National Unity Government & a history of division in Afghanistan

National Unity Government

& a history of division in Afghanistan

S. D. Ekelschot MSc. Public Administration

Leiden University S1368478

Supervisor MSc. Vasilis Karakasis March 2018

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First of all I would like to thank my supervisors Vasilis Karakasis and Joris Voorhoeve for all their patience and assistance throughout this research process: rereading quite some pieces of text, advising and steering me whenever I needed it. In this regard, I would also like to thank Geor Hintzen with whom I have spent many hours talking about Afghanistan and shared a great fascination for its culture and history. It has taken some time and it has been quite an explorative adventure. But luckily, not all those who wander are lost, and with some guidance I found the direction to the finish of this thesis.

I would like to thank my family for always having faith in me and for never getting tired of the word “thesis” but always showing interest and asking me how I was progressing instead. I would like to thank my friends, Sara, Marianush, Mélissa, Dan, Serena, Rosanne, and Jasmijn for all their encouraging talks and help, and Jeroen for bringing me coffee and bananas at the library. I also apologize for all those times that I had to tell you “I have to write thesis” but we will make up for that now. Furthermore, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my colleagues and friends at BPRA, Marcel, Amela and Pepijn, for their flexibility and giving me all the time to finish my thesis.

Finally, I would like to thank the Coffeestar at the library where I spent many hours writing two theses: Robbe en Tijmen, thank you for the special effort you put in making shapes in my cappuccinos, small chat, and company. It made studying more fun! And last but not least, I would like to thank the security of the Leiden University Wijnhaven, and Bayram in

particular, for the jokes and happy talks, and for letting me out when I was once again the last remaining person in the building. Much appreciated!

Executive Summary

This study aims to provide a comprehensive insight into the historical and social constellation of Afghan society and the process in which this has an influence on the state functioning of the National Unity Government. Afghanistan is located within a field of powerful states, at the centre of Central Asia, where the travellers of the Silk Route and the great many empires of the Turks, Mongols, Persia, China, the Maghred and the eastern Mediterranean, such as that of Alexander the Great, have left a patchwork of different tribes. This is what makes Afghanistan distinct from other states, such as those in Europe, where ethnicity is often determining the boundaries of their territory. Due to its history and being “a graveyard of empires”, Afghan society has always been divided. The tribes may fight and revolt against each other but there has never been an incentive to disintegrate into different nations based on ethnicity because of the continuous threat of occupation by the outside nations. My research, however, has investigated the unity and the performance of the new installed government since 2014. It furthermore describes the development of political order by the narrative of several important events and conditions throughout Afghan history. The study also provides a cumulative overview of the different segments in Afghan society through some anthropological research and has analysed whether the divisions within Afghan society has created political cleavages that may influence the functioning of its government. The causal exploration of the current failure and paralysis of the National Unity Government through an analysis of both present and historical Afghan society and politics, has presented a very complex constellation of factors, in which none of them, by themselves, could have produced the outcome of the weak Afghan state. Instead, the identified political cleavages shaped by different conditions have developed over time. Current state failure is therefore a product of many facets such as the ethnic opposition between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns, the cleavages between modernists and traditionalists, the position of warlords in the societal and governmental system, continuous dependency on foreign aid, the inability to develop a sustainable and functioning economy, fear and distrust for the government by the average Afghan people, the lack of constrains on corrupt governmental figures, the lack of proper rule of law, the inability of the state to reach into the outer areas of the country, the resilience of custom and tradition, but maybe most of all, the deteriorating security situation, due to the insurgent attacks by the Taliban and the many years of war that has changed Afghanistan tremendously and in such fashion that it has altered its whole culture and society.

Contents 1 Introduction ... 1 2 Research Design ... 4 2.1 Political cleavages ... 4 2.2 State functioning ... 7 2.3 Research questions ... 9 2.4 Causal process tracing method ... 9 2.5 Justification of the sources cited ... 14 3 The historical and cultural narrative ... 15 3.1 Part 1: historical narrative ... 15 3.1.1 Geographical location: where the story begins ... 15 3.1.2 The origin of traditional political order ... 19 3.1.3 The end of traditional political order ... 25 3.1.4 A new era: restoring political order ... 30 3.2 Part 2: anthropological analysis ... 37 3.2.1 Religious identity ... 37 3.2.2 Ethnicity ... 38 3.2.3 Qawms ... 42 3.2.4 Warlords ... 42 3.3 Conclusion ... 44 4 The functioning of the National Unity Government ... 46 4.1 The NUG as a solution to power struggle? ... 46 4.2 Appointment by parity and merit ... 48 4.3 Performance of the government institutions ... 50 4.3.1 The National Assembly ... 51 4.3.2 The judiciary ... 54 4.3.3 The security sector ... 55 4.3.4 The Taliban: a shadow government ... 56 4.3.5 Sub-national governance ... 58 4.4 Conclusion: a weak state ... 62 5 Analysis ... 64 5.1 Relevant political cleavages ... 64 5.1.1 Cleavage: Pashtuns vs. Non-Pashtuns (traditional) ... 64 5.1.2 Cleavage: Warlords vs. State ... 65 5.1.3 Cleavage: Taliban vs. State ... 67

5.1.4 Cleavage: Modernists vs. Tradition ... 69

5.2 CPT configuration ... 71

6 Conclusions ... 76

7 References ... 79

“A massive truck bomb blast has ripped through the heart of Kabul’s diplomatic district, killing at least 80 people and wounding hundreds in a powerful explosion described by officials as “one of the biggest” to have hit the capital of Afghanistan”(Al Jazeera, 2017, May 31).

1 Introduction

The United Nations strategic review of 2017 classified Afghanistan as one in active conflict and stated that in the first nine months of this year, 12.903 conflict incidents have been reported, which is five times more than the amount of incidents in 2008 (OCHA, 2017, October 31). Moreover, more than 69,000 trauma cases have been reported, which signifies a 21 per cent increase in comparison to those in 2016 (ibid.). Currently, Afghans make up the second largest refugee group in Europe and are the largest refugee population of concern to the UNHCR in Asia (Petersmann, 2017, Aug. 4; UNHCR, 2017, Nov. 14). In the first eight months of 2017, more than 200,000 people were forced to flee their homes (ibid.). Sixteen years since the Taliban has been defeated and removed from power in Afghanistan, the state is still weak and failing. The governmental system is nearly paralysed and general John Nicholson even warned that its fracture and “the leadership situation” threaten the country’s stability (Nicholson, 2016, Dec. 2). Last year, in 2016, director of National Intelligence James Clapper indeed confirmed that the country was “at serious risk of political breakdown” (Katzman, 2017, p. 10).

The new National Unity Government, installed in 2014, seems to be divided between two camps, the Pashtuns and the Non-Pashtuns represented by the Pashtun president, Ashraf Ghani, and its Tajik Chief Executive Officer, Abdullah Abdullah. The two are unable to agree on any crucial matters, such as the appointment of new officials, which prevents the government from well functioning. It has, for instance, caused a delay in parliamentary elections and which is why the Parliament is performing outside its constitutional mandate for over two years already. Moreover, the internal conflicts of the security apparatus undermine the ability to provide and uphold security. As the Taliban is growing stronger, the prospects for Afghanistan are not good, as the state is at the edge of complete breakdown.

In this thesis, I examine the relationship between political cleavages and the current functioning of the Afghan state. Thereby, I explore how this relationship has evolved and how the current state reflects political division within Afghan society. Therefore, the major

research questions included: how do political cleavages influence the functioning of the contemporary Afghan state? The main contribution of my study is to provide an insightful analysis of the underlying mechanisms of political cleavages that appear to divide the current governmental system and prevent it from well functioning. The great asset of approaching state performance by the use of the term “political cleavages” is that it connects individual political and sociological behaviour with that of macro-historical processes (Bornschier, 2009). It describes socially constructed divisions that have a potential of conflict and could lead to social and political structural transformations. Change is inherent to politics, which makes political structures dynamic and respond to internal and external forces (Lane & Ersson, 1987).Therefore, my thesis aims to present those who are interested in state-building the contribution of anthropological and historical analysis. Sociological phenomenon may differ from country to country. Hence previous state-building experiences in one country may not provide an accurate framework for state-building projects in another. My thesis was therefore devoted to a qualitative research, exploring the historical and anthropological aspects of the political cleavages that affect state functioning today.

Methodology

My thesis presents a qualitative research based within-case analysis of Afghanistan. It includes not only a study of its public administration but combines this with a historical and anthropological approach. The aim of this thesis is not only to summarize existing case studies of the anthropological and historical aspects of Afghan society but also to reveal how these features have shaped the Afghans state system today. My research has drawn upon academic works, books, reports and (news) articles, media channels such as Twitter and Youtube, and documentaries. I was limited to the use of English because I do not speak any of the Afghan official languages.

Outline of the thesis

Besides this introduction, my thesis contains seven other chapters. In the second chapter I elaborate on the research’s questions, its theoretical framework, and the used method of analysis. In the third chapter, I have explored Afghans geographical location among other powerful states, its history and heterogeneous society to determine whether there are divisions in society that have the potential of influencing state performance. The fourth chapter analyses the state functioning of the National Unity Government, reveals that its institutions function rather ineffective and therefore concludes that Afghanistan is a weak and fragile

state. Then in chapter five, based on this outcome in chapter four, the political cleavages that influence state functioning are identified and explained in the first section. The second section of the chapter presents a causal process tracing graphic that summarizes and elaborates on how these political cleavages have influenced current state performance. The sixth chapter finally presents the conclusions to my research and recommendations for further research.

2 Research Design

As described in the introduction, the Afghan state is clearly not functioning well and there is still much violence and conflict. My aim was therefore to analyse what conditions are causing bad state performance and the process that has eventually led to this status quo. Through my inductive research, I stumbled upon the theory of political cleavages. These are divisions in society with a potential of conflict. I decided to examine the relationship between political cleaves and state functioning in the context of a single case study: Afghanistan. My main focus was to identify the political cleavages in Afghan society and to explore how these cleavages interact with the state functioning of the Afghan government. The main question of my research was therefore the following: how do political cleavages influence the functioning of the contemporary Afghan state?

This chapter aims to provide the reader an explanation of: what cleavages are, why they actually exist, how they relate to politics, and what state functioning actually means. Subsequently, the (sub-) questions of the research that are drawn from this theory are set out and elaborated on. Finally, the chapter concludes with a description of the used research method: the causal process tracing method.

2.1 Political cleavages

The Cambridge Dictionary describes cleavage as “a division or disagreement” (2017). According to Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, a cleavage, in political and sociological theory, is “a division on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups or organizations among conflict may arise” (Lane & Ersson, 1987, p. 39). Thus, although cleavages may be linked to conflict, the two concepts are not identical; there may be conflict without the presence of a cleavage and visa versa. They argue that cleavages may be found in society, in party systems and in governments and can occur at different levels, and thus, with a probability of conflict (ibid.).

Within society, these cleavages develop because the “need, wishes and demands” for resources, either material or non-material resources, may differ among individuals or parties. However, these resources are scarce and may or may not be able to fulfil all requirements” (Lane & Ersson, 1987, p. 39). This is why there is a need for political systems. Stein Rokkan, for example, explains that statebuilding manages the patterns of cleavages and the factors that

create dissension between people. This is also what defines them: “political systems are to be interpreted according to how they relate to structures of social cleavages” (Lane & Ersson, 1987; Rokkan, 1970; Kriesi, 1998). In accordance, Garrett Hardin described in 1968 that social arrangements prevent the exploitation of resources by restraining access to that what is called “the commons” (Hardin, 1968). This also explains why there is conflict at the basis of social life; “the fight between individuals or organizations for opportunities, which are scarce due to limitations set by the environment”, and the “allocation of resources of every nature involves the resolution of conflict about priorities” (Lane & Ersson, 1987, p. 39). This leads to great dilemmas concerning questions of equity, equality and justice. It also motivates individuals to move against each other, which makes the concept of politics very important (ibid.).

The Cambridge Dictionary defines politics as “the activities of the government, members of law making organizations, or people who try to influence the way a country is governed” (2017). Politics is determined by cleavages; the parties involved have different and conflicting interest in the allocation of the resources. Political systems are therefore vital in dealing with these kinds of dissent and provide “mechanisms of resolution by means of decision-making structures” (ibid.). The political institutions aim to deliver the social arrangements through which the incompatibility of goals and demands of individuals and organizations are regulated to avoid anarchy (ibid.). Moreover, studying political cleavages is especially meaningful in the context of democracies. This is because democractic politics implies that, at some point, a decision needs to be made about something that involves different alternatives. Structures of different political cleavages provide these alternatives. If people would not gather in opposed groupings, democratic politics would not operate. It would signify that politics is of no importance to the community and is dictated by a ruling elite (Almond & Verba, 1965 in ibid.). Additionally, the significance and intensity of a cleavage grows in case it provides the members of the group “a distinctive and persistent outlook or cultural orientation that is different from that of other sectors; a raison d’être for maintaining organized segmentation” (Kenneth McRae, 1974 in ibid. p. 43).

Hanspeter Kriesi has specified his research to the role of social divisions and political cleavages in Western Europe and their translation into politics. According to Kriesi, political segments can influence the political context, but the political context can also influence the preferences and values of these cleavages (Kriesi, 1998, p. 168). He argues that collective

political actors selectively reinforce some preferences and ignore others when social divisions are translated into politics (ibid. p. 177). The different political segments carry different value orientations and therefore lead to different political choices.

His study also makes apparent that, in the process of preference formation, historical structures play an important role. He claims that political preferences are “shaped by the legacy of past political struggles, which is sedimented in the multiple layers of traditional cleavages and in the configuration of political actors associated with them” (ibid.). In addition he argues that, whether new political preferences and cleavages are formed, depends on the strength of traditional cleavages: “the more salient and the less pacified traditional cleavages are, the less new cleavages will come to the fore in politics” (ibid.).

Cleavage typologies

There are many typologies of cleavage; there is no consensus among scholars and no clear leading criteria to divide the cleavages. For instance, Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor describe three types of cleavages: a trait cleavages which indicate race or caste; an attitudinal or ‘opinion’ cleavages: ideology or preference; and behavioural cleavages: those elicited through voting and organizational membership (Lane & Ersson, 2017). They describe “cleavage” as “merely a division of a community – into religious groups, opinion groups, or voting groups, for example” (ibid. p. 41). Moreover, the typology of cleavages described by Hans Daalder is also used often. He differentiates cleavages among class or sectional interest, religion, geographical conflict, nationality or nationalism, and “regime” in which one could think of status quo parties versus reform parties (ibid. p. 42). The division of cleavages made by Scott Flanagan is perhaps in comparison relatively simple; he divides the typologies of cleavages into: 1) segmental cleavages, which could be based on either race, language or religious differences, 2) cultural cleavages, for example, young versus old, traditional versus modern, and authoritarian versus libertarian, and 3) economic-function cleavages, such as class, status or role differences (ibid.). In contrast to Flanagan, Harry Echstein argues that segmental cleavages, like all political divisions, concern “lines of objective social differentiation” (ibid.). This means that countless different types of cleavages can be segmental cleavages. One could think of tribes, race, sex, old versus young, religion, and so on (ibid.).

Given the described theory, I concluded that there is not one valid justification or criterion or typology that prescribes what a cleavage should comprise. Therefore, my research relied foremost on the Lane and Ersson’s approach of political cleavage. The ambiguity of their criterion description of segmentation provided me the flexibility to recognize any relevant social segmentation that may influence state functioning in Afghanistan. In this sense, I was able to identify and combine all the necessary factors that lead me to a comprehensive conclusion to my research question. Yet, Lane and Ersson also argue that the identification of a cleavage needs to be done properly. According to them, a “proper choice of cleavage” entails an explanation “on the basis of theoretical arguments about interrelationships between cleavages” (ibid. p. 46). This is why my research also relied on a comprehensive narrative to infer how cleavages become relevant and influence current state functioning in Afghanistan. I have conceptualized political cleavages as the following: a division based on some criteria of individuals, groups or organizations found in society, in party systems and in governments and can occur at different levels, with a probability of conflict, and that may influence the way a country is governed.

2.2 State functioning

As political systems are designed to manage the allocation of resources and deal with the different cleavages in the political landscape, it seems evident that these cleavages have the capability to influence this system and thereby its functioning. To analyse this assumption and the functioning of the current state system in Afghanistan, I have first examined what the term state functioning actually means. The concept is composed of two constructs: state and functioning. The construct, state, is either defined as “a country or its government” (Cambridge Dictionary, 2017). According to Koch, there is not something like “the state” (Koch in Wagemaker, 2012, p. 26). He rather describes a condition of “stateness” that develops over time (ibid.). Francis Fukuyama further elaborates that these dimensions of “stateness” are rather “the functions, the capabilities and legitimacy of governments” (Fukuyama, 2004, p. xx). The latter construct, functioning, relates to “the way in which something works or operates” (Cambridge Dictionary, 2017). It can also be a synonym for the word “performance”, which refers to action that can either be done well or bad (ibid.). In this regard, functioning is the opposite of dysfunction, which indicates a problem or “not working” (ibid.). In my research, I therefore refer to state functioning as the well or bad performance of the governmental functions, capabilities and legitimacy.

State functions

The functions of a state are highly critical. First of all, by defining its territory and building institutions, the state is able to extract the needed resources from its citizens, such as taxes and soldiers for its national army, in order to survive. On the other hand, the state offers its citizens protection from outside invaders (Torpey, 1997, p. 5). Therefore, the function of the state is some sort of a contract between the state and its citizens. According to Fukuyama, there is a broad range of functions of the modern state that may vary from “protecting property rights” to “provide safety” (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 1). Additionally, the World Bank Poverty Group argues, that in most countries today, governments “aim not merely to protect their citizens, but also to ensure that even the poorest among them have access to basic services” (World Bank, 1999, p. 65). In order to do so, governments establish a broad scope of state institutions to provide in services such as education, old age pensions, safe drinking water or basic health care (ibid.). However, in case government institutions fail to deliver the services they were designed to provide, the state could grow weak. This has serious consequences for the state’s survival.

Weak States

As written in the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World report of the Brookings Institution in 2008, failed and critically weak states are “countries that lack the essential capacity and/or will to fulfil four sets of critical government responsibilities: fostering an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; securing their populations from violent conflict and controlling their territory; and meeting the basic human needs of their population” (Rise & Patrick, 2008, p. 14). As a consequence, the Brookings Institution describes that fragile states can “fall prey to and spawn a host of transnational security threats, such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, organized crime, infectious disease, environmental degradation, and civil conflicts that spill over borders” (ibid.). This is because, as Edward Newman argues, “state failure implies that central state authority and control do not de facto exist” and this government inability leads to porous borders of state territory (Newman, 2009, p. 422).

2.3 Research questions

As earlier described in this chapter, I built the main research question of this thesis on the theory of political cleavages: how do political cleavages influence the functioning of the contemporary Afghan state? Concluding on the theory as described above, this question can now be translated into an analysis of how the divisions found in Afghan society, that have a probability of conflict and that may influence the way a country is governed, have an impact on the performance of the governmental functions, capabilities and legitimacy in Afghanistan. However, to be able to answer the main question of my thesis, I have laid out the following sub-questions:

• How well or bad is the current performance of the governmental functions, capabilities and legitimacy of the Afghan state?

• What are the relevant political cleavages?

• Are there historical and traditional political cleavages that are still relevant?

• How does the performance of the current Afghan government mirror the political cleavages?

• Does the current political system offer a solution to conflict between political cleavages?

2.4 Causal process tracing method

In order to address this set of questions, I resort to causal process tracing. According to Joachim Blatter and Markus Haverland, the causal process tracing method (CPT) relies on configurational thinking and a technique of drawing inferences based on the thought: 1) that “a plurality of causal factors work together to create an outcome” and 2) that this “causality plays out in time and space” (2012, p. 81). In their book Designing Case Studies, Blatter and Haverland describe that, in contrast to co-variational analysis that seeks to explain a variable’s effect of a specific cause, the CPT approach rather pursues to explain the complex composition of causes of a specific outcome (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 80). Process tracing is not a standardized method to draw inferences but rather emphasizes the importance of “temporal order, spatiotemporal density and analytic depth” (ibid. p. 81). Thus, instead of using variables and statistic methods, the CPT approach uses terms like “conditions” and aims to identify the causal conjunctions that rely on configurational thinking. Using the CPT technique, the “necessary and sufficient conditions that lead to a specific outcome” are analysed in a context of time and space (ibid. p. 80). Therefore, the CPT approach focuses on

the process of “how” a certain outcome is achieved within a certain context, rather than to conclude that “A leads to B”, as is the case with the co-variational approach.

Comprehensive storyline

Drawing on process tracing, I need to put forward a ‘comprehensive storyline’, through which I am able to determine the pathway and temporal order of events that leads from cause to effect and specifies the underlying action-formation mechanisms that link conditions (ibid.). “A comprehensive storyline is the development of potentially relevant causal conditions a presented in a narrative style. […] A major goal of these comprehensive storylines is to differentiate the major structural sequences of the overall process and identify the critical moments that further shape the process” (ibid. p. 111). They thus present the bigger picture and “identify the most important steps that have led to the outcome” (ibid.). The overall process, that is presented by the narrative, is then “sectioned into different sequences that are separated by decisive situations of time that have the characteristics of ‘critical (con) junctions’ – their outcome strongly affects the further path of a causal process” (ibid. p. 111-2). In sum, CPT links causal conditions by a comprehensive story into a causal mechanism that describes the “when and how” of interrelationships that have lead to the outcome of interest (ibid. p. 80).

By taking the CPT approach, my research has aimed to “properly” identify the relevant political cleavages and the interrelationships between them, based on a theoretical justification derived from the comprehensive narrative, as Lane and Ersson earlier in this chapter suggest. In addition, as Hanspeter Kriesi argues that political cleavages and preferences are shaped by past political struggles and the multiple layers of traditional cleavages and the political actors involved, the CPT approach also enabled me to look at the historical evaluation of cleavages to see how traditional cleavage structures that are still salient in Afghanistan. This is why my analysis of political cleavages takes an exploratory diachronic and historical approach. Furthermore, because the CPT method places great emphasis on context, social scientists have the liberty to gather empirical evidence from all relevant academic and non-academic literature from various disciplines, which “provides the researcher with a broad spectrum of potentially important factors of influence” for the configurational analysis (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 106). In order to establish a good understanding of Afghan societal constellation and to identify the relevant typologies of

cleavages and divisions, my research has also taken the cultural context into consideration and incorporates a somewhat anthropological approach.

Initial conditions and contingency

To draw inferences with the CPT method, there are three vital assumptions at the basis: 1) “almost all social outcomes are the results of a combination of causal factors; 2) there are divergent pathways to similar social outcomes; and 3) the effects of the same causal factor can be different in different contexts and combinations” (ibid. p. 80). Therefore, CPT also builds on the idea of ‘contingency’ and ‘initial conditions’. James Mahoney and Daniel Schensul describe initial conditions as “the historically specific configuration of variables at the “beginning” - or perhaps even before the beginning – of a sequence of events” (2006, p. 459). Furthermore, contingency is described as “a way of speaking about the unpredictable nature of final outcomes, given some set of initial conditions” (ibid. p. 461). It is, for example, during critical junctures, a relative short period of time, when the range of possibilities is substantial, that the actions and choices made are momentous for the final outcome. “This is when contingency becomes paramount” (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007, p. 343). In this sense, initial conditions by themselves are unable to predict or explain final outcomes (Mahoney & Schensul, 2006, p. 459). According to Blatter and Haverland, this is why the CPT method is applied to reveal (inter) dependencies and configurations of all the different conditions that were necessary to establish the outcome of interest (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p.91). The principle of contingency thus also implies that the inferences drawn from causal process tracing analysis highly depends on context and explains why every case study is different. The causal configurations observed in one case study may therefore not apply to another.

Contextual, necessary and sufficient conditions

Other than initial conditions, a distinction is made between contextual, necessary and sufficient conditions that are part of the CPT causal configuration. Figure 1 provides a visual explanation of how these conditions interact in such causal mechanism. According to Blatter and Haverland, “a causal factor (X) is a necessary condition if the outcome (Y) occurs only if X exists. Nevertheless, Y does not always have to occur if X exists. In other words, Y is not possible without X, but X does not always lead to Y” (ibid. p. 92). Thus this implies contingency and that these necessary conditions (NC) depend on the context; a situational mechanism with contextual conditions (CC) to produce the next step in the sequence that will

eventually lead to the final outcome. For example, in political processes, the effects of contextual conditions “lend themselves to systematic description and explanation, hence their proper understanding facilitates discovery of true regularities” (Tilly & Gooding, 2006, p. 6). Context is like “a piece of the puzzle”: an important piece of explanatory information to understand why developments take form in the way they do (ibid. p. 20-2). This is why aspects like philosophy, psychology, ideas, culture, history, place, population, technology, and general reflections could matter in causal process analysis. It could explain, for example, why certain decisions are made, why certain ideas of justice, democracy or social order may be relevant, how cultural differences may determine different political values, how chains of events in history have led to a certain outcome, and so on (ibid. p. 27-8).

Figure 1: Causal conjunctions and chains of contextual, necessary and sufficient conditions

The CPT method also identifies sufficient conditions (SC). These conditions differ from the necessary conditions as they do not rely on other factors but can independently produce the next step in the causal sequence. This makes the causal strength of a sufficient condition higher than that of a necessary condition. Blatter and Haverland explain, “a causal factor (X) is a sufficient condition if the outcome (Y) always occurs when X exists. Nevertheless, Y can also occur when X does not exist. In other words, X always leads to Y, but Y is also possible without X” (ibid. p. 92).

Causal configurations

Taken together, the comprehensive storyline, the initial conditions, the contextual, necessary and sufficient conditions, constitute the ingredients to the configuration of the causal process mechanism(s) used here. The interactions of the conditions within this configuration will eventually lead to the final outcome, which is the current status quo in Afghanistan. The comprehensive storyline explains how and when this happens. Thus, depending on the

comprehensive narrative, the overall causal process mechanism of the outcome could encompass different sub- mechanisms of interactions, such as causal chains and conjunctions, which are “glued” together by the explanation of the story. To indicatively illustrate this, I provide a short example. In chapter 3, I elaborate about the cleavage between the Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtuns. The Pashtuns form the elite minority in Afghanistan. However, internally, this ethnic group is much divided. In figure 2, I have visualized the causal conjunction, in which several factors, glued together by a comprehensive story, have eventually produced the fact that the Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtuns oppose each other.

Figure 2: example of a causal configuration

The storyline goes, for example, like this: the division between the ruling Pashtun elite and the non-Pashtun tribes (8) is derived from the evolution of the traditional political structures. Afghanistan is a landlocked buffer state among powerful states (1). This has resulted in a history of different invading empires (3) that have left a patchwork of different ethnic communities (4). As the history describes, the physical features of the Afghan lands have led to unequal division of resources due to differences in available arable land among the regions and the quality of infrastructure (2). This partly explains why there is rivalry among different tribes and qawms (6) and why certain ethnic groups have culturally developed differently than others. The rivalry between the Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtuns (7) is especially important for the foremost reason that the Pashtuns were the ruling ethnic group for the last few centuries. Their internal divergence has had an impact on the state-building process of Afghanistan. The Abdalis have defeated the Ghilzais in Kandahar by placing the first king of Afghanistan on

the throne and the Ghilzais have fought the Durranis during the rule of the Taliban, who were mostly Ghilzai Pashtuns.

2.5 Justification of the sources cited

As I was unable to local research in Afghanistan myself and as I do not speak any of the Afghan languages, I was bound by the available secondary sources written in Dutch and English. My research has drawn upon academic works such as those from the highly recognized World Bank and United Nations; the Congressional Research Service that provides policy and legal analysis to the United States Congress; the publications of the International Crisis Group, which is one of the few research organizations stationed in Afghanistan; the works of Jennifer Murtazashvili, who is an Associate Professor at the University of Pittsburg and lived a couple of years in the Central Eurasia area and is specialized in the relationship between customary governance at the local level and the state; the writings by the Afghan Analyst Network, which is an independent non-profit policy research organization registered in Kabul; the research of Allard Wagemaker, who served in Afghanistan and investigated the military intervention and state-building in Afghanistan between 2001-2011; but also the academic works of president Ashraf Ghani himself, as an anthropologist professor and co-founder of the Institute for State Effectiveness wrote the book Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World. Other books that I have consulted, were those like that of Tamim Ansary, an Afghan-American author, who was born and also lived in Kabul and writes about the history of modern Afghanistan. Moreover, my research has also valued the writings and teachings of Thomas Barfield, an anthropologist professor at the Boston University. Next to the book that he wrote, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, some of his classes about Afghanistan are recorded and to be watched on YouTube. Other social media sources that I used were Twitter, which provided me with updates from Afghan politicians, journalists and news channels such as TOLO News and Pajhwok Afghan News about the latest developments in the country.

3 The historical and cultural narrative

This chapter provides the comprehensive storyline that enables me to do a process tracing analysis of the causal factors, and cleavages in particular, that have influenced state functioning in the past. The first section, part one of the chapter, provides a summary of the events and other conditions that have shaped political order in Afghanistan. The story begins with the initial conditions of the geographical location. The reason why I have chosen to start here is because it explains why there are so many different ethnicities in Afghanistan and how it has shaped both society and politics up till today. The historical narrative further describes the development of political order and events that are crucial to understand its current political system. The second section, the chapter gives an overview of the different segments in society by an anthropological analysis approach. Both parts of this chapter are very important to distinguish the political cleavages and their development through time.

3.1 Part 1: historical narrative

3.1.1 Geographical location: where the story begins

Afghanistan is a landlocked country that is located in Central Asia. It has a very mountainous landscape but also some large plains in the north and the southeast (Ansary, 2012; Runion, 2017, p. 5). Deserts cover much of the Afghan lands, despite the fertile soil in the regions around the waters of the Amu Darya or Oxus River in the north (ibid.). Although, geography may not be Afghanistan’s destiny, it has shaped the country’s history by the many travellers and conquerors that have once set foot on it (Barfield, 2010; Hiebert, 2013; Atwoord, 2013).

Afghanistan used to be at the heart of the Silk Route. The Silk Route was more than merely a route. It was a great network of stopping posts and cities for merchants who travelled from east to west and connected civilizations from China, India, Persia, Arabia, eastern Africa, the Maghreb, and the eastern Mediterranean (Thornton, 2013; Lacau et al. 2012). Due to its landlocked position and because the Afghan lands connected so many other empires, it has been invaded so many times in the past that it left a collage of different tribes. Finding strength in their diversity, the many warlike Afghan tribes eventually made the country unconquerable; the reason why Afghanistan became known as “the graveyard of empires” (Pillalamarri, 2017, June 30).

Around 500 B.C. the ancestors of the contemporary Pashtun tribes dominated the south of the Afghan lands, while the lands of what is now Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan was under the influence of the Indian king of Gandhara (ibid; Behrendt, 2012). Around 330 B.C., Alexander the Great conquered this area. Later, under the rule of the Indian Maurya Empire cities of Bamuyan and Ghandhara flourished as great Buddhist centres. However, succeeding conquerors mostly destroyed its monasteries and other Buddhist remains (ibid; Yamada, 2002, p.109, 118; Greater Des Moines Public Art Foundation, 2012; Gall, 2006, December 6). By the time the Arabs invaded the country in the eight-century, the lands of Afghanistan contained a patchwork of different principalities such as those of the Greco-Bactrians, the Indo-Parthians, the Saka, the Kushans, the Kidarites, and the Hephthalites (Pillalamarri, 2017). The Arabs found it quite hard to overrule them, which is why it took them an estimated 200 years to spread Islam from east to west Afghanistan (ibid.).

Comparably today, Afghanistan is surrounded by very powerful states that hold special interest in the territory. In the south and the east Afghanistan borders with Pakistan, Iran in the west, and in the north with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Afghanistan maintains strong relationships with these surrounding powers that often try to interfere in their domestic affairs for strategic purposes.

Pakistan and India

Afghanistan is located right in the middle of a power struggle between India and Pakistan. At the centre of this conflict are the disagreements about the Kashmir areas where both countries claim parts of the land (Wagemaker, 2012, p. 92). Both Pakistan and India try to extent their power by offering development aid and financing projects in Afghanistan, also in an attempt to obstruct one another. For India, Afghanistan is highly interesting because it links with Central Asia and Iran, two regions with whom India has close trading relationships. Quite recently, a new trading route between India, Afghanistan and Iran was launched. This Kabul-Chabahar-Mumbai route limits Afghanistan’s dependence on trade with Pakistan because it can now import and export goods to India without even passing through Pakistan (Economic Times, 2017, Nov. 7). For this reason, Pakistan worries about India’s growing economic and political influence is the region.

Pakistan was founded when it gained independence from India in 1947. It is a federation with a parliamentary democracy encompassing, like Afghanistan, many different tribes, ethnicities

and different practises of Islam (Wagemaker, 2012, p. 93). Among the many tribes, the most dominant ones are the Punjabi’s (mostly found in the army), the Sindhi’s, the Baluchi’s, and the Pashtuns (ibid.). Especially the latter is of great importance for Pakistan - Afghanistan relations, which concerns the matter of a Pashtunistan. The issue dates back to the establishment of the Durand line in 1893 that had to distinguish Afghanistan from British India (now Pakistan). The border was drawn through an area inhabited by Pashtun tribes and that, as a consequence, divided whole Pashtun villages and families. Currently, the line formally separates the Pashtun tribes found in the Pakistani areas of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and regions in Baluchistan such as Quetta, from those tribes that live on the Afghan side of the border (Global Security.org, 2011, Nov. 7). Yet, despite the border that divides the Afghans from the Pakistani, the Pashtuns in those areas rather identify themselves as being Pashtun and with the villages or regions in which they live in (Ansary, 2012). This is because, living at the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, in a very mountainous landscape, it is hard to tell where exactly the border is located (ibid). Therefore, Pashtun tribes living here do not recognize the Durand line. They rather favour an independent Pashtunistan based on their ethnical heritage. Moreover, at the national level, Afghanistan refuses to acknowledge the border and holds strong relationships with the Pashtuns at the other side of the frontier. The country even claims the rights of the Pakistan North-West Frontiers Province (NWFP) (Global Security.org, 2011, Nov. 7). Unsurprisingly, different parties fight over the ‘lands of Pashtunistan’. There are violent casualties in the Afghan and Pakistan Pashtun regions frequently and these areas are great breeding nests of radicalization (Wagemaker, 2012, p. 94). Yet, Afghanistan accuses Islamabad’s counterterrorism policies to be murky and fall short (Siddique, 2017, Nov. 8).

The former Soviet countries

The countries that surround Afghanistan in the North are the former Soviet states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Rae, 2011; Wagemaker, 2012, p. 88). Drug trafficking and Islamic militancy shape the intense security interdependence within this region (Rae, 2011). Islamic movements abroad such as the Taliban, funded by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and the fundamental and orthodox Islamic groups, like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) are deteriorating the overall security situation in the region (Wagemaker, 2012, p. 90). Additionally, much of the narcotic production originates in Afghanistan and flows over the borders. Yet, because of poor

domestic infrastructure and corruption within these former Soviet states, it is hard to successfully combat drug trafficking and Islamist terrorism in this area (Rae, 2011). These issues thus require intrastate cooperation as the domestic security within one state relies on the security situation in another. However, the hostilities among these countries prevent such interstate responses to tackle these challenges.

Iran

Iran and Afghanistan share a history that dates back to the great Persian Empire. Up to today, Iran still exerts significant influence in Afghanistan. Iran benefits from stability in the region because a stable Afghan state would mean the return of many Afghan refugees residing in Iran and the withdrawal of the US troops (Wagemaker, 2012, p. 98). Yet, the rivalry between Sunni Islamic Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran also takes place in Afghanistan. Therefore, Iran supports the Hazaras in Afghanistan, who are mostly Shiite Islamic, and seeks ways to limit the influence of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the region (ibid.). In order to do this, it even cooperates with Sunni Tajik and Uzbek parties in an attempt to counterbalance the Saudi and Pakistani support to the Pashtuns (ibid.). I will further elaborate on the ethnic groups within Afghanistan, later in this chapter.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy, perhaps the most powerful land in the Middle East (Wagemaker, 2012, p. 97). It encompasses the biggest oil sources in the region, the holy cities of Mecca and Medina are situated here, and their influence also extends far beyond the Saudi borders due to reported (financial) support of Wahhabism (a very orthodox branch of Islam) in other parts of the world, such as Pakistan and Palestine-Israel (ibid.). As a Sunni Arabic Islamic nation, Saudi external policies are often defined by the great power struggles within the Middle East between the Sunni and Shia branches Islam and the Arabs and non-Arabs (ibid.). This is why they heavily challenge the other very powerful nation in the Middle East: Iran, a non-Arabic but Persian country, guided by Shia Islam. This rivalry also extents to Afghanistan, as already mentioned earlier. Saudi Arabia reportedly finances the religious Deobandi and Wahhabi schools in Pakistan, which is also out of resistance to the spreading influence of Iran and Shia Islam in the region of Central Asia (Puri, 2009; Wagemaker, 2012, p. 99; Johnson & Mason, 2007, p. 75). Al Qaeda, a radical terrorist organization with roots in Saudi Arabia, has actively supported the Taliban. For long, the Taliban functioned as a

muscle in their jihad against the United States and other, more liberal, convictions of Islam (ibid).

3.1.2 The origin of traditional political order

Traditional political order, as found in Afghanistan before the reign of Abdu’Rahman in 19th century, dates back to Turko-Mongolian rulers that founded dynasties all over the region from what is now modern Turkey to northern India (Barfield, 2010). This political structure was based on two characteristics: 1) the subject population was not politically or military involved, and 2) the only people who competed for power belonged to a dynastic elite of ‘professional rulers’, or foreign invaders (ibid.). Therefore, Afghan political order did not traditionally rely on popular support. It was rather a sort of contract between the ruler and the many Afghan tribes: the tribes would stand back from power but in return demanded that he would either respect their traditional rights or pay them off (ibid.).

Although subordinated groups within Afghan society may revolt against or in favour of Afghan rulers, they never regarded themselves as potential rulers (ibid.). According to anthropologist Thomas Barfield, “the emergence of a class of professional rulers was the product of a hierarchical political culture in which only men from certain elite descent groups were believed to have the right to rule or even compete for power” (ibid.). Instead of fighting tribal revolts, rulers sought to prevent them by granting tribes authority over parts of the land and the provision of feudal levies (ibid; Pillalamarri, 2015). The rulers would also work together with the local rulers and use their military capacity to protect the land from foreign invaders and provided security (ibid.). However, the only occasion in which tribal warriors would become a challenge to political order was when the state would grow weak. Yet, this would still not change the system. In case these warriors would succeed to seize power, they would immediately monopolize themselves and push rivals to the margins (Barfield, 2010). This was exactly how the Durrani Dynasty started off when Ahmad Shah Abdali “Baba” (father) became the first king of the Afghans.

Durrani absolutism

The Persian warlord Nader Shah seized power over the Afghan lands after he defeated the Turkish Empire with some help of the local, Pashtun tribes: the Abdalis (Pillalamarri, 2015). After he captured Kandahar, he captured Kabul and Delhi, where he stole many treasures under which the famous Koh-i-Noor, ‘the mountain of light’ (Ansary, 2012, p. 10). In 1747,

the Persian warlord was assassinated. His Afghan general, Ahmad Khan Abdali, was then chosen as the first king of Afghanistan (Pillalamarri, 2015). His followers praised him as the Durri-i-Durran, the pearl of pearls (Ansary, 2012, p. 12). The new bloodline of royal rulers, the Durrani dynasty, those of the pearly ones, delivered kings for the upcoming 250 years (ibid.).

The story tells that Ahmad Khan was chosen as king of the Afghans through a Pashtun democratic institution called jirga (Ansary, 2012). According to Pashtun tradition, a jirga is a council of the most notable elders of the tribe who make most important decisions on the basis of consensus. Yet, Barfield argues that Ahmad Khan was appointed because of other,

non-democratic, political considerations: the rivalry among the Pashtun tribes made the Abdali Pashtuns chose Ahmad because an Abdali on the throne could remove their Ghilzai rivals in Kandahar (Barfield, 2010). Furthermore, in times when “money was an army’s mother’s milk”, Ahmad Khan had become incredibly wealthy after seizing the large treasure caravan of the Persian Nader Shah and therefore also military very powerful (ibid.). Another aspect was that the Abdali general had built a great network with a lot of connections beyond his Pashtun clan. For example, the Turkish Shi’ite Qizilbash who supported him with significant military capacity (ibid.).

Ahmad Shah transformed traditional ruling by abandoning the local feudal system and replaced it with autocracy (Barfield, 2010). As he knew that a weak state could threaten his position, he appointed his sons as governors in territories that were hard for him to control. By doing this, he replaced the ruling elites in places such as Baluchistan, Khorasan and Turkistan, who were actually defeated enemies and thus always ready to revolt. Through the appointment of his sons, he extended his power over the lands and ensured stability (ibid.). To protect the country from threats from abroad, the king also built a strong army to keep potential foreign invaders, such as the Mughals and the Sikhs, at bay (ibid). The absolutism of Ahmad Shah was, however, still limited.

Ahmad Shah Abdali

“Durri-i-Durran”

(Bibliothèque Nationale de France, 2017).

From a military perspective, Ahmad Shah’s government was highly centralized. In his army, Ahmad Shah even succeeded to unite the tribes more than any other ruler would be able to (Ansary, 2012, p. 15). the army provided a sense of Afghaniyat or ‘Afghan-ness’ and soldiers from all kinds of ethnic origin would fought side by side (ibid.). However, one of his descendants, Amir Abdu’Rahman, would use the term later to denote Afghanistan as “the land of the Pashtuns” (ibid. p. 88; Bleuer, 2012). From the administrative perspective, the system was more of a confederation in which most governors were practically governing autonomously in their ‘mini-kingdoms’ (Barfield, 2010). However, when the Shah died, the state grew vulnerable by the absence of its charismatic leader (Ansary, 2012, p. 32). His heirs were less towering. They all fought for the crown while the country fragmented and slipped back into civil war between Pashtun tribes (ibid.). Whereas the grandsons of the shah were fighting over power, Dost Mohammed, member another Durrani clan, declared himself king in 1826. This was the beginning of a new Durrani clan, the royal Mohammadzais (ibid.). He restored some order in the empire but failed to preserve the city of Peshawar, the traditional winter capital of Afghan kings, and lost it to the Sikh king Ranjit Singh (ibid. p. 33).

Foreign imperialist forces

Roughly between 1813 and 1917, Afghanistan found itself in the middle of the “Great Game” between Great Britain and Russia (Ansary, 2012, p. 35). Since the 18th century, European powers explored the seas (ibid. p. 36). The oceans provided access to the rest of the world. Great naval powers, such as Great Britain, mastered international trade and politics. Russia desired the same access. However, the Russian Arctic waters in the north prevented this as they were generally frozen. The only way for Russia to acquire entrance to the stage of naval power politics was to expand their imperium southwards in the direction of Afghanistan, all the way to the Arabian Sea (ibid. p. 37). This made Britain, on the other hand, quite anxious. They wanted to keep Russia as far from their precious British India as possible. The lion and the bear confronted each other at the heart of Central Asia and found another cause to fight for: control over Afghanistan (ibid.).

When the western colonial powers set foot in Afghanistan, the traditional exclusive elite authority began to erode (Barfield, 2010). During both Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839 and 1878), the Afghans had been able to remain independent from the British invaders (Barfield, 2010). Yet, the Durrani kings relied heavily on the employment of militias coming from the rural lands that were barely under their control. These soldiers were only encouraged to fight in

armed resistance against the foreign invaders but were prohibited to engage in politics or power sharing after the battle was over (ibid.). This was aligned with tradition, as politics was something that was left for the ruling elite. Until the end of the Mohammadzai dynasty, rulers were able to maintain a grip on power without any significant rivalry coming from non-mohammadzai competitors (Barfield, 2010).

As the Afghans were able to resist foreign occupation during both wars, the British decided to change their tactics to exert their influence. At the end of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1880), the British placed Adbu’Rahman on the throne, also a descendant of Dost Mohammad (Ansary, 2012, p. 83). With him they made some agreements: if he kept the Russians out, they would hand the country over to him as soon as Russian expansionist aspirations were not fulfilled (ibid.). In return, Abdu’Rahman demanded that he would gain full authority within the Afghan borders. Both parties settled the deal. In the upcoming years, the new king, later known as the “Iron Amir”, would reform the entire traditional Afghan political system with a (hard-handed) nation-building project (ibid. p. 88).

The land of the Pashtuns

Abdu’Rahman completely reorganized the country. He crushed every tribal revolt and even launched a policy to move entire tribal populations around Afghanistan (ibid. p. 90). By dislocating entire families, the Amir hoped to reintegrate them into the new polity he had created (ibid.). It would destroy their roots so that they would not know who to trust in the new region they had come to live (ibid.). Another nation-building aspect was that the Amir was now propagating Afghanistan as the land of the Pashtuns. As Ahmad Shah had spread out his sons over the Afghan land to extent his control, Abdu’Rahman provided the Pashtun tribes the land of other tribal groups such as the Hazara, who were driven into the impoverished sites of mountainous Hazarajat and who he later enslaved by law (Ansary, 2012; Barfield, 2010).

Abdu’Rahman built a centralized state based on a government apparatus that included an army, kalantars in every village (a village representative to the Amir), kotwals (the officials of the Amir), provincial governors and officials, district governors and subgovernors, and the mirzas in the capital (skilled officeholders of the amir) and his state mullahs as the state’s religious judges and jurisconsults (Wagemaker, 2012, p. 69; Ansary, 2012, p. 94, 97). He even established a secret intelligence agency to spy on anyone who disobeyed his rule

(Ansary, 2012, p. 91). This was a branch of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and was highly specialized in “night arrests” were people would disappear into the night after an unexpected knock on their door (ibid. p. 97). To pay for this administration, as his entire government employee drew salaries, he taxed almost all kinds of things: animal taxes, tree taxes, taxes for marrying, and even taxes for dying (ibid.). The Amir deliberately kept the country poor and prohibited any improvement such as infrastructure and technologies that could lead to economic development (Barfield, 2010). He feared that such development could lead to foreign interference. Although the country was economically suffering, he was able to ignore this due to the financial support of the British (ibid). Moreover, he used the Islam as a means to establish political legitimacy. Abdu’Rahman claimed to be appointed by Allah to reign over Afghanistan and was therefore authorized to do as he pleased. He would accuse any rebel of acting against the will of God and punish him accordingly (ibid. p. 93). Afghanistan was no longer a secular state.

The Durand line In 1893, the Amir met with Mortimer Durand, minister to the Raj, the British sovereign in India (ibid.). The British requested a solid southern border. This border would be the margins of the era to which the British could extend their power without being pushed back (ibid.). As Abdu’Rahman was on a mission to consolidate Afghanistan, he as well needed clearly defined borders and agreed to the offer (ibid. p. 89). This decision had, however, some consequences: first of all, by drawing the Durand line, the new King

consolidated the dispute about Peshawar into a political fact. The city, where many Afghan kings lay buried, had been a matter of conflict ever since the Sikh warrior-king Ranjit Singh had captured it in the battle of 1834 (ibid. p.88). Second, by placing the border right through the traditional land of the Pashtuns, dividing villages and families, the area around the ‘Durand line’, in both Afghanistan and in Pakistan, would become subject of endless conflict.

The hard hand of the Iron Amir was growing resentment among the people. The decentralized system was abolished that used to provide a high degree of autonomy in their traditional

region. Now they had to summit that autonomy over to the government in Kabul (Barfield, 2010). Although any revolt was crushed, it did provoke a force of resentment that undermined the authority of his successors until civil war broke out after the abdication of Amanullah Shah in 1928 (Barfield, 2010).

Modernism versus traditionalism

In 1923, Amanullah Shah presented the Nizamnama or ‘the Book of Order’. A new legal code that was comparable to the one of Ataturk in Turkey and adapted codes from Switzerland, France and Italy (Ansary, 2012, p. 117). It was a secular legal book that did not even mention the Sharia (ibid.). This was very unusual in Afghanistan, especially since his grandfather, Abdu’Rahman, had made Sharia law an official part of the Afghan governmental system. Unsurprisingly, the Nizamnama made a lot of people uneasy, particularly the religious clerics that saw the book as a threat to their power (ibid.). The ulema also believed that no men could draw rules, this was a right that only belonged to God (ibid.).

In sum, the Book of Order “banned the use of torture, even by the government; forbade forced entry into any private home, even by the government; gave every citizen the right to bring charges of corruption, even against any government official; banned slavery; guaranteed freedom of religion; outlawed underage marriage; gave women the freedom to wear a burqa or chad’ri, or not, even their husbands could not force them to wear one (ibid. p. 117-8). Moreover, the King also argued that the Quran discouraged polygamy, as it was impossible to treat all wives equally. Amanullah opened new, coeducational, schools and universities and students, both men and women, could learn foreign languages and could even study abroad (ibid.).

All these reforms appeared to be a little too much and a little too soon for highly religious Afghan society. Religious leaders even preached that the King had become an infidel (ibid. p. 120). In January 1929, Amanullah and his family decided to leave the country. The King was given refuge by the Italian King Victor Emmanuel and ended up making furniture for a living (ibid. p. 130). His abdication had left a power vacuum and Afghanistan turned into civil war. Followers of the former king fought conservative religious rebellions. Habibllah Kalakani, a Tajik, took power and reversed every policy of modernization. However, the new ruler only governed for nine months (ibid.). He was a Tajik and the royal Pashtuns, especially the Durranis felt embarrassed. Moreover, he was only the son of a water carrier and thus of low

class (ibid.) A distant relative of Durrani Dost Mohammad and former commander in chief of the Iron Amir’s armies and counsellor of at Amanullah’s palace, Nadir, had him assassinated and became the new shah. The tradition of the governing dynastic elite was restored.

The House of Nadir Shah would also modernize Afghanistan but on a very careful and slow pace, not to damage its amiable relations with the ulema and bring his ruling into jeopardy. He later became assassinated in 1933 by one of the devotees of the former king Amanullah, whom which he had mostly killed or captured. His son Zahir succeeded him until Mohammad Daoud Khan, his Prime Minister and cousin, seized power in a coup in 1973 and made himself president of the new republic of Afghanistan (Ansary, 2012). Daoud wanted to lessen the influence of and dependence on the Soviet Union but was also assassinated by the communist party, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) (ibid.).

3.1.3 The end of traditional political order

When communists seized power in 1978 with the Saur Revolution and the invasion of the Soviets in 1979, the traditional power structures of a ruling dynastic elite had officially collapsed (Wagemaker, 2012, p. 105). The communists were also modernists and wanted a secular government and, among other things, equality between men and women (Ansary, 2012, p. 265). The Marxist PDPA socialist regime was a defender of “the working class” (Barfield, 2010; Ansary, 2012, p. 182). However, what did a “working class” mean for Afghan peasants? What did it mean for a nomadic clan? Much of the Afghan people, especially outside of Kabul, had absolutely no experience with democracy (ibid.). It was also not something of Afghan tradition for peasants to involve in politics and revolt against an established Muslim ruler (Barfield, 2010). Changing the government to a democracy did also not match its society. Although revolutionists such as Ataturk in Turkey and Reza Shah had forced the people to adopt the “Western” lifestyle, the majority of the Afghans, outside of Kabul, carried on the way they had always lived: without electricity, education, and public health care (Barfield, 2010). Moreover, the regime invited them to secular framework of policies rather than blood, history and personal connections (Ansary, 2012, p. 183-4). Yet, the only thing that villagers were questioning, was the religiosity of the government officials, who maintained Western living standards in Kabul; drinking alcohol and wearing western suits (Barfield, 2010).