Tiny, yet in Charge: Small States and
the Council of the European Union
Presidency
George Hintzen
Bachelor's Thesis
Small States in World Politics
Mr. Veenendaal
Word Count: 8357
Political Science: International Relations and Organisations
Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences
Leiden University
June 2018
Introduction
In recent years, the European Union (EU) has gone through rough times. The lingering European debt crisis that broke out in 2009 was closely followed by the migrant crisis of 2015, which was in its turn followed by the leave vote in the 2016 Brexit referendum. In 2017, separatism in Catalonia put the EU in a difficult position, whilst the EU simultaneously had to deal with the rise of illiberalism in several Central European countries. Today, the EU continues to dominate the news cycle, as many of these issues are yet to be resolved. Public sentiment towards the EU is split among Europeans, with the largest group citing to have a neutral image of the Union (Eurobarometer, 2017). On the one hand, the EU is the public's favourite scapegoat, blamed for a host of issues it has nothing to do with or of which it has no say in the matter. On the other, the EU is expected by many to solve problems far out of reach of its power or potency.
The prospective withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU will leave small member states vulnerable, as their guardian ally departs from the EU sphere (Taylor, 2018; Nic, 2018). Amongst the members of the Union are many states that are undisputedly small, and many more that perceive themselves as such. Often a victim of the powerful Franco-German alliance, small states have always been on the outlook for counter-alliances with other small states (Taylor, 2018). With unequal representation in the European Parliament and voting procedures in the Council of the European Union that favour states with larger populations, one of the last institutions in which member states have equal power irrespective of their size is the presidency of the Council of the European Union. Held by each state after waiting their turn, this rotating position, at least on paper, gives every state an equal opportunity to influence EU politics.
With the large and influential United Kingdom leaving, and states that will possibly accede in the future such as Montenegro or Albania predominantly being small, studying the role of small states in the European Union has never been as important as today. After discussing broader literature on the role of small states in world politics, on the European Union, and on small states in the EU, this thesis will focus on how small states act and what they achieve as president of the Council of the European Union. For small states, this position is of great importance, as it gives them an opportunity to leave their mark on EU politics. By looking at disparities in expertise, reputation, membership duration, domestic politics, and financial resources, this thesis will attempt to find out in what ways small state presidencies differ and are similar, and identify the causes of these differences and similarities. The results can be valuable for future small state presidencies, not only for those of states that have executed presidencies before and for those of states that have not, but also for those of small states that are not a member of the EU yet. Additionally, a better understanding of the powers of the Council presidency will be gained.
Small States in International Relations
In International Relations research, small states have long been overlooked (Thorhallsson, 2000, p. 6). The concept of small states and their role in international politics originates in the post-Congress of Vienna era of the nineteenth century. States that did not have a say in international affairs were referred to as "small powers" (Ingebritsen et al., 2006, p. 5), a category that today is often called "small states". There is no consensus on what states are to be included in the category of "small states" (Hey, 2003, p. 2). Demographics, area, and economic indicators are criteria that can arguably all be used to determine whether a state is small or not. On the other hand, it can be argued that smallness is a matter of perception. Hey (2003, p. 3) explains that any state can be a small state, if the state in question or others perceive it as such. When smallness is regarded a matter of perception, a change in behaviour of a state can lead to the state no longer being defined as small.
Over time, research on small states has not been conducted in a continuous flow, but can be divided into a number of phases. Small states were regarded as the main beneficiaries of the emergence of international organisations in the interwar period (Ingebritsen et al., 2006, p. 9). However, in the post Second World War world, small state research was primarily occupied with security. In the context of the Cold War, emphasis was laid on what policies could help small states escape the negative consequences of smallness within the bipolar power system (Ingebritsen et al., 2006, p. 10). After a standstill during the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, globalisation, liberalisation, and regional integration contributed to a revival of small state studies (Ingebritsen et al., 2006, p. 15). By partially alleviating the negative effects of hard borders on small states, these three phenomena contributed to new academic interest in small states, as well as more optimism about the position of small states in the international domain (Baldersheim & Keating, 2015, p. 7).
According to the theory of liberalism, small states have a subordinate position on the international playing field compared to other states. Nevertheless, small states can have a considerable influence on economic matters (Heywood, 2013, p. 62). Out of self-interest small states will promote free trade, peace, international law, democracy and human rights. Free trade is necessary for small states to be economically successful, following from a lack of domestic resources and a small domestic market. The promotion of non-material issues as peace, democracy, and human rights will contribute to a peaceful international environment in which the existence of small states is not endangered. This is confirmed by Ingebritsen (2004), who explains that small states often operate as neutral actors supporting the rule of law, because of its taming effects on larger powers and its ability to provide order in the international system (p. 378). Following from this, small states are strong advocates of international cooperation and international organisations.
Membership of an international or regional organisation legitimises the existence of a small state and confirms its territorial integrity and sovereignty; this is a concept known as extantism (Maass, 2017, p. 108). Constructivist literature posits that the institutionalisation of rules and norms in international organisations make these open to debate and question for all member states regardless of their size. Consequently, small states have the opportunity to influence these rules and norms, whereas without international organisations these would presumably be imposed upon them by larger states (Ingebritsen et al., 2006, p. 20). Another reason why small states have embraced international organisations is the fact that most international organisations employ the "one state, one vote" principle, formally putting small states on an equal footing with their larger counterparts. This means that small states have a significantly larger voice within international organisations, compared to the voice they have in other interstate affairs (Cooper & Shaw, 2012, p. 10).
One of the most important and powerful international organisations is the European Union (EU). As one of the most comprehensive regional organisations worldwide, the EU has served as a model for others since its emergence in the aftermath of the Second World War (Börzel & Risse, 2009, p. 6). Sometimes the EU is regarded as a system sui generis (Phelan, 2012, p. 367). If this were the case, studying the EU would be necessary to gain an understanding of the workings of the EU itself. In other respects however, the EU is regarded as similar to other regional organisations or agreements such as ECOWAS, NAFTA or UNASUR1. When perceived as such, studying the EU can deliver
valuable insights into other regional organisations.
Small States in the European Union
As most international organisations, the European Union has many small states within the ranks of its members. When the boundary is put at a population of five million, small states even make up one third of the Union's members. The number of small states has especially grown since the EU's expansion to the east, which began with the accession of ten new member states in 2004. However, small states have been around since very beginning, as Luxembourg was among the founding members of the Union. Research on small states in the EU has overwhelmingly depicted small states as less active and less successful in influencing policy decisions as compared to larger states. Panke (2011) argues that small states are overall less active within the Union, especially those that have acceded to the EU relatively short ago. Small states suffer budgetary, administrative, and staff limitations, leading to a weak bargaining position. Therefore, they do not achieve the same level of success as their larger counterparts do in influencing policy (Baldersheim & Keating, 2015, p. 70).
Baldersheim and Keating (2015) explain that small states that suffer from weak bargaining power could influence EU policy decisions both by arguing and lobbying. The former requires expertise, the latter, among other things, a large delegation. Especially the newer small states find themselves in a position in which it is hard to obtain either expertise or a large delegation of representatives. Expertise requires experience, something recently acceded small states–some of which only gained their independence relatively short ago–do not yet have. Likewise, for small states it can be hard to set up a large delegation, owing to a limited population and budget (Panke, 2011, p. 128). Small states that have longer been a member of the EU are experienced, having learnt the workings of the organisation, and having developed strategies to exert influence on decision-making (Panke, 2011, p. 129). Panke argues that for small states to overcome their limited capacities they should concentrate on a few key interests and try to gain expertise in these. Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006) confirm this claim by arguing that small states need to prioritise particular policy areas in order to have the necessary 'administrative force' to defend their interests (p. 659).
Whereas Panke emphasises the structural disadvantages small states endure within the EU framework, others name various characteristics of small states that are to their benefit. Handel, for instance, argues that small states typically have more international leverage than one would expect, due to their domestic political consensus and ethnic and cultural homogeneity (Handel, 1981). Thorhallsson (2000) explains that domestic political consensus is easier attainable for small states than it is for larger states. On top of that, small states usually have good working procedures in everyday diplomacy resulting from a tight-knit group of diplomats, and small state leaders have the ability to mobilise their population. Both lead to a strong bargaining position internationally (Thorhallsson, 2000, p. 6), as does the perceived neutrality and trustworthiness of small states (Steinsson & Thorhallsson, 2017).
Presidency of the Council
Many publications portray the fact that it tends to be more difficult for small states to influence policy decisions in the EU. This might not be entirely true. Small states do have one particular opportunity to have their say in the EU, in the form of the presidency of the Council of the European Union. Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006) explain that the Council presidency gives small states a lot of influence over policy decisions. Tallberg (2004) argues that small states can exert influence via the Council presidency just as much as larger states do. The Council presidency puts small states on an equal footing with larger states, because state size does not formally alter the power of the presidency. Furthermore, due to the rotating system used for the allocation of the presidency, a small state relatively often finds itself president of the Council. With the system of qualified majority voting (QMV) being used for most decisions of the Council, small states are possibly only left with one institution of power that treats them indifferently from larger states. Therefore, the relationship
between small states and the Council presidency must be examined more closely in order to find out exactly if, and how, small states can reap the benefits of the presidency.
The power of the presidency of the Council of the EU is not undisputed. Tallberg (2003) argues that the presidency is more powerful than often assumed. In another article he explains that scholars tend to underestimate the influence of the presidency, whereas empirically the presidency has shown to be both strong and influential (Tallberg, 2004, p. 1000). The president controls negotiations and decides who says what, when and how. According to Tallberg (2004), the presidency draws its power from on the one hand privileged information, and on the other procedural control, of which agenda-setting power is an important part. Interestingly, states do not only use the presidency resources for EU-wide collective gain, but also to further their national interests. This can be done by for example agenda-setting, agenda-structuring, and agenda exclusion (Tallberg, 2003, p. 16).
Bendel and Magnusdóttir (2017) posit that for small states with limited power, the Council presidency can provide a power platform for agenda-setting. Although it should be noted that the agenda of the Council has long been set before the presidency of a state starts, limiting the agenda-setting capacities of an incumbent. The incumbent of the presidency is in a position in which it can propagate its national interests, seize the opportunity to ameliorate its reputation, and gather goodwill and respect from other member states. On the other hand, the Council presidency can make an incumbent opt to silence its purely domestic interests, in order to preserve a positive image (Bendel & Magnusdóttir, 2017, p. 28). The presidency of the Council attracts much attention, leading to the fact that actively pursuing domestic interests during its tenure can hurt the incumbent state's reputation. This brings to light that there is not a single predicted way in which every small state will carry out a Council presidency, but that there rather are multiple options for small states to choose from. This will lead to both similarities and differences in behaviour between small state Council presidents. Nevertheless, there are certain expectations of a Council president: the position is closely connected to the notion of neutrality, with the incumbent expected to act as an "honest broker" that does not display its own interests (Bendel & Magnusdóttir, 2017, p. 28).
Research question
We now know that small states are overall less active and less successful in influencing EU policy decisions. The potentially big exception to this rule might be the presidency of the Council of the EU, which in theory enables small states to influence policy decisions to the same degree larger states have the ability to. Small states that have long been a member of the Union are usually more successful in influencing policy decisions than small states that have only recently joined the Union (Baldersheim & Keating, 2005, p. 70). Yet it is unknown if this discrepancy is also present when influencing policy as president of the Council of the EU. To find out if this is the case or not, several small state
presidencies could be compared. On this basis I propose the following research question: "How can the differences and similarities between the most recent Council of the European Union presidencies of Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta be explained?"
By comparing the most recent presidencies of the three smallest EU member states, this thesis aims to reveal the differences and similarities between small state presidencies. In everyday policymaking, small states that have long been a member are more influential than small states that have not (Panke, 2011, p. 129). It will be investigated if this is also the case regarding the Council presidency. It can be imagined that the expertise that Luxembourg has gained over time helps the state carry out a more influential presidency than Cyprus or Malta. Alternatively, the position of the presidency could give the same power to any incumbent, regardless of its expertise and resources.
Expectations
According to Bendel and Magnusdóttir (2017) small states can carry out a presidency either characterised by a style of unilateral leadership, mainly pursuing the national interest, or take on a more problem-solving role, or even the role of an honest broker, silencing the national interest. Newcomers on the European stage tend to opt for a problem-solving style. Out of fear of a bad reputation or appearing to not fully support the European project, new small member states suppress their national interest and act as a neutral judge, placing the collective EU gain first. Especially during their first tenure as president of the Council, small states avoid risk-taking behaviour and pursuing overly ambitious goals (Bendel & Magnusdóttir, 2017, p. 46).
Following from this, Cyprus and Malta are expected to take on an honest-broker role during their presidencies, since they are relatively new members of the Union and their most recent presidencies, in 2012 and in 2017 respectively, were their very first. On the other hand, Luxembourg is expected to opt for a presidency characterised by directional leadership in which pursuing the national interest also has a place. This follows from the fact that Luxembourg has long been a member of the EU and therefore has gained the experience and reputation enabling the state to carry out such a presidency. In addition to membership duration, the presence or absence of domestic political consensus in a state is also expected to play a role, as the literature posits that domestic political consensus increases a small state's international leverage (Handel, 1981). Due to Malta's highly polarised political climate characterised by its two-party system, electoral factors may play a role in the state's execution of its first presidency. The consequences of this are expected to be negative, as domestic polarisation weakens a small state's international bargaining power. Both Cyprus and Luxembourg are expected to reap the benefits of having a more consensual domestic political climate, boosting their international bargaining power, as explained by Thorhallsson (2000).
Of all three states it can be expected that they will execute a relatively inactive presidency, as the literature tells us that small states are less active than larger states in the EU (Panke, 2011). An inactive presidency will rather be marked by relatively easily attainable objectives, than by overly ambitious ones. On the other hand, as noted earlier, small states tend to have some characteristics that grant them a relatively strong bargaining position. This might lead to them achieving a few challenging goals, if these characteristics are present.
Operationalisation of concepts
This research intends to reveal in what ways various small state Council presidencies differ and are similar. To uncover this, several factors will be examined. There are many factors that can potentially influence a small state presidency, not only in performance, but also in behaviour. These factors can be divided into two categories: those over which the small state in question does and does not have influence. This thesis takes both categories of factors into account. Aside from examining these factors and their influence, the results of small state presidencies will be compared.
In this research, a small state is a state with a population of one million or less. Putting the bar at a population of one million makes sense as this creates a coherent group of states. This group contains the smallest EU members both by population and by area; in both cases by a large margin, as the gap between the next smallest EU member states again both in terms of population and area is large. Factors that influence small state performance and behaviour over which the state in question has little to no influence, are expertise, duration of membership of the EU, domestic political consensus, and financial resources. By contrast, the factors which small states can influence, are the choice of the state to either propagate or silence its national interests; the role a state takes on: that of unilateral leadership, a problem solver, or an honest broker; and the choice either to set ambitious goals or to pursue modest targets. The factor of reputation falls between the two categories, as the reputation of a state is influenced by its own behaviour, but in the end is a perception others have, over which little influence can be exercised. A small state has little to no influence over its domestic unity, as domestic political consensus is part of the political culture of a state, shaped by the need to govern in coalitions or not and the degree to which the political landscape is polarised. Along with these factors, the results of the various small state Council presidencies will be studied. It will be assessed if goals set beforehand by the state in question are achieved, not achieved or partially achieved.
Research design
This thesis makes use of a qualitative research design, carrying out a comparative case-oriented study, examining three cases, in order to answer the research question. To uncover causal relationships, several variables concerning the cases will be put under scrutiny, resulting in a qualitative approach.
The comparative case study will be carried out making use of a most similar systems research design. This design makes use of cases that are similar in a wide array of variables, but differ in the variables under scrutiny. The most similar systems design eliminates the possibility that variables that do not vary amongst the cases are labelled as causing the differences found between the examined cases (Levy, 2008, p. 10).
By making use of the most similar systems design, this research aims to uncover the variables that make the cases behave differently from each other when it comes to the Council presidency. The three cases that are selected for this research are, as noted earlier in the research question, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta. As previously mentioned, a small state is, in this research, a state with a population of one million or less. Since there are only three EU members that fall in this category, it makes sense to include all three. It is not insignificant to note that all three states have had their last tenure of the presidency of the Council relatively short ago. This makes the circumstances in which these states held the presidency very similar, which in its turn makes the comparison fairer.
The usage of total population sampling of small state EU members enables this research to formulate general theoretical expectations regarding small states. As there are several states with a population of less than one million that could possibly join the EU in the future, like Montenegro or Iceland, the findings of this research will not only be useful for the states that are put under scrutiny in this thesis. The case of Luxembourg could possibly serve as a prototypical case. Beforehand, this case is expected to behave differently, caused by its considerably longer membership of the EU compared to the other two states. The findings regarding Luxembourg and the Council presidency could become the norm for member states that have long been a member of the Union and therefore have carried out many Council presidencies, including Cyprus and Malta in the distant future.
An important research method this thesis will employ is that of content analysis. Most findings will be drawn from government reports, independent reports, governmental and nongovernmental websites, newspaper articles, and academic literature. These sources will be selected carefully by looking at who the authors are, and at their relationship with the content. It will be taken into account that some sources may present biased information. The comparison of both domestic sources and sources from abroad concerning the three examined states, will contribute to a more impartial impression of facts. By revealing in what way the states in question behaved and performed during their tenure of the Council presidency, disparities and similarities regarding the three presidencies will come to light. This will enable this thesis to answer the research question as well as to contribute to broader literature on small states.
Data analysis
Cypriot Council presidency of 2012
On July 1 2012, Cyprus took on the presidency of the Council of the European Union. The very first Cypriot presidency took place during the highly uncertain times of the European debt crisis. With Cypriot banks having strong ties to their Greek counterparts, Cyprus requested an EU bailout only days before becoming Council president (Wilson et al., 2012). Cyprus, an island state with an area of 5,895 km2 and a population of 865,000 in 2012, is strongly shaped by the so-called 'Cyprus dispute',
the occupation of the northern third of the island by Turkish troops since 1974. De jure, the Cypriot government has sovereignty over the entire island; de facto however, the island is divided into two separate entities: the Republic of Cyprus on the one hand, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the other, with the latter solely being recognised by Turkey. Cyprus' small size, the state of its economy, and the ongoing dispute with Turkey all led to very low expectations of the presidency (Ugarn, 2012), with one EU diplomat noting beforehand: “The expectations are now so low that they can only surprise in a positive way” (Spiegel, 2012).
Whereas Cyprus was economically entangled to the Middle East rather than to Europe during the 1980s, the state decided to pursue EU membership, hoping it would strengthen its position in the Cyprus dispute, amongst other things (Adamczyk, 2012, p. 111; Kyris, 2015). Cyprus' domestic political climate is characterised by its multi-party system, with the continual need to govern in coalitions safeguarding political consensus (Cyprus Profile).
Priorities
As all states do when occupying the position of the Council presidency, Cyprus set a few priorities it aimed to focus on during its presidency. The four main priorities formulated by the Cypriot government were: an efficient and sustainable EU, a better performing and growing European economy, an EU relevant for its citizens, and an EU closer to its neighbours (Cy2012eu; European Commission, 2012).
The main responsibility of the Cypriot presidency was the formation of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) (European Commission, 2012). Appearing on the European agenda every seven years, Cyprus had no choice in making the MFF one of the core issues of its presidency. Cyprus realistically pledged to only make progress on the MFF file rather than to close it, and set itself the goal to achieve a "political agreement", leaving further work to the successive Council presidency (Gotev, 2012). No goals clearly or exclusively served the Cypriot national interest. Numerous goals, such as fighting the consequences of the European debt crisis, or the development of the Integrated Maritime Policy served alongside Cypriot interests, EU wide interests.
Style of presidency
According to independent media platform Euractiv, Cyprus decidedly took on the role of an honest and impartial broker during its presidency, as pledged beforehand (Gotev, 2012). Having asked for an EU bailout just days before its presidency started nevertheless undermined Cyprus' credibility to act as an honest broker when it came to issues regarding financial stability and economic reform (Linders & Blockmans, 2013, p. 1). The state disregarded its domestic issues and clearly tried to serve the greater EU interests (Christou, 2013, p. 80), in the hope to enhance its reputation and come across as a credible and responsible partner (Gotev, 2012). As a result of its small size, Cyprus had to deal with fewer (financial) resources and fewer representatives than other states (Christou, 2013, p. 86). As typical traits of small states, these led to relatively weak bargaining power. In spite of this, Cyprus managed to score a number of positive results, owing to its pragmatic approach to the office, according to an independent report of the Centre of European Policy Studies (CEPS) (Linders & Blockmans, 2013, p. 1). The state opted to not pursue overly ambitious goals, but to stick to a modest but nevertheless relevant agenda (Christou, 2013, p. 87; Gotev, 2012).
In an unconventional manner, Cyprus decided to execute a "Brussels-based" presidency, meaning that the vast majority of the formalities took place in Brussels, as opposed to in its national capital, Nicosia (Christou, 2013, p. 81; Gotev, 2012). Apart from financial restrictions, limitations in administrative capacity and the inconvenient location of Cyprus in the far east of the Mediterranean, the main reason that led Cyprus to making this decision, was the fear that domestic issues regarding the Cyprus dispute would spoil the Cypriot presidency in terms of effectiveness and reputation (Christou, 2013, p. 81). Cyprus did not pursue its national interest, as none of its goals clearly or solely served Cypriot interests. Furthermore, the state did not use the Council presidency to strengthen its position in the Cyprus dispute, but instead chose to push the conflict to the background by carrying out most activities in Brussels (Gotev, 2012). Cypriot president Demetris Christofias stated that Cyprus would represent the position of the entire EU regarding candidate states, including Turkey, and thus use the presidency to promote EU interests, rather than national interests (Adamczyk, 2012, p. 117).
Results
As pledged beforehand, Cyprus laid emphasis on the formation of the Multiannual Financial Framework and the problems resulting from the economic crisis during its presidency (Adamczyk, 2012, p. 123). The presidency was characterised by effective brokerage and mediation, in spite of Cyprus having fewer resources and smaller teams than most other states (Christou, 2013, p. 86). The Cypriots had no experience regarding the presidency, but realised some of their goals due to their pragmatic approach of pursuing realistic targets rather than ambitious goals (Christou, 2013, p. 87; Linders & Blockmans, 2013, p. 1).
The achievements of the Cypriot presidency, which include an agreement on an important step towards the completion of the banking union (Linders & Blockmans, 2013, p. 2), were accompanied by a disappointing performance on the MFF file. Although progress was made, no "political agreement" was reached (Gotev, 2012) and a considerable amount of work was passed on to the successive Council president, Ireland (Vogel, 2012).
Nonetheless, Cyprus exceeded the low expectations and can therefore look back on a fairly successful presidency, as reported by Politico (Vogel, 2012). Achievements include agreements on a common patent and on a single banking supervisor for the Eurozone (Vogel, 2012). Whereas Turkey put itself in a negative light by boycotting the Cypriot presidency, Cyprus improved its image and reputation among EU members by executing a positively judged presidency, albeit one in which Cyprus set the bar very low for itself (Adamczyk, 2012, p. 123; Linders & Blockmans, 2013, p. 1).
Expectations
Expectations drawn from the literature predicted Cyprus to act as an honest broker, not pursue its national interest, and not set too ambitious goals. These predictions turned out to be right, as the state pledged to act as an honest broker and did so, albeit with the notable exception of financial and economical issues. Cyprus also did not pursue its national interest, by keeping the Cyprus dispute out of the picture and not pursuing goals exclusively serving its own national interest. Finally, the state did not set ambitious goals, but carried out a pragmatic presidency characterised by attainable goals and a narrow agenda. The Cypriot domestic political consensus did not appear to work either to their advantage or disadvantage. Nevertheless, Cyprus did suffer from typical traits of small states that weaken bargaining power: fewer (financial) resources and staff limitations.
Luxembourgish Council presidency of 2015
On July 1, 2015 Luxembourg took on the role of Council of the EU president, succeeding Latvia. For Luxembourg, a founding member of the EU, this was its twelfth tenure of the presidency, the previous time being in 2005 (GAIN, 2015). Luxembourg, a country with a population of 570,000 with an area of 2586 km2 in the heart of Europe, has always been strongly committed to European integration with a focus on Franco-German peace (Hey, 2003, p. 75). One of the most politically stable countries in the world (Expat Insider, 2017), Luxembourg is widely renowned for its domestic political climate, which is centred on the concept of consensus.
The second half of 2015 was marked by two major events which both greatly influenced the Council presidency of Luxembourg: the worsening migration crisis and the Paris attacks. It was during the Luxembourg presidency that German Chancellor Angela Merkel repeatedly spoke the words "wir
schaffen das", which were later used against her by opponents of her immigration policy. In the same
period, 130 people were killed in a series of terrorist attacks in Paris, claimed by ISIS, on Friday November 13, 2015.
Priorities
Luxembourg formulated seven priorities to achieve during its presidency. These priorities concerned the economy and employment, the social dimension of EU policy which focuses on social inclusion, managing migration, revitalising the single market, the EU on the global stage, sustainable development, and EU competitiveness (Eu2015lu). By pursuing goals that were not all in scope of the Council presidency's power, Luxembourg proved to be an ambitious player (Johnston, 2015; Renman & Russack, 2016).
None of the aforementioned ambitions solely served the national interest of Luxembourg. By not trying to push through a big national agenda, Luxembourg instead aimed to carry out a European agenda, benefitting all member states (Högenauer, 2016, p. 94). This fits the Luxembourg rationale that what benefits the EU, will also benefit Luxembourg. Additionally, the negative attention caused by the 2014 Luxleaks scandal inclined Luxembourg to fight tax-avoidance schemes, which is not in their national interest (Renman & Russack, 2016). As a result of both expertise and experience (Hearl, 2006, p. 51), Luxembourg was able to embark on a well-prepared presidency while priding itself on a good reputation (Menges, 2015; Högenauer, 2016, p. 91).
Style of presidency
Beforehand, Luxembourg had pledged to act as an honest broker during its presidency (Eu2015lu). Both the migration crisis and the Paris attacks nevertheless required a determined and united response at the EU level (Eu2015lu). By hosting several extraordinary meetings, on the migration crisis, on
terrorism, but also on meat after the meat sector was hit by a crisis, Luxembourg showed itself capable of leadership when needed. By continually responding to emergencies in a timely fashion, the state proved its ability to manage crises, according to a CEPS report (Renman & Russack, 2016).
With the 2015 presidency being the twelfth for Luxembourg, many politicians and diplomats could rely on experiences gained in one or multiple previous presidencies (Hearl, 2006, p. 52; Högenauer, 2016, p. 94). Owing to a relatively generous domestic budget, Luxembourg did not face the financial limitations predicted to restrict small state presidencies (Högenauer, 2016, p. 94). Luxembourg joined Cyprus in opting for a Brussels-based presidency, as it had done during its previous presidencies. The execution of the presidency was left to the permanent representation in Brussels, which did not require an increase in staff, as Luxembourg always boasts a relatively large presence in Brussels in comparison to its size (Högenauer, 2016, p. 94).
The state benefitted from various traits typical of small states. A tight-knit group of all-round diplomats, who work simultaneously on multiple files, ensured mutual trust, personal relationships, and a horizontal view on all policy areas (Högenauer, 2016, p. 95). Most Luxembourgish diplomats could also rely on long-term individual experience. On top of that, the specific Luxembourgish context of multilingualism benefitted the delegation during negotiations, as both the French and the Germans could be addressed in their mother tongue (Högenauer, 2016, p. 95).
Results
The Luxembourg presidency was marked by the two major crises that hit Europe in late 2015: the migration crisis and the Paris attacks (Renman & Russack, 2016). Although the pre-set programme was largely eclipsed by these unforeseen events, Luxembourg proved able to achieve some important goals. In the field of the priorities of the digital single market and of a competitive EU in global terms, important steps were made by reaching hard-fought political agreement (Renman & Russack, 2016). On its other priorities Luxembourg failed to deliver decisively, with minor successes in the field of sustainable development and no tangible progress made on deepening the EU's social dimension (Högenauer, 2016, p. 96).
During the migration crisis, the state managed to broker an agreement concerning the relocation of 160,000 refugees across the continent, which was adopted by qualified majority voting after intense mediation efforts of Luxembourg (Renman & Russack, 2016). In the wake of the Paris attacks Luxembourg responded quickly by organising another extraordinary council meeting in which priority actions were decided upon (Parlementaire Monitor, 2016). Furthermore, the European Passenger Name Record (PNR) was adopted (Europa Nu, 2015). These unexpected accomplishments were widely regarded as major achievements, attributed to the Luxembourgish presidency (Renman &
Russack, 2016). By closing a number of negotiations on important deadlocked legislative files, Luxembourg showcased its know-how in diplomacy (Renman & Russack, 2016). Even though it was not one of its responsibilities, Luxembourg also played a central role in the adoption of the Paris climate agreement (France diplomatie, 2016). For the first time in six years a unanimous agreement was reached on the EU annual budget, again demonstrating Luxembourg's exceptional diplomatic capabilities (Högenauer, 2016, p. 95).
Despite the crisis-ridden tenure, both the media and EU politicians reviewed the Luxembourgish presidency positively (Högenauer, 2016, p. 98). The presidency was regarded as a success due to its realistic and attainable programme, albeit with some exceptions, Luxembourg's experience, its culture of consensus, and above all Luxembourg's responsiveness to crises (Högenauer, 2016, p. 99). Luxembourg managed to be an honest-broker president that showed up well prepared on its own priorities (Högenauer, 2016, p. 99). Strongly marked by the two crises that hit Europe in 2015, Luxembourg nevertheless managed to carry out a successful presidency in which decisive and strong responses played a large role.
Expectations
Expectations drawn from the literature predicted Luxembourg to carry out a presidency characterised by directional leadership, the absence of overly ambitious goals, and the pursuit of the national interest. These predictions turned out to be more wrong than right. Luxembourg initially pledged to act as an honest broker and ended up acting as such, although the state had to show leadership when needed in times of crisis. A few priorities Luxembourg set were out of scope of the Council presidency's power, making Luxembourg an ambitious player. No evidence was found that Luxembourg pursued its national interest, although it is noteworthy to mention that many in Luxembourg equate the national interest with the EU wide interest. Additionally, Luxembourg did not experience the limitations typical for small states according to the literature. The state did neither suffer financial limitations, nor a small presence of diplomats in Brussels. However, Luxembourg clearly did enjoy the benefits of being a small state: a tight-knit group of all-round diplomats and long-term individual experience enabled the country to carry out a successful presidency.
Maltese Council presidency of 2017
On January 1, 2017 Malta succeeded Slovakia and took on the Council of the EU presidency for the very first time, nearly thirteen years after becoming an EU member. With the migrant crisis now fading away, the new challenge the EU was facing in early 2017 was Brexit. On March 29, 2017, during the Maltese EU council presidency, British Prime Minister Theresa May triggered the so-called Article 50 procedure, which officially launched the Brexit negotiations.
Malta, an island country in the southern Mediterranean with a population of 440,000 and an area of 316 km2, is the smallest EU member state, both in terms of population and area. Located off the
southern coast of the Italian island of Sicily, Malta has often had to grapple with migration, especially in recent years. Malta's domestic political climate is strongly shaped by its two-party system. Since independence, the Nationalist party on the one hand and the Labour party on the other have fought each other for political control over Malta. This ongoing battle has left both the electorate and the political climate deeply polarised (Cini, 2002, p. 7).
Priorities
Malta presented six priorities its first Council presidency would focus on especially. These six priorities were: migration, the single market, security, social inclusion, Europe's neighbourhood, and the maritime policy (MaltaEU2017). With migration and Europe's neighbourhood both concerning the influx of migrants to Malta, and the maritime policy linked to Malta being an island state, Malta's own national interest is clearly visible in the six priorities set by the state; in contrast to both Cyprus and Luxembourg. Overall, Malta's goals were regarded as ambitious by both the EU and by Malta itself (Apelblat, 2017; Bonnici, 2017; Europe Direct, 2017).
Style of presidency
Amid fears over its logistical capacities and human capital, Malta showed itself an honest broker by allowing debate on delicate issues on which it did not want to force a compromise (Debono, 2017). Maltese Prime Minister Joseph Muscat kept his promise as he had vowed to act as an honest broker beforehand (Diacono, 2016; Follain et al., 2017). Malta's suffering of budgetary limitations came to light when the government actively encouraged local businesses to donate to the state's presidency (MaltaEU2017). In a highly unusual fashion, Prime Minister Muscat called a snap election during the Maltese tenure of the Council presidency, which did not go down well in Brussels (Cooper, 2017; Cooper et al., 2017). Deeply involved in the domestic dispute about the Panama Papers scandal, the Prime Minister decided to pull the planned election forwards into the Maltese presidency. This resulted in heightened domestic tension and a fierce election campaign, which according to some, including the government itself, did not hurt the success of the presidency (Sansone, 2017). However, others, including the opposition, argue that the Maltese reputation was dented, following from both the
unconventional snap election and the Prime Minister being inquired by a European Council Committee for his role in the Panama Papers scandal (Editorial: "EU presidency", 2017). Furthermore, Estonia, the next presidency holder, had to temporarily take over Malta's presidential duties, as the Maltese were negotiating a new cabinet in the weeks following the snap election (Cavegn, 2017). Highly unusual, the Maltese government showed that for them, when it comes down to it, domestic politics overrule the responsibilities of the Council presidency.
Malta did not carry out a Brussels-based presidency but chose to host the majority of official events in its capital Valletta (Sansone, 2017). Prime Minister Muscat highlighted this by not only thanking the Maltese EU officials for carrying out an, according to him, successful presidency, but also thanking ordinary Maltese people such as hotel employees and taxi drivers for their role. On top of that, the Maltese organised many cultural and artistic events in their home country, to showcase their culture and skills to the outside world, as well as to gain publicity (Sansone, 2017).
Results
With initial concerns over Malta's capacities, experience, and expertise, Malta's Council presidency generally received mixed reviews (Vicenti, 2017). Malta turned out to be good at one of the most important tasks of the presidency: negotiating deals (Cooper et al., 2017). On the file of maritime affairs, Malta achieved what it intended to by closing some of the toughest files on fishing. Regarding Brexit, Malta did a good job keeping the remaining 27 member states together, a potentially difficult task since Malta was the first Council president that had to deal with the official negotiations (Cooper et al., 2017).
On the file of migration views were more mixed. Aside from bringing about a surprise 'Malta Declaration' which increased voluntary returns of migrants and included training of Libyan coast guard forces, Malta failed to deliver on its own goals (Cooper et al., 2017; Grech, 2017). Beforehand, Malta had ambitiously pledged to revise the Dublin treaty, called for a fairer distribution of migrants over member states, and vowed to relocate migrants who had already arrived (MaltaEU2017) None of these objectives were achieved, despite migration being the number one priority on every list published.
In the policy area of social inclusion, nothing big was achieved. Malta organised various conferences on minority rights as well as on women in the workforce, but nothing tangible came out of them (Cooper et al., 2017). In the fields of security and the single market Malta fared fairly better, achieving some moderate successes (Cooper et al., 2017).
Altogether, Malta carried out a Council presidency marked by both successes and disappointments. Some, especially the domestic opposition, reported the presidency to be overshadowed by the Panama Papers scandal and the subsequent snap election, which occurred during Malta's presidency. An unusual occurrence, which did not go down well in Brussels and even temporarily suspended Malta's tenure; showcasing that Malta's domestic political climate inhibited the country from carrying out a normal presidency. Beforehand, the Prime Minister had pledged to act as an honest-broker president during negotiations. Although this seemed to be the case, it is remarkable that in the set priorities, as well as in the attained results, the Maltese national interest can clearly be found, as for instance with the achievements on maritime legislation.
Expectations
Malta clearly defied the expectations drawn from the literature. Predicted to pursue neither ambitious goals nor the national interest, the state ended up doing both. Although Malta pursued several realistic targets, many goals were very ambitious and proved impossible to attain. In order to improve its reputation, the island state was expected to act as an honest broker. In most policy areas the state acted as such, but the state's reputation nevertheless suffered from the snap election called during its tenure of the Council presidency. Malta clearly showed typical small state behaviour by organising many events at home, in order to showcase itself to the outside world. Malta's heavily polarised political climate was predicted to play a role. The snap election clearly showcased this, as did the pursuit of the national interest by the government, which has to been seen in the light of the ruling party wanting to present tangible achievements to the electorate. Furthermore, Malta suffered typical small state restrictions such as limitations in both budget and human capital.
Conclusion
Looking at the most recent Council of the EU presidencies of Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta, both similarities and differences can be observed. Cyprus and Luxembourg pursued no national interests during their tenure, whereas Malta did. Cyprus opted for this in order to safeguard its reputation. Luxembourg did not visibly pursue its national interest, although many in Luxembourg see the pursuit of the EU interest as beneficial to their national interest. The Maltese government opted to pursue its national interest, most likely for electoral reasons.
Cyprus and Luxemburg both carried out a Brussels-based presidency, whilst Malta did not. For Cyprus this again had reputational reasons, as the Cyprus dispute was supposed to stay out of sight for others. For Luxembourg a Brussels-based presidency is business as usual, as the state's permanent representation in Brussels executes the presidency without additional support. Malta showed the expected typical small state behaviour by eagerly seizing the opportunity of standing in the limelight. Malta and Luxembourg both set ambitious goals to attain, whilst Cyprus did not pursue an ambitious agenda. For Luxembourg this leads back to its expertise and experience gained from its long-standing EU membership, and for Malta this can be traced back to its domestic politics. Cyprus, finally, took on a pragmatic approach and realised that ambitious goals would be out of reach for a maiden small state presidency. All three states pledged to act as an honest broker, with only Luxembourg having to divert from this promise in order to manage unexpected crises.
The advantages of being a small state were clearly enjoyed by Luxembourg, with the state benefitting from a tight-knit group of all-round diplomats and long-term individual experience. Both Cyprus and Malta did not appear to benefit from any traits typical for small states. On the contrary, Cyprus and Malta both suffered financial limitations and restrictions in human capital, which are both predicted shortcomings of a small state. Neither suffering budgetary, nor administrative, nor staff limitations, Luxembourg appeared nothing like a small state when it comes to disadvantages small states are predicted to suffer from.
The aforementioned factors of reputation; experience and expertise following from long-standing EU membership; domestic politics consisting of electoral factors and domestic consensus; typical small state behaviour; and the advantages and disadvantages of being a small state all explain the differences and similarities in behaviour and in choices made between the three examined small state Council presidencies. Nevertheless it should be noted that unforeseen events can greatly influence a Council presidency. The European debt crisis, the migrant crisis, the Paris attacks, and the Panama Papers scandal clearly left their mark on all three examined presidencies respectively, making it harder to draw a fair comparison.
The answers this thesis has provided fill the gap in the literature that was identified earlier. Luxembourg carrying out the most successful presidency of the three examined presidencies in terms of achievements brings to light that small states that have long been a member of the EU are more successful as Council president than states that have recently joined the Union. It was already known that older small states are more successful than newer small states in influencing EU policy in day-to-day decision-making.
Other states can learn from the findings of this thesis, as Cyprus' success in achieving its easily attainable goals and Malta's struggle to achieve its ambitious goals both tell small states that will accede to the Union in the future that opting for a realistic approach is the path to success. If small states are afraid their domestic issues will spoil their presidency, they can opt for a Brussels-based presidency, as Cyprus did. The for small states usually easily attainable political consensus will not necessarily work to their advantage, nonetheless, a polarised political climate can pose a serious risk for a small state presidency. Furthermore, Malta shows that even for a newcomer, pursuing the national interest is not necessarily harmful, nor is it any guarantee for success. Finally, opting for an honest-broker role is always the safe choice to ensure an unscathed reputation, although showing leadership when needed can earn one great praise.
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