THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE
AND
THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities
University of Amsterdam
August 2016 Harriet Hanemaaijer
6168345
Main supervisor: Dhr. Dr. R.J. De Bruin Second supervisor: Mw. Dr. Van Heerikhuizen
Table of Content
INTRODUCTION ... 3
1. DEMOCRACY ... 6
1.1DEFINING DEMOCRACY ... 6
1.2DEMOCRACY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ... 10
1.3DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT ... 14
1.4OPTIMISM AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ... 16
2. PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS AND A PUBLIC SPHERE ... 18
2.1PARLIAMENTS ROLE IN DEMOCRACY ... 18
2.2WESTMINSTER MODEL ... 21
2.3CONSENSUS MODEL ... 23
2.4PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ... 26
2.5EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE CONSENSUS MODEL AND A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE .... 30
3. TWO DIMENSIONS OF THE EU DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT ... 33
3.1LACK OF A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE ... 33
3.2EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OTHER ACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE ... 37
3.3INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION ... 40
4. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE ... 46
4.1THEORIES ON A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE ... 47
4.2SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS OF 2015 AND THE RESPONSE OF EU MEMBER STATES ... 50
4.3CASE STUDY:REACTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT TO THE DEATH OF AYLAN KURDI ... 53
4.4NEWSPAPER ANALYSIS ... 54
4.5EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS’ INFLUENCE ... 60
CONCLUSION ... 62
Introduction
The topic of this thesis is the European Union’s democratic deficit due to the absence of a functioning European public sphere. Ever since the first usage of the term democratic deficit, in the 1970’s,1 it has been used to describe the European project in various ways. Political leaders in favour of strengthening European integration or those pleading abandonment of the European project altogether have used the term democratic deficit as an argument to
strengthen their point of view. Scholars have researched the European Union (EU) democratic deficit from numerous different perspectives. This is possible because almost everyone agrees that a democratic deficit exists, there is no overall or general understanding why it exists or agreement on what can be done to overcome the deficiencies. This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding that the EU suffers a democratic deficit due to the inability of the European Parliament to contribute to a functional European public sphere. The following research questions will be addressed: 1) What is the nature of the democratic deficit of the EU? 2) What role does the European Parliament play in the European public sphere?
In order to do this the thesis will be divided into four chapters. The first chapter concentrates on defining the terms democracy and democratic deficit. The difference between democratic elements, democratic processes, and hard and soft institutions of democracy will be discussed. After this the democratic deficit will be examined in relation to the EU using two main EU integration theories: (neo)functionalism and (liberal)intergovernmentalism. These integration theories are addressed in order to bring to light the connection between soft institutions of democracy and how EU integration is perceived. After this a definition will be given of the term democratic deficit in relation to the EU. The main point of this first chapter is to provide information concerning the democratic deficit of the EU.
The second chapter will concentrate on the different parliamentary systems. First, the importance of a parliament will be discussed in relation to a democratic regime. This will be followed by an examination of the two main parliamentary systems, the Westminster model and the consensus model. The European Parliament will be discussed in relation to the two parliamentary models and it will become clear that the European Parliament, and the EU as a whole, has more characteristics in common with the consensus model. Subsequently the link will be made between the choice of parliamentary model and the impact it has on forming and intensifying the European public sphere. This chapter looks into the second main question;
1 Azman, K., ‘The Problem of “Democratic Deficit” in the European Union’, International
what role the European Parliament plays in the strengthening and establishing a European public sphere. In other words does the parliamentary system incorporated by the European Parliament aid the construction and strengthening of a European public sphere?
The third chapter will explain in detail the two different dimensions of the democratic deficit of the EU, namely the European public sphere and the institutional dimension. The first category, the European public sphere dimension, will concentrate on what a public sphere is and mention the existence of a European public sphere, albeit a weak one, due to the europeanisation of the different national public spaces. After this the influence of a demos in a public sphere will be examined. The next section of this chapter will concentrate on why the European Parliament is the most qualified EU institution to play a prominent role in
strengthening the European public sphere over other (political) actors of the EU. The last section of this third chapter will examine the institutional dimension. It will concentrate on the three main arguments produced by Eurosceptics, namely the EU lacks of transparency, accountability and legitimacy. This section, as well as this chapter, will conclude with explaining why the European public sphere dimension is considered more important than the institutional dimension.
The fourth and final chapter will consist of a case study in which the role of the European Parliament in the national public spheres of two different EU member states, Italy and the Netherlands, will be examined. In this section the European Parliaments response to the Syrian refugee crisis in the month of September 2015 will be researched. In order to receive an indication of the European Parliaments reaction to the Syrian refugee crisis in the two mentioned EU member states, four national newspapers covering the entire political spectrum, will be examined. In doing so, the second research question will be answered: what role does the European Parliament play in the European public sphere? In order to do this however, the three main theories concerning the existence of a European public sphere will first have to be discussed.
The case study of the fourth chapter is an empirical analysis of the European
Parliaments involvement in the national public spheres of Italy and the Netherlands. In order to examine how involved the European Parliament is in the national public spheres of Italy and the Netherlands, four national newspapers will be examined. Taking into consideration that not all newspapers are considered reliable, I have focused my research on well-founded news publishers: the Dutch newspapers Trouw, De Volksrant, De Telegraaf and NRC
Handelsblad and the Italian Corriere della Sera, Il Resto del Carlino, La Repubblica and La Stampa. These newspapers will give an indication of how and what the public was debating
and which political actors helped shape public opinion. The timeframe, the month September 2015, was chosen because of the death of Aylan Kurdi and the international shock that it caused. It will be interesting to find out, through media research, if the European Parliament is absent, participating or a leading contributor in the European public sphere concerning the Syrian refugee crisis.
1. Democracy
In order to answer the research questions a viable definition of democracy needs to be given. This chapter will first concentrate on understanding two main concepts: democracy and democratic deficit. The term democracy will be further divided into the categories of democratic processes and democratic elements. After this the difference between hard and soft institutions of democracy will be covered. While explaining the soft institutions of democracy attention will be focused on the existence of a demos and a public sphere. After giving a feasible definition of democracy the term will be examined in relation to the EU. In order to do so democratic aspects will be discussed of two main EU integration theories, namely (neo)functionalism and (liberal)intergovernmentalism. By doing this an insight will be given into why soft institutional aspects of democracy have been considered less important in comparison to hard institutional aspects of democracy. The next section of this chapter will discuss the democratic deficit of the EU in more depth. It will divide the EU’s democratic deficit in two different categories, institutional dimension and European public sphere dimension, which will be discussed in greater depth later. This chapter will end on a positive note exploring why the EU could well be considered to be democratic in nature after all.
1.1 Defining democracy
Giving an all-encompassing definition of democracy is an almost impossible task because it is one of the most contested concepts in history.2 Over the course of human history democracy developed in various areas of the world, although often of a wholly different nature from what we would describe as democracy today. Democracy as a regime has been independently invented and reinvented whenever appropriate conditions existed.3 The flexibility of the term is one reason why it is difficult to provide an inclusive definition. There are different forms of democracy and the definition seems to change according to individual or communal desires. In order to give a viable definition, one needs to look beyond the different democracy theories and concentrate on the basic aspects that the various theories have in common. These aspects of democracy shall be divided into two categories, democratic processes and democratic elements. Both categories will be discussed separately below.
2 O’Donnell, G., ‘The Perpetual Crises of Democracy,’ Journal of Democracy, nr. 1 (2007), p. 6.
To understand what democracy means one must understand the democratic processes. This category has one key aspect, which is that all members of an entity are treated equally capable and equally qualified to participate in the process of decision-making. In other words all members are considered politically equal. This key facet can be subdivided into five different criteria, which will be examined further below:4
1. Effective participation; 2. Voting equality;
3. Enlightened understanding;
4. Capability of setting and controlling the political agenda; 5. Inclusion of adults.
The first criterion, effective participation, means that all the members of an entity must have equal and effective opportunities to voice their opinions concerning policy matters. Voting equality means much the same where it concerns voting: votes, as well as voting
opportunities, should be equal to all members. Additionally these two criteria infer, that citizens should be free to run for office. Enlightened understanding, the third criterion, implies that each member must have equal and effective opportunities and time for learning about the relevant alternative policies and their likely consequences.5 This infers that individuals have the right to information, which in turn requires a high level freedom of the press. The fourth criterion, control of the agenda, means that members of an entity can decide what matters are to be placed on, or removed from, the agenda. Lastly, inclusion of adults implies that the adult members of an entity should enjoy the four rights and responsibilities defined above. This means that political discrimination on any ground is not acceptable. These four fundamental aspects are necessary in order to live in a democratic society.
Having discussed the democratic processes the second category, democratic elements, needs to be explained. In addition to the five aspects of democratic processes, members of an entity should have ample freedom and control over public policies and policy makers.6 When it comes to deciding which democratic elements are important for a democratic society, different democratic theories begin to form. Emphasis needs to be put on the democratic elements these theories have in common in order to avoid focusing on one particular democracy theory. All modern democracy theories share a minimal basis of democratic
4 Dahl, R., On Democracy, New Haven: Yale University Press 1998, p. 37. 5 Ibid, p. 37.
6 Diamond, L. and Morlino, L., ‘The Quality of Democracy An Overview,’ Journal of
elements. This means that democracy can be reduced to a minimal understanding in terms of a distinct institutional composition and a fundamental set of values that any democracy would need to embody.7 In addition to the five aspects of democratic processes there are several required elements of democracy which have to be present for a society or polity to be democratic. Different theories on democracy emphasise a range of such elements, but many share common fundamentals. Leonardo Morlino, a professor of political science and director of the Research Center of Democracies and Democratisations in Rome, stipulates the
following four such essential elements8: 1. Universal, adult suffrage;
2. Recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; 3. More than one political party;
4. More than one source of information.
In order to fully understand what democracy means attention must be given to the goal a democratic regime wants to achieve. The main aim of democracy is to equip a society with sufficient freedom, political equality and control over public polities and policy makers through the legitimate and lawful functioning of stable institutions.9 In order to achieve this goal, three fundamental requirements need to be achieved. The first requirement is upholding the rule of law. Defining this term in itself is not an easy matter as it is also one of the most contested concepts in politics. The classical definitions of the rule of law implies that all citizens are equal before the law and that these laws are set out in advance and in general and clear terms.10 The second requirement is that all adult citizens need to be able to participate in the political process. A democratic regime needs to ensure that all citizens are able to use their formal rights to influence and take part in the decision-making process by participating in elections, organising themselves and being able to lobby for their interest.11 The final requirement is the ability to hold political leaders accountable for their political actions. Political leaders are accountable in two manners: vertically and horizontally. Vertical
7 Blokker, P., Multiple Democracies in Europe, New York: Routledge 2010, p. 4.
8 Morlino, L., ‘Good and Bad Democracies: How to Conduct Research into the Quality of Democracy,’ Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, nr. 1 (2004), p. 5. 9 Diamond, L. and Morlino, L., ‘The Quality of Democracy An Overview,’ Journal of
Democracy, nr. 4 (2004), p. 22.
10 Tamanaha, B.Z., On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 3.
11 Diamond, L. and Morlino, L., ‘The Quality of Democracy An Overview,’ Journal of
accountability means that political leaders are answerable for their political decisions when asked for argumentation or clarification by voters or interest groups.12 Horizontal
accountability means that political officials are accountable for their political actions to other officeholders and (state) institutions. This ensures that a system of checks and balances are upheld.
When defining the term democracy one should also take into consideration the difference between hard and soft institutions. The term hard institution implies that there are sets of tangible laws available to the public, for example a constitution. These hard
institutions ensure that citizens can participate in the political process, in other words it guarantees, through legislation, a government of the people, by the people, for the people. Scholars are convinced that a democracy cannot solely rely on these hard institutions. Soft institutions such as the public sphere allow citizens a broader and more equal opportunity to engage in politics.13
In a public sphere communication between different actors, for example, experts EU officials, media, national government representatives, interest groups and the public takes place in order to discuss policy matters. The function of the communicational infrastructure of a democratic public sphere is to turn relevant societal problems into topics of debate, and to allow the general public to relate and at the same time take an affirmative or negative stand on news and opinions.14 A public sphere provides the different actors a platform to achieve different things. On the one hand political actors are provided with a political discourse, meaning the formal exchange of reasoned views as to which of several alternative courses of action should be taken to solve a societal problem.15 In other words political actors are exposed to public opinion, which is constantly changing. It provides political leaders legitimacy to act. Furthermore they are offered a stage to broadcast information on their political views and accomplishments. On the other hand a public sphere provides the public with information because of the constant communication between the different actors, which allows for the formation of public opinion. The public takes part in this public debate, which gives people the idea that they are being heard and that their political views are being taken
12 Diamond, L. and Morlino, L., ‘The Quality of Democracy An Overview,’ Journal of
Democracy, nr. 4 (2004), p. 25.
13 Habermas, J., ‘Why Europe needs a constitution,’ New Left Review, nr. 11 (2001), p. 17. 14 Ibid, p. 18.
15 Johnson, D. and Johnson, R., ‘Civil Political Discourse in a Democracy: The contribution of psychology,’ Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, nr. 4 (2000), p. 292.
into account. Overall a public sphere provides the community with the ability to hold political leaders accountable for their action.
Another soft institution is a demos, meaning a collective singular of ‘a people’ capable of defining itself as a democratic nation.16 There are however two important distinctions, namely the ethnic and the civic conception of demos. The latter distinction implies a community of citizens who identify themselves with a liberal political culture, sustained by the function of democratic legal institutions and procedural norms.17 In other words
Europeans can form common identities because of their shared values enshrined in the resuscitated Constitutional Treaty. In this sense a demos does not only have to rely on identities derived from the nation state. This has also been coined ‘constitutional patriotism’ by Jurgen Habermas. In order for civic demos to develop, constant debate must take place that is able to question tradition and renegotiate what the public sphere must look like. The
definition of the term ethnic demos is the traditional understanding of the term demos,
meaning a group of people sharing the same culture, myths, historical memories and possibly the same religion and ethnicity. This provides the community with a shared belonging making it capable for the community to identify with each other. A demos is required in a democracy, because it provides a community with a shared identity and the ability to express common yet conflicting political views.
The point has been made that democracy is not an easy term to define. In order to give a workable definition I will try to sum up the previous paragraphs and produce a curt
definition of what democracy should entail. A democratic regime should have free and fair elections; adhere to the rule of law; separate power with an effective system of checks and balances and promote freedom. In addition to that people need to actively participate in a democratic regime in order to maintain a democracy.
1.2 Democracy and the European Union
The EU is a never before seen entity. Europe is in the process of inventing a new political form, something more than a confederation but at the same time, less than a federation. It is an association of states that pool their sovereignty only in very restricted areas in varying degrees. It is an association that does not seek to have the coercive power to act directly on
16 Habermas, J., ‘Why Europe needs a constitution,’ New Left Review, nr. 11 (2001), p. 15. 17 Antonsich, M., ‘Bringing the demos back in. People ‘s views on EUropean identity’,
individuals in the fashion of nation states.18 In other words the EU is a sui generis (meaning of its own kind). Others label it as an unidentified political object or less then a federation but more than a regime.19 There is a constant debate amongst social and political scientists on the topic whether or not the EU is considered democratic and to what extent this is considered to be problematic. Over the course of EU history steps have been taken by policy makers to make the EU more democratic. In the following two paragraphs two prominent European integration theories, (neo)functionalism and (liberal)intergovernmentalism, will be discussed with emphasis on the establishing of a European public sphere.
Functionalism is an integration and cooperation theory. The functionalist David Mitrany has greatly contributed to this theory. In his book A Working Peace System he
characterises the twentieth century as a time of technical issues that could be resolved only by cooperative action across state boundaries.20 These issues can best be resolved by highly trained specialists, rather than by politicians. This would create a thickening web between transnational regimes and institutions. These entities can tackle the matters professionally without any need of political alignment. This theory leaves little to no space for the nation state or political ideologies. Once successes are booked in one policy area the more incentive a transnational community would have in tackling other functional settings in a cooperative manner. This domino effect of the ever-increasing need to collaborate is called ramification. From functional cooperation would come the essential basis for institutions in the form of international organisations and regimes based on multilateralism that would ultimately diminish the importance and relevance of the nation state.21
The principal contribution of neofunctionalism lies in the elaboration, modification, and testing of hypotheses, brought to light by functionalism, while focusing on the EU.22 It implies that actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.23 The initial decision to integrate has lead to a self-sustaining integration that is bound to further itself. Integration in one sector will cause
18 Habermas, J., ‘Why Europe needs a constitution,’ New Left Review, nr. 11 (2001), p. 5. 19 Schmidt, V., ‘The European Union: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State?*,’ Journal
of Common Market Studies, nr. 5 (2004), p. 1.
20 Dougherty, J. and Pfaltzgraff, R., Contending theories of international relations: A
comprehensive survey, New York: Longman 2001, p. 512.
21 Ibid, p. 512. 22 Ibid, p. 512.
(un)intended integration in other sectors due to the intimate relationship between different policies. This is called spillover.
It is, however, interesting for this thesis how neofunctionalism views democracy in the EU. The main reason to integrate lies in shared, common goals that can more easily be
achieved by working together. Actors can learn from their experiences in co-operative decision-making, modify their preferences and even develop common ideals and identities.24 It is these interests that cause loyalties to shift from, for example, the national parliament to the European Parliament. One can argue that according to functionalism the democratic deficit in the EU is not that problematic because the collaboration is value-based. Political actors, in seeking to realise their value-derived goals, will choose whatever means are made available by the prevailing democratic order.25 Neofunctionalism assumes that a democratic standard already exists. Hard institutions of democracy are implemented because the political actors prefer these democratic standards, for example, the rule of law and the separation of power. Furthermore soft institutions of democracy can be achieved because of the shifting of loyalties from a national to a transnational level. Soft institutions will gradually come about once society understands that collaboration in order to reach a goal is better than struggling alone.
Liberal intergovernmentalism, the second integration theory, implies that political actors on the national level influence the EU collaboration more than neofunctionalism assumes. According to intergovernmentalism, integrative process is characterised by intergovernmental initiatives agreed upon by the participating heads of governments. However, before, these initiatives are agreed upon, bargaining and compromises take place, which reflect the domestic constraints, pressures and interests that each head of government brings to the negotiation table. The heads of government may call into existence institutions to insure that made agreements are upheld.
Andrew Moravcsik, the political theorist behind liberal integovernmentalism, argues that because of constitutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control via national governments and the increasing powers of both the European Parliament and the national parliaments, the EU does not have a problematic democratic deficit. The Treaties that have been agreed upon by all the heads of government have sufficient legislation ensuring that EU policy-making is in nearly all cases clean, transparent, effective and politically responsive to
24 Schmitter P., ‘Haas and the legacy of neofunctionalism,’ Journal of European Public
Policy, nr. 2 (2005), p. 259.
the demands of European citizens.26 According to him national leaders have the power over
the EU Treaties. It is the national governments of the EU member states that decide on the future of the EU, thus making them the guardians of democratic process. Moreover, liberal integovernmentalists agree that, due to the multilevel political structure of the EU, the checks and balances and the restrictive policy areas the EU can influence, the EU is as democratic as it needs to be. Additionally they criticise those who consider the EU to be undemocratic by accusing them of holding the EU to a democratic standard that no nation state can meet.27
Bringing these two integration theories together and discussing them from the perspective of democracy, one can conclude that the soft institution of democracy has been considered a non-issue. In functionalism a supranational institution such as a transnational parliament is something that is achieved later on and is considered a spillover. It is not considered a priority. Instead traditional parliaments should be replaced with functional parliaments comprised of experts that can hold political actors accountable. Additionally, the creation of a European demos is also considered a spillover of regional integration. A public sphere is initially not necessary. The elite only need to agree on sector specific transnational tasks. An elite sphere would exist in which specialists compare notes. Popular consent is not needed and public opinion is disregarded. Liberal intergovernmentalism assumes that a European public sphere is not needed because the EU policy issues are not crucial enough to warrant the involvement of the general public. A public debate on a transnational EU level is not required because the member states are the masters of the treaties, insuring that the debate will be kept on a national level. Additionally, the institutional checks and balances that the treaties ensure are sufficient enough to eradicate corruption from the EU policy structure.
Whether integration was the result of national governments pursuing their economic interests or the consequences of automatic sectorial expansion to more and more policy matters, the EU has largely come about by excluding the public. Both of these integration theories agree that the path to successful European integration would not and should not require a European demos or the creation of a European public sphere.28 These two
integration theories are biased against popular involvement. In the next section of this chapter the main emphasis will be on the democratic deficit of the EU. The main arguments
26 Moravcsik, A., ‘In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, nr. 4 (2002), p. 605.
27 Moravcsik, A., ‘The myth of Europe’s ‘democratic deficit’’, Intereconomics, nr. 6 (2008), p. 341.
28 Perez, F., Political Communication in Europe: The Cultural and Structural Limits of the
concerning why scholars and politician consider the EU to be undemocratic will be introduced below.
1.3 Democratic deficit
The EU has increasingly received criticism for having a democratic deficit. Just like with democracy, defining the term democratic deficit is a difficult task because an agreed upon definition does not exist. According to the classic democratic deficit theory the term implies a ‘dispossession’ of national representative institutions that is only ‘partly compensated’ at the EU level.29 According to the EU website the term democratic deficit is a concept invoked principally in the argument that the EU and its various bodies suffer from a lack of democracy and seem inaccessible to the ordinary citizen because their complex method of operating.30 This term has been used by Eurosceptics, who criticise and oppose the collaboration of nation states on EU level, as a core argument to stop the EU integration process. Euroscepticism is on the rise. This can, however, be seen as a positive impulse. To understand this, one must understand that there are two different types of Euroscepticisms, namely the outside and inside form. Outside Euroscepticism targets the integration process of the EU as a whole. Outside Eurosceptics want to see the EU fall and the dispensed sovereignty of the nation state restored. In contrast to that, there is inside Euroscepticism. It considers EU integration as fixed and therefore it debates not the existence of the EU, but the content of EU policies. There is a shift-taking place whereby more EU citizens are converting to inside rather then outside Euroscepticism. In the following section arguments produced by both inside and outside Eurosceptics will shortly be discussed.
There are numerous different arguments used by scholars claiming that there is a democratic deficit in the EU. The term democratic deficit is such a broad term that arguments concerning democracy in the EU can be approached from many different angles. Many Eurosceptics criticise the institutions, the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, of not being democratic or operating in a democratic manner. The European Parliament is considered a weak institution. It has accumulated more legislative and regulatory powers over the years but it still is only one of four major institutions active in
29 Lord, C., ‘Assessing Democracy in a Contested Polity’, Journal of Common Market
Studies, nr. 4 (2001), p. 642.
30 Author unkonown, ‘Democratic deficit’,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/democratic_deficit_en.htm, consulted on 11 March 2015.
the EU policy-making process. Additionally the European Parliament elections are considered second-order elections whereby national political parties debate on national issues leaving no room for transnational deliberation. To make matters worse the election turnout for the European Parliament has been declining, which contributes to the lack of legitimacy argument. The European Commission is perceived as a technocratic EU institution that operates above and out of reach of the EU citizens. In the recent years the European Commission has been criticised because it is more likely to listen to lobby groups than the peoples of Europe. Lastly the Council of Ministers, comprised of national ministers,
diplomatic representatives and administrative officials from the EU, often operates in secret. In addition to the lack of transparency, qualified majority voting has been incorporated to most EU policy matters. This makes it very difficult to hold a national minister accountable for EU policy or the lack thereof. A national minister can easily blame the decision-making process or his colleagues from other EU member states for unwanted legislation and
decisions. Furthermore the different legislative processes, in which the three mentioned EU institutions, work together in a degree of varying importance is also considered too
cumbersome for EU citizens to understand. 31
From another angle Eurosceptics argue that the democratic deficit of the EU is
concentrated around the idea that the EU does not have a demos. A demos is essential in order for a democratic entity to exist because it is the connectedness of the peoples amongst
themselves, as well as between themselves and political actors that ensures a democratic regime. The geographical barriers, linguistic and cultural differences hamper the creation of a common bond and a public sphere. The EU lacks most features that define a nation state: a named human population sharing a historical territory; common memories and myths of origin; a mass, standardised public culture; a common economy and territorial mobility, and common legal rights and duties for all members of the collective.32 Eurosceptics believe that EU citizens do not share common interests or a common identity. They argue that the EU is a socio-political space that exists only as a network of upper classes and elites, but it remains distant from the emotions of the masses whose identities are primarily rooted in national spaces.33 Furthermore a European public sphere has not fully established this makes holding European political actors accountable for their actions difficult, which in turns creates a
31 Zweifel, T., ‘…Who is without sin cast the first stone: the EU’s democratic deficit in comparison’, Journal of European Public Policy, nr. 5 (2011), p. 817.
32 Ibid, p. 486.
33 Antonsich, M., ‘Bringing the demos back in. People ‘s views on EUropean identity’,
democratic deficit. The European public sphere is dysfunctional because on the one hand it does not manage to facilitate a relationship between the representatives and the represented and on the other hand it does not have the capacity to encourage politicisation (the capacity to visualise conflict between/among alternative/optional ways of governing society).34 In chapter three the lack of a European public sphere will be elaborated on, as it is a prime part of the argument this work is establishing.
Looking at the arguments stated above, the points can be divided into two different dimensions. The first is the institutional dimension for it describes a lack of democracy that is of an institutional nature. In other words a democratic deficit can be found in the EU when it comes to the hard institution of the democracy theory. The second dimension points to a democratic deficit of another nature, namely the lack of a European public sphere. This second dimension focuses on the soft institutional aspects of the democracy theory. The reason for separating democratic deficits into two dimensions is because the first dimension can be tackled through legislation. The last dimension, a lack of a European public sphere, cannot only be influenced by legislation because no piece of legislation can ensure the creation of a European public sphere. In chapter three the two dimensions will be discussed separately in further detail. The last section of this chapter will discuss why there is reason for optimism concerning the EU and democratic deficit.
1.4 Optimism and the democratic deficit of the European Union
In the previous section a global outline of arguments have been provided stating that there is a democratic deficit in the EU. In the following paragraphs arguments will be provided stating the opposite. To begin with, the terminology that is being used in the debate whether the EU has a democratic deficit is wrong and unfair. The definitions that are being used are
appropriate for nation states. The EU is not a nation state and therefore can never attain the kind of democratic legitimacy required of one, thus making the comparison between the EU and a nation state in the context of democracy unfair.
One could argue that the EU is not dealing with a democratic deficit but a political and communication gap between political actors and EU citizens. The argument has been made that in order for the EU to be democratic a demos must exist. The EU does not have a single people; it is comprised of 28 different nationalities. These peoples do not share common
34 Perez, F., Political Communication in Europe: The Cultural and Structural Limits of the
interests and are loyal to their national identities. It would appear that EU citizens are not interested in the EU, which is why the turnout during European Parliament elections seems to be dwindling. There is room for optimism on this front. According to a Eurobarometer poll published in 2007, 55% of the respondents trust the Europeans Parliament, 50% the European Commission, 44% the Council of Ministers and 48% the EU as a whole. The same
respondents trust their own national parliament 35% or less. The placing of such trust over and above that of national parliaments surely points to some sense of positive identification with the European system of governance.35
Another argument stating that the democratic deficit of the EU is not as problematic as Eurospectics and politicians would perceive it to be is the fact that the member states are the masters over the treaties.36 The European Council, comprised of the different heads of state, write and can amend EU treaties. Consequently the heads of states and thus also indirectly the EU citizens influence the power and actions of the EU. It is true that the EU decision-making process is complex; there are many different political actors involved on different levels. This is however the case to ensure a level of democracy. Democratic checks and balances are put in place so that equally important political actors, individuals and/or institutions, may put a stop to what can be considered undemocratic policies and decisions.
There is no academic or politician today that would deny the fact that there is a
democratic deficit in the EU. The question should not be whether there is a democratic deficit but whether this democratic deficit is troublesome enough for the EU not to be considered a democracy. Taking into consideration that different nation states can also be considered to be suffering from a democratic deficit with the same criticism that the EU receives, the struggle to become more democratic on all levels of government is continuous. I have argued in this first chapter, and will continue to do so in the remaining chapters of this thesis, that the lack of a European public sphere is a paramount aspect of the democratic deficit of the EU. In this thesis I wish to contribute to the debate on whether or not the European Parliament is failing to create a European public sphere. In order to give a proper insight into what role a
parliament plays in the democratic process, the parliament as a political institution will be the subject of the next chapter.
35 Ward, T., ‘The European Union: a crisis of legitimacy’, European View, nr. 9 (2010), p. 123.
36 Timmermans, W., ‘Gedifferentieerde integratie binnen de Europese Unie,’ Jura falconis, nr. 3 (1995), p. 383.
2. Parliamentary systems and a public sphere
Nation states are composed of numerous different political institutions. At least one of these political institutions is comprised of elected officials tasked with representing the citizens. Nation states are not the only entities that have representatives or parliamentary institutions, some (international) organisations have representative establishments as well. The most common institution that represents the citizens is a parliament. Some nation states have elected presidents but because my thesis concentrates on the EU, which has a parliamentary system and not a presidential system, the focus will be on a parliamentary system. In the previous chapter it has become clear that the EU has a democratic deficit. This is evident not only because of institutional shortcomings but also because of the absence of a functioning European public sphere. Since this thesis questions the European Parliament capability of creating a European public sphere, thus contributing to a democratic deficit, it is necessary to take a closer look at the European Parliament. In the first section of this chapter a general outline will be given of what role a parliament has in connection to a democracy. This will be followed by a description of the two main parliamentary systems, namely the Westminster model and consensus model. The third section will concentrate on the European Parliament and whether it has more in common with one parliamentary model over another. This chapter will finish with examining what effect the parliamentary system of the European Parliament has on the creation and maintaining a European public sphere.
2.1 Parliaments role in democracy
The notion that the people should be rulers or should have a say in political decisions is an old concept. Aristotle had the opinion that citizens should take turns providing political leadership meaning that some rule and others are ruled.37 A common definition of democracy is
‘government of, by and for the people’. This thesis concentrates on the ‘Government by the people’, which implies democratic participation of the citizens. One key way citizens can participate in how their society should be governed is through parliament, whether it is voting on members of parliament or taking a more active role in parliament itself. In this following section three main roles will be given that explains the role of a parliament in a democratic society.
37Rhodes, R., ‘T Hart, P., and Keohane, N., Western Political Thought, Oxford: Oxford
Every parliamentary system in a democracy has one thing in common: it has a parliament, which is the voice of its citizens. Members of parliament are elected by their citizens and are chosen to represent them. Citizens may vote to elect parliamentarians who share their ideologies and agree on how they want to see their society governed. A parliament is comprised of parliament members who in turn are members of a political party or, if they do not belong to a political party, are called independents. In a parliamentary system a distinction is made between political parties that are part of the government and those that take part in the opposition. When a political party wins the majority of parliamentary seats or forms a majority through a coalition with other like-minded political parties it can form the government. The government is tasked with governing the nation state; it is the executive power. The main undertaking of parliament is the managing of the constitutional propriety of the way the government governs.38 The parliament is tasked with controlling the government; it is an elected assembly that holds the government to account. These two branches of power have been separated so that checks and balances may exist. This is necessary for, as English historian Lord Acton said, ‘power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely’.
The steel in the framework of the parliamentary system is that the parliament
scrutinises the government and holds it accountable for their actions. Accountability is a very elusive concept and can mean different things to different audiences. Relating to nation states, accountability is closely linked to electoral representation and the evaluation of their
performances by organisations or the general public. Political accountability is the
responsibility and answerability of leaders and/or governments to the public either through a parliamentary institution or directly to the people. A parliament has different means to regulate the government. Firstly, a parliament has an obligation to ask questions concerning the actions of the government. This is called the right of inquiry. Secondly, a parliament commonly has the right to approve or reject the government’s budget. This is an important task for if the majority does not agree with the nation states’ financial distribution the
government has to redistribute finances over the different departments. The third main role of parliament is to provide legitimacy. The definition of legitimacy that I will use throughout this thesis is the particular motivation for the acceptance of political rule.39 It is the criterion that determines whether the exercise of coercive power by political individuals or institutions
38 Jenkins K., ‘Parliament, Government and the Civil Service’, Parliamentary Affairs, nr. 4 (2004), p. 800.
39 Bolleyer, N. and Reh, C., ‘EU legitimacy revisited: the normative foundation of a multilevel polity’, Journal of European Pubic Policy, nr. 4 (2012), p. 473.
over citizens is justified.40 After the Second World War, the principle of popular legitimacy
and representative democracy became the prevalent form for running a nation state defeating other structures like authoritarian regimes. Popular legitimacy entails that there is a clear link between state and nation and that the state ought to represent the nation. In other words the people make a nation and the state, the governing body of the nation, should serve the people. In a democratic political society an elected parliament or an elected individual provides legitimacy because there is a clear link between the people and the state.
Providing legitimacy and holding individuals or institutions with political power accountable for their political actions are important tasks a parliament has. Furthermore, a parliament is a major player in an effective and well-functioning public sphere because it provides a platform where citizens can debate their political differences and where people can gather information and form their opinions.
The electorate and the government are directly linked through a parliament. Policy and draft legislations are often openly debated in parliament, providing the citizens information on the happenings of the government and on the views of the different parliament members or political parties. Parliaments need to uphold an open line of communication with the public for three reasons. Firstly, the public needs to stay informed of the work and the role of the parliament as a political institution. By doing so the citizens should have the correct
information necessary to make political decisions come election time. With this information, concerned citizens and other actors can hold debates, share and create opinions and form ideologies. Secondly, through an open line of communication the parliament needs to promote itself as an institution and explain why it should be valued and what the differences are
between the different political parties or fractions.41 Lastly, a parliament needs to listen to the public in order for the citizens to have faith in the political system. Without this bond between citizens and parliament, the electorate loses faith in the state. Additionally, when citizens have a bond with the institutions of power, the electorate can identify with the state. In chapter four, media research will be conducted in order to see whether the European Parliament is a participator in the European public sphere. In other words, does the European Parliament link the EU executive power to the different peoples of Europe? In order to answer this question
40 Bellamy, R., ‘An Ever Closer Union Among Peoples of Europe: Republican
Intergovernmentalism and Demoicratic Representation within the EU’, Journal of European
Integration, nr. 5 (2013), p. 501.
the different parliamentary models need to be examined in more detail because by doing so an explanation might be given why the European Parliament acts in the manner that it does.
A democratic nation state does not necessarily have to implement a parliamentary model to be democratic, but because the EU has the most similarities with the parliament political system this thesis will concentrate on this political system over other democratic political systems. These two main parliamentary models, the Westminster model and the consensus model, will be discussed below.
2.2 Westminster model
The Westminster model will be the first parliamentary system that will be discussed. It
received its name because the British parliamentary version is the original and the best-known example of this model.42 It has been exported to many of the (former) Commonwealth
countries and it is strongly linked to the majoritarian model. There are ten characteristics that define the Westminster model each one will be discussed below. The first characteristic concentrates on the electoral system. This model has what is called a disproportionate election system. This implies that this system tends to produce highly disproportionate elections results.43 Looking at the British system, the members of parliament are elected according to the plurality method. This means that elected parliament members receive a seat if they obtain a plurality of votes in a constituency. This infers that they do not need to receive a majority but they need to get one more vote than their opponents. When looking at the actual results on a national level a political party might receive the majority of constituencies without actually receiving an actual majority. A party can win with a majority with less the 40% of the votes.
The second aspect of the Westminster model focuses on the party system. This model is characterised by a two-party system. This means that two big political parties obtain the bulk of the seats in the parliament. In theory there can be more political parties and there normally are but they do not get as many seats and thus are not as important. The
disproportionate election system greatly influences the party system. Due to the winner-takes-all approach of this particular electoral system voters are encouraged to vote on the biggest political parties. Casting a vote on a smaller political party will probably result in a lost vote because of the small chance it has in winning a seat in parliament.
42 Lijphart, A., Patterns of Democracy, New Haven: Yale University Press 1999, p. 9. 43 Ibid, p. 15.
The third characteristic of this model concentrates on the formation of government. In the Westminster model the executive power is concentrated in one political party. The
political party that wins the plurality of votes gets the majority of seats in the parliament and may form the executive branch. A coalition is rare because the Westminster model is a two-party system. The two principal parties are of approximately equal strength making the opposition relatively large.
The next characteristic focuses on the political relationship between the government and the parliament. In the Westminster model government is dominant over parliament. The political party that has the majority in parliament constructs a government, thus the
government is composed of members from one cohesive party. This infers that the government can count on staying in office and getting its legislative proposals approved without much resistance from parliament. Only an explicit vote of no confidence can cause a government to resign. This is, however, very rare.
The fifth characteristic of the Westminster model focuses on the form of the executive power. This model is known to have a unitary and centralised government. This entails that the central government has a strong presence throughout the nation state. It is the ultimate supreme and administrative power. Local governments may perform marginal governing tasks, only when the central government has delegated these tasks to the sub-national entities.
The sixth aspect of the Westminster model focuses on the organisation of the
legislature. Common for this model is that the parliament has a single parliamentary chamber otherwise known as a unicameral parliament. This makes the legislative process more
efficient because draft legislation only has to be passed by one chamber. The United Kingdom does deviate from this particular characteristic because they have two parliamentary
chambers. The first chamber is called the House of Commons and is tasked with
parliamentary tasks comparable to that of a typical parliament. The second chamber is called the House of Lords; it has almost no legislative power, merely the power to delay legislation.
The possibility for judiciary review and the existence of a written constitution are the respective seventh and eight aspects of the parliamentary system. These two aspects are closely linked for there is no judiciary review possible without a constitution. The
Westminster model knows no written constitution. The institutional laws that describe how the nation state should be governed, which are stated in a constitution, are considered equivalent to normal legislation. These institutional laws can therefore be altered in the regular legislative process. Due to the absence of a written constitution there is no hierarchy in legislation. Therefore there is no need for a judiciary review. The courts cannot test the
constitutionality of regular legislation because of the lack of a constitution-like document.44 In this aspect the United Kingdom, to some extent, differs from the Westminster model because the nation state joined the EU in 1973, which has made judicial review on EU policy areas possible.
The ninth aspect of the Westminster model concentrated on the existence and form of interest groups. This model is divined by what is called interest group pluralism. It sets a political arena in which interest groups just like the government and opposition, is very competitive. It is pluralist because a variety of interest groups can exert pressure on the government in an uncoordinated and competitive manner, but these groups have little power to influence government.
The tenth and final characteristic of the Westminster model focuses on the amount of control the central government may exercise on the central bank. A central bank is tasked with managing the state’s currency, interest rates and money supply. In this model the central bank is controlled by the executive power. The central bank is strongly influenced by the government and often may not act independently.
Having discussed the Westminster model in detail it is important to take note that this is the purest form of the parliamentary model. Not one nation state that employs this model fits the description completely, not even the United Kingdom, the birthplace of this particular model. In the following few paragraphs a description will be given of the consensus model.
2.3 Consensus model
The second parliamentary system that scholars of democracy have distinguished is called the consensus model. In contrast to the Westminster model, where the power is clearly
centralised, the consensus model tries to share, disperse and restrain the centralisation of power in numerous ways. The consensus model can be described by ten characteristics that will be discussed below.
The first characteristic of the consensus model focuses on the electoral system. This model has a proportional representation system. This means that parliamentary seats have been divided among the political parties in proportion to the number of votes they have received. Commonly a political party in the consensus model will have to exceed an arbitrary minimum of votes, the threshold, in order for it to be allowed to take part in parliamentary activities. Once a political party has done so, the votes are allocated proportionally amongst
the different representatives or political parties. This implies that if a political party receives 20% of the votes that that particular political party will roughly receive 20% of the seats in parliament.
The second aspect of the consensus model focuses on the party system. This model is known to have a multiparty system. This means that there are numerous political parties active in parliament. The size of these political parties may vary for the only administrative requirement political parties need to adhere to, in order to receive a parliamentary seat, is the threshold. Consequently there is not one political party that has a majority in parliament.
The third characteristic of this model concentrates on the formation of government. In the consensus model the executive power is formed by the formation of a coalition because one political party does not have a majority in the parliament. In other words political parties share executive power. The government is comprised of a coalition between the biggest political parties or the political parties that have found common ground on major political issues and combined have a majority. This is considered to have a stabilising effect particularly in pluralistic societies where the population can be sharply divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic or racial lines.45
The fourth characteristic focuses on the political relationship between the government and the parliament. In this model the powers between the executive and legislative branches can be considered more balanced in comparison with the Westminster model. Due to the nature of proportional representation one political party rarely receives a majority. The result of this is that there are many different political parties active in parliament. This implies that in order to form the majority government, different political parties have to rely on one another and work together. Therefore in order to create legislation it is considered
advantageous to create political support over an as broad as possible political spectrum, thus increasing the chances the draft legislation will become law. In addition to this the executive power needs the confidence of the majority in parliament in order to stay in power. The executive power is therefore continuously performing a balancing act between, creating legislation and operating in line with their own political party’s ideology and appeasing the majority in parliament. In the consensus model the executive power is more dependent on the parliament than in the Westminster model.
The fifth characteristic of the consensus model focuses on the form of the executive power. This model is known for its federalist and decentralised form of government. Power is
spread out over different levels of government, namely central, provincial and or regional governments. This has been developed in order to provide minorities living almost homogenously in one region a reasonable level of autonomy. The electoral system of the Westminster model assures the representation of localities through the delegates or representatives, allowing for more centralisation without contributing to a decrease of regional sense of representation. The consensus model assures no such regional representation; therefore it needs to attain this local representation by other means.
The sixth aspect of this model focuses on the organisation of the legislature. Common for this model is that the parliament has two parliamentary chambers otherwise known as a bicameral parliament. The reasoning behind this is that the second chamber gives special representation to minorities or the different autonomous regions. For this parliamentary structure to be effective however the second chamber needs to be elected on a different basis. Both parliament chambers should have the same legislative power in order to ensure the political relevance of the second chamber.
Just like with the Westminster model the seventh and eighth characteristics will be discussed together because of their close ties to one another. The consensus model is known to have a written constitution. In other words the consensus model is known for its
constitutional rigidity. Nation states that have embodied this model, in one form or another, have a written constitution stipulating basic rules of governance. Only a special majority can change a constitutional law. What a special majority may entail differs per nation state, some require there to be a two-thirds majority in parliament and others require a nationwide
referendum. Having a constitution makes the eighth characteristic, judiciary review, possible. There is a Supreme Court that can overturn legislation that is found to be in conflict with the constitution. The Supreme Court is also tasked with interpreting the constitutional provisions concerning the separation of power between the different levels of government and thus ensuring that the different levels can coexist harmoniously.
The ninth aspect of the consensus model concentrates on the existence and form of interest groups. The interest groups in this model are of a corporatist nature. This implies that socio-political organisations such as labour, agricultural, ethnic, business, military orientated interest groups are consulted before or during the legislation process. Since the 1990s many European countries have a declining extent and effectiveness of neocorporatism, which implies the involvement of different focused interest groups in establishing economic policy. However, through peak associations an interest group can still influence or put a tremendous amount of pressure on the government.
The tenth and final characteristic of this model focuses on the amount of control the central government may exercise on the central bank. The central bank in the consensus model may largely operate independently from the executive power. In other words the executive power exerts almost no power over the actions of the central bank.
Autonomous central banks are considered to be better at managing inflation and maintaining price stability.46
The ten characteristics of the consensus model stand in sharp contrast of the ten characteristics in the Westminster model. Just like the Westminster model however, all the different characteristics mentioned above cannot be found in one country, however
Switzerland comes very close to a perfect embodiment of this model. In the next section of this chapter the European Parliament will be placed in one of the discussed models.
2.4 Parliamentary system of the European Parliament
The EU currently has 28 member states with each arguably its own variation of a parliamentary system. In the followings paragraphs a description will be given of which parliamentary system the European Parliament has. Does it follow the lines of the
Westminster model or the consensus model? We have to keep in mind that the EU is a sui generis entity. In its uniqueness and peculiarity it is unlikely to fit any model, as it does not perfectly adhere to other great models over governance, for example, the trias politica. Nevertheless, similarities with either the Westminster of consensus model are bound to outweigh the other and thus tell us something of its nature. In the following paragraphs we shall systematically compare the characteristics of each model with those of the European Parliament in it current form.
In the following paragraphs the ten different characteristics will be discussed in relation to the EU, when possible focusing in particular on the European Parliament. With the first characteristic, the electoral system, the European Parliament has more in common with the consensus model. Since 1979 the elections of the European Parliament has been held with five-year intervals with all the EU member states, except of the United Kingdom,
immediately incorporating the system of proportional representation. Members of the
European Parliament (hereafter: MEPs) are chosen on the basis of proportional representation but the seats are allocated on a basis called digressive proportionality. This means that the EU member states with a larger population are assigned more seats in comparison to the smaller
EU member states. Unfortunately, there is still a degree of disproportionality as a result of the overrepresentation of the smaller populated member states compared to the
underrepresentation of the larger inhabited member states. Nonetheless, the EU has more in common in this aspect with the consensus model.
The second characteristic concentrates on the party system. The European Parliament, just like with the consensus model has a multiparty system. Currently there are eight different political factions and 751 MEPs. The political factions are made up of directly elected
officials from a national political party list of the different EU member states. Once in the European Parliament, MEPs are grouped not by nationality but by political affiliation. In order to pass legislation coalitions must be formed because not one political faction has a majority. These coalitions are based on policy subject matter meaning that a coalition may differ per policy area.
The third characteristic is the method used to form the executive power. In the
Westminster model normally a single party, with the majority, forms the executive power. In the consensus model it is very uncommon for one political party to have a majority, therefore the executive power is formed through the formation coalitions. The EU bears no resemblance to either two parliamentary models. Consent is needed from the European Parliament before the European Commission can be instated. However, the European Parliament is not as visible and important during the formation of the European Commission, as a parliament would be in either the consensus or the Westminster model.
As it happens, the European Parliament and the European Commission have a somewhat balanced relation. This coincides with the fourth aspect, namely the relationship between the executive and legislative branch. The European Parliament must approve the European Commission when it is instated. The European Parliament also has the right to dismiss the entire European Commission with a two-thirds majority if they have lost
confidence in the executive branch. This is a drastic political measure and has rarely occurred in the history of the EU. The European Commission has the sole right of initiative and control over the EU budgetary. The European Parliament, in collaboration with the Council of
Minsters, has strong budgetary powers. Together these two institutions also have to the right to amend or not pass draft legislation. Unfortunately, the European Parliament cannot exert the same amount of pressure on the executive branch as national parliament can, due to fact that the European Commissioners are not linked to the different political factions active in the European Parliament. Due to the lack of grip and pressure the European Parliament has over the executive branch, the EU has more in common with the Westminster model.
The next aspect that is to be discussed is the form of government. Does the EU lean on the one hand more towards a unitary and centralised government or on the other hand more towards a federal and decentralised government? If one would compare the EU to other international organisations, the supranational EU is highly unified and centralised but compare it to a nation state the EU is more a confederation than a federation as well as extremely de-central.47 A confederation is a union of states and a federation is a union of individuals in body politic, suggesting the unity of one people of nation states.48 Thus when it comes to placing the EU into a unitary and centralised form of government or into a federal and decentralised form of government one must consider the perspective with which one is viewing the EU. As an international organisation it has a very centralised structure but compared to a nation state it is considered to have a decentralised form. In this thesis the EU is compared to a nation state thus placing it in the consensus model.
The sixth characteristic concentrates on the organisation of the legislator. This Does the EU have a bicameral or a unicameral system? There are three institutions that have legislative powers. The European Commission has the right to initiate legislation. The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers share legislative powers. The European Parliament started out subordinate to the Council of Ministers but with the signing of Treaty of Lisbon the two institutions have been put on equal footing on most of the policy matters of the EU. Thus, the EU has two parliamentary chambers, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. One last criterion of the bicameral structure is that the two
parliamentary institutions need to be comprised differently. As the Council of Ministers is made up of representatives from the governments of the different EU member states and the European Parliament is made up of directly elected representatives this criterion is meet. Therefore, focusing on this characteristic the EU has more in common with the consensus model.
The seventh and eighth characteristics concentrate on the existence of a written constitution and the possibility of judiciary review. In 2005 the Dutch and French population, via a referendum, rejected the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Thus on paper the EU has no written constitution, however, in practice one can argue that it has. The existing Treaty of Lisbon is an international document that can only be changed with the consent of all the member states. It might not be called a constitution but the Treaty of Lisbon can be
47 Lijphart, A., Patterns of Democracy, New Haven: Yale University Press 1999, p. 45. 48 Perez, F., Political Communication in Europe: The Cultural and Structural Limits of the
