Examining Ripeness in Yemen

(1)

(2)

TITLE PAGE

Title: Examining Ripeness in Yemen

Assignment: Master Thesis

Date: 07/06/2020 Word count: 16,292

Author: Katja Napokoj Student number: s1793748

Program: MSc Crisis and Security Management Faculty: Governance and Global Affairs

University: Leiden University, Campus of The Hague

Supervisor: Dr. Jelle van Buuren, Assistant Professor 2nd Reader:

Title Page Photo 1 https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170929-yemens-houthis-threaten- (Top): israels-basis/

Title Page Photo 2 https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2015/5/20/the-propaganda- (Bottom): machine-behind-the-houthis

(3)

ABSTRACT

The conflict in Yemen has been ranging virtually unabated for nearly three years. What may have benevolently started as an aggressive attempt at conflict management by the Saudi-led Coalition, has instead polarized the country, destroyed its already-lagging economy and precipitated one of the worst humanitarian crises of the modern times. With the cost of conflict running so high on both sides, and a military victory no longer an option, it is difficult to explain why the prospects for peace nevertheless remain poor. This thesis is an exploratory attempt at finding a reasonable explanation to this puzzle, utilizing the lens of Zartman’s ripeness theory. The latter centers around the idea of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) and a way out are a necessary precondition to the conflicting parties’ willingness to negotiate. The thesis accordingly attempts to analyze whether ripeness exists in Yemen’s conflict by examining whether the effects of third-party intervention on the Yemeni parties are impeding the development of a ripe moment. I tentatively conclude that the rift in the Coalition is staving off ripeness among local parties and is thus preventing resolution.

Key Words: Yemen, Conflict Management, Resolution, Ripeness Theory, Mutually Hurting

(4)

Map 1: Areas of Control in Yemen, December 20191

1_{“Areas of control in Yemen,” Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, in “Yemen crisis: Why is there a war?” BBC News,} February 2020, accessed May 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423.

(5)

INTRODUCTION

In the conflict in Yemen, the capricious nature of Yemeni politics and individual interests of the international players are often watered down for the sake of brevity, particularly in the international media. As such, the narrative is somewhat binary in that the Houthis—religiously a Zayidi Shi’a sect, aligned with Iran, from whom they are reportedly receiving military and financial support,2 represented one side of the conflict. Opposing them, is the Internationally Recognized Government of the Republic of Yemen (IRG) under the leadership of President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, heavily supported by the Saudi-Led Coalition (SLC), and alliance of ten primarily Arab states including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan and Senegal.3

However, Yemen also suffers disunity stemming from secessionist aspirations in the South4 under the leadership of the Southern Transition Council (STC) as well as destabilizing extremist elements and shifting tribal allegiances. In fact, the country has now become, what Clements, borrowing from McKersie and Walton, refers to as a “‘expanding systems of conflict’,”5 drawing in regional powers. These include Saudi Arabia, as the leader of the Coalition, the UAE, with key interests in the South, and Iran, interested in spreading its influence in the region. These diverse interests are contributing to the lack of resolution in Yemen, prolonging the fighting and further exacerbating humanitarian crisis.

The conflict officially started on 26 March 2015, when Saudi and Emirati planes descended upon Sana’a in their first aerial attack on the city as part of so-called Operation Decisive Storm.

2_{Daniel Byman, “Yemen's Disastrous War,” Survival 60, no. 5 (September 2018): 149, https://doi.org/10.1080/} 00396338.2018.1518376.

3_{The US, United Kingdom and France also supported the Coalition with intelligence, weapons and logistical support.} 4_{Note that references to ‘North’ and ‘South’ refer to the territorial boundaries previously aligned with the former split} between Yemen Arab Republic in the North and People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). It was the British Ottomans who first drew the line between the north and south Yemen, early in the twentieth century. Territorially, South Yemen was much larger but contained significantly smaller population than the North. The former South Yemen in today’s terms roughly encompassed the governorates of Mahra, Hadramout, Shabwah, Abyan, Aden and Lahj, while Sa’adah, al-Jawf, Ma’rib, Hajjah, Mahweet, Hudaydah, Sana’a, Dhamar, Ibb, Ta’iz and al-Baidha governorates belonged to the former North.

5_{Ashley Jonathan Clements, “The Frontlines of Diplomacy: Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups” (PhD} Diss., Australian National University, 2018), 170.

(7)

The stated goals of the Operation were to restore Yemen’s internationally recognized government, prevent former president Saleh from influencing the future of Yemen; and the withdrawal of the Houthi forces from government institutions and military installations; and their demilitarization,6 in line with the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2201 (2015). Furthermore, the Saudi-led Coalition (SLC) claimed to have intervened in response to a direct request from President Hadi for international support against the Houthis, as enshrined in UNSCR 2216; President Hadi issued this call not long after he had escaped his native country to find safe haven in Saudi’s capital, Riyadh. As such, the battle was on between the Houthis and the Coalition on behalf of the internationally recognized IRG, led by President Hadi.

With the Houthis less advanced in terms of warfare technology with scarcer military resources,7 the SLC intervention was expected to be brief, intended only to halt what was then the Houthi-Saleh8 rampage through the country. Yet, this miscalculation soon became obvious and a ‘brief intervention’ become a full-fledged war, which, in its sixth year, shows no signs of abating. While the international community consistently calls for a political solution, bombs from the SLC airplanes continue to fall and are responded to in kind by the Houthi weaponry. All sides in the conflict have been accused of “serious violations of humanitarian law [which] may lead to criminal responsibility for war crimes,”9_{including lack of target selectivity, which killed civilians, engaging} in torture and use of starvation as a war tactic.10

Estimates suggest that some 100,000 people have been killed in Yemen between 2015 and October 2019,11_{of which 17,700 were civilians.}12_{However, the real casualties of the conflict are} millions of Yemenis who suffer in silence, lacking sufficient access to food and water, medical

6_{Ghassan Shabaneh, “Operation Decisive Storm: Objectives and Hurdles,” Al Jazeera, April 12, 2015,} https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/04/2015412115549719521.html.

7_{Emile Hokayem et al., “The War in Yemen,” Survival 58/6 (2016): 161,}_{https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.125} 7202.

8_{The Houthis formed an alliance with Yemen’s ousted president Ali Abdullah Saleh, which was a major factor in} their successful takeover of Sana’a in September 2014. However, once Saleh stated an intention to switch sides, the Houthis killed him on 4 December 2017.

9_{Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts, “Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations} and Abuses since September 2014,” United Nations General Assembly, A/HRC/42/17, Human Rights Council, 9 August 2019, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G19/240/87/PDF/G1924087.pdf?OpenElement. 10_{Eminent Experts, “Human Rights.”}

11_{“Press Release: Over 100,000 Reported Killed in Yemen War,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, 31} October 2019, accessed April 2020,

https://acleddata.com/2019/10/31/press-release-over-100000-reported-killed-in-yemen-war/.

12_{“Humanitarian Needs Overview: Yemen,” United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,} December, 2018, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2019_Yemen_HNO_FINAL.pdf.

(8)

care, education and safety. Notably, on 3 April 2018, the United Nations declared that Yemen was “facing the worst manmade humanitarian crisis in the world,”13_{with 22.2 million Yemenis (75%} of the total population) needing some form of humanitarian assistance.14 These numbers have grown since as military blockades have exacerbated a food crisis15 that saw 20.1 million of the country’s 30.5 million become food insecure16_{and in 2019, the United Nations (UN) Secretary} General Antonio Guterres announced that 10 million Yemenis were “just one step away from famine.”17_{On top of that, Yemenis periodically suffer from the bouts of communicable diseases,} the worst being the cholera outbreak which started in April 2017 with more than 1.2 million cases, making it the largest outbreak of cholera in “epidemiologically recorded history.”18

On the other side of the equation is the SLC whose weapons and military intervention are proving to be incredibly costly—at one point estimated at 200 million USD daily.19 Despite the investment, the SLC has been fighting at the standstill and has, even after five years, failed to achieve the basic objectives of its initial operation, called the Decisive Storm. The Storm sought to restore the IRG, headed by Hadi, and curb Houthi influence in Yemen by seeking, among other, their withdrawal from government and military institutions and their disarmament.20 As such, while Yemen is turning into a financial blackhole for the SLC (primarily financed by Saudi), the countries involved are also increasingly suffering reputational damage, as the Coalition has been unable to stem claims accusing it of having violated international laws and committed war crimes. Accordingly, the bonds within the Coalition are increasingly breaking, with the UAE-Saudi tensions coming to the fore in Aden and the South amid last year’s UAE stated intention to

13_{“2018 Yemen High-Level Pledging Event,” United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 3} April 2018, https://www.unocha.org/2018-yemen-high-level-pledging-event.

14_{“Pledging Event.”}

15_{Pre-crisis, Yemen imported roughly 90 per cent of its staples. “Humanitarian Needs.”} 16_{“Humanitarian Needs.”}

17_{“General's remarks to the Pledging Conference for Yemen [as delivered],” United Nations} Secretary-General, February 26, 2019,

https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2019-02-26/secretary-generals-remarks-the-pledging-conference-for-yemen-delivered-%C2%A0.

18_{Frederik Federspiel et al., “The cholera outbreak in Yemen: lessons learned and way forward,” BMC Public} Health 18, no. 1338 (December 2018),

https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s12889-018-6227-6.

19_{“Comment 2: The Percolating Proxy War in Yemen,” Strategic Comments 23, no. 1 (February 2017): iv-vi, v,} https://doi.org/10.1080/13567888.2017.1291569.

(9)

withdraw some of its ground troops and redeploy the remaining to fighting terrorism rather than continuing the involvement in the direct fighting between conflict participants in Yemen.21

Despite these immense costs on both sides and an evident futility of continued military confrontations, every attempt at a political resolution among the conflict participants has thus far failed. To cite only the most recent example, namely the so-called Stockholm Agreement in December 2018, which came after months of unsuccessful calls for a ceasefire to stem the fighting in the strategic port of Hudaydah on Yemen’s Red Sea coast. The fighting had debilitated Yemen’s food supply, threatening famine. And while the Agreement, had some success in calming the front, it nevertheless took the Houthis months after the signing to honor the terms and announce their redeployment from the city. 22 In addition, at the time of writing, the Agreement23 has yet to be fully implemented.

The Stockholm Agreement is but one example in the line of many peace initiatives which sought to resolve the ongoing conflict in the country. We may, for example, recall the Houthi ‘no show’24_{at the final attempt to renew the peace process in Geneva in September 2018, which took} nearly three years of continuous fighting to mature. Another, more pivotal example is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative which arguably precipitated the vicissitude of what was a crisis in 2011 to a war in 2015. With the involvement of external parties in 2015, Yemen’s conflict is often considered no longer a civil but a proxy war. However, while the international media, the numerous policy papers as well as the few scholarly articles out there are very good at analyzing the various causes of the conflict as well as its present dynamics,25_{very little exists in the way of} a study that would focus specifically on analyzing Yemen’s consistent failures to find a political solution. In other words, it almost seems that due to the complexity of the conflict, with competing

21_{Reportedly, UAE withdrew its troops primarily to appease Saudi when the Republic of Yemen Government and} Southern Transition Council troops (both anti-Houthi; but first largely supported by Saudi and the latter by UAE) clashed in Aden. However, Sharp also hinted that this redeployment of troops may reflect UAE’s reputational concerns associated with the country’s continued military involvement in the conflict.

Jeremy M. Sharp, “Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention,” Congressional Research Service, updated September 17, 2019: 8, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43960.

22_{Sharp, “Yemen,” 1.}

23_{Note that the Stockholm Agreement is tripartite and in addition to the redeployment of troops in Hudaydah on both} sides, also asks for talks in Ta’iz and exchange of prisoners.

24_{According to open sources, it was the SLC who wouldn’t release the Houthi plane in time to join the negotiations.} Stephanie Nebehay, “Yemen Peace Talks Collapse in Geneva after Houthi No-Show,” Reuters, September 8, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-un/yemen-peace-talks-collapse-in-geneva-after-houthi-no-show-idUSKCN1LO08Z.

25_{Conflict dynamics is here somewhat simplistically conceived as an interface between conflict drivers (past and} present grievances) and the interconnectedness of conflict participants (action-reaction).

(10)

interests and/or grievances of conflict participants, the reasons for Yemen’s failures are self-evident. As such, this thesis offers a different starting point in the analysis of the conflict, one that is concerned with analyzing elements indicating potential for resolution.

In Yemen, which itself is a complex collection of localized conflicts, one must be careful to ask correct questions. Here, the question is not why the conflict, despite the obvious lack of any rational reason to do so, continues, but why have attempts to find a resolution in Yemen thus far failed, despite the widespread local and international demand and support thereof. I have therefore turned to Zartman’s theory of ripeness,26_{which, in essence, poses a very rudimentary question that} transcends the failures of individual agreements and initiatives and rather focuses on the underlying readiness, or ripeness, of the parties to willingly pursue a negotiated solution. In other words, Zartman argues that a precondition to any negotiations is the parties’ “recognition of being in a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) and of sharing a willingness to look for a joint way out (WO), a situation defined as ripeness.”27_{This framework thus allows us to reason that the} underlying cause for Yemen’s ceaseless failures at finding a negotiated solution is simply because neither (or at least one) of the parties is ready to make concessions to the other.

Accordingly, this thesis, while attempting to contribute to the literature on contemporary conflict resolution by examining the case of Yemen’s current conflict, is predicated on a hypothesis that the lack of resolution in Yemen indicates that the conflict parties have not yet achieved ripeness. To test this, the hypothesis had to be re-worked into a more narrowly focused sub-hypothesis, namely that increased regionalization of the conflict is preventing the local parties from achieving the conditions for ripeness. This reflects my academic interest in connecting external and internal dynamics of the conflict and determining whether ripeness has been impeded with the involvement of regional actors, fueling internal rifts among Yemeni conflict participants, mainly associated with current and historical grievances and a struggle for power.

As Yemen conflict is a multiparty environment, this sub-hypothesis is in turn rooted in the assumption that Ripeness does not exist unless all parties perceive it. Another assumption is that as both a way out and an MHS are necessary for ripeness, the absence of one in any of the parties undermines ripeness of all parties. Consequently, the analysis, while concerned with the lack of

26_{I. William Zartman, “Mediation: Ripeness and its Challenges in the Middle East,” International Negotiation 20} (2015): 480, Brill–Nijhoff.

(11)

resolution of the conflict which started in Yemen in March 2015, will focus on the events which took place both before and during the conflict. As the conflict was still ongoing at the time of writing, the analysis will conclude in 18 January 2020 with a missile attack on a mosque in Ma’rib, which suggests a complete collapse of the Riyadh Agreement. As such, analysis will not include any events after this date.

By analyzing the case of the conflict in Yemen, the thesis seeks to contribute to the current discussions on conflict resolution and, more specifically, as it concerns ‘ripeness.’ There has been significant academic debate regarding this concept as it poses many conceptual difficulties and despite the relatively abundant literature on the topic, there is still little agreement on how to ‘spot’ ripeness and where in the academic study of conflict it truly resides. These will be further discussed below. At the same time, I argue that Yemen itself is important to study, as a precedent is being set for regional intervention that may have implications for both the field of conflict resolution and international security management.

The thesis is structured as follows: The first part of the thesis will consist of a comprehensive review of the theoretical framework, in which I briefly summarize contemporary debates on conflict resolution and give an overview of how the current dynamics in Yemen have been discussed. I argue that Yemeni conflict are sufficiently described in literature, there is a gap where an emphasis on the analysis of failures in resolution and a viable explanation thereof is missing for the case of Yemen. With this, I hope to clearly position my research within the existing body of knowledge.

Following the discussion on the theoretical framework will be an a chapter on research design, discussing my research question and assumptions, complemented by a discussion on methodology, including case selection, method of analysis and its relevance in contemporary field of conflict studies. Additionally, the research design section will also discuss in more detail the main limitations of this study, which include lack of access to first-hand accounts and a reliance on secondary data, overall data scarcity, potential for personal bias in data analysis, questions on approach to analysis of an active conflict, and the small sample given the choice to focus on only one case study. The second and last part of this assignment will consist of an analysis of the above sub-hypothesis to either confirm or refute the central hypothesis, followed by a conclusion summarizing the main analytical findings and lessons for future.

(12)

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The aim of this thesis is to explore conflict resolution in an ongoing conflict through a case study approach. Therefore, to arrive at a semblance of a sensible analysis, we must first understand what has already been written about the conflict management and resolution in the post-Cold War world to understand and assess the most common contemporary theories and understand arising trends. Following will be a systematically review the relevant English-language literature to gain perspective on how the Yemeni conflict is treated by experts in academic literature and other relevant sources, focusing particularly on obstacles to resolution.

Conflict

Conflicts are complex phenomena, which means they progress at a relatively hard-to-predict trajectory where their escalation and de-escalation patterns as well as their intensity may be influenced by both endogenous and exogenous phenomena, with the conflict parties both expanding and contracting over time.28 A plethora of literature has been written in an attempt to predict outcomes and analyze factors that lead both to the eruption and resolution of conflicts. At the same time, much energy of contemporary foreign policy-making goes into “whether, when, and how to intervene in intrastate conflicts,”29_{as the states increasingly see the need, or indeed a} responsibility to intervene in intrastate conflicts.30 Yet, one must only look as far as the Syrian Arab Republic or Libya to see that thus far, this has not been a particularly successful endeavor of the global governance regime.

Accordingly, the below discussion focuses specifically on contemporary conflict, its management and resolution, starting with a general overview in the post-Cold War world. Here, there is a brief discussion from literature, first supplemented by the definition of some key concepts that are used throughout this thesis. The purpose of this chapter is to look at how current discussions may be applied to the case of Yemen and reveal a gap that this thesis hopes to fill. Based on the latter, the theoretical framework will be outlined, within which I later seek to analyze the Yemeni conflict in an aspiration to offer a new perspective on the current conflict and its difficulties in resolution.

28_{Louis Kriesberg, “Transforming Intractable Conflicts,” Desafíos 10, no. 1 (2004): 190.}

29_{Hans J. Giessmann, “Regionalism and Crisis Prevention in (Western) Europe and (Eastern) Asia: A Systematic} Comparison,” Asia-Pacific Review 14, no. 2 (December 2007): 62, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13439000701736963. 30_{Giessmann, “Regionalism,” 62.}

(13)

Since the turn of last century, when conflict management and resolution began to be systematically studied, the literature on the topic has expanded exponentially.31_{As the field is} primarily an accumulation of knowledge of both successful and unsuccessful methods, it is difficult to sift through the entire body of knowledge, which, of course is not the purpose of this brief literature review. Instead, the focus will be on some key trends, relevant to this study, that can be distinguished in literature: first, the persistence of now primarily intrastate armed conflict, which defies the overly optimistic aspirations for a global period of stability, is increasingly challenging both state and international capabilities to respond to and manage them; second, in the absence of established pattern of risk management, uncertainty currently permeates the field of conflict resolution; and third, there appears to be an increased tendency towards regionalization of threat management. These are further detailed below as they relate to and aid in understanding of some of the pitfalls in Yemen’s conflict.

Contemporary Conflict: Evolution, Management and Resolution

Conflicts, as we may understand them in contemporary era, are complex phenomena, often defying a clear-cut narrative, obvious causes, and a predictive sequencing of events. This is because conflict itself is not composed of a single action or limited to one actor; rather, a conflict is a process that evolves with the circumstances created by the outcomes of previous actions and the changing perceptions of the parties to the conflict. Notably, conflict starts with a so-called ‘grievance’ arising from a situation, real or perceived, that an individual or a group consider unfair. This grievance may then progress to become a conflict, during which “the aggrieved party confronts the offending party and communicates his or her resentment or feelings of injustice to the person or group.”32_{Conflicts can be resolved through a number of methods, such as mediation,} bargaining and negotiation. Indeed, James Laue contended that “true and full resolution of conflict occurs through negotiation,”33_{either direct of mediated.}

31_{Louis Kriesberg, “The Conflict Resolution Field: Origins, Growth and Differentiation,” in Peacemaking in} International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, ed. William I. Zartman (Washington D.C.: United States Institute

for Peace, 2007), 25.

32_{Steven Vago, Law and Society (Boston: Prentice Hall, 2012), 256.}

33_{James Laue, “The Conflict Resolution Field: An Overview and Some Critical Questions,” in Dialogues on Conflict} Resolution: Bridging Theory and Practice, ed. W. Scott Thompson et al. (Washington, D. C.: United States Institute

(14)

While conflict is today widespread, some consider it “common developmental stage in any relationship.”34_{Indeed, the very interaction between humans, the argument goes, “must contain an} element of conflict.”35 As such, raised to societal level, some would argue that this perpetual necessity of conflict constitutes the primordial ethos to understanding the evolution (and devolution) of human societies—an empirical certitude, reaching back to humanity’s earliest beginnings. In other words, without conflict, human progress would not exist. Although not a phenomenon of modern times, this idea was first, and most prominently advocated by Marx in his dialectic view of history that was, for him, marked by eternal struggle of the social classes, or, more specifically, by the “struggles between exploited and exploiting, between ruling and oppressed.”36_{However, for the purposes of this thesis a much more straight-forward definition of} ‘conflict’ is adopted, as advocated in empirical studies which portray conflict in terms of battle-related deaths. While numbers can vary significantly,37 armed conflict is often defined in terms of 25 battle deaths per annum, which is, according to several scholars “high enough for the violence to represent a politically significant event.”38

While it is important to acknowledge that globally, the world is a much more peaceful place than, for example, 500 years ago,39 the violence and conflict of the 21st century is witnessing a transformation from an organized, state-based violence to a much more fluid, and perhaps less predictable form of conflict; one that is fueled by frustrations of poverty, lack of economic and social development and the breakdown of domestic order.40_{Nevertheless, these perceived conflicts} much less frequently erupt into an immemorial (total) war,41_{which can be defined as “conflicts} that count more than 1,000 battle deaths in a single year.42 At the same time, there is a diminished

34_{Richard Abel, “A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society,” Law and Society Review 8, no. 2 (Winter} 1973): 227, ProQuest.

35_{Abel, “Comparative Theory,” 227.}

36_{Frederich Engels, “Preface to the 1888 English Edition,” 28 June, 1883, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx} /works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf.

37_{From as high as 1000 battle-related deaths (Correlates of War project) to as low as 25 (Conflict Data Project from} Uppsala/Oslo Universities). The latter number appears more prominent. Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset*,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 5 (September 2002): 619. SAGE

38_{Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict,” 617.}

39_{Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined, (New York: Viking, 2011), 17.} 40_{I. William Zartman, “Introduction: Toward the Resolution of International Conflicts” in Peacemaking in} International Conflict: Methods and Techniques (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 5. 41_{Louis Kriesberg, “A Constructive Conflict Approach to World Struggles,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 21,} no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2015): 34.

42_{Christopher Blattman et al., “Civil War,” Journal of Economic Literature 48, no. 1 (March 2010): 3.} http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.48.1.3.

(15)

propensity of states to fight other states with the frequency of the pre-Cold War era, which again precipitated a decline in armed conflict since the 1990s.

This is true for both inter- and intrastate conflict. In the case of the latter, instances of civil (intrastate) conflict and war, which peaked in 1992, have, despite spikes since 2014,43 been steadily decreasing44 with violence still at a much lower level than during the Cold War.45 Indeed, the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1989 and the subsequent end of the Cold War marked a monumental event in the evolution of modern international system. The ‘victory’ of Western democracies over the perils of socialist-Marxist ideology was thought to epitomize “the end of history”46_{—the coming of an era where peace and economic prosperity would thrive.} Yet, the ensuing transformation in the power balance among international players soon succeeded in vanquishing this initial enthusiasm by a dose of somber reality.

Indeed, conflict continues to permeate global affairs, and Fukuyama-inspired optimism for the “unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism”47_{was—at the turn of the} millennium—and still is premature. This is evident in today’s global affairs and indeed, as soon as the world recovered from the impending doom of mutually assured destruction of the Cold War, the post-1990 global system again began repolarizing48 in a manner perhaps prophetically foreseen by Huntington in his timeless manifesto on the clash of civilizations.49_{And while the reality may} be somewhat less clear-cut than Huntington’s absolutes, our contemporary world of post-modern “democratic retreat”50_{is indeed riven by renewed polarization that is inspiring persistent conflict,} evident in the ongoing ‘civil’ wars and incidents of (political) violence, spanning half the world’s habitable continents.51

43_{Håvard Strand et al., “Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946–2018,” Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Conflict} Trends, March 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Strand%2C%20Rustad%2C%20 Urdal%2C%20Nyg%C3%A5rd%20-%20Trends%20in%20Armed%20Conflict%2C%201946%E2%80%932018%2 C%20Conflict%20Trends%203-2019.pdf.

44_{Blattman et al., “Civil War,” 4; Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict,” 617.}

45_{Erik Melander, “Organized Violence in the World 2015: An assessment by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program,”} Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Paper number 9, January 2015, http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/61/

61335_1ucdp-paper-9.pdf.

46_{Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989): 4.} 47_{Fukuyama, “End of History,” 4.}

48_{Chester A. Crocker, “The Strategic Dilemma of a World Adrift,” Survival 57, no. 1 (February 2015): 9,} http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1008292.

49_{Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49. HeinOnline.} 50_{Francis Fukuyama, “The “End of History” 20 Years Later,” interview in New Perspectives Quarterly (Fall 2013):} 31.

(16)

A New World Order

As discussed above, states are now less likely to fight other states, there has been an important shift in modern conflict, namely from the so-called symmetrical—i.e. one state army pitched against another state’s army, to asymmetrical conflicts and warfare, where, for example, states engage non-state militias.52_{Such conflicts may at times still pose a significant threat to the} stability of the regional and international system; and while states may be prepared for interstate warfare, both in terms of prevention and management, they appear to be much less so in the case of asymmetric conflicts.53 This is because some of the strategies used in interstate warfare may be less effective in intrastate conflicts. Yemen is a case in point where “coercive punishment”54_used by the Coalition against the Houthis has seen very limited returns. At the same time, a growing body of literature suggest that third-party interventions, especially with multiple interveners and on both sides of the conflict, are associated with a greater likelihood conflict perpetuity.55

The fact that contemporary intervention into civil conflicts and wars may facilitate rather than aid in resolution suggests a new level of chaos governing the contemporary international system. Indeed, the presumption of stability during the Cold War arising from the proverbial waters of bipolarity,56 where power was ‘neatly’ balanced between two superpowers ‘dominating’ the international system,57 gave way to power asymmetry of a multipolar system. The demise of the status quo ante, in existence for nearly half a century, was thus replaced by emerging new powers inevitably seeking to asseverate their rightful place in the coming world order. Additionally, states came to share their power by a multitude of non-state actors, including international and non-governmental organizations, interest groups and multinational corporations.58_{This “novel redistribution of power among states”}59_{and non-state actors,} characteristic of the post-Cold War world, provided an opening for new sources of and opportunities for competition and, by extension, conflict, potentially facilitating its perpetuity.

52_{Maria Kett and Michael Rowson, “Drivers of violent conflict,” Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, Vol. 100} (September 2007): 403.

53_{Giessmann, “Regionalism,” 62.}

54_{Ralph Shield, “The Saudi Air War in Yemen: A Case for Coercive Success Through Battlefield Denial,” Journal of} Strategic Studies 41, no. 3 (April 2018): 483. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1308863.

55_{Patrick M. Regan, “Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts,” The Journal of} Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 1996): 337. SAGE.

56_{Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “What New World Order?” Foreign Affairs 71, No. 2 (Spring 1992): 84, ProQuest.}

57_{John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15, no.} 1 (Summer 1990): 14.

58_{Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1 (January/February 1997): 50.} 59_{Mathews, “Power Shift,” 51.}

(17)

Given that this new ‘multipolar’ world order may be lacking in order itself, due to and the multitude of actors and thus necessarily interests involved, civil wars may thus present a neat ‘window of opportunity’60_{for exploitation}61_{by external parties to pursue their own agendas. This} may be further compounded by a failure of a comprehensive international process of dealing with intrastate violence and war.62 While there was increased hope in the 1990s that UN would represent the “global mechanism”63_{for monitoring, managing and resolving conflict, its successes were} inconsistent64 and its will to intervene was subordinate to the interests of UN’s lead actors presiding over UN Security Council.65 Accordingly, questions of legitimacy and uncertainty associated with the lack of a structured approach impede the process of peacemaking. There is a sense of “a world adrift,”66_{where a shortage of distinct power centers has made conflict} management an ad hoc affair between and among state and non-state actors on a somewhat case-to-case basis.67

Conflict Resolution Literature in Yemen

Thus far the literature review has looked at the prevailing understanding on conflict resolution in global debates, reviewing both historical and contemporary trends. This section will attempt to build upon the above discussion and briefly summarize the various perceptions among experts as to the lack of resolution in Yemen. It should be pointed out that in literature, a coherent narrative on the obstacles to resolution of the conflict are less well examined than its causes and dynamics. Specifically, a focused examination analyzing both internal and external factors is largely absent and in its place are instead either policy recommendations for specific actors involved and grim scenarios attempting to predict the future of Yemen and the region should resolution fail. Nevertheless, there is a prevalent tendency in literature to ascribe the continuation

60_{Kingdon, J. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, (New York: HarperCollins, 1984).}

61_{Boin, A., et al. “Crisis Exploitation: Political and Policy Impacts of Framing Contests,” Journal of European Public} Policy 16, no. 1 (December 2009): 82, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760802453221.

62_{Zartman, “Introduction,” 7-11.}

63_{Chester A. Crocker et al., “Collective Conflict Management: A New Formula for Global Peace and Security} Cooperation?” International Affairs 87, no. 1 (2011): 44.

64_{Crocker et al., “Collective Conflict Management,” 44-45.}

65_{Chester A. Crocker et al., “A Global Security Vacuum Half-filled: Regional Organizations, Hybrid Groups and} Security Management,” International Peacekeeping 21, no. 1 (April 2014): 1, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/ 13533312.2014.895603.

66_{Crocker, “Strategic Dilemma,” 15.} 67_{Crocker, “Strategic Dilemma,” 9.}

(18)

of the conflict in Yemen to its regionalization and the rest of this thesis will pick up on these debates and attempt to expand them later in the analysis section.

Overall, the Coalition’s intervention is largely viewed upon in unfavorable terms, describing it as “flawed”68_{and “an apparent exercise in military futility.”}69_{But beyond the} Coalition’s lack of success on the battlefield, the underlying implications of such an intervention are multifaceted. First, Perkins noted that the prioritization of external actors, including the United States and Saudi Arabia, of “international security over the demands of the [Yemeni] people,”70_is diminishing its legitimacy. In other words, starting with the GCC Initiative which stymied the so-called youth revolution in favor of preserving the ruling elite, Yemen’s fundamental political structure remained unchanged post-Arab Spring.71 In addition to political, the lack of economic reforms that should have occurred as a result of the transition, never took place. This means that Yemen continues to be dependent on external support to supplant its impoverished economy and lack of public services, and as such those who are able to provide even the most basic of these are able to secure the support of the general populace.72 Given that the support is external, it is increasingly possible to manipulate opposition to the goals of external parties, at the expense of the Yemeni interests. At the same time, this further facilitates the country’s fragmentation and the arising factionalism among the opposition.73

Another aspect of this foreign intervention is the unwillingness on the part of the Coalition to recognize that a military victory is unlikely74_{on either side and a sentiment that both local and} regional conflict participants “seem to prefer a fight.”75_{Indeed, given the gravity of the Houthi} threat as perceived by the Gulf countries, due to the group’s suspected link to Iran and the proximity of geography smack on the border with Saudi, this compounds the existing sectarian fear. It is this component of the conflict which becomes yet another element that diminishes the

68_{Hokayem et al., “The War,” 180.}

69_{“Yemen’s Debilitating War,” Strategic Comments 24, no. 8 (December 2018): ix-xi, ix. https://doi.org/10.1080} /13567888.2018.1557840.

70_{Brian M. Perkins, “Yemen: Between Revolution and Regression,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 4 (July} 2017): 314, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1205368.

71_{Abdullah Hamidaddin, “Negotiations with Tribes, States and Memories,” in Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow} of the Intifadat, ed. William I. Zartman (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015), Kindle, 117.

72_{Maria-Louise Clausen, “Understanding the Crisis in Yemen: Evaluating Competing Narratives,” The International} Spectator 50, no. 3 (September 2015): 26. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729. 2015.1053707.

73_{Byman, “Disastrous War,” 147.} 74_{Byman, “Disastrous War,” 154.}

75_{International Crisis Group, “Yemen at War,” Crisis Group Middle East Briefing 45, March 27, 2015,} https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-war.

(19)

parties’ willingness to negotiate, particularly as it is used by the Gulf countries as a method of projecting power and influence on the regional level.76_{In this role, the regional parties to the} conflict are unwilling to admit that compromises will have to be made, particularly so as to revise the initial ambitious goals of the Coalition,77 as this may mean admitting defeat.

In addition, the continued fragmentation of Yemeni identities prevents external stakeholders and outside powers engaged in the conflict to “find a common local proxy to back.”78 This is not only contributing to the lack of unity needed to resist the Houthis but may also be inspiring disunity among the Coalition, particularly in the case of Saudis and UAE. Notably, the latter is supporting the Southern Transition Council that seeks secession from Yemen (and the Saudi-supported IRG).79

Nevertheless, it is clear that Yemen will not resolve the crisis alone, without the engagement of regional actors. In fact, any compromise among the local actors will have to secure “the support of the country’s long-term patrons.”80_{However, what role each of the parties should} play to successfully begin negotiations, needs further analysis and will thus be discussed in the analysis section below.

Conclusion: Contemporary Conflict Management

The above exploration on current frameworks, within which conflict management and resolution are usually discussed, contributes to our understanding of the issues in Yemen. Indeed, the lack of resolution thus far may, to an extent, be a reflection of the novel global power re-distribution, leading to multipolarity. At the same time, the Coalition’s intervention into what was essentially a civil war may be staving off its resolution.

Nevertheless, many of these theories are focused on factors exogenous to Yemen and fail to account for what may be perceived as the lack of readiness to find an exit to the fighting on the part of all conflict participants. As I will argue in this thesis, this readiness is crucial to resolution and the lack thereof is impeding it. It is for reason that I now turn to a discussion on Zartman’s

76_{Clausen, “Crisis in Yemen,” 22.} 77_{Shield, “Saudi Air War,” 483.} 78_{Byman, “Disastrous War,” 147.} 79_{Byman, “Disastrous War,” 147.}

80_{Peter Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi–Iranian ‘Cold War’,” (Research Paper, Middle East and North Africa} Programme, Chatham House, 2015) https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/ 20150218YemenIranSaudi.pdf.

(20)

ripeness theory, as it allows for an alternative approach to the analysis to conflict resolution; one that focuses on analyzing whether or not elements conductive of resolution exist. These are embodied in the so-called concept of ‘ripeness.’81 As such, it is quite a flexible tool in conflict resolution in that it allows for a more comprehensive analysis of all dimensions, including local, regional and international dimensions of the conflict by focusing specifically on individual actors and their perceptions to (hopefully) draw meaningful conclusions on the conflict, and opportunities for resolution.

Conflict Management and Negotiation

Zartman smartly pointed out that “conflict demands resolution,”82 and it is thus no small wonder that discussions on conflict management and resolution have been at the forefront of many foreign policy agendas. Indeed, conflict resolution may be considered a “crucial component of global leadership,”83_{and is as such, ‘everybody’s business.’}84_{This is also reflected in the plethora} of terminology used. For example, when discussing conflict, a number of terms are used in literature to refer to methods of coping, mitigating and resolving it. Terms such as ‘conflict resolution,’ ‘conflict regulation,’ ‘dispute processing,’ ‘dispute settlement,’ ‘dispute resolution’ and ‘disputing’ are often used synonymously in literature.85_{This thesis centers around the term} ‘conflict resolution’ as elaborated by Zartman to refer to any attempt to remove “the causes as well as the manifestations of a conflict between parties and eliminating the sources of incompatibility in their positions.”86_{As such, conflict resolution is both about ‘the means and an end’ at the} disposal of the conflict parties to arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution. In other words, conflict resolution also offers a so-called ‘way out.’

It is important to note that conflict resolution is distinct from ‘conflict management’ in that the latter seeks to eliminate “the violent and violence-related means of pursuing the conflict,”87 thereby opening space for political resolution. That said, some authors appear to be using conflict management and conflict resolution interchangeably, ascribing the methods by which to conduct

81_{Zartman, “Mediation,” 480.} 82_{Zartman, “Introduction,” 14.} 83_{Zartman, “Introduction,” 14.} 84_{Zartman, “Introduction,” 14.} 85_{Vago, Law, 255.} 86_{Zartman, “Introduction,” 12-13.} 87_{Zartman, “Introduction,” 12-13.}

(21)

management or arrive at resolution are ascribed to either at one time or another. For example, Crocker noted that conflict management as a field includes varied academic and practitioner interests, including “negotiation, mediation, peacekeeping, peacebuilding,”88 whereas Zartman treats each of these as separate phenomena, roughly corresponding to the level of conflict.89 The difficulty of distinguishing between the two may likely be to the unclear boundaries that separate the process of conflict management from that of conflict resolution. As such, it is generally more fruitful to instead focus on the processes involved, including, for example, negotiation and mediation.

Figure 1: Stages of Conflict90

Negotiation and Conflict Ripeness

As established above, conflict may be considered a “permanent feature of social and political interaction, and often occurs in for good reason.”91_{The key to its resolution is then related} to the degree, with which the grievances and concerns of the conflict parties are recognized and addressed.92_{And while some authors reject the merits of the act negotiation for its own sake and} consider it to be a zero-sum game,93 negotiation continues to be considered a pivotal process by means of which resolution may be facilitated.

88_{Chester A. Crocker et al., International Negotiation and Mediation in Violent Conflicts: The Changing Context of} Peacemaking (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 1.

89_{Zartman, “Introduction,” 13.}

90_{Eric Brahm, “Conflict Stages,” Beyond Intractability, September 2003, https://www.beyondintractability.org/ essay} /conflict_stages/?nid=1068.

91_{Zartman, “Introduction,” 15.} 92_{Zartman, “Introduction,” 15.}

93_{Michael J. Butler, “Searching for an Exit: The Effects of Context, Process and Structure on Crisis Negotiation,”} International Negotiation 24 (April 2019): 373, Brill–Nijhoff.

(22)

In as much as negotiation is a useful tool in crisis environments, it has received much attention and has been widely discussed among academics in the field of conflict and crises resolution. Accordingly, no agreed upon definition exists. Druckman notes that this variety in definitions to an extent reflects the many different situations which benefit from the process of negotiation.94 To turn to Zartman, for example, as one of the leading experts in the field of negotiation, he describes negotiation as a “process of arriving at a common outcome from conflicting positions under a decision rule of unanimity.”95_{As such, negotiation often occurs} among conflict participants, where it reflects their “desire to ‘exit’ the crisis dynamic.”96 Furthermore, the process assumes that parties make joint decisions and involves communicating “statements, demands, and contingent promises to produce specific actions.”97_{It also presupposes} that parties entering into are equal, at least nominally, in that they are each free to engage in or disengage from the process or reject the terms of an agreement proposal.98 There are many caveats to the process of negotiation, in the way it may be conducted (e.g. direct or third-party negotiation) and the environments in which it is used (e.g. a tool for resolution of international crises, support transition of a political or to mediate an organizational conflict).

However, while the study of negotiation is very relevant and should by no means be overlooked, studying the process itself tells us little about why negotiation occurs in some cases and not in others; or the likelihood of it occurring and under what conditions.99_{In other words,} what are the conditions that lead parties to the negotiating table, or more broadly, towards conflict resolution? Indeed, there is a general understanding in literature that a conflict must ‘ripen’ in order to be ready for resolution. This notion forms the essence of ripeness theory, as first elaborated by I. William Zartman. Specifically, the theory suggests that conflicts may be susceptible to resolution only when they become ripe. The inverse is also true—i.e. attempting to resolve conflicts which are not yet ripe for resolution will inevitably meet with failure.100

94_{Daniel Druckman, “Negotiating in the International Context” in Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods} and Techniques, ed. I. William Zartman (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 111.

95_{I. William Zartman, “Negotiations in Transitions: A Conceptual Framework,” in Arab Spring: Negotiating in the} Shadow of the Intifadat, ed. I. William Zartman (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015), Kindle, 196.

96_{Butler, “Exit,” 371.}

97_{Zartman, “Negotiations in Transitions,” 196.} 98_{Clements, “Frontlines,” 70.}

99_{Butler, “Exit,” 371.}

(23)

Haass defined ripeness as the “existence of the prerequisites for diplomatic progress, that is, circumstances conducive for negotiated progress or even solution.”101_{Zartman, meanwhile,} more explicitly noted that ripeness represents the principle that a conflict party will only take action unless it senses it must do so.102 He further noted that “ripeness is not self-implementing; it is a necessary but insufficient condition for the opening of negotiations and must be seized, by the parties or by a third party.”103 In other words, resolution of any conflict will not occur naturally but will instead proceed via a so-called ‘ripe moment, which itself is composed of two elements: a parties’ perception of fist the existence of a so-called MHS and second, a common ‘way out.’ Notably, MHS may serve as an element that compels the conflict parties to take joint action in search of an exit from the conflict. Accordingly, ripeness theory also attempts to facilitate an understanding of the conditions under which a shift in the behavior of the conflicting parties may occur—i.e. from conflicting to engaging.104

An MHS essentially represents a perceived stalemate in the conflict, which occurs when parties may not achieve victory, and both have depleted their respective resources. MHS has also been equated with a deadlock105 and a plateau;106 a moment when “the efforts of both parties to impose unilateral solutions are blocked”107_{continuously, without further possibilities to prevail.} Being rational actors who base decisions on cost-benefit analysis, the parties recognize that staying in this situation is comparatively costlier—i.e. ‘hurting’—to their interests than seeking alternatives. It is for this reason that they seek a ‘way out.’108

Importantly, however, Zartman noted that this ‘pain’ or ‘hurt’ involved in the MHS is crucial in establishing the parties’ perceptions of a stalemate in the conflict which is a concept, oft misunderstood.109 Importantly, given that MHS is a subjective phenomenon, the level at which the pain becomes ‘unbearable’ also depends on a subjective perception of each of the conflict

101_{Richard N. Haass, “Ripeness and the settlement of international disputes,” Survival 30/3 (1988): 232-251, 232.} 102_{Zartman, “Mediation,” 480.}

103_{Zartman, “Mediation,” 480.} 104_{Zartman, “Mediation,” 480.}

105_{Marieke Kleiboer, “Ripeness of Conflict: A Fruitful Notion?” review of Conflicts Unending, by Richard N. Haass,} Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, by Stephen Stedman, and Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, by I. William Zartman, Journal of Peace Research 31, no. 1 (1994): 110, SAGE. 106_{I. William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments,” The Global Review} of Ethnopolitics 1, no. 1 (September 2001): 8.

107_{Kleiboer, “Ripeness?” 110.} 108_{Zartman, “Timing,” 8.} 109_{Zartman, “Mediation,” 480.}

(24)

protagonists, individually. Until the parties perceive that this pain has brought them to an impasse, despite any objective indications that this should be so, the MHS does not exist and the parties will not seek an exit to the conflict.110 Things are further complicated by the fact that the momentum of MHS is by itself by no means a guarantee that negotiations or indeed the resolution of the conflict will in any way be successful. As such, Zartman offers that under ideal circumstances, an MHS should be connected to a “impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe,”111 which then serves to provide either a deadline for action, or a reminder that “that pain can be sharply increased,”112 therefore enhancing urgency and benefits of immediate action. Nevertheless, this catastrophe is not a necessary, but nevertheless a “useful extension of the MHS.”113

The second component of ripeness is a ‘way out,’ which is also perceptual, but conceptually not as complex as an MHS. A ‘way out’ does not necessarily present a solution to the conflict but rather provides the parties with an alternative to fighting, or potentially enhances the tangibility of resolution. As a perceptual event, it is, similarly to MHS, unique to individual party and thus subjective—for a way out to exist, each party must show willingness to present the other party with an acceptable outcome, as well as the conviction that the conflict can be resolved. In other words, the conflict parties perceive “that there is a workable alternative to combat.” 114

At the same time, this perception to a ‘way out’ is a crucial component of ripeness, as without it, the momentum of MHS would leave the parties stranded in a directionless limbo with “nowhere to go.”115_{Zartman explains that this ‘way out’ must be translated into a mutually enticing} opportunity (MEO).116_{MEO represents a pull factor and developing it facilitates ripeness.} However, again similar to MHS, neither the ‘way out’ or MEO are in the absence of an MHS sufficient to induce the process of negotiation. This is because conflict parties may feel comfortable in the stalemate (which is not sufficiently hurting) and as such the conflict remains at a standstill, defying resolution.117 Nevertheless, Zarman does contend that MEO as a concept begs

110_{Zartman, “Mediation,” 480.} 111_{Zartman, “Timing,” 8.} 112_{Zartman, “Timing,” 8.} 113_{Zartman, “Timing,” 8.} 114_{Kleiboer, “Ripeness?” 111.} 115_{Zartman, “Timing,” 9.} 116_{Zartman, “Mediation,” 480.} 117_{Zartman, “Timing,” 14.}

(25)

further research so as to allow for a better understanding of how MEOs can be created and sustained.118

Figure 2: Ripeness119

Conceptualization of Ripeness

Several attempts have been made by scholars to conceptualize ripeness, all meeting with challenges. As Berridge (2002) pointed out, “diagnosing ‘ripe moments’ is not exactly a scientific exercise,”120_{and is as such problematic, to an extent defying empirical study. Kleiboer also argued} for two different conceptualizations of ripeness. This is exemplified in her parabola on the ripeness of apples, where she equates ripeness of conflict with the ripeness of fruit. She noted that ripeness reflects both “objective standards,”121_{such as the time it takes for apples to ripen, the type of apple;} and a “subjective perception”122_{of taste, for example, which is unique to each consumer.} Translating that into conflict terms, ripeness, as already discussed above, is a “perceptual event,”123

118_{Zartman, “Mediation,” 491.}

119_{I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure, “Lessons for Research,” in Escalation and Negotiation in International} Conflicts, ed. I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 304. 120_{G.R. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (London: Palgrave, 2002), quoted in Jonathan Wilkenfeld,} Mediating International Crises (London: Routledge, 2005): 143.

121_{Kleiboer, “Ripeness?” 111.} 122_{Kleiboer, “Ripeness?” 111.} 123_{Zartman, “Timing,” 9.}

(26)

and is thus based on individual party’s subjective assessment of an ongoing, external condition. This then makes the ‘moment of ripeness’ unpredictable as the key assumption simply seems to be that conflicting parties will seek resolution only “when they are ready to do so.”124 This makes ripeness difficult to objectively study because it is challenging to access individual perceptions of parties to the conflict, assuming that parties could even be considered unilateral actors or that perceptions are stable phenomena.

Furthermore, Zartman also argued that it is up to the conflicting parties to recognize and seize a moment when resolution is evidently possible.125 However, recognizing such a moment relies on the parties’ subjective interpretation of events, which may be viewed differently by external (objective) stakeholders. As such, ripeness is only a “necessary but not sufficient”126 condition to start negotiations. In other words, ripeness is a sort of ‘window of opportunity’127 or an ‘entry point’ into the conflict128_{that must be seized by the participants or “taken or created with} skill”129_{by external mediators. Furthermore, the existence of ripeness by no means predicts the} outcome of either negotiations or the conflict.

Another issue with the ripeness theory is that, while potentially valid, it is difficult to recognize ripeness and its elements in the moment they occur. For example, a ‘ripe’ moment may be difficult to pinpoint but can be recognized only during the post-hoc analysis. This clearly opens the door to the potential for hindsight bias. At the same time, however, it is clear that the idea of ripeness, while considered an essential element on the road to conflict resolution, aspires to be a tool for anticipating, or even predicting moments when negotiation and potentially resolution will become possible. Aggestam indeed noted that this dichotomy of ripeness either as a “predictive tool”130_{or explanatory theory to account for “the success or failure of negotiations,”}131_{add a new} problematic to the mix of concerns, reflecting on the theory’s viability. This is related to the potential for “conceptual stretching,”132_{as prediction and explanation serve divergent objectives} in scholarly research.133 Nevertheless, I contend that these drawbacks fail to make the theory and

124_{Zartman, “Timing,” 8.} 125_{Zartman, “Timing,” 9.} 126_{Zartman, “Timing,” 9.} 127_{Kingdon, Agendas.}

128_{Crocker et al., International Negotiation, 8.} 129_{Kleiboer, “Ripeness?” 111.}

130_{Aggestam, “Enhancing Ripeness,” 273.} 131_{Aggestam, “Enhancing Ripeness,” 273.} 132_{Aggestam, “Enhancing Ripeness,” 273.} 133_{Aggestam, “Enhancing Ripeness,” 273.}

(27)

less attractive as a research tool for exploration of conflict, its dynamics and potential for resolution. And while its aspects of a post hoc exploration into successes or failures of negotiations have their place in research, this thesis will draw of the theory’s predictive capacity, especially given the fact that Yemen is an ongoing conflict in need of urgent resolution.

Conclusion

This section looked at competing theories on conflict resolution, concluding with an elaboration on Zartman’s ripeness theory, including ripeness conceptualization and issues with the theory. I argued that despite the difficulties with conceptualizing ripeness, it is nonetheless a useful theoretical framework that may aid in understanding the lack of resolution in Yemen. Issues discussed in this section thus form the basis for understanding the theoretical framework, within which events will be analyzed in this thesis. Building on these percepts, the following chapter will outline the research design, including the research question and other related points.

(28)

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The following chapter outlines the research design of this thesis, setting out to first discuss the research question, followed by a review of data collection and analysis. The decisions behind the case selection is also discussed. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the study limitations.

Research Design and Question

The conflict that is now ongoing in Yemen has started post-Arab Spring in 2011, with the implementation of the GCC initiative, which dissuaded Yemen from the brink of civil war by promising a transitional road to a more democratic state of equal citizenship. Despite this ambitious goal of stabilizing Yemen, the Initiative was but a myopic fix, permitting only a terrifically superficial and foreign interest driven redress of Yemen’s deep-rooted animosities that had been festering in the country for decades. Even the reputed National Dialogue Conference (NDC), cited as an example to be followed by other weak states,134 ended without a firm resolution. The Initiative then fully failed when the Houthis took the capital Sana’a in September 2014 and imposed a parallel government to the IRG, led by Hadi. Hostilities between Hadi and Houthis erupted in January 2015 and the Coalition intervened in March that year. Since then there have been several attempts at negotiations, both formal and informal, direct or mediated by external parties, in anticipation of resolution through non-violent means (the so-called political solution).

Examples of attempts at resolution include several rounds of UN-sponsored talks in Geneva, between IRG and the Houthis, with the first round in June 2015, followed by another round in December of that year. Both collapsed several days after starting. Another round was scheduled for January 2016, but never took place, followed by another attempt in Kuwait in 2016. The latter have thus far lasted the longest, from their start in April until August that year (with several suspensions in between), with no agreement reached.135 Another round was scheduled to take place in Geneva, again under the auspices of the UN but were called off when the Houthis failed to show three days into the negotiations.136_{In other words, thus far, every attempt at reaching} a comprehensive political solution has failed. At the same time, some of the less ambitious

so-134_{Stacey Philbrick Yadav, “The “Yemen Model” as a Failure of Political Imagination,” International Journal of} Middle East Studies 47 (2015): 144-147. 146

135_{“U.N.-sponsored peace talks for Yemen,” Reuters, June 7, 2018,} https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-yemen-factbox/u-n-sponsored-peace-talks-for-yemen-idUSKCN1J31M9.

(29)

called confidence-building measures have also met with mixed success—for example, prisoner swap, medical evacuations and the granting of humanitarian access have been successful in some instances.137 Another such example is the Stockholm Agreement of December 2018, focused on stemming the hostilities in the Hudaydah’s strategic port on the Red Sea. Agreement calmed the front, and facilitated humanitarian access, at the time this thesis was written, the Agreement138 has not been implemented fully.139Based on these relatively consistent failures in attempts at reaching a comprehensive, negotiated agreement as well as the vast humanitarian catastrophe, it is possible to conclude, with relative certainty, that there are underlying obstacles to resolution. What those obstacles are, remains under discussion, and it is the key subject of this thesis.

In other words, even if the regional element of the conflict is removed—i.e. Saudis discontinue the bombing campaign, this does not guarantee that Houthi-Hadi antagonism will fade enough to arrive at a meaningful political settlement. The question thus remains: why have attempts to find a resolution in Yemen thus far failed? To answer this, I hypothesize that the lack of resolution in Yemen indicates that the conflict parties have not yet achieved ripeness. To test this hypothesis, I reformulated the it into a more workable sub-hypothesis to reflect the ongoing debates third-party intervention increased regionalization of the conflict is preventing the local parties from achieving the conditions for conditions for ripeness. Indeed, this sub-hypothesis is in turn rooted in two assumptions: first, namely that MHS does not exist unless both parties perceive it; and that as both a way out and an MHS are necessary for ripeness, the absence of one in any of the parties undermines ripeness of all parties. As such, if only one of the parties perceives it, and the other one does not, MHS will not exist. This simplification and focus on MHS was done in an attempt to narrow the scope and complexity entailed in the thesis, due to limited space. Nevertheless, the sub-hypothesis allows for a detailed examination of conflict participants that is both inward and outward facing.

Before moving on, it is also necessary to make clear, to the extent I have not done so yet, the terms that I will be utilizing in my analysis. Specifically, by regionalization, I am referring to a shift in

137_{Nebehay, “Yemen Peace Talks Collapse.}

138_{Note that the Stockholm Agreement is tripartite and in addition to the redeployment of troops in Hudaydah on both} sides, also asks for talks in Ta’iz and exchange of prisoners.

Examining Ripeness in Yemen

ABSTRACT

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY