The Islamic State: Territoriality through terror

’’Territoriality through terror’’

The

Islamic State

Burak Kurt – s1429647

Crisis and Security Management Supervisor - Dr. Alastair Reed Second reader – Bart Schuurman MA Leiden University 2016

A thesis submitted to the Campus The Hague of Leiden University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Crisis and Security Management By BURAK KURT Burak Kurt - s1429647 MSc Crisis and Security Management Leiden University Supervisor Dr. Alastair Reed Second reader – Bart Schuurman MA Date March 2016

P

REFACE

This thesis is proudly submitted to the Campus The Hague of Leiden University in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Crisis and Security Management. ‘’Of pain you could wish only one thing: that it should stop. [..] In the face of pain there are no heroes.’’ This quote from George Orwell’s novel 1984 best describes my wish during the last months of the research process. This thesis is the result of fighting in an academic battlefield of contested and diffuse concepts, disagreement about definitional issues and long nights of analyzing literature, news articles and primary sources.

I would like to thank Dr. Reed for providing invaluable supervision and comments during the research process. In particular, special thanks to my family, friends and colleagues for the unconditional support, and above all thanks to my mother who helped with the translation of Arabic and Quranic texts.

Being confronted with violence and war, graphic images in propaganda and hateful doctrines of violent actors may give an image of a dystopian world. Or leads to fear of the ‘unknown’. This thesis aims to make the unknown known by dissecting the strategy of the biggest and unprecedented contemporary challenge to international security: The Islamic State. Rotterdam/The Hague, March 2016 Burak Kurt

’’And if they incline to

peace

, then incline to it

[also] and rely upon Allah.

Indeed, it is He who is the

Hearing, the Knowing.’’

(Quran 8:61)

A

BSTRACT

The Islamic State poses one of the most prominent challenges to international and national security. It became internationally disreputable for its brutality and terror acts since it established a Caliphate in June 2014. The threat of the Islamic State to the international community posed new – and urgent – research questions and increased the need for a sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of violent activity. The labeling of the Islamic State by academia, state actors, public opinion and media is inconclusive, diverse and diffuse. Public opinion, governmental publications and academia characterize the strategy of the Islamic State as either ‘terrorism’ or ‘insurgency’. The contested relationship between the actual strategy of the Islamic State and the name applied, which undermines the ability to address the realities involved in the armed conflict, is addressed by positioning terrorism and insurgency as a strategy of irregular war and exposing the key differences along the lines of political, organizational and relational features that follow from the strategy in question. As such, the key differences are not about tactics, targets, motivations or causes. The dilemma at hand is that the Islamic State, on the one hand, conducts terrorist attacks from Baghdad to Paris, and on the other, is clearly pursuing a territorial agenda in Iraq and the Levant related to religious and political-military control. The analysis of primary sources and state of the art studies shows that the Islamic State aims to establish, control, expand and govern an Islamic State [a physical Caliphate] in the Dar al-Islam and to win an ‘apocalyptic war’ with the enemies of Islam by reviving and expanding (Sunni) Islam and Sharia law in controlled territories and abroad. This vision of ‘’Remaining and Expanding’’ is the strategic political objective guiding all the decisions of the Islamic State. As such, the Islamic State is clearly pursuing a strategy of insurgency through a territorial, political, social, and religious agenda. The Islamic State aims to provide an alternative form of governance by initiating a social and spatial process that assigns identities for the Umma within structures of religious, military and political power. It categorizes the controlled population in a manner that is only possible if non-Sunnis and adversaries are violently removed, coercively or voluntarily destroyed. This is significant because it shows that the Islamic State employs excessive and brutal terror attacks to transform a sociospatial area into a ‘space populated by ideology’. Terrorist tactics are used to achieve the conceived territoriality of the Umma and the Caliphate. Conventional campaigns are often complemented with terrorism tactics to shock and disorientate regime soldiers, serve as costly signaling (attrition), give false appearance of attacks (intimidation) and to create substantial damage. These tactics enabled the Islamic State to produce, shape, and control specific territories and critical areas. Terror attacks against civilians, such as the 2016 Baghdad bombings, aim to intimidate and coerce the population and increase sectarian tensions. This state of chaos is a critical requirement, or essential condition, for the Islamic State to control terrain and survive as an organization. It forces submission of the population through terrorism and warns civilians not to cooperate with government forces.

T

YPOLOGY OF

I

SLAMIC

S

TATE

’

S STRATEGY

Islamic State’s

insurgent

strategy: territoriality through terror

Political strategy The What? Objectives and ends Vision The Islamic State aims to establish, control, expand and govern an Islamic State [a physical Caliphate] in the Dar al-Islam and to win an ‘apocalyptic war’ with the enemies of Islam by reviving and expanding (Sunni) Islam and Sharia law in controlled territories and abroad. Strategic center of gravity: Control of terrain to serve as a physical caliphate. Strategic objectives: • Political-military and religious power; • Control of people and territory; • State-building and forming a governance; • Win an apocalyptic war; • Systematic and global messaging and branding. Organizational strategy The How? Strategic concepts and courses of action Sophisticated governance structure, hierarchal command and control, centralized decision making; strategy is aimed at increasing active militants and auxiliary support; recruitment processes and obtaining collaboration or support are less selective; (semi-)open operational environment; coercive methods (in group and out group) to prevent desertion; facilitating population support and mass mobilization; capable of generating resources. Relational and social strategy The How? Strategic concepts and courses of action Strategy is conducted through the people; some form of active population support, passive support or sympathy; direct interaction with population; coercion or intimidation of population; severing ties with government. Strategy-tactic nexus The repertoire of political violence Tactical dimension of territoriality The Islamic State employs excessive and brutal terror attacks to transform a sociospatial area into a ‘space populated by ideology’. The tactical dependence on terrorism is best understood as a critical requirement to secure strategic power. Terrorist tactics are used to achieve the conceived territoriality of the Umma and the Home of Islam. These tactics enabled the Islamic State to (re-)produce, shape, and control specific territories and critical areas. Islamic State shows the ability of conventional and ‘symmetric’ warfare (due to arsenal of heavy weaponry and mass mobilization of recruits), terrorist tactics aimed at military (to shock and disorientate, create damage, attrition and false appearance of attacks), terrorist tactics aimed at civilians (to intimidate and coerce into submission), guerilla warfare (utilizing its asymmetric and quantitative disadvantage in offensive attacks).

Preface

5

Abstract

6

Tables and Figures

11

Islamic State, Daesh, Da’ish, or …?

13

1. Introduction

17

1.1 Problem statement 18 1.1.1 Thesis statement 18 1.1.2 Conceptual problem: The politics of portrayal and the war on words 18 1.1.3 Research problem: categorization the Islamic State and capturing the realities of conflict 19 1.2 Relevancy 21 1.2.1 Gaining control over the interpretation of violence 22 1.2.2 Interpreting the violence of the Islamic State 23 1.3 Goal and Aims 24

2. Literature review and theoretical framework

26

2.1 The Debate: an introduction 26 2.1.1 State of the Art: detachment and the need for cross-polination 26 2.1.2 The academic Discourse: positioning studies on the Islamic State 28 2.2 Defining political violence 31 2.2.1 Violence 31 2.2.2 Political violence 34 2.3 A panoramic view: Ideologies and justification of political violence 36 2.4 Strategies of irregular war: violence and conflict 37 2.4.1 The notion of asymmetric and irregular wars 38 2.4.2 The insurgency-terrorism nexus 39 2.5 Defining the strategy of Insurgency 42 2.5.1 Insurgency as a strategy of irregular war 42 2.6 Defining the strategy of Terrorism 45

2.6.1 Terrorism as a strategy of irregular war 47

3. Methodology

50

3.1 Research questions 50 3.2 Operationalization and measurement 50 3.2.1 The theoretical framework 50 3.2.2 The analytical framework 56 3.3 Qualitative single case study 56 3.3.1 Case selection 57 3.3.2 Case description 58 3.4 Research methods: data analysis and data collection 59 3.4.1 Literature review 60 3.4.2 Document analysis 60 3.5 Data sources 61

4. Case study: The Islamic State

63

4.1 Introduction and background 63 4.1.1 The Jihad 63 4.1.2 Iraq and Syria 67 4.1.3 The evolution of the Islamic State 73 4.2 The Strategy, battlefield and violence of the Islamic State 78 4.2.1 The overarching strategy: state-building and territoriality 78 4.2.2 The five stages of Islamic State’s strategy 83 4.2.3 Discussion of the strategy and political objectives 92 4.3 Organizational features 94 4.3.1 Recruitment 94 4.3.2 Leadership & command and control 97 4.3.3 Economic model 99 4.3.4 Discussion of the organizational features 101 4.4 Social and relational features 102

4.4.1 Inter-organizational relations 102 4.4.2 Interaction with the population 103 4.4.3 Discussion of the social and relational features 105

5. Conclusions and further discussion

106

5.1 Conclusion 106 Typology of Islamic State’s strategy 110

Bibliography

112

T

ABLES AND F

IGURES

Table 2.1 The intension and extension of definitional strategies of violence Table 2.2 Terrorist group conceptualization, intension vs. extension Figure 3.1 Organization of concepts Table 3.2 The concept of violence: definitional strategies and dimensions Table 3.3 The concept of political violence: definition, indicators, and ideologies in relation to justification Table 3.4 Typology of political violence strategies: insurgency and terrorism Table 3.5 Analytical framework of strategies of insurgency and terrorism Table 3.6 List of key words Figure 4.1 The signatures of Sykes-Picot Figure 4.2 The original map of Sykes Picot (1916) Figure 4.3 Sanctuary Map of the Islamic State, July 8 ,2014 Figure 4.4 Sanctuary Map of the Islamic State, December 21, 2015 Figure 4.5 The first five issues of Islamic State’s magazine DABIQ Figure 4.6 Countries with Islamic State Provinces Figure 4.7 Value tree of Islamic State strategic and fundamental objectives Figure 4.8 Major attacks of (or inspired by) the Islamic State in 2015 Figure 4.9 Attacks against civilians by the Islamic State (outside Iraq and Syria) Figure 4.10 The leadership structure of the Islamic State Table 4.11 Overview of Islamic State’s revenues and expenditures

‘’HAPPINESS AMONG DESTRUCTION’’

ISLAMIC

STATE

,

D

AESH,

D

A’

ISH, OR

…?

The Islamic State has a long history of evolution and name changes (Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada 2016). This thesis uses the term ‘Islamic State’ throughout the text. Obviously, the use of the term does not endorse or recognize its legitimacy or statehood. The Islamic State is also known as:

‘’

Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, ISIL, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,

Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, ISIS, Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa

al-Sham, Al Qaida in Iraq, al-Qaida in Iraq, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Al Qaeda in

Iraq, AQI, AQI-Zarqawi, Tawhid, Tawhid and Jihad, Kateab

al-Tawhid, Brigades of al-Tawhid, Monotheism and Jihad Group, Al Qaida of

the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers, Al-Qaida of Jihad in the Land of

the Two Rivers, Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, Al-Qaida in the

Land of the Two Rivers, Al-Qaida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the

Two Rivers, Al-Qaida Group of Jihad in Iraq, Al-Qa'ida of Jihad in Iraq, Al-Qaida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers, The Organization of

Jihad's Base in the Country of the Two Rivers, The Organization of

al-Jihad's Base of Operations in the Land of the Two Rivers, The Organization

of al-Jihad's Base of Operations in Iraq, The Organization of al-Jihad's

Base in Iraq, The Organization of al-Jihad's Base in the Land of the Two

Rivers, The Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers, The

Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia, Al-Qaida in Mesopotamia,

Tanzim Qa'idat Al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, Tanzim al-Qaeda al-Jihad fi

Bilad al-Rafidain, Tanzeem Qa'idat al Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini, Jama'at

Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad, JTJ, Islamic State of Iraq, Islamic State in Iraq, ISI,

Mujahidin Shura Council, Unity and Holy Struggle, Unity and Holy War,

Unity and Jihad Group, al-Zarqawi Network

’’

ABU BAKR AL-BAGHDADI LEADER OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

Introduction

“

Doublethink means the power of

holding two contradictory beliefs in

one’s mind simultaneously, and

accepting both of them.

”

George Orwell, 1984

1.

INTRODUCTION

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi gained global attention on 29 June 2014 when the establishment of the Islamic State was announced in the city of Mosul and he was declared as the Caliph. The self-proclaimed Islamic State killed internationally over 400 people in 2015 with their attacks on a Russian airplane and killing spree’s in Beirut and Paris. The United Nations detailed the various war crimes of the Islamic State in the report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq (6 July – 10 September 2014). The findings show numerous infringements and restrictions of human rights and freedom, mass execution, sexual slavery, targeting of minorities and employment of child soldiers. It is estimated that the Islamic State attracted more than 27.000 foreign fighters since its establishment in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for hundreds of attacks on civilians from Sinai to Paris, stretching its violent outreach to the corners of different continents. The Islamic State is known for its expanding network of strategic alliances with groups who pledged loyalty to the Caliph. The orchestration of the theater of fear is not only employed through violent, deadly and symbolic attacks, but also through the strategic use of cyberspace. The corporate branding of the Islamic State is successfully constructed through its media outlet of Alhayat and mediums as YouTube and Twitter. The estimates of its Twitter accountants range from 46,000 to 70,000, mainly located Iraq and Syria (Berger & Morgan 2015). The Islamic State’s magazines DABIQ and Konstantiniyye showcases justification for and images of bombings, beheadings and other forms of violent action. The fifth issue of DABIQ magazine is dedicated to the political intentions and strategy of the Islamic State. The magazine is titled ’’Remaining and Expanding’’, or “baqiya wa tatamadad’’ in Arabic, and reflects the core modus operandi of the Islamic State as envisioned by its founding father Zarqawi (Lister 2014). The magazine quotes the second leader Abu Umar al-Baghdadi: ‘’The Islamic State is here to stay, even if all the Christians, Jews, mushrikin, and apostates despise such. And it will continue to spread to all corners of the Earth.’’

1.1

P

ROBLEM STATEMENT

1.1.1

T

HESIS STATEMENT

The contested relationship between the actual strategy of the Islamic State and the name applied, which undermines the ability to address the realities involved in the armed conflict, can be solved by positioning terrorism and insurgency as a strategy of irregular war and exposing the key differences along the lines of political, organizational and relational features that follow from the strategy in question (Bhatia 2005, Duyvesteyn and Fumerton 2015).

1.1.2

C

ONCEPTUAL PROBLEM

:

T

HE POLITICS OF PORTRAYAL AND THE WAR ON WORDS

Discursive problem: ‘Us and Them’ The act of naming makes the unknown known, and ‘’assigns […] a set of characteristics, motives, values and behaviors’’ (Bhatia 2005). This process enables the recipient or audience to understand, interpret and evaluate a given situation. Naming is particularly relevant in the discourses of political violence, insurgency and terrorism. It enables the viewer to evaluate the perceived threat and the morality or justification of the violence. Schroder and Schmidt (2001) note that ‘’violence without an audience will still leave people dead, but it is socially meaningless’’. Governments opposing violent uprising do not only engage in the psychical war but also in a ‘war on words’. The function of this ‘war’ is ‘’to attain a victory of interpretation and ensure that a particular viewpoint triumphs’’ (Bhatia 2005). Naming the adversary reflects the subjective viewpoint – with its underlying moral and ideological implications – and often serves political or propaganda purposes (Ganor 2002, Bhatia 2005, Jackson 2007). The named subject then becomes associated with normative principles and characteristics (Bhatia 2005). As a result, policy-orientated or popular naming undermines the local realities of a given conflict or armed group. An article of ‘The Week’ magazine notes ‘’the dilemma of what to call Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's terrorist group has been troubling politicians and the media since the militants began their advance across Iraq and Syria.’’ In addition, the online platform War on the Rocks notes that the brutality of the Islamic State ‘’derails mainstream understanding of the group and promotes damaging misconceptions in the discourse on radicalization and recruitment’’ (Winter 2015).

President Obama outlined the objectives of defeating the Islamic State in his address – on September 10th 2014 from the State Floor of the White House – on the U.S. led international coalition. Obama called upon the international community to ‘’eradicate a cancer like [the Islamic State]’ with a ‘broad coalition to roll back this terrorist threat’’. Obama explicitly defined the Islamic State as ‘’a terrorist group’’, and ‘‘a cancer […] that requires a sustained counterterrorism strategy.’’ The group is designated by the U.S. Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization since 2004 (State Department, n.d.). It is listed as a former part of

al-Qaeda in Iraq, under the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Beck and

Miner (2013) argue that formal terrorism designations by the United States influences the designations of other countries and rely on organizational markers of the perceived threat. Noteworthy is that the American and British governments show a bias towards Islamic organizations with the capability of aviation attacks, which are more often listed as a terrorist organization. The study of Beck and Miner (2013) supports the argument that typecasting based on ideological affiliation occurs and that it resulted mainly after the 9/11 attacks. Katzman (2008) notes this in his congressional report regarding Al Qaeda and the ‘war on terror’, ‘’[…] the Administration has repeatedly attempted to link in the public consciousness the Iraq war to the September 11 attacks in part because of consistent public support for a military component of the overall war on terrorism.’’ Held (2008) argues that international humanitarian laws favor state actors and nations, and are biased towards non-state actors by excluding state actors in the legal definitions of political violence, such as terrorism. These clarification and definitional obstacles are also evident in the current academic discourse on the conceptualization of political violence, and in particular with the insurgency-terrorism nexus.

1.1.3

R

ESEARCH PROBLEM

:

CATEGORIZATION THE STRATEGY OF

I

SLAMIC

S

TATE

AND CAPTURING THE REALITIES OF CONFLICT

As Schmidt (1992) argues, the academic arena of discourse is concerned with stipulating ‘’a definition which is useful for conducting research on the topic’’ (Weinburg et al. 2004). The analytical problem lies within the lack of useful concepts for academic and policy purposes (Della Porta 2006, Duyvesteyn and Fumerton 2015). Few concepts are as contentious as the concept of ‘terrorism’ (Crenshaw and Robison 2010). The definitional problems of the concept of terrorism has hindered analysis, added to ambiguity and compounds the confusion (Weinburg et al. 2004). Some even argue that the notion of terrorism has become an ‘’essentially contested concept’’ (Weinburg et al 2004). The application of the term ‘’conveys opprobrium’’ and attaches the named subject to normative principles and negative characteristics. Studies note that terrorism ‘’suffers from stretching and travelling problems’’, resulting in the subsets of Islamic terrorism,

begin and stop? How is it distinctive from other forms of political violence such as insurgencies? Terms are often used synonymously and interchangeably by analysts, policy makers and scholars (Bhatia 2005, Jackson 2007, Duyvesteyn and Fumerton 2015).

The editors of the special issue on Islamic State of the journal of Perspectives on Terrorism (2015) note that ‘’our understanding of [the Islamic State] is lagging behind the group’s battlefield advances.’’ In addition, Zohar (2015) stresses that armed non-state actors ‘’fight conventional wars including wars of positions in different stages of their struggle. They simultaneously employ terrorism, guerrilla, and regular warfare rather than advancing from one stage to another.’’ Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2015) argue that the growing interest in political violence surpassed ‘’the development of more penetrating analysis of the conceptual and empirical relationship between insurgency and terrorism.’’ The study of Blanchard (et al. 2014) illustrates this problem. Blanchard (et al. 2014) states that the Islamic State is an ‘’insurgent terrorist group’’ and advices the US government to adopt ‘’new counterterrorism goals.’’

The categorization of the Islamic State is further problematized due to the lack of cross-pollination in the study of political violence (Crenshaw and Robison 2010, Boyle 2012, Verdeja 2012). This ‘field of tension’ can be explained in twofold. On the one hand there is a disaggregation in the studies of political violence into its types. This ‘trend of detachment’ leads to a lack of consensus definitions and problematizes the understanding of political violent groups. Boyle (2012) notes that ‘’the study of each type of political violence is now a world of its own, largely detached from the developments in research on other types of political violence. As scholars have disaggregated the problem of political violence, it has become increasingly difficult to keep up with research in related topics and see the connections between the similar types of violent behavior.’’ On the other, the study of political violence is characterized by a lack of (panoramic) typology that provides a wider research- and contextual framework (Crenshaw and Robison 2010, Boyle 2012, Verdeja 2012, Hollander 2009). As a result, general theories and comparative studies between insurgency and terrorism are hindered, due to lack of cross-pollination of research advances. Boyle (2012) notes that this is illustrated in the wholly different bibliographies between studies in terrorism and other similar forms of violence, or so-called ‘kinship concepts’. Positioning terrorism as an ‘exceptional act’ undermines the understanding of this specific type of violence, because it is often used simultaneously with other types of political violence (Boyle 2012).

The contested relationship between the actual strategy of the Islamic State and the name applied undermines the realities ‘on the ground’ and leave policy makers behind with salient questions regarding the extent and complexity of the threat (Berger 2014). The labeling of the

Islamic State by academia, state actors, public opinion and media is inconclusive, diverse and diffuse. Public opinion, governmental publications and academia characterize the strategy of the Islamic State as either ‘terrorism’ or ‘insurgency’ (Russell 2004, Brachman and McCants 2006, Eisenstadt and White 2005, Lewis 2013, Katagiri 2015, Blanchard et al. 2015, Ganor 2015, Khatib 2015, Barrett 2014, Lister 2014, Kalyvas 2015). The tactics and operations are characterized as a mix of conventional and irregular/asymmetric warfare, and labeled as hybrid, guerilla or terrorist (Ibid.).

The academic discourse regarding the Islamic State exposes several competing frameworks. Lister 2015 argues that ‘’while a group like IS, which represents a qualitative step beyond a mere ‘terrorist organization,’ is militant at its core, it is reliant above all else upon societal and political instability, which can generally only be solved through a constructive engagement with those root causes.’’ Studies which label the Islamic State as ‘terrorism’ often interpret the group as an ‘Al Qaeda redux’ (Kadercan 2015). These terrorist frameworks are accompanied with emphasis of the target of attacks (namely civilians), the unprecedented brutality of terrorist tactics, and the clandestine nature of the organization. The other dominant framework is that of an insurgent or revolutionary organization (Katagiri 2015, Kalyvas 2015m Barret 2014). The label is applied while emphasizing its territorial control, social services and governance. Kalyvas (2015) argues that ‘’if we conceive of revolution as the attempt to put a utopian social program into action, such that its resulting application would upend existing social and political relations in a significant way, then clearly ISIS is a revolutionary group.’’ Lia (2015) positions the Islamic State as a proto-state and describe its distinctive characteristics such as its territoriality and the provision of social services. The author argues, ‘’a jihadi insurgent group whose enforcement of Sharia is halfhearted and whose commitment to jihad is compromised by peace talks with the enemy will not attract ideologically committed foreign fighters.’’ In addition, Gated and Podder (2015) argue that ‘’as a rebel organization at war, IS seeks military victory. Unlike many other jihadist groups, such as the Taliban, who seek to hold and govern territory (but within a confined space), IS is the only group that combines rebel governance with expansionist territorial ambitions – to create an Islamic Caliphate.’’ Cronin (2015) qualifies the Islamic State as a proto-state, by emphasizing the nature of the organization. The author notes, ‘’if isis is purely and simply anything, it is a pseudo-state led by a conventional army. […] simply killing isis' leaders would not cripple the organization. They govern a functioning pseudo-state with a complex administrative structure.’’

1.2

R

ELEVANCY

The Islamic State poses one of the most prominent challenges to international and national security, and is regarded as one of the wealthiest and well-equipped violent groups (Barrett

2014, Saltman and Winter 2014, Philips 2015, Ganor 2015, Kalyvas 2015). The Islamic State attracted thousands of foreign fighters and targeted civilians with attacks in Iraq, Syria and abroad (Barrett 2014, Philips 2015). Modern threats such as the Islamic State posed new – and urgent – research questions and increased the need for a sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of violent activity (Boyle 2012). The analysis of Islamic State’s violence and conceptualization of insurgency and terrorism is important in order to make sense of the character of contemporary war and for the design of sustainable counter-strategies (Duyvesteyn and Fumerton 2015).

1.2.1

G

AINING CONTROL OVER THE INTERPRETATION OF VIOLENCE

Analyzing the definitional strategies and discourse of political violence, insurgency and terrorism helps to understand the ways participants and observers make sense of violence (Demmers 2012). Schroder and Schmidt (2001) stress the ‘dialectic nature’ of violence by emphasizing the complex relationship between ‘violent imaginaries’ (narratives, symbols and meanings of violence) and the actual violent practices. These imaginaries convey notions of self-identity and ideas of legitimation of violence, and is attributed to historicity, emotional value and instrumental reasoning (Demmers 2012). As Hollander (2009) argues, ‘’the legitimation of contemporary political violence is central to its understanding.’’ Re-interpreting previous wars into the present and the future generates symbolic value (Demmers 2012). It illustrates the performative quality of violence by emphasizing its expressive and communicative aspects. Brass (1996) notes, ‘’the struggle over meaning of violence may not lead to a consensus or a hegemonic interpretation. It will certainly not lead to a truth but at most to a ‘regime of truth’ which will give us a pre-established context into which we can place future acts of a similar type into the same context and for the reinterpretation of previous acts of violence in history.’’ Acknowledging the different arenas of discourse makes defining terrorism and insurgency more manageable (Weinburg et al. 2004). The analysis of Islamic State’s strategy should be separated from the official naming by governments in order to understand the complex nature of its violence and to result in adequate counter-measures (Moghadam et al. 2014). The analytical framework of this thesis positions terrorism and insurgency as strategies of irregular war and differentiates the types of political violence along the lines of its political, organizational and relational features. This typology of terrorism and insurgency should be considered as ideal types. As Bhatia (2005) argues, ‘’while a name may reflect the core or essential qualities of an object, some aspects of the character will remain outside the descriptive boundaries of the name applied’’. This thesis aims to understand violence by emphasizing the ‘’creative way in which people interpret meaning during course of interaction’’, and ‘’calls for a view on theory

building and sense making’’ (Demmers 2012). The analytical framework of Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2015) offers policy makers and analysts ‘’the conceptual clarity required for governments to make a more accurate assessment of their adversary.’’ Furthermore, the authors state that ‘’a clear and coherent analytic framework can provide both scholars and practitioners ammunition with which to challenge the politics of labeling, and the simplistic and phenomenon-conflating hegemonic state and media discourses that commonly takes the place of careful analysis in the post-9/11 world.’’

1.2.2

I

NTERPRETING THE VIOLENCE OF THE

I

SLAMIC

S

TATE

Wars and conflict are often depicted in discourses of ‘us and them’, good and evil, state and non-state, political violence and criminal violence, belligerents and civilians (Kalyvas 2003). The struggle of the international community with the Islamic State illustrates the complexity of contemporary non-state armed groups. The lines between state and non-state actors are blurred, as contemporary non-state armed actors such as IRA, ETA, Hezbollah and the Islamic State increasingly gained state symmetry by filling in the governance and security gaps in conflict areas. Understanding (the variety of) political violence by non-state actors is key for conflict resolution. Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2015) stress that ‘’[…] exercise is more than just academic. Crucially, the conceptual differentiation posited [in the analytical framework] helps us to identify the critical vulnerabilities of each strategy, in turn providing important pointers as to what counter-measures may be appropriate’’ In addition, Brass (2010) notes that ‘’virtually all forms of collective violence, far from being senseless, have strategic purposes: intimidation of the other, consolidation of one’s own group, forced migration, etcetera’’ and that ‘’the strategic character of such forms of killing also ought to be evident.’’ Binary frameworks of ‘us and them’ and ‘good and evil’ undermine the complexity of political violence, insurgency and terrorism. These frameworks fail to grasp the similarities and differences between acts of violence, the combination of identities and actions, and the variety of shifting coalitions and strategies (Kalyvas 2003). In reference to the War on Terror, Berger (2014) notes that policy makers’ most salient problem is the struggle to interpret the dynamics of the battlefield and to distinguish between in- and out-group members. Berger (2014) stresses that the ‘’black and white nature of the policy structure presents significant complication when it comes to particulars, such as the question of whether to designate Syrian rebel groups with al Qaeda sympathies as terrorist organizations subject to sanctions.’’ A special issue of the

Perspectives on Terrorism journal (2015) stresses that defining the adversary and its strategy is

In an attempt to provide ‘’more fine grained measurement of regional group involvement in international operations’’, Hegghammer and Nesser (2015) assessed the threat of the Islamic State to the international community by analyzing its messaging of strategic objectives and connection to violent plots. The authors argue, ‘’the big question, of course, is whether the [the Islamic State] leadership might change strategy and start mounting major operations in addition to the smaller ones it is already inspiring’’ and that ‘’Western governments should make strategic plans’’ on scenario’s for counter-measures based on the strategy the Islamic State is currently employing. The British Army’s doctrine for operations (2010) notes ‘’[the character of war] evolves and is changed by human experience, innovation and the dynamics of conflict itself. In its nature, conflict is dangerous, violent, complex, often irrational and frequently chaotic. The character of conflict changes, sometimes very quickly; it can appear that everything is new in conflict, except its nature. The implications of this distinction for armed forces are profound. They need to be agile and relevant to deal with the character of conflict, while maintaining a hold on the realities of its nature.’’ Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2015) argue that ‘’it is imperative that analysts and policy makers alike are able to distinguish the qualitative differences between the strategy of terrorism and the strategy of insurgency in order to respond to them appropriately, and that a misreading of an opponent’s strategy can have undesirable consequences.’’ In addition, a special report of the Crisis Group ‘Exploiting Disorder: al Qaeda and the Islamic State’ (2016) advises governments to ‘disaggregate not conflate’. The research group notes that in order to stop violence and stimulate conflict resolution, governments should understand the shifting dynamics and distinguish between groups with different goals and strategies.

1.3

G

OAL AND

A

IMS

The analytical end of this thesis is to interpret and define the strategy of the Islamic State through the lens of political violence. The goal is to provide nuance in the academic and political discourse regarding Islamic State’s strategy, by separating the official and popular labeling of Islamic State ‘’from the [academic] analysis of their origins, conduct and threat potential’’ (Moghadam et al. 2014). This thesis aims to offer clarity of diffuse concepts of political violence by theorizing and by positioning insurgency and terrorism as strategies of irregular war. The research aims to understand particular understandings regarding the Islamic State by reviewing the definitional strategies of political violence. A categorical distinction of terrorism and

Literature review and

“Power is not a means; it is an end. One does not establish

a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the revolution in order to establish the dictatorship. The object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of power is power.”

George Orwell, 1984

2.

L

ITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1

T

HE

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NTRODUCTION

As with many concepts in social science, the concepts of political violence, insurgency and terrorism are diffuse and contested (Crenshaw and Robison 2010, Boyle 2012). This literature review provides conceptual clarification criteria, explicit definitions and operationalization in order to address the problems with concept ambiguity in the study of political violence. The object under study is political violence, as a whole but also its disaggregation into the subsets of insurgency and terrorism. Explicit definitions and measurements are crucial for comparative analysis between both forms of political violence (Crenshaw and Robison 2010, Boyle 2012, Duyvesteyn and Fumerton 2015). This literature review analyses the empirical and conceptual relationship between the key concepts of political violence, terrorism and insurgency. The main questions guiding this section are: what are the definitional strategies through which to understand and define political violence, and how can we define the concepts of insurgency and terrorism? This section contains contributions for the design of an analytical framework of political violence. The following introductory paragraphs describe on the one hand the academic debate regarding the theoretical isolation of types of political violence, and on the other, the current debate and perspectives on the Islamic State. The sections address the relevancy of this thesis and positions the Islamic State in the broader discourse, by reflecting on the state of the art in the study of political violence and the post 9/11 academic debate about Islamic terrorism.

2.1.1

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TATE OF THE

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DETACHMENT AND THE NEED FOR CROSS

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POLINATION

Violent uprisings in recent history – such as Rwanda, Afghanistan and 9/11 - initiated new research questions with important policy and academic implications (Boyle 2012, Verdeja 2012). Recent scholarship in the study of political violence ushered an expansion in quantity and quality of research and resulted in significant changes in the scope and orientation of the study of political violence (Boyle 2012, Verdeja 2012). As argued in the problem statement, the study of political violence is characterized with a field of tension between on the one hand isolation and

detachment of specific types of political violence, and on the other, the lack of cross-pollination of approaches and ideas (Hollander 2009, Boyle 2012, Straus 2012, Verdeja 2012). Cross-pollination studies aim to situate different types of political violence in a wider research- and contextual framework. Boyle (2012) argues that the study of political violence in increasingly detached from the study of terrorism. Positioning terrorism as an ‘exceptional act’ undermines the understanding of this specific type of violence, because it is often used simultaneously with other types of political violence (Boyle 2012, Verdeja 2012). Boyle argues that ‘’to understand terrorism is to locate the choice for that particular tactic in context with their strategic ambitions and the other tactical choices made from that repertoire.’’ Despite the argument that the disaggregation of political violence into separate fields of study provides insight in the causes and processes at different stages of violence, the trend of detachment poses problems for comparative analysis between similar subsets of violence, such as insurgency and terrorism. Panoramic studies of political violence aim to provide an overview of different aspects of kinship concepts – such as genocide, terrorism and insurgency -, and enable identification of the links between similarities and differences in codes of conduct. In addition, it helps to understand the scope and repertoire of violent political action (Hollander 2009, Boyle 2012, Straus 2012, Verdeja 2012). Straus (2012) and Boyle (2012) argue that the study of political violence has become more sophisticated and requires overcoming the theoretical isolation of different types of political violence, by embedding the related concepts in a broader research framework. The latter is reinforced in their remarks regarding respectively terrorism and genocide. Boyle (2012) stresses that ‘’to understand terrorism is to locate the choice for that particular tactic in context with their strategic ambitions and the other tactical choices made from that repertoire.’’ In addition, Straus (2012) argues that ‘’the study of genocide should be embedded in a broader study of political violence […] and that students of genocide should ask why genocide and not another outcome occurs […].’’

Respecting both the specificity and broader positioning of types of political violence strengthens comparative analysis between different forms, and helps to identify unique or common empirical and theoretical findings, explaining patterns and codes of conduct of violence (Straus 2012). The analytical focus of this thesis is aimed to ‘’distinguish A from whatever is not-A’’, in order to derive variables from concepts for data analysis (Sartori 1984). The method of comparative analysis is applied to conceptualize political violence and compare strategies of insurgency and terrorism, by investigating patterns, similarities and differences provided by literature. The comparative analysis of strategies of terrorism and insurgency is useful to conceptualize and distinguish forms of political violence and understand contemporary conflicts. In addition, acknowledging different definitional strategies shows that different definitions favor

particular understandings, and in return shape research efforts. This post-structuralism approach is useful for understanding concept-formation.

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POSITIONING STUDIES ON THE

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The 9/11 attacks introduced an era of heightened attention for terrorism and, subsequently, a transformation of security policies and military doctrines of Western governments and international organizations (Jackson 2007). The aftermath of 9/11 elevated ‘terrorism’ as a key component of contemporary policy-making and academic discourse. In the modern era, terrorism leveled the important political debates about human rights and climate change (Jackson 2007). As the term became ‘mainstream’, the notion of terrorism is employed in political and popular discourses with ‘’a set of unacknowledged assumptions and embedded political-cultural narratives’’ (Jackson 2007). The dominant academic discourse centered around defining terrorism; studies of Schmid (1988), Ganor (2002), Weinberg (2004), Bhatia (2005), and Jackson (2007) aimed to dissect the key defining elements, assumptions, labels and narratives of terrorism. Some studies noted that the discourse of terrorism is intellectually contestable, politicized or harms the efforts of designing counter-measures against violence (Jackson 2007). Weinberg (et al. 2004) noted that the ‘war of words’ strengthens the ambiguity and confusion, even to the point that researchers labeled terrorism an ‘essentially contested concept’. Labeling the activities of a state or social and political group as terrorism carries moral and normative implications (about legitimacy of violent action) and conveys opprobrium (Weinberg et al. 2004). Both states and non-state groups recognized the propaganda and political advantage of the use of terms such as ‘rebels’, ‘guerilla fighters’ and ‘freedom fighters’ (Ganor 2002, Bhatia 2005). Due to the use of the term terrorism for political effect and propaganda advantage, the concept suffered from negative connotations and ‘’border and membership problems’’, resulting in the difficulty to distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence (Weinberg et al. 2004, Jackson 2007, Ganor 2002). Also, as argued, terrorism became more detached from the study of political violence and became a ‘world of its own’ with other normative considerations and guiding analytical categories.

The outbreak of studies on Al Qaeda after 2001 illustrated the particular attention of academics from the field of political violence, law, and religious terrorism regarding the concept of ‘Islamic terrorism’. This specific label of terrorism emerged from studies of ‘religious terrorism’ and is embedded in broader institutional and discursive foundations of Western thought (Jackson 2007, Weinberg et al. 2004, Gray 2007). Studies show that core assumptions and narratives of ‘Islamic terrorism’ are rooted in influential works from orientalist scholarship, such as Samuel Huntington ‘Clash of Civilizations’, and terrorism studies, such as David Rapoport’s seminal

article in 1984 (Weinberg et al. 2004, Jackson 2007). Huntington went as far as to state that ‘Islam has bloody borders’. Scholars in the field of orientalism and terrorism often appeared on different ‘arenas of discourse’. These scholars transmitted core assumptions and narratives of Islamic terrorism from the academic arena to the public and political arena (and vice versa) (Weinberg et al. 2004). Jackson (2007) argues that the discourses of Islamic terrorism draw on traditions of political-cultural narratives of the ‘War on Terrorism’ as well as cultural stereotypes in mainstream media. In November 2001, CNN reported a ‘brainstorm session’ between Hollywood’s major studios and White House representatives, described as a ‘’lively exchange of ideas’’ and aimed to include Hollywood in the war against terrorism. Similarly, in February 2016, the Guardian reported on the meeting between US secretary of state John Kerry and Hollywood, and stated that the aim is ‘’to counter the narrative that [the Islamic State] is providing and to see how film might take an important role’’ (Lee 2016). The discursive and conceptual problems are still relevant in the contemporary debate regarding the Islamic State. As argued, the discourse of Islamic terrorism and the Islamic State is contestable and consists of unacknowledged assumptions and politicized narratives. Understanding discursive foundations of ‘Islamic State’ discourse is important because it influences the measures taken (Bhatia 2005). When labeled as ‘terrorist’ or ‘evil’ in the political arena, the named subject cannot be appeased, with the result of hindering conflict resolution. These foundations can also be found in the academic and political debate regarding the Islamic State. As Obama stated, the Islamic State is ‘’a [growing] terrorist threat [and a] trace of evil’’, and ‘‘it will take time to eradicate a cancer like [the Islamic State]’’ (emphasis added). These kind of qualifications and threat assessments undermine long-term solutions and fail to grasp Islamic State’s simultaneous existence as political entity, social service provider, and military force (Cafarella et al. 2016, Jackson 2007). These assumptions and narratives are incorporated in counter-policies and trouble the understanding of the Islamic State, either by exaggerating the threat or restricting the ‘legitimate knowledge’ regarding the group as a contrasting and negative ‘other’ (Jackson 2007). This narrative enables governments to pursue international and political projects and to construct and maintain a national identity (Bhatia 2005, Weinburg et al. 2004).

The rationale for governments’ language implies that the ‘eradication of the cancer’ can only take the form of total annihilation. Or as Obama stated, ‘’to degrade and ultimately to destroy the terrorist group known as ISIL.’’ Another noteworthy element in the discourse is careful qualification to mitigate the use of assumptions and names that could be interpreted as pejorative. Obama noted, ‘’[the Islamic State] is not “Islamic.” No religion condones the killing of innocents. And the vast majority of [Islamic State’s] victims have been Muslim.’’ These ‘careful qualifications’ are often accompanied by oppositional binaries, such as ‘moderate and extremist

Muslims’’ or, as Obama stated, ‘’the world against terrorists’’. The statement and narrative of the US President aims to shape and retain a particular image of and approach to the Islamic State (Jackson 2007). Obama stated, ‘’[the Islamic State] is a terrorist organization, pure and simple.’’ As argued, narratives like these influence threat assessments and undermine the realities of the conflict and adversary. This in turn leads to logical fallacies, with the result of a contested relationship between the perception of the threat and the actual threat of the Islamic State. The special issue on the Islamic State of the Perspectives on Terrorism journal (2015) noted that further research is needed to improve our understanding of Islamic State’s advances in Iraq and Syria. Although unlike the previous peak of academic interest in Al Qaeda, the contemporary challenge of the Islamic State to the Middle East and wider international community posed substantial new research questions and fueled the academic debate regarding political violence, and especially, Islamic terrorism. The Islamic State became internationally disreputable for its brutality and terror acts, as well as the instrumentality of violence for political and propaganda effect. Publications and studies dominantly focus, on the one hand, on the type and extent of the threat and, on the other, the design and monitoring of a counter-strategy (Lister 2015, Hegghammer and Nesser 2015).

These research issues are intertwined; making sense of the war and the threat, and understanding the nature of the adversary is crucial for the design of effective counter-measures that exploit the weaknesses of Islamic State’ strategy (Jackson 2007, Bhatia 2005, Duyvesteyn and Fumerton 2015). This thesis aims to strip the (discourse of) Islamic State from ideological and political assumptions and provides an alternative way in which the Islamic State is interpreted and understood. The case study tests Duyvesteyn and Fumerton’s (2015) analytical framework of strategic differentiation. This approach aims to strip the notions of Orientalism and other influences regarding terrorism, by separating the attributes of the action from attributes of the actor. The following sections review the lexicon of political violence, which results in an analytical framework that categorically differentiates between terrorist and insurgent strategies of irregular war. This framework helps to understand and position the Islamic State, by breaking the strategy into its component parts and analyzing the overarching strategic principles guiding the violent actions in controlled territories and abroad. The political, organizational, and relational and social features that follow from the strategy are discussed through the lens of insurgency and terrorism.

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EFINING POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Due to a lack of consensus on key indicators and conceptual implications, the term political violence is used to refer to various violent acts, such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, rioting, terrorism, insurgency, civil wars, coup d’état, dictatorship and revolutions (Samaranayake 1997, Samaranayake 1999). Moreover, the term is historically bound, often based on ideology, and varies among (social and political) groups and across geographical area (Della Porta 2006, Ozdamar 2008). This diversity and disaggregation of the study of political violence resulted in concept ambiguity (Boyle 2012). As argued in the problem statement, the analytical problem lies within the lack of useful concepts for academic and policy purposes (Della Porta 2006, Duyvesteyn and Fumerton 2015). Della Porta (2006) identifies three thresholds for conceptual clarity: neutrality/univocality, communicability and discrimination. The challenge within the study of political violence is to define concepts abstractly in theoretical terms and identify differentiation criteria or thresholds that captures the phenomenon being studied. The aim for the conceptualization in this thesis is to provide typological clarity in order to comparatively assess and define insurgency and terrorism. Communicability and explanatory power is increased through standardization of definitions and concepts (Ozdamar 2008).

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IOLENCE

Violence is defined by numerous adjectives, such as structural, instrumental, political, physical violence, or defined by pejorative meanings, often implicitly or explicitly referring to ‘illegitimate’ violence or used by those who defend the status quo (Garver 1968, Garver 1973, Coady 2007). The latter definition implies a biased view in favor of the established order and bring an ‘’initial opprobrium upon the non-state actors’’ (Coady 2007). Violence is a central theme in political science, the discourse reveals a variety of definitional strategies that embark on or emphasize certain normative or ideological propositions (Van der Dennen 2005, Coady 2007). The Cambridge Handbook of Violent Behavior and Aggression (2007) states that academic definitions of violence vary and emphasize ‘’different aspects of motivation, impact, and action and [differ in] psychological, social, and political meaning.’’

Coady (2007) distinguishes three types of definitions, namely wide, restricted and legitimate definitions. Grundy and Weinstein (1974) and Van der Dennen (2005) approach the definitional issues with different emphasis and identify expansive and ethical, observational, and orthodox or narrow definitions of violence. The authors note that violence is defined in different terms, namely ‘violence in terms of violation’, ‘violence in terms of physical force’, and ‘violence in terms of illegitimate force’. The different definitional strategies can be distinguished in practically three schools of thought. First, definitions that aim to equate physical and psychological violence are regarded as wide, ethical or expansive definitions. This approach aims

to define violence in terms of violation of basic human rights. Second, definitions that aim to equate state and non-state violence are regarded as restricted or observational definitions. This approach narrows down the wide definition by focusing on the observational act of psychical violence. The third and last definitional strategy aims to define violence in terms of legitimacy and are regarded as legitimist, narrow or orthodox definitions. This approach narrows down the restricted definition and distinguishes between defense of the established authority (as ‘force’ or as legitimate violence) and against the established authority (as ‘violence’ or illegitimate violence). Table 2.1 provides an overview of the intension and extension of definitional strategies of violence. Violence defined in terms of violation: wide, ethical and expansive definitions • Wide definitions include a vast range of inequalities and injustices within the extension of the definition of violence (Bufacchi 2005). One of the most cited definitions is from Garver (1968) where he argues that the central understanding of violence is the act of violating a basic human right, namely one’s body and the right to autonomy (Garver 1968, Coady 1986, Coady 2007, Van der Dennen 2005, Grundy and Weinstein 1974). Violence in terms of violation is regarded by Van der Dennen (2005) and Bufacchi (2005) as an expansive and ethical definition due to the positioning of the act of violation as the rationale for defining violence. Van der Dennen (2005) argues that ‘’the key to this [definition] is the equation of physical attacks on persons with institutional denial of opportunity [or psychological violence].’’ However, Coady (2007) contrasts this inclusion of psychological violence and violation of human rights, by stating the dissimilarity between ‘’stabbing a beggar to death, or ignoring his [or her] plea to assistance.’’ Garver (1968) provides a response to the latter point by stating that ‘’if we fail to recognize that real psychological violence can be perpetrated on people, a violation of their autonomy, their dignity, their right to determine things for themselves, to be humans rather than dogs, then we fail to realize the full dimension of what it is to do violence.’’ The difference between these views is the focus on ‘’the manner of acting [or] the way in which the outcome ensues.’’ Coady (2007) notes that these definitions are often elicited by the United States’ political left, often referring to ‘structural violence’ to address their interests.

Violence in terms of physical force: restricted and observational definitions

• Restricted definitions are often referred to as the ‘normal and ordinary’ understanding of violence. Violence refers in common language to ‘‘behavior involving physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone or something’’ (Coady 2007, Oxford Dictionary 2015, emphasis added). The World Report on Violence and Health (2014) defines violence as: ‘’the intentional

use of physical force of power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation.’’ Coady (2007) argues that this definitional strategy is the most politically neutral. This definition narrows the wide definitions by incorporating ‘physical injury or force’ and excluding psychological violence or injury (Coady 2007). Violence in terms of physical force is regarded as an observational definition and does not differentiate among the sources, effects and purpose of violence (Grundy and Weinstein 1974). This definition narrows the expansive definition and is grounded in the ‘‘observational act of applying physical force’’ (Van der Dennen 2005, Grundy and Weinstein 1974). Van der Dennen (2005) argues that ‘’the key to this [definition] of violence is equating force exercised by the state and force exercised by people who are [non-state actors].’’

Violence in terms of legitimacy: legitimist, narrow or orthodox definitions

• The last type mentioned by Coady (2007) is the legitimist definition, often used in the United States by conservative or right wing liberals. The legitimist definition explicitly or implicitly refers to illegitimate use of violence by (non-state) persons or groups, and is underlined with some degree of morality (Grundy and Weinstein 1974). The established order or governmental institutions often use these definitions; criminological or judicial definitions are examples of this approach. The second part of the definition of the Oxford Dictionary emphasizes this aspect by defining violence as ‘’the unlawful exercise of physical force or intimidation by the exhibition of such force.’’ Grundy and Weinstein (1974) notes that this definitional strategy defines violence in terms of illegitimate force, which only includes violent action – deemed illegitimate by the established order – with physical force. This narrow or orthodox definition distinguishes between physical coercion by legitimate authorities (often termed ‘force’) and illegitimate coercive actions for personal or group objectives (termed ‘violence’). Force is mentioned as legitimate because it defends ‘’good order of society’’ (Garver 1986). This violent defense of established order is explicitly distinguished with the violence directed against it (Garver 1986, emphasize added). The rationale for this definition is the different focus on the consequences of force and implicates a ‘’conservative interpretation of political morality’’ (Van der Dennen 2005). Within this narrow or orthodox school, legitimate force ensures a system of established expectations and ‘regular’ interpersonal relations, and therefore, enables the established authority to justify the use of ‘force’ (Grundy and Weinstein 1974, Van der Dennen 2005).

Table 2.1 The intension and extension of definitional strategies of violence

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In his wide definition of violence, Garver (1968) differentiates violence along two criteria, namely overt or covert, and personal or institutional. The author implicates ‘personal’ violence as an individual acting on its own initiative, as opposed to ‘institutional’, which indicates individual or collective violent acts perpetrated by virtue of a group’s power (Betz 1977). ‘Overt’ refers to the observational act of physical violence, and ‘covert’ to the act of psychological violence. Garver (1968) gives the following typology of violence: • Overt personal violence: mugging, murder or rape; • Covert or quiet personal violence: verbal and psychological abuse; • Overt institutional violence: instances of civil or international wars; • Covert or quiet institutional violence: slavery, ghettos or colonialism.

Nieburg (1969) provides a theoretical understanding of the development of political violence and its social dynamics in his study of the behavioral process of political violence. He argues that society is inherently competitive and that groups and individuals adopt a wide range of violent and non-violent means to further their advance or objectives. The rationale in Nieburg’s study is the concept of bargaining (Van der Dennen 2005, p.8). In this competitive context, Hartogs and Artzt (1970) and Grundy and Weinstein (1974) differentiate on the one hand between organized and spontaneous violence, and on the other, criminal and political violence. Hartogs and Artzt (1970) note that individual or collective violence is either spontaneous or ‘’patterned and deliberate.’’ Spontaneous violence is regarded an ‘accidental’ outbreak, enabled through different internal and external circumstances. These circumstances could be individual or

Intension Number of necessary conditions for each definition Wide, ethical and expansive Restricted and observational Legitimist, narrow and orthodox Psychological Yes - - Physical

Yes Yes Yes

Legitimate - - Yes Extension The degree by how broadly the definition applies Broad ß---à Narrow

societal grievances, aggression or frustrations (Galula 1964, Della Porta 2006). Complementary, Hartogs and Artzt (1970) argue that organized violence can serve as a means ‘’of social combat.’’ Grundy and Weinstein (1974) add to this by dividing organized violence in criminal or political violence. With regard to the latter point, history shows that revolutionaries become political parties and political violence can become criminal (Harbom and Wallensteen 2009). In other words, studies show that social or political groups can change violent strategies, but that the lines between criminal and political violence are often blurred (Duyvesteyn and Fumerton 2015, Della Porta 2006, Schuberth 2015). The central argument in the discourse is differentiation between one the one hand ‘criminal violence’ as violent acts for economic, material or pathological reasons, and on the other, ‘political violence’ as ideological or politically motivated (Van der Dennen 2005, Schuberth 2015). In the instrumental sense, acts of political violence are than a means to advance political power, political change or political control (Villa 2008, Duyvesteyn and Fumerton 2015, Buffachi 2005) and acts of criminal violence as materially or economically beneficial for the perpetrator (Stepanova 2009). Villa (2009) argues that this elicits ‘’political itself must be defined as a competition or striving to share power or influence the distribution of power.’’

Political violence is defined by Marshall (1999) as an ‘’episodic interaction between social identity groups engaged in an ongoing, iterative (i.e., processual) relationship in which instrumental force is used and results in death and/or injury to humans.’’ Gurr (1970, in Della Porta 2006) defines political violence as ‘’collective attacks within a political community against a political regime’’, and by Della Porta and Tarrow (1986, in Della Porta 2006) as ‘’those repertoires of collective action that involve great physical force and cause damage to an adversary in order to impose political aims.’’ However, these definitions do not meet the recruitments of scientific useful concepts. Arguing that political violence is only directed at political regimes excludes state (sponsored) violence. In addition, this approach does not address the problem of violent movements filling in the governance and security gap such as proto-states. Furthermore, it is difficult to operationalize ‘’great physical force’’ and ‘’damage’’ in the definitions of Della Porta and Tarrow (1986, in Della Porta 2006) due to its subjectivity. Della Porta (2006) addresses this problem by providing the following operationalization of political violence:

• ‘’Attacks on property, when damage or theft of property is the main goal; • Rioting, when unorganized disorder leads to damage to property;

• Violent confrontation, when members of opposing political groups fight with one another; • Clashes with the police, when protestors interact violently with the police;