Confucianism in Contemporary China

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Confucianism in Contemporary China

Johanna Visser Student ID number: 1339931

Student email: j.m.visser.4@hum.leidenuniv.nl Supervisor: prof.dr. A.T. Gerritsen

MA Asian Studies

Leiden University: Humanities Faculty 2020-2021

MA Thesis Final Version January 4, 2020

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A1 Five Constant Regulations and Eight Virtues in the National Congresses 2002-2017 50 A2 Diagram of Confucian terms in the National Congresses, 2002-2017 53 A3 Diagram of total Confucian terms per National Congress, 2002-2007 53 Appendix B Analyses speech of Xi Jinping at the 2565th commemoration of Confucius’ birthday in

Qufu, 2014. 54

B1 Five Constant Regulations and Eight Virtues in 2014 speech 54

B2 Text analysis of 2014 Speech 54

Appendix C Frontpage Confucius Museum 58

Appendix D Analysis of the Confucius Museum 60

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Introduction

中国梦 (_{Zhongguo Meng), the Chinese Dream, is a slogan that encapsulates president Xi} Jinping’s vision for China. The idea of a ‘Chinese Dream’ was first promoted by president Xi on November 11, 2012 at the exhibition “Road to Rejuvenation” (复兴之路, fuxing zhi lu). This

exhibition reviewed the historical process that the Chinese people have gone through to realize national rejuvenation in modern times (Xinhua, 2012). 1 _{The Chinese Dream points to the ‘great}

rejuvenation (伟大复兴, weida fuxing) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and is still in effect as of 2020 (Xinhua, 2020; Latham 2020). According to Xi Jinping, the Chinese Dream embodies the long-cherished wishes of generations of Chinese people and reflects the overall interests of the Chinese nation and the Chinese nation (Xinhua, 2012). We should understand this desire for a restoration in the context of the ‘era of humiliation’. The ‘era of humiliation’ refers to the period beginning with China’s loss in the first Opium War (1839-1842) and ending with the establishment of the PRC in 1949. Confucianism is one of the factors that was blamed as the cause of this ‘era of humiliation’. During the May Fourth Movement in 1919, and second, during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, Confucianism was regarded as highly problematic by the CCP, and even the cause of widespread problems in society. When the PRC was established it was claimed that the ‘era of humiliation’ would be overcome through communism and self-sufficiency. In the 1980s, however, the CCP deviated from this communist path and turned to a ‘market-economy with Chinese characteristics’.2

Within this context of turning away from communism, Confucianism has been gaining an increased importance in the discourse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It even seems that Confucianism is becoming a part of the Chinese Dream as envisioned by Xi Jinping. In 2017, Michael Peters claimed that Xi Jinping is “wedded to Confucian moral values” (Peters, 2017:1301). Thereby, Confucianism reclaims a place in Chinese society that was largely lost in the twentieth century. Confucianism is even regarded as the solution of China’s contemporary

1_{Xinhua News Agency is the official state-run press agency of the PRC.}

2_{This term became common usage during the ‘era of Deng Xiaoping’ (1978-1994) and was largely} associated with Deng’s overall program of adopting elements of market economics as a means to foster growth using foreign investment and to increase productivity while the CCP retained both its formal commitment to achieve communism and its monopoly on political power.

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problems. Therefore, this thesis explores to what extent the Chinese government is increasingly using Confucianism in its political discourse.

First, this thesis will provide a short introduction to the topic of Confucianism. It briefly considers Confucian values and the significance of Confucianism in Chinese history. This chapter will also provide the background which will be used to measure the extent to which Confucian values are relevant today. The second chapter explores the relationship between Confucianism and the CCP. It provides a brief overview of the state of Confucianism in twentieth-century China. This is followed by an extensive analysis of several key reports of the National Congresses of the CCP to explore how, over the course of a little over two decades, the attitude of the CCP changed from regarding Confucianism as a target that needed to be eliminated to an attitude of gradual appreciation. Then, the chapter provides a critical discussion of a speech Xi Jinping made at the 2565th commemoration of Confucius’ birthday in Qufu, Shandong province, as the first CCP leader. The third chapter of this thesis provides a thorough analysis of the newly established Confucius Museum in Qufu, using the findings from the first two chapters. An analysis of the museum is chosen because of the role a museum plays in creating a national narrative about the place of Confucianism in the national narrative the CCP presents. For this reason, an analysis of the Confucius museum gives insight into what extent the Chinese government is portraying Confucianism to its citizens. Lastly, this thesis provides a discussion of the extent to which the Chinese government embraces Confucianism in its political discourse and to what extent this is further convey to citizens, putting forward an overarching analysis of the three chapters of this thesis to answer the question: In what ways Confucianism play a role in the discourse of the CCP in contemporary China? and to what extent does

Chapter 1: An introduction to Confucianism

1.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces Confucianism. The first section explores the key concepts of Confucianism. The second section gives a brief overview of the role of Confucianism in Chinese history.

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1.2 What is Confucianism?

In academic circles, there is no consensus on what Confucianism entails. In his book An

Introduction to Confucianism , Xinzhong Yao (2000), puts forward that some scholars argue that

Confucianism is a philosophy and others say that it is a religion. In their article from 2009, Guillaume Dutournier and Ji Zhe, put forward that Confucianism can also refer to the discourses and practices of the scholar-officials of the Chinese empire. Wang Fengyan on the other hand, described in 2004 Confucianism as a moral education, based on the idea of a universal human nature. According to Paul Goldin in 2014, the term refers to “the philosophy of Confucius, his disciples, and the numerous later thinkers who regard themselves as followers of his tradition” (Goldin, 2014:1). Within the light of this definition of Confucianism, it can also be argued that Confucianism is a tradition of books, as it takes the Four Books and Five Classics as the source of all values and ideals.3 _{Among the Four Books is the} Analects, which is a book that is composed

of Confucius’ sayings and was compiled by his disciples after his passing. TheAnalects grew to be one of the central texts of Confucianism. The importance of the Analects for Confucianism and Chinese history in general, is discussed by many scholars such as Michael Hunter in 2017 and Ann-ping Chin in 2014. Hunter describes the Analects as “the preeminent source of the teachings of the most influential figure in the East Asian tradition, as a cornerstone of traditional Chinese pedagogy for the last two thousand years, as a foundational text within the modern study of the classical period” (Hunter, 2017:1-2). Chin states that the Analects is “the single most important book in the history of China” (Chin, 2014:i).

The core values of Confucianism can be identified as the “Five Constant Regulations” and the “Eight Virtues” which are regarded as the moral foundations of society. These core values are described in the Analects. The Five Constant Regulations are humaneness, ren (仁), righteousness, yi (义), propriety, li (礼), wisdom, zhi (智), and faithfulness, xin (信). According to Yao (2000), these principles form the essence of life and the bonds of society. Guoxiang Zhang

3_{The Four Books and Five Classics (四书五经) are written in China before 300BC and played an}

important role in Chinese history as they were used in the imperial examinations. The Four Books are: the

Great Learning (大学), the Doctrine of the Mean (中庸), the Analects (论语), and the Mencius (孟子). The Five Classics are: the Book of Poetry (诗经), the Book of Documents (书经), the Book of Rites (礼记), the

Book of Changes (易经), and the Spring and Autumn Annals (春秋). For more information regarding these books and classics see Nylan, Michael. (2001); Yao, Xinzhong. (2000).

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in 2012 and Guozun Ke in 2015, regard the Eight Virtues as consisting of filial piety, xiao (孝), brotherhood, ti (悌), loyalty, zhong (忠), trust, xin (信), propriety, li (礼), righteousness, yi (义), integrity,lian(廉), and sensibility, chi (耻). These Eight Virtues serve as an extension to the Five Constant Regulations.

Besides the Five Constant Regulations and the Eight Virtues, Confucius discussed in the

Analects concept of sheng (圣), which means sage or saint and embodies an ideal person.

However, this becoming a sage is hard to achieve, therefore Confucius introduced the concept of junzi (君子), which could be translated as ‘respectable person’. A junzi acts according to proper conduct (礼), the rituals, to achieve harmony (和). Harmony is another important aspect of Confucianism. To achieve harmony in the world, everyone must act in accordance with their position in society. A ruler must act as a ruler, a minister must act as a minster, a father as a father, a son as a son. A harmonious society starts with good governance, which is achieved through the correct execution of the ancient rites. This is reflected in AnalectsXIV.44 “when rulers love to observe the rules of propriety, the people respond readily to calls on them for service” (Confucius, 2013:41).

Although these values themselves have not changed over the past two millennia, their interpretation and application changed over the centuries. Even contemporary scholars have different interpretations of what the most important aspects of Confucianism are. Wing-Tsit Chan for example, pointed out in 2008 that the primary concern of Confucianism is to build a good society, based on good governance and harmonious human relations. Robert Oxnam, China scholar and President Emeritus of the Asia Society New York, on the other hand, asserted in 1997 that Confucian teaching rests on “filial piety, humanness, and ritual”. The following chapters analyze to what extent these regulations and virtues play a role in the contemporary political discourse of the CCP and explore which aspects are emphasized by the CCP.

1.3 The significance of Confucianism in Chinese history

As noted in the previous section, the application of Confucianism in Chinese society has continuously developed. Originally, Confucius’ goal was to educate leaders of the state, in order for them to pursue good governance in a harmonious way. This section briefly discusses this role to gain an understanding of the influence of Confucianism on political discourse in Chinese

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history. Then, this section outlines the end of Confucianism in modern Chinese history and describes how Confucianism was targeted during the twentieth century.

Primarily due to the imperial examination system, Confucianism played an important role in the Chinese empire. Since the Han dynasty (202 BC - 200 AD), imperial examinations have been used to appoint people to certain governmental positions. In their book, English

language assessment and the Chinese learner, Liying Cheng and Andy Curtis (2010) assert that

the concept of a country ruled by men of ability and virtue was an outgrowth of Confucian philosophy, as appointing a person according to their merit instead of class is one of Confucius’ core values. The imperial examinations were further developed during the Tang dynasty (608 - 970 AD). Hou-Can Zhang argued in 1988 that even though the influence of Buddhism was widely spread during the Tang dynasty, interpreting the Confucian classics as part of the imperial examination became more important. This means that the importance of Confucianism at that point was already quite imbued with society. During the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) the examinations mostly concentrated on the orthodox interpretation of the Confucian classics. According to David Castrillon in 2012 this orthodox interpretation meant an unquestionable adherence to Confucianism, which focused on a certain uniformity of thought, thereby minimizing creativity and individual opinion. From the early nineteenth century, during the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), proposals emerged to include Western technology in the imperial examinations. Pragmatics had become critical of Confucian learning because China had endured losses during Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860). In the decades following the Opium Wars, reforms were implemented to reform the military complex, among other things. However, China’s loss in the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895), proved that these reforms had failed, and conservative Confucianism was blamed for this. It was also attempted to revise the imperial examination system. Yet, Kuhng Hyun Ko argued in 2017 that these reforms were unsuccessful as the amount of change required was immense. An example of this revision of the examination system was the attempt to integrate Western concepts into the exams. According to Castrillon (2012), this proved to be difficult since many examinees were unwilling to learn new ideas in conjunction with classical topics. Eventually, in 1905, the examination system was abolished altogether. This also meant an end to the use of Confucianism as a state

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ideology. Confucianism as a system of thought, however, did not instantly disappear. This is reflected by the continuing criticism on Confucianism.

During the May Fourth Movement in 1919, there was a lot of criticism against Confucianism and the traditional values it reflected. There was a sense that the focus on Confucianism by the ruling elite, instead of a more pragmatic focus, with training in topics like economics and modern science, had left China behind in the political world order. Yao (2000), adds to this by pointing out that Confucianism was blamed for all the intellectual, political, and social failures of that time.

Andrew Jacobs asserted in 2011 that Mao Zedong also condemned Confucianism as backward and feudal. Feudalism and its accompanying traditional values, were regarded as the main threat to communist rule, as they were seen as having brought the ‘era of humiliation’ upon China. According to CCP rhetoric of the time, conservative traditional culture had caused China’s losses in the previous wars. Communism was seen as the answer in rebuilding China and restoring its glory. Confucianism and its feudal roots were attacked through political discourse. Confucianism and all traces of feudalism were targeted from the beginning of the PRC and during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1979) further actions against Confucius and Confucianism were taken. For example, during the Four Olds Campaign (破四旧, po si jiu), Red

Guards were encouraged to deface Confucian temples and statues.4 the ancestral home of Confucius was destroyed and bodies of Confucius’ descendants were exhumed and publicly displayed (Jacobs, 2011).

Despite the crackdown on Confucianism, this did not stop thinkers to develop Confucianism further and adapt it to the modern era. This reflects the significance and the versatility of Confucianism. This new phase in Confucianism is called Xiandai Xin Ruxue (现代新 儒学_{) or Modern New Confucianism, as philosophers thought of ways to incorporate modern} values such as democracy and science into Confucianism. This topic has been studied extensively for example by Jana Rošker (2020) and Tze-ki Hon and Kristin Stapleton (2017).

4_{The Red Guards were groups of militant university and high school students formed into paramilitary}

units as part of the Cultural Revolution (1966- 1979). For more information see Chen, Yixin (1999); Rosen, Stanley (1979).

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Therefore, this thesis will no longer talk about this phase of Confucianism. Instead, this thesis focuses on how the core values of Confucianism are reflected in modern political discourse.

1.4 Conclusion

Confucianism is system of thought which primarily deals with morality and consists of core values asserted by the Five Constant Regulations and Eight Virtues. For centuries, Confucianism was an integral part of the state ideology signified through the imperial examination systems. The need to further crackdown on Confucianism, even though the imperial examination system has been abolished, means that Confucianism extended further than just the state. Thus, Confucianism is to a large extent integrated with Chinese culture. Despite the crackdowns, during the May Fourth Movement and the Cultural Revolution, Confucianists kept developing Confucianism for applications in the modern era, which further signifies its impact.

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Chapter 2: Confucianism and the CCP

2.1 Introduction

As outlined in the previous chapter, it is evident that in Maoist China (1949-1976) there was a crackdown on Confucianism and the traditional values it embodied. This chapter, however, deals with the proposed appropriation of Confucianism by the CCP in contemporary China. The first section of this chapter sketches an outline of the extent to which there was a gradual appropriation of Confucianism by the CCP in the Post-Mao era. The first part of the section discusses the political climate of this Post-Mao era in which Confucianism became accepted again. Then, the extent of the place of Confucianism in the PRC is discussed. Lastly, it presents certain assertions scholars have made to why the CCP turned to Confucianism. The second section of this chapter, provides a thorough analysis on the governmental discourse on Confucianism of the past two decades. A focus is laid on the past four National Congresses of the past two decades, the sixteenth National Congress in 2002, the seventeenth National Congress in 2007, the eighteenth National Congress in 2012, and the nineteenth National Congress in 2017. Lastly, this section provides an analysis of Xi Jinping’s speech at the commemoration of Confucius’ 2565th birthday on September 24, 2014.

2.2 A changing attitude towards Confucianism: from target to appreciation

After the Cultural Revolution, which ended in 1979, China gradually opened up again to the world economic system through the Opening Up Reforms (改革开放, gaige kaifang), after decades of primarily self-sufficiency.5 _{Don Starr, Director of Chinese Studies in the School of}

Modern Languages and Cultures of Durham University, asserted in 2009 that China’s economic underachievement in the Maoist period, made China shift to a more capitalist approach in the 1980s. The accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), in 2002 is regarded as the symbol of China’s reintegration in the world economic system. According to Starr (2009), the shift in economic policy also needed ideological justification because the opening up reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping undermined the communist ideology. No longer would communist ideology

5_{For more information on the Opening Up Reforms see Ploberger, Christian (2016); Shao, Binhong}

(2019).

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alone guide the economic course of China. The new system that emerged is known as “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, which was also discussed in the introduction of this thesis. At the same time, “Confucianism” progressively acquired new visibility.

Some scholars, however, such as Jie Chen in 1995, assert that due to these economic and political reforms, the ideology of the CCP, on which it based its legitimacy to rule, had been shattered. This is substantiated by Stanley Rosen in 1990, who put forward that studies showed that many people questioned the validity of Marxist ideology and adopted a more pragmatic attitude. The CCP could only exercise ideological, and moral leadership by summoning Party officials to work on national economic prosperity. Furthermore, Chen (1995), asserts that in this period party discipline collapsed and corruption was rampant. This does not mean that there was no corruption under Mao Zedong and there was corruption due to the new economic system, this thesis however, focusses on the fact that in this post-Mao period there was corruption. Kin-man Chan further elaborates in 2016, that a sense of moral crisis in China emerged simultaneously with the Opening Up Reforms. This moral crisis can be described as a form of disillusionment with socialism and a proposed legitimacy crisis of the CCP (Chan, 2016). This suggests that when the CCP turned away from communism the morality of the Party members was decreasing and that corruption increased.

At the same time, the stance towards Confucianism changed in this Opening Up period. In the 1980s, academic studies on Confucius and Confucianism resumed in China. This is a direct indication that Confucianism was no longer fully despised or considered an unacceptable topic for study by the Chinese government. Tianchen Li points out in 1999 that research organizations and academic associations dedicated to Confucianism had begun to emerge. In 1984, for example, the China Confucius Foundation was established and in 1986 the Confucius Studies Journal brought out its first edition. Other signs of the growing appreciation of Confucianism are the growing number of popular books about Confucius and the increase in works of art concerning Confucius (Li, 1999). Julian Baum reports in 1987 on the first conference on Confucian studies held in Qufu in 25 years. The purpose of this conference was to evaluate “Confucius’ thinking, to take what is valuable, and to discard what is useless'' (Baum, 1987). The significance of this conference was described by Baum as “an opportunity to

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reflect on the teachings of a man who, over the centuries, has provoked more passionate debate than Karl Marx or Mao Tse-tung” (Baum, 1987). This statement underscores the importance Confucius has had for China in prior centuries. Apart from Marxism or Leninism or even Mao Zedong Thought, research was being conducted to what extent Confucianism could be useful for the PRC. Values such as paternalism, social hierarchy, discrimination against women and ancestor worship, had already been eliminated under Maoist rule. These values were criticized because of their traditional and feudal tendencies. Foreign scholars at the Qufu meeting, however, pointed out that other Confucian traditions, such as deep concern about the morality in government and an emphasis on harmony in social and political relations, could be useful for the CCP in the post-Mao era (Baum, 1987). Especially the emphasis on morality in government was questioned because of the Opening up Reforms. This suggests that the ‘moral crisis’ of this period could be considered as an explanation for the turn to Confucianism. Donald Munro of the University of Michigan also pointed out that the meeting showed a resurfacing interest in ethical principles and the search for a humanist tradition that is relevant to China today. Munro further added that “after this meeting, the orthodox Marxist-Leninists will be more and more willing to openly acknowledge that one or two virtues in traditional Confucianism are worth inheriting and promoting in Chinese culture'' (Baum, 1987). This last remark suggests that the conference of Confucius studies lead to an opening for Party officials to incorporate certain Confucian virtues. This does not mean that this conference is the direct cause for a renewed interest in Confucius by the CCP, but it does reflect a change in attitude towards Confucianism by the CCP in this early reform period.

Scholars such as Werner Meissner in 2006, argue for a turn to Confucianism because the authoritarian aspects of Confucianism helped contribute to a “socialist spiritual civilization” and was motivated by a search for a cultural antidote to the ‘threat of westernization’. Other scholars such as Starr (2009) and Joe Lo and Suyan Pan in 2014, have conducted research on the connection between Confucius Institutes and China's soft power.6_{In that regard, Confucius}

6_{The Confucius Institute Project was implemented in 2004.}_{Since 2004, China has set up over 700} Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms all over the world. The purpose of these Confucius Institutes is to promote the country’s “soft power”. For more information see Starr (2006); Lo and Pan (2014).

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and Confucianism can also play a role in the branding of China as a cultural symbol, and thus is connected to China’s expansion of soft power. Shufang Wu, on the other hand, assessed in 2014, after conducting a content analysis of the People’s Daily between 2000-2009, that the CCP pragmatically promotes Confucianism to secure a cultural leadership. Furthermore, Wu puts forward that “Confucianism was used as a source of moral and ideological support in providing persuasive explanations for political strategies and policies of the government” (Wu 2014:990). This reasoning is also supported by Chan (2016), who also puts forward that Confucianism was used by the Chinese government to deal with the moral crisis in the reform period.

Thus, in academia, there is no consensus on the reasoning behind the return to Confucianism of the CCP. Nevertheless, there is an indication that the CCP is increasingly using Confucian rhetoric in its political discourse and even as a political tool to secure its leadership in the post-Mao era. Dongfang Shuo and Hongcheng Lin reflect in a commentary on the Analects in 2006 that “the primitive Confucians considered the nature of human beings as something that had to be represented through the moral practices of people, but many Confucian scholars in later and modern times have considered the thought of Confucianism as a kind of moral philosophy” (Shuo & Lin, 2006:416-417). 7_{This means that while some traditional practices were}

despised, this did not necessarily mean that other aspects of Confucianism could not be applied to modern life. In other words, one did not have to act in a Confucian way; but one could adhere to certain moral practices. This notion is also suggested by Eske Møllgaard in 2007, who asserts that “traditionally it was always possible to measure one’s virtuous conduct, yet one can still ask if one’s discourse is authentically Confucian or not” (Møllgaard, 2007:397). This means that one can solely focus on the discourse of the CCP to assess whether they convey Confucian values, without considering their actions. For this reason, the following section discusses to what extent Confucian values were adopted in the political discourse of the CCP during the period from 2002 to present.

7_{Shuo and Lin differentiate between “primitive Confucians” who refer to the early Confucians from}

Confucius` time and later Confucians.

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2.3 From appreciation to government tool

This section discusses to what extent Confucianism gradually came to be seen as a government tool. In this section, therefore, a closer look is taken at the political discourse in the twenty-first century using the toolbox for political discourse analysis as proposed by Florian Schneider in 2013. This section first provides an analysis of the past four National Congresses of the CCP. The National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is a Party congress that is held every five years, the previous four National Congresses span the period of 2002-2017. The National Congress of the CCP is theoretically the highest body within the CCP and is the public venue for top-level leadership changes in the Communist Party and the formal event for changes to the Party’s Constitution. The National Congresses are important as they reflect the CCP’s objectives for the upcoming five years. Several themes have been chosen to focus on this section to paint a clear picture on Chinese culture and how eventually Confucianism plays a role within this overall narrative. Then, this chapter provides a closer examination of the political discourse of Xi Jinping regarding Confucianism. This section first provides an analysis of Xi Jinping’s speech at the 2565th commemoration of Confucius’ birthday in Qufu. This speech is important because it is the first time that a CCP leader acknowledges the significance of Confucius for China’s traditional culture in a positive way. Furthermore, this speech forms the basis for the Confucius Museum which will be further elaborated upon in the third chapter of this thesis.

2.3.1 Analysis of the National Congresses

This section dives into the reports of the past four National Congresses. The first National Congress that is discussed is the sixteenth National Congress of 2002, in which the report of the National Congress was made by Jiang Zemin. The seventeenth and the eighteenth National Congresses were in 2007 and 2012, respectively, and their reports were made by Hu Jintao. The report of the nineteenth National Congress is from 2017 and was made by Xi Jinping. This thesis used both the Chinese versions of the reports and the English version. The report of the sixteenth National Congress, both Chinese and English, was published on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CCP. The documents of the other three National Congresses were published by Xinhua News Agency, the official state-run press agency of the PRC.

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This section first provides an analysis of use of Confucian values as outlined through the Five Virtues and Eight Regulations, which were discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. Then, the texts are further analyzed on their discourse on Chinese traditional culture and gain an understanding of how Confucianism is framed in political discourse. Lastly, this section discusses to what extent the National Congresses discuss morality, because Confucianism is regarded as a moral philosophy, and Confucianism became accepted again by the CCP in a time of moral crisis.

2.3.1.1 Virtues and regulations

The reports of the National Congresses were first analyzed. The texts that are examined in this section are the Chinese versions of the reports from 2002-2017. Through these National Congresses the ideology of the CCP is expressed. So, the documents are comparable in terms of looking at party ideology. The features that are used are the characters from the Five Virtues and Eight Regulations. As pointed out in the previous chapter, these form the basis of a moral society, according to Confucianism.

Appendix A1 provides insight into how many times the terms are mentioned in the reports. Then, the terms were divided into words, often the characters were used in combination with another character due which their meaning differs. The terms were then translated and the words that are similar to the Confucian meanings were further categorized. In Appendix A1 these were put in “bold” font. Although their interpretations may slightly differ from the original meanings, it does give insight into what aspects are deemed important by the CCP.

Appendix A2, shows that in the past four National Congresses the emphasis primarily laid on 义, righteousness, 智, wisdom, 信, trust, and 忠, loyalty. Compared to the other three National Congresses, the nineteenth National Congress stands out, as the use of the Confucian terms has nearly doubled (Appendix A3). In the nineteenth National Congress there is an increase in the use of righteousness, wisdom, and loyalty, yet a decrease in the use of trust. Furthermore, the Nineteenth National Congress discusses仁, humaneness, and 孝, filial piety, which is new compared to the other National Congresses. This suggests an increase in

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Confucian values under Xi Jinping. Overall, the use of Confucianist terms is most profound in the nineteenth National Congress. This suggests a revaluation of Confucianism by Xi Jinping.

2.3.1.2. How is Chinese culture specified in the National Congresses?

In the sixteenth National Congress of 2002, it is mentioned by then president of the CCP Jiang Zemin that “the power of culture is deeply rooted in the vitality, creativity and cohesion of a nation. All Party members must fully understand the strategic significance of cultural development and make socialistic culture develop and flourish” (Jiang, 2002). This is an indication that the CCP uses culture as a political tool. Confucianism is not directly mentioned during this National Congress. The importance of cultivating a national spirit, however, is expressed in “confronted with interaction of different thoughts and cultures in the world, we must take it as a crucial task in our cultural development to carry forward and cultivate the national spirit and incorporate it into our national education and the entire process of building civilization so that the entire people are always filled with an enterprising spirit” (Jiang, 2002). With this the Chinese government points out that the Chinese should rely on their own culture, which is a nationalist argument. Furthermore, Jiang Zemin puts forward that “it is necessary to establish a socialist ideological and ethical system compatible with the socialist market economy and the socialist legal standard and consistent with the traditional virtues of the Chinese nation” (Jiang, 2002). What these traditional virtues are is not further specified in this report. It does, however, indicate that not solely should be relied upon communist values, and that there is space for a return to more traditional values. The focus of this National Congress, thus, still primarily lies on promoting communist values.

In the report of the seventeenth National Congress in 2007 Hu Jintao puts forward that culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion (Hu, 2007). This is in line with the previous National Congress. Although the emphasis in the seventeenth National Congress, lies on creating a socialist culture to make socialist ideology more “attractive and cohesive”, traditional Chinese culture is also mentioned. “We must have a comprehensive understanding of traditional Chinese culture, keep its essence and discard its dross to enable it to fit in with present-day society, stay in harmony with modern civilization, keep its national character and reflect changes of the time” (Hu, 2007). This reiterates that the CCP does not fully

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discard traditional Chinese culture and that it can even have a function in modern times. However, it is not mentioned what this traditional Chinese culture entails and is therefore open to interpretation.

The report of the eighteenth National Congress in 2012 was also made by Hu Jintao. In the report he puts forward that to achieve national rejuvenation, a new surge in promoting socialist culture must be created. A stronger emphasis is laid on the promotion of socialist culture, whereas before only its importance was mentioned. This is reflected by Hu Jintao, who states that “It is critical to inspire the cultural creativity of the whole nation. We should depend on reform of the cultural sector, release and develop cultural productive forces, foster a democratic atmosphere in both academic research and artistic pursuit, create a vast cultural arena for the people and encourage the free flow of cultural inspiration from all sources” (Hu, 2012). Furthermore, it is noted that the international influence of Chinese culture will steadily increase. To achieve this goal, several objectives are mentioned. On national level, the main objective is still to strengthen core socialist values, however, another objective that is mentioned is that civic morality should be improved. Which suggests that morality is a part of Chinese culture. The third objective that is mentioned is that a system for carrying forward fine traditional culture and promoting outstanding traditional Chinese culture should be developed. In the previous National Congress, the seventeenth, it was put forward that there should be a comprehensive understanding of traditional Chinese culture, yet now this traditional Chinese culture should be actively promoted as well.

The nineteenth National Congress argues an even stronger emphasis on Chinese culture, as the title of this report is Building Stronger Cultural Confidence and Helping Socialist Culture to flourish. Xi Jinping points out that “our country will thrive only if our culture thrives, and our nation will be strong only if our culture is strong'' (Xi, 2017). This is a very strong argument as he further suggests that the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is only possible with a rich and prosperous culture. Whereas in the previous reports Chinese socialist culture and traditional Chinese culture have been regarded as two separate entities, Xi Jinping now argues that “socialist culture with Chinese characteristics is derived from China’s fine traditional culture, which was born out of the Chinese civilization and nurtured over more than 5000 years” (Xi,

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2017). Thus, it is stated that contemporary Chinese socialist culture has been formed through traditional Chinese culture and therefore, traditional Chinese culture has value in the contemporary Chinese society. The primary objective for building a stronger cultural confidence and helping socialist culture to flourish is to hold the leading position in ideological work. The second objective is to cultivate and observe core socialist values, which will be based on China’s “fine traditional culture” (优秀传统文化, youxiu chuantong wenhua), keep alive and develop its vision, concepts, values, and moral norms, and do so in a way that responds to the call of our era. Thus, the features of Chinese traditional culture that can still be applied to modern day China lays primarily in the concept of morality.

Overall, culture has gained a more important role in the political discourse of the CCP, primarily on the aspect of promoting this culture. What the Chinese culture entails has also changed as now the traditional Chinese culture is regarded as an integral part of Chinese socialism, as it has played a role in forming socialism with Chinese characteristics. Furthermore, traditional Chinese culture is used in the context of morality, which suggests that along with the more general soft power, this is the main reason for reintegrating traditional Chinese culture. The following section therefore further elaborates upon how morality is addressed in the National Congresses.

2.3.1.3 In what context is “morality” part of the political discourse in the National Congresses?

Morality in the sixteenth National Congress is addressed in the section culture. It states that the “national spirit is the moral kingpin on which a nation relies for survival and development” (Jiang, 2002). This “national spirit” is based on the 5000 years of history the Chinese nation has been built on. This national spirit is something that exists in all Chinese people, and therefore the argument is made that this morality or moral code of conduct surpasses the ideology of the CCP.

In the seventeenth National Congress, morality is mentioned several times in different contexts. It is first mentioned in the chapter on culture, Promoting Vigorous Development and

Prosperity of Socialist Culture, in which it is put forward “We must keep to the orientation of advanced socialist culture, bring about a new upsurge in socialist cultural development, stimulate the cultural creativity of the whole nation, and enhance culture as part of the soft

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power of our country to better guarantee the people's basic cultural rights and interests, enrich the cultural life in Chinese society and inspire the enthusiasm of the people for progress” (Hu, 2007). Several objectives are then pointed out among which the second is interesting in this case as it mentions morality in the context that family virtues and individual morality should be enhanced and that ideological and moral education among young people can create a favorable environment for their healthy development. This means that in this regard morality plays a role on the level of the individual, and not solely on Party members. Besides, this section touches upon the culture of harmony that should be fostered. The second mentioning of morality is in the context of education, as within the education system there should be a focus on cultivating the moral integrity of students. Thirdly, it is put forward that Party members should uphold high ideological and moral standards, “so that they will set an example in putting into practice the socialist core values” (Hu, 2007). Lastly, holding moral standards high is mentioned in the context of combating corruption within the CCP. Again, these situations all reflect a lack of morality in Chinese society.

Morality in the eighteenth National Congress is also mentioned several times. The first time it is in the context of significantly improving China’s soft power. Focusing on moral and ethical standards play a role in this, and to achieve this more cultural works should be created. The chapter on developing a strong socialist culture also mentions morality several times. Primarily in “improving civic morality in an all-round way” (Hu, 2012). The education in public morality should be intensified, and traditional Chinese virtues should be advocated. Contrary to the previous National Congress, morality is tied to traditional Chinese virtues again. This might suggest the acknowledgement of the need for a wider promotion of Confucianism to further improve morality. Furthermore, as in the previous National Congress, again in the educational context morality is mentioned. Lastly, it is put forward that Party members should have a moral integrity, yet this is more in the context of the Chinese socialist culture, rather than specific traditional Chinese culture.

The nineteenth National Congress discusses morality already in the introduction of the report. This is in the context of corruption and that moral defenses against corruption are being prepared. In the chapter Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era, the need for

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moral integrity is mentioned in the context of the governance of the Party, which should be law-based in order to enhance this moral integrity. Furthermore, when discussing upholding core socialist values, it is argued that they “should cherish our cultural roots, draw on other cultures, and be forward thinking. We should do more to foster a Chinese spirit, Chinese values, and Chinese strength to provide a source of cultural and moral guidance for our people” (Xi, 2017). This suggests that pure socialist ideology lacks these aspects, and for that reason, there should be a return to traditional culture. That these morals come from fine traditional Chinese culture is also pointed out in the chapter on Building Stronger Cultural Confidence and Helping

Socialist Culture Flourish. One of the objectives outlined in this chapter is also dedicated to raising intellectual and moral standards, as a part of building awareness of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the Chinese Dream. Ultimately it is an integral part of the national rejuvenation of China. This is further reflected in the statement that the CCP will launch a civic morality campaign to “raise public ethical standards, enhance work ethics, family virtues, and personal integrity (Xi, 2017). The importance of moral integrity is further outlined in the section on socialist literature and art, as the CCP strives to strengthen the professional standards of artists and writers to see the emergence of a large number of eminent figures who have moral integrity and outstanding artistic appeal, and creators of inspiring works. This focus on cultural production was not there on the aforementioned National Congresses and provides an insight in the importance of China’s soft power on a more general level. The other mentions of morality in this report of the National Congress are again in the context of education of students and the moral integrity of Party members.

Overall, the discourse on morality in the National Congresses is connected to “fine traditional Chinese culture”. For that reason, it is also an integral part of Chinese socialist culture, as morality is developed through socialist culture. The focus on developing and cultivating morality seems to be raised because there is a lack of morality in society. Therefore, it should be brought into China’s educational system, and it should be enhanced within the Party itself. In the nineteenth National Congress this grip on morality is even put on the arts. Furthermore, the CCP stresses the cultivation of morality, rather than let it come from the Chinese people itself, or to leave it to their citizens themselves to live how they see fit.

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2.3.2 Xi Jinping and Confucianism

This section further dives into the political discourse of Xi Jinping. As discussed in the previous section, primarily with regard to the nineteenth National Congress of the CCP in 2017, under Xi Jinping there seems to be an increase in the implementation of Confucianism in his discourse.

This section provides an analysis of Xi Jinping’s speech at the commemoration of the 2565th birthday of Confucius. Xiangwei Wang frames this speech in an article in the South China Morning Post in 2014 as an endorsement of the promotion of Confucius by Xi Jinping. 8

The China Daily puts forward in an article in 2014 that Xi Jinping cites Confucius as a positive example for the modern Chinese nation.9_{The article further states that “the new leadership's}

endorsement of traditional culture has reached an unprecedented level since the establishment of New China in 1949, and Confucianism, the doctrine of the much-revered thinker, obviously resonates with Chinese today” (Zhao, 2014). This speech is thus very important as it states a clear shift with the situation of the decades prior. Furthermore, this speech was also used as a guideline for the Confucius Museum in Qufu which is analyzed in the following chapter.

2.3.2.1 Xi Jinping’s speech at the commemoration of the 2565th birthday of Confucius

This section provides an analysis of Xi Jinping’s speech in 2014 at the commemoration of the 2565th birthday of Confucius in Qufu, Shandong, following the previously discussed methodologies. Similar to the analysis of the National Congresses, the speech is first analyzed using the terms from the Five Constant Regulations and Eight Virtues (Appendix B1). Then is discussed to what extent Xi Jinping describes Chinese culture, which is followed by a discussion on how Xi Jinping discusses morality in his speech. In his speech, Xi Jinping says that China’s excellent traditional culture, including Confucianism, contains important enlightenment to solve contemporary problems, he then quotes several of these ‘wisdoms’, which are analyzed in Appendix B2.

In his speech, although referring to Confucius and Confucianism, Xi Jinping does not use the Confucian terms from the Five Constant Regulations and the Eight Virtues (Appendix B1).

8_{The South China morning post is a Hong Kong-based English-language newspaper founded in 1903.}

Since 2016 it is owned by the Alibaba Group, a Chinese multinational technology company.

9_{The China Daily is an English-language daily newspaper owned by the Publicity Department of the}

Chinese Communist Party.

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Instead, he refers to other Chinese values (Appendix B2). Most of these values are taken from Confucianism.

The central claim made in the speech is that the Chinese people can “learn the new by reviewing the past”. Xi Jinping voices several problems in current Chinese society. These are a continuous expansion of the gap between the rich and the poor, excessive pursuit of luxury, the vicious expansion of individualism, the continuous decline of social integrity, the deteriorating ethics and morality and the increasingly tense relationship between man and nature. The solution for these problems, he argues, lies in traditional Chinese culture, as they provide useful insight for people to understand and transform the world, can provide useful insights for state governance, and insights for moral construction. The focus on moral construction is, as pointed out in the previous section, reflected in the reports of the National Congresses, in particular in the Nineteenth National Congress. Promotion of traditional culture on the other hand, is primarily reflected in the Eighteenth National Congress.

Another point that Xi Jinping makes is that to understand contemporary China, it is necessary to have a deep understanding of China’s cultural heritage. Studying Confucius and Confucianism is an important way to understand the national characteristics of the Chinese people. Moreover, he emphasizes that Chinese Communists have always been advocates of China’s excellent traditional culture. This last claim is not entirely valid as during the Cultural Revolution traditional culture was regarded as contra-revolutionary. Thus, in this regard it can be argued that when the CCP refers to fine traditional culture it merely refers to certain aspects of this traditional culture.

Xi Jinping further outlines several principles that should be focused on which also reflect certain traditional Chinese values. These are to “maintain the diversity of world civilization”, which means that there can be harmony despite differences, “respect the civilizations of all countries and nations”, “properly conduct civilized learning and reference”, and to “treat cultural traditions scientifically” (Xi, 2014). These principles reflect certain core values of Confucianism such as the emphasis on harmony, which is the ultimate goal of Confucianism, to build a harmonious society. Furthermore, these principles reflect primarily harmony between countries and do not consider the different cultures in China itself.

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To conclude, this speech points out that Confucius and Confucianism are regarded as tools to achieve the national rejuvenation of China. The main aspects that Xi Jinping focuses on are morality and harmony. Furthermore, the speech on its own proves that Confucianism is an integral part of the government discourse, to the extent that certain values are branded as being part of Chinese traditional culture. Moreover, Xi Jinping presents Confucianism as a part of the Chinese Dream.

2.4 Conclusion

Confucianism seems to be used as an ideological basis for certain aspects in Chinese society that are keeping China from achieving national rejuvenation and achieving the Chinese Dream. Interesting to note is the fact that elements of traditional Chinese culture are used to substantiate this, instead of values that come from communism.

In the 1980s it is noted that there is more space for other thought systems than just Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. That in China Confucianism is growing again is reflected by the research centers dedicated to Confucianism that are established and the popularity of Confucianism is reflected by the increase of popular books on Confucianism in this period. During the reform period, China is facing several internal challenges, such as corruption on which the National Congresses elaborate. The solution for battling this corruption lies in enhancing the people’s morality. To further substantiate this, it is outlined that this morality was always part of China’s 5000 years of traditional culture. Xi Jinping also mentions this in his speech to commemorate the 2565th birthday of Confucius, when he outlines that the Chinese people can learn from traditional Chinese culture to face the challenges of contemporary China, among which is battling corruption. Certain traditional Chinese values. are regarded as solutions to challenges that contemporary China is facing. At the same time, the responsibility is put on Chinese citizens to be part of the solution. This is substantiated by the fact that there is an emphasis on the education of the Chinese people and of Party members.

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Chapter 3: The Case of the Qufu Confucius Museum

3.1 Introduction

Marzia Varutti explores in 2014 museums in China to gain a better understanding of contemporary Chinese politics. This chapter, therefore, examines the Confucius Museum in Qufu to gain an understanding of the current state of Confucianism in the PRC. This section first provides an introduction into the development of museums in China and their function. Then it outlines the relevance of analyzing a museum, providing a short academic background. This is followed by an extensive analysis of the Confucius Museum in Qufu. The analysis is divided into six subsections corresponding with the six galleries of the Confucius Museum. Using the findings of the previous two chapters, the analysis discusses how Confucius and Confucianism are displayed.

3.2 The relevance of studying a museum

Over the past century, museums have gained an increasingly important place in China. According to an article in the People's Daily in 2002, since the 1990s, the number of museums in China has increased vastly.10 _{Donghai Su discussed in 1995 that museums in China held}

different functions during the different political periods, which was strongly influenced by political events. During the Maoist period this function was exploited to the extent that museums served the political needs of the CCP (Su, 1995). This suggests that during this period, museums served a political purpose. Sofia Bollo and Yu Zhang assert in 2017 that museums in China are still used as a way of advancing a political agenda. They state that “museum institutions represent pivotal elements in public strategies to present and create national awareness and identity, insofar as their vast collections provide symbols of cultural identification” (Bollo & Zhang, 2017:1). After the Maoist period, museums have become increasingly important in China. This is evidenced by the aforementioned growth in the number of museums and by fact that the requirements for the development of museums have been incorporated into the Constitution of China (Constitution of the PRC, art 22). According to Su

10_{The People's Daily is the largest newspaper group in China. The paper is an official newspaper of the}

CCP.

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(1995), after the Maoist era, museums also resumed their cultural essence, being a show window of the country. This asserts that a museum not only propagates Chinese culture, but also that their function as a political tool did not fade.

Other scholars discuss the function of national museums with particular regard to their function in nation building. According to Peter Aronsson and Gabriella Elgenius in 2011, national museums are defined as “those institutions, collections and displays claiming, articulating and representing dominant national values, myths and realities” (Aronsson & Elgenius, 2011:5). The Confucius Museum in Qufu is not specified as a national museum, yet it is articulating and representing dominant national values. This is reflected by a statement on their website that puts forward that the Confucius museum is a “provincial specialized modern museum constructed by Shandong provincial party committee and government, which aims at carrying out the serious speech spirits addressed by General Secretary of Xi Jinping during his inspection of Qufu, inheriting and carrying forward the excellent traditional Chinese culture represented by Confucianism'' (Confucius Museum, 2020). Aronsson and Elgenius also assert in 2015 that national museums are a manifestation of cultural and political desires, which is also reflected by the statement of the Confucius Museum. Moreover, the Confucius Museum is supervised by the Department of Culture and Tourism of Shandong (Confucius Museum, 2020). Elizabeth Weiser points out in 2017 that national museums can have a strong motivational effect on civic life through a material demonstration of a national rhetoric. This means that the presented narrative of museums may directly influence the behavior of citizens. Furthermore, Ilaria Porciani states in 2015 that in “Eastern Europe, new national history museums seek to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of communism through new narratives” (Porciani, 2015:120). As discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis, in China there seems to be a moral vacuum the CCP wants to fill, using the narrative of “fine traditional Chinese culture”, of which Confucianism plays a big part. The moral function of a museum is also discussed by Su (1995), who puts forward that the Chinese government has a history of setting up museums for the purpose of raising the moral statues of visitors. He asserts that some of these moral values are esteemed as virtues which represent an important aspect of the national spirit, and therefore it is a museum's responsibility to publicize these virtues.

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3.3 Analysis of the Confucius Museum

This section dives into the Confucius Museum itself. Using the online tour provided by the Confucius Museum, an extensive analysis is conducted of the permanent exhibitions at the Museum (Appendix D). The Confucius Museum was opened in September 2019, and the museum covers an area of 55.000 square meters, has a collection of more than 700.000 cultural relics, including more than 300.000 files about the Confucius family and more than 40.000 classic books (Xinhua, 2019). Furthermore, the collection includes more than 8000 ancient costumes and several instruments used for paying tribute to Confucius. Furthermore, the museum offers free admission, both online and offline. The aim of the Museum is to carry out the spirit of Xi Jinping’s speech he made in Qufu in 2014 and to carry forward the “excellent traditional Chinese culture” represented by Confucianism.

Considering the website of the Confucius Museum (Appendix C) and the information in the museum itself which is mostly in Chinese (Appendix D), the target audience of the Confucius Museum are Chinese speaking visitors. Taking the size of the museum into account, the six permanent galleries are analyzed in their own subchapter. The Confucius Museum is divided into six main galleries, of which each has their own theme. The following sections chart the material ways in which the Confucius museum displays Confucianism using the online tour of the Museum (Appendix, D). This chapter concludes with an overall analysis on how Confucianism is portrayed in the Confucius Museum and to wat extent this portrayal of Confucianism corresponds with the vision on Confucianism of Xi Jinping.

3.3.1 Part 1: The Era of Confucius

The first exhibition of the museum is called the “Era of Confucius” and describes how Confucius’ time was one of turmoil. It is noted that the state of Lu, where Confucius was from, however, managed to preserve rituals from the Western Zhou (1047-772 BC), despite the political chaos. Furthermore, it asserts that it was Confucius who upheld the virtuous governance of exemplary rulers and that his forefathers were the first mythical emperors of China. This contributes to a sense that Confucius was a mythical person with outstanding qualities. The text concludes with a statement that Confucius’s thought is a crystallization of the early period of Chinese civilization and was a response to the dilemmas of that period. Confucius’ thought is thus

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presented as a solution to social dilemmas or problems. This corresponds with the suggestion made by Xi Jinping in his 2014 speech, that Confucianism can serve as a solution to contemporary problems.

The first subsection of the first part of the museum is called “Generations Pass along the Endless Flow of Time''. Written below the title of this gallery, on a wall in Chinese, it is emphasized that Confucius admired the legendary era of China, and that this historical heritage, which is thousands of years old, is an important foundation of his thought (Appendix D, 15). Confucius is portrayed as someone who follows the footsteps of the mythical emperors and kings of China (Appendix D, 20-21). This text asserts also that the Sage Kings of China chose virtue and ability, preached trust, and cultivated friendship with neighbors, and were widely supported by the people. This suggests that traditional Chinese values are in fact older than Confucianism itself, and later became incorporated into Confucianism. The significance of traditional Chinese culture is further shown by a section in which a vessel from the Shang dynasty is displayed besides a couple of vessels from the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). Although the material is different, they show a resemblance in form (Appendix D, 25).

The second subsection of the first part of the Museum is called “A Time of Challenges”. The texts describe how in Confucius’ time, morals were decreasing in society, because the ritual system collapsed and the people no longer adhered to their roles in society. This difficult time inspired thinkers to be positive nevertheless and puts forward Confucius as an example of this. It describes the practical application of Confucianism in Confucius’ time. In his speech, as discussed in section 3.2.3.1, Xi Jinping, basically puts forward the same point, stating that contemporary China faces many challenges, yet traditional Chinese values can serve as a solution. The turbulence of the Spring and Autumn period is further described as a period in which countries fight each other, underscored by a vast array of ancient weapons that are on display. In the National Congresses as described in the previous chapter of this thesis, there is also an emphasis on how countries should learn from each other in a harmonious way. This is also reflected in a more general vision of the Chinese government which opposes the infringement in other countries’ politics.

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The last subsection of the first part of the Museum is called “Archeological Insights into the Times of Confucius”. It reiterates that despite the turbulent time in which Confucius lived, he managed to hold on to the old rituals, and that when the state of Lu eventually was conquered by the state of Chu, the values of Lu were not subdued. Furthermore, it is stated that Confucian values coexisted with other cultures and were integrated in the local culture. This suggests that Confucianism is able to coexist beside other cultures. This is something that is also put forward in the commemoration speech of Xi Jinping, when he mentions the concept of “harmony despite differences”. This also means that Confucian values can exist beside socialist values, as there is already a precedent for this in Confucius’ own time, thereby proposing a certain consistency over the past centuries. What is further interesting to note in this part of the gallery is that a section from the Lunyu is on display, which is about being a junzi (Appendix D, 38). As pointed out in the first chapter of this thesis, a junzi is someone who lives up to the moral values of Confucianism. Mentioning this concept in this museum is a sign that there is a certain value attached to aspiring to be a junzi, as someone upholds moral values of Confucianism.

Although the title of this gallery is ‘the Era of Confucius’, it surpasses this specific time frame. On the one hand, it asserts that certain values that are labeled as Confucian are in fact older than Confucius himself, on the other hand, it asserts a contemporary application of Confucianism. This substantiates the claim that Confucianism is part of traditional Chinese culture.

3.3.2 Part 2: The Life of Confucius

This part of the museum gallery is about Confucius himself, and Confucius is described as “he had the courage of one that knew the futility of his actions and yet bore on for the sake of it, struggling for his ideals an entire lifetime” (Appendix D, 48). Contrary to the attitude towards Confucius in the decades prior, during the Maoist era, Confucius seems to be reinstated and even pictured as an ideal person.

The title of the first subsection is “The gentleman is fond of Rites”, thus another mention of the concept of junzi is outlined. Contrary to the single mention of junzi in the previous gallery, this section is fully dedicated to what being a junzi entails. This section also

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puts emphasis on education, as it states that Confucius was eager to learn and was sensitive, which laid a good foundation for his later career. Furthermore, in pictures on the walls, the duties of government class are depicted (Appendix D, 52-53).

The second subsection is called “Educating others without tiring” and the accompanying text asserts that Confucius educated a large number of junzi, who have both virtue and talent (Appendix D, 58). Furthermore, the text states that Confucius formed a set of educational methods and concepts that have had a profound impact upon later generations. This underlines the influence of Confucius upon later centuries.

The third subsection is a more general reflection on Confucius’ life, in which he travelled a lot. His travels are illustrated in the gallery with carriage artefacts from the Western Zhou period, and illustrations of people passing through the Song state in plain clothes (Appendix D, 65-67).

The last subsection is on “The Sage Accumulates the Great Accomplishments”, describes how Confucius eventually returned to Lu, and that he focused on education and cultural heritage in this period. It is also stated that Confucius became a “Master of Early Chinese cultural knowledge”. This section puts emphasis on education and Chinese cultural heritage, even stating that cultural heritage played an important role in Confucius’ life, suggesting that Confucianism is part of Chinese traditional culture, and that the Chinese traditional culture surpasses the time of Confucius. The gallery further shows a statue of a man with the caption “Be diligent in one’s studies”, thus emphasizing the importance of education (Appendix D, 69). There are also many scrolls on display and paintings from the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) of Confucius’ travels. These paintings also suggest a continuation in the appreciation of Confucianism. Even a visitor without prior knowledge can understand in this way that Confucianism is presented as having a profound influence in Chinese society.

Overall, the gallery on the life of Confucius highlights several aspects. In the first subsection, the concept of junzi is placed in the same context as the duties of government officials. This suggests, therefore, that government officials should maintain the moral values of ajunzi. Although not stated specifically, it therefore can be assumed that this is also applicable to government officials in contemporary China, regarding the continuity of Confucianism in

Confucianism in Contemporary China