systemic level of analysis. First, frustration-aggression theories which would explain civil strife, riots, coups, revolutions and guerrilla wars. Individuals would feel frustrated if they believe something is blocking them from reaching a strong desire. Second, group-identity theories to explain nationalistic, ethnic, and religious conflicts. Groups reinforce the cleavage between each other and strengthen their identities, which leads to conflict. Third, structural theories can explain conflicts which arise because of rational calculations depending on physical factors such as number of actors, resource limits, and barriers to movements.
The different types of conflicts can according to Homer-Dixon (1999, pp. 47-48) be caused by three types of environmental scarcity of renewable resources: supply-induced, demand-induced, and structural scarcities. Supply-induced scarcity is caused by depletion or degradation of renewable resources. Demand-induced scarcity is caused by rivalry when population growth increases and competition over resources arises. Structural scarcity arises when resources are disproportionately divided between different groups. It is important to state that scarcity is a subjective concept (Benjaminsen, 2008, p. 821; Homer-Dixon, 1994, p. 9). Scarcity is
dependent on the beliefs or preferences of people about a resource and not only on the physical limits out of which the resource consists.
Other case studies have also supported the link between environmental scarcity and conflict. However, as discussed above with population growth, environmental scarcity alone does not prove the occurrence of conflict. The mechanisms for conflict to occur are more complex which becomes clear from Homer-Dixon’s research. An important factor that impacts the relation is state behavior. This becomes clear from the research of Howard and Homer-Dixon (1995). Howard and Homer-Dixon (1995, pp. 1-2; 28; 39-40) performed a case study about the people of Chiapas in Mexico. They researched how different forms of environmental scarcities affected the group and concluded that environmental scarcities alone did not cause civil strife. Other factors such as a growing peasant population, weak property rights, power of elites, multiplied the grievances. At the same time, economic liberalization from the regime caused power from labor peasants to be shifted to private capital which led to inflation, capital flight and unstable financial markets. This eventually caused radical peasant groups to turn to rebellion. Lanz (1996) contributes to the narrative that state decisions are an important factor in causing conflicts next to environmental scarcities. Lanz’s (1996) research on the case of Tigray and Wollo in Ethiopia concluded that unaddressed social and environmental issues, the drought in this case, created conditions for social conflict. Policy failures of the states increased the issues. Geography, ecological fragility, and ethnic diversity made state control difficult.
Kahl (1998) elaborates on the role of the state and the link between environmental scarcity and population growth leading to conflict. In his case study on the occurrence of civil strife in Kenya between 1991 and 1993, he concludes that both demographic and environmental factors led to social pressures causing elites to turn to violence. An important demographic factor according to Kahl (1998, p. 94) is population growth. Both demographic and environmental stress provide grievances and stimulate intergroup violence and violence against the state. In previous literature two hypotheses are connected to population growth and environmental degradation leading to conflict (Kahl, 1998, p. 81). First, the deprivation hypothesis, which states that environmental pressures and population growth threaten individuals causing them to become violent against governments. Second, the state weakness hypothesis, which can also play an important role in combination with population growth causing individuals to turn to violence. The state has weak coercive mechanisms, such as police, armed forces and intelligence organizations which can deter or repress violence before the
exploitation’ is likely to take place, meaning that elites exploit scarcities to consolidate power. The relation between environmental change and conflict is influenced by competition and grievances (Kahl, 1998, p. 81). Competition is explained by the opportunity cost model. This model argues that if incomes rise, participation in conflict would diminish because the participation is viewed as a result of unemployment and lack of economic alternatives. Individuals would be unlikely to take part in violence unless there are more opportunities available than engage in organized violence. The regional context in which the individuals are located influences the competition. This becomes clear from the study of Benjaminsen (2008) who argues that the environmental context of droughts led to migration. With a case study on intergroup violence with the Tuareg rebellion groups in Mali, Benjaminsen (2008, p. 819) researches scarcity causing violent conflicts for the Sahel Region. This case study has shown that scarcity does contribute to the formation of the rebellion groups, although not directly. The scarcity led to the migration of men to Algeria and Libya, where they learned revolutionary ideas. Benjaminsen (2008) argues that the droughts where thus not the direct foundation for the conflicts.
From the case studies above can be concluded that environmental scarcities form a cause for conflict. However, environmental scarcities are not the sole cause for conflicts to occur. Other factors also impact the occurrence of conflict. The relation between environmental degradation and conflict will further be explored by analyzing previous quantitative studies.
Quantitative Findings
Previous quantitative studies report mixed findings. Some case studies and quantitative studies support the link between environmental change and conflict. However, some subsequent quantitative studies do not. The findings are often dependent on other variables next to environmental degradation.
Several studies provide empirical support with large N-studies for the link between environmental scarcity and conflict. For example, Hauge and Ellingsen (1998, p. 314), who have performed a large N-study. Although the research confirms the link, economic and political factors are more important in predicting domestic armed conflicts than the environmental factors. Magnus Theisen (2008, p. 802) has replicated the study of Hauge and Ellingsen by testing the effect of population growth, water, droughts and soil degradation on conflict. The results show that only high soil degradation increases the risk for armed conflict. The study does not support the link between natural resources and conflict. The narrative for the empirical support of the link between environmental scarcity and conflict is complemented by Von Uexkull et al. (2016, p. 12391) who researched the circumstances under which droughts and climatic extremes occur. Their research, a large-N analysis from countries in Asia and Africa between 1989 and 2014, finds that droughts do not have a significant effect on the short-term risk that a conflict with the states occurs. However, for groups depending on agriculture and which are politically excluded, local droughts increase the risk of sustained violence. The studies discussed above where all cross-national. Boone (2017, pp. 277; 288-289) contributes to the narrative with a large N-study of 24 subnational cases of land conflict between 1990 and 2014. Boone (2017) states that land tenure institutions are an important factor in declaring the resource scarcity of land leading to conflict. National rulers have formed land tenure institutions that structure local land according to ethnic hierarchies. In rural Africa the land tenure institutions explain for a substantial part the large-scale conflicts between local populations and migrant populations over land. State-backed institutions are enforcing the control over land in order to let the land be controlled by only state-recognized ethnic groups.
Next to studies that support the link between environmental scarcity and conflict, there are also several cross-national quantitative studies that do not. Urdal (2005, p. 422) is one of the studies whose results contradict the neo-Malthusian narrative. The study has analyzed all sovereign states and politically dependent areas for the period 1950 until 2000 and has focused on the influence of the variable population growth on the link. The research shows that growing populations are not experiencing more risk for conflict compared to countries with low population growth (Urdal, 2005, p. 430). The neo-Malthusian narrative is only supported for the 1970s. The findings also suggest that scarcity of land decreased the risk of armed conflict. According to Urdal (2005, p. 420) these findings suggest that highly populated areas are forced to develop in order to overcome resource scarcity, which reduces the risk of conflict. The large-N study of Gizelis and Wooden (2010, pp. 444; 447) focuses on water scarcity in the time period of 1981 until 2000 and contributes to this narrative by researching other mechanisms that influence the link scarcity and conflict, such as effectiveness of governance. Their research finds that water scarcity does not increase the risk of conflict (Gizelis & Wooden, 2010, p. 451). However, the findings state that water scarcity does undermine governance and democratic institutions, and that this can lead to conflict.
Next to cross-national quantitative studies, some subnational studies also do not provide support for the neo-Malthusian link. Østby et al. (2011, p. 377; 385) analyses with a large-N study on Indonesian provinces from 1990 to 2003, the link between resource scarcity and population pressure leading to conflict. Next to this, the inter-group dynamics polarization and horizontal inequality are researched. The results show that population growth increases the risk of frequent violence but not of sporadic violence (Østby et al, 2011, p. 395). However, scarcity of productive land does not cause more violence and has a negative relation to sporadic violence.
The studies above are indecisive about the existence of the link between environmental scarcity and conflict. A third category, the cornucopians, has reached a contradictory conclusion that resource abundance will lead to conflict. The cornucopians believe that most natural resources are not scarce, and that population growth will not lead to a resource crisis (Urdal, 2005, p. 419). Humans can overcome these challenges by adapting, which would instead bring development. According to the cornucopians it is abundance of natural resources instead of scarcity which forms an incentive for armed conflict. Resource-rich countries have poor political and economic institutions and are more rent-seeking which leads to conflict (Koubi et al., 2014, p. 232). Resource-rich countries also encounter more civil conflicts. De Soysa (2002,
p. 2) has researched both the effect of scarcity and abundance of natural resources on civil violence with large-N samples. The results indicate that the abundance of mineral wealth has a positive effect on civil conflict, regardless of whether the resources are from poor states (De Soysa, 2002, p. 27). The large-N research from 1970 to 2006 of Salehyan and Hendrix (2014, p. 248) also supports these conclusions by finding that water abundance is positively correlated with organized political violence. However, Salehyan and Hendrix’s (2014, p. 239) research finds that this relation is stronger in countries that are less developed and more dependent on agriculture. This is in support of the “honey pot” hypothesis of the cornucopians, which states that the abundance of natural resources leads to civil strife which stimulates the formation of rebel groups who capture resources and control the revenue streams (Kahl, 2002, p. 267). Another hypothesis of the cornucopians is the resource-curse hypothesis. The resource-curse hypothesis states that an abundance of natural resources can weaken the economy and development of countries, and can contribute to state failure (Kahl, 2002, p. 268). Resource abundance would shift resources away from sectors of the economy that have potential to grow which harms the development of the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, this effect is called the Dutch Disease.
Concludingly, the causal mechanisms between environmental change leading to conflict are complex. While case studies and some quantitative studies support the link between environmental change and conflict, other quantitative studies do not. Different factors contribute to conflict such as population growth and migration, state weakness, competition, and grievances. These factors interplay with environmental factors. Freeman (2017) contributes to the idea that intervening variables could play a role between the causation of environmental change leading to conflict. Freeman (2017, p. 351; 358) argues that environmental change and conflict cannot be directly linked to each other and that migration is an important mechanism that influences the relation. However, violent conflicts do not directly occur because of scarcity, environmental degradation or migration. Conflicts have more profound causes such as existing social, political or economic tensions. Former quantitative research has not shown a consistent causal connection between environmental change and conflict which make the contextual factors more important and requires deeper analysis of the context. More research is thus needed on the possibility of other variables which might explain the link between environmental change and conflict, which is why this paper will conduct a case study to further analyze the causal mechanisms. Although there is much research done on interpastoral conflicts, Freeman (2017)
environmental change and the mechanisms which are possibly responsible for causing the rise of Islamist terrorist groups should be researched (Freeman, 2017, p. 369). That is why, this research paper will analyze the effect of environmental change on terrorist groups. Environmental change as a cause of the occurrence of conflict by the terrorist group Boko Haram at Lake Chad will be researched. The research question is:
To what extent is environmental change a root cause for the rise of Boko Haram at Lake
3. Methodology
To answer the proposed research question, a qualitative historical analysis will be used. The research method is qualitative because it will focus on a case study of Lake Chad (and thus on Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon). A case study research is needed to analyse the complex causal mechanisms which result in conflict. The research will be divided into two sections. The first part will focus on the background of Lake Chad and the occurrence of violent conflicts. Lake Chad is important to research because the lake is one of the lakes in the world with the highest risk of socio-political stress (Okpara, Stringer, Dougill & Bila, 2015, p. 312). Next to this, the size of the lake experiences significant changes due to environmental change. Between the 1970s and 1980s the lake diminished in size with 90% (IRD le Mag, 2020, March 30). However, in the last twenty years the amount of water has augmented. The second part of this research will focus on the terrorist group Boko Haram and the causes for its emergence. According to Thurston (2018, p. 3) Boko Haram forms the outcome of local interactions between religion and politics. The movement is dynamic and has adapted its core doctrine to external events. To answer the research question how climate change has contributed to the formation and existence of Boko Haram, it is needed to closely look at the history of Boko Haram and Lake Chad. This research section will be divided into three sections. First, the regional circumstances around Lake Chad before Boko Haram was founded, in the time period 1960 till 2001. In 2001 Boko Haram was founded and started a method of open-air preaching. Since then, the group has expanded. The period from 1960 is chosen because Nigeria, the country where Boko Haram was founded, gained independence in 1960. Next to this, Lake Chad experienced a time of droughts during the 1970s and 1980s which had an enormous impact on the size of the lake (Onuoha, 2008, p. 46). Furthermore, the foundation for Boko Haram started with the upgrowing of its leaders in 1970. The second section will focus on the time period 2001 till 2009, 2009 being the period when Boko Haram became active around Lake Chad. The third section will focus on the period after 2009 till now.
4. The Desertification of the Lake Chad Basin
Lake Chad is a transboundary lake adjacent to the countries: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. Over the past forty years, the lake has diminished in size (Onuoha, 2008, p. 35). The droughts in Lake Chad started approximately 25 years ago (Treszkai, 2018, p. 54). The droughts have led to a humanitarian crisis, with more than 10.7 million people affected and 2.4 people that were forced to migrate (Omenma, 2020, p. 190). Figure 1 shows the changes in size of the lake (Treszkai, 2018, p. 57). In 2008 the lake was about 2500 km 2 (Omenma, 2020, p. 191). However, the Lake has been growing since then and in 2012 the area consisted of 4516 km 2 with a depth of 11 meters.
Magrin (2016, p. 208) states that figure 1 is incorrect. Due to seasonal changes and variability from rainfall, the lake is constantly changing. This is why, outlining the lake in a figure is not possible. The figure does show the geographical complexity from the four surrounding countries depending on the lake. Different types of ecological zones can be found around the lake: deserts, forests, wetlands, savannahs, and mountains (Omenma, 2020, p. 190). The study of Pham-Duc et al. (2020, p. 6) shows that Lake Chad has been divided into two pools due to the droughts. The northern pool has diminished due to the increase of evaporation and vegetation, and because of the river Komadugu Yobe’s discharge. This was caused by the building of two new dams in Nigeria on the Yobe River in 1974 and 1992 (Treszkai, 2018, p. 58). Due to these dams and poor water management the Yobe’s runoff was reduced with sixty percent. Only one percent of the water reaches Lake Chad, which disrupts the natural balance of the basin. However, the southern pool is more stable (Pham-Duc et al., 2020, p. 6). Stable local rainfall and an increase of discharge by the Chari-Longone river have led to the augmentation of the pool since 2008. In 1964, the four countries surrounding the lake set up the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) (Treszkai, 2018, p. 57). The objective of this commission was to regulate the water and other natural resources. However, the commission could not help the shrinking of the Basin.
The lake is the source of water for more than 30 million people. Furthermore, the lake has a vital function. Sixty percent of the population is dependent for their livelihoods on the economic activities, such as fishing, agriculture, hunting and pastoralism. From the four countries, Chad is the most dependent on Lake Chad (Omenma, 2020, p. 184; 190). The capital of Chad, Ndjamena, and its demographic center are located close to the lake, which makes that 91% of
the Chadian population lives close to the lake. The lake is also of economic importance to Nigeria (Omenma, 2020, pp. 184-185; 190-192). However, for Nigeria the Niger Delta has more economic priority. Cameroon and Niger have equally large populations living by the lake. The lake provides the border areas with resources such as water, grasses, fish, grains, and other raw materials. Next to this, the lake also contains eight oil- and gasfields in 2010. Three of these oilfields are located in Chad and five in Niger.
Figure 1. Lake Chad’s Desertification (1963-2007)
Note. Reprinted from “Water Conflicts. Case Study Lake Chad Conflict”, by Treszkai, A., 2018. Strategic Impact, p. 57.
4.1. Context of Lake Chad: 1960 till 2001
In this part it will be argued that the environmental change of the size of Lake Chad has led to changes in natural resources and natural borders, which partly forms the foundation for the increasing unstable social environment after 2000. The other contributing factors responsible for this foundation have been historical. The environmental and historical factors have together formed the basis for grievances, resulting in migration, ethnic tensions, and poor social and economic conditions. These processes will be discussed below and have formed the foundation for a climate of violence and human insecurity around Lake Chad.
Environmental Factors
Natural Resources and Changing Borders
The desertification of Lake Chad discussed above has resulted in a high variability in access to the natural resources water and land. The Lake has an important function for fishers, herders and pastors who are largely dependent on the lake for their income and livelihoods. Since the 1950s the Lake has attracted many migrants from countries as far as Mali in the Sahel (Magrin, 2016, p. 209). The Lake offered many opportunities for fishers and large areas with fertile sediment for pastorals, which were useful for agriculture. Due to the shrinkage of the Lake the fishers’ productivity has diminished. The fishing crisis in the 1980s and the floodings have contributed to uncertain livelihoods for the fishers. New techniques in the 1990s which make use of rainfall have contributed to a new growth of the number of fishers since the 1990s.
Tensions around Lake Chad
Due to the Lake’s changes, herders and pastors have also been victim of uncertainty. Since the 1990s the agricultural industry has become more lucrative (Magrin, 2016, p. 210). However, the costs to pump over greater distances for irrigated agriculture are high. Agriculture has been important around both the northern and southern pool. Although the northern pool has been more vulnerable. The northern pool dried up seasonally and due to droughts, which caused fishers at the northern pool to change to agriculture. At the southern pool, technical innovations led to a boom in farming systems. These southern farming systems became connected to the urban markets of the cities Maiduguri and N’Djamena. The flood-recession pastures are contributing to sedentary livestock herding and are securing the livelihood of pastoral groups. According to Magrin (2016, p. 210), from the 1970s to the 2000s the number of conflicts between the farmers and herders have been limited. However, Magrin (2016, p. 210) does state
that the socio-political tensions are growing because of the northern pool and its resources, such as water and land, being far more vulnerable than the southern pool. The different ethnic and religious groups that rely on these resources are dependent on local political negotiations. Due to the growing population and migration, the pressure and competition in these areas has also increased resulting in socio-political tensions.
Other researchers such as Onuoha (2010, pp. 33-34) disagree with the statement of Magrin (2016) that the tensions between herders and farmers have diminished. Onuoha (2010, pp. 33-34) argues that the desertification and shrinkage of Lake Chad have made seasonal movements of pastoralists from the northern lake more permanent. During the dry season pastoralists move to the southern part and during the rainy season they move back to the northern region. Because of the continuing shrinkage of especially the northern pool, more pastoralists are settling down in the southern areas. This has resulted in resource conflicts which have the potential to elaborate in ethnic clashes. Onuoha (2010, pp. 26-27) also argues that the development of the agricultural industry cannot be considered as beneficial. With these developments water is increasingly misused in irrigation projects. Onuoha (2010, pp. 32-33) argues that the size variability of Lake Chad has contributed to the conflicts in the area in two ways. First, the contacts between the major livelihood systems has intensified which makes them more competitive. Second, in a response to the situation around the Lake, the level of migration has intensified.
International Borders
The shrinkage of Lake Chad and the change of its size have an important implication on the international boundaries in the region by making them blurred (Onuoha, 2010, p. 33). Fishermen from Nigeria and Niger cross the borders in pursuit of water. This issue has been increasing interstate tensions in the area. The Lake has over time increasingly drifted away from Nigerian and Niger to Chad and Cameroon resulting in many tensions over the access and use of water. An example is the migration of Nigerian fishermen in the 1980s to Cameroon due to the disappearance of water (Treszkai, 2018, p. 58). The borders between the countries existed since colonial times. The fishermen formed about thirty new villages in Cameroon. The Nigerian government claimed that the new villages belonged to Nigeria which led to military conflicts between the two countries. The case was settled in 2002 when it was brought before the International Court of Justice, which decided that Nigeria had to remove its military forces from Cameroon. Due to the environmental degradation and shrinkage of the lake, the countries
Cameroon and Chad are in a military alliance. However, the interstate cooperation has not tackled the root causes of the tensions, which still cause intrastate conflict. The areas around Lake Chad provide safe havens for criminals (Omenma, 2020, p. 185). Criminals need a support base for their material, money, safe houses and recruits. This becomes clear from the guerrilla rebellions which have been active around Lake Chad (Omenma, 2020, p. 193). Most of these conflicts were based on the access of water resources, fishing rights and agricultural land. In 1964, guerrillas of the Sawaba liberation movement occupied Bosso in Niger. In 1978, the “Third Liberation Army” of the National Liberation Front of Chad was based close to the lake. Later on, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Chad was located on the Nigerian border of the lake. They recruited fighters around the lake and in Kanem. In 1990, after the fall of the dictatorship of Habré in Chad, the supporters of the president relocated by the lake under the name Movement for the Defense of Democracy. Since then, the lake has provided safe havens for Tubu rebels, Chadian army deserters and smugglers.
Migration
The environmental degradation has led to interstate and intrastate migration around the lake. This started in the 1950s with the fishermen as discussed above. However, the migration has expanded since many areas in the Sahel experienced droughts in the 1970s (Magrin, 2016, p. 209). Moreover, with the Chadian conflicts of the 1970s-1980s, Lake Chad was an appealing area for migrants. The population has since 1970 grown from 700,000 people to 2 million in 2014. In 2013, the Lake had a total population of 47 million people. The population growth and migrants have resulted in more pressure on the available resources and employment opportunities around Lake Chad, which have caused tension and competition in the region.
The Resource Oil
Next to land and water, oil had important implications for the tensions in Nigeria. In 1956, oil was discovered in the Niger Delta in southern Nigeria (Grobbelaar & Solomon, 2014, p. 230). In 1971, Nigeria was the seventh-largest petroleum producer of the world. Although Nigeria’s economy has profited from this discovery, locally this has not made a difference for many parts of Nigeria. The Nigerian state has made little attempts to improve employment, leading to an overall feeling of dissatisfaction among the population. The discovery of the oil has contributed to the growing gap and tensions between the northern and southern regions of Nigeria. The Niger Delta, which is located in the South of Nigeria, has contributed to the richness of the south. Next to this, the oil discoveries have contributed to making the Niger Delta with Lagos
the commercial capital of the country (Grobbelaar & Solomon, 2014, p. 232). According to Kendhammer (2015, p. 155) the discovery of oil led to an oil-fueled neopatrimonialism. The state installed ethnic networks to organize state-owned oil networks for which ethnic decedents received financial benefit. Local and state-level patrons exploited this new opportunity.
Oil has also been discovered in the Lake Chad Basin. Chad had already found oil on its side of the border since the 1970s (Egypt Independent, 2015, November 9). Since 2006, Nigeria has licensed a Chinese petroleum Corporation to explore the oil blocks in Lake Chad Basin. However, the discovery of oil in the Lake Chad Basin has resulted in growing tensions about the oil and borders between the countries surrounding Lake Chad. Nigeria has not been able to further explore the oil blocks because of the Boko Haram insurgency. In 2017, a group of Nigerian scientists have been kidnapped, after which the oil exploration activities have been put on halt for two years (Reuters, 2017, July 31).
Historical Factors
The region of Lake Chad has formed the foundation for tensions due to natural resources, porous borders, and migration. However, the origin of Boko Haram is namely in Nigeria, which is why this will be the focus to better understand the political context in which Boko Haram emerged. The country Nigeria has been formed out of a Northern and Southern Protectorate in 1900 by the British colonization (Grobbelaar & Solomon, 2014, p. 227). These protectorates both consisted of different ethnical, racial, or tribal groups. Although the northern and southern parts of Nigeria have merged to one country, the division between the two regions is still visible religiously. Nigeria exists out of at least 250 different ethnic groups. However, a broader division can be made between northern Nigeria which largely exists out of a Muslim population and the south which are largely Christians (Campbell, 2011, May 25). In Nigeria the three largest groups with the most political influence are the Igbos in southeastern Nigeria, the Yorubas in southwestern Nigeria and the Hausa-Fulanis in northern Nigeria (Grobbelaar & Solomon, 2014, p. 229). These groups were all very diverse. Northern Nigeria was once the center of an Islamic empire, the Sokoto Caliphate, which has caused a strong religious identity to be formed for the Hausa-Fulanis. However, the Yorubas in southwestern Nigeria defined themselves ethnically. These ethnic and religious divisions have formed the basis for possible conflicts, especially since the independence of Nigeria in 1960. In northern Nigeria, clashes between Muslim and Christian communities became regular. Campbell (2011, May 25) argues
ethnic differences and the competition for access to resources. The south is richer and has better access to natural resources such as water and oil as discussed above, which continues the feeling of marginalization in the north. The economy of the north experienced decline because of lack of investments in infrastructure and agriculture, and deindustrialization. Kendhammer (2015, p. 152) also argues that after independence in 1960, the division of land between ethnic groups, and the north-south division, led to growing tensions. Competition over access to patronage led to a series of violent military coups. In 1966, this led to the secession of the Eastern region and the Nigerian Civil War (1967-70). Nigeria then changed to an ethnofederal model, dividing regions to prevent war.
Furthermore, the north has a backlog in education and has a higher rate of illiteracy than the south. The colonial influence of Britain has contributed to this educational gap between the north and the south. The lack of education can already be found during the Sokoto Caliphate in the 19th century (de Montclos, 2017, p. 28). The Muslim children went to Qur’anic schools.
Britain forbade Christian missionary schools in northern Nigeria to undermine the Sokoto Caliphate, which had become necessary for indirect rule to maintain order. Although the British attempted to change the education until 1936, they failed and did not invest in the education systems. As a result of independence in 1960, the northern Muslims were behind in education compared to the Christians in the south.
All in all, environmental and historical factors have both formed the foundation for tensions between northern and southern Nigeria. The environmental factors that contributed to this foundation were natural resources and porous borders resulting in migration and tensions. The historical tensions were mainly caused by the north-south division. Both environmental and historical factors have led to grievances in the north.
4.2. The Rise of Boko Haram: 2001 till 2009
As discussed in the first part, the environmental variability and history of Lake Chad have been the cause for grievances leading together to migration, ethnic tensions, and poor social and economic conditions. This has formed the basis for a climate of violence and human insecurity. In this part it will be argued that this climate of violence and human insecurity has led to more mistrust towards the state. The criticism towards the state formed the reasoning for Boko Haram to begin their movement. Previous movements will be discussed to show the similarities with Boko Haram in opportunities and its operations leading to the rise of conflict.
The History of Boko Haram
The name Boko was derived from the term “ilimin boko” referring to the education which was brought by the colonialists. Boko Haram thus means that western education is a sin (BBC News, 2014). The origin of Boko Haram has been debated. Some believe that the origin can be found in 1995 (Aghedo, 2017, p. 70). The group would have used a different name such as Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra Sahaba, Nigerian Taliban, Yusufiyya. The name Boko Haram would be an alias for the real name “Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal Jihad”. Other scholars believe that Boko Haram was founded in 2002 in northeastern Nigeria in Borno State by Mohammad Yusuf (Ladbury, Allamin, Nagarajan, Francis & Ukiwo, 2016, p. 3). Boko Haram’s rise and career can be divided into five phases (Thurston, 2018, p. 2). The first phase, from the 1970s to the 1990s, forms the basis for the movement. The founders grew up in an insecure environment with interreligious violence, urbanization and political uncertainty. The second phase, from 2001 to 2009, was devoted to open-air preaching and making the movement known. Between 2003 and 2004 a part of Boko Haram focused on attacking local authorities. The year 2009 formed a key year for Boko Haram. In 2009 Boko Haram turned to jihadism and caused violent rebellions in northern Nigerian States. During this year Boko Haram’s founder, Mohammad Yusuf, was killed. During the third phase, from 2010 to 2013, Boko Haram turned into a violent terroristic movement, bombing cities and performing assassinations in Nigeria. During the fourth phase, from 2013 to 2015, Boko Haram occupied a region in northeastern Nigeria and suppressed the civilians. The fifth state started when Boko Haram’s territory was attacked and taken over by Nigeria’s military and the neighboring countries. Boko Haram intensified its terroristic activities. In March 2015, Boko Haram declared to be affiliated with the Islamic State.
During the 1970s in Nigeria, Salafist movements began to criticize the Sufis which led to growing tensions (de Montclos, 2017, pp. 25-26). Salafism has a strict interpretation of Islam and follows the Quran, while Sufis were focused on recitations and followed the Sufi saints (Zajac, 2014, p. 98). Salafist movements have been hostile to Sufism because they argue that Sufism is not the true Islam and corrupts the religion. The Iranians supported the Shi’ites and Sufis, leading to even more division between the different groups (de Montclos, 2017, pp. 25-26). The movement of Mohammed Yusuf opposed all the current Islamic movements in Nigeria: Sufism, Salafism or Shiism. The original incentives for the formation of Boko Haram were to protest against the corruption and un-Islamic rule, and to criticize the current patrimonial governance systems (Ladbury et al., 2016, p. 3). The movement was well-received among the population. In the previous years, from 1999 to 2001, twelve northern Nigerian states had introduced Sharia law in order to address corruption, inequality, and injustice. These changes did not meet the expectations of the local population. Since 2000, Mohammed Yusuf had been active in governmental functions to promote the need for sharia law, for example in the Council of Ulama from the city Maiduguri. In 2002, Mohammed Yusuf was named the representative of the local government at the Board of the State Commissioner of Religious Affairs in Damaturu, the capital city of the region Yobe (de Montclos, 2017, p. 26). During the 2003 and 2007 elections, Mohammad Yusuf negotiated with the governor of Borno (de Montclos, 2017, p. 20). This shows that Boko Haram did not only undertake armed actions to impose their version of sharia. Since 2001, the movement had received financial support by the local authorities to participate in the formation of Islamic tribunals. According to Iyekekpolo (2020, p. 758) political elites have also made Boko Haram more politically relevant which gave Boko Haram the opportunity to make extreme demands. In 2003, Borno’s state governor appointed a Boko Haram member into government, who then began to demand full implementation of sharia.
Membership and Recruitment
Boko Haram’s movements consists of different actors. The main actors are Islamist militants, criminals, and thugs that are linked to northern political elites (Grobbelaar & Solomon, 2014, pp. 237-238). Boko Haram has followers in 19 different states in Nigeria. Next to this, the movement has members in Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Sudan. The members consist of dissatisfied youths, unemployed graduates, and Almajiris. Almajiris is a practice where children have to study under Islamic preachers in the northern cities of Nigeria.
According to Grobbelaar and Solomon (2014, p. 238) these people are attracted by Boko Haram for several reasons. First, the financial incentives. Boko Haram pays their members for participating in the movement and criminal practices. Secondly, kinship. Northern Nigerians feel affiliated with the movement because they are related to the members or followers. Thirdly, interreligious and government violence. Because of the many historical conflicts between the Muslims and Christians, revenge can be an important factor for people to become a member of Boko Haram. Fourthly, radicalization. Some Nigerian imams have radicalized people who then became members of Boko Haram. The different types of members and manners in which they are attracted to Boko Haram are important because it shows that the circumstances around Lake Chad play an important role in the recruitment and thus in the growth of Boko Haram. The lack of financial alternatives and poverty in the region makes the financial incentives of Boko Haram attractive for the local population. The state has an important role in this as well because it was unable to create more economic opportunities which could have reduced the number of people who were attracted to the movement. The tensions between the different Muslim groups and Christians also play an important role in the reasons for which the Nigerian population becomes a member of Boko Haram. The geographical location of Lake Chad, with its lack of opportunities, has thus formed the basis for recruitment.
The importance of the geographical location for the rise of Boko Haram can be noticed even more when examining the ethnicity of Boko Haram. According to Pieri and Zenn (2017, p. 54) the factor of kinship is highly important. Boko Haram exists for eighty percent out of Kanuri which originate from the ethnic Karnuri-led Kanem-Borno Empire (700-1900) which was an Islamic Caliphate (Pieri & Zenn, 2017, p. 42). The Kanuri hold the important leadership positions within Boko Haram and the movement was originally started from the Kanuri heartland in Maiduguri, Borno State. The recruited men in the region are mainly Kanuri.
Resemblances with Earlier Movements
According to several academic scholars, Boko Haram’s movement is similar to several historical non-state movements in Nigeria, such as the Usman dan Fodio Caliphate (1804-1903), the Kanuri-led Kanem-Borno Empire (700-1900) and the Maitatsine rebellion (1980-1985) (de Montclos, 2017, pp. 29-42; Aghedo, 2017, p. 65). These three movements will be discussed to examine the similar factors in the rise and growth with Boko Haram.
Usman dan Fodio Caliphate (1804-1903)
The Sokoto Caliphate was founded by Usman dan Fodio in 1804 and lasted until 1903 in northwestern Nigeria (Grobbelaar & Solomon, 2014, pp. 234-235). Boko Haram has been accused of following the example of Dan Fodio by focusing on its withdrawal from society by creating new schools and different education. Similar to Dan Fodio, both groups turned to more violence when the police pressure augmented, and the movements grew in size. Both Mohammad Yusuf and Usman dan Fodio have been viewed as charismatic and mystical preachers (de Montclos, 2017, p. 26). Boko Haram and Usman dan Fodio were both focused on combatting the state. Mohammed Yusuf criticized the corruption and the democratic governance, while Usman dan Fodio mainly fought against the tax on cattle farming in its early stages (de Montclos, 2017, p. 29). Boko Haram has used the Sokoto Caliphate of Dan Fodio as an example for an “northwestern model” (Pieri & Zenn, 2017, p. 43). The motives and type of leadership were thus similar.
The Kanem-Borno Empire (700-1900)
The Kanuri-led Kanem-Borno Empire was founded in 700 and lasted until 1900 (de Montclos, 2017, pp. 29-42). The regime of Dan Fodio threatened to overthrow the Kanem-Borno Empire (Pieri & Zenn, 2017, p. 55). The leader of the Kanem-Borno Empire during this time, Muhammad Al-Kanemi, was regarded as the savior of Borno from the Dan Fodio movement. Al-Kanemi was seen as a religious scholar as well as a political leader. The leaders of Boko Haram have a negative image of Al-Kanemi because he marginalized the Kanuri’s. However, Boko Haram has expressed their awe for the achievements of the Kanem-Borno Empire. Boko Haram exists partly as discussed earlier out of Kanuri, and its key financiers have also been Kanuri at the start of Boko Haram (Pieri & Zenn, 2017, p. 56). It can thus be argued that the Kanem-Borno Caliphate has resurfaced with the movement of Boko Haram as they are both Kanuri-led.
The Maitatsine Rebellion (1980-1985)
The Maitatsine rebellion was founded in 1980, in the northern city of Kano (Aghedo, 2017, p. 65). Since then, it has grown to other regions such as Maiduguri in 1982, the city where Boko Haram was founded. In 1985 the movement was suppressed by the military. During the rebellion’s active years, they have killed over 10,000 people. Aghedo (2017, p. 65) blames the uprising of the Maitatsine rebellion on the regional circumstances including many intermittent riots and revolts during that time. Furthermore, the uprising can be considered a result of the
religious intolerance between the different Muslim groups and the division between Islam and Christianity. Next to the religious division, the ethnic diversity has been indicated as a root cause. The root causes for both the Maitatsine rebellion and Boko Haram uprisings were thus similar. The messages and methods of operation of both groups also correspond. (Aghedo, 2017, p. 71). Both groups insisted on the need for Islamic law instead of secularism and Western education. The Maitatsine leader Marwa condemned Western consumer goods. Both the Maitatsine and Boko Haram rebellions have called for an Islamic state or Caliphate and rejected democracy. Similar to Boko Haram, the Maitatsine argued that democratic governance led to corruption and the oppression of the population. The Biafran War in 1967-1970 and the oil-producing Niger Delta region both led to socioeconomic marginalization and grievances in the northern region of Nigeria. The modus operandi was both very similar for the Maitatsine and Boko Haram rebellions as both used enclaves and ungoverned territories (Aghedo, 2017, p. 73). The Maitatsine rebellion mainly used kidnapping and killing of the population or security agents as their weapons. Bombs and explosives were not as popular during this time because of the lack of available knowledge. The geographical location of Lake Chad provided the Maitatsine rebellion with the same opportunities as Boko Haram. The humanitarian crisis in the region caused by grievances and migration has been the ongoing reason for many tensions during the last few decades. Lake Chad’s surrounding countries have not been able to manage the humanitarian crisis and tensions. The ethnic tensions and porous borders with the other countries surrounding Lake Chad have provided the foundation for violent movements to occur.
It can be concluded that Boko Haram’s movement has not been unique in its rise and motives. The Sokoto Caliphate and Maitatsine rebellion show similar grievances as a foundation for uprisings, to the case of Boko Haram. Criticizing the state by a charismatic leader because of its corruption or un-Islamic law have been shared motives for all these movements. The state has contributed to the rise of these movements by not addressing the criticisms and tensions. The Kanem-Borno Empire shows the history of the Kanuri ethnicity that also dominates the movement of Boko Haram. The three former movements have also contributed to the receptiveness of the message of Boko Haram (Trémolières & OECD, 2013, p. 103). The geographical location of Lake Chad has provided grievances, a lack of opportunities, and divided ethnicity and religion as a basis for all these movements. The countries around Lake Chad have not been effective in addressing the criticisms, resulting in more tensions and grievances which served as a motivation for these movements. Moreover, the state did not
had, could have prevented the attractiveness of Boko Haram for the people in the region. The historical rebellion movements have functioned for Boko Haram as examples on how to start and lead the movement. This created the foundation for the receptiveness of Boko Haram’s message.
4.3. Boko Haram’s Deadly Resurfacing: 2009 – 2020
After discussing the reasons for the rise of Boko Haram, the reformation of the movement in 2009 will now be discussed. Furthermore, the motives and factors responsible for the growth of the violent movement will be analyzed.
In 2009, Boko Haram gained popularity because of a violent confrontation between the movement and the Nigerian armed forces which resulted in the death of more than 700 people (Aghedo, 2017, p. 70). During this confrontation the leader of Boko Haram, Mohammad Yusuf, was arrested and murdered while he was in police custody. After this clash, the group went underground and re-emerged with a new leader in 2010: Mallam Abubakar Shekau (Ladbury et al., 2016, p. 3). The group took on a new name in July 2010: jama'atu ahli s-sunna li-d-da'awati wa-l-jihad (JAS) (Trémolieres & OECD, 2013, p. 105). JAS re-settled in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, and started with revenge attacks on the security forces (Ladbury et al., 2016, p. 3). Under Shekau’s lead, the group became more radical, using suicide bombings, guerrilla tactics, and women and children to perform their attacks (Akinola, 2017, p. 134). Under the current leader, Shekau, the group had between 120,000 and 200,000 members (Aghedo, 2017, p. 70). During this time, JAS began attacking the local population. Both Christians and Muslims were targeted in public spaces (Ladbury et al., 2016, pp. 3-4). In mid-2013, the ‘Civilian Joint Task Force’ (CJTF) drove JAS out of Maiduguri. However, JAS regrouped in the rural areas where they continued to attack the surrounding cities. In August 2014, Shekau announced the creation of a Caliphate in Northeastern Nigeria under the control of JAS (Pieri & Zenn, 2017, p. 41). JAS continued to annex towns in Borno, Yobe and Andamawa States. In February 2015 a multinational force, including Chadian troops, stopped JAS’ momentum before the Nigerian presidential elections in February. In February 2016, almost all the territories were retaken from JAS by the Nigerian army.
Meanwhile, Shekau had also been in contact with jihadi groups in other countries. In July 2010, Boko Haram pledged its allegiance to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Trémolières & OECD, 2013, p. 105). Furthermore, JAS has links with al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM and al-Shabaab have trained JAS and financed the rebellion. These organizations have contributed to JAS’ violent transformation. One of JAS’ biggest attacks took place on 26th of August 2011 when the United Nations headquarters in Abuja was attacked with
a suicide bomber in a vehicle with explosives. The attack gained JAS international attention (Onuoha, 2014, p. 3). There have also been indications that AQIM ordered JAS to perform
State (IS) (Ladbury et al., 2016, p. 4). JAS was then renamed the ‘Islamic State in West African Province’ (ISWAP). The multinational force set up in 2015 is nowadays still attacking JAS. However, JAS has continued with its insurgences with the last operation on the 23rd of March 2020 with a massacre against the Chadian soldiers (The Guardian, 2020, March 24). Ninety-two Chadian soldiers were killed by Boko Haram. Boko Haram has thus changed from a movement which criticized the state before 2009, to a violent movement that also attacks the local population. The attacks have resulted in intra- and international migration around Lake Chad.
International Dimension
Boko Haram has been one of the biggest security challenges in Nigeria (Onuoha, 2014, p. 5). However, the movement’s activities have also had a regional impact on the other countries surrounding Lake Chad. Since 2010, due to the porous borders, Boko Haram has actively expanded towards the other countries: Cameroon, Chad and Niger (Agbiboa, 2017, p. 109). The first movement of Boko Haram before 2009, recruited their followers already beyond Nigeria (Thurston, 2018, pp. 244-245). When Boko Haram turned to jihadism in 2009, the recruitment in Chad was limited. However, in southeastern Niger and northern Cameroon Boko Haram found support. During this time of Muhammad Yusuf, the movement also had a presence in Niger. In Niger during the 1990s and 2000s, a wide debate had gained presence about the country’s inheritance of colonial rule and laïcité. Boko Haram benefitted from this climate of skepticism about Niger’s political system. In Cameroon, Boko Haram was also active early on. Especially in 2010 and 2011 when Boko Haram became a violent terroristic movement, youth sympathized ideologically with them (Thurston, 2018, p. 247). Between 2012 and 2015, the recruitment of Boko Haram changed from voluntary membership to the paying of their followers for help in performing attacks. That is why many youths joined Boko Haram in order to survive. Since 2011, Boko Haram’s network for recruitment, training and indoctrination has been international. These practices take place in camps in Mali, areas of Niger, Cameroon, Chad, Sudan, some cells are also located in the Central African Republic (Onuoha, 2014, p. 6). Since May 2014, Cameroon has been a key location for the planning of Boko Haram’s cross-border attacks in Niger, Cameroon and Chad (Onuoha, 2014, pp. 7-8). These transnational attacks which have been possible due to the porous borders around Lake Chad, have important consequences such as migration. More than six million residents of the states Borno, Yobe and Adamawa have been affected by the attacks. In 2013, 300,000 people from these states have fled and the number of refugees has been growing with each attack. These numbers do not
include the number of refugees that have fled across Nigeria’s borders. This has resulted in more pressure on the scarce resources such as food and water. The health facilities have also experienced violence from Boko Haram which has caused many to fled or be shut down. Many farmers and cattle herders have been displaced due to Boko Haram’s violence, leading to severe food insecurity. Boko Haram has thus changed from a non-violent religious group in 2001 to a violent group with aggressive campaigns after 2009. The environmental factors such as scarce resources around Lake Chad have, together with the migration, contributed to heightened tensions in the region which have provided Boko Haram with opportunities to thrive.
Explanations for the Violent Resurfacing
According to Omenma (2020, pp. 193-195) Boko Haram’s motive is debated. However, it is clear that the movement changed from a non-violent religious group to a rebellion movement. Three motives are often cited for the change to violence. First, a religious motive focused on advocating the Islamic sharia law and rejecting Western education. Secondly, a political motive focused on gaining power and controlling government patronage. Thirdly, the poverty theory by whom Boko Haram is seen as a grassroot movement caused by anger for marginalization, deprivation and poverty. According to Higazi and Brisset-Foucault (2013) vengeance was an important motivation for Boko Haram. The state had created injustices and Boko Haram’s people felt they were the victims in the conflict of 2009. An important demand of the group was to liberate their prisoners whom the state would be torturing. The countries around Lake Chad have been unable to address these criticisms which resulted in more tensions in the region.
Several factors that fueled the violent reorganization of Boko Haram in 2009 can be examined. First, a weak state fueled the resurfacing of Boko Haram. In 2011, after Nigeria’s elections, the southerner and Christian, Goodluck Jonathan, became the president of Nigeria (Aghedo, 2017, p. 66). Since 2007, the northerner Yar’Auda had been president. According to the northern elite, this change of power was a violation of the ruling People’s Democratic Party’s agreement that the north would be in power until 2015. The announcement of Jonathan as the presidential election winner in 2011 formed the trigger for post-election violence. Furthermore, Jonathan was also a Christian which meant that the change of power not only triggered the tensions between the north and the south, but also between the Muslims and the Christians. Next to the presidential changes resulting in violence, Nigeria’s counter-insurgency strategy is argued to fail (Akinola, 2017, pp. 129-131). The security forces in Nigeria were corrupt and discouraged
arms to underpaid soldiers because they were afraid that they would sell them. Between 2013 and 2015 Boko Haram regularly invaded Nigeria’s military bases and stole the weapons, after which the capabilities of the Nigerian military were questioned (Akinola, 2017, pp. 131-134). The Nigerian government hired private military contractors and mercenaries which raised questions about the insufficiency of the government’s resources. The Nigerian government has openly acknowledged several times that they are unprepared for the guerrilla strategies and suicide bombings of Boko Haram. The lack of state control has given Boko Haram the possibility of trafficking weapons and drugs (Trémolières & OECD, 2013, p. 103). In 2012, Nigeria’s government confirmed that Boko Haram received the weaponry from Libya after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime. However, there is not much known about these networks. The state has thus been unable to repress Boko Haram’s movement due to its weak coercive mechanisms such as the security forces, armed forces and the police, which could have repressed the violence and the growth of the movement. The weak position of the state had already contributed to the uprising of the movement because it was unable to address the grievances, tensions, and economic inequalities around Lake Chad. According to Iyekekpolo (2020, p. 761) another factor which contributed to Nigeria being a weak state are the factionalized political elites in the partial democracy who could not put aside their interests in power to combat Boko Haram and which became even more important during the power struggle for presidency in 2011. Boko Haram’s movement was motivated in 2002 by criticism against the state. If the environmental factors such as scarce resources would have been addressed earlier, the growth of Boko Haram’s movement could have been prevented.
Second, the violent insurgency of Boko Haram has worsened the social and economic conditions in the north (Trémolières & OECD, 2013, p. 100). This has in turn provided Boko Haram the opportunity to flourish and rebuild. In 2012, the borders between Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger have been temporarily closed due to the threat of Boko Haram in the border towns (Trémolières & OECD, 2013, p. 106). This had negative effects on the economies and shows the challenge to security and stability that Boko Haram poses around Lake Chad. As discussed above, Boko Haram’s insurgency has led to many inter- and intrastate refugees which contributed to the humanitarian crisis (Onuoha, 2014, pp. 7-8). Environmental factors such as food insecurity and lack of water and land, have also contributed to this crisis. The resources around Lake Chad are scarce and due to migration, they are now divided under even more people, which increases competition and tensions. Furthermore, the intensive migration in the region was possible due to the porous borders. The environmental factors have thus together with Boko Haram’s movement resulted in a vicious circle which worsens the social and
economic conditions in the north of Nigeria. The economic opportunities in the region were already scarce and due to the growth of the population this has increased. Lack of economic alternatives have brought people the incentives to participate in conflict. If the state would have addressed the environmental factors such as scarce resources, porous borders but also the lack of economic opportunities, people would have had less incentives to participate in Boko Haram’s movement.
All in all, Boko Haram’s movement has changed from a movement that criticized the state before 2009, to a violent movement that also attacked the local population. The attacks have resulted in migration around Lake Chad. The violent resurfacing of Boko Haram after 2009 was possible due to the weak coercive mechanisms from the police, security and armed forces of the state and the factionalized political elites. Weak states provided Boko Haram the opportunity to resurface and to carry out violent attacks, which have contributed to pressures and tensions. This resulted in migration in the region. Due to the migration more people have to use the scarce resources in the region. The environmental factors, scarce resources and porous borders, and Boko Haram’s movement have thus created a vicious circle of worsening social and economic conditions in the north of Nigeria, which have caused the humanitarian crisis.
5. Conclusion and Recommendations
In this study the effect of environmental change on the occurrence of conflict has been researched. A historical analysis of a case study has been conducted on the extent to which the environmental change around Lake Chad has caused the rise of Boko Haram. It is important to note that the analysis has focused on the contextual regional factors influencing the connection. The research consists of three parts. The first part focused on the period before Boko Haram was founded, from 1960 to 2001. The second part analyzed the rise of Boko Haram, from 2001 till 2009, and the third part focused on the resurfacing of Boko Haram from 2009 till now. The results show that environmental factors were partly a root cause for the rise of Boko Haram. The contextual foundation for the rise of Boko Haram was constructed in the 19th century. A combination of environmental factors and historical factors have created the incentives and opportunity for the movement of Boko Haram to rise. The environmental factors include scarcity of natural resources, changing borders, pre-existing tensions between ethnic and religious groups, fishermen and herders, and migration. The historical factors include the border construction and poor educational levels effected by the British colonization, and the historical tensions between religious and ethnic groups resulting in a north-south division in Nigeria. Eventually, the environmental and historical factors have caused grievances which have been the incentives for Boko Haram to rise. Earlier examples of caliphates and movements in the region have provided examples for Boko Haram and have contributed to the receptiveness of Boko Haram’s message across the population. After 2009, the violent resurfacing and regional expansion of Boko Haram has been mainly possible due to a weak state and poor counter-insurgency programmes, and the worsening regional social and economic conditions which have contributed to migration and a humanitarian crisis.
This research has been limited in that it cannot comprehend all the contextual factors which influence the relation between the environmental change of Lake Chad and the rise of Boko Haram. Next to this, the motives of Boko Haram are unclear and have been debated which complicates making assumptions about the reasoning behind the rise and resurfacing, or the methods of the movement. Future research would be recommended to continue the focus on local-contextual factors influencing the relation between environmental change and terrorism in different regions. Small-scale quantitative analysis would be recommended. Policy recommendations would include a focus on addressing the root causes on which Boko Haram’s existence is dependent which will not only be beneficial for the humanitarian crisis but also facilitate the counterinsurgency programmes. According to Médecins sans Frontières (n.d.) the
states have currently only focused on combatting the armed groups instead of the humanitarian crisis. Another recommendation would be a long-term policy in which the states manage Lake Chad and address the lack of economic opportunities due to the scarce resources of land and water, for example with laws for fishing and land.
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