Women and the fight against Boko Haram : a gender-sensitive perspective on counterterrorism

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W

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OUNTERTERRORISM

ALEX O’MAHONY

SUPERVISOR: DR JANA KRAUSE SECOND READER: DR MIKE MEDEIROS

AUGUST, 2019

MASTER’S THESIS POLITICAL SCIENCE SPECIALISATION: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Abstract

This thesis outlines the gender dimensions of counterterrorism and peacebuilding, highlighting the argument that increased gender equality is conducive to durable peace. However, policy initiatives addressing peace and security are often lacking gender

perspectives. In the case of Nigeria and its conflict with Boko Haram, the policies in place have not achieved high levels of success. Due to the prominent gender dimensions of the conflict, this thesis argues that a strong gender perspective is necessary to address the root causes of this conflict, and facilitate post-conflict reconstruction. Therefore, this thesis questions how successfully gender perspectives are integrated into counterterrorism

approaches relating to the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, and further determines ways to strengthen these gender perspectives. It identifies the implementation and integration of gender policies and security policies as areas of failures, and suggests that addressing these issues, as well as highlighting the issue of structural violence as a condition conducive to terrorism, could help counter violent extremism and facilitate durable peace.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

This thesis seeks to answer the question: ‘How successfully do counterterrorism strategies related to Boko Haram integrate gender perspectives?’. The motivation behind this question stems from broad academic debates on women, peace and security, and their

relevance to this specific case study. Policy framework relating gender and security issues is a relatively recent development, beginning with the adoption UNSCR 1325 in 2000. Since then, academic research has debated the successes and failures of the resolution, with many criticising its implementation (Fink, Barakat and Shetiret, 2013; Porter, 2003; Kreft, 2017; Arostegui, 2013; Tryggestad, 2010). In part, this is due to the fact that the resolution itself cannot be legally binding. States must implement its recommendations through their own policy initiatives. In 2013 Nigeria adopted The National Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions. This policy is based upon the framework of recommended policy initiatives in the Women, Peace and Security agenda, which provides a thorough foundation for the goals and perspectives of the Nigerian policy. In theory, the recommendations and principles of UNSCR 1325 and its Nigerian equivalent should be included in any peace and security policies formulated by the UN and Nigeria, respectively. Therefore, gender perspectives should be fully integrated in counterterrorism strategies. In Nigeria, this is of particular importance considering the conflict with Boko Haram and its gender dimensions. Therefore, the counterterrorism strategies related to Boko Haram, represent an especially relevant case study to investigate whether or not gender perspectives are being integrated into peace and security discourses.

Boko Haram is an Islamist terrorist group based in northern Nigeria, and a major source of violent conflict in the region. It was originally founded in 2002, under the

leadership of Islamic cleric, Mohammad Yusuf, and has since transformed into a lethal terror organization (Crisis Group, 2016). The organisation’s name translates to ‘Western Education is Forbidden’, echoing the insurgency’s goals to stop Western influence on society and introduce Sharia law in northern Nigeria (Onuoha and George, 2015). In 2014, Boko Haram was the deadliest terrorist group in the world, killing 6,118 people in terrorist attacks (Global Terrorism Index, 2015), and despite near military defeat, the organization remains active and among the top five most deadly terrorist organisations (Global Terrorism Index, 2018). The conflict has created a serious humanitarian crisis, with at least 1.7 million internally displaced

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people (IDPs) in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa (Amnesty

International, 2018). Furthermore, abuses in IDP camps are widespread, in particular sexual abuses against women (Amnesty International, 2018), meaning the effects of the insurgency have spread beyond the immediate violence of the militants into post-conflict contexts, furthering the long-term instability of the region.

The gender dimensions of the conflict with Boko Haram have been widely publicised, particularly in the aftermath of the so-called ‘Chibok Abductions’, when 276 schoolgirls were kidnapped by the organization from a school in the town of Chibok (Pereira, 2018).

Although, this is the most well known incidence of Boko Haram’s abuse of women, it is not an isolated incident in any sense. These are just some of 8000 women who have been abducted by the sect, according to International Alert (2017), a number that could be, and probably is, even higher now. The reason behind the abductions lies in the many ways that women are valuable to the organisation. They can be married to militants (willingly or forcibly), or play the roles of recruiter, spy, domestic labourer, fighter, or forced or willing suicide bomber (Crisis Group, 2016). They are both tactically and practically advantageous. In particular, women have been successful as suicide bombers; [b]etween April 2011 and May 2017 women and girls carried out 176 out of 216 bombings in the Lake Chad region’, mostly aimed at soft targets (Pereira, 2018). The use of women by the terrorist organisation also stems from the societal context within which they operate, taking advantage of the deeply entrenched patriarchy to put women in new, as well as established roles, in ways that advantage the organisation (Crisis Group, 2016). As such, it is clear that any efforts to counter the insurgency and bring about lasting peace should include a gender perspective.

In July 2018, the heads of the United Nations’ counter-terrorism bodies visited Nigeria with the aim of identifying areas where the UN could provide assistance in efforts to address the threat of Boko Haram. In particular, the visit highlighted the link between

security and development, and the need to address underlying conditions conducive to violent extremism. One aspect included in these considerations is the relationship between gender and security, and the importance of involving and empowering women in counterterrorism and peace processes (UN Security Council, 2018). However, there have always been issues with integrating these perspectives. In general, ‘[t]here has been little discussion on

integrating terrorism prevention efforts into broader conflict prevention efforts, or vice versa, and considering the roles of women in these activities’ (Fink, Barakat and Shetiret, 2013:2). Coordination remains a challenge due to the multitude of actors and organisations with different perspectives and aims and within international organisations, such as the UN

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‘[p]olicy coordination and programming to integrate peace and security issues [...]remains a challenge in large parts because efforts to address armed conflict are insulated from those relating to counter-terrorism’ (Fink, Barakat and Shetiret, 2013:7). There are policies in place at both international and national levels to address these issues but they have met with limited results. The policies in place have not successfully subverted the threat of violent extremism, nor its effect on women, as seen in the conflict with Boko Haram. Therefore, research must identify the flaws in these policies to better their chances of future success. Currently, gender policy frameworks have not successfully changed gender power dynamics, and Nigeria remains a male dominated, patriarchal society. This thesis will argue that the gender

dimensions of conflict are vital to determining peacebuilding success, and that strengthening gender perspectives in policy recommendations and implementation will have a positive influence towards creating durable peace.

As Crisis Group summarises in their report on the conflict:

[...] countering the sect and rebuilding a peaceful society in the North East requires the government and its international partners to tackle gender discrimination, better protect women and girls affected by the violence and support women’s economic and social reintegration, as well as enhance their role in building sustainable peace (2016)

Therefore, using the literature relating to gender and peacebuilding, gender and security, and women and Boko Haram, this thesis aims to identify the necessary factors to address in policies aimed at countering the Boko Haram insurgency, and to analyse the existing policies to determine their effectiveness based on indicators of strong or weak gender perspectives.

Ultimately, the research reveals that the counterterrorism strategies relating to countering Boko Haram are not successfully integrating gender perspectives. In fact, in the case of Nigeria, certain policy and legal frameworks are counterproductive to women’s empowerment through the enablement and lack of supervision over security forces, members of which abuse their power and exploit women. On a global level, the UN strategy is not quite as detrimental to women, however it fails to provide a counterterrorism strategy with a strong gender perspective for member states to emulate. This is particularly problematic for states such as Nigeria, where gender parity is not an established norm, and the state does not have the capacity to introduce transformative policies on its own (Ipe, Cockayne and Miller, 2010). Therefore, the UN must better integrate gender perspectives, as articulated in UNSCR 1325, into its counterterrorism strategy, to create even the possibility of member states

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following suit. This is vital for the situation in Nigeria, as their counterterrorism approach requires a serious overhaul to properly integrate gender perspectives and undo the damage it has done to women.

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Chapter 2

Literature Review

The literature relevant to my research can be split into three sections: gender and peacebuilding, gender and security, and women and Boko Haram. The section on gender and peacebuilding begins with an overview of key developments in peacebuilding and how they relate to gender, then highlights the effects of armed conflict on women and girls, and finally, outlines the arguments on gender equity and gender mainstreaming in relation to peace and conflict. The gender and security section discusses the frequent absence of women from security discourses and the implications of this in terms of both national and human security. The section on women and Boko Haram provides an overview of previously conducted research on the topic, covering the recruitment of women, the roles of women in the

organisation, and the issues concerning reintegration into society after interaction with Boko Haram. These three sections demonstrate the importance of gender in peacebuilding

processes and security discourses, and the role socially embedded gender dynamics have played in heightening the ‘success’ of Boko Haram. Combining the literature of these topics establishes that counteracting the manipulation of gender dynamics by terrorist groups requires addressing social, political, and economic inequalities contributing to the

propagation of these dynamics. As such, all three elements provide justification for the need to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the gender perspectives of counterterrorism and peacebuilding initiatives in Nigeria.

2.1 Gender and Peacebuilding

The literature reveals two strong patterns of argument for including gender perspectives in peacebuilding processes, meaning incorporating an understanding of the differentiated impact of conflict on men and women (von Hlatky, 2017), as well as

considering how gender relations contribute to the outbreak of conflict and the prospect of establishing durable peace (Strickland and Duvvury, 2003). These stem from the history and development of peacebuilding and its relationship with gender issues, and are rooted in how armed conflict affects women and girls. These arguments seek to address the developing awareness of the importance of gender issues in conflict and the particular experiences of women and girls in conflict and in society on a broader scale. One argument is that when women are marginalised from peace processes, women’s experiences and interpretations of peace and conflict cannot be fully addressed and comprehensive peacebuilding, creating a

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form of positive peace for the whole population, becomes far less likely (McKay, 2004). The other argument focuses on the link between gender equity and peacebuilding, stating that societies where women are more empowered, with higher social capital, are less likely to experience conflict, and more likely to sustain peace in post-conflict situations (Gizelis, 2009). In many conflict-afflicted regions structurally embedded gender power dynamics contribute to and aggravate conflict situations, as well as preventing transitions to durable peace (Strickland and Duvvury, 2003). These perspectives and their implications should inform policies and programs for successful post-conflict reconstruction (von Hlatky, 2017), but, despite gender-sensitive approaches becoming more common, they have failed to result in significant change (Strickland and Duvvury, 2003). The literature on this topic discusses this failure and theorises the reasons behind it.

Peacebuilding: History and Development

During the Cold War, UN peacekeeping forces were limited to monitoring ceasefires or patrolling neutral buffer zones between former combatants, for the most part staying out of the domestic politics of their host states (Paris, 2018). However post- Cold War and the end of bilateralism in the global state system saw a rise in inter-state conflict. This led to the beginning of more multifaceted UN peacebuilding missions, aiming to help in the

reconstruction of the political, economic, and social foundations of countries emerging from civil wars (Paris, 2018). Paris states that during this period in the early to mid 1990s ‘rosy pro-liberalisation dominated peacebuilding discourses, [and] democratisation and

marketization were portrayed as almost magical formulas for peace in war-torn states’ (2010: 338). These discourses were sustained by a key assumption informing peacebuilding

missions of the 90s: that ‘rapid liberalisation would create conditions for stable and lasting peace in countries emerging from civil conflict’, however as the years went on it became apparent that rapid liberalisation strategies did little to address the drivers of conflict (Paris, 2010: 341). As Porter argues:

Positive, sustainable peace requires the resolution of the root causes of conflicts in order to remove violent manifestations. Such root causes include political, social, economic, and gender injustice, inequality and oppression, hence the need for comprehensive ongoing peacebuilding (2003:258).

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By the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, the UN was acknowledging the need for more comprehensive and longer-lasting approaches to peacebuilding, based on the principle of ‘no exit without strategy’. New missions were given broader mandates to strengthen state institutions and promote the growth of civil society. However, missions, such as that in East Timor, were still criticised for not taking these measures far enough. Furthermore, the expanded powers of peacebuilders were criticised for preventing local ownership of

peacebuilding processes (Paris, 2010). Therefore, further steps were necessary to transform social, political, and economic landscapes to bring about sustainable peace after the departure of international peacebuilders. Gender inequality is a major aspect relating to this. This was an under-addressed root cause of conflict, but necessary to encourage local ownership. If half the population remains marginalised, any peace negotiated cannot be a full positive peace. Munro notes that in the initial stages of peacebuilding during the 90s ‘mainstream

peacebuilding literature [did] not address gender issues nor gender equity. If prompted and questioned, most people in the field would agree that a certain degree of peace and stability is needed before equity issues can be dealt with’ (Munro, 2000: 5). However, this assumption depends on the idea that peace leads to gender equality, rather than gender equality leads to peace (Munro, 2000) and with a growing awareness amongst academics and policy makers of the need to address root causes of conflict and establish long-term strategies for durable peace, gender became more of a priority.

Internal conflicts of the 1990s, such as Rwanda, where the genocide resulted in the rape of over 25,000 women and left behind massive amounts of widows and orphans and, Bosnia with its rape camps and massacres of men that made thousands of women widows, brought to the eyes of the world the horrific plight of women and the urgency of addressing their needs (Arostegui, 2013). Gender and conflict were first connected on a policy level at the Fourth Women’s World Conference in 1995 in Beijing with the establishment of the Beijing Platform for Action. This acknowledged twelve critical areas of concern representing major obstacles to women’s advancement, one being armed conflict, as well as establishing certain strategic objectives to remove these obstacles (Porter, 2003). However, a major milestone came five years later when the UN Security Council and General Assembly

adopted resolution 1325. Resolution 1325 was ground-breaking as it marked the first time the Security Council linked women in their own right to the realm of international peace and security (Porter, 2003; Kreft, 2017). Much of the academic literature in gender and peacebuilding since then has focused on UNSCR 1325, weighing in on its successes and failures (Fink, Barakat and Shetiret, 2013; Porter, 2003; Kreft, 2017; Arostegui, 2013;

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Tryggestad, 2010). On this note the general position of the literature states that although the resolution represents a major step forward in terms of rhetoric, the implementation of its goals has been disappointing (Fink, Barakat and Shetiret, 2013; Porter, 2003; Kreft, 2017; Arostegui, 2013; Tryggestad, 2010). There are several reasons put forward for this. Tryggestad argues ‘[g]ender issues have emerged as a legitimate and widely accepted

normative framework of relevance for peace and security matters’, however this norm has not cascaded fully (2010: 169). As Kreft puts it: ‘UNSCR 1325 has not yet assumed “taken for granted status”; that is, it has not yet become part of the informal rules and logics of the United Nations system or been internalised by its member states’ (2017: 137). Therefore, the implementation of the resolution is determined by inconsistent factors, such as the prevalence of sexual violence (Kreft, 2017) or ‘the lobbying of norm entrepreneurs in member states, within the NGO community and in the UN system’ (Tryggestad, 2010: 169). Other reasons posited for implementation issues by academics include insufficient commitment (e.g. because of cultural reasons), limitations of the resolution itself or structural or ideational factors (Kreft, 2017).

However, as gender issues were becoming more prominent among liberal

peacebuilding discourses, the concept of liberal peacebuilding was itself being attacked. The ‘rosy pro-liberalisation’ view of peacebuilding has been challenged in recent years by a ‘school of commentators who view liberal peacebuilding as fundamentally destructive or illegitimate. Some maintain that missions have done more harm than good, others portray these missions as a form Western or liberal imperialism’ (Paris, 2010:337). After 9/11 the US became aware that state failure and instability posed a threat to national security, providing bases for terrorist organisations, and interventionism became an issue of national security, propelling it to the top of the national security agenda (Paris, 2018). The ensuing invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq added fuel to the arguments that peacebuilding was a form of

imperialism as the Bush administration justified the invasions partly on liberal grounds, as a means of providing the benefits of democracy and freedom to oppressed societies (Paris, 2010).

Paris argues that the failings of post-conflict stabilisation in Iraq and Afghanistan left the US and some of its allies reluctant to involve themselves in state-building elsewhere (2018). This has led to increasing militaristic approaches and an emphasis on stabilisation and counterterrorism rather than liberal peacebuilding amongst national and international actors (Karlsrud, 2019). Karlsrud argues that this leads to ‘less intrusive UN peacekeeping operations with more limited goals, a shorter term outlook and a more reactive to security

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incidents, all to the detriment of implementing a long-term people-centric strategy to address the root causes of security challenges’ (2019: 15). Hence, any gender policy is faced with the challenge of missions unsuited to its goals. However, Paris argues that it is impossible to predict how attitudes to peacebuilding will evolve, the UN continues to perform

peacebuilding activities in many countries, and should aim for future successes. Therefore, a reassessment of priorities is necessary depending on the desired outcome because ‘[a]s instruments for prolonging ceasefires, peacebuilding missions have generally performed well, if, however, the goal is to address underlying sources of conflict, the record is less

convincing’ (2018: 21).

The Effects of Armed Conflict on Women and Girls

The effects of armed conflict on women and girls are twofold. On the one hand, women are disproportionately victimised by conflict. On the other hand, conflict can disrupt socially embedded gender dynamics by necessity, creating the circumstances for women to take on new roles and empowering them. The literature relating to gender and peacebuilding emphasises the need to acknowledge the entirety of women’s experiences in conflict

situations, so that the narrative of women as victims does not stand in isolation from women’s agency in conflict. Kreft argues that ‘[v]iolent conflict is usually gendered, exhibiting distinctive patterns of agency and victimisation’ (2017: 134). However,

victimisation and agency extend to both genders. The narrative is not as clear-cut as women as victims and men as actors. It is the nature of agency and victimisation that is differentiated by gender. Men tend to be the primary actors in conflict, in the sense that they are the

perpetrators of violence, however, in this sense they are also victimised, as they are, in turn, targeted in killings (Kreft, 2017). Women are also simultaneously victims and actors in conflict, in ways discussed in the following paragraphs.

Women and girls, more often than not, occupy subordinate positions to men and boys in societies afflicted with instability and violent conflict (Porter, 2003). As such, when conflicts are divided along ethnic or ideological lines, women are viewed as symbolic citizens of these cultural positions, rather than active combatants. In such circumstances, perceptions of men’s patriarchal ownership of women’s bodies leave them vulnerable as ‘property to be attacked’; their bodies become battlefields (Arostegui, 2013; Porter, 2003). In this context, women and girls are ‘especially targeted for extreme sexual violence,

abductions, forced marriage and impregnation, and slavery’ (Arostegui, 2013: 32). Porter argues ‘[w]omen’s sexual integrity is undermined when rape is used as a weapon of war [...]

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with a further violation occurring due to shame’ (2003: 249). Moreover, ‘women in conflict are disproportionality affected by gender inequalities in in poverty, malnutrition and access to education, a precarious economic and employment situation, displacement and human

trafficking’ (Kreft, 2017: 134). Women are often left as heads of households when they are widowed during conflict, and therefore ‘assume primary responsibility in coping with the pain and loss of killed or maimed loved ones, caring for the wounded, and nurturing ill and old dependents and traumatised fearful children [...] inadequate food and income’ (Porter, 2003: 249). On top of all of these factors, maternal health also deteriorates during conflict and the rate of women’s post conflict mortality is higher than men’s (Kreft, 2017).

However, post-conflict contexts can also provide opportunities for women and ‘many have used post-conflict periods to re-shape societies, rewrite the rules and advance women’s rights’ (Arostegui, 2013:35). In, post-conflict states, such as Rwanda, South Sudan, and Uganda, women’s empowerment came with the education, advocacy, and organisational skills that developed as a result of conflict, including the creation of women’s networks and peace groups that did not exist previously. Women are also participating in justice systems and advocating for accountability for crimes (Arostegui, 2013). Furthermore, while the position of head of household can be a struggle during conflict, it also represents women’s agency and their ability to control their circumstances. Manchada argues that ‘[a]reas of armed conflict may present the most ideal opportunities for addressing gender inequalities, since programmes such as relief, reconstruction and rehabitation could represent a new beginning’ (Manchada, 2005: ). However, it should be noted that consolidating wartime gains in women’s equality is not always an easy task, as social, political and economic violence is used against women to reassert control (Arostegui, 2013). This structural violence represents a return to the status quo, and an environment primed for relapse into violent conflict.

Gender and Equity

Structural violence against women has major effects on peacebuilding. The social, political, and economic marginalisation of women is a factor linked to conflict. Inequality destabilises regions and prevents women’s experiences of peace and conflict from being included in peace processes (Strickland and Duvvury, 2003; Gizelis 2009). Strickland and Duvvury argue that women’s participation in peacebuilding is affected by socially embedded power dynamics and discuss the problems this creates for establishing durable peace. They maintain that peacebuilding initiatives often fail to adequately address the underlying norms determining gender power dynamics and suggest that transformative approaches are required

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to rectify the institutionalisation of gender power imbalances (2003). Therefore, gender mainstreaming will continue to produce limited results unless the deeper societal issues are addressed, as it operates at a surface level.

Gizelis also argues that successful peacebuilding requires addressing gender equity issues. She looks at how the pre-conflict status of women determines higher or lower domestic capacities. UN operations, or the contributions of other international organisations and NGOs, can substitute or supplement low domestic capacity, however successful

peacebuilding is more likely in regions with higher domestic capacity. These places have more resources and international organisations can use pre-existing structures. She demonstrates how women are relevant in ensuring peacebuilding success by linking the higher status of women in society with higher levels of domestic capacity and social capital, and reasoning that increased female empowerment and participation in peace processes also help the success of peacebuilding missions (2009).

Gender mainstreaming is an approach to achieving gender equality (UN Women, 2019). Strickland and Duvvury state that within ‘the context of conflict and post-conflict situations, gender mainstreaming depends upon recognising and working in response to the different experiences of women and men related to conflict and peacebuilding’ (Strickland and Duvvury, 2003:17). However, this recognition is often lacking. Despite the ‘numerous accounts of women taking up new jobs, joining armies and acting as peacemakers’ during conflict (Justino, Mitchell and Müller, 2018:912), perceptions of women’s roles are

disproportionately confined to a singular narrative of victimhood, denying women’s agency and undermining their ability to play a part in formal peace processes (Justino, Mitchell and Müller, 2019; Strickland and Duvvury, 2003). Strickland and Duvuury’s writings show that women’s contributions to peacebuilding are overlooked as they often occur outside of these formal peace processes. Informal peace processes include ‘peace marches, intergroup dialogue, and the promotion of intercultural tolerance and understanding’. These activities mostly take place at the local level, while formal activities, such as ‘conflict resolution, peace negotiations, reconciliation, and provision of humanitarian aid’ extend to the national and international levels. As women are seldom present in formal activities, issues affecting women are far less likely to be addressed at national and international levels (2003:7).

It follows that, for women’s experiences of conflict to be understood, women must be included in all areas of peacebuilding, rather than confined to informal activities. This is articulated in UNSC Resolution 1325, which ‘calls for the increased participation of women from conflict prevention to peace processes and postconflict reconstruction’ (von Hlatky,

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2017:), however despite creating strong gender components in recent peacebuilding initiatives (Justino, Mitchell and Müller, 2019) UNSCR 1325 has achieved limited results (Strickland and Duvvury, 2003). Women’s participation is obstructed by many issues, such as a lack of women in senior decision making roles, prioritisation of including combatants in formal peace talks above an inclusive approach, social norms determining women’s place as within the private, not public, sphere, and lack of experience in politics and advocacy because of these other factors (Conciliation Resources, 2015; Justino, Mitchell and Müller, 2019).

In Nigeria, women are underrepresented politically. The country is ranked 181st out of 190 countries for rates of female participation in parliament, at just 6% (International Parliamentary Union, 2019), despite having adopted a National Gender Policy in 2007, aimed at advancing gender mainstreaming (Matfess, 2017). Therefore, despite gender-sensitive policy rhetoric, women are unlikely to play a role in formal peace processes as they are not in decision-making positions. Furthermore, the social and economic position of women is an obstacle to increased participation. These factors have led to the argument that including women in peacebuilding initiatives requires addressing broader issues of gender and equity in conflict-prone regions, not only to aid in peacebuilding gender mainstreaming initiatives, but also as a peacebuilding method in of itself (Strickland and Duvvury, 2003; Gizelis, 2009).

Overall, including women and the perspectives of women in all aspects of peace processes is vital for establishing durable peace. However, gender mainstreaming initiatives have struggled to achieve their aims beyond policy and rhetoric. This is linked to gender and equity. When women have a higher status in society, conflict is less likely, however conflict-prone regions tend to be burdened with structurally embedded gender dynamics hindering the social and economic positions of women. Implementing gender mainstreaming policies requires addressing the institutionalisation of these gender dynamics, an issue not properly considered when formulating policy. Furthermore, gender inequality has implications for peace and conflict beyond representation in peacebuilding processes, and when these issues are addressed conflict becomes less likely.

2.2 Gender and Security

Feminist contributions to security studies note that women are frequently absent from security discourses (Sjoberg, 2009; McKay, 2004; Ni Aolain, 2013; Ni Aoliain and

Huckerby, 2016). Furthermore, as is also noted in peacebuilding literature, when they are included, women are overwhelmingly portrayed as victims, a narrative which fails to acknowledge the multitude of roles women play in security and conflict practices (Sjoberg,

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2009; McKay, 2004; Ni Aolain, 2013). The literature concerning the absence of women from security discourses analyses this phenomenon from national security and human security perspectives, frequently critiquing these predominant theories’ lack of gender analyses. Gender and security issues in Nigeria are further enhanced by its deeply patriarchal society, with male dominated institutions underpinning the marginilisation of women from these discourses. This has been especially significant to the conflict with Boko Haram, due to the sect’s disproportionate use of women relative to other terrorist organisations (Bloom & Matfess, 2016). The group's instrumentalisation of women and the reasons behind this can be analysed through feminist critiques of security and counterterrorism discourses within the context of Nigerian social and political dynamics.

Roles and Motivations

Within terrorism and counterterrorism contexts, women can play the roles of sympathizer, mobiliser, preventer, or perpetrator, to name but a few (Fink, Barakat and Shetiret, 2013). Security decision makers are currently interested in women as potential de-radicalisers, seeing them as embedded security allies and early warning systems due to their perceived position as mediators in families and communities (d’Estaing, 2017). However, limiting women to one role within security discourses risks the instrumentalisation of women for this role, while failing to recognize the complexity of their involvement in issues of violent extremism (d’Estaing, 2017). As Matfess argues: ‘Supporting women’s empowerment and gender equality should not be confused with an assertion that women are universally pacifistic, altruistic entities’ (2017:187). Ní Aoláin notes that there is a ‘tendency to move between extremes of women as victims or as violent perpetrators without acknowledging the intersectionality of roles that women adopt and move between’ (2013:1111). Female

members of Boko Haram are a good example of this, due to the difficulty in discerning their motivations. Although many are abducted, coerced, or suffering from forms of Stockholm syndrome, others may have joined the organisation voluntarily, or have been genuinely radicalised after their abduction, moving between the roles of victim and perpetrator (Bloom and Matfess, 2016).

It is vital to understand women’s motivations for involvement in terrorist

organisations when formulating counterterrorism strategy (Ni Aoilain, 2013). While we should not automatically assume women’s motivations differ from men’s, as to do so would reify gender stereotypes, ‘understanding women’s participation in a gender-sensitive way means understanding that women terrorists live in an unequal world but also remaining open

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to understanding individuals’ personal and political choices are personal and contingent’ (Sjoberg, Gentry and Neal, 2009:2). Fink, Barakat and Shetiret outline the reasons why women become terrorists. Many are the same as men, such as grievance about sociopolitical conditions, grief about the death of a loved one, real or perceived humiliation on a physical, psychological, or political level, a fanatical commitment to religious or ideological beliefs, economic motivations, or desire to affect radical societal change. However others are gender-specific, for example, women are more vulnerable than men to being drugged, raped,

physically coerced, and emotionally and socially blackmailed, especially in patriarchal societies (2013), as seen with Boko Haram’s abductions and use of women. For instance, there have been reports of abducted women and girls who refused to convert being subjected to ‘physical and psychological abuse, forced labour, forced participation in military

operations, forced marriage and sexual abuse, including rape’ (Matfess, 2017:88).

Furthermore, ‘elements of liberation from highly stratified gender roles may be a motivating factor for violent acts’ (Ní Aoláin, 2013:1096). Such societal conditions have played a role in motivating women to join Boko Haram, including factors such as, a lack of education and opportunity, marriage opportunities, security, and the social and economic status of women (Moaveni, 2019; Matfess 2017). Including an awareness of these gender-specific motivations in counterterrorism strategies necessitates addressing structural violence against women within societies, and considering the specific experiences of women when formulating disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) policies.

Security and Insecurity

The success of female terrorists is rooted in gendered stereotypes that identify women as non-violent actors (Agara, 2015; Sjoberg, Cooke and Neal, 2009; Ní Aoláin, 2013). These stereotypes ‘emphasise peacefulness, mothering care and interdependence rather than

violence’ (Sjoberg, Cooke and Neal, 2009:3). Therefore, the involvement of women in terrorist attacks ‘disrupts society’s concepts of femininity’ (Agara, 2015: 115) and ‘interrupts stereotypical expectations of women as pure, innocent and non-violent’ (Sjoberg, Cooke and Neal, 2009:4). Agara states that the result of this is that the public sees women terrorists as ‘deviants’ placing themselves in a supposedly male role (2015:117). This encourages the absence of women from terrorism and counterterrorism discourses as their participation is dismissed as an anomaly. As a result of these issues ‘women are less likely to arouse

suspicion, are better equipped to conceal explosives, and are generally not subject to as strict security measures’ (Ní Aoláin, 2013), making women terrorists potentially more dangerous

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as they have access to sensitive areas (Alli, 2005). Furthermore, in Muslim regions, such as northern Nigeria, culturally pervasive gender norms can contribute to this. The hijab worn by Muslim women can be used to conceal explosives and Islamic law forbids men from frisking women, an issue due to the fact that, in these regions, most security officers are male

(Onuoha and George, 2015; the Economist, 2017). Therefore, including women in security discourses means not only considering them as potential attackers, but also incorporating the training and placement of more female security agents.

The idea of women terrorists as an affront to socially embedded gender stereotypes also means their attacks carry more shock value (Alli, 2015). Agara argues that terrorism is a deliberate tactical choice, chosen over other means of insurgency due to its psychological impact (2015). Therefore, using women as attackers is tactically advantageous for terrorist organisations. This is particularly prevalent in media responses to women terrorists, as ‘news of female suicide bombers is often sensational and attracts coverage better than their male counterparts’ (Onuaha and George, 2015:107). Pereira argues that Boko Haram’s use of women and girls as suicide bombers seems to be ‘an adaption of their operational tactics, designed to get maximum media attention’, therefore becoming a ‘gendered strategy of communication’ (2018:254). Matfess also notes that the ‘symbolic value of using women as weapons, including the ability of this tactic to cultivate fear in local populations by upending gender norms and expectations, should not be underestimated’ (2017:133). Therefore, national security policies aimed at undercutting the group’s instruments of power need to be aware of the gender dynamics of such operational tools.

Furthermore, as with all conflict, and as discussed in the previous section, certain conditions are conducive to violent extremism, one being the status of women (Ní Aoláin and Huckerby, 2019). Matfess argues that the lack of political will in Nigeria to engage with women’s issues means that humanitarian aid lacks a gendered perspective and gross

violations of women’s rights will continue post-conflict, thereby facilitating a ‘priming factor for a relapse into conflict’ (2017:184). Therefore, addressing issues of gender equality should be part of national security strategies, particularly in deeply patriarchal societies, such as that which Boko Haram operates in. Agara argues that as long as women are stereotyped as the ‘weaker sex’ and defined by traditional gender roles, terrorist organisations will exploit this perspective through the use of women (2015). Therefore, the success of female terrorists means that women will continue to be targeted for recruitment, willingly or unwillingly, by terrorist groups, thereby leaving them vulnerable to such groups, or even groups aspiring to violence in times of peace.

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The implications of women’s absences from security discourses go beyond times of conflict. DDR efforts ignoring women mean that they are further marginalized post-conflict. This manifests itself in multiple ways, whether women are participants or victims of violent extremism. Ni Aolian notes that due to the fear of stigmatization in traditional societies, women will not admit to a combatant or paramilitary role and frequently choose not to appear before truth and accountability processes (2013). This can affect women’s inclusion in future political processes, as ‘those who attain the status of combatant can benefit from post-conflict deals designed to re-integrate them into the political and legal economies of the state’ (Ní Aoláin, 2013:1104). ‘[W]hen women are left out of the combatant matrix, there is material, legal and political loss to be counted’ (Ní Aoláin, 2013:1104), thereby propagating inequality and lack of representation post-conflict.

Moreover, when women are ignored in security discourses, their own security concerns, which may not be limited to the presence or absence of violent conflict, are not considered. McKay argues that:

Girls and women experience human insecurity in differently from men and are subject to gender hierarchies and power inequities that exacerbate their insecurity. Because of their lower status, girls and women are less able to articulate and act upon their security needs, as compared with boys and men (2004: 153).

Violence against women is the largest contributor to their insecurity, however this is not limited to direct violence, but also structural violence (McKay, 2004). Justino, Mitchell and Müller’s research shows that women’s understandings of peace differ from men’s, highlighting ‘access to basic needs for their families, such as food and shelter, absence of violence in the home, their children’s ability to attend school, and unity in commuunities and families’, while men’s understanding emphasizes ‘the absence of violence and armed conflict in the community’ (2019:922). Brechenmacher also notes that in truth and accountability processes women are more likely prioritise the need for legal accountability for sexual violence (2018). Currently, in Nigeria, not one member of Boko Haram has been prosecuted for sexual violence (Russell-Brown, 2018). If these concerns are ignored, women will not feel safe or secure even in times of supposed ‘peace’, as this version of peace is not based on their understanding of the concept. Matfess questions, ‘if women are sidelined and made more vulnerable in the post-conflict period, then who is peace for?’ (2017:186). From a feminist perspective, the answer is that ‘boys’ and men’s security is prioritised over that of

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girls and women because of sexism whereby women and girls are discriminated against because of their gender’ (McKay, 2004: 155), however durable peace requires a re-ordering of these priorities to emphasise the security concerns of the whole population, particularly those who are least secure.

2.3 Women and Boko Haram

Women in Nigeria face pervasive structural violence, particularly in the north of the country; the region where Boko Haram is based and which endures the most wide-spread poverty (Matfess, 2017). On top of this, Nigeria’s legal system remains stacked against women due to their under-representation in government (Matfess, 2017). Gender relations in this region have been influenced by a legacy of military rule, normalising the gendered constructions of masculine leadership and of women as needing ‘protection’, as well as particular interpretations of Islam, which include the belief that girls should get married at the onset of puberty (Pereira, 2018). This is exacerbated by the poverty of the region, whereby a girl’s education is considered an ‘expensive luxury’ in comparison with the material benefits marriage is believed to confer (Pereira, 2018: 259). Thus, women in this region experience economic, social, and political marginalisation, as well as limited access to education, all factors contributing to gender inequality, therefore the likelihood of conflict is higher the possibility of creating durable peace is lower.

Women involved with Boko Haram exemplify the vast range of contributions women make to terrorism and counterterrorism efforts, as well as the victimization of women by terrorist groups. News outlets have profiled women kidnapped and coerced into suicide bombing missions, women who joined the organization voluntarily, women who were empowered within the organization, women who experienced sexual violence, as well as women fighting for and against the insurgency (Nwaubani, 2018; Okeowo, 2015; Maclean, 2017; The Economist, 2017; Gbowee, 2014). Therefore, although women are victims of the Boko Haram insurgency, this is not a complete picture of women’s experiences with Boko Haram, all of which should be considered within security discourses. Understanding women’s roles in the organization and their implications involves understanding the

recruitment processes of, and possible motivations for joining, the insurgency. Furthermore, issues of reintegration contribute to the propagation of conflict and the continuation of the group.

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Bloom and Matfess argue that ‘women and girls have become “swords” mobilised and weaponised to carry out attacks, while also being used as powerful “symbols” of Boko Haram’s ideology’ (2016:106). As “swords” women are powerful operational tools, for the reasons discussed in the previous section. Symbolically, the women of Boko Haram represent the image of the persecuted Muslim women, with the organisation as their protector.

Therefore women are powerful propaganda tools (Bloom and Matfess, 2016). Potts and Graves argue that, in the case of the Chibok abductions, kidnapping girls from school symbolises the neutralisation of a threat to the kind of repressive fundamentalism Boko Haram promotes over “Western education” (2014), while Pereira claims abducting

schoolgirls and using women and girls as suicide bombers are tactics for creating theatres for violent spectacle, aimed at gaining international notoriety (2018). These actions represent this idea of women as “swords” and “symbols”, as a means of recruitment, operational success, and ways to push the group’s message.

Certain conditions can also play a role in recruitment by motivating women to join Boko Haram. These include factors such as a lack of education and opportunity, better marriage opportunities, security, and the social and economic status of women (Moaveni, 2019; Matfess 2017). Marriage has played a major role in the recruitment of women, and indeed men, to the organization, particularly in its early days, while also contributing to the groups broader tactical planning (Bloom and Matfess, 2016; Hudson and Matfess, 2017; Moaveni 2019). The concept of a brideprice is vital to understanding how marriage became a motivating factor to join Boko Haram, Brideprice is a form of payment a man gives when marrying a women. However, the levels of poverty among younger men often mean they do not have the opportunity to marry. As a further result of this, women are forced to marry older, financially stable men rather than choosing from their peers. The organization made joining appealing by lowering brideprice. Therefore men are given more of an opportunity to marry, and women have more of a choice regarding whom they marry. As well as this, Boko Haram directed its members to give the brideprice directly to the bride, rather than to her family, another motivating factor for women who are offered little to no chance at financial independence in the region. Meanwhile, tactically, marriage helps the organization by creating the next generation of jihadists, boosting their numbers and increasing group cohesion (Hudson and Matfess, 2017; Matfess, 2017; Moaveni, 2019). However, it is also important to note that these tactical elements mean that marriage is not always voluntary, and kidnapped girls are often forced into marriages with combatants (Matfess, 2017; Maclean, 2017).

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As for the social and economic status of women, Moaveni argues that the group can offer more than the limited opportunities afforded to them in a deeply patriarchal society (2019). ), while Matfess also claims that the oppression of women and girls incentivised female sympathy for the sect (2017). This can be seen in Nwaubani’s profiles of two women married to high-ranking members of Boko Haram. They detail the status and respect afforded to them within in the organization, a stark contrast to the experiences of most women in northern Nigeria (2018). Nwaubani argues that the insurgency realized a powerful

recruitment strategy was to tell women that within the organization they could have whatever role they wanted (2018). Moaveni notes that current security policies aiming to dissuade women from extremist groups, and international groups devoting funds and attention to countering violent extremism, tend to focus on the ideological appeal of such violent groups, rather than addressing the political and social frustrations that compel women to join terrorist organisations (2019), however these examples show that without the addressing structural inequalities in society, motivating factors will continue to drive women to such organisations.

However, Boko Haram does not limit itself to volunteer participants. The majority of women and girls involved in the organisation are there by force, a fact that must also be acknowledged when designing counterterrorism and reintegration policies (Matfess, 2017). Maclean’s interviews with two young women depict the violence and trauma they suffered from during their time with Boko Haram. Both girls were kidnapped, exposed to sexual violence, and forced to participate in suicide bombing missions, which, fortunately, were unsuccessful (2017). Bloom and Matfess see this treatment of women as evidence that the organisation views them as malleable and expendable, just another form of artillery, a weapon rather than participant (Bloom and Matfess, 2016). Therefore the subjugation of women in not circumvented within Boko Haram, as suggested by the roles of some women, but rather, utilized to the advantage of the sect in whatever way is most appropriate for their aims.

It should also be noted that women play a large part in fighting violent extremism. The New Yorker profiles Fatima Muhammed, a woman involved in efforts to fight the insurgency as a member of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a vigilante group battling Boko Haram. Her duties include frisking women coming into crowded public events and apprehending women in their home. Fatima carries no weapons and is the only female member of her sector of the CJTF (Okeowo, 2015). Therefore, Fatima’s efforts also emphasise the need for more female security agents to do these tasks, particularly within more formal security agencies to limit the danger posed to untrained civilian actors. Outside

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of security efforts, women also contribute to efforts against Boko Haram. Protests by women drew global attention to the Chibok abductions, forcing the government to prioritise the release of the girls (Gbowee, 2014), revealing the power of promoting strong civil society and supporting women’s groups as methods of counterterrorism within badly governed states.

Reintegration

Another issue linked to women and Boko Haram is that of reintegrating women, many whom were abducted and abused by the organization, back into their families and communities. This can be challenging due to conservative values and ‘honour culture’ (Bloom & Matfess, 2016), therefore women can be tempted to rejoin the organization (Moaveni, 2019). These issues are heightened by the failures of IDP camps. Women who have left the organization can be tempted to return because of the conditions, lack of security, and lack of opportunity in international aid camps (Moaveni, 2019). Matfess argues that in Nigeria, ‘women are at the heart of the humanitarian crisis simply because they are the demographic that remains’ (2017), however the lack of a gender perspective in establishing humanitarian aid can lead to issues such as those currently being experienced by women in Nigeria. Women feel unsafe in IDP camps, sexual abuse is an under-addressed and frequently occurring issue, and these camps do not offer opportunities or incentives to remain.

Corruption allows for situations where women are forced to exchange sex for food in humanitarian camps (Pereira, 2018; Amnesty International, 2018), and while ‘some

reintegration programmes offer skills training, [...] embroidering and selling a cap a month neither enables a woman to feed her children, nor does it protect her from rape after dark’ (Moaveni, 2019).

Women returning home after leaving Boko Haram are met with suspicion and fear that they will radicalize others. Furthermore, their children, often born as a result of rape, are considered tainted by the “bad blood” of their militant fathers. There is a need for the

government to put support services in place for those returning and to give better education to local people on the experiences of these women (International Alert/UNICEF, 2016). The Economist notes that the result of this stigma, means that whether these women are radicalized or not, ‘Boko Haram sows fear and division, exactly as it intends’ (2017). Additionally, Brechenmacher argues that experiences of structural marginalisation, which encouraged some women to join Boko Haram, must be understood in order to ensure

specialised reintegration (Brechenmacher, 2018). Furthermore, under these stipulations, such marginilisation and subjugation should not be allowed to fester within post-conflict

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humanitarian contexts either. These issues, on top of the already discussed gender and security aspect of reintegration, reveal the necessity of gender perspectives in post-conflict policies.

2.4 Conclusion

Due to these strong gender components, counterterrorism and peacebuilding policies aimed towards the threat of Boko Haram in Nigeria need to be formulated with a strong gender perspective, and coordinated, to effectively implement policy. The literature

highlights the need to recognize the differentiation between men and women’s experiences of conflict, while warning against branding women as either victims or purely pacifist actors based on socially constructed gender stereotypes. It also stresses that including women in peace and security processes is vital in pursuing these aims, and in further empowering women, a goal which in of itself contributes to stability and peace. However, the current state of the literature reveals gaps in several key areas. Mainstream peacebuilding literature has begun to integrate gender issues, and has identified areas in need of improvement within the UN system, however, criticism of liberal peacebuilding signifies a barrier to the kind of long-term strategies required for missions seeking to breakdown socially embedded gender power dynamics and build more equal and inclusive societies. Part of this issue relates to the trend towards peacebuilding as a matter of national security. In turning away from liberal

peacebuilding discourses, gender issues are also at risk of being ignored. But while the literature has covered problems with implementing gender policy, criticism of liberal

peacebuilding, and counterterrorism as a form of peacebuilding, it has not provided much in the way of combining these three areas.

The topics of gender and peacebuilding and counterterrorism and peacebuilding rarely intersect in academic discourses. This is problematic as they clearly do intersect in practice. As a prominent component of peacebuilding in a post-9/11 world, counterterrorism policies should incorporate the liberal values, such as gender equality, which contribute to

establishing durable peace. As such, the academic world should aim to analyse counterterrorism cases and policies in gender and peacebuilding contexts. This thesis addresses the gap in the literature by focusing on the counterterrorism strategy for fighting Boko Haram. The literature on women and Boko Haram establishes the links between the terrorist organization and gender, however does not include an analysis of relevant policies through a gender lens. This analysis takes into account that counterterrorism is a form of peacebuilding, and should therefore aim to establish durable peace, with gender as a vital

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component of this prospect. It thereby seeks to establish the likely effectiveness or

ineffectiveness of counterterrorism policies relating to Boko Haram based on their strengths or shortcomings in relation to gender.

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Chapter 3

Theoretical Framework

3.1 Concepts and Definitions

The following section provides an overview of key definitions and concepts, touched upon in the literature review, but not wholly defined or explained. Each term is relevant and necessary to the research. Gender is the focal point of the policy analysis, and understanding the term is vital for formulating the perspective and lens through which the policies are viewed. Peacebuilding is demonstrative of the aims of such policies, and as such the type of peace they strive towards must be defined. Violent extremism and terrorism are major forms of conflict in Nigeria, and defining features of Boko Haram. Defining the terms clarifies how they produces obstacles to peace. Finally, the literature identifies structural violence as a major contributing factor to the conflict in Nigeria, particularly due to the gender dimensions of this conflict. Understanding the term is vital to tackling the problem, particularly as it is not as visible as direct violence.

Gender

Refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization

processes. They are context/ time-specific and changeable. Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a women or a man in a given context. In most

societies there are differences and inequalities between women and men in

responsibilities assigned, activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, as well as decision-making opportunities. Gender is part of the broader socio-cultural context. Other important criteria for socio-cultural analysis include class, race, poverty level, ethnic group and age (UN Women, 2019).

This definition of gender, as cited from UN Women, gives a comprehensive overview of the term, while acknowledging its fluidity. Most importantly, it stresses the idea that defining factors of gender are socially constructed and context-specific. Therefore,

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gender-sensitive policies must be adaptable to the cultural context of where they are applied. In doing so, policies must aim to have an overall awareness and sensitivity towards socio-cultural idiosyncrasies and how they relate to gender constructions. The idea that gender is socially constructed is also vital for understanding socially embedded gender power

dynamics, and in formulating plans to subvert discriminatory practices. Constructed gender stereotypes are built up over time, with deep running foundations in society. This means that deconstructing them and getting to the root of these stereotypes can be a complex and time consuming task. However, an understanding of this means that gender-sensitive policy framework is more capable of formulating long-term approaches to addressing gender

discrimination. Conversely, the idea that gender is biologically determined can be detrimental to gender-sensitive approaches as it pre-assigns certain characteristics to male and female gender categories, thereby limiting the reach of transformative approaches.

Peacebuilding

This research uses a holistic definition of the concept of peacebuilding, considering diverse measures with the aims of conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping, and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction (Paris, 2018). A holistic definition is necessary when analyzing policies through a gender-sensitive lens, as the security of women is not necessarily defined merely by the presence or absence of violent conflict, but also by a form of societal stability that is dependent upon the absence of pervasive structural violence. By defining peacebuilding as such, policy suggestions can aim to establish forms of positive peace, more likely to bring about long-term lasting peace than precarious forms of negative peace, which may end violent conflict without addressing the priming social factors likely to reignite tensions and destabilise regions.

Violent extremism

The term ‘violent extremism’ ‘[r]efers to the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals’. This can include ‘terrorism and other forms of politically motivated violence’ (UNESCO, 2017). This is a deliberately broad definition for violent extremism, chosen in part because of the many types of violence experienced by the women involved with Boko Haram, both at the hands of the organisation and the state, many of which are excluded from more detailed definitions. This definition allows space for feminist interpretations of the term, whereby violent extremism and acts of terrorism may not be limited to private actors, but can also include the violence

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perpetrated by the state (McKay, 2004). Furthermore, this definition does not limit the term ‘violence’ to acts perpetrated against physical structures or bodies, thereby allowing room for more subtle but pervasive forms of violence such as structural violence or the violence of psychological trauma.

Terrorism

Definitions of terrorism can vary greatly, however this thesis will consider a relatively broad definition, based on feminist perspectives. Sjoberg argues that feminist perspectives on terrorism can vary, but offers a suggestion based on deepening the definition of terrorism: ‘terrorism is extreme violence against those who actually are not the target of the political action (or are, at the very least, a secondary target)’ (2009: 71). She states that if this is the case then ‘parallels can be drawn between forms of violence generally understood as ‘terrorist’ (e.g. suicide bombing) and forms of violence generally understood as outside the realm of terrorism’ (2009: 71). Therefore the assumption that states are not terrorists is

nullified and acts of ‘state terrorism’, such as gender subordination or human rights violations are included within this definition (2009:71).

Structural Violence

Structural violence [...] is almost always invisible, embedded in ubiquitous social structures, normalized by stable institutions and regular experience. Structural violence occurs whenever people are disadvantaged by political, legal, economic or cultural traditions. Because they are longwithstanding, structural inequities usually seem ordinary, the way things are and have always been. But structural violence produces death and suffering as often as direct violence does, though the damage is slower, more subtle, more common, and more difficult to repair (Winter and Leighton, 2001:99).

Much of the literature emphasises the relevance of structural violence in creating the conditions conducive to conflict and violent extremism and propagating the exclusion of women from formal roles in conflict, security, and peacebuilding processes, where their input is necessary for establishing a durable peace relevant to the entire population.

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3.2 Theoretical Argument

Gender Equality Leads to Peace

This thesis investigates the question ‘how successfully do counterterrorism strategies related to Boko Haram integrate gender perspectives?’ The theoretical foundation for this analysis relies on the well-established concept that gender equality leads to peace (Gizelis, 2009). Without gender equality, any form of established peace is defined only by the absence of violent armed conflict. Gender equality is a necessary factor for positive peace for all, and positive peace is more likely to be durable. In regions affected by the immediacy of violent conflict, short-term strategies to end violence are also necessary, however, these short-term strategies must also consider gender perspectives or risk continued violence. Therefore, the success of integrating gender perspectives into strategies can be measured based on their short-term and long-term goals for achieving gender equality in conflict and post-conflict contexts.

In peace and conflict policy initiatives, gender equality means ensuring that the differentiated experiences of men and women are given equal weighting, rather than relying on a masculine-heavy viewpoint, as has been traditional in the realm of international security (von Hlatky, 2017; Ni Aoliain, 2013). In the short-term, this benefits security forces, as well as women who are victims of, or participants in, violence. On a deeper level, establishing gender equality as a social, political, and economic norm can lead to durable positive peace. Therefore, in the long-term, social and political norms should be re-structured to address the security concerns of women, and to ensure their unimpeded participation in all levels of society. Munro argues that ‘peacebuilding does not mean a return to the status quo preceding the conflict as it is often the status quo which leads to conflict’ (2000: 4), showing that counterterrorism policies should not merely address direct violence and its perpetrators, but must also transform the underlying social conditions conducive to violent extremism, such as gender inequality.

Short-term Goals

In the short-term, acknowledging women’s capacity to commit violent acts is necessary to combat Boko Haram’s strategy of attack. As the literature on gender and security has shown, women’s capacity for violence is frequently underestimated due to gender stereotypes confining women to pacifist and nurturing roles (Agara, 2013; Ni Aolian, 2013). Boko Haram has taken advantage of this through its use of women and girls as suicide

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bombers (Agara, 2013), therefore counterterrorism strategies must include reference to women as terrorist attackers to raise awareness within security forces and combat this

phenomenon. Furthermore, any DDR initiatives should include specific provisions for female combatants, as women’s motivations and experiences can differ from men’s (Ni Aoliain, 2013).

Long-term Goals

Long-term goals are vital to sustained security and positive peace. Gender equality across all aspects of society should be a long-term goal for counterterrorism policies relating to Boko Haram. Winter and Leighton note that ‘structural violence is problematic in and of itself, but it is also dangerous because it frequently leads to direct violence. Those who are chronically oppressed are often, for logical reasons, those who resort to direct violence’ (2001: 99). Therefore, structural violence creates the conditions conducive to violent extremism, not only by generating instability and making women vulnerable to terrorist organisations, but also by motivating women to engage in violent extremism. In which case, from a gender perspective, structural violence is a major foundational factor to be addressed in counterterrorism initiatives.

Furthermore, policy frameworks, which only address direct violence perpetrated by traditionally defined terrorist actors, may not adequately speak to the security concerns of women. For example, there is little progress made towards women’s security if the terrorism of the state remains or replaces the terrorism of Boko Haram if and when the organisation is defeated. By acknowledging the variety of forms violent extremism takes, policy initiatives aiming to counter this issue with a gender-sensitive approach must acknowledge that any actor, using any form of violence for ideological, religious or political goals, can conform to this definition. This goes back to the question in the literature asking, who is peace for (Matfess, 2017)? Countering the violent extremism of Boko Haram is irrelevant if women continue to suffer from violence at the hands of those looking to maintain dominant gender power structures, therefore policies should aim to transform the social, political, and

economic injustices impeding women from attaining equal status. Transformative approaches can create the conditions conducive to durable peace, whereby masculinities emphasising toxic behaviours can be transformed into patterns more open to negotiation, cooperation, and equality, and femininities can be expanded to normalise the idea of women in the public sphere (Strickland and Duvvury, 2003). Therefore, polices should aim to redefine gender

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binaries in their social contexts to subvert discriminatory power dynamics and facilitate stable conditions for durable peace.

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Chapter 4

Research Design

4.1 Methodology

This thesis attempts to determine how successfully counterterrorism approaches relating to the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria integrate gender perspectives. It also tries to define which areas can be improved upon and in what ways. Finally, it asks how this will help counter violent extremism and facilitate durable peace. The ways, in which relevant policy documents are articulated, form the basis for their implementation. Therefore, the research was conducted following a discourse analysis methodology, interpreting the strengths and weaknesses of policy recommendations and frameworks through a gender sensitive lens. This involved formulating a gendered policy analysis framework, consisting of a list of questions shaped by the theoretical perspectives articulated in the literature, to

provide the guidelines for systematic analysis. The gender-lens model designed by Beverly A. McPhail is a systematic list of questions challenging policy discourses. These questions lend themselves to the specific context of peace and security gender issues by addressing the various issues discussed in the literature, from the inclusion of women throughout processes, to the social and economic empowerment of women, and the need to address root causes of structural violence. These issues fall under the scope of many of these questions, and the division of questions into categories allows for thorough and systematic analysis. McPhail outlines the goals and values of a gendered policy analysis, prioritising the visibility of women (2003). These concur with the literature’s positions on the importance of including women in peace and security practices, and the importance of empowering women in male-dominated societies. The questions are as follows:

A. Values

1. Do feminist values undergird the policy? Which feminism, which values?

2. Are value conflicts involved in the problem representations either between different feminist perspectives or between feminist and mainstream values?