British'Policy'on'Terrorism'
The$British$Threat$Construction$and$Security$Response$to$Foreign$
Terrorist$Fighters$in$Comparison$to$the$case$of$the$Irish$Republican$
Army$
$ British$House$of$Parliament$(Source:$Hearn$2013)$ $ Aideen$Hearn,$10800549$ Supervisor:$Dr.$Stephanie$Simon$ Second$Reader:$Prof.$Dr.$Marieke$de$Goede$ ‘Master$Thesis$Political$Science’$ Specialisation:$International$Relations$ Date$of$completion:$26th$June$2015$'
Table$of$Contents$
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$ Introducing$the$Topic$...$5$ Chapter$One$–$The$Conceptual$Framework$...$9$ Foreign$(Terrorist)$Fighters$...$9$ The$Security$Discourse$and$the$construction$of$danger$...$10$ Producing$Social$Meanings$–$Understanding$Terrorism$...$11$ Reproducing$Social$Meanings$...$12$ Governing$Terrorism$...$13$ Chapter$Two$–$Method$...$15$ The$Cases$...$16$ The$Irish$Republican$Army$(IRA)$...$16$ Foreign$Terrorist$Fighters$...$17$ The$discourse$analysis$...$18$ Dominant$Discourse$versus$Alternative$Understandings$...$18$ Data$...$19$ Chapter$Three$U$The$discourse$on$the$Irish$Republican$Army$in$1939$...$20$ The$Threat$Construction$...$21$ Alternative$Understandings$of$the$Issue$...$23$ The$Political$Causes$of$the$Problem$...$24$ Governing$the$IRA$Threat$...$24$ The$discourse$on$the$Irish$Republican$Army$in$1974$...$27$ The$perceived$Threat$posed$by$the$IRA$...$28$ How$to$Govern$the$Terrorist$Threat?$...$29$ Alternative$Understandings$of$the$Issue$...$30$ What$happened$after$1974$...$31$Chapter$Four$–$The$Discourse$on$Foreign$Terrorist$Fighters$...$33$ The$Context$–$The$British$Experience$with$Foreign$Terrorist$Fighters$...$33$ The$Threat$–$A$Clash$of$Civilisations?$...$34$ Alternative$Understandings$–$The$Politics$Behind$the$Threat$...$35$ The$Political$Consequences$...$36$ Using$PreUemption$to$Govern$the$Issue$...$37$ Worries$about$the$Bill$...$39$ Conclusion$...$41$ References$...$47$ $
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Introducing'the'Topic'
$The$British$Prime$Minister,$David$Cameron,$made$the$following$statement$on$24th$of$ September$2014:$
The$conflict$in$Syria$is$shocking$the$world$with$its$barbarity….$But$one$of$the$most$disturbing$ aspects$ is$ how$ this$ conflict$ is$ sucking$ in$ our$ own$ young$ people,$ from$ modern,$ prosperous$ societies$(Cameron$2014,$no$pagination).$
A$month$earlier,$the$threat$level$for$international$terrorism$in$the$United$Kingdom$had$been$ raised$ from$ ‘substantial’$ to$ ‘severe’,$ which$ means$ that$ a$ terrorist$ attack$ was$ considered$ ‘highly$ likely’$ (Home$ Office$ 2014).$ According$ to$ MI5$ (n.d.),$ the$ British$ national$ security$ intelligence$ agency,$ this$ increased$ risk$ stemmed$ mainly$ from$ British$ nationals,$ mainly$ muslims,$who$had$travelled$to$Syria$and$Iraq,$to$join$the$conflict,$and$wanted$to$return$to$ the$UK.$These$people$were$seen$as$a$risk$to$British$security$because$it$was$feared$that$they$ had$ participated$ in$ terrorist$ activity$ abroad$ and$ that$ they$ would$ carry$ out$ attacks$ in$ the$ United$ Kingdom$ upon$ their$ return.$ That$ is$ why$ these$ people$ were$ also$ called$ ‘foreign$ terrorist$fighters’$(United$Nations$Security$Council$2014).$$
To$be$able$to$deal$with$this$last$risk,$the$British$Government$introduced$Temporary$ Exclusion$Orders$as$part$of$the$CounterUTerrorism$and$Security$Act$2015$(s$2).$These$Orders$ entail$that$a$British$citizen$is$not$allowed$to$return$to$the$UK$if$he/she$does$not$agree$with$ the$terms$that$have$been$set$by$the$British$Government,$that$is$to$say$if$they$do$not$agree$to$ be$prosecuted$or$put$under$close$supervision$upon$their$return$(Home$Office$n.d.).$$
This$is$not$the$first$time$that$the$British$Government$introduced$Exclusion$Orders$to$ deal$ with$ what$ they$ perceived$ as$ a$ terrorist$ threat.$ In$ both$ 1939$ and$ in$ 1974$ the$ British$ Government$ was$ confronted$ with$ a$ series$ of$ violent$ attacks$ on$ British$ soil$ (English$ 2004).$ The$Irish$Republican$Army$carried$out$these$attacks.$The$IRA$used$these$attacks$to$achieve$ their$political$goal,$which$was$the$separation$of$Northern$Ireland$from$the$UK.$Most$of$these$ attacks$were$carried$out$in$Northern$Ireland,$but$in$some$cases,$like$in$1939$and$in$1974,$the$ IRA$decided$to$expand$its$campaign$to$Great$Britain$(Durney$2004).$In$both$of$these$cases$ the$British$Government$responded$to$the$attacks$by$introducing$new$legislation,$namely$the$ Prevention$ of$ Violence$ (Temporary$ Provisions)$ Act$ 1939$ and$ the$ Prevention$ of$ Terrorism$ (Temporary$ Provisions)$ Act$ 1974.$ Both$ Acts$ included$ Exclusion$ Orders.$ But$ unlike$ the$
Temporary$Exclusion$Orders,$these$Orders$could$only$be$made$for$people$that$had$not$been$ resident$in$Great$Britain$for$over$19$years.$
In$ both$ the$ case$ of$ the$ IRA$ and$ the$ foreign$ terrorist$ fighters$ these$ measures$ were$ referred$ to$ as$ ‘repressive’$ and$ ‘draconian’$ (HC$ Deb$ 24$ July$ 1939,$ cc1047U127;$ HC$ Deb$ 28$ November$1974,$cc634U752;$HC$Deb$2$December$2014,$c228).$To$understand$how$the$British$ Government$ justified$ this$ ‘repressive’$ response$ the$ following$ research$ question$ will$ be$ answered:$
How$does$the$UK$government$frame$and$justify$a$‘repressive’$approach$to$govern$the$return$ of$ Foreign$ Terrorist$ Fighters?$ How$ does$ this$ compare$ historically$ to$ the$ British$ threat$ construction$and$security$response$to$the$Irish$Republican$Army?$
$ The$ case$ of$ the$ Irish$ Republican$ Army$ is$ included$ in$ this$ thesis,$ not$ only$ because$similar$policies$(Exclusion$Orders)$were$adopted,$but$also$because$they$are$part$of$ the$ British$ context$ in$ which$ the$ discourse$ on$ foreign$ terrorist$ fighters$ took$ place.$ This$ context$influences$the$way$in$which$an$issue$is$understood$and$what$policies$are$thought$of$ as$ possible$ (Neumann$ 2008).$ It$ is$ therefore$ important$ to$ also$ look$ at$ the$ way$ in$ which$ similar$ issues$ have$ been$ governed$ in$ the$ past.$ Or$ in$ other$ words,$ it$ is$ important$ to$ understand$ how$ the$ concept$ of$ terrorism$ has$ functioned$ within$ discourse,$ as$ this$ may$ constrain$ what$ is$ thought$ of$ as$ possible$ in$ the$ current$ case$ of$ foreign$ terrorist$ fighters$ (Campbell$1992).$$ This$means$it$is$also$important$to$examine$the$use$of$the$concept$of$terrorism.$The$ use$of$the$concept$of$terrorism,$namely,$has$political$consequences.$It$often$means$that$a$ preUemptive$rational$is$used$to$govern$the$issue$(Aradau$&$Van$Munster$2007).$This$is$the$ case$because$terrorism$is$often$represented$as$both$uncertain$and$potentially$catastrophic,$ which$are$the$two$characteristics$of$a$preUemptive$rational$(Ibid.).$So$in$both$cases$it$will$be$ examined$how$the$concept$of$terrorism$was$used$and$if$a$preUemptive$rational$was$used$to$ govern$the$‘terrorist$threat’.$ $
Understanding$ how$ a$ country$ like$ the$ United$ Kingdom$ frames$ and$ justifies$ its$ policies$ is$ important$ for$ various$ reasons.$ The$ first$ is$ that$ policies$ carry$ consequences$ with$ them,$ including$unintended$consequences.$Especially$if$the$issue$is$governed$by$preUemption$there$ is$a$risk$that$the$policies$have$unintended$consequences$(Anderson$2010).$That$is$because$ preUemption$is$based$on$a$zero$risk$rational.$Which$means$that$the$risk$must$be$avoided$at$
all$costs$(Aradau$&$Van$Munster$2007).$“Inaction$is$not$an$option$so$unintended$effects$are$ unavoidable”$(Anderson$2010,$p.790).$This$sometimes$means$that$new$threats$are$created$ by$these$preUemptive$policies$(Ibid.).$ $ In$the$case$of$foreign$terrorist$fighters$these$unintended$consequences$are$important$ because$the$British$policy$is$part$of$a$larger$international$strategy$to$deal$with$international$ terrorism$in$general$and$the$foreign$terrorist$fighters$in$particular.$That$is$the$UK$adopted$ these$ measures$ to$ implement$ resolution$ 2178,$ which$ was$ adopted$ by$ the$ UN$ Security$ Council$in$September$2014$(United$Nations$Security$Council$2014).$This$resolution$was$not$ only$ aimed$ at$ preventing$ terrorist$ attacks,$ but$ also$ aimed$ at$ tackling$ the$ root$ causes$ of$ international$terrorism.$$
$ In$relation$to$the$IRA,$the$British$Government$also$wanted$to$find$a$political$solution$ to$ the$ bigger$ issue$ of$ Northern$ Ireland,$ which$ was$ in$ fact$ the$ root$ cause$ of$ the$ problem.$ Introducing$a$policy$that$would$possibly$have$unintended$consequences,$like$alienating$the$ Irish$community,$would$not$have$been$beneficial$to$this$political$solution.$Closely$linked$to$ this,$is$the$argument$that$Richards$(2011)$makes,$which$is$that$these$communities,$the$Irish$ in$the$case$of$the$IRA$and$Muslims$in$the$case$of$the$foreign$terrorist$fighters,$may$prove$to$ be$useful$in$dissuading$their$members$from$becoming$violent.$ $ As$regards$the$foreign$terrorist$fighters,$there$is$another$reason$why$it$is$important$ to$examine$how$the$British$Government$framed$and$justified$their$policy.$That$is$because$ the$United$Kingdom$is$part$of$the$European$Union,$which$is$not$merely$an$economic$union,$ but$also$a$political$union$(European$Union$n.d.).$Which$means$that$one$country’s$policy$also$ affects$the$other$countries.$It$is$for$this$reason$that$the$European$Council$(2014)$expressed$ their$ whish$ to$ “compare$ experiences$ and$ impact$ of$ these$ measures$ as$ soon$ as$ possible”$ (p.13).$ Other$ European$ countries,$ namely,$ have$ adopted$ very$ different$ approaches$ to$ the$ problem.$Denmark,$for$example,$adopted$a$‘soft’$approach,$which$means$they$are$allowing$ these$ foreign$ terrorist$ fighters$ to$ come$ back$ home$ and$ are$ trying$ to$ reintegrate$ these$ people$back$into$Danish$society$(Center$for$Security$Studies$2014).$When$one$country$allows$ its$ citizens$ to$ return$ to$ their$ country,$ which$ Denmark$ is$ doing,$ while$ another$ is$ excluding$ them,$this$may$create$difficulties$within$the$EU$as$a$whole.$If$the$EU$wants$to$streamline$ these$policies,$it$is$important$to$understand$how$countries$came$to$adopt$these$policies.$$
A$last$reason$is$that$counterterrorism$policies$often$have$important$consequences$for$the$ human$rights$of$a$country’s$citizens.$Chalk$(1998)$warns$that:$ where$the$state$fails$to$ensure$that$its$response$to$terrorism$is$limited,$wellUdefined$$ and$controlled,$it$is$likely$that$institutionalised$counterUterrorist$policies$will$pose$an$$ even$greater$threat$to$the$political$and$civil$traditions$that$are$central$to$the$Liberal$$ democratic$way$of$life$(p.373).$ There$are$already$worries$that$these$Exclusion$Orders$may$have$important$consequences$for$ human$rights.$It$is$for$instance$argued$that$these$Orders$may$make$a$person$stateless,$which$ goes$ against$ the$ International$ Human$ Rights$ Convention$ (Home$ Affairs$ Committee$ 2014;$ BBC$ 2014;$ Semotiuk,$ 2014).$ These$ measures$ may$ also$ infringe$ upon$ the$ liberties$ of$ the$ British$citizens,$as$they$are$not$free$to$travel$to$other$countries$without$having$to$explain$ their$ reasons$ for$ travelling$ to$ these$ countries$ (HC$ Deb$ 2$ December$ 2014$ cc207U257).$ In$ addition,$if$they$do$agree$to$the$terms$of$return,$they$will$be$restricted$in$their$freedoms$as$ they$will$be$put$under$surveillance$(Home$Affairs$Committee$2014).$ $ In$the$next$chapter$the$conceptual$framework$that$is$used$in$this$thesis$will$be$outlined.$This$ will$include$a$discussion$of$the$concept$of$terrorism$and$the$political$consequences$of$using$ this$concept.$In$the$second$chapter$we$will$explaine$what$method$has$been$used$to$answer$ the$research$question.$This$will$include$a$description$and$justification$of$the$chosen$cases,$a$ summary$ of$ the$ data$ that$ has$ been$ used$ and$ an$ explanation$ of$ how$ the$ data$ has$ been$ analysed.$After$this,$the$cases$will$be$discussed$and$analysed,$starting$with$the$case$of$the$ IRA$in$1939$and$in$1974,$followed$by$the$case$of$foreign$terrorist$fighters$in$2014U2015.$In$ the$end$it$will$be$concluded$that$the$threats$were$represented$in$a$slightly$different$way$as$ the$IRA$was$referred$to$as$political$terrorism,$while$the$foreign$terrorist$fighters$were$seen$ as$ a$ case$ of$ ideological$ terrorism.$ However,$ despite$ this$ difference$ both$ were$ seen$ as$ a$ threat$to$British$democratic$values$and$liberties$and$both$were$consequently$governed$by$a$ preUemptive$rational$which$made$the$‘repressive’$policies$possible.$
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Chapter'One'–'The'Conceptual'Framework'
$In$this$chapter$the$conceptual$framework$will$be$represented.$This$will$include$a$discussion$ of$ the$ most$ important$ concepts:$ discourse,$ foreign$ (terrorist)$ fighters,$ terrorism$ and$ preU emption.$But$it$will$also$include$an$explanation$of$how$a$(security)$discourse$produces$and$ reproduces$ a$ certain$ understanding$ and$ representation$ of$ a$ (security)$ issue$ and$ how$ this$ limits$the$policy$options$that$can$be$used$to$govern$the$issue.$$
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Security$ is$ about$ being$ without$ danger$ (Zedner$ 2009).$ But$ danger,$ according$ to$ Campbell$ (1992),$ is$ not$ something$ that$ “exists$ independently$ of$ those$ to$ whom$ it$ may$ become$ a$ threat”$ (p.1).$ What$ Campbell$ means$ is$ that$ the$ interpreting$ of$ certain$ events$ as$ being$ threatening$and$dangerous$is$very$much$dependent$on$the$people$that$do$the$interpreting$ (Ibid.).$As$will$be$explained$in$the$next$section,$the$return$of$foreign$fighters$is$for$instance$ not$necessarily$a$dangerous$event,$but$certain$countries$(including$the$UK)$interpreted$this$ event$and$these$people$as$threatening.$$ This$does$not$mean$that$there$is$no$material$reality$on$which$these$interpretations$ are$based$(Campbell$1992).$On$the$contrary,$there$are$certain$events$that$are$interpreted$as$ dangerous$ because$ they$ actually$ do$ kill$ people.$ For$ example,$ the$ 9/11$ terrorist$ attacks$ in$ 2001$ killed$ nearly$ 3000$ people$1.$ But$ despite$ this$ number$ the$ chance$ of$ being$ killed$ in$ a$
terrorist$attack$is$very$small$(Campbell$1992).$Based$on$statistics$it$is$for$instance$more$likely$ that$you$will$get$killed$from$a$fall$from$your$bed$than$in$terrorist$attack$(Roper$2008).$And$ while$terrorism$is$identified$as$a$major$threat$to$British$national$security$(MI5$n.d.),$going$to$ bed$is$not$something$that$is$usually$interpreted$as$being$dangerous.$So$what$does$this$mean$ for$the$issue$of$the$return$of$foreign$fighters?$ Foreign((Terrorist)(Fighters(
Foreign$ fighters$ are$ people$ that$ travel$ abroad$ to$ fight$ in$ another$ country$ (Barrett$ 2014).$ Although$the$concept$of$foreign$fighters$is$relatively$new,$as$it$has$hardly$been$used$before$ 2001,$ the$ phenomenon$ is$ not$ new$ (Malet$ 2010).$ Throughout$ history,$ people,$ including$ British$citizens,$have$joined$fights$that$were$not$theirs.$For$instance,$during$the$Spanish$civil$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
1$9/11$refers$to$September$11,$2001$when$terrorists$carried$out$several$attacks$within$the$United$States$(British$
war$ of$ 1936U39,$ 2500$ British$ ‘volunteers’$ (as$ foreign$ fighters$ were$ called$ in$ that$ time)$ travelled$ to$ Spain$ to$ fight$ for$ the$ Spanish$ Republic$ (Baxell$ 2004).$ Conflicts$ in$ Afghanistan$ (1980s)$and$Bosnia$(1990s)$also$attracted$a$number$of$British$foreign$fighters$(De$Roy$van$ Zuijdewijn$&$Bakker$2014).$But$as$Malet$(2010)$shows,$the$majority$of$these$people$were$ harmless$when$they$returned$to$their$home$countries.$$
Foreign$fighters$are$thus$not$necessarily$a$threat,$but$adding$the$word$‘terrorist’$as$in$ foreign$terrorist$fighters$changes$the$situation.$It$is$this$terrorist$dimension$that$makes$these$ people$ a$ threat$ in$ the$ eyes$ of$ the$ British$ Government.$ There$ are$ two$ reasons$ why$ the$ concept$of$terrorism$is$used$in$this$context.$The$first$is$that$it$is$assumed$that$these$people$ participated$in$terrorist$activities$in$Syria$and$Iraq$(Cameron$2014).$The$second$reason$is$the$ fear$that$when$these$people$return$home$they$will$carry$out$terrorist$attacks$on$British$soil$ (Cameron$2014).$This$second$fear$is$based$on$the$belief$that$the$majority$of$these$foreign$ fighters$will$have$fought$with$Muslim$extremists$such$as$ISIL,$who$have$already$threatened$ other$countries$with$terrorist$attacks$(Barrett$2014).$This$however$still$does$not$fully$explain$ how$the$issue$is$represented$and$understood$besides$that$it$is$seen$as$a$terrorist$threat.$As$ will$ be$ explained$ later$ on$ the$ use$ of$ the$ concept$ of$ terrorism$ produces$ a$ certain$ understanding$of$the$issue$and$has$its$own$consequences.$$
The(Security(Discourse(and(the(construction(of(danger(
In$order$to$carry$out$this$examination$it$is$important$that$we$understand$how$this$type$of$ threat,$ namely$ a$ terrorist$ threat,$ has$ been$ understood$ in$ the$ British$ context.$ This$ can$ be$ done$by$looking$at$the$security$discourse$on$the$return$of$foreign$terrorist$fighters$that$has$ taken$ place$ in$ Britain.$ A$ security$ discourse$ consists$ of$ how$ a$ threat$ is$ understood$ and$ represented.$As$Agius$(2013)$explains$it:$“discourses$are$systems$of$representation”$(p.243)$ that$produce$and$reproduce$“social$relations$and$meanings$that$include$representations$and$ practices”$(p.243).$
Before$ explaining$ what$ this$ means$ we$ should$ mention$ that$ when$ talking$ about$ a$ security$discourse$it$might$seem$as$if$there$is$just$one$security$discourse$taking$place$within$ a$country.$This,$however,$is$not$the$case.$Oftentimes$there$is$one$dominant$discourse,$but$in$ addition$ to$ this$ there$ are$ also$ alternative$ understandings$ of$ the$ issue$ in$ question.$ In$ this$ thesis$as$we$attempt$to$examine$how$the$British$Government$understands$and$governs$the$ return$ of$ foreign$ terrorist$ fighters,$ the$ dominant$ discourse$ will$ be$ central.$ This$ dominant$
discourse$ is$ the$ one$ put$ forward$ by$ the$ majority$ of$ political$ elites.$ Along$ with$ this,$ alternative$ understandings,$ expressed$ by$ other$ politicians,$ will$ be$ taken$ into$ account,$ as$ they$are$also$important$for$the$construction$of$the$dominant$discourse.$In$the$next$chapter$ on$methods,$this$will$be$further$explained.$
Producing(Social(Meanings(–(Understanding(Terrorism($
According$to$Agius$(2013)$discourses$produce$social$meanings.$What$this$means$is$that$the$ representation$ of$ an$ issue$ produces$ a$ certain$ understanding$ of$ the$ situation.$ As$ regards$ foreign$terrorist$fighters$and$the$IRA,$the$use$of$the$concept$of$terrorism$produces$a$certain$ understanding$ of$ the$ issue.$ To$ discover$ what$ sort$ of$ understanding$ this$ is,$ it$ is$ important$ that$we$examine$what$the$concept$of$terrorism$actually$means.$$
Terrorism$ as$ a$ concept$ cannot$ easily$ be$ defined.$ It$ has$ been$ used$ in$ a$ variety$ of$ different$ways,$and$frequently$it$is$defined$in$a$very$vague$and$imprecise$manner$(Vagts$&$ Meron$1974).$For$instance,$in$the$UN$Security$Council$resolution$on$foreign$fighters,$all$the$ measures$are$aimed$at$preventing$and$punishing$terrorism,$but$a$definition$of$terrorism$is$ not$included$(UN$Security$Council$2014).$It$is,$therefore,$up$to$the$member$states$to$judge$ what$is$deemed$to$be$a$‘terrorist’$act$(Lynch$&$Groll$2014).$$ Some$authors$have$tried$to$explain$what$it$means$to$call$something$‘terrorism’.$Anglí$ (2013)$ is$ one$ of$ these$ authors.$ She$ explains$ that$ terrorism$ can$ be$ divided$ into$ two$ categories,$ namely$ terrorism$ as$ a$ method$ and$ terrorism$ as$ a$ criminal$ act.$ These$ two$ categories,$ however,$ cannot$ easily$ be$ separated$ because$ they$ are$ often$ closely$ linked.$ Walzer$ (1977)$ explains$ that$ terrorism$ is$ often$ used$ as$ a$ method$ by$ states$ or$ nonUstate$ groups,$ to$ force$ Governments$ to$ give$ in$ to$ their$ demands.$ This$ method$ often$ entails$ frightening$ a$ whole$ population$ by$ randomly$ killing$ innocent$ members$ of$ this$ population$ (Walzer$1977).$$
Terrorism,$however,$is$often$seen$as$an$illegal$method$to$achieve$a$goal,$whether$it$is$ used$ in$ a$ war$ or$ in$ peacetime.$ In$ war$ the$ rules$ of$ war$ apply,$ and$ these$ have$ been$ established$in$the$Geneva$Convention,$which$is$a$set$of$treaties$signed$by$all$196$members$ of$ the$ United$ Nations$ (International$ Committee$ of$ the$ Red$ Cross$ n.d.).$ Part$ of$ this$ Convention$is$a$treaty$(that$was)$adopted$in$1949,$which$gives$innocent$civilians$a$protected$ status$ in$ war.$ This$ means$ that$ the$ killing$ of$ innocent$ civilians$ should$ be$ prevented$ in$ wartime.$ This$ treaty,$ therefore,$ also$ includes$ terrorism,$ since$ terrorism$ amounts$ to$ the$
deliberate$killing$of$civilians.$Terrorism$is$thus$seen$as$a$war$crime.$In$peacetime$ordinary$ laws$apply.$Under$these$laws,$killing$innocent$people$is$seen$as$murder,$and$thus$also$as$a$ crime$ (Walzer$ 1977).$ So$ whether$ a$ situation$ is$ seen$ as$ a$ war$ or$ not,$ and$ whether$ the$ participants$fall$under$the$rules$of$war$or$under$ordinary$law,$terrorism$is$always$a$crime.$As$ we$will$see$further$on$in$this$chapter,$the$fact$that$terrorism$is$seen$as$a$crime$in$both$war$ and$peacetime$has$consequences$for$the$way$in$which$terrorism$is$governed.$ $$ Reproducing(Social(Meanings$ A$discourse$not$only$produces$social$meanings,$but$also$reproduces$them$(Agius$2013).$This$ means$that$in$order$to$understand$the$construction$of$a$threat$it$is$not$enough$to$merely$ look$ at$ ‘the$ moment$ of$ intervention’$ (McDonald$ 2008,$ p.564).$ What$ this$ means$ is$ that$ looking$ at$ the$ discourse$ itself$ and$ the$ policies$ that$ are$ implemented$ is$ not$ enough$ to$ understand$how$a$threat$is$constructed.$Discourses$take$place$in$a$broader$context$which$ also$influences$the$discourse.$$
$ This$ broader$ context$ includes$ the$ beliefs$ of$ the$ people$ that$ do$ the$ interpreting.$ These$beliefs$are$important$because$they$influence$how$people$see$the$world$and$how$they$ understand$ events.$ As$ Campbell$ (1992)$ explains$ it:$ people$ try$ to$ comprehend$ events$ by$ “rendering$the$unfamiliar$in$the$terms$of$the$familiar”$(p.4).$People$try$to$understand$certain$ events$by$comparing$them$to$what$they$already$know$and$understand.$Events$then$come$to$ be$ seen$ as$ dangerous$ if$ they$ seem$ to$ be$ threatening$ something$ that$ is$ of$ value$ to$ the$ community$concerned.$Values$are$thus$also$important$in$the$construction$of$threats.$When$ something$ of$ value$ (this$ can$ include$ life,$ property,$ or$ values$ like$ freedom$ of$ speech)$ is$ deemed$to$be$threatened$by$an$event,$that$event$then$comes$to$be$seen$as$a$danger$(Ibid.).$$ $ What$people$know$and$understand$is$largely$based$on$previous$experiences.$In$the$ case$ of$ the$ foreign$ terrorist$ fighters,$ the$ concept$ of$ terrorism$ is$ important$ for$ the$ understanding$ of$ this$ issue$ because$ terrorism$ is$ a$ very$ familiar$ concept$ in$ Great$ Britain.$ Since$1974$there$has$been$legislation$on$terrorism,$and$even$before$that$date$the$term$was$ being$ used$ to$ describe$ certain$ people,$ i.e.$ members$ of$ the$ Irish$ Republican$ Army$ (IRA)$ (Hillyard$ 1993).$ For$ this$ reason$ it$ is$ vital$ that$ we$ examine$ how$ ‘concepts$ have$ historically$ functioned$within$discourse’$(Campbell$1992,$p.5).$As$regards$the$foreign$terrorist$fighters,$ this$means$that$if$we$wish$to$get$a$sound$understanding$of$how$terrorism$is$understood$in$
Britain,$we$have$to$examine$how$the$concept$of$terrorism$has$historically$functioned$within$ British$discourse,$or$in$other$words,$how$it$has$been$understood$and$governed$in$the$past.$
Governing(Terrorism$
This$ is$ important$ because$ a$ discourse$ does$ not$ only$ produce$ and$ reproduce$ a$ certain$ representation,$ but$ it$ also$ produces$ certain$ behaviour$ and$ practices$ (Agius$ 2013)$ The$ discourse$“constrains$what$is$thought$of$as$possible,$and$what$is$thought$of$as$the$‘natural$ thing’$to$do$in$a$given$situation”$(Neumann$2008,$p.62).$This$means$that$certain$policies$do$ not$fall$within$the$range$of$possible$policy$options$and$are$therefore$not$considered$when$ the$Government$weighs$its$options.$In$brief,$a$discourse$not$only$indicates$how$an$issue$is$ understood,$but$also$how$it$is$consequently$governed.$$ $ As$we$have$seen$earlier$on,$terrorism$is$usually$seen$as$a$crime,$whether$in$war$or$in$ peaceUtime.$ This$ means$ that$ governing$ an$ issue$ that$ is$ represented$ as$ a$ terrorist$ threat,$ means$ using$ rationalities$ that$ are$ deemed$ appropriate$ for$ governing$ a$ crime.$ That$ is$ governing$terrorism$fits$into$what$Michel$Foucault$(ed.$Senellart$2009)$calls$the$‘apparatus$ of$security’.$$
This$ apparatus$ of$ security$ places$ the$ phenomenon,$ which$ is$ the$ committing$ of$ a$ crime,$within$a$series$of$probable$events.$What$happens$then$is$that$the$Government$makes$ a$ costUbenefit$ calculation$ and$ “establishes$ an$ average$ considered$ as$ optimal$ on$ the$ one$ hand,$ and,$ on$ the$ other,$ a$ bandwidth$ of$ the$ acceptable$ that$ must$ not$ be$ exceeded”$ (ed.$ Senellart$2009,$p.21).$Security$then$“respond[s]$to$a$reality$in$such$a$way$that$this$response$ cancels$out$the$reality$to$which$it$responds$–$nullifies$it,$or$limits,$checks,$or$regulates$it”.$ According$ to$ Aradau$ and$ Van$ Munster$ (2007)$ an$ apparatus$ consists$ of$ rationalities$ and$ technologies.$ A$ rational$ or$ rationality$ is$ way$ “of$ thinking$ about$ a$ social$ problem$ that$ will$ make$ its$ management$ practicable”$ (p.97).$ A$ ‘security$ rational’$ then$ is$ a$ way$ of$ thinking$ about$a$security$problem.$“Technologies$are$the$means$of$realization$of$rationalities”$(Ibid.).$$ So$what$behaviour$and$practices$are$produced$by$using$the$concept$of$terrorism?$Or$ in$other$words,$what$rationalities$are$usually$used$to$govern$terrorism?$According$to$Aradau$ and$Van$Munster$(2007)$the$security$rational$that$is$usually$used$to$govern$terrorism,$is$preU emption$ (Aradau$ &$ Van$ Munster$ 2007).$ PreUemption,$ however,$ does$ not$ establish$ an$ optimal$average$and$a$bandwidth$of$the$acceptable,$but$it$uses$a$zero$risk$rational,$which$ means$ that$ any$ risk$ is$ unacceptable$ and$ must$ be$ avoided$ at$ all$ costs.$ PreUemption$ is$ a$
strategy$that$is$aimed$at$preventing$the$risk$from$becoming$reality.$It$thus$responds$to$the$ reality$ by$ trying$ to$ nullify$ it.$ The$ reason$ why$ preUemption$ is$ used$ to$ govern$ terrorism$ is$ because$terrorism$is$often$seen$as$an$uncertain$and$catastrophic$risk$(Aradau$&$Van$Munster$ 2007).$This$means$that$the$risk$is$represented$as$having$the$potential$to$cause$“grave$and$ irreversible$ damage”$ (Aradau$ &$ Van$ Munster$ 2007,$ p.$ 101)$ and$ that$ of$ uncertainty$ which$ means$there$is$no$knowledge$of$“if,$when,$where$and$how”$the$risk$will$occur$in$the$future.$$
According$to$Aradau$and$Van$Munster$(2007)$preUemptive$measures$are$guided$by$ four$rationalities.$The$first$is$the$worstUcase$scenario,$which$means$that$because$there$is$no$ knowledge$about$what$exactly$will$happen$in$the$future,$Governments$assume$the$worst$will$ happen$and$take$precautions$to$prevent$this.$The$second$rationality$is$that$of$serious$and$ irreversible$ damage,$ which$ means$ Governments$ assume$ that,$ for$ instance,$ if$ terrorists$ do$ carry$out$an$attack,$that$this$attack$will$have$the$potential$of$causing$serious$and$irreversible$ damage.$This$potential$means$that$Governments$believe$that$the$‘risk$must$be$avoided$at$all$ costs’$ (Aradau$ &$ Van$ Munster$ 2007,$ p.103),$ which$ is$ the$ third$ rational:$ zeroUrisk.$ The$ last$ rationality$is$the$shifting$burden$of$proof,$which$means$that$because$the$risk$is$so$great$and$ because$it$must$be$avoided$at$all$costs,$people$have$to$prove$that$they$are$innocent.$If$they$ cannot$ do$ this,$ they$ are$ assumed$ to$ be$ guilty.$In$ the$ empirical$ analysis$ it$ will$ be$ examined$if$the$British$Government$used$a$preUemptive$rational$to$govern$the$issue.$
$
To$ sum$ up$ this$ chapter,$ the$ use$ of$ the$ concept$ of$ terrorism$ does$ not$ only$ produce$ and$ reproduce$certain$representations$and$understandings$of$the$issue,$but$it$also$has$political$ consequences.$It$often$means$that$preUemption$is$used$to$govern$the$issue.$In$the$empirical$ analysis$this$conceptual$framework$will$be$used$to$analyse$the$discourses$on$both$the$IRA$ and$the$foreign$terrorist$fighters.$This$will$be$done$to$examine$how$the$British$Government$ ended$up$introducing$repressive$measures,$namely$exclusion$orders,$in$both$cases.$
Chapter'Two'–'Method'
$To$answer$the$research$question$we$will$carry$out$a$qualitative$discourse$analysis.$Discourse,$ as$ explained$ in$ the$ previous$ chapter,$ consists$ of$ representations$ and$ understandings$ of$ a$ certain$issue.$Discourse,$however$not$only$reflects$on$how$issues$are$understood,$but$it$also$ “produces$ preconditions$ for$ action”$ (Neumann$ 2008,$ p.62).$ This$ means$ that$ the$ way$ in$ which$an$issue,$or$in$this$case$a$perceived$threat,$is$understood$limits$the$range$of$possible$ outcomes.$ In$ this$ thesis$ we$ will$ examine$ how$ terrorist$ threats$ have$ been$ represented$ in$ British$discourse.$By$analysing$the$discourse,$it$should$be$possible$to$show$how$the$discourse$ limited$the$policy$options$of$the$British$Government$and$how$they$came$to$adopt$the$policy$ they$ did.$ The$ discourse$ analysis$ will$ thus$ be$ used$ to$ “start$ with$ a$ specific$ outcome$ and$ demonstrate$the$preconditions$for$it$happening”$(Neumann$2008,$pp.$62U63).$
$ Sometimes$ representations$ become$ institutionalized$ and$ normalized$ over$ time$ (Neumann$ 2008).$ This$ happens$ when$ they$ are$ repeated$ time$ and$ again.$ Repetition,$ however,$does$not$mean$that$these$representations$do$not$vary$and$slightly$change.$When$ representations$ become$ institutionalized$ it$ becomes$ even$ harder$ to$ move$ outside$ the$ boundaries$ of$ this$ discourse$ and$ to$ broaden$ the$ possible$ outcomes.$ In$ the$ case$ of$ Great$ Britain,$it$is$important$to$determine$if$certain$representations$of$terrorist$threats$have$been$ repeated$over$time,$and$if$this$limited$the$current$discourse$and$range$of$policy$options.$$
The$discourse$analysis$will,$therefore,$not$only$include$an$analysis$of$the$discourse$on$ foreign$ terrorist$ fighters,$ but$ also$ of$ a$ similar$ case,$ namely$ the$ perceived$ terrorist$ threat$ posed$by$the$Irish$Republican$Army.$In$the$following$section$these$cases$will$be$explained$ and$the$time$periods$to$be$used$for$the$discourse$analysis$will$be$clarified.$ $ The$advantage$of$using$a$discourse$analysis$is$that$it$“makes$the$social$world$more$ transparent$by$demonstrating$how$its$elements$interact”$(Neumann$2008,$p.76).$In$this$ thesis$it$will$help$us$uncover$how$certain$events$were$interpreted$as$a$threat$to$British$ security$and$how$this$limited$the$policy$options$that$were$open$to$the$Government.$There$ are$however$also$limitations$to$this$method.$By$using$a$discourse$analysis,$it$is$for$instance$ impossible$to$determine$causality.$It$is$possible$to$point$to$the$preconditions$of$a$certain$ outcome,$but$it$is$impossible$to$prove$that$these$preconditions$actually$caused$the$outcome$ (Neumann$2008).$
The(Cases(
The$Irish$Republican$Army$(IRA)$
To$ understand$ how$ terrorism$ has$ been$ understood$ and$ governed$ through$ modern$ British$ history$the$case$of$the$IRA$will$be$examined.$The$IRA$started$out$as$an$organization$fighting$ for$ an$ independent$ Irish$ Republic,$ free$ from$ British$ rule$ (Durney,$ 2004).$ In$ 1922$ this$ goal$ was$ partly$ achieved$ when$ the$ Irish$ Free$ State$ was$ created.$ This$ Irish$ Free$ State$ did$ not$ include$ Northern$ Ireland,$ which$ remained$ part$ of$ the$ United$ Kingdom$ (UK)$ because$ the$ Unionist$section$of$opinion$in$Northern$Ireland$did$not$want$to$be$separated$from$the$UK$ (Hopkinson,$ 1993).$ After$ this$ date$ the$ IRA,$ in$ its$ various$ forms2,$ continued$ to$ fight$ to$
separate$Northern$Ireland$from$the$UK$(Durney,$2004).$Quite$a$bit$of$violence$was$used$to$ achieve$this$goal.$This$violence$was$usually$restricted$to$Northern$Ireland,$but$in$a$few$cases$ the$IRA$campaigns$were$extended$to$Great$Britain.$This$happened$in$1939$and$again,$more$ then$thirty$years$later,$in$1974.$In$both$these$instances$the$British$Government$introduced$ legislation$to$deal$with$these$attacks$on$British$soil.$$
Between$ 1974$ and$ 2014$ the$ British$ Government$ introduced$ further$ terrorist$ legislation$ to$ deal$ with$ both$ the$ IRA,$ and$ later$ on$ terrorism$ in$ general.$ For$ a$ full$ understanding$of$British$policy$on$terrorism$it$would$be$wise$to$study$this$entire$period,$but$ as$this$would$be$a$very$large$project$it$is$not$doable$within$the$scope$of$this$thesis.$However,$ not$covering$this$full$period$leaves$room$for$a$more$inUdept$case$study$of$the$three$cases$ that$are$studied.$ 1.$Prevention$of$Violence$Act$1939$ The$first$instance$was$when$the$Prevention$of$Violence$Act$was$introduced$in$1939.$This$was$ the$ first$ time$ legislation$ was$ introduced$ in$ Great$ Britain$ to$ prevent$ IRA$ attacks$ on$ British$ territory.$The$act$itself$did$not$include$the$concept$of$terrorism,$but$much$of$the$discourse$ surrounding$this$act$was$about$the$‘terrorist$attacks’$committed$by$the$IRA.$
The$time$period$to$be$used$for$the$discourse$analysis$will$be$from$January$1939$up$ until$ July$ 1939.$ This$ time$ period$ is$ chosen$ because$ in$ January$ 1939$ the$ IRA$ started$ a$ bombing$campaign$in$Britain$to$force$the$British$Government$to$withdraw$its$troops$from$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
2$Between$1922$and$now$the$IRA$has$changed$leadership$multiple$times$and$sometimes$differences$of$opinion$
led$to$splits$in$the$organization.$This,$for$instance,$happened$in$the$1970s$with$the$Provisional$IRA$(English$ 2004).$$
Northern$ Ireland.$ Eventually$ the$ British$ Government$ got$ their$ hands$ on$ a$ copy$ of$ a$ document$called$the$SUPlan,$which$contained$the$plans$of$the$IRA$attacks3.$The$Government$ decided$that$new$policies$had$to$be$implemented$to$deal$with$the$perceived$threat$posed$by$ the$IRA$(HC$Deb$24$July$1939,$cc$1047U48).$To$this$end,$Sir$Samuel$Hoare,$the$Secretary$of$ State$at$the$time,$introduced$the$Prevention$of$Violence$Bill.$The$first$reading$in$the$House$ of$Commons$took$place$on$July$19,$1939$(Schedule7$2015).$Nine$days$later$it$received$the$ Royal$Assent$and$the$Prevention$of$Violence$Act$came$into$being$(Walker$1992).$$ 2.$Prevention$of$Terrorism$Act$1974$ The$second$instance$was$when$the$Prevention$of$Terrorism$Act$was$introduced$in$1974.$This$ was$the$successor$of$the$Prevention$of$Violence$Act$1939.$This$was$the$first$act$to$include$ the$ concept$ of$ terrorism$ to$ describe$ the$ violence$ committed$ by$ the$ IRA.$ That$ is$ why$ this$ period$is$included$in$the$thesis,$as$it$is,$in$fact,$the$first$example$of$British$counterUterrorism$ legislation.$$
For$ this$ discourse$ analysis$ the$ time$ period$ from$ November$ 21,$ 1974$ up$ to$ the$ end$ of$ November$1974$will$be$used.$On$November$21$the$IRA$bombed$two$pubs$in$Birmingham.$ TwentyUone$people$ were$ killed$ in$ these$attacks$ and$one$ hundred$ and$eighty$people$ were$ injured$(Pantazis$&$Pemberton$2009).$The$attack$put$pressure$on$the$British$Government$to$ take$action$and$they$did$this$by$introducing$a$new$Bill,$the$Prevention$of$Terrorism$Bill.$This$ was$done$six$days$after$the$attack$and$only$two$days$later$the$Bill$received$the$Royal$Assent.$$ Foreign$Terrorist$Fighters$ The$time$period$that$will$be$used$for$the$discourse$analysis$on$foreign$terrorist$fighters$will$ be$from$September$2014$up$to$February$2015.$This$time$period$has$been$chosen$because$in$ September$2014$the$UN$Security$Council$adopted$resolution$2178$to$deal$with$the$problem$ of$foreign$terrorist$fighters$(UN$Security$Council$2014).$On$November$26,$2014,$the$British$ Government$introduced$the$Counter$Terrorism$and$Security$Bill$to$implement$this$resolution$ (UK$Parliament$n.d.)$and$on$February$12,$2015$the$Bill$received$the$Royal$Assent.$By$looking$ at$ this$ time$ period$ the$ discourse$ that$ led$ to$ the$ adoption$ of$ the$ Counter$ Terrorism$ and$ Security$Act$can$be$studied$and$analysed.$$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
3$This$SUplan$or$Sabotage$plan$contained$plans$for$several$attacks$with$the$aim$of$damaging$British$buildings$
and$infrastructure$(Durney$2004).$Although$it$was$never$their$intention$to$harm$civilians,$several$people$were$ injured$during$these$attacks$due$to$‘badly$made$bombs$and$inexperienced$handlers’$(Durney$2004,$p.49).$
The(discourse(analysis( How$will$the$material$be$analysed?$$ Firstly,$the$context$in$which$the$discourse$took$place$will$be$briefly$explained.$This$is$done$ because$the$context$often$also$plays$an$important$role$in$shaping$the$discourse.$ Secondly,$we$will$examine$how$the$issue$was$represented$by$the$majority$of$politicians.$This$ will$be$done$by$answering$the$following$questions$ •! What$was$the$threat$according$to$the$majority$of$politicians?$ •! How$was$the$concept$of$terrorism$used?$How$was$the$concept$defined?$ •! What$values$were$deemed$threatened?$
Thirdly,$ we$ will$ examine$ if$ there$ were$ alternative$ understandings$ of$ the$ issue.$ These$ alternative$ understandings$ are$ important$ in$ understanding$ the$ dominant$ threat$ construction,$because$they$will$provide$an$insight$into$the$arguments$that$were$used$against$ these$alternative$arguments,$and$so$the$manner$in$which$the$majority$of$politicians$justified$ their$own$understanding$and$policies.$$ Finally,$we$will$examine$how$the$perceived$threat$was$governed:$ •! Was$there$a$preUemptive$rational$used$to$govern$the$issue?$ PreUemption$can$be$identified$by$examining$if$one,$or$all$of$the$four$rationalities$(worst$case$ scenario,$ zeroUrisk,$ shifting$ burden$ of$ proof$ and$ serious$ and$ irreversible$ damage)$ was$ present$within$the$discourse.$
•! What$policies$were$considered$to$be$outside$the$range$of$possibilities?$$ $
In$addition,$in$the$case$of$the$IRA$a$brief$overview$will$be$given$of$the$situation$after$1974.$ This$ overview$ will$ also$ include$ a$ summary$ of$ the$ (unintended)$ consequences$ of$ the$ legislation$ that$ was$ introduced.$ After$ having$ analysed$ both$ cases$ the$ main$ points$ of$ the$ discourses$ will$ be$ summarised$ and$ compared$ to$ establish$ the$ similarities$ and$ differences$ between$these$cases.$This$will$be$done$in$the$conclusion.$
$
Dominant(Discourse(versus(Alternative(Understandings(
As$ was$ explained$ in$ Chapter$ One,$ there$ is$ usually$ not$ just$ one$ discourse$ on$ a$ particular$ subject.$Very$often$there$is$one$dominant$discourse$and$several$alternative$understandings$ of$the$same$issue.$In$this$thesis$we$will$be$mainly$focusing$on$the$British$Government$and$
British$Parliament$as$a$means$of$identifying$these$discourses.$This$choice$was$made$because$ it$was$the$Government$that$introduced$the$relevant$Bills$and$the$British$Parliament$that$had$ to$approve$them$to$make$them$into$law.$So,$to$explain$how$the$perceived$terrorist$threats$ from$the$IRA$and$the$foreign$terrorist$fighters$were$governed,$it$is$essential$that$we$look$at$ the$discourses$within$the$British$Government$and$Parliament.$By$dominant$discourse,$in$this$ case,$ we$ are$ referring$ to$ the$ discourse$ put$ forward$ by$ the$ majority$ of$ politicians$ (Government$ officials$ and$ Members$ of$ Parliament).$ The$ alternative$ discourses$ are$ those$ made$by$the$Members$of$Parliament$who$did$not$support$this$dominant$discourse,$and$in$all$ probability$to$some$extent$opposed$the$Bills.$
Data((
The$data$that$that$will$be$used$for$the$discourse$analysis$are:$
•! The$ Parliamentary$ debates$ on$ the$ Bills:$ this$ will$ illustrate$ the$ dominant$ discourse$ put$ forward$by$the$Government$and/or$majority$of$the$Members$of$Parliament,$but$it$will$ also$show$if$and$what$other$understandings$there$were$and$what$governing$rational$was$ present.$
•! The$ speeches$ and$ memoranda$ of$ Government$ officials:$ these$ will$ demonstrate$ (illustrate)$how$the$British$Government$justified$the$proposed$Bills$ •! The$Bills$and$Acts$themselves:$this$will$illustrate$how$the$problem$was$governed$ ( $ $
'
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Chapter'Three'>'The'discourse'on'the'Irish'Republican'Army'in'1939$
$In$ January$ 1939$ the$ IRA$ gave$ the$ British$ Government$ an$ ultimatum.$ If$ the$ British$ Government$ did$ not$ remove$ its$ troops$ from$ Northern$ Ireland,$ the$ IRA$ would$ take$ action$ against$Great$Britain$(English$2004).$When$the$British$Government$did$not$respond,$the$IRA$ declared$ war$ on$ Great$ Britain$ (Durney$ 2004).$ Throughout$ 1939$ they$ carried$ out$ several$ attacks$ on$ British$ buildings$ and$ infrastructure$ (Durney$ 2004).$ Eventually$ the$ British$ Government$ decided$ to$ take$ action$ to$ prevent$ further$ attacks.$ To$ this$ end,$ Sir$ Samuel$ Hoare,$the$Secretary$of$State$at$the$time,$introduced$the$Prevention$of$Violence$Bill.$The$Bill$ included$ the$ following$ measures:$ Exclusion$ Orders;$ registration$ orders$ which$ meant$ that$ suspects$could$be$ordered$to$register$their$personal$information$with$the$police;$and$arrest$ of$suspects$without$a$warrant.$$
$ At$ the$ time$ the$ Conservatives$ were$ in$ Government$ and$ the$ Prime$ Minister$ was$ Neville$Chamberlain$(Gov.UK$n.d.a).$Chamberlain’s$Government$was$mainly$occupied$by$the$
approaching$ war$ with$ Germany,$ that$ is$ the$ Second$ World$ War.$ Two$ months$ after$ the$ Prevention$of$Violence$Act$got$Royal$Assent;$Great$Britain$declared$war$on$Germany$(Jeffery$ 2011).$As$we$will$see$later$on$in$this$chapter$this$upcoming$war$also$affected$the$discourse$ on$the$IRA.$ The(Threat(Construction( When$looking$at$the$discourse$on$the$IRA$in$1939$it$is$noticeable$that$only$during$and$after$ the$second$reading$of$the$Bill$the$concept$of$terrorism$was$used$to$describe$the$IRA$and$its$ activities.$Before$this$date$the$activities$of$the$IRA$were$referred$to$as$‘criminal$activities’$ (HC$Deb$09$May$1939,$cc314U5W),$‘criminal$outrages’$and$‘crimes$of$violence’$(HC$Deb$10$ July$ 1939,$ c1830W).$ The$ Bill$ and$ Act$ themselves$ also$ did$ not$ include$ the$ concept$ of$ terrorism,$ but$ describe$ the$ IRA’s$ activities$ as$ ‘acts$ of$ violence’$ (Prevention$ of$ Violence$ (Temporary$Provisions)$Bill$(No$203)$1938U39).$$
During$the$second$reading$of$the$Bill,$however,$the$concept$was$frequently$used$to$ describe$the$IRA$and$its$activities$(HC$Deb$24$July$1939,$cc1047U127).$The$Secretary$of$State,$ Samuel$Hoare,$and$the$majority$of$Members$of$Parliament$(MPs)$mainly$referred$to$the$IRA$ as$terrorists$and$to$their$attacks$as$‘terrorist$outrages’$(c1049).$$
$ So$ why$ was$ the$ concept$ of$ terrorism$ only$ used$ in$ the$ debates$ in$ the$ House$ of$ Commons$and$not$in$the$Bill$itself?$The$reason$for$this$could$be$that$the$Government$was$ not$ completely$ convinced$ it$ was$ dealing$ with$ a$ terrorist$ threat.$ In$ the$ second$ reading,$ Samuel$Hoare$explained$that$it$was$clear$that$the$IRA’s$attacks$were$not$aimed$at$harming$ people,$but$merely$at$destroying$British$property.$But$as$these$bombings$did$kill$one$man$ and$injured$several$other$people,$he$argued$that$the$IRA$did$pose$a$danger$to$human$life.$ Walzer$ (1977)$ and$ Durney$ (2004)$ make$ this$ same$ observation.$ They$ both$ argue$ that$ the$ IRA’s$campaign$was$not$intended$to$kill$anybody.$But$as$Durney$(2004)$explains$people$were$ killed$because$of$“badly$made$bombs$and$inexperienced$handlers”$(p.49).$$ When$looking$at$the$general$debate$in$the$House$of$Commons$(HC$Deb$24$July$1939,$ cc1047U127)$it$becomes$clear$that$the$dominant$view$of$the$situation$was$that$the$Bill$was$ ‘exceptional’,$but$that$Great$Britain$was$facing$a$special$emergency$and$that$drastic$action$ was$needed$to$deal$with$this$emergency.$For$example,$Sir$Hugh$O’Neill,$an$Ulster$Unionist$ member,$said$the$following:$“I$dislike$these$special$measures$which$aim$at$impinging$upon$ the$liberty$of$the$subject,$but$in$times$of$crisis$you$have$to$bring$in$special$measures”$(Ibid.,$ c1063).$This$is$also$how$the$Government$justified$the$Bill.$Samuel$Hoare$explained:$“there$is$ no$other$course$open$to$the$Government”$(Ibid.,$c1047)$and$“further$powers$are$essential$if$ grave$loss$of$life$and$property$is$to$be$avoided”$(Ibid.,$c1051).$$
The$ majority$ of$ MPs$ did$ not$ only$ fear$ for$ loss$ of$ life$ and$ property,$ but$ they$ also$ viewed$the$IRA$as$a$threat$to$the$democratic$values$and$liberties$in$Great$Britain.$Colonel$ Wedgewood,$ a$ Labour$ MP,$ described$ the$ situation$ as$ a$ struggle$ between$ “those$ who$ believe$in$force,$in$violence,$and$those$who$believe$in$liberty$and$democracy”$(HC$Deb$24$ July$ 1939,$ c1084).$ Wedgewood$ expressed$ a$ broader$ sentiment.$ He$ was,$ namely,$ not$ the$ only$one$who$saw$the$IRA$attacks$as$a$threat$to$the$democratic$values$of$Great$Britain.$The$ AttorneyUGeneral,$ for$ example,$ also$ expressed$ this$ sentiment$ when$ he$ said:$ “there$ is$ nothing$more$alien$to$every$instinct$of$a$free$people$than$terrorism”$(Ibid.,$c1113).$This$view$ of$the$British$citizens$as$free$people$in$a$democratic$country$is$also$evident$from$the$many$ statements$made$by$MPs$that$British$public$opinion$would$not$be$swayed$by$terrorism:$“a$ campaign$of$terrorism$of$this$kind$is$the$very$last$thing$ever$likely$to$influence$the$political$ opinions$ of$ the$ British$ people”$ (Ibid.,$ c1061).$ The$ main$ sentiment$ in$ this$ regard$ was$ that$ British$citizens$were$free$to$make$their$own$choices$because$they$lived$in$a$democracy$and$ this$meant$that$terrorists$could$not$be$allowed$to$dictate$their$policy.$
Alternative(Understandings(of(the(Issue(
This$view$was$not$the$only$one$within$the$House$of$Commons.$Mr$Dingle$Foot$and$Mr$Denis$ Pritt,$both$Labour$MPs,$did$agree$that$there$was$a$problem$and$that$the$circumstances$were$ ‘grave’,$but$they$did$not$agree$that$these$circumstances$justified$the$introduction$of$these$ special$ measures.$ Mr$ Pritt$ explained$ that$ he$ was$ not$ in$ accord$ with$ Samuel$ Hoare’s$ perception$ that$ they$ were$ living$ in$ “abnormal$ times”$ (HC$ Deb$ 24$ July$ 1939,$ c1057).$ He$ argued$that$there$was$nothing$new$about$the$situation.$As$did$Mr$Wedgwood$Benn,$also$a$ Labour$ MP,$ when$ he$ explained$ that$ even$ when$ the$ House$ itself$ was$ bombed4$the$ Government$ at$ the$ time$ did$ not$ ask$ for$ these$ kind$ of$ special$ powers$ (Ibid.).$ Mr$ George$ Buchanan,$MP$for$the$Independent$Labour$Party,$even$took$it$a$step$further$and$argued$that$ he$did$not$feel$the$same$indignation$towards$the$IRA$attacks$as$the$rest$of$the$House.$He$ stated:$“If$such$movements$are$successful$they$must$affect$the$community”$(Ibid.,$c1095).$ This$ suggests$ that$ Mr$ Buchanan$ did$ not$ (totally)$ oppose$ the$ tactics$ used$ by$ the$ IRA$ to$ achieve$its$political$goals.$$
$ These$ same$ MPs$ also$ felt$ that$ these$ measures$ ran$ counter$ to$ the$ traditions$ and$ values$ of$ Great$ Britain.$ Mr$ Foot,$ for$ instance,$ argued$ that$ what$ made$ Great$ Britain$ a$ democracy,$ as$ opposed$ to$ a$ dictatorship,$ were$ the$ limits$ that$ were$ imposed$ on$ the$ executive$ by$ British$ law$ (HC$ Deb$ 24$ July$ 1939,$ cc1047U127).$ British$ law$ prevented$ the$ executive$ from$ arbitrary$ use$ of$ its$ power.$ He$ continued$ his$ argument$ by$ saying$ that$ the$ proposed$ measures$ risked$ destroying$ these$ safeguards$ and$ gave$ the$ executive$ too$ much$ power.$ Mr$ William$ Gallacher,$ a$ Communist$ MP,$ expressed$ this$ same$ sentiment$ when$ he$ stated:$“Somebody$said$that$no$one$could$accuse$the$Home$Secretary$of$being$a$dictator,$ but$give$the$Home$Secretary$a$chance$to$be$a$dictator$and$see$how$he$will$behave$himself”$ (Ibid.,$c1121).$Mr$Benn$supported$Mr$Foot$and$Mr$Gallacher$in$their$views$and$added$the$ following:$“I$do$not$think$the$reputation$of$our$country$in$the$world$will$be$improved$by$the$ passage$of$this$Bill”$(Ibid.,$c1111).$He$explained$that$this$reputation$rested$on$the$belief$that$ Great$Britain$was$a$country$that$stood$for$liberty,$and$by$introducing$measures$that$would$ infringe$upon$the$liberty$of$its$citizens,$Great$Britain$would$go$against$this$belief.$$ $ So$although$all$MPs$agreed$on$what$values$were$important$in$Great$Britain,$namely$ democracy$ and$ liberty,$ they$ did$ not$ agree$ on$ how$ this$ was$ linked$ to$ the$ threat.$ The$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
4$Mr$Benn$refers$to$the$year$of$1885$when$the$Fenians$bombed$the$House$of$Commons$as$part$of$their$Fenian$ Dynamite$Campaign$(Kenna$2011).$
proponents$argued$that$the$terrorists$threatened$these$values,$while$the$opponents$argued$ that$it$was$the$proposed$Bill$that$formed$the$threat$to$these$values.$$
The(Political(Causes(of(the(Problem(
As$ Richards$ (2011)$ explains,$ terrorism$ is$ often$ used$ to$ achieve$ some$ political$ goal.$ In$ the$ discourse$in$1939$the$majority$of$politicians$recognized$this,$but$because$of$the$urgency$of$ the$ situation$ the$ political$ causes$ of$ the$ problem$ were$ largely$ absent$ from$ the$ debates.$ Samuel$Hoare$explained$that$the$Bill$was$urgently$needed$and$that$there$was$therefore$no$ time$ to$ discuss$ the$ political$ causes$ of$ the$ problem$ (HC$ Deb$ 24$ July$ 1939,$ cc1047U127).$ In$ addition,$he$and$other$MPs$stressed$that$they$could$not$listen$to$the$political$opinions$of$the$ IRA,$if$they$resorted$to$violence.$They$argued$that$in$a$democracy$terrorism$could$not$be$ accepted$as$a$means$to$achieve$a$political$goal.$A$minority$of$MPs$disagreed$and$felt$that$ this$Bill$was$not$the$right$way$to$deal$with$the$problem$(Ibid.).$Mr$Buchanan$and$Campbell$ Stephen$(MP$for$the$Independent$Labour$Party),$for$instance$argued$that$the$Government$ should$deal$with$the$political$causes$of$the$problem$and$take$action$against$the$people$guilty$ of$crimes$(Ibid.).$$ Governing(the(IRA(Threat(
In$ the$ dominant$ discourse$ the$ issue$ was$ mainly$ understood$ as$ a$ terrorist$ threat$ and$ the$ situation$ as$ a$ special$ emergency$ requiring$ exceptional$ measures.$ In$ addition,$ the$ IRA$ was$ not$ only$ seen$ as$ a$ threat$ to$ life$ and$ property,$ but$ more$ importantly$ also$ as$ a$ threat$ to$ democratic$ values$ and$ liberties.$ What$ did$ this$ mean$ for$ the$ way$ in$ which$ this$ threat$ was$ governed?$What$governing$rational$was$present$in$the$debate?$
$ As$the$title$of$the$Bill$already$suggests,$‘Prevention$of$Violence$Bill’,$the$main$aim$of$ the$Bill$was$prevention.$But$it$is$also$evident$when$looking$at$the$discourse.$Samuel$Hoare,$ as$a$representative$of$the$British$Government,$explained$that$prevention$was$the$only$way$ the$ problem$ could$ be$ addressed.$ He$ argued$ that$ the$ IRA$ terrorists$ were$ becoming$ more$ astute,$which$made$it$more$difficult$to$find$evidence$of$their$crimes.$Criminal$prosecution$ was,$ therefore,$ not$ an$ option,$ according$ to$ Hoare$ (HC$ Deb$ 24$ July$ 1939,$ cc1047U127).$ Instead$a$preUemptive$rational$was$used$to$govern$the$issue.$That$is,$all$four$rationalities$of$ preUemption$can$be$identified$within$the$discourse.$$
The$zero$risk$rationality$is$clearly$visible$in$this$discourse.$A$lot$of$MPs$raised$their$ worries$about$the$consequences$of$this$Bill$for$the$liberties$of$British$citizens.$But$despite$
these$worries$the$majority$of$MPs$believed$that$these$liberties$might$have$to$be$sacrificed$in$ the$light$of$the$situation.$Mr$Arthur$Greenwood$(Labour$MP)$for$instance$argued:$“The$State$ should$ take$ all$ the$ measures$ necessary$ for$ the$ protection$ of$ life$ and$ property”$ (Ibid.,$ cc1058U59).$
The$worstUcase$scenario$is$also$present$in$the$discourse.$Samuel$Hoare$did$not$only$ defend$the$Bill$by$pointing$to$the$damage$that$had$already$been$done$to$life$and$property,$ but$also$by$explaining$that$if$a$war$would$break$out$(he$was$referring$to$the$threatening$war$ with$ Germany)$ these$ terrorist$ would$ pose$ an$ even$ greater$ danger$ (HC$ Deb$ 24$ July$ 1939,$ cc1047U127).$ This$ was$ the$ worstUcase$ scenario.$ He$ explained$ that$ the$ danger$ of$ sabotage$ would$be$“immeasurable$increased$by$these$terrorist$outrages”$(c1052).$But$Samuel$Hoare$ was$not$the$only$person$to$worry$at$this$possibility.$Mr$Greenwood,$also$expressed$worries$ about$the$use$of$terrorism$if$a$war$should$break$out.$So,$although$at$the$time$of$the$second$ reading$ there$ was$ only$ one$ person$ killed$ by$ the$ IRA$ bombings,$ Samuel$ Hoare$ and$ others$ expressed$their$concerns$of$what$could$happen$in$the$event$of$war.$In$addition,$they$worried$ that$although$the$IRA$did$not$seem$to$be$willing$to$kill$anybody$at$the$time,$in$the$future$ they$might$change$tactics.$$
In$addition,$it$is$apparent$that$Samuel$Hoare$worried$about$serious$and$irreversible$ damage$ that$ could$ be$ caused$ by$ the$ IRA.$ This$ becomes$ clear$ when$ he$ uses$ sentences$ as$ “very$ serious$ damage$ upon$ the$ community”$ (c1050)$ (c1050)$ and$ “grave$ loss$ of$ life$ and$ property”$(c1051).$$
The$last$rational,$that$of$the$shifting$burden$of$proof,$is$less$easy$to$identify$within$ the$discourse.$But$when$looking$at$the$reasons$why$the$Bill$was$introduced,$it$becomes$clear$ that$this$rational$is$also$present.$Samuel$Hoare,$explained$that$the$Bill$was$aimed$at$taking$ action$ against$ suspected$ terrorists,$ who$ (that)$ could$ not$ be$ prosecuted$ in$ a$ court$ of$ law$ because$ of$ a$ lack$ of$ evidence.$ This$ suggests$ that$ under$ the$ new$ Bill$ people$ who$ were$ possibly$innocent$could$become$victims$of$this$Bill.$If$the$Secretary$of$State$was$satisfied$that$ the$suspect$has$been$involved$in$terrorist$activity$he$could$take$action$against$this$person$ (Prevention$of$Violence$(Temporary$Provisions)$Bill$(No$203)$1938U39).$This$meant$that$the$ Secretary$ of$ State$ would$ judge$ if$ someone$ was$ innocent$ or$ guilty$ and$ unless$ the$ suspect$ could$prove$that$he$was$innocent,$action$would$be$taken$against$him.$
On$July$28,$1939$the$Bill$received$Royal$Assent.$Two$months$later$the$Second$World$War$ broke$out$and$the$Act$and$the$IRA$moved$to$the$background$(Jeffery$2011).$More$then$thirty$ years$later$the$IRA,$in$a$different$guise,$reappeared$on$British$soil$and$a$new$law$was$
introduced$to$combat$the$IRA.$This$Act$and$its$prior$discourse$will$be$discussed$in$the$next$ section$of$this$chapter.$$
The'discourse'on'the'Irish'Republican'Army'in'1974'
$After$the$ineffective$bombing$campaign$of$19395,$Great$Britain$did$not$experience$any$IRA$ attacks$ on$ their$ soil$ for$ over$ thirty$ years.$ In$ 1973$ this$ changed$ when$ the$ Provisional$ IRA6$
decided$to$expand$its$bombing$campaign$to$Great$Britain$(English$2004).$Great$Britain$had$ sent$ troops$ to$ Northern$ Ireland$ in$ 1969$ at$ the$ request$ of$ the$ Government$ of$ Northern$ Ireland$(Dingley$2009).$The$IRA$believed$that$forcing$Great$Britain$to$remove$its$troops$from$ Northern$Ireland$would$resolve$the$problem$there.$This$same$reasoning$was$used$during$the$ 1939$ campaign.$ But$ unlike$ the$ campaign$ in$ 1939,$ this$ time$ the$ group$ known$ as$ the$ Provisional$ IRA$ was$ not$ opposed$ to$ using$ violence$ against$ human$ life$ to$ achieve$ its$ goals$ (English$2004).$They$believed$that$other$strategies,$like$the$one$in$1939,$had$proven$to$be$ insufficient$to$achieve$these$goals.$$ In$March$1973$the$Provisional$IRA$carried$out$its$first$attack$in$Great$Britain,$killing$ one$person.$The$attack$that$made$the$biggest$impression$and$also$spurred$British$legislation$ to$deal$with$these$attacks$was$the$attack$in$Birmingham.$On$November$21,$1974,$two$pubs$ were$blown$up$in$Birmingham,$killing$21$people$and$injuring$over$150$people.$The$British$ Government$ responded$ to$ this$ attack$ by$ introducing$ the$ Prevention$ of$ Terrorism$ (Temporary$Provisions)$Bill$1974,$which$became$law$on$November$29,$1974,$only$eight$days$ after$ the$ attack.$ At$ the$ time$ the$ Labour$ Party$ was$ in$ Government$ with$ Harolf$ Wilson$ as$ Prime$Minister.$ $In$the$Prevention$of$Terrorism$(Temporary$Provisions)$Act$1974$(s1U3)$the$Provisional$ IRA$was$proscribed,$which$meant$that$it$was$illegal$to$be$a$member$of$this$organization$and$ to$assist$them$in$any$way;$Exclusion$Orders$were$reintroduced$to$exclude$people$“concerned$ in…$acts$of$terrorism”$(s3)$and$the$police$was$allowed$to$arrest$people$without$a$warrant$if$ they$suspected$them$to$be$guilty$of$an$offence$under$this$Act.$$ The$context$within$which$the$discourse$in$1974$took$place$was$quite$different$from$ the$ context$ in$ 1939.$ While$ having$ only$ killed$ one$ person$ in$ 1939,$ by$ accident,$ the$ IRA$ in$ 1974$had$no$reservations$about$killing$people$to$achieve$its$goals.$It$is,$therefore,$essential$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
5$The$word$‘ineffective’$is$used$here$because$the$IRA$did$not$achieve$their$goal,$which$was$the$removal$of$ Briitsh$troops$from$Northern$Ireland$(English$2004).$
that$we$examine$the$impact$this$had$on$the$discourse$and$on$the$policy$that$was$chosen$to$ deal$with$the$problem.$$
The(perceived(Threat(posed(by(the(IRA( (
When$ looking$ at$ the$ parliamentary$ debates$ following$ the$ Birmingham$ bombings,$ it$ is$ noticeable$ that$ all$ the$ MPs$ used$ very$ emotive$ language$ when$ speaking$ about$ the$ attack:$ ‘horrifying’,$ ‘dreadful$ crime$ against$ humanity’,$ ‘appalling$ outrages’,$ ‘unspeakable$ wickedness’,$ ‘ruthless$ war$ of$ aggression’,$ ‘shock$ and$ horror’$ and$ ‘inhuman$ and$ desperate$ crime’$(HC$Deb$22$November$1974,$cc1671U81).$Even$though$not$all$MPs$agreed$with$the$ proposed$Bill$(Prevention$of$Terrorism$Bill),$they$did$all$agree$that$the$attacks$were$horrible$ and$appalling.$
Moreover,$there$was$no$doubt$in$the$House$of$Commons$as$to$whether$the$events$ were$terrorist.$It$was$clear$to$all$MPs$that$terrorism$was$the$right$description$for$the$threat$ they$ were$ facing,$ and$ the$ concept$ was$ therefore$ also$ present$ in$ the$ Bill:$ Prevention$ of$ Terrorism$Bill.$This$is$in$contrast$to$1939$when$the$concept$was$only$used$in$the$debates,$but$ not$in$the$Bill$itself.$
In$both$the$debates$and$in$the$Bill$in$1974,$terrorism$was$defined$as$“acts$of$violence$ for$political$ends$designed$to$influence$public$opinion$or$Government$policy$with$respect$to$ affairs$ in$ Northern$ Ireland"$ (HC$ Deb$ 28$ November$ 1974,$ c635;$ Prevention$ of$ Terrorism$ (Temporary$ Provisions)$ Bill$ (No$ 16)$ 1974U75).$ Terrorism$ was$ thus$ limited$ to$ ‘violence$ for$ political$ends’.$This$meant$that$it$was$recognized$that$the$Provisional$IRA$had$political$goals$ motivating$ their$ violence.$ This$ is$ also$ apparent$ from$ the$ use$ of$ ‘political$ terrorism’$ in$ the$ debates$ (HC$ Deb$ 28$ November$ 1974,$ c713).$ Many$ MPs$ used$ this$ when$ talking$ about$ the$ Provisional$IRA.$$
In$ many$ of$ the$ debates$ in$ the$ House$ of$ Commons,$ the$ Secretary$ of$ State,$ Roy$ Jenkins,$ defended$ his$ Bill$ by$ explaining$ that$ although$ the$ measures$ were$ exceptional$ and$ draconian,$they$were$justified$in$the$light$of$the$danger$Great$Britain$was$facing$(HC$Deb$22$ November$ 1974,$ cc1671U81;$ HC$ Deb$ 25$ November$ 1974,$ c33U45).$ The$ majority$ of$ MPs$ expressed$ a$ similar$ sentiment,$ starting$ off$ by$ explaining$ that$ they$ found$ the$ proposed$ measures$undesirable$because$they$infringed$upon$individual$liberties,$but$that$the$events$ made$ them$ sadly$ necessary$ (HC$ Deb$ 25$ November$ 1974,$ cc33U45;$ HC$ Deb$ 28$ November$ 1974,$ cc634U752).$ Alan$ Beith,$ a$ Liberal$ Democrat,$ for$ instance,$ stressed$ that:$ “However$
repugnant$to$civil$liberties$they$are,$they$have$been$made$necessary$by$murderous$people”$ (HC$Deb$25$November$1974,$c37).$$
$ Just$like$in$1939,$the$Provisional$IRA$was$not$only$seen$as$a$threat$to$the$lives$of$the$ British$citizens,$but$also$as$a$threat$to$the$democratic$values$and$liberties$of$Great$Britain.$ Percy$ Grieve,$ a$ Conservative$ MP,$ stresses$ that:$ “There$ can$ be$ no$ doubt$ that$ the$ aim$ of$ anarchists,$be$they$in$the$Irish$Republican$Army$or$in$whatever$other$group$working$in$the$ free$ world$ by$ terrorism,$ is$ to$ destroy$ freedom$ and$ to$ bring$ about$ the$ end$ of$ civilised$ society”$ (HC$ Deb$ 28$ November$ 1974,$ c696).$ Edward$ du$ Cann,$ a$ Conservative$ MP,$ agrees$ with$ Grieve:$ “They$ are$ dishonourable$ enemies$ of$ democracy,$ of$ liberty,$ of$ the$ Christian$ religion”$(Ibid.,$c708).$Phillip$Whitehead,$a$Labour$MP,$even$went$as$far$as$to$describe$it$as$a$ because$“battle$[that]$is$essentially$one$for$hearts$and$mind”$(Ibid.,$c732).$$ How(to(Govern(the(Terrorist(Threat?( When$looking$at$the$debates$it$is$apparent$that$the$British$Government$was$facing$a$difficult$ dilemma.$On$the$one$hand,$they$had$to$find$a$solution$to$the$political$problem$in$Northern$ Ireland.$On$the$other$hand,$they$did$not$want$to$give$the$terrorists$the$idea$that$they$could$ get$away$with$these$attacks$and$that$they$could$pressurize$the$Government$into$giving$in$to$ their$demands.$$ $ All$the$MPs,$including$the$opponents$of$the$Bill,$agreed$that$a$political$solution$was$ needed$to$effectively$deal$with$the$problem$(HC$Deb$28$November$1974,$cc634U752).$But$ there$was$some$disagreement$about$the$proposed$Bill.$All$agreed$that$the$Bill$did$not$tackle$ the$ political$ side$ of$ the$ problem,$ but$ still$ the$ Bill$ was$ needed$ according$ to$ the$ British$ Government.$There$were$two$reasons$why$the$Bill$was$introduced.$Firstly,$there$was$a$lot$of$ public$pressure.$Many$MPs$explained$that$they$had$received$letters$from$their$constituents$ asking$for$a$firm$response$to$the$terrorist$attacks.$A$lot$of$MPs$feared$that$if$they$did$not$ respond$ to$ this$ demand$ the$ British$ public$ would$ take$ matters$ into$ their$ own$ hands$ and$ exact$revenge$on$the$(largely$innocent)$Irish$community$in$Great$Britain.$$
$ The$second$reason$was$that$the$Government$needed$to$show$the$IRA$that$terrorism$ did$not$work.$If,$as$some$suggested,$British$troops$were$pulled$out$of$Northern$Ireland,$this$ would$give$the$IRA$the$impression$that$they$were$winning.$A$political$solution,$according$to$ Roy$Jenkins,$should$therefore$be$sought$in$a$way$that$did$not$give$this$impression.$The$Bill$
would$take$a$firm$stance$against$terrorism,$which$would$then$give$the$Government$room$to$ find$a$political$solution$without$seeming$weak.$
$ The$ Bill$ itself,$ and$ the$ justification$ of$ the$ Bill,$ seems$ to$ be$ based$ on$ a$ largely$ preU emptive$governing$rational.$The$first$is$the$zero$risk$rationality.$All$the$measures$in$the$Bill$ are$constantly$justified$by$the$‘grave$situation’.$Roy$Jenkins,$the$Secretary$of$State,$explained$ that$it$was$better$to$be$safe$than$sorry.$What$he$meant$by$this$was$that$it$was$better$to$ sacrifice$individual$liberties$than$to$risk$another$terrorist$attack:$“We$are$in$greater$danger$ of$ justifiable$ criticism$ if$ we$ do$ too$ little$ than$ if$ we$ do$ too$ much”$ (Jenkins$ 1974,$ no$ pagination).$ The$ second$ rationality$ is$ the$ shifting$ burden$ of$ proof.$ This$ rationality$ is$ also$ visible$ from$ the$ way$ in$ which$ the$ Bill$ is$ justified.$ Roy$ Jenkins$ explained$ that$ the$ Bill$ was$ introduced$ to$ take$ effective$ action$ against$ people$ that$ were$ suspected$ of$ terrorism,$ but$ against$whom$there$was$not$sufficient$evidence$to$be$able$to$prosecute$(Jenkins$1974).$The$ third$rationality,$the$worstUcase$scenario$is$apparent$when$Members$of$Parliament$stressed$ that$the$threat$was$not$just$one$to$life$and$property,$but$also$one$to$the$democratic$values$ and$ liberties$ of$ Great$ Britain.$ It$ was$ feared$ that$ the$ ‘terrorists’$ wantd$ to$ destroy$ this$ “democratic$free$inheritance”$(HC$Deb$28$November$1974,$c708)$and$that$would$certainly$ amount$to$very$serious$and$irreversible$damage,$which$is$the$last$rationality.$$ Alternative(Understandings(of(the(Issue$ Although$in$1974$there$was$less$disagreement$about$the$nature$of$the$threat$than$in$1939,$ there$was$disagreement$about$the$proposed$Bill.$While$proponents$of$the$Bill$believed$that$ a$political$solution$could$be$sought$after$the$Bill$was$passed,$opponents$thought$that$the$Bill$ would$only$worsen$the$political$situation.$There$were$especially$worries$about$the$Exclusion$ Orders.$ Gerard$ Fitt,$ a$ politician$ from$ Northern$ Ireland,$ feared$ that$ these$ Orders$ would$ discriminate$ against$ the$ people$ of$ Northern$ Ireland$ because$ he$ believed$ the$ British$ Government$was$“in$effect$saying$that$Northern$Ireland$is$not$part$of$the$United$Kingdom”$ (HC$Deb$28$November$197,$c667).$This$worry$was$based$on$the$fact$that$only$citizens$from$ Northern$Ireland$could$be$excluded$from$Great$Britain.$$
In$ addition,$ multiple$ MPs,$ including$ proponents$ of$ the$ Bill,$ stressed$ that$ the$ Irish$ community$ in$ Great$ Britain$ was$ crucial$ in$ uncovering$ terrorist$ plots$ and$ that$ the$ Government$should$therefore$be$careful$that$the$introduced$measures$did$not$alienate$this$ community$(HC$Deb$28$November$1974,$cc634U752).$Alan$Beith,$a$Liberal$MP,$explained$that$
he$ had$ already$ received$ letters$ from$ Irish$ people$ who$ were$ worried$ that$ these$ measures$ were$ an$ “attempt$ to$ make$ secondUclass$ citizens$ of$ that$ [Irish]$ community”$ (HC$ Deb$ 28$ November$1974,$c674).$As$we$will$see$in$the$next$section,$this$worry$was$not$unfounded.$$ What(happened(after(1974( In$1993$Hillyard$conducted$a$study$on$the$consequences$of$this$Act$on$the$Irish$community.$ He$concluded$that$the$Act$resulted$in$the$construction$of$the$Irish$as$a$‘suspect$community’.$ This$meant$that$everyone$with$an$Irish$accent$was$treated$as$a$suspect$and$in$fact$led$to$ discrimination$against$these$people.$They$were$stopped$and$searched$at$the$British$borders$ and$ arrested$ without$ sufficient$ evidence.$ Some$ of$ these$ Irish$ people$ were$ also$ excluded$ from$Great$Britain,$without$clear$evidence$supporting$this$decision$(Hillyard$1993).$Hillyard$ (1993)$mentions$the$case$of$John$Matthews,$who$was$excluded$from$Great$Britain$on$the$ suspicion$that$he$was$involved$in$a$terrorist$attack.$However,$at$the$time$of$this$attack$he$ was$ accused$ of$ committing,$ he$ was$ at$ an$ Alcoholic$ Anonymous$ meeting.$ So$ although$ the$ British$ Government$ and$ Parliament$ needed$ the$ help$ of$ the$ Irish$ community,$ which$ they$ acknowledged$ during$ the$ debates,$ they$ still$ managed$ to$ alienate$ this$ community$ and$ thereby$making$it$harder$to$prevent$future$attacks.$$
$ During$ the$ debates$ the$ Government$ and$ Parliament$ also$ stressed$ the$ need$ for$ a$ political$solution$to$the$problem$in$Northern$Ireland.$Before,$during$and$after$the$Bill$was$ introduced,$ the$ British$ Government$ was$ pursuing$ this$ political$ solution.$ They$ had$ been$ having$ secret$ talks$ with$ members$ of$ the$ Provisional$ IRA$ since$ 1972$ (Craig$ 2012).$ These$ secret$ talks$ continued$ after$ the$ ‘horrific’$ bombings$ in$ Birmingham.$ In$ 1975$ these$ talks$ resulted$in$a$temporary$ceasefire$(Ibid.).$But$after$violence$broke$out$again$and$the$ceasefire$ ended,$ the$ talks$ also$ ceased.$ Eventually$ after$ more$ then$ twenty$ years$ an$ agreement$ was$ reached$between$Sinn$Féin,$the$political$party$associated$with$the$Provisional$IRA,$and$the$ British$ Government$ (Archick$ 2015).$ This$ was$ the$ Good$ Friday$ Agreement.$ This$ Agreement$ entailed$that$power$over$Northern$Ireland$would$be$transferred$from$London$to$Belfast.$In$ this$devolved$Government$both$unionist$and$nationalist$parties$would$have$a$say$(Ibid.).$$ $ What$is$striking$about$this$agreement$is$that$some$of$the$people$that$were$part$of$ the$negotiations$were$also$former$Provisional$IRA$members,$even$convicted$bombers.$Gerry$ Kelly,$for$instance,$was$responsible$for$the$Old$Bailey$bombing$in$1973$and$was$convicted$for$ life$(Taylor$1997).$In$1983$he$escaped$prison$and$was$recaptured$in$the$Netherlands$in$1986$
(BBC$2015).$After$this$recapturing$he$received$Royal$Pardon$and$was$released$(Ibid.).$In$1998$ he$ took$ part$ in$ the$ negotiations$ for$ the$ Good$ Friday$ Agreement$ as$ part$ of$ the$ Sinn$ Féin$ delegation$(Sinn$Féin$2013).$ In$sum,$despite$the$‘draconian’$measures$that$were$introduced,$the$British$ Government$did$try$to$find$a$political$solution$to$the$problem,$but$they$only$succeeded$in$ this$in$1998,$with$the$help$of$former$‘terrorists’.$ $ $ $ $ '
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Chapter'Four'–'The'Discourse'on'Foreign'Terrorist'Fighters$
$Having$analysed$the$discourses$on$the$Irish$Republican$Army$in$1939$and$1974,$we$would$ now$like$to$turn$to$the$current$discourse$on$Foreign$Terrorist$Fighters.$This$discourse$took$ place$ in$ the$ United$ Kingdom$ before$ the$ CounterUTerrorism$ and$ Security$ Act$ 2015$ was$ adopted,$which$it$was$in$January$2015.$$
The(Context(–(The(British(Experience(with(Foreign(Terrorist(Fighters$
Before$ moving$ on$ to$ the$ actual$ discourse,$ we$ would$ like$ to$ briefly$ discuss$ the$ context$ in$ which$ this$ discourse$ took$ place.$In$ September$ 2014,$ the$ United$ Nations$ (UN)$ Security$ Council$estimated$that$over$13.000$people$from$eighty$different$countries$travelled$to$Syria$ and$ Iraq$ to$ join$ violent$ Islamic$ extremist$ groups$ like$ Islamic$ State$ in$ Levant$ (UN$ Security$ Council$2014).$It$was$feared$that$these$people,$also$called$foreign$terrorist$fighters,$would$ not$only$worsen$the$situation$in$the$countries$they$travelled$to,$but$it$was$also$feared$that$ these$ people$ would$ carry$ out$ terrorist$ attacks$ when$ they$ would$ return$ to$ their$ home$ countries$(Ibid.).$$
In$ March$ 2014,$ the$ Center$ for$ Security$ Studies7$(2014)$ estimated$ that$ about$ 500$ British$ citizens$ had$ travelled$ to$ Syria.$ One$ of$ these$ people$ was$ Mohammed$ Emwazi,$ also$ known$as$‘Jihadi$John’$(Casciani$n.d.).$In$August$2014,$ISIL$released$a$video$in$which$a$man$ with$ a$ British$ accent$ beheaded$ an$ American$ journalist.$ In$ the$ following$ months$ more$ of$ these$ videos$ were$ released,$ including$ two$ videos$ in$ which$ two$ British$ aid$ workers$ were$ beheaded.$In$these$videos$the$man$with$the$British$accent,$who$came$to$be$known$as$‘Jihadi$ John’,$ was$ present$ every$ time$ (Ibid.).$ The$ fact$ that$ a$ British$ citizen$ was$ beheading$ other$ people,$ including$ fellow$ British$ citizens,$ seemed$ to$ make$ it$ painfully$ clear$ in$ Great$ Britain$ why$these$foreign$terrorist$fighters$posed$a$threat$to$their$security$(Cameron$2014).$
$ In$ addition$ in$ 2014$ and$ 2015$ various$ terrorist$ attacks$ occurred$ in$ other$ European$ countries$that$made$the$British$Government$even$more$aware$of$the$threat$posed$by$foreign$ terrorist$ fighters.$ Among$ these,$ for$ instance,$ was$ the$ shooting$ at$ the$ Jewish$ museum$ in$ Brussels$in$May$2014$(Penketh$2014).$During$this$attack$a$Frenchman,$who$spent$over$a$year$ in$Syria,$killed$three$people$(Ibid.).$$
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7$$$The$Center$for$Security$Studies$is$located$in$Switserland,$and$is$involved$in$research$and$policy$consultancy$ in$the$field$of$security$policy$(CSS$n.d.).$
$ $
At$the$time$of$the$discourse$that$is$examined$here,$David$Cameron$was$Prime$Minister,$a$ member$of$the$Conservative$Party;$and$the$Cabinet$consisted$of$a$coalition$of$members$of$ the$ Conservative$ Party$ and$ the$ Liberal$ Democrats$ (Gov.UK$ n.d.b).$ To$ deal$ with$ issue$ of$
foreign$ terrorist$ fighters,$ Cameron’s$ government$ introduced$ the$ CounterUTerrorism$ and$ Security$2015$Bill.$Part$of$this$Bill$were$the$Temporary$Exclusion$Orders.$$
The(Threat(–(A(Clash(of(Civilisations?($
In$the$discourse$the$issue$of$foreign$terrorist$fighters$was$framed$as$a$terrorist$threat.$The$ main$ reason$ why$ these$ people$ were$ viewed$ as$ dangerous$ was$ not$ because$ they$ were$ foreign$fighters,$but$because$they$were$foreign$terrorist$fighters.$Terrorism,$however,$was$ not$ really$ defined$ in$ the$ discourse.$ That$ is$ to$ say,$ the$ meaning$ of$ terrorism$ was$ not$ discussed$in$the$parliamentary$debates,$but$the$act$itself$does$refer$to$a$definition$given$in$ the$Terrorism$Act$2000.$This$definition$is$as$follows$(the$following):$$
Terrorism$ means$ the$ use$ or$ threat$ of$ action$ where…$ the$ use$ or$ threat$ is$ designed$ to$ influence$ the$ Government$ or$ an$ international$ Governmental$ organisation$ or$ to$ intimidate$ the$ public$ or$ a$ section$ of$ the$ public$ and…$ the$ use$ or$ threat$ is$ made$ for$ the$ purpose$ of$ advancing$a$political,$religious,$racial$or$ideological$cause”$(Terrorism$Act$2000$s.1).$$ The$action$is$also$defined$in$the$Terrorism$Act,$including$a$range$of$actions,$such$as,$violence$ against$citizens$or$serious$damages$to$property$(Ibid.).$This$definition$was$described$as$“the$ broadest$ever$definition$of$terrorism”$(Fekete$2001).$While$in$1974$terrorism$was$defined$as$ ‘political$terrorism’,$this$new$definition$expands$the$goals$for$which$terrorism$can$be$used,$ including$religious$and$ideological$goals.$$ $ In$the$case$of$the$foreign$terrorist$fighters$the$issue$was$mainly$represented$as$a$case$ of$ ideological$ terrorism.$ That$ is$ to$ say,$ it$ was$ represented$ as$ an$ ideological$ struggle$ over$ values.$ The$ first$ time$ this$ representation$ was$ used,$ was$ by$ David$ Cameron$ in$ his$ speech$ during$the$UN$Security$Council$summit$on$24$September$2014.$Cameron$(2014)$described$ the$situation$as$a$fight$between$the$Islamist$extremists$who$used$horrific$cruelty$that$was$ “mediaeval$ in$ character”$ (no$ pagination)$ and$ “our$ peaceful,$ tolerant$ country”$ (no$ pagination).$He$also$stated$that:$“The$poisonous$ideology$of$extremism…$is$the$root$cause$of$ this$terrorist$threat”$(Ibid.).$
