• No results found

Nationalist Europeans: A thesis on the effects of national identity on the public opinion on EU power over migration policy

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

Share "Nationalist Europeans: A thesis on the effects of national identity on the public opinion on EU power over migration policy"

Copied!
32
0
0

Bezig met laden.... (Bekijk nu de volledige tekst)

Hele tekst

(1)

Nationalist Europeans

A thesis on the effects of national identity on the public

opinion on EU power over migration policy

Samira Belkaid s2290170


Master

Public Administration


Track

International and European governance


Supervisor

Dr. D. Toshkov 


Second reader

Dr. B.J. Carroll


(2)

Abstract 3

1. Introduction 4

Academic and societal relevance 6

2. Literature review 7

3. Theoretical framework 11

3.1 Social identity theory 11

3.2 National identity 12 3.3 Conceptual model 14 3.3 Additional hypotheses 14 4. Research design 17 4.2 Operationalization 17 4.3 Method of analysis 19

4.4 Validity and reliability 19

5. Results 20

5.1 Descriptive statistics 20

6. Conclusion 28

(3)

Abstract

The results of the last Eurobarometer showed that migration seems to be the most important issue to EU citizens for a while now. On EU level we can see a harmonized policy in many fields, but not migration. It remains a highly politicized topic in which collaboration between all member states appears to be impossible. In this thesis we have aimed to find information on the effect that identity may have on the public opinion on EU power over migration policy. The analysis showed that there is a significant effect that identity has on the opinion on EU power over migration policy. However, it is not the only variable that has a significant effect. In this way we can get an understanding on what moves citizens when being confronted with migration. Hoping that with the gained knowledge we will better understand why it remains difficult for member states to collaborate on this topic, and perhaps 


(4)

1. Introduction

Since its foundation, the European Union has been trying to improve the integration process and this has been successful. Over time, the European Union has seen an increase in the scope of their policy-making power. Examples are the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the completion of the internal market and the Eurozone. The EU gains trust by removing economic barriers for its member states and by enhancing economic growth and facilitating free movement of goods and people. The goal of this integration process has been economic growth, but the main goal has always been more ambitious. During World War I and II, Europe was confronted with the horrible consequences that nationalism can bring. The idea was that a European identity would be the outcome of European integration and scale down nation rivalries (Marks, 1999, p.69). One of the ways the EU has tried to achieve the sense of a European identity is through the process of economic integration (Fligstein et al., 2012, p.106). 


However, EU integration has had an impact on the autonomy of the member states (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, p.1). The EU has gained more formal authority over the core state powers of its member states. This means that the EU is more involved in policy areas such as foreign policy, security, migration and fiscal affairs. This has been made possible by a growth of capacity. Their capacity however still has a limit compared to the member states. But where the EU falls short in capacity, it gains power through regulation. Through regulations the EU is able to constrain member states’ power over core state powers (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2016, p.43-45). The member states, of course, are still able to participate in the decision making process but one can conclude that they are losing some political control (Hooghe & Marks, 1996, p.342). This increase of power means that next to economic integration, the EU has added political and cultural integration.

Enough evidence proves that the EU has gained power in the last few decades. It is thus interesting to see what this growth of power does to the public opinion of EU citizens. Which type of citizens tend to have a more positive attitude towards EU integration? And maybe more interestingly, which type of citizens tend to have a more negative attitude and what does this mean for EU power over migration policy? 


It is not surprising that in the last few years EU integration has become highly politicized. Especially since the EU had to face challenges such as the Euro crisis, the migration crisis, terrorist attacks and Brexit (Kriesi, 2016, p.32). This makes it interesting to look in to the public opinion on a specific highly politicized topic, namely; migration. During the peak of the migration crisis in 2015, the EU saw an influx of a million refugees (The Guardian, 2018). The large numbers of refugees and many deadly incidents in the Mediterranean Sea demanded more EU involvement,

(5)

especially from the member states carrying most of the burden such as Italy and Greece. Several measures had been made, but without the predicted effect. One of the policies was to share the burden between the member states by relocating refugees. The response was disappointing and member states refused to cooperate. This led to member states taking their own measures and harden their border control (Börzel & Risse, 2017, p.90-91). 


Migration has always been a topic that has moved public opinion. Over the last few years immigration has become a main concern under the citizens of the EU. According to the Eurobarometer results of 2005, the main concern of EU citizens was unemployment. It was mentioned by 44% of the respondents as the main concern while immigration was in the sixth position with 15% mentions (Eurobarometer, 2005) This has drastically changed if we look at the Eurobarometer results of 2018. Immigration is now the main concern and mentioned 40% by the respondents (Eurobarometer, 2018).

It would be interesting for this research to see how the situation now, is given that migration has been highly politicized after the migration crisis of 2015. The crisis has led to a division within the EU on whether power over the migration policy should lie at the EU or at the member states. For example, the quota policy that the EU tried to implement led to a lot of opposition from many member states. Member states claimed that the power over migration policy should stay at a national level so that each member state can make a policy that fits their own country. The migration crisis eventually led to a welcoming country from Germany on one side and to countries like Hungary and Croatia closing its borders completely for refugees on the other (Dines et al., 2018, p. 445).

We see that it has been, and it still is, difficult for the EU to formulate a migration policy that every member states agrees with. The opinion of citizens and their attitudes towards immigration policy is of importance when creating a migration policy (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001, p.133). As the research of Börzel and Risse (2017) has shown, identity plays a major role in supranationalizing migration policy. In this research we will look further in to the effects that identity, and more specifically, national identity has on the public opinion on EU power over migration policy. We expect that having an exclusive national identity will have a negative effect on the opinion over EU power. This is especially because migration is currently such a salient topic and research has shown that anti-immigration sentiments can be associated with cultural values and nationality (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007, p.437).It is thus interesting to know who is more positive or negative towards EU power over migration policy so that we can get an understanding about the

(6)

To summarize and conclude: The research question that this thesis will try to answer is whether national identity has an effect on the public opinion on EU power over migration policy. This expected relationship will be substantiated in the following chapters.


Academic and societal relevance

This research will benefit the existing studies in the science of public administration by adding more information on what has an effect on public opinion on EU integration. A lot of research has been focused on the importance of economic factors on public support for EU integration (Marks, 2004; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). However, this relationship does not explain why those who do not suffer economically are skeptical, or whether the same effect can be expected when looking into migration policy specifically. As will be explained in the following chapters, there are studies that have proven that national identity is a variable that has serious effects on the public opinion towards not only the EU integration, but also towards immigrants. But what is missing from existing studies is the effect that national identity may have on the possible harmonization migration policy on EU level. Luedtke has done research on this subject in 2005. Our research can either further confirm what has been concluded in this research or come up with a different conclusion. Either way we will gain more knowledge on the effect that national identity may have and this may benefit knowledge we have on policy making.

Additionally, this thesis has societal relevance. Eurosceptism is often expressed as refusing national sovereignty to the EU. We see that political radical right-winged parties are becoming bigger in Europe and these are the parties that are usually Eurosceptic (Hooghe & Marks, 2004, p. 426). We can build on the research that has already been done and see if the situation has changed. The political landscape has changed in the last decade after a few crises and this might have had an impact on the public opinion on EU power over migration policy. Especially after the migration crisis, we can see a rise of right winged parties that hold on to and emphasize their national identity (Fligstein et al., 2012, p.114). It is thus interesting to see the effect of national identity on EU power over migration policy.

(7)

2. Literature review

2.1 Public opinion and EU integration

There is a lot to be found on public opinion and EU integration. For a long time, public opinion toward EU integration was ignored. But after the citizens of Denmark rejected the Maastricht treaty of 1992 in a referendum more attention was given to the subject (Hobolt, & Vries, 2016, p.415). In general terms, public opinion refers to a positive or negative attitude towards EU integration. A lot of research has been done on the subject and the the best arguments that have been made is that economic rationality and identity are the main drivers of public opinion on EU integration. The primary concern of the EU has always been trade liberalization and economic collaboration between nation states as explained in the introduction (Carey, 2002, p.390). The EU has gained trust by removing economic barriers (Hooghe & Marks, 2004, p.415). Especially for those with higher incomes and education (Inglehart, 1970, p.69), individuals tend to look at the economic consequences of being part of the EU and base their opinion on the gains or losses that they, or the group they belong to, get from EU integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2005, p.420). This means economic factors are meaningful when analyzing public opinion towards EU integration.


However, we see a transition towards a more political union in which symbolic meanings are becoming more important (Carey, 2002, p.390). Scholars have argued that identity appears to be a more powerful concept to explain public opinion (Hooghe & Marks, 2004; Sides & Citrin, 2007; McLaren, 2002). Individuals tend to identify themselves most with their nation state and this is expected to have an effect on the attitude towards EU integration. McLaren (2007) argues that citizens perceive EU integration as a negative process because it is a threat to the community or group that they identify with. A threat for example is a loss of national symbols (p.234-236).

There appears to be a negative relationship between personal identity and the opinion on European integration. Hooghe and Marks (2005) explained in their research that individuals who identify exclusively with their national identity, as opposed to those who also identify with a European identity, are usually opposed to European integration. This has to do with the fact that the EU goes beyond national boundaries, which makes it difficult for governments to pursue their own national preferences. Kristi and Lachat (2004) explain that EU integration is usually seen as a threat by individuals who strongly identity with their nationality. There has been evidence that individuals that can identify with only one identity are more likely to oppose to multi-level governance. Toshkov & Kortenska (2015) have shown that there is relationship between immigration levels and

(8)

public support for EU integration. A final conclusion of Hobolt and De Vries (2017) is that more work is needed to understand how public opinion may be a challenge or opportunity for the future of European integration. A way to do this is to look at the effects that identity can have on the opinion on a specific policy.

2.2 Identity and migration

A lot has been written about the relationship between the concept of identity and migration. Citrin et al (1990) analyzed the reaction of one majority ethnic group (Anglo-Americans) and two ethnic minority groups (Hispanics and Asians). The hypothesis of the research is that the way Anglo-Americans identify themselves affects the way they perceive potential changing of the ethnic composition of their American society (p.1126). They then continue to explain what ‘American identity’ exactly entails. They conclude their research with the finding that the conception of the American identity influences their perception towards ethnic minorities. ‘Americanism’ ended up being the most important variable that influenced the opinion on ethnic minorities (p.1148). They end their research with the remark that future research could analyze the relationship between national identity and for example political tolerance.


Other research which aimed to clarify the relation between national identity and anti-immigrant sentiments was done by De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005). Their hypothesis is: low levels of fear for immigration are related to higher levels of support for EU integration (p.65). They argue that Europeans who have negative perception towards immigrants are more likely to categorize them. A result of EU integration is that many people from different backgrounds are brought together and according to the authors this will lead to categorization of these groups. Negative judgements will be made and this in turn will lead to a negative attitude towards EU integration. They call this a clear case of out-group bias. They use data data from two EU countries: Denmark and the Netherlands. This is not exactly what we aim to find in our research, although it is explained in the research how identity relates to the attitude towards migration, meaning this is still a factor that is of importance to us. For the argument they try to make in their research it is unfortunate that they chose to focus on only two EU countries, because this makes it difficult to generalize the findings to other EU countries. 


Sniderman et. al. (2004) have also contributed to the research around identity and the attitude towards migration. In their research they tested the validity of two theories. The first one is realist conflict. This theory focuses on the economic well-being of individuals. The second theory is social identity theory, which is a theory based on group membership. This research is only based on

(9)

the Netherlands and it only concerns itself with about the attitude towards immigrants and not so much on the migration policy. One quarter of their respondents agreed to the idea that the Dutch ‘way of life’ is under threat (p.44). This thought leads to a negative attitude towards immigrant minorities (p.47). The only question that concerns the opinion on migration policy is: ‘It is better to

live in an orderly society in which the laws are vigorously enforced than to give people too much freedom’. This question does not measure the attitude towards a stricter or more open migration

policy. Therefore this article does not give us much insight on the effect of national identity on the public opinion on migration policy. However, we do see that there is a significant relationship between national identity and attitudes towards immigrants, just like the other articles have concluded. This does give us enough scientific background upon which to build our research.

Adam Luedtke (2005) is in our knowledge the only one that has done research on the effect of national identity on the public opinion on immigration policy. In his research he used several variables to determine the effect on public opinion towards a harmonized EU policy. According to him, knowledge about this relationship is valuable since immigration policy is the only policy that has been lagging behind in EU integration. This is an interesting notion, especially since this situation has not changed even after the migration crisis. His argument is that immigration clashes with the rooted national identities of citizens and thus results in a negative attitude towards supra nationalization of immigration control (p.85). The results of the research show that there is a strong relationship between national identity and EU control over migration policy. More specifically the research shows that citizens with an exclusive national identity are more likely to have a negative attitude towards EU control over migration policy (p.96). National identity has a significant effect for most countries. One of the countries for which there was no significant relationship was Italy. It is interesting to see whether this would still be the case after the migration crisis, which makes our own research a relevant addition to the existing literature. One variable that was not include in this research is the attitude towards immigrants. In our opinion this is a relevant variable when trying to analyze public opinion towards a common EU policy. Especially since according to Sniderman. et al. (2004), there is a significant relationship between national identity and the attitude towards immigrants.

(10)

2.3 What will be new?

In short, what we can conclude from all the research that has been already done on this subject is that there is a relationship between national identity and the attitude towards immigrants and migration. Radical right parties have emerged as anti-immigrant parties outing critique on European initiatives on immigration policy claiming it enforces criminality, terrorism and drugs trafficking. This might influence the public opinion in a way. While we will not go in to the dynamics of society and how these may influence the probability of having a strong national identity, we must not forget that this is a important factor to realize. Every country, every society may deal with different societal factors that are of importance in explaining national identity.

Our research will add valuable knowledge to the already existing literature by focusing on the effect that national identity may have on the opinion on migration policy. The articles we have mentioned in this chapter have focused on the attitude towards immigrants or migration, but not specifically on the policy aspect. The immigration policy of a country establishes who may belong to a nation and who may not. Since this is a important factor of the national identity of a country it is valuable to see the effect. Our research is comparable with the one by Luedtke (2005), however the difference lies in the the variables that will be used. We will add a variable that is concerned with the attitude towards immigrants, which we think is important when researching migration policy. The research done by Luedtke was also done 14 years ago. Since then much has happened in the field of migration which makes it valuable to see if the relationship between the two variables has changed. In the following chapter we will explain how this aspect is relevant when looking at the identity of citizens.

(11)

3. Theoretical framework

In this chapter we will discuss our hypotheses and the motivation behind them by explaining the mechanisms of our chosen variables. We will first discuss our main hypothesis and will then continue to discuss additional hypotheses that are relevant for our research. 


The argument that we try to make in this research is that national identity has an effect on the attitude towards EU control over migration policy. This argument is based on the idea that citizens that identify with multiple identities are more likely to have a positive attitude towards EU integration and thus towards a migration policy that is controlled on EU level. For example, a Dutch citizen that identifies himself as both a Dutch and European citizen is more likely to have a positive attitude towards more EU power. That would also mean that someone who identifies himself with only their national identity would be more likely to have a negative attitude towards EU power over migration policy. In this chapter we will explain why we belief this relationship is accurate.

3.1 Social identity theory

To explain this expected relationship we start by looking into the theory of social identity. This is a social psychological theory that has the ability to clarify intergroup processes and relations. Since we are aiming to find a relationship between identity and the attitude towards EU power over migration policy, this is a perfect theory to apply to our case. In simple terms, the theory explains that individuals belong to a social group. These can be for example national or political groups. In our case, we are interested in the national group. 


To belong to a group includes how one should think and behave. Social identities also want to prevent extinction which leads to a behavior of members in which they maintain a ‘them’ versus ‘us’ comparison. This way of thinking is something we can call self-categorization. This is a process in which the similarities between members of a social group are accentuated. The same is done to the differences of members that belong to a different social group (Hogg et. al., 1995, p.259-260). This means that social identities are about groups or communities. An individual cannot have a social identity on its own. It is always shared with a larger group and there is mutual knowledge about the membership of the group (Risse, 2015, p.22). Members do not only accentuate similarities and differences. They also tend to think that the group they belong to are superior to others. They are even ready to discriminate against ‘inferior’ groups (Brown, 2000, p.747). However, we should not think that we can only identify with one social group. We do not only identify to our nation for example. We might identify to our gender, religion or preferred football group. But for this research,

(12)

only national identity is relevant. 


3.2 National identity

Now we understand the basics of social identity theory, we can begin explaining our most important concept: National identity. National identity can be defined in different ways. Blank et. al. (2001) explain national identity by saying that it includes the intensity and the type of relationship citizens have towards their nation. To which group someone identifies with, makes someone ‘who he is’. We could say that national identity encompasses the loyalty towards the nation of citizens and how powerful this loyalty is in influencing their preferences. It is expected that the territorial identities are the strongest (Hooghe & Marks, 2005, p.422-423). If loyalty towards their nation state is very strong the chances are higher that foreign influences on their nation’s politics will be rejected (Carey, 2002, p.392). Börzel and Risse (2017) add to this, saying that identities relate to a specific group. This may be a social group or a political group. We can call this communities. The identities make clear who belong to the community and who do not. In other words, who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ (p.87). This fits perfectly with the explanation of social identity theory that was mentioned before in which was explained that to belong in a group means that other groups will be categorized. 


Research shows us that there are different types of national identity, The first one is an

exclusive identity, the idea that someone has one single identity that is dominant to all the others

(Marks, 1999, p.72). Citizens who identity themselves with one exclusive identity are more likely to have a negative attitude towards EU integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2004, p.416). The second one is an inclusive, or multiple, identity. In this case one has multiple identities that can coexist (Marks, 1999, p.71). So for example, one can identity themselves as both Spanish and Catalonian and European. Chances are that these citizens are more likely to be less Eurosceptic and in favor of European integration. But one can, of course, also identify as both Dutch and European. These two concepts can thus be seen as determinants for EU support. This concept is of importance when looking in to public opinion towards EU integration since the EU is a polity that goes beyond the nation states and their territories (Hooghe and Marks, 2005, p.420).

The reason why the type of identity has this effect is explained by McLaren (2002). She explains that a determinant for EU support is the attitude towards other nationalities and cultures, or more specifically the negative attitude towards other cultures. She argues that negative attitudes are not just based on cost/benefit calculations, but also about the hostility to other unknown cultures. These might not be a threat to them as individuals, but a threat to their nation state and to them as a

(13)

group (p.554). One might think that national power over their resources is being threatened, and with it, their national culture (p.423). As explained before, social identity theory explains that there are different groups, and immigrants are by definition an other social group and thus do not share the same national identity (Sides & Citrin, 2007, p.480). This would mean that a negative attitude towards other groups, or ‘out groups’, would be in contrast to the project of EU integration, since its enhancing diversity and immigration with its open border policy (Kentmin-Cin & Erisen, 2017). 


However, we want to know how this may have an effect on the opinion on EU power over migration policy. Until now we have only established the relationship between identity and the opinion on immigrants. But we also need to know the relationship between identity and the opinion on migration policy. The EU is not only the embodiment of trade liberalization anymore. Since the EU has gained power over the core state powers, it is a challenge for member states to create policies according to their own preferences. Citizens who acknowledge a European identity are more likely to accept the authority of the EU and thus their policies. This relationship also works the other way around (Carey, 2002, p.392). One might even say that the EU supports multiculturalism as it tries to diminish the differences between the nations and aims to create a sense of unity (Hooghe and Marks, 2005, p.423). This is a challenge since its been said that institutions, laws and migration policies are based on national identity (Luedtke, 2005, p.88). The chosen theory has shown that individuals are members of a social group, and in our case, members of a nation. And they identify themselves with their nation states. The immigration policy of their nation decides who may enter their nation and belong to their group and who may not.

H1: Citizens with an exclusive national identity are more likely to be against an increase of EU

(14)

3.3 Conceptual model

As explained in the theory, we expect that the type of identity will have an effect on our dependent variable. More specifically, the model shows that we expect the effect of an exclusive identity to be negative, whereas we expect an inclusive identity to have a positive effect on the public opinion on EU power over migration policy.

3.3 Additional hypotheses

National identity is not the only variable that might have an effect on the public opinion on EU power over migration policy. To make sure we do not ignore plausible independent variables in our research we have formulated additional hypotheses that are relevant for the study. 


As explained before, McLaren (2002) analyzed the relationship between hostility and other groups and the public opinion on EU integration. Their opinion can be based on either the expected cultural or economic threat that immigrants may form for the dominant group in a country. 


We can distinguish two types of attitudes regarding immigration. The first is the attitude towards immigrants and the second is the attitude towards immigration. These attitudes may support each other because one can affect the other. An anti-immigrant attitude may lead to an anti-immigration attitude (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010, p. 313).

These negative attitudes would likely mean that they would be against more EU power over migration policy because they enhance globalization which in turn benefits immigration and thus immigrants. The idea is that a harmonized EU policy would benefit immigrants because of the

Exclusive Identity Inclusive Identity Public Opinion on EU power over migration policy

-+

(15)

liberalized nature of the EU. This liberalized nature would mean that an EU policy would give immigrants more social rights, something that citizens with a negative attitude towards immigrants would not agree with (Jacobson, 1996, p.3). 


H2: Citizens with a negative opinion towards immigrants are more likely to be against more EU

power over migration policy.

Studies on the public opinion on EU integration and migration have focused on the potential economic competition as a result of migration. This would then be the source of anti-immigrant sentiment for especially low-educated citizens (Hainmuller & Hiscox, 2007, p.399). The idea behind this is that liberalization of the economy and a more international economic policy favors citizens with a high education and a high income (Hooghe & Marks, 2004, p.415). Education is a variable in which a cost/benefit analysis is more relevant than it is when looking at the variable ‘type of identity’. Gabel (1998) wrote in his article that the liberalization of the market and the EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) has an effect on citizens. This effect depends on the education level of the citizens. Citizens with a high level of education are more likely to benefit from the liberalization of the market than those with a low level of education (p.337). Kenneth and Slaughter (2001) write in their research that there is a significant relationship between skill-levels and opinion of immigration. This means that they have found out that low-skilled citizens are more likely to prefer a more strict immigration policy than citizens who are high-skilled. The variable ‘skill level’ is measured in years of education.


Since not only those with a higher level of education belong to a higher level of society, it would thus be interesting for this thesis to see if the variable of class of society might have a moderating effect on the relationship between national identity and public opinion on EU power over migration policy. As notified before, research shows that the relationship between identity and the opinion on migration is stronger than economic variables. However we do not know if education might weaken or strengthen the relationship between the two variables.


H3: Citizens with an exclusive identity from a lower class of society are more likely to be against more EU power of migration policy.

(16)

Another way of explaining the public opinion on EU power over migration policy is by looking into the priorities of citizens. Meaning that citizens who have the opinion that migration is the most important issue of the EU are more likely to be against a common EU migration policy. Especially those who are of the opinion that their own country is better off making their own migration policy. Those who think that their country is not capable of creating an effective migration policy are more likely to be more in favor of a common EU migration policy. Christin and Trechsel (2002) have explained in their article that there is a significant relationship between national attachment in combination with national pride and the opinion on European integration. Meaning that citizens who are attached to their nation and are proud of their nation are more likely to have a negative opinion towards European integration. McLaren (2007) came to a comparable conclusion in her research. She explained that there is a relationship between the type of identity and the attitude towards EU institutions. She found out that those with an exclusive identity are more likely to be biased against EU institutions, despite the fact they might have personally benefitted from these institutions (p.248).

H4: Citizens who have prioritized migration as a main issue in their country are more likely to be against more EU power over migration policy.

(17)

4. Research design

This chapter will contain the method of data collection, operationalization of our variables, method of analysis and a reflection on the validity and reliability of the research. 


4.1 Data collection


To test the hypothesis, we will use the data collected from the Eurobarometer 90. The EU sets out surveys twice a year. In these surveys, several questions are asked to measure the opinion of EU citizens on topics concerning the European Union. Other that, demographics factors are also taken in to account. The survey we use in this research was carried out in November 2018 and in all EU member states. Citizens from five candidate countries have also participated in the survey. These factors make the Eurobarometer 90 a suitable survey for our research, since we want to look at the effect in the EU as a whole. This means that our research encompasses every member state, including the United Kingdom. The candidate states are not relevant for our research since we want to know how the citizens feel from the current member state since they are more likely to also identify with a European identity. For our research we have excluded the candidates, since only the member states are relevant for the specific policy that we have chosen. 


4.2 Operationalization

Our two main variables are national identity and public opinion on EU power over

migration policy. The variable type of identity will be measured by looking at whether respondents

identify with their nationality only or also with the European identity. According to our theory, respondents will either belong the group of people with an exclusive identity or with an inclusive identity. The people who identify with both their nationality and the European identity will belong to the group of people with an inclusive identity. The question that will be used to measure this is QD3 ‘Do you see yourself as…’. We have recoded the variable so that 1 = Exclusive identity, which includes the answer (NATIONALITY) only and 0 = Inclusive identity, which includes the answers (NATIONALITY) and European, European and (NATIONALITY) and European. 


We have excluded missing values and the those who have answered with ‘none’ and ‘I don’t know’, since we are only interested in the respondents who we can divide in exclusive and inclusive. We could have coded the ‘I don’t knows’ as 0.5, but because we do not know the reasoning behind choosing for this answer and whether to place it closer to a exclusive or inclusive

(18)

The variable EU power over migration policy will be measured by looking at the attitude of the respondent towards migration policy. This will be done by looking at whether the respondents are for or against a common EU migration policy by looking at how they answered the question QA15 ‘are you for or against a common European policy on migration’. The only values we have included are ‘against’ and ‘for’ which we have recoded so that 0 = against and 1 = for. The rest of the values have been coded as missing values.

The variable attitude towards immigrants is measured by looking at whether respondents view immigrants from within the EU and outside of the EU as positive or negative. To be able to measure this variable, we have computed these two questions: QB1.1: Please tell me whether each

of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you. Immigration of people from other EU Member States and QB1.2: Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you. Immigration of people from outside the EU. Both

questions measure the attitude of the respondents towards immigrants which it possible to compute them into the variable we are using. We took the average of the two variables. The measurement of this variable is ordinal with 1 = very positive, 2 = fairly positive, 3 = fairly negative, 4 = very negative.

The variable society class will be measured by the self-identifying question D63: ‘Do you see yourself and your household belonging to…’ The values are as follows: 1 = The working class of society, 2 = The lower middle class of society, 3 = The middle class of society, 4 = The upper middle class of society, 5 = The higher class of society. This variable is measured at an ordinal level.

The variable prioritization of migration will be measured by looking at whether respondents are of the opinion that migration is a main issue in their own country. This will be done by using the question qa3: What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment? In which one of the possible answers is immigration. The values belonging this variable are 0 = not mentioned and 1 = mentioned. Respondents who are of the opinion that migration is one of the main issues of their country would have mentioned migration as an answer to this question.

(19)

4.3 Method of analysis

Before testing the hypotheses we will present the descriptives on support for EU power over migration policy and the data on the type of identity to get better insights on our research population. This information of course does not prove any effect that the type of identity may have. In order to be able to accept or refuse our hypotheses we will perform a multiple regression analysis. Because our dependent variable and a few of our independent variables are categorical variables with only two levels, we have recoded them as dummy variables. We have also made sure to include confounding variables such as age and gender.

We pool the data from all countries to see if there is a significant relationship between the two variables. However it is also interesting to see if there are differences between the countries so after analyzing the regression analysis of all member states, we will look into the differences between the countries.

4.4 Validity and reliability

For our research to be be appropriate we have to make sure our measures are valid and reliable. Measurements are valid if they measure what we actually want to measure. To ensure this in our research we made sure to measure our variables in the correct level of measurement. We have also tried to explain as precisely how our variables will be measured.

In simple terms, a research is reliable when it is replicable. Meaning that if a different researcher repeated the same research by applying the same measurement technique to the same data, they would get the same result (Toshkov, 2016, p. 117). We ensure this in our research by explaining as precisely as possible how we decided to measure our variable. In the case of this thesis this means that we made sure to be clear on which questions we have used from the Eurobarometer to measure our variables. Also, by using the dataset from the Eurobarometer we have a great number of respondents, reducing the chance of randomness.


(20)

5. Results

In this chapter we will lay out the results that we have gotten from our regression analysis. Before we do this, a set of descriptive statistics will be given to get a better understanding of the population of our research. We will then go in to the multiple regression analysis and the interpretation.

5.1 Descriptive statistics

Our research population consist of roughly 27.000 respondents from all 28 member states, with around 1000 respondents from each country. The average age of our respondents lies around the age of 50. The number of men and women is nearly equally divided with 46,2% men and 53,8% women.

As explained in our research design, we have recoded our independent variable ‘type of identity’ in two categories. Looking at table 1, we see the original four categories of the variable. The majority of the respondents identify with both their national identity and the European identity. More than one third of the respondents identify with only their nationality. 


Looking at the descriptives of the variable ‘type of identity’ that we have recoded, we see that the majority of the respondents, with 64%, have an inclusive identity while 36% of the respondents only identify with their nationality. Meaning that the majority of the citizens of the EU do identify with the European identity and thus have an inclusive identity. |


In figure 1, we see how many respondents have an exclusive identity per member state. Lithuania has the most respondents with an exclusive identity with 53,7%. Countries such as Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Hungary score below the 30%. Except for Hungary, these are all countries who have been part of the EU since its foundation. Italy and France have also been part of the EU since 1952 but they have more respondents with an exclusive identity than the others. We see that most countries who became member states in the last two decades are the ones with relatively more respondents with an exclusive identity. In figure 3 we see the

Table 1: Original categories of type of identity and common policy support

Against For Total (Nationality) only 14,1% 19,7% 33,8% (Nationality) and European 13,4% 42,9% 56,3% European and (Nationality) 1,7% 5,6% 7,3% European only 0,3% 1,1% 1,4%

(21)

percentage of respondents that are against and for a common EU policy per type of identity. Again, the majority of the respondents are in favor of a common policy, even within the group of those with an exclusive identity.

Figure 3: Percentage for and against a common EU policy per type of identity

0 20 40 60 80 Exclusive Inclusive 76 58 24 42 Against For

Figure 1: Percentage of respondents with an exclusive identity per country

0 15 30 45 60 LUX ESP DEU NET H BEL HUN PO L CRO MAL SL V SL K SW E ITA FRA CZ PO R

ROM FIN IRE DEN AU S

CYP EST BU L

GRE LV GB LIT

(22)

Studying the descriptives of our dependent variable opinion on EU power over migration

policy we see that the 76% of the respondents with an inclusive identity are in favor of a common

policy. Only 24% of the respondents are against a common migration policy. If we look at the difference between the types of identity we have described, we see in figure 3 that the majority of those with an inclusive identity are in favor of a common migration policy. But also the majority of those with an exclusive identity are in favor of a common EU policy. The difference in the response however is not as big in the group of those with an exclusive identity. 


It is interesting to compare the member states with each other. In figure 4 we included all member states. We see that the results are not perfectly in line, but most countries with a high percentage of respondents with an exclusive identity are also the countries with a high rate of respondents who are against a common EU policy. If we look at the specific countries, this may not be surprising since countries such as Hungary, Czech Republic and Estonia have openly expressed to be against a common EU policy. The countries that were more open towards immigrants and refugees during the migration crisis are those with the lowest percentage of opposition to a common policy. The biggest example is Germany. 


Figure 4: Exclusive ID and those against common EU policy per country in percentage

0 17,5 35 52,5 70

LUX ESP GER NED BEL HUN PO L CRO MAL SL V SL K SW E ITA FRA CZ PO R

ROM FIN IRE DEN AU S

CYP EST BUL GR LV GB LIT

(23)

5.2 Analysis

Before going into our regression we have looked into the correlation between our independent variables. This information gives us information about how highly our independent variables correlate with each other. In table 2 we see that the correlation levels are quite low. On the scale of -1 to 1 (which is used to show the level of correlation) all our independent variable score below 0.3. The two variable that correlate most with each other are ‘type of identity’ and ‘attitude towards immigrants’. We do have to keep in mind that the variables that are used in this thesis are not continuous.

Now we have touched upon the correlation levels of our independent variable we can continue to our regression analysis. In table 3 we see the results of our multiple regression analysis. It consists of four different models. Model 1 includes only the independent variable ‘type of identity’ and our control variables. In model 2 we have included the variable ‘attitude towards immigrants’ to see what kind of effects it has on the effect that ‘type of identity’ has. In model three all relevant variables are included. Model 4 includes only the variable ‘importance of migration’ and the control variables.


Our statistical analysis provides evidence that our independent variable type of identity is statistically significant with a p-value below 0.05. National identity is not the only independent variable that is significant in this case. We see that the attitude towards immigrants, society class and age are also statistically significant with a p-value below 0.05. The variables for which we could not find evidence within our data are ‘importance of migration’ and ‘gender’. With a Table 2: Correlation table independent variables

Type of

identity Attitude towards immigrants

Society class Prioritization

of migration Age Gender Type of identity 1 0.281** -0.219** 0.013* 0.153** 0.043** Attitude towards immigrants 1 -0.135** 0.114** 0.130** 0.010 Society class 1 0.051** -0.110** -0.004 Prioritization of migration 1 0.019** -0.026** Age 1 0.010 Gender 1

(24)

coefficient of -0.213 and a significant level of p <0.05 we can conclude that the type of identity indeed has affect on the opinion on EU power over migration policy. However, looking at model 2 in which we included the variable ‘attitude towards immigrants’, we see a change in the coefficient of ‘type of identity’. It remains significant but due to the fact that part of the effect of type of identity is apparently exercised trough the attitude towards immigration, the coefficient becomes smaller. If we look at model 3, in which the remaining variables are added, we see that the coefficient of ‘type of identity’ changes very slightly.

Regarding our first hypothesis: Citizens with an exclusive national identity are more likely to be

against an increase of EU power over migration policy than citizens with an inclusive identity, we

have to look at our coefficient again. We have coded the variable so that 0 = inclusive identity and 1 = exclusive identity. This would mean that we would expect a negative coefficient and that is exactly what we see. We can interpret this number as such that having an exclusive identity leads to a negative opinion on EU power over migration policy by -0.141 units on the dependent variable. With this information we can report that we found evidence that is consistent with what we expected in our hypothesis. But as mentioned before, identity is exercised through the attitude they have towards immigrants.

Table 3: Multiple linear regression model of opinion on a common migration policy.

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Type of Identity -0.213**
(0.008) -0.150**
(0.009) -0.142**
(0.009) Age (0.000)0.016
 0.034**
(0.000) 0.036**
(0.000) (0.000)0.001
 Gender (0.008)0.006
 (0.008)0.004
 (0.008)0.004
 (0.006)-0.003
 Attitude towards immigrants -0.243**
(0.005) -0.242**
(0.005) Society class 0.043**
(0.004) Importance of migration (0.010)0.016
 (0.000)-0.011
 R2 0.045 0.099 0.101 0.000 ** p < 0.05 


(25)

Regarding our second hypothesis which was: Citizens with a negative opinion towards immigrants

are more likely to be against more EU power over migration policy. We can also conclude that our

statistical model provides us the evidence that the expected relationship is present because our p value is < 0.05. Looking at our regression coefficient in table 1 we see that it is the strongest predictor of our model with a weight of -0.242. It means that by every increase of 1 unit of attitude towards immigrants the opinion decreases with 0.242. So the more negative one feels towards immigrants, the more negative the opinion will be. This gives us enough evidence to accept our second hypothesis.

Turning to our third hypothesis: Citizens with an exclusive identity from a lower class of society are

more likely to be against more EU power of migration policy.

As we have seen, the type of identity is not the only predictor that is significant in our model. In fact, it is also not the most powerful predictor of our model. The attitude towards immigrants seems to be the variable with the strongest negative effect. However, class of society is still significant meaning that the higher the level of class society is, the more positive they are towards public opinion on EU power over migration policy.

Our fourth hypothesis is concerned with whether our respondents find migration an important issue in their country. According to the results of our analysis the effect is just not significant with p > 0.05. We expected a negative relationship between the two variable and this is not what we see. The coefficient is not that large, especially compared to type of identity and attitude towards immigrants and it is positive. To make sure that the variable is not significant, we included it in model 4 of our regression. With only the controlling variables, it still appears to be not significant within the dataset we have used.

What we gain from this information is that national identity is indeed a variable that has a significant effect on the public opinion on EU power over migration policy and our analysis has given us the evidence we needed to accept our hypothesis. However, the variable attitude towards

immigrants seems to be a bigger predictor in our analysis.

Because we focused so much on national identity in this thesis it is interesting to see whether the model differs per country. We have set out the results per country in table 4. If we look at the table we see that for every country the variable ‘attitude towards immigrants’ is significant. The variable is not always as strong as a predictor as national identity but it is significant for every single country. We cannot say the same for ‘type of identity’. Out of the 28 member states, it is not significant for seven countries. The seven countries are Malta, Sweden, Italy, Portugal, Estonia,

(26)

results do not give us insights in this information. It probably means that other factors are of more importance when studying the opinion on EU power on migration policy. We for one, have at least one variable that seems to have more power that the type of identity and that is the attitude that respondents have towards immigrants.

Table 4: Multiple regression per country

Lux Esp Ger Ned Bel Hun Pol Mal Slv Type of identity -0.207**
(0.071) -0.209**
 (0.041) -0.185**
 (0.039) -0.171**
 (0.032) -0.152**
 (0.040) -0.165** (0.055) 
 0.159*
 (0.057)
 0.078
 (0.055) -0.152**
 (0.043) Attitude towards immigrants -0.287**
 (-0.031) -0.114*
 (0.020) -0.222**
 (0.021) 0.158**
 (0.032) -0.222**
 (0.023) -0.148**
 (0.030) 0.254**
 (0.036)
 -0.155*
 (0.036) -0.223**
 (0.028) Society class 0.106
 (0.026) -0.001
 (0.013) 0.080
 (0.016) 0.056
 (0.014) 0.051
 (0.21) 0.076
 (0.026) 0.003
 (0.025) -0.129
 (0.025) -0.017
 (0.022) Importance of migration 0.049
 (0.072) -0.206
 (0.035) 0.0783
 (0.031)
 0.012
 (0.030) -0.078*
 (0.038) 0.005
 (0.053) -0.107*
 (0.081) 0.085
 (0.052) 0.118*
 (0.046) Age -0.045
 (0.001) 0.081
 (0.001) 0.033
 (0.001) 0.036
 (0.001) 0.004
 (0.001) -0.415
 (0.001) -0.075
 (0.002) 0.002
 (0.001) 0.114*
 (0.001) Gender -0.045
 (0.001) 0.043 (0.026) -0.230
 (0.001) -0.006
 (0.026) -0.058
 (0.001) 0.162
 (0.045 0.135*
 (0.051) 0.038
 (0.051) 0.073
 (0.040) Adjusted R2 0.139 0.049 0.114 0.068 0.114 0.061 0.128 0.020 0.089 ** p < 0.001 * p < 0.05


Standard errors in parentheses

Tabel 1: Multiple regression per country, continued

Slk Swe Ita Fra CZ Por Rom Fin Ire Den Type of identity -0.198**
 (0.047) 0.032
 (0.033) -0,168
 (0.047) -0.178* *
 (0.042) -0.106*
 (0.048) -0.040
 (0.042) -0.142*
 (0.051) -0.173* *
 (0.047) -0.168* *
 (0.038) -0.205* *
 (0.046) Attitude towards immigrants -0.218**
 (0.033) -0.200* *
 (0.033) -0.168* *
 (0.029) -0.312* *
 (0.024) -0.189* *
 (0.034) -0,242* *
 (0.032) 0.012
 (0.035) -0.340* *
 (0.033) -0.172* *
 (0.026) -0.150*
 (0.028) Society class 0.091*
 (0.025) 0.095*
 (0.016) 0.125*
 (0.025) 0.092*
 (0.020) -0.049
 (0.026) 0.011 (0.023) -0.088
 (0.025) -0.031
 (0.021) 0.098*
 (0.018) 0.063
 (0.023) Prioritization of migration (0.070)0.101*
 -0.055
 (0.040) -0.005
 (0.042) 0.011
 (0.053) -0.016
 (0.059) 0.022
 (0.103) -0.647
 (0.135) -0.047
 (0.065) 0.017 (0.088) -0.093*
 (0.045) Age 0.082
 (0.001) -0.161* *
 (0.001) -0.048
 (0.001) 0.079
 (0.001) 0.107*
 (0.001) 0.031
 (0.001) -0,091
 (0.002) 0.004
 (0.001) 0.224
 (0.001) 0.081
 (0.001) Gender 0.041
 (0.044) 0.029
 (0.031) 0.036
 (0.001) 0.079
 (0.001) 0.107
 (0.001) -0.049
 (0.036) 0.412
 (0.048) 0.028
 (0.042) 0.010
 (0.035) -0.035
 (0.001) Adjusted R2 0.117 0.063 0.036 .0193 0.058 0.067 0.019 0.180 0.070 0.109 ** p < 0.001 * p < 0.05


(27)

Table 4: Multiple regression per country, continued 2

Aus Cyp Est Bul Gre Lat GB Lit Den Type of identity -0.213**
(0.045) 0.199**
 (0.058) -0.118
 (0.060) -0.155*
 (0.054) -0.211**
 (0.041) 0.047
 (0.051) -0.178**
 (0.042) -0.078
 (0.040) -0.205**
 (0.046) Attitude towards immigrants -0.131**
 (0.029) -0.163*
 (0.033) -0.233**
 (0.045) -0.206**
 (0.034) -0.167**
 (0.025) -0.198**
 (0.036) -0.201**
 (0.025) -0.104*
 (-0.028) -0.150*
 (0.028) Society class 0.188**
 (0.025) 0.016
 (0.031) 0.093
 (0.029) -0.121
 (0.026) 0.175**
 (0.021) -0,011
 (0.026) 0.060
 (0.025) -0.089
 (0.020) 0.063
 (0.023) Importance of migration (0.054)0.005
 -0.066
 (0.081) -0.005
 (0.087) -0.095
 (0.085) 0.025
 (0.044) 0.044
 (0.090) -0.031
 0.056 -0.065
 (0.061) -0.093*
 (0.045) Age -0.026
 (0.001) 0.065
 (0.001) -0,547
 (0.002) 0.255
 (0.002) 0.048
 (0.001) 0.356
 (0.001) -0.140** (0.001) 0.038
 (0.001) 0.081
 (0.001) Gender -0.032
 (0.045) -0.001
 (0.054) 0.005
 (0.059) 0.001
 (0.048) -0.010
 (0.038) 0.078
 (0.051) -0.014
 (0.039) -0.018
 (0.039) -0.035
 (0.001) Adjusted R2 0.114 0.066 0.090 0.069 0.121 0.038 0.145 0.012 0.109 ** p < 0.001 * p < 0.05


(28)

6. Conclusion

The European Union has been through a rough period of time with several crises. We see an increase of radical right parties in several countries and the same trend is present when looking at the results of the elections of the European Parliament of 2019. The election resulted in a record number of nationalists in the parliament. These parties have anti EU integration attitudes and are usually anti-immigration (Guardian, 2019). This change of the political landscape make this thesis a relevant research at the moment.

The goal of this thesis was to find out whether national identity had an effect on the public opinion on EU power over migration policy. We made the decision to apply a multiple regression analysis, while a binary logistic regression might have been more appropriate, we are of the opinion that this decision does not influence our out come by much because the results are often similar to each other. 


The results of our models gave us the evidence that this effect is in fact present in our data. We have seen that this effect is present in the majority of the member states. As was explained in chapter two, type of identity seemed to be a biggest predictor in several cases. However in our research we found that the variable attitude towards immigrants was a bigger predictor than type of identity. In our opinion this gives us more reason to believe that the EU might someday find common ground when dealing with migration. This has to do with the fact that we believe that it is so much harder to influence the identity of citizens. Our results showed that the countries that have been part of the EU early on are the countries with the least amount of respondents with an exclusive identity. But some of these countries have been part of the EU since 1952, and if that means that it takes 50 years for citizens to identify as a European citizen, we might not see that happen in every member state. And if we look back to our theory in which it is explained that immigrants are per definition not part of the national identity, it seems impossible for a government to have a positive impact on the those with an exclusive identity regarding migration. To us it seems more plausible that, as society, we can change the attitude we have towards immigrants. We do not want to make it sound like this is an easy thing to do, but it may be easier than changing the identity of citizens. 


With this information we believe that the EU stands for a great challenge regarding migration policy. Looking at the results, which showed us that identity and the attitude towards immigrants are factors that are of importance to EU citizens, we might consider that a common EU policy is something we will not be able to see in future. Especially if these factors make sure that right

(29)

winged political parties keep getting bigger in the member states. 


We must realize that attitude towards immigrants can be affected by many factors, such as the migration policy of the country, the type of immigrants present in the country and many more. We did not go in to this in our research, but this could definitely be of value in future research. Another interesting option for future research is to find empirical evidence for the differences between the countries regarding what affects the public opinion on EU power over migration. As seen in our analysis there a significant differences between the countries and more knowledge on this might give us a better understanding on why it has been so difficult for the EU to formulate a migration policy in which every member state believes.

A silver lining to this conclusion is that our results also showed that the majority of our respondents identified with the European identity and a majority of our respondents have a positive attitude towards a common migration policy. If only we could say the same about the leaders of the member states of the European Union, maybe then we can reach a consensus on a European migration policy.

(30)

Literature

Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2017). From the euro to the Schengen crises: European integration theories, politicization, and identity politics. Journal of European Public Policy, 1-26.


Brown, R. (2000). Social identity theory: Past achievements, current problems and future challenges. European journal of social psychology, 30(6), 745-778.


Carey, S. (2002). Undivided loyalties: is national identity an obstacle to European integration?.

European union politics, 3(4), 387-413.


Ceobanu, A. M., & Escandell, X. (2010). Comparative analyses of public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration using multinational survey data: A review of theories and research. Annual review of sociology, 36, 309-328.


Citrin, J., Reingold, B., & Green, D. P. (1990). American identity and the politics of ethnic change.

The Journal of Politics, 52(4), 1124-1154.


European Commission , Brussels (2019): Eurobarometer 90 (2018). Kantar Public [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7489 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.13254


Fligstein, N., Polyakova, A., & Sandholtz, W. (2012). EuropeanL integration, nationalism and European identity. JCMS: journal of common market studies, 50, 106-122.


Gabel, M. (1998). Public support for European integration: An empirical test of five theories. The Journal of Politics, 60(2), 333-354.


Genschel, P., & Jachtenfuchs, M. (2016). More integration, less federation: the European integration of core state powers. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(1), 42-59.


Hainmueller, J., & Hiscox, M. J. (2007). Educated preferences: Explaining attitudes toward immigration in Europe. International organization, 61(2), 399-442.


(31)

Hogg, M. A., Terry, D. J., & White, K. M. (1995). A tale of two theories: A critical comparison of identity theory with social identity theory. Social psychology quarterly, 255-269.


Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2004). Does identity or economic rationality drive public opinion on European integration?. PS: Political Science & Politics, 37(3), 415-420.


Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2005). Calculation, community and cues: Public opinion on European integration. European Union Politics, 6(4), 419-443.

Hooghe, L., Marks, G., & Marks, G. W. (2001). Multi-level governance and European integration.

Rowman & Littlefield.

Inglehart, R. (1970). Cognitive mobilization and European identity. Comparative Politics, 3(1), 45-70.


Kentmen-Cin, C., & Erisen, C. (2017). Anti-immigration attitudes and the opposition to European integration: A critical assessment. European Union Politics, 18(1), 3-25.

Luedtke, A. (2005). European integration, public opinion and immigration policy: Testing the impact of national identity. European Union Politics, 6(1), 83-112.


Marks, G. (1999). Territorial identities in the European Union. Regional integration and democracy:

Expanding on the European experience, 69-91.


Marks, G., Hooghe, L., & Blank, K. (1996). European integration from the 1980s: state-centric v. multi-level governance. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(3), 341-378.

McLaren, L. (2007). Explaining mass-level Euroscepticism: Identity, interests, and institutional distrust. Acta Politica, 42(2-3), 233-251.


Risse, T. (2015). A community of Europeans?: Transnational identities and public spheres. Cornell University Press.


(32)

Scheve, K. F., & Slaughter, M. J. (2001). Labor market competition and individual preferences over immigration policy. Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(1), 133-145.


Sides, J., & Citrin, J. (2007). European opinion about immigration: The role of identities, interests and information. British journal of political science, 37(3), 477-504.


Sniderman, P. M., Hagendoorn, L., & Prior, M. (2004). Predisposing factors and situational triggers: Exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities. American political science review, 98(1), 35-49.

Toshkov, D. (2016). Research design in political science. Macmillan International Higher Education.

Toshkov, D., & Kortenska, E. (2015). Does Immigration Undermine Public Support for Integration in the E uropean U nion?. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(4), 910-925.

The Guardian (2019, 27 May). European elections: far-right 'surge' ends in a ripple [https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/27/european-elections-far-right-surge-ends-in-a-ripple]

The Guardian. (2018, 15 June). What is the current state of the migration crisis in Europe? [https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/15/what-current-scale-migration-crisis-europe-future- outlook]

Referenties

GERELATEERDE DOCUMENTEN

She speaks of an ‘abscess’ that poisons the relations between Poland and Germany if the eastern neighbour does not satisfy the claims of German expellees: ‘Before EU

The Granger test SP&gt;AC (AC&gt;SP) examines the null hypothesis that the lagged coefficients of SPINDEX (ACREDIT) do not Granger cause ACREDIT (SPINDEX) for both bubble

Understanding friendship and learning networks of international and host students using longitudinal social network

Through its use of classic noir techniques and narratives, the series discourse presents an allegory to the recently intensified spectacle of post-truth politics dominating

With the present study, I wanted to find out to what extent hedonic and eudaimonic needs predict young people’s consumption of different types of political media

Another form of warning are governmental initiated anti-smoking counteracting campaigns, to warn people about the health risks associated with direct and second-hand smoking

The projects that are developed according to the CeHRes roadmap undergo formative evaluation after each of these phases, namely contextual inquiry, value specification, design

The real earnings management proxy is significantly negatively related to gender diversity and nationality diversity, implying that when the firms’ board of directors consists