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Master Thesis CSM  June 8, 2017

Hybrid Threats in Political Discourse: What has changed?

A Study into the Concept of Hybrid Threats in the European Union

Lotte Hulshof - s1889001

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs - Campus The Hague First supervisor: Dr. Els de Busser

Second supervisor: Dr. G.M. van Buuren

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“All things are subject to interpretation; whichever interpretation prevails at a given time is a function of power and not truth.”

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Abstract

Since 2014, hybrid threats have become so-called buzzwords and have been an often-debated topic in European Union (EU) political discussions. The EU argues these threats have significantly changed its security environment and proposes all kinds of measures for the organization and its Member States to combat these threats. By calling hybrid threats a “new type of threat” the EU seems to suggest hybrid threats are a new phenomenon. Within academics, however, this is debated. Many argue the novelty of hybrid threats only resides in its label. This research argues hybrid threats are indeed not new. By distinguishing between the content of the concept of hybrid threats and EU framing on these security issues, this analysis concluded that the EU has increased its political attention towards hybrid threats, because it frames these threats to be new, not because these threats are substantively unprecedented. Nonetheless, this research discovered various legitimization strategies the EU uses to emphasize the need for increased EU coordination in combating these threats.

KEY WORDS  concept of hybrid threats  threats of a hybrid character  framing  labelling  legitimization  European Union  political discourse

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Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION ... 1

CHAPTER 1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 3

1.1HYBRID THREATS IN ACADEMICS ... 3

1.2HYBRID THREATS IN EU POLITICS ... 7

1.3FRAMING, BUZZWORDS ... 7

1.4COPENHAGEN SCHOOL SECURITIZATION ... 8

1.5REYES’ ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ON LEGITIMIZATION ... 10

CHAPTER 2 METHOD... 11

2.1RESEARCHING “CHANGE” ... 11

2.2EXPLANATION AND METHOD OF THE SUB-QUESTIONS ... 12

2.3OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS ... 15

2.4REFLECTION ON THE RESEARCH METHOD ... 16

CHAPTER 3 DEFINING AND FRAMING OF HYBRID THREATS: 2014-2017 . 17 3.1INCREASED ATTENTION TO HYBRID THREATS:CRIMEA AND ISLAMIC STATE ... 18

3.2HYBRID THREAT CHARACTERISTICS ... 21

3.3FRAMING ... 25

CHAPTER 4 THREATS OF A HYBRID CHARACTER: 2002-2014 ... 27

4.1MADRID TRAIN BOMBINGS ... 28

4.2ESTONIA CYBER ATTACKS ... 33

4.3RUSSO-GEORGIA WAR ... 39

4.4SIMILAR EVENTS ... 45

4.5CONCLUSION ... 46

CHAPTER 5 EU FRAMING AND LABELLING: 2002-2014 ... 47

5.1MADRID TRAIN BOMBINGS ... 48

5.2ESTONIA CYBER ATTACKS ... 52

5.3RUSSO-GEORGIA WAR ... 55

5.4FRAMING AND LABELLING IN STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS ... 59

5.5CONCLUSION ... 60

CHAPTER 6 LEGITIMIZATION ... 61

6.1EU POLITICAL ATTENTION INCREASES ... 62

6.2SECURITIZATION ... 62

6.3REYES’ LEGITIMIZATION STRATEGIES ... 64

6.4THE FRAMEWORK APPLIED ... 65

6.5CONCLUSION ... 69

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION ... 70

CHAPTER 8 REFLECTION ... 71

8.1ACADEMIC AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION, STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS . 71 8.2FUTURE RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS ... 74

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Introduction

“[…] Hybrid warfare is nothing new. It is as old as the Trojan horse” is what NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said at the opening of the 2015 NATO Transformation Seminar in Washington DC (Keynote speech, 2015). Recently, however, “hybrid warfare” and “hybrid threats” have become so-called buzzwords and have been a central topic for debate within the international community, especially at EU and NATO level (Jacobs & Lasconjarias, 2015: 1). The EU argues its “security environment has changed dramatically” because of these “changing forms of threats” (Commission, 2016: 2; EEAS, 2015: 2). Therefore, one of the main issues on the EU security agenda is how to properly defend the organization and its Member States against these hybrid threats. New security policies are being developed and in the latest EU Global Strategy, as presented last year by High Representative Federica Mogherini, one of the five priorities for EU foreign policy is to increase the resilience of states and societies east and south of the EU, where hybrid threats are most present (Legrand, 2016). These elements all seem to suggest that hybrid threats according to the EU are new, and that they constitute a complex challenge to the organization as a whole and its individual Member States (Popescu, 2015: 1). However, within academic literature the novelty of hybrid threats is debated. Some scholars argue hybrid tactics have not only been a Russian strategy for a long time, but also one of Western countries, while others point to hybrid threats posing a new type of threat to the international community (Galeotti, 2016; Popescu, 2015). Moreover, there is neither clarity nor consensus among scholars and policymakers on how to define “hybrid warfare”, or “hybrid threats” and the terms are therefore often used interchangeably and arbitrarily (idem, 2).Therefore, by conducting research into the concept of hybrid threats, this thesis will investigate the novelty of these threats, both substantively and conceptually. It aims to explain what has changed that has made hybrid threats a priority topic at EU political level and why the EU has only recently become more concerned with hybrid threats. In other words, it aims to find out whether the concept of hybrid threats has effectively changed recently and poses a new type of threat to the EU, or whether the concept substantively refers to the same type of threat, but is now framed differently at EU political discussions. The main research question will therefore be:

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Why have hybrid threats become a priority topic in European Union political discussions and how does the European Union legitimize this priority position?

In order to answer the main question, this research will be guided by various sub-questions. As the research focuses on the EU level of analysis, first the scope and content of the concept of “hybrid threats” according to the EU will be analysed by answering the sub-question: “How has the European Union defined and framed hybrid threats between 2014 and 2017?”. Once the characteristics assigned to hybrid threats by the EU are outlined, the second sub-question will aim to find out to what extent these hybrid characteristics can be traced back in certain security threats that took place in the EU’s past. For this purpose, three case studies will be conducted. The second sub-question to be answered will therefore be: “To what extent has the European Union dealt with threats of a hybrid character between 2002 and 2014?”. Subsequently, the selected cases will be assessed on how the EU speaks about and describes these threats by analysing the following question: “How has the European Union framed and labelled threats of a hybrid character between 2002 and 2014?”. Finally, once it is explained why hybrid threats have become a priority topic in EU political discussions, the fourth sub-question will go into EU legitimization on the increased discussion of hybrid threats at the EU-level by questioning: “How does the European Union legitimize hybrid threats as a priority topic at its political discussions?”

By answering these questions, this research could first of all be very relevant within academia, as hybrid threats are currently under great attention of policy makers, but academically it is a relatively underdeveloped field of study. Various scholars have written on the concept of hybrid threats, but hardly any empirical research has been conducted on what hybrid threats mean in policies and practice. Therefore, this thesis will provide such empirical research and will add to the development of the academic conceptualization of “hybrid threats” in the field of crisis and security management. It will moreover contribute to the academic debate on the novelty of hybrid threats, by establishing whether hybrid threats have substantively changed, or whether the way these threats are presented by the EU has changed.

Secondly, the knowledge on the concept of hybrid threats this research develops can be valuable to both European and non-European policymakers.

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Although hybrid threats are currently a priority on the EU security agenda, societal clarity about what these threats actually are, is lacking. Similar to the discussions on the term “terrorism”, the term “hybrid threat” is very clear, but its components and characteristics are numerous and disputed. For policymakers it is therefore difficult to establish what these threats mean in practice and how to properly defend a country, or a whole an international organization like the EU, against these threats. By linking hybrid threats to more familiar threats, this research could provide more clarity on what characterizes a hybrid threat, how it can be recognized and where these threats come from. By thus creating a more profound understanding of the concept, policy makers might recognise hybrid threats at an earlier stage and measures to tackle and defend against these threats can become more targeted.

Hence, this thesis is constructed as follows. The chapter following this introduction will be devoted to outlining the theoretical framework of Securitization Theory and will be elaborating on the concept of “hybrid threats”. Secondly, the methods section will explain how this research was built and what aspects of EU top-level discussions will be taken into account. Subsequently, the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth chapter will each go into one of the before-mentioned sub-questions. Finally, the main findings of this research as well as suggestions for future research and practical recommendations will be presented in the last two chapters.

Chapter 1 Theoretical framework

It is important to note that this research will not go into the scope of a hybrid threat or its proximity to the EU to answer for the increased political attention paid to hybrid threats. Instead, this is a study into the concept of hybrid threats, of which the analysis is based on the criteria assigned to hybrid threats by the EU. The goal of this research is to find out how the concept of hybrid threats can explain for these threats becoming a priority topic in the EU’s political discussions.

1.1 Hybrid threats in academics Interchangeable use of concepts

As remarked before, the terms “hybrid threat” and “hybrid warfare” or “hybrid war” are often used interchangeably both within academic literature and policymaking (Jacobs & Lasconjarias, 2015: 2). Therefore, the same will be done while outlining

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the theoretical framework on these concepts. However, Pawlak (2015: 1), an author of the European Parliamentary Research Service, does distinguish between “hybrid threat”, “hybrid conflict” and “hybrid war” based on the variety of intensity of a threat and the intentions of the actors involved. As “hybrid” means “something that is of mixed origin or composition”, the term “hybrid threats” already suggests a multiplicity of threats.1 Accordingly, Pawlak describes a “hybrid threat” as “a phenomenon resulting from convergence and interconnection of different elements, which together form a more complex and multidimensional threat” (ibid.). “Hybrid conflict” and “hybrid war” are more specific categories and in both cases hybrid tactics are deployed by a state to achieve certain strategic goals. Nevertheless, there is a difference. In hybrid conflict the parties do not use overt tactics against each other. Instead, they rely on the combination of military intimidation and economic, political and diplomatic means to achieve their goals. During hybrid war these mixed means are also used, but in addition, a country does overtly use armed forces against another country or a non-state actor (ibid.). However, for the sake of consistency and because the EU in its political discussions mostly uses the term “hybrid threats”, only this term will be used in the chapters following the theoretical framework of this research.

Origins

The concept of “hybrid warfare” was first used in academics in 2002 by William J. Nemeth in a thesis at the United States Naval Postgraduate School (Andersson & Tardy, 2015: 2). Nemeth (2002: 29) recognized the asymmetry of hybrid warfare and the mixed use of both the traditional means of warfare and modern technologies and mobilization methods. He speaks of a “hybrid society”, which uses all possible tactics against the enemy, such as controlling food or water supplies and blurring the distinction between combatants and non-combatants (idem: 74). Moreover, he emphasized modern, technologically advanced societies are the main targets of hybrid warfare, thereby warning for what could become “the West’s main future threat” (idem: 29) and recommending the West to adapt its warfare tactics (idem: 76).

Only later on the term “hybrid warfare” gained public attention when Lieutenant General Mattis and Lieutentant Colonel Frank Hoffman, both from the United States (US), wrote about it in a 2005 US Naval Institute Magazine under the

1 Retrieved from the Merriam Webster Online Dictionary:

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heading “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” (Mattis & Hoffman, 2005). They argued future enemies would use a combination of techniques, merging different means of war, thereby creating an “unprecedented synthesis” of hybrid warfare (idem: 1). In subsequent years, Hoffman has written various articles and books on hybrid war and hybrid threats. He defines a “hybrid threat” as “any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behaviours in a battle space to obtain their political objectives” (idem: 2).

Recent conceptualizations

These elements can also be identified in more recent academic conceptualizations of hybrid threats or hybrid warfare. A universal definition is provided by Jacobs and Lasconjarias (2015: 3), who define hybrid war merely in terms of a violent conflict including both state and non-state actors, using conventional and unconventional means not limited to a particular physical territory. Pawlak (2015: 1) also emphasizes this mixture and remarks hybrid threats refer to “the interconnected nature of challenges […], multiplicity of actors involved […] and diversity of conventional and unconventional means used”. Furthermore, he argues hybrid threats can have very diverse origins, including for example terrorism, cyber attacks, organised crime, maritime disputes, constraints to the use of orbital space, the strategic use of another country’s resource dependency, or covert operations (idem: 2). Especially cyberspace has become a new domain from which threats occur. The United States (US) strategic doctrine has even recognized cyberspace to be of equal importance as the land, air, sea and space domains (Deibert, Rohozinski & Crete-Nishihata, 2012: 3). Jasper and Moreland (2014: 3) also specifically characterize hybrid threats by referring to the use of blended tactics, terrorism, and criminal activity. They moreover point to the flexible and adaptable structure of hybrid threats, often including paramilitary forces, and the use of propaganda and information warfare tactics, which disregard International Law (ibid.).

Thus, these definitions of hybrid threats are often very similar. They just highlight different features. In general, as the “hybrid” part of hybrid threats already suggests, it can be discovered that most definitions share the assumption that hybrid threats consist of a mixture of both conventional and non-conventional means in order to achieve certain objectives.

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How new and useful are these terms?

Despite all academic conceptualizations, the terms hybrid threat, hybrid warfare and hybrid war are still used interchangeably, arbitrarily and without any clear, undisputed definition (Jacobs & Lasconjarias, 2015: 2). The academic debate mainly revolves around the novelty and usefulness of the terms. Supporters of the concepts, such as Hoffman, argue hybrid warfare is a new type of warfare because 21st century technologies and communication mechanisms are used and new combinations of capabilities are deployed that are different from traditional war methods (Jasper & Moreland, 2014: 1). Bachmann and Gunneriusson (2015: 88) also call the characteristics they attribute to hybrid warfare as “features of the new war”. They describe hybrid warfare as a “new form of war” posing “new threats” (idem: 77). However, some scholars disregard both the novelty and usefulness of the term “hybrid threat”. First, critics argue “hybrid threat” is merely the latest term to refer to what might already have existed in the past, namely the combination of war across domains and the use of irregular or asymmetric measures (Kofman & Rojansky, 2015: 2; Jasper & Moreland, 2014: 1; Van Puyvelde, 2016). Cederberg & Eronen (2015: 3) also argue the international community has already experienced similar activities, only referred to by other terms, such as “non-linear operations, low-intensity conflict, full-spectrum conflict, political warfare, unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, asymmetric warfare and unrestricted warfare”. “Hybrid threats” would thus merely be a label to make sense of security issues and to refer to an already existing trend of how modern wars are fought (Kofman & Rojansky, 2015: 1-2). Moreover, the rise of for example cyber warfare as a hybrid tactic, critics argue, “has not fundamentally changed the nature of warfare, but expanded its use in a new dimension” (Van Puyvelde, 2016). Second, critics argue the concept of hybrid threats is too abstract and broad, which creates confusion and undermines the utility of the term in practice (ibid.). Any mix of conventional and non-conventional capabilities could be ranged under the concept (Sadowski & Becker, 2010: 2).

The academic discussion on hybrid threats is therefore twofold. Some scholars argue only the term is new, while others emphasize the actual threat posed to international peace and security has changed. For the latter, also the content of the concept is new.

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1.2 Hybrid threats in EU politics

As will be explained in chapter 3, only many years later than within academics, the concept of hybrid threats gained attention at the EU political level. The conceptualizations of hybrid threats that will be guiding for this research will be outlined in this chapter. These conceptualizations of hybrid threats and the criteria assigned to them will serve as a tool to explain whether the actual threat posed by hybrid threats changed over time and whether this can explain for hybrid threats becoming a priority topic in EU politics. However, this is only the first part of the analysis, as phenomena do not only gain political attention because of substantive change, but also because they have been given a different meaning by policymakers. Thus, in order to conduct research into a concept to find out why a certain phenomenon gained political attention, as this thesis aims to do, an analytical framework is needed that explains how policymakers possibly interpret, present and use a concept. In other words, analytical tools are needed to explain how EU policymakers frame the concept of hybrid threats.

1.3 Framing, buzzwords

Framing is a principle used in all kinds of academic fields and a lot has been written on the topic, also related to the EU. According to Reese (2001: 1), framing is “the way events and issues are organized and made sense of”. Moreover, frames are “organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world (idem, 5). Framing can take place at the individual level or at the larger level, creating aggregate shifts in collective issue definitions (Baumgartner & Mahoney, 2008: 435). Schaffner & Sellers (2010) note there is not much agreement on how to define framing, as it is applied differently across fields of study, such as psychology, sociology, communications, and political science. However, they also argue that in practice, researchers have largely accepted a broader definition of framing, namely “information that conveys differing perspectives on some event or issue” (idem: 2). This study will only go into framing within politics in order to assess EU framing on hybrid threats. Political framing is often used in discussions concerning issues, certain events such as war or disasters, or during campaigning (Klar, Robison, & Druckman, 2012). Druckman (2001) argues that when it comes to politics, one can distinguish

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between two uses of framing. The first one is what he calls “frames in communication”, which means a frame refers to the words, images, phrases, and presentation styles politicians use to transfer information (idem: 227). The words a politician chooses reveal what he or she must perceive most relevant to the topic. For example emphasizing security issues in a discussion could be a sign that the politician uses a security frame to refer to the issue. The second use is “frames in thought”, by which a frame refers to what a politician is thinking, as opposed to what he or she is saying or writing. A frame here describes one’s perception of a situation (idem: 228). Therefore, when analysing EU framing on hybrid threats for this research, both the wordings and underlying ideas of the EU will be taken into account, thereby being aware of the directly visible, as well as more covert elements of framing.

Related to framing are so-called “buzzwords”. These are “words that define what is in vogue” (Cornwall, 2007: 472). They are labels that can provide space for political actors to make their own meaning of a certain issue or event, because the content of the concept can be far from concrete (idem: 474). Cornwall (ibid.) describes this by arguing buzzwords “shelter multiple agendas”. The term “hybrid threat” is now often called a buzzword by the critics just discussed, who emphasise it is just the latest label to refer to already existing threats (Jacobs & Lasconjarias, 2015: 1). This research aims to find out whether the term “hybrid threats” is indeed merely a buzzword.

1.4 Copenhagen School Securitization

In their book “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) recognise the power of framing. In their book they explain what makes something an international security issue and how certain issues gain political attention. According to their theory, something becomes a security issue when it “is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object”, for example the state, or because of increased interdependency of states, the international system as a whole (idem: 21-22). A problem is thus presented as a priority issue (idem: 25). Within politics, an existential threat can be a threat to the sovereignty or ideology of the referent object (idem: 22). The authors mention an existential threat to the EU can be an event that might make an end to its integration process (ibid.). Moreover,

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international regimes or societies can be existentially threatened by situations undermining “the rules, norms and institutions that constitute those regimes” (ibid.).

The particularity of the issue, now being framed as a security threat, in turn legitimizes the use of special measures to deal with it. This is what the authors call “securitization”. It means “the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (idem: 24). At the international level, which is the level studied for this research, this means an issue is presented to be of such importance that it cannot be dealt with through “normal” politics, but instead requires to be addressed by top leaders as a priority topic (idem: 29). Thus, when an issue is securitized, politics move beyond normal rules by framing the issue as something special. This way, public issues can also be non-politicized, which means they are not made a topic of public debate, or politicized, meaning the issue is a topic of debate and should be dealt with through conventional procedures, instead of the special procedures justified when an issue becomes securitized (ibid.). Where issues are placed on this spectrum depends on the circumstances. However, it is important to note that an issue is only successfully securitized if the audience accepts this, either through force or consent (idem: 25). Without this platform, emergency measures are hard to be legitimized and one can merely speak of a “securitizing move” instead of securitization (ibid.). Successful securitization thus requires framing something as an existential threat, taking extraordinary actions and gaining enough support to do so.

In this research, Securitization at the political level will be used in chapter 6 to analyse how the EU legitimizes the amount of political attention paid to hybrid threats at the EU level, as it makes a clear connection between framing and legitimization. The analytical framework of Securitization suits this research very well, especially because of the constructivist assumptions behind it. Buzan et al. (1998: 24) namely emphasize “the meaning of a concept lies in its usage” and that it cannot be analytically defined according to what is best. Securitization thus recognises the power of framing, which is an essential part of this study. Moreover, the authors argue the process of securitization is best studied through studying discourse (idem: 25). As can be derived from the second chapter, this is exactly the method used in this research.

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Possible limitations

Although Securitization takes a prominent position within studies of international relations, it is also often criticized for its usefulness in practice. McDonald (2008) explains various criticisms on Securitization. His main argument is that the framework of Securitization is too narrow. Its sole focus on framing an issue as an existential threat in order to determine the nature of an act according to McDonald ignores understanding security in particular contexts and misses a lot about the construction of security (idem: 564, 578). For this specific research, this could mean the fixed character of Securitization with its sole focus on framing an issue as an existential threat limits its ability to fully explain EU legitimization on its political attention to hybrid threats. It could be discovered that the EU has used various arguments to legitimize the increased EU-level political attention to hybrid threats. The extensive analysis of a significant amount of EU documents on hybrid threats will have to demonstrate this. In case the EU indeed attempts to legitimize increased EU political attention to hybrid threats through various ways, Securitization can still be applicable. However, the explanation on how the EU has legitimized hybrid threats as a priority topic at its political discussions would become one-sided, in the sense that this question would only be answered by analysing whether or not the EU has framed hybrid threats as an existential threat, thereby disregarding possible other legitimization strategies. Therefore, in case the EU turns out to come up with a variety of attempts to legitimize its increased political attention to hybrid threats, another analytical framework will be used to cover these ways of legitimization. This framework, which is outlined in Antonio Reyes’ 2011 article called “Strategies of legitimization in political discourse: From words to actions”, is not as established as Securitization, but nonetheless very useful, as it provides five possible legitimization strategies in political discourse.

1.5 Reyes’ analytical framework on legitimization

Reyes’ analytical framework draws on a substantive analysis of previous studies on legitimization. He also uses theoretical concepts and ideas from both Critical Discourse Analysis and linguistics to explain the ways in which language can control discourse, and therefore to reveal the power of language (Reyes, 2011: 785, 804). His interdisciplinary data collection has turned Reyes’ ideas into a reliable framework.

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Moreover, his focus on language suits this research, because in order to discover how the EU has legitimized its increased political attention for hybrid threats, I will also mainly rely on linguistics and the wordings of the EU institutions in their written texts. Furthermore, Reyes, like in this research, focuses on political discourse. He argues legitimization deserves special attention in political discourse, as it is through language that politicians justify their political agenda and decide on the course of a whole country or even several countries (idem: 783). As legitimization in political discourse according to Reyes is intentional and planned in order to be persuasive, he explains five strategies a speaker can use to justify political goals (ibid.). Although Reyes mainly draws on examples from speech acts, his framework is still very useful for this research, as written text within politics are also usually intentional and persuasive, and this research also partly involves speech analysis.

“Legitimization”

The analytical framework provided by Reyes might not only be useful because of its five legitimization strategies in case Securitization lacks explanatory value. It also explains what “legitimization” means in political discourse. Legitimization originally refers to making something legal or legalized. However, nowadays it is also used outside of the legal domain and often used interchangeably with the word “justification” (idem: 782.). Legitimization is a process by which speakers aim to influence a type of social behaviour (782). It is therefore a justification of a mental or physical behaviour (ibid.). It is enacted through argumentation to explain certain actions or ideas, and is related to a goal, which often seeks one’s support and approval (ibid.). The interlocutor has to become to perceive something as the right thing to do. This conceptualization of legitimizations will be taken into account in chapter 6 of this research, which aims to find out how the EU has attempted to justify its behaviour regarding political attention to hybrid threats.

Chapter 2 Method

2.1 Researching “change”

As already mentioned before, this is a study into the concept of hybrid threats and the goal of this research is to find out how the concept of hybrid threats can explain for these threats becoming a priority topic in EU political discussions. Therefore, the

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focus of this research lies on analysing what has changed or is new concerning hybrid threats that has made these threats a EU political priority topic. This will be done on the one hand by analysing whether the concept of “hybrid threats” changed substantively. That is to say whether the content of the concept has changed over time. On the other hand, its novelty will be assessed by analysing whether the meaning of hybrid threats as formulated by the EU has changed, so whether EU framing has changed over time.

In this process of “change” in political attention to hybrid threats, a turning point can be discovered, differentiating between the situation “before” and “now”. In this study, the year 2014 will be regarded a turning point, significantly increasing EU political attention to hybrid threats. First of all, because many scholars refer to Russia’s performance in Ukraine in March 2014 as the event increasing security concerns in the West and encouraging political discussions (Galeotti, 2016: 282; Cederberg & Eronen, 2015: 2). Secondly, because the EU itself recognises its security environment significantly changed in 2014. The EEAS specifically mentions the appearance in 2014 of “two key developments dominating security agendas”, being Russia’s performance in Ukraine and the advancements of Islamic State both within and south of the EU (EEAS, 2015: 2). It will thus be discovered whether the concept of “hybrid threats” has substantively changed over time and its content is new, or whether hybrid threats are problems that have already existed before 2014 and just have been given a new buzzword.

In the next section, the selection and method of the various sub-questions will be explained and justified.

2.2 Explanation and method of the sub-questions

1. How has the European Union defined and framed hybrid threats between 2014 and 2017?

In this part of the research the scope and the content of the concept of “hybrid threats” according to the EU will be analysed. This will be done by analysing what characteristics the EU assigns to hybrid threats and what the EU mentions as examples of hybrid threats. Since hybrid threats have only recently become a priority topic in EU political discussions, the documents in which the EU describes hybrid

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threats mostly stem from 2014 onwards. Though in 2011 the EU mentioned the concept, policymakers did not explain what they meant with it. Therefore, this part of the research will look into the definition of hybrid threats of the EU between 2014 up to the present, 2017. Moreover, it will look into how the EU has framed hybrid threats during this period, in order to make a comparison with the third sub-question.

Method:

To determine the characteristics, all kinds of EU documents will be analysed. Examples are policy proposals, meeting minutes, conclusions, and official publications of various EU institutions, as well as various EU Security Strategy documents, such as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The institutions will mainly be the European Commission (Commission), the European Council, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), and the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA). The characteristics found will be used as indicators for answering the second sub-question. These documents will also be used to analyse EU framing on hybrid threats for this period.

2. To what extent has the European Union dealt with threats of a hybrid character between 2002 and 2014?

In order to determine whether the content of hybrid threats has changed and whether hybrid threats are indeed a new type of threat, it must be determined whether the EU has already experienced hybrid threats, or at least “hybrid-like” threats, in the past. This is important, because although the EU might not have used the term hybrid threats before 2011, that does not mean that hybrid threats, or threats showing hybrid characteristics, did not exist back then. Especially since academic literature, starting to use the concept in 2002, suggests hybrid threats did exist in earlier times. Therefore, the timeframe for this part of the research will be 2002-2014, from the time the term was first used in academics, up to the time when the term gained attention at the EU political level.

Method:

This part of the research will analyse whether the characteristics the EU assigns to hybrid threats, as found by answering the first sub-question, can be found back in

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incidents the EU had to deal with in the past. As the academic literature suggests the world has experienced hybrid threats throughout history, there is a reasonable suspicion that this will indeed be the case. Hence, three cases will be selected that, based on either academic insights or EU statements, seem to possess the hybrid characteristics presented in the first sub-question. These cases are therefore purposively sampled. They represent significant incidents in which the EU was involved. Finally, it will be explained to what extent and why these cases can be perceived as hybrid threats, or at least hybrid-like threats.

3. How has the European Union framed and labelled threats of a hybrid character between 2002 and 2014?

In this section, the three cases selected under the second sub-question will be assessed on how the EU framed and labelled these threats in the past. How has the EU spoken about these threats and has the EU maybe described these threats with certain concepts?

Method:

For this purpose, the same kind of documents as for the first sub-question will be used. However, these three case studies are very specific. Therefore, in order not to overlook anything regarding EU frames on hybrid threats, more general EU security strategy documents of this time period will also be analysed, thereby creating a balance between the general and the specific.

4. How does the European Union legitimize hybrid threats as a priority topic at its political discussions?

Once it is established why hybrid threats have become a priority topic in EU political discussions, it would be interesting to look into the perception of the EU itself regarding its increased political attention to hybrid threats, by analysing how it has legitimized this. In order to do so, the analytical framework of Securitization will be used to find out whether the EU has framed hybrid threats as an existential threat, thereby prioritizing hybrid threats as a security issue on its political agenda. However,

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as indicated in the theoretical framework, Reyes’ analytical framework might be used as well to come to a more thorough analysis of EU legitimization for this research.

2.3 Operationalization of concepts

As the theoretical framework of this research has shown, academic conceptualizations of hybrid threats are very complex. The unit of analysis for this research, however, is the EU and therefore the EU perspective on hybrid threats will be taken as the starting point for this study. Using the academic definition would harm internal validity, as a change in EU political attention to hybrid threats could then also be the result of the EU simply not recognising threats before 2014 to be hybrid because it used other standards to assess the hybrid character of the events. The concept of “hybrid threats” will thus be operationalized by analysing how various EU institutions describe and characterize hybrid threats. Common characteristics will be deduced from these descriptions to serve as indicators of hybrid threats in the analysis of the three case studies. Moreover, in case a security threat contains only some of the characteristics of hybrid threats as determined in the first sub-question, this threat will be called a “hybrid-like” threat. “Threats of a hybrid character”, then, refers to the threats analysed in the three case studies, as these threats are most likely to reveal hybrid characteristics, but are not officially called hybrid threats by EU policymakers. Furthermore, various aspects of the last sub-question on legitimization require clarification. First of all, Reyes’ definition of legitimization, which is “a justification of a mental or physical behaviour”, will be used as the basis for analysing EU legitimization in this research and will be operationalized by applying Securitization, possibly complemented by Reyes’ legitimization strategies. Secondly, hybrid threats as a “priority topic” in this sub-question is understood as hybrid threats being often discussed at the EU level. How the EU legitimizes that it often discusses hybrid threats at the EU level, in turn, is indicated by the reasons the EU provides to explain its emphasis on the necessity to increase EU coordination in combating hybrid threats. In other words: how does the EU legitimize that it emphasises the necessity of increased EU coordination to combat hybrid threats, and therefore that hybrid threats are often addressed at its political discussions? Lastly, when speaking of “EU-level political discussions” this research refers on the one hand to meetings of the various EU institutions, especially those of the Commission, the European Council, the FAC

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(especially when discussing the CSDP), and the JHA, and on the other hand to the broader security strategy documents of the EU.

2.4 Reflection on the research method Research design

This will be an explanatory research, as it aims to explain why a certain phenomenon occurred, namely why hybrid threats have become a priority topic at the EU political level. The unit of analysis, therefore, is the EU as a whole. The research seeks to find out whether the change in EU political attention was caused by changing threats or changing frames of the same kind of threats. Therefore, the independent variables are the criteria assigned to hybrid threats by the EU between 2014 and 2017, and the frames of EU policymakers on hybrid threats for the periods of 2002-2014 and 2014-2017. What will be studied is the influence of these aspects concerning the concept of hybrid threats on the dependent variable of the change in EU political attention to hybrid threats. As the influence of a concept within politics does not only depend on its meaning in terms of characteristics and indicators, but also to a significant extent on its usage by policymakers, the influence of both content and framing aspects of the concept of hybrid threats will be studied. In terms of internal validity this means the analysis does at least show how the concept of hybrid threats can explain the change in political attention of hybrid threats, which is exactly its goal. Nevertheless, this research should not and does not claim to go beyond a conceptual explanation for the change in EU political attention to hybrid threats. Internal validity can however at the same time be a possible pitfall of this research. For the second and third sub-questions, three cases are sampled that need to develop general knowledge on both the content and EU framing on threats of a hybrid character in the past. It could be questioned whether one can do so, merely on the basis of these cases. Nevertheless, it needs to be remarked that the cases were selected by purposive sampling. They were chosen based on both academic insights, the criteria the EU nowadays assigns to hybrid threats, and recent examples of hybrid threats the EU provides. Besides, the individual cases each represent much more common threats, such as terrorism and cyber attacks. Therefore, the selected cases can, at least to some extent, be regarded as “typical” examples to develop general knowledge on EU framing on hybrid threats in the past. Furthermore, this research will provide a clear external validity. First of

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all, because it decouples the content of a concept (its features) from its phrasing (the term). This could also be done for other concepts of which the term is very clear, but the content much less so. An example could be the concept of “terrorism”. Moreover, making the connection between the content and phrasing of a concept on the one hand, and the political attention for the concept on the other hand, could also be done for other concepts, of which terrorism again can be an example.

Data collection and assessment

Considering its explanatory character and in order to keep this study feasible within the relatively short amount of time available, this research will limit itself to conducting qualitative document analysis of all kinds of publicly available EU (policy) documents. The latter will consist of policy proposals, meeting minutes, conclusions, and official publications of various EU institutions, as well as documents providing EU security strategy guidelines and priorities. As already explained, the institutions representing the EU for this research will mainly be the Commission, the European Council, the FAC (especially when discussing the CSDP), and the JHA. The unit of observation for this research will thus be EU-level documents. Although qualitative document analysis is thus the most feasible and efficient way to provide sufficient explanatory value to reliably answer the main research question, the lack of a triangulation of methods could possibly affect the reliability of the findings.

The EU documents will be analysed by using the method of discourse analysis. This method is mainly interested in how people make sense of certain phenomena and how things are classified in order to make sense of the world. That is exactly what this research aims to discover. It will look into how EU policymakers make sense of hybrid threats. Therefore, discourse analysis is the way in which the data need to be assessed in order to discover the criteria EU policymakers assign to hybrid threats and their frames on these threats. By focusing on associations, language and meaning making, discourse analysis not only suits the study of frames, but also contributes to discover tactics of legitimization used by policymakers.

Chapter 3 Defining and framing of hybrid threats: 2014-2017

This part of the research will analyse the increased political attention of the EU for hybrid threats from 2014 up to the present, 2017. It will explain how the EU has

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defined hybrid threats in this period, by focusing on the characteristics the EU assigns to these threats and the examples it provides. In addition to these characteristics, the wordings of the EU when speaking about hybrid threats will be analysed to find out how the EU framed these threats in this period.

3.1 Increased attention to hybrid threats: Crimea and Islamic State

In EU politics, “hybrid threats” as a term was taken into account only many years later than within academia. One of the first times the term was mentioned, was in November 2011, in a Commission proposal to the Council on the establishment of a specific plan to implement “Horizon 2020”, a programme proposed to fulfil the EU’s 2020 policy agenda, in which the EU supports research and innovation (Commission, 2011). The Joint Research Centre, which provides scientific and technical support to EU policies, should contribute to tackling global security challenges. (ibid.). In this context, the Commission mentioned “new areas to be addressed include vulnerability and resilience to emerging or hybrid threats” (ibid.). More recently, however, the topic is discussed much more often at the EU political level. In 2014, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker (2014: 11) in his Political Guidelines for the upcoming Commission stressed the importance for Europe to work together more closely in the fields of security and defence. Therefore, on the request of the Foreign Affairs Council in May 2015, the High Representative of the European Union Federica Mogherini, in close cooperation with Commission services, the European Defence Agency and EU Member States, presented at the end of 2015 a Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats (Commission, 2016: 1). This Joint Framework contains 22 proposals for the EU and its Member States to counter hybrid threats and improve resilience against these threats. In this Joint Framework, the Commission emphasized “[I]n recent years, the European Union’s security environment has changed dramatically” (idem: 2). It thereby mainly referred to two “key developments” near the EU borders, especially to Russia’s performance in Ukraine to its East, and the increased threat posed by the Islamic State to the EU’s South (EEAS, 2015: 2).

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Crimea

In February 2014, the Russia-oriented President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych was voted out of office by the Ukrainian parliament (Pinkham, 2017). This happened after months of large protests in the country because of the corrupt and violent rule under Yanukovych, fuelled by his refusal to sign an Association Agreement with the EU (ibid.). Only weeks later, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin sent his “little green men”, soldiers without insignia on their uniforms, to the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea, which once belonged to the former Soviet Union and is still for a large part inhabited by Russians (ibid.) His troops quickly won over, or overrated the Ukrainian ones without many casualties (ibid.). Contrary to Kiev’s proposal to vote for a new government, the Supreme Council of Crimea, seized by soldiers and taken over by newly appointed officials, voted to hold a regional referendum on the status of Crimea (Yuhas & Jalabi, 2014). This was legitimized by claiming the interim government in Kiev had staged a coup by removing Yanukovych from his position (ibid.). In the end, after the Crimean parliament had already declared Crimea to become part of Russia, a large majority of its inhabitants voted accordingly (ibid.).

Russia’s goals in this conflict are not exactly clear. Possible reasons could be the perceived threat of the expansion of NATO at Russia’s Western border, the revived idea of Soviet Union imperialism, or merely the impulsive response to the fall of Yanukovych (Treisman, 2016). Nevertheless, to many policymakers and scholars it is evident that Russia’s use of kinetic means by deploying military forces in Crimea seems more of a last resort to annex the peninsula, after years of using subversive and diplomatic means (Jonsson & Seely, 2015: 9, 11). Namely, in the course of the years, Russia has spread a lot of disinformation in Ukraine (idem: 13). It controlled and maintained the narrative that a political preference of independence from Russia was fascist, anti-Russian, as in the past Ukrainian nationalists had committed cruelties on the Russians (ibid.). Moreover, before the referendum, propaganda banners to secede from Ukraine were widely present in Crimea (ibid.). Information flows were further controlled by destroying phone and Internet cables to Crimea and taking over various media stations. So-called “trolls” were used, which are people hired to post pro-Kremlin comments on news and social media messages (idem: 14). Russia has also attempted to put pressure on Ukraine economically and politically. First of all by imposing various product bans on Ukrainian goods. Only after the Yanukovych government suspended negotiations with the EU on a possible Association Agreement

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these bans were removed and gas prices for Ukraine were reduced by one-third (idem: 16). Russia thus linked its commercial relationship with Ukraine to the orientation of the Ukrainian government (idem: 17). Finally, a number of pro-Russian groups, funded and coordinated by Moscow, were present in Crimea. They have tried to increase tensions in the peninsula by spreading hatred against ethnic Ukrainians, manipulating Russian language rights and creating aversion towards NATO (Gwaltney, 2006).

Therefore, many countries, including all EU member states, declared the referendum to be illegitimate (EEAS, 2015: 2). According to the EU, Russia had violated international law by limiting Ukraine’s territorial integrity and using hybrid tactics, thereby destabilizing the region (EEAS, 2015, 2). Moreover, the EU claimed Russia had not only affected Ukraine, but had also attempted to divide the international community and the EU by blaming the latter and its proposed Association Agreement with Ukraine for having caused the conflict (ibid.).

Islamic State

The Islamic State (IS) is a radical militant Sunni movement mostly present in the Middle East and Africa. IS has taken control over territory in Iraq, Syria and Libya from which it aims to establish the caliphate (Laub, 2016). IS uses both conventional and non-conventional means to achieve its goals. The movement has proved in Iraq with its firepower and troops that it is able to rapidly conquer strategically important cities or roads (Jasper & Moreland, 2014: 3). IS managed to obtain weapons such as mines, explosives, chemicals, missiles and drones, which are used to attack the opponent and obstruct offensive actions (ibid.). These conventional means are supported by strict ways of governance to suppress opposition and by incorporating local civilian insurgent groups to uphold the captured areas (idem: 4). IS furthermore uses acts of terrorism to scare local and international populations and to spread their message. They regularly publicize beheadings and target cultural or religious places that represent a shared heritage, with the aim to divide entire societies (idem: 5). By violating fundamental rights and funding themselves by means of organized crime and illegal oil sales, IS disregards international laws (idem: 7). Additionally, professional propaganda movies are created to present IS fighters as heroes and social media is used for recruitment, marketing, fundraising and denouncing Western values (idem: 5-6). By means of this propaganda, IS has gained support from people abroad,

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including Europeans, who are radicalized by these campaigns and join IS as foreign fighters (idem: 6). The EU, therefore, is very concerned about the expansion of IS and its ideology to Europe and emphasizes the possibly severe consequences when European foreign fighters return to the continent (EEAS, 2015: 2). Moreover, the EU is worried about the regional instability IS creates to Europe’s South and its increased affiliations with other militias (ibid.). For example in 2015, Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria announced its allegiance to IS, the BBC reported (“Nigeria's Boko Haram pledges allegiance to Islamic State”, 2015). Another example of such militia is Al Shabaab in East Africa, which CNN reports is connected to Al-Qaeda (“Al-Shabaab joining al Qaeda, monitor group says”, 2012).

3.2 Hybrid threat characteristics

The EEAS (2015: 2) and the Commission (2016: 2) thus point to these two threats, creating instabilities both within and near Europe, as the main developments leading to political attention to hybrid threats. Taking these events as examples, how does the EU, then, define hybrid threats? Several EU institutions have tried to come up with a description of the term. The EEAS (2015: 2) characterizes hybrid threats as the “centrally designed and controlled use of various covert and overt tactics, enacted by military and/or non-military means, ranging from intelligence and cyber operations through economic pressure to the use of conventional forces”. Another important characteristic of hybrid threats according to the EEAS is the attacker’s use of both coercive and subversive measures (ibid.). The latter can include sabotage or disruption of services, such as communications and energy supplies. For these purposes, proxy insurgent groups can be deployed, or aggressive acts can be covered behind the pretext of “humanitarian intervention” (ibid.). Moreover, massive disinformation campaigns established to control the narrative are an important element of hybrid threats (idem: 3). The abovementioned measures aim to exploit a country’s vulnerabilities and create ambiguity in both the affected population and the international community at large by blurring the distinction between war and peace (ibid.). This way, the attacker impedes full attribution and effective response by the opponent. The ultimate goal of the aggressor is to undermine and destabilise an opponent and to politically influence or even dominate a country in order to achieve an “overall strategy” (idem: 2).

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In its proposal to establish the EU Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats, the Commission also points to the characteristics of exploiting vulnerabilities, creating ambiguity, and using disinformation campaigns and social media to control the political narrative or to radicalize, recruit and direct proxy groups (Commission, 2016: 2). The Commission moreover argues the concept of hybrid threats in general includes “the mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare” (ibid.). Like the EEAS, the Commission in this description recognises the mixed use of various methods, the coordinated way these measures are deployed, and the aggressor’s aim to achieve certain objectives. It moreover refers to the blurring distinction between war and peace. However, the Commission’s description is different in the sense that it specifies that hybrid threats can originate from either state or non-state actors. Nonetheless, it remains relatively vague about the specific objectives these actors may want to achieve, while the EEAS refers to undermining, destabilising and political objectives.

The FAC (2016) is also concerned about hybrid threats. In an explanatory video on its website, the FAC explains the aim of the attacker is to destabilise and undermine the enemy by using both military and non-military means, including cyber-attacks, disruption of communications or energy supplies, and massive disinformation campaigns using social media (ibid.). Other characteristics are distorting facts to create ambiguity and to hide what happens on the ground, thereby impeding rapid decision-making (ibid.).

Characterization instead of definition

However, the EEAS at the same time recognises it is very difficult to come up with a clearly delimited definition of hybrid threats and suggests that one should rather speak in terms of characterizations of these threats when explaining their main features (EEAS, 2015: 2). The Commission even argues one should not aim to strictly define hybrid threats, as this would ignore its changing and developing nature. Hence, conceptualizations of hybrid threats should remain flexible (Commission, 2016: 2). Therefore, this research will not come up with its own definition of hybrid threats. Here, only its most important characteristics according to the definitions and

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descriptions provided by the EU will be highlighted in order to find out under what conditions threats obtain a hybrid character. Like academic conceptualizations, the definitions of the EU institutions slightly differ from one another. However, this is caused rather by differences in emphasis and wording, than in meaning. In general, several common characteristics the EU nowadays assigns to hybrid threats can be derived from these definitions. It can be assumed that these documents represent the EU’s contemporary view on the features of hybrid threats, as they were presented in recent years by various EU bodies and institutions.

General characteristics

The characteristics assigned to hybrid threats by the EU can be reduced to four general features of these threats, each exemplified by the events of Crimea and the development of IS. First of all, hybrid threats are usually centrally coordinated and controlled by state or non-state actors. In the case of Crimea, the Russian state coordinated the threat by sending troops to the peninsula, spreading disinformation and using propaganda. The organization of IS is an example of a non-state actor regulating terrorist attacks and recruiting new members by propaganda campaigns.

Second, hybrid threats, as the word “hybrid” already implies, are characterized by the use of a mixture of various tactics and methods. This mixture can consist of covert, overt, coercive, subversive, conventional, unconventional, military and non-military tactics. A very important one for hybrid threats are the massive disinformation campaigns using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalize, recruit and direct proxy groups. As the EU has learnt from Russia’s performance in Crimea, a combination of diplomatic, economic, technological and military means was used. Russia pressured Ukraine by adapting gas prices according to the latter’s political course, destroying communication systems and sending troops to the peninsula of Crimea. Additionally, Russian propaganda in Crimea aimed at influencing the outcome of the referendum by blackening Ukrainians. The performance of IS also shows a combination of conventional means, namely all kinds of weapons, and the use of proxy insurgent groups and propaganda, which can be regarded unconventional. Moreover, the anti-Western narrative of IS aims to radicalize people, increase the group of foreign fighters and strengthen people’s affiliation with the organization.

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Third, the aggressor’s aims are to exploit a country’s vulnerabilities, create ambiguity in the affected population and the international community, and impede full attribution and effective response by the opponent by blurring the distinction between war and peace. In Crimea, Russia responded to the vulnerabilities of Kiev in that region by appealing to the Russian-speaking population in the region and making use of Ukraine’s energy dependency. Moreover, the Russians created ambiguity, as in the international community it was debated whether the appearance of the “little green men” as a military force was a violation of the Geneva Conventions (Lasconjarias & Larsen, 2015: 120). Furthermore, it is hard to hold the Russians accountable for their actions. Although the referendum did not meet international law, the result of the majority voting in favour of joining Russia made it possible for Moscow to justify the annexation of Crimea by presenting it as the will of the people (idem: 117-118). IS also responds to vulnerabilities, namely those inherently present in Western states. EU Member States face difficulties to respond to the spread of hatred, among others because they are open societies, safeguarding the freedom of speech (EEAS, 2015: 3). Moreover, their political systems traditionally focus on fighting other state actors. They are therefore not yet able to effectively defend themselves against hybrid threats originating from non-state actors and proxy insurgent groups (ibid.).

Finally, the fourth characteristic of hybrid threats is that the ultimate goal of the attackers is to undermine and destabilise an opponent and to politically influence or even dominate a country in order to achieve specific objectives. The EEAS has clearly formulated this characteristic. Although the Commission remains rather vague about the objectives of the attacker, it also recognises the attacker somehow aims to control the political narrative (Commission, 2016: 2). Russia created a lot of insurgencies in Ukraine, which revealed the fundamental disagreements between various populations, thereby undermining the unity of the country (Jonsson & Seely, 2015: 9, 11). By trying to influence Ukraine’s political course through blackmailing, influencing the political narrative and ensuring a referendum took place, the Russians also aimed to influence the country politically. IS also aims to divide the international community by creating fear, denouncing Western values and replacing them by radical Islamic ideas (Jasper & Moreland, 2014: 5-6).

As this part of the research establishes a characterization rather than a definition of hybrid threats according to the EU, not all requirements have to be fully met in order

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for a threat to be hybrid or, at least, hybrid-like. Nevertheless, the EEAS does refer to the exploitation of a country’s vulnerabilities to be a “fundamental characteristic” of hybrid threats (EEAS, 2015: 3). Generating ambiguity is also called a “critically important” aspect (ibid.). Therefore, these features will be of special importance for determining the extent to which a threat can be perceived hybrid.

3.3 Framing

New type of threat against EU values

When discussing hybrid threats and the two key developments just discussed, the Commission (2016: 2) speaks of “a security environment that has changed dramatically”. These current security challenges, the Commission furthermore argues, pose “changing forms of threats” (ibid.). These changes are also recognised by the FAC, stating in an explanatory video on its website that the situation in Ukraine and the rise of IS pose “a new type of threat: a hybrid threat” (FAC, 2016). Juncker, Stoltenberg, and President of the European Council Donald Tusk in a NATO EU Joint Declaration have even called these threats “unprecedented challenges” (Joint Declaration, 2016: 1). Hence, EU institutions seem to suggest hybrid threats are a new phenomenon to them. Moreover, having taken into account the characteristics of these new threats, EU policymakers argue hybrid threats destabilize the larger neighbourhood and divide the international community and the EU itself (FAC, 2016; EEAS, 2015: 2). First of all, because the annexation of Crimea and the terrorist threat of IS aim to create ambiguity among Member States, having different threat perceptions and ideas when it comes to strategies to tackle these problems. Therefore, the EU emphasizes that close cooperation within the Union is more important than ever (FAC, 2015: 4). Secondly, because hybrid threats disrespect the norms, rules and values on which the EU is built (idem: 2). Russia has violated international law by derogating Ukraine’s territorial integrity, while pointing to the EU for having caused the conflict with the proposed Association Agreement with Ukraine (EEAS, 2015: 2). Furthermore, the EU argues the expansion of IS has lead European youngsters away from traditional European values (ibid.). Moreover, after the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015, the European Council stated the attacks “targeted the fundamental values and human rights that are at the heart of the European Union”, by which it referred to fundamental freedoms and democracy (“Informal meeting of the Heads of State,”

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2015). It also called terrorists “the enemies of our values” (ibid.). The FAC therefore argued hybrid threats, together with longstanding security issues, are “significantly impacting European security as well as international peace and security” (FAC, 2015: 2). In the 2016 EU Global Strategy Mogherini also argued hybrid threats had violated the European security order and were a direct danger to European citizens and their territory (EU, 2016: 3, 7, 9). In light of these new key challenges threatening the unity and values of the EU, the Commission (2016: 2) emphasized the need to not only increase, but also adapt the EU’s capacities as a security provider. Therefore, the proposed response of the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats mainly focused on helping the EU and its Member States to improve situational awareness by sharing intelligence and best practices, and to build resilience against these threats. The latter, according to the EU, should be achieved by creating and maintaining a strong political system. This means effectively applying the rule of law to guarantee fundamental freedoms, fighting corruption, and reforming the funding of political parties, thereby preventing stress and catastrophe hybrid threats aim to create (idem: 3-5; EEAS, 2015: 5). It was argued that an important first step in the process is for Member States to identify and reduce their key vulnerabilities, such as energy dependency (idem: 4; idem: 3).

Conclusion

The EU thus emphasizes the destabilizing and dividing threat hybrid threats pose to the international community and the EU itself. It has thus framed hybrid threats to be a direct danger to Europe by threatening its unity and the fundamental values and principles on which the EU is built. Moreover, the wordings of the EU when speaking about hybrid threats indicate it presents these security threats to be of significant danger. By pointing to Europe’s dramatically changing security environment and hybrid threats posing unprecedented challenges, the EU seems to suggest it has not experienced anything like this before. Accordingly, it has framed hybrid threats to be a new type of threat. The interesting question now, is why the EU only recently has become concerned with hybrid threats, while the concept already existed, at least in academic literature, and various scholars argue the world has already experienced hybrid threats in the past? That is a question the following chapters of this research aim to answer.

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