Development Aid and Human Rights
Do donors really care about human rights? A study of donor behavior in
Ethiopia
Manthan Gamit 11209089
Master’s Thesis
MSc. Conflict Resolution and Governance Graduate School of Social Sciences
University of Amsterdam Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Jana Krause Second Reader: Dr. Philip Schleifer
June 30, 2017 Word count: 21,126
1. Introduction……… 3
2. Background………. 8
2.1. Ethiopia………. 8
2.2. Development Assistance Group Ethiopia (DAG)……… 10
3. Theoretical Framework……… 12
3.1. Aid Conditionality……… 12
3.2. Human Rights in Development Aid………. 15
3.3. Ethiopia’s Human Rights Record……….. 20
3.4. Development Aid and Donors’ Work in Ethiopia……….. 23
3.5. Framing Theory………..……….. 26
4. Methodology……….. 29
4.1. Data Analysis Method……….. 29
4.1.1. First Coding Phase……….. 30
4.1.2. Second Coding Phase……… 31
4.2. Limitations and Ethical Considerations……… 33
4.3. Data Sampling and Collection………. 34
5. Findings……… 36
5.1. Existence of Human Rights Violations……….. 36
5.2. Acknowledgements of Human Rights Violations by Donors………. 37
5.3. Cases for the Study of Donors’ Behavior………. 37
5.3.1. Case 1……….. 38
5.3.2. Case 2……….. 43
5.3.3. Case 3……….. 47
5.4. Criticism of Donors………. 48
6. ‘Framing’ in Practice………... 51
6.1. Diverting away from Human Rights Issues………. 51
6.2. Treatment of Accusations……….. 52
6.3. We do care if ‘Harm’ is caused but not if………. 53
6.4. Other Aspects that matter more……… 54
7. Conclusion……….. 58
Bibliography……… 61
Appendices………. 73
1． Introduction
On Aug. 21, when I reached the finish line of the men’s marathon at the Olympics in Rio, I crossed my fists above my head. This is sign of peaceful protest used by my people, the Oromo, for the past 10 months. I did it to raise awareness; hundreds of my fellow Ethiopians have been killed by security forces only because they peacefully protested against injustice. (Feyisa 2016)
Feyisa Lilesa, the Ethiopian Olympian crossed his arms after winning the silver medal in the Men’s Marathon at the 2016 Rio Olympics. This gesture symbolizes solidarity with the protests against the oppression of the Omoro people and says a thousand words. Just like Lilesa, an Oromo, the Amhara, Anuak, Nuer, Suri and Gumuz have suffered abuses from the Ethiopian government. The Ethiopian authorities have increased control and tightened their grip on the Ethiopian political and civilian rights. When the government placed the country under a state of emergence in October 2016 many feared for their lives (Al Jazeera 2016b). Such is the state of Ethiopia in recent years, where the rights of the people have been trampled on. For decades the Ethiopian government, led by the coalition named Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has flourished under this tight grip. But there is another notable thing that has flourished as well - development aid.
The failure of the donors to address the issues relating to human rights violations in Ethiopia undermines the purpose of development. Donors’ leniency, their relationship with the government, and the government’s attitude towards the development partners, all works against the people suffering in Ethiopia. The reason why development aid remains unaffected could be due to donors’ failure to act upon human rights violation issues. The same reason holds true for the lack of donors’ actions when recipients retract on the conditional aid promises. The general consensus on conditionality is that it does not work. Many scholars point to the lack of donors’ commitment to follow up on their policy goals. But the contrast in aid flow and the human rights situation in Ethiopia is not just due to the failure of conditional aid. Conditional aid has become a less attractive a choice for donors in recent years. However, I believe that failure of conditionality and the failure to address human rights abuses in Ethiopia have one thing in common, an unwillingness of the donors’ to take action.
Donors have built on their success in Ethiopia by promoting and proposing new projects year after year since the 1940s. Donors have been loyal to Ethiopia even through its regime
changes. The only signs of worry were seen when Ethiopia goes to war, which have been called by international donors as a “meaningless squabble” (Borchgrevink 2008). When the aid amount to Ethiopia dropped, the worldwide level of official development assistance were also low. The political and civil condition has been deteriorating in Ethiopia since the 2005 Elections (ODI 2013d, 2015b; USDS 2010, 2011, 2012). And it is getting worse as press freedom and information sharing is restricted and journalists are being persecuted (Amnesty International 2016; CSIS 2011; Euractiv 2016; ODI 2015b; Tadias Magazine 2017). Considering the importance of fundamental human rights in Western democracy, the donors haven’t raised many concerns regarding what is happening in Ethiopia. This is particularly unusual considering the fact that in the aftermath of MDGs and the adoption of SDGs donors have increasingly endorsed the importance of human rights for successful development.
Human rights became an integral part of development aid dialogue after the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights (UN 1993). Civil and political rights are important now and converge extensively in meaning with economic, social and cultural rights in development policy discourse.1 The development aid industry regularly cites human rights as vital for providing sustainable development of individuals and societies alike (OECD 2013). The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are good examples of this. SDGs, unlike their predecessor the MDGs, are seen as incorporating a broader framework of human rights (IPPF 2016). MDGs, with eight goals, were more focused on reducing poverty and fighting diseases. MDGs in sectors such as poverty reduction, health and disease, and education at primary school level were seen as a success (UN 2015). But they lacked focus on the kind of contentious issues that SDGs have incorporated such as the issues of inequality, inclusion, access to justice and accountability.2 Maybe MDGs worked because developing countries in Africa and Asia do not see any problems with the promotion of education and disease prevention. A clear shift towards the human rights based approach to development can be observed in SDGs.
MDGs were able to achieve their targets-although sub-Sahara Africa is the region lagging the most-because they did not touch issues such as accountable institution building or
1 The trend in human rights concept provided by the Office of United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR). Available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/ESCR/Pages/AreESCRfundamentallydifferentfromcivilandpolitical rights.aspx
2 Data retrieved from The Hunger Project. Available at
inclusiveness. SDGs, on the other hand, are expected to promote democratic principles and human rights. The SDGs will be a challenge for the donors because some goals are the exact aspect of development aid where conditionality has failed the donors. Observation and monitoring the promotion of good governance principles is difficult. It involves a willing consent from the recipient governments and commitment of the implementer of the projects-i.e. the donors. The best way to promote human rights through development and to obtain effective results is thorough implementation of the objectives. For that to occur, the actions of the donor are key, but the literature on conditional aid tells a different tale.
Failure of conditionality could also be linked to a lack of donor commitment. For conditionality to work well, donors need to improve the way they function on the ground. If the conditionality has met with lukewarm success, then the human rights based approach to development might suffer a similar fate. Because it is not easy to promote structural reforms in the underdeveloped world. If the ruling parties are against the idea, then the chances of success for such reforms are slim. Donors, on the other hand, have always been criticized of not matching practice with the rhetoric of policy. One of the prerequisites that Boyce (2003) deems necessary for conditional aid to be effective in conflict situations is that peace should be the top priority of the donor governments and agencies. If donors need to endorse and promote human rights through development aid, then there should be no compromise when it comes to protection of human rights. The donors have to address human rights violations if they want to match their rhetoric of a holistic development of individuals. Majority of the reasons for this failure point towards donors’ reluctance to take stricter measures to implement the conditions. Much blame is pointed towards donors’ incompetence in developing effective policies. However, less attention is given to how donors implement their policies. Donors’ behavior and the decisions made on the ground are integral in making policies effective.
Donors’ practice remain an under-researched area of development aid. I think in order to have effective results from policy, practice is important. Especially if donors want to promote the human rights framework via development aid. The concepts of development and human rights appear very compatible in policy talks. However, for these concepts to be truly compatible, their application in practice should be analyzed. More importantly, the significance of human rights in the practice of donors needs to studied. And to that end this paper will attempt to answer the following question.
What are the implications of donors’ practice in relation to human rights violations in Ethiopia for the human rights based approach to development?
The aim of the study is thus to understand how human rights are treated by the donors on the ground. For that, an analysis of donors’ behavior in a country where concerns for the protection of human rights are rising is necessary. The goal of the study is to try to understand donors’ viewpoint of human rights violations in Ethiopia. This builds on the assumption that the human rights framework will be treated the same as conditionality that is with less commitment to it. It will try to test this hypothesis on the basis that the conditionality was a failure due to the way the donors treat them as a lesser priority. The human rights violations in Ethiopia are being treated the same way due to other priorities that the donors have. The study will examine how donors manage to deal with (these priorities) interests and incentives, which are given more importance than policy principles adopted for better practice. These are the anomalies that affect the results of conditional aids, and could be detrimental to development assistance based on human rights.
The study explores the idea that due to other implicit priorities, the donors use ‘framing’ in practice in order to avoid jeopardizing their reputation and development commitments. The frames are used as a leverage to counterbalance their shortcomings in practice. These shortcomings are the inability of the donors to address issues that harm the development projects. Issues that could lead to disruption in ongoing projects or the donor-recipient relations include human rights violations, autocratic behavior, and democratic reforms. Political conditionality touched upon some of these issues and the failure of conditional aid could be linked to such behavior from donors. And I think human rights violations are being treated the same way in Ethiopia.
Conducting a study of how human rights violations are treated by the donors in a heavily funded country will provide helpful insights for human rights based development assistance. It will also help the donors to realize what needs to be done in order to achieve better results from development aid. Academics have been arguing that there were always limits to what conditionality can achieve in terms of reforms. I think the same is true for human rights based development assistance unless donors’ understand how they treat their policy principle in action on ground. Analysis of donors’ behavior is also important for improved efficiency and effectiveness
of the development projects. The study is also attempts to understand how big a part reputation and incentives play in the functioning of donor agencies. The use of framing theory will help to understand what aspect of development assistance is given more importance in the case of anomalies and distortions in development projects.
Ethiopia was selected as the case study due to its human rights situation, popularity with the donors and worsening political and civil environment. Donors’ actions and attitudes surrounding such events are ideal for understanding the true motives of donors in development assistance. In the next chapter a background on Ethiopia’ geographical and ethnic constitution is provided along with a brief details on Ethiopia’s ruling party and Development Assistance Group Ethiopia (DAG). This is followed by Chapter 3 which provides a review of the debates on the theoretic concepts used in the thesis. An explanation of the methods used for collection and analyses of the data for the study is provided in Chapter 4. The analysis and findings from the data is covered in Chapters 5 and 6. In Chapter 5 details of the 3 within cases identified for analysis of donors’ behavior surrounding human rights violations are explained. This is followed by Chapter 6, which sets the platform to understand the use of ‘frames’ by donors in their practice. The chapter further explains the presence of implicit interest that donors give priority to. In the final chapter, conclusions of the analysis is provided along with its implication on development aid.
2. Background
Since the thesis is a study of conditions in Ethiopia, it was necessary to provide brief background information about the country and its history. In Section 2.1, Ethiopia’s ethnic and regional components are explained. The section also gives a description of the parties of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Then in the final section, due to the important role of the Development Assistance Group Ethiopia (DAG) in Ethiopia, a brief account of its activities and duties are explained.
2.1. Ethiopia
Ethiopia is located in the Horn of Africa, bordering Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya. The nation consists of 9 regions namely Tigray, Afar, Somali, Amhara, Oromia, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR) Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Harar and two chartered cities, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa (AHR 2012). Home to a diverse ethnic, religious and linguistic society, Oromo, Amhara, Tigray, Somali and Afar are the major ethnicities (Bariagaber 1998, Hailu 2010). Oromo was identified as the location of the largest ethnic group in 2012 census. Situated mainly in Oromia, they make up 35% of the population (Amnesty International 2014; CSIS 2011; Michael 2008). The second largest ethnic group in Ethiopia is the Amhara, with the majority living in Amhara region. Compromising some 90% of rural population, agriculture is the main occupation of the Amhara people (Hailu 2010). The Somali region lies to the east, bordering Djibouti in the North, Somalia in the West and Kenya in the South West. With a population over 5 million, pastoralism and agro pastoralism are the major livelihoods (PC 2014).
Afar is linked historically to both Eritrea and Djibouti. Mainly pastoralist, the region only have over 1.6 million inhabitants. The next most populous regions are Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Harar (PC 2014; Reda 2011). The Berta and Gumuz people inhabit the Benishangul-Gumuz region while the Anuak and Nuer people identify Gambella as their ancestral home. The Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR) has a population of 17 million. It is home to the Gurage, Hadiya, Kambata, Wolayta, Hamar and Surma tribes among others (USAID 2005). Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are designated as chartered cities. Tigray, among the smaller regions in the country, is home to the Tigray people. They are considered a minority group because they only make up 6% of Ethiopia’s population. However, the Tigray elites are known to have a considerable influence on the politics of Ethiopia.
Figure 1. Regions of Ethiopia
The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in 1991 after it ousted the Derg regime (HRW 1997; Mezgebe 2015). EPRDF is a coalition of four parties which each represent different ethnicity. The Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (OPDO), the Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement (SEPDM), the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) and the Tigrayan Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF) constitute the EPRDF. The EPRDF is led by TPLF and has a Marxist-Leninist social ideology. The Derg rule extremely discriminatory towards the Oromo, Amhara, the Southern people and other ethnic groups. The new constitution of Ethiopia recognized the rights of every citizens and respect for
human rights (HRW 1997, 2010b). But, the EPRDF as a coalition is said to be operated according to the whims of the Tigray led TPLF, an arrangement which does not bode well for the other ethnicities.
The OPDO for instance has very little popular support in the Oromia region. The popular party from this region is the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which was allied with the EPDRF during and after the ousting of the Derg. However as friction grew, the efforts by OLF (which was banned in 1992) to gain better recognition for Oromos were perceived as hostile by the EPRDF. This led to decades of repression of the Oromo people. The Oromo accused of supporting or aiding the OLF, have been harassed and tortured by the EPRDF (HRW 1997, 2005, 2010b). Another party lacking legitimacy among the people it represents is ANDM, which was created by the TPLF to garner Amhara support. However, the TPLF has a long history of animosity against the natives of the Amhara region (Ejigu 2016). The Amhara and Tigray people have always seen each other as rivals. TPLF’s endorsement of ANDM is seen by Amhara as an effort by the Tigray elites to suppress the Amhara people. Similar unpopularity is prevalent in the SNNPR for Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement (SEPDM). Ethiopia thus remains a de facto single-party state under the rule of powerful minority elites.
2.2. Development Assistance Group Ethiopia (DAG)
The Development Assistance Group Ethiopia (DAG) is a group of 30 donors currently present in Ethiopia. Established in 2001, DAG includes members such as African Development Bank, the EU, UKDFID, USAID and the World Bank among others. The purpose of DAG is to monitor the aid effective principles and ensure the effective delivery of aid in Ethiopia.3 The group works in co-ordination with the Ethiopian government to oversee development along with its Growth and Transformation Plan. DAG looks after the implementation and monitoring of the MDGs as well. Reports regarding the progress of the effectiveness principles and other donor related assessments are released by DAG. DAG is a seen as a representative of the donors for the purpose of opening a dialogue with the Ethiopian government. Thus, ensuring that the differences between the donors and Ethiopian government are addressed in a constructive manner. The group also
3 Data retrieved from Devex. Available at
monitors the improvement the Ethiopian development scene and encourages aid harmonization and effectiveness.4
The decisions that DAG makes reflect that of the donors it represents. Acting on behalf of the donors, it undertakes annual evaluations of development projects in Ethiopia. Furthermore, DAG also steers the agenda on aimed at achieving aid effectiveness principles adopted after 2005 in the Paris declaration. However, DAG does not implement any development projects on behalf of the donors. Donors also work independently from DAG in terms of mandates and agendas. DAG is a mechanism to rally the donors under one umbrella with the aim of achieving better policy dialogue with the Ethiopian government. The need for this was evident to all after the violence of 2005 Elections, since concerns were raised for the future prospects of democratic progress in Ethiopia.
4 Data retrieved from Development Assistance Group. Available at
3. Theoretical Framework
This section explains the concepts and theories applied in the study. The first section provides a debate on the effects of conditional aid. Section 3.2 provides details on human rights frameworks involvement in development aid policy dialogue. This is followed by a section on Ethiopia’s human rights situation. In Section 3.4 the history of development aid and the commitment of donors to Ethiopia is details. The final section is devoted to the theory of framing, it provides an explanation of the concept of the theory and the justification for its use in the study. 3.1. Aid Conditionality
In 1980s loans with economic conditionality were introduced by the IMF and the World Bank (Selbervik 1999). The Structural Adjustment loans adopted by the IFIs were intended to reform the structure of poor economies since ‘savings’ and ‘foreign-exchange’ gaps were considered the reason for economic stagnation. However, inconclusive results on the impact of aid on economic growth shifted the focus away from the ‘two-gap’ model (Quibria 2004; World Bank 1998). Sound policies and robust institutions were seen as a requisite for inducing growth. This led to the adoption of the ‘institutions gap’ or ‘policy gap’ model and donors tried to introduce political reforms via aid. Referred to as the ‘second generation conditionality’ (political conditionality) they essentially promoted “the introduction and strengthening of the institutions of liberal democracy” (Borchgrevink 2008 p. 197).
Donors incorporated political ‘conditionality’ in their agenda as a mean to reform political, social and economic policies. According to Selbervik (1999), the donor were “seeking to induce the recipient to pursue certain goals and to adopt certain policies, set by the donor, to which the recipient would otherwise not have given equally high priority” (p. 12). Other underlying reasons for this policy change were corrupt manipulation of aid money by autocratic governments (World Bank 1998). Dellepiane, Faust and Molenaers (2015) point out that “pervasive political institutions, including corruption, patronage but also authoritarian regimes were undermining economic reforms necessary for growth and broader measures of inclusive economic development” (p. 3). In Assessing Aid (1998), the World Bank states that “failures in policymaking, institution building, and the provision of public services have been more severe constraints on development than capital markets” (p. 11). Hence factors such as good governance, democratic institutions and human
rights grew in prominence. These slowly started to be incorporated in policy agendas and conditionality of the 1990s.
Political conditionality became a go to tool for the donors to ‘wield influence’ over the recipients (Borchgrevink 2008). Building democratic and liberal institutions became a compulsion for the policy makers of aid conditionality. However, Alesina and Dollar (2000) observe that aid is more effective when recipients are willing to introduce sound policies for growth. Booth (2011) mentions the importance of the quality of institutions for economic growth and effectiveness of development aid. While Montinola’s (2010) cross country analysis findings show that International Financial Institutions’ fiscal reforms type of aid worked only on more democratic governments. This brought to attention the inherent difficulty in the concept of conditional aid. The willingness of the recipient to reform is also very important for the success of reforms based on conditionality. From the 1990s through the early 2000s ex-ante style of conditional aid became popular with the donors. An example is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) introduced by the International Monetary Fund (IMI) and the World Bank in 1999. A follow up to the Structural Adjustment Program, PRSPs came with a set of conditions. Recipient governments were intended to undertake legislative and policy reforms (Dutta and Rastogi 2016). Encouraged to be (recipient) country-driven, PRSPs were meant to be devised by and for the recipient. PRSPs focused on inclusion of the civil society and private sectors in the development plans of the government. PRSPs were intended to help poor countries achieve the MDGs (Gore 2004). But PRSPs had their own weaknesses. The ‘one size fits all’ policy recommendations left less space for recipient ownership, and promises rather than results were enough to acquire aid. This led to lukewarm results.
Conditionality political or otherwise, has been perceived generally as “not working very well” by academics (Borchgrevink 2008 p. 198). Issues such as the recipient and donor relationship, donor agencies’ internal incentives, and the Samaritan's Dilemma play a significant part in determining success (Kanbur 2000, Quibria 2004, 2014). This paved the way for a different kind of aid, which was ‘selective.’ Donors introduced programs that focused on a process-orientedness, incentive-driven, performance-based type of ‘selective aid’ (USAID 2010). Dellepiane, Faust and Molenaers (2015) mention that the donors’ current thinking is that “aid should be given selectively to those countries that are well governed in order to increase aid effectiveness” (p. 4). The United States’ Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and European Commission’s Governance
Incentive Tranche (GIT) does exactly that (Molenaers and Nijs 2009). MCC and GIT place more importance on accountability, transparency and results; these initiatives select the recipient on the basis of ex post policies. But lack of enforcement, inefficient monitoring and failure to punish breaches in conditionality remain matters of concern. Selective aid lacks measures of enforcement when recipients do not improve on the indicators. In recent years the growth of unconventional donors such as China and India, who are ready to give aid with no strings attached, and low incentives on the tranche for the recipients, render initiatives such as MIC and GIT unattractive.
However, the debate over the effectiveness of conditionality is not new. Montinola (2010) argues that the effectiveness of aid conditionality is determined by factors such as the recipient country’s ‘level of democracy.’ Urging that the fiscal reform type of aid should only be focused on democratic governments, she connects her arguments to that of power hungry attitude of poor governments and maintains that “policy-based conditionality need not be abandoned” (p. 379). Booth (2011) says that institutional change is an internal process, but this should not discourage the external actors from attempting to find ways to improve the process, thereby showing his belief in the concept of ‘conditional aid,’ and support for more context specific aid. Scholl (2005), on the other hand, presses the donors to be aware of the recipient regimes and consrtruct incentives accordingly. Further, he states that donor agencies should be willing to implement punitive steps in cases of default on the recipient side.
Brown (2005) argues that political conditionality has proven to be disappointing, lending help only when governments are willing to reform. Even then, evidence of reforms induced by aid is difficult to establish. He points out that recipient governments’ structural problems and donors’ lack of commitment and understanding are reasons for the failure of conditional aid. Clist (2012) states that donors overestimate their abilities, which leads to continued use of conditional aid and subsequently its failure. In the same vein, Quibria (2004) mentions that differences between recipient and donor needs, recipient’s inconsistency in keeping their promise and donor incentive issues all contribute to the ineffectiveness of conditionality.
From the above academic observations a few themes can be seen as recurring. Whether it is a critic or a proponent, it is clear that more democratic a recipient is, the better the chances for conditionality to work. But, the success of conditionality does not only depend on recipient’s willingness to reform. I agree with Booth’s argument, the donors should not throw away the concept of conditional aid due to that. Because I believe conditionality can be successful but if and
only if the donors are willing to be more committed. This means that the government should be willing to have stricter policies towards monitoring and implementation.
I think that it is possible for democratic and human rights to achieve reforms via conditionality if donors are willing to accept the necessity of using sanctions. However this depend on the donors’ level of commitment to their policy principles. To date, studies have considered factors such as economic and political structure of recipient and policies for institution building. However, one factor that remains under researched is donor practice. There is a need to re-evaluate donor practices in order to better understand the chances of the success for the human rights based approach to development. I want to focus on the donors’ practice because the literature on conditionality does not provide an analysis of donors’ behavior.
The conditionality and human rights based approach to development have similar traits. They both address reforms that are difficult to achieve. Asking recipient governments to undergo structural reforms in their governance requires exemplary behavior from donors. I think donors cannot disregard matters that affect recipient countries’ political environment. Promotion of the political and civil environment is one of the pillars of the human rights based approach, which includes principles such as equality, inclusiveness, non-discrimination and other freedoms. This study builds on the assumption that since implementation of conditionality is affected immensely by the donors’ practice, so will the implementation human rights based development. And in order to achieve effective result for the human rights based approach to development assistance, a study of donors’ practice on ground is essential. In the following section details of human rights in the development assistance agenda are provided.
3.2. Human Rights in Development Aid
Any definition of human rights requires a comprehensive list of fundamental rights. Freedom of speech, expression, movement, and press, freedom from fear, hunger, and freedom to information, among others, are deemed to be the right of every human being.5 These rights are preserved under treaties such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Booth, Foresti and O’Neil 2006). Parties to these treaties must
5 Referred from the definition of human rights by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR). Available at
provide and protect the rights adopted under these treaties. The treaties are thus the tools that were adopted by the United Nations as a way to avoid abuse of civil rights that had been seen during and after the Second World War.
Before the Cold-War, fundamental human rights were among the major concerns of the donors. Advocating human rights through conditionality however has proven to be a challenging task (Booth, Foresti and O’Neil 2006). Intrusion in a government’s affairs by a foreign state was perceived as being undermining and disrespectful. Hence, donors and peace enforcement and peacebuilding missions alike have found it difficult to address the issues at hand. For the latter, mandates could be contrived in such a manner that foreign forces remain and maintain peace in consenting areas. However, when it comes to development aid, it is a complex process to make mandates which explicitly embody the human rights framework.
The post-Cold War era saw cases of grave human rights violations by some foreign-funded states. The 1994 Rwandan Genocide in particular had the aid-industry thinking about the issues of fundamental human rights and how aid could help in their promotion. Rwanda was a special case because it was one of the ‘donor darlings.’ Pre-Rwanda Vienna Declaration of 1993 marked the reaffirmation of the treaties of the UN. The declaration established that “democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedom are interdependent and mutually reinforcing” (UN 1993, p. 3). Human rights based approach adopted by the UN further consolidated human rights importance for development. The DAC members in 2007 outlined the importance of human rights for development. The DAC policy paper (OECD 2007) states that “human rights and sustainable development are mutually reinforcing,” and “discrimination and exclusion, lack of accountability and abuse of state power are recognized as structural causes of poverty” (p. 3). Empowerment, equality, access to education and information, opportunity, transparency, accountability, inclusiveness, and the protection of civil and political rights have all been recognized by the DAC members as fundamental for sustainable growth.
The 2000 Millennium Declaration also mentions the importance of the human rights framework. Increasingly human rights are being recognized as providing a ‘holistic’ approach towards development. However, various donors have different approaches towards the integration of human rights in their development assistance agenda. Attaching norms of fundamental human rights to development aid is not that easy and the donors try not to adopt them as explicit development goals (OECD 2013). OECD-DAC members have recognized the link
between aid and respect for human rights, emphasizing that a strict application of conditions is requires in order to incorporate human rights agenda into aid (OECD 2006). Although the way in which the donors incorporate the human rights framework varies. Some may use the framework to guide their agenda while others avoid explicitly advocating it. Still, linking human rights to development practitioners’ work has been a difficult task. The UN and the European Commission were among the earliest donors who adopted the human rights framework. While organizations such as the African Development Bank and the World Bank have no explicit policies regarding human rights (OECD 2013).
Booth, Foresti and O’Neil (2006) mentioned a decade ago that “human rights and development agendas are converging more clearly than ever before, although in practice they often still remain separate domains of interventions” (p. 9). Human rights continue to be a contentious issue, which donors sometimes do not think worthy enough to jeopardize their development commitments. Donors thus try to circumvent the issue by adopting agendas that appear more ‘development’ oriented and refrain from explicitly mentioning human rights. USAID for instance acknowledges the oppressive behavior of the Ethiopian government but does not push the governments for a response due to its extreme sensitivity to the criticism (USAID 2012). Development projects that help in providing public services, education, basic health care, inclusion of women and marginalized groups can all be placed under the umbrella of normative human rights. Good governance principles such as transparency, accountability and inclusiveness encouraged by the donors have also become part of a comprehensive human rights framework. I think that donors’ development assistance in and of itself already entails the human rights framework. Whether they explicitly mention it or not.
Hamm (2001) states that in order for the human rights approach to development to be effective, there needs to be an impregnable practical framework for its implementation. He emphasizes that “the planning, implementation and evaluation of development (should be done) according to human rights standards” (p. 1022). By this he means that donor practice should be considered immensely important if human rights approach is to be successful. However, on human rights Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz (2009) mention that “once countries fulfilled certain minimum criteria for human rights, they were not penalized in terms of how much aid they were likely to receive for human rights abuses” (p. 184). Carey (2007) echoes this sentiment and points out that after a country becomes a recipient “human rights loses its importance” as an indicator for the
donors (p. 457). Or “the promotion of human rights take a back seat in actual commitment of funds” (p.450-451).
This shows that donor practice has proved to be an inhibitor in realizing human rights based development. Dellepiane, Faust and Molenaers (2015) define a new type of political conditionality on the basis of human rights. They refer to “allocation and use of financial resources to sanction or reward recipients in order to promote democratic governance and human rights” (p. 2). This of course is the new emerging trend where human rights are being considered as an important aspect of development. Promoting human rights through conditionality as mentioned in section 3.2 is a difficult task. Because it ultimately depends upon donors’ practice. Sectors such as education and health and disease prevention of MDGs were successful due to its harmless type of nature. By harmless it means that it does not put pressure on recipient governments to incorporate large scale structural reforms. However human rights touches sensitive issues such as transparency, freedom of information, civil society space. These factors can put pressure on recipients. So what happens when human rights are deliberately violated by a recipient government? Can the donors cross the line and intervene to address them? If human rights are violated and citizens persecuted, what does it say about human rights based approach to development? Over here I see parallels between implementation of conditional aid and the treatment of human rights violation.
Conditionality met with criticism due to many factors, one of them was lack of commitment from donors to their policy principles. Donors’ inability to prioritize reforms in conditional aid allowed the recipients to exploit gains from development assistance. Because it was difficult for the donors to monitor and inspect the application of principles of conditionality. Recipient governments’ resistance might be one of the reasons, but if that is the case then why do donors bother to provide aid in the first place. It is because the donors are stuck in cycle of running and operating the aid-industry which pushes the reform agenda down, unless it is productive. Conditionality is ineffective due to disagreement of program structure between donor and recipient, recipients not completing the promises to reform and the structure of incentives for donors (Quibria 2014). The incentive structure plays a huge role in how donors act on ground and allows for development assistance to continue even when it proves to be ineffective. This is the area where human rights based framework has similarities with conditional aid. The donors’ incentive structure does not provide enough incentive to protect human rights unless it is not
affecting development assistance. An example of it is suspension of general budget support to Ethiopia, after the government was accused of unlawfully killing its citizen after 2005 Election, but other aid continued and increased again (Abegaz 2015; DAG 2005; HRW 2010). It is not unusual for donors to behave in this manner, because this is how the aid-industry keeps running.
Human rights protection is vital if human rights based approach to development is to be successful. If the donors cannot address these issues, there does not seem a point in having human rights as a framework for development. And to find out if donors can address such issues we need to analyze them in action. There is also a lack in research on donor behavior in cases of grave human rights violations. This study aims to fill at least part of this gap in literature. It is concerned how human rights get treated across the boundary of policy making to policy implementation.
Ethiopia is a case where a progressive recipient meets a growing authoritarian government. Allegations of widespread human rights violations have consistently grown in the past decade and so has the aid. However, donors over the years have hesitated to reprimand the government for its bad behavior. Significant reductions in the amount of aid occurred during the period of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War 1998-2000 (AHR 2009; Furtado and Smith 2007). Even then, due to the Samaritan’s Dilemma, the donors were afraid to suspend the humanitarian assistance, and continued with their ongoing programs. New projects, however, were neither discussed nor implemented. Since that time, there is been a steady increase in amount of aid flowing into Ethiopia. The last instance of any major steps taken by donors came in the aftermath of the 2005 Elections. Donors withdrew their general budget support over reports of death and persecution of opposition members. This could be seen as the first time the donors acted in direct response to a misbehaving government. However, in 2006 much of the aid was redirected into other programs (especially through PBS). This was seen by many critics as a failure by the donors to pin down the government for their misconduct. But the donors ended up rerouting the flow of aid, the upshot of which was of little consequences to the Ethiopian government.
My inquiry focuses on this aspect of the donor behavior. Borchgrevink (2008) makes a valid point when he states that donors are in a post-conditionality stage in Ethiopia. Traditional politically conditioned aid is not how the donors are engaging with the government. He points out that the donors have tried to use an ‘engagement policy’ in Ethiopia. “Where influence is wielded through persuasion and ideological hegemony” (p. 213). The donors were willing to address the
sensitive issues of democracy and human rights, especially after the 2005 Election riots. Human rights violations were cited by many donors as an area of concern. DAG thus became much more active in how aid was coordinated in Ethiopia. The initial spark of concern, which was seen right after the 2005 violence, seems to have subsided. Why was this so?
One reason could be that the donors have mellowed their stance against Ethiopia because of the government’s blatant refusal to cooperate in sensitive matters. The EPRDF led government has openly shown disapproval at donor interference in the country matters. This has made the donors reluctant to put any further pressure on the government or openly criticize it. Such an attitude from the Western countries has resulted in a consistent increase in aid since the 2005 elections (HRW 2010; OLI 2013d; World Bank 2001). However, this is exactly what will not be fruitful if donors’ were to truly address human rights framework in development assistance. Any kind of compromise concerning the wellbeing and progress of citizen defeats the purpose of human rights based approach to development.
My findings suggest that the Ethiopian case is where human rights have become secondary to the kind of development projects that provide services such as education, healthcare, water and sanitation, infrastructure and food and even capacity building training. But aren’t some of these services, such as basic education, healthcare and food, integral components of what is considered to be fundamental human rights? Then what about rights such as freedom of movement, expression, speech, freedom of opinion and information, freedom from discrimination and torture, the right to peaceful assembly and association? If these are the human rights that the Vienna Declaration and the Millennium Declaration are talking about, then Ethiopia is the perfect case to study whether their application in practice will work or not. In the next section, I provide a brief account of the state of the human rights in Ethiopia.
3.3. Ethiopia’s Human Rights Record
The Ethiopian people have suffered persecution since the pre-Derg regime period. Some of the events that raise some alarm calls about Ethiopia’s human rights record are the 2005 Police Massacre, the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation law (CSO) and the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (ATP). The Police Massacre was a violent crackdown by the security forces on protestors after the 2005 elections. Protesters, who were mainly addressing their grievance regarding fraud in the election process, were brutally treated by the security forces of the
government. Mass killings, imprisonment and unjudicial trials followed, resulting in the death of around 200 and detention of some 30,000 others (AHR 2009). Hundreds of opposition leaders, journalist and even aid workers were arrested and prosecuted (HRW 2010). Although, heralded as a ‘democracy’ by the West, following the elections, the government took several steps to increase their control over the political and civil space.
The government adopted the Charities and Societies Proclamation Law (CSO) in February 2009. Under CSO all the NGOs in Ethiopia have to register either as Ethiopian Charities or Societies, Ethiopian Resident Charities or Societies; or Foreign Charities or Societies (Save the Children 2009b). The law has limited the scope of work for many foreign humanitarian organizations (HRW 2016). Various human rights watchdogs have labeled the law as a deliberate attempt by the government to restrict the freedom of press and information. It has become difficult for the International NGOs to report on human rights violations in Ethiopia. Organizations that receive more than 10% foreign funding are prohibited from working on or promoting human rights and democracy (USDS 2010). This has resulted in many NGOs reducing their staff, scope and in some cases removing any human rights related activities from their mandate (USDS 2011). CSO is a sign from the government that it intends to control everything related to information sharing.
The Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (ATP) enacted immediately after CSO deals with terrorism in Ethiopia. It allows the government to “repress internationally protected freedoms and to crack down on political dissent, including peaceful political demonstrations and public criticisms of government policy” (OLI 2015b p. 9). The government forces, at their own discretion, have used the label of ‘terrorism’ as justification to curtail civil rights (USAID 2012). It has lead restrictions on the right to a fair trial. Cases where family members of the accused have been denied a visit have also been reported (OLI 2013d; USDS 2016). It is a convenient tool to stifle dissent, political opposition and freedom of expression. Journalists and opposition members have been detained under cover of the law. It is seen by many organizations as violation of human rights (OLI 2015b).
More recent developments are the 2015-16 protests in Oromia and Amhara regions (Al Jazeera 2016b). For years the people of the Oromia region have been accused of being linked to the Oromo Liberation Front, identified by the Ethiopian government as a designated terrorist organization. This has led to arbitrary detention, torture and harassment of the Oromo people under ATP. In 2015, protests arose in the town of Ginchi over the purpose and implications of an
Figure 2. The Oromia Region of Ethiopia6
investment project known as the Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master Plan (HRW 2016). This protest has led to widespread suppression of the Oromo people. Living in a state of fear, the Oromos have limited access to information, public services and are forced to conform to the government’s wishes (HRW 2010).
The government has responded violently and seems relentless in punishing the protestors. Security forces have fired bullets on peaceful demonstrations, arrested school children and tortured and detained many others. Opposition leaders, teachers, even musicians have been detained and around 400 people have been killed since the start of the protest in November of
2015 (HRW 2016). In 2016, further protests in Oromia regions triggered fresh protests in the northern region of Amhara. The Amhara people, in a similar fashion to their Southern brothers, have long protested against the firm grip of the Tigray elites on the government. Starting over land rights issues soon the protests in Amhara regions become about political and cultural rights (Al Jazeera 2016b; 2017). Unprecedented in nature, these protests are a result of years of frustration and repression suffered by the Amharic and Oromo people. The events are many but the issues remain the same-curtailment of human rights and they undermine the development of a country. For a sustainable growth, inclusiveness, freedom of expression and press and accountability are vital.
3.4. Development Aid and Donors’ Work in Ethiopia
The Ethiopian economy has been growing at a rate of around 10% for a decade7, and this is one reason why donors consider Ethiopia a success story. In practice, economic progress is still seen as a vital development indicator. Another reason for Ethiopia’s popularity with the donors is poverty reduction. In 2011 only 30% of the population lived below the national poverty line, down from 44% in 2000 (World Bank 2015). Another relief factor for the donors is the low level of corruption in Ethiopia. Furthermore, in recent years there have been no major civil conflicts.8 Hence donors have proliferated and development projects have increased since the Eritrea War.
Ethiopia receives $3.5 billion in development aid annually, including humanitarian aid (OLI 2013d). However, humanitarian assistance is not included in this study, as it only focuses on long-term development aid. The reason for this is because I believe humanitarian assistance should be need-specific and unconditional. Humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia includes food aid in case of extreme droughts. Emergency aid during natural calamities and conflict situation are also considered to be humanitarian assistance. However, food for work programs which are adopted for resilience building are categorized as long-term development projects because their mandate is not decided on the basis of emergency situations.
7 Data retrieved from the World Bank. Available at
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview
8 Although Ethiopia is currently under state of emergency. Information retrieved from the
Washington Post. Available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/despite-outward-calm-ethiopia-extends-state-of-emergency/ 2017/03/30/b5544098-1529-11e7-ada0-1489b735b3a3_story.html?utm_term=.f5e379d83b0d
The aid money supports various development programs through Ethiopian government’s development agenda, known as the Growth and Transformations Plan (GTP). Infrastructure and agriculture projects, education and healthcare programs, and food aid is delivered through programs such as Promoting Public Services (PBS), the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), the General Education Quality Improvement Project (GEQIP) and the Public Sector Capacity Building Program (PSCAP) (EC 2008; HRW 2010; World Bank 2013; USAID 2012). Many of these are second or third generation programs. For example, PBS III, due to run from 2012-2019, is built on the success of PBS I and II.
Over 30 donors fund various different projects in collaboration with other development partners and the government. Many focus on the MDGs by working alongside the government, while maintaining their separate initiatives as well. A sector-wise distribution of donors and projects is provided in Table 3. Health and disease prevention projects are run alongside the national Health Sector Development Program (HDFC) however countries such as the US also contributes through USAID’s worldwide health initiatives.
Austria, the EC, Ireland, the UK and the World Bank along with other donors are funding a countrywide program that provides basic services to the citizen (DAG 2010). The Promoting Basic Services (PBS) provides services such as education, healthcare, water and sanitation and builds basic infrastructure such as roads and schools. The current version of PBS III started in 2012 and has similar mandate to its predecessors. Social service provision and reduction of poverty are its key aim (EC 2008). The scope of the program and its coverage is significant for service provision in Ethiopia.
Education, which is one of the primary services provided through PBS, is also funded by other donors through other initiatives. The General Education Quality Improvement Project (GEQIP) is funded by Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK and the World Bank. GEQIP’s goal is to improve the quality of education service (HRW 2010). Other donors, such as the USAID, also work with the Ministry of Education to improve the education services and infrastructure. Different donors fulfil their agenda by working with the government’s national plans on providing primary education to children.
Democratic governance is another sector where many donors encourage development. Donors engage in improving governance and institution building with projects such as the Public Sector Capacity Building Program (PSCAP). The EC and the UK, both devote significant resources to
the promotion of good governance, are the principle source of funding this program, along with Sweden, the UNDP and the World Bank. The program is intended to increase the efficiency of public service, participation of the citizens and the promotion of good governance and accountability (World Bank 2013). The Democratic Institutions Program (DIP) works to promote and protect the rights of citizens, good governance and broader participation from its citizens (UNDP 2010). Funded by Canada, the EC, Ireland, Sweden, the UK and the US among others, DIP is part of these donors’ democratic institutions promotion agenda (EC 2008).
Donors also heavily focus on the infrastructure needs of Ethiopia. USAID’s Power Africa Initiative helps the private sector involvement in the Ethiopia’s energy needs. Through the Road Sector Development Program, the EC along with Japan, the Netherland and UK focus on infrastructure such as roads, energy and water. Projects focused on improvement of transport and trade infrastructure, support for agricultural market, management of natural resources, and strengthening socio-economic and democratic governance (EC 2007, 2014).
The donors have a comprehensive development agenda in Ethiopia. Different donors have their own priorities and sectors that they want to focus on, depending on the needs of Ethiopia. Since Ethiopia is vulnerable to droughts and has an arid climate, many donors have contributed to agriculture and livelihood projects. The EC, Ireland, the UK, the US and the World have all invested generous amount of aid. The USAID with its Feed the Future and Agriculture Growth Program initiatives works to improve the food security of the affected regions. Agriculture programs and market management aim to increase the production and management efficiency (USAID 2011). The Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) is in the forefront of achieving the goal of improving the resilience of the locals. Supported by all the major donors, PSNP is delivered to more than 7.5 million beneficiaries in more than 300 woredas9 (HRW 2010). The beneficiaries have to provide their labor through public-works project in return for cash or food (ODI 2006). PSNP is vital for people who suffer from the consequences of droughts and low food production.
There are also a few controversial government initiatives. Ethiopian government’s Commune Development Program (CDP) or also known as the Villagization Program is a resettlement program intended to relocate citizens from their lands in order to facilitate investment deals and improve foreign investment (OLI 2016). Although, not funded by foreign donors, this program has been marred by accusations of human rights violations. A similar project
is an infrastructure project called the Gibe III Dam, which will result in displacement of many native people, raises the issue of forced evictions. Further, allegations of misuse of development assistance to oppress Ethiopian minority groups have also been reported. However, donors over the years have tried to justify their position by saying that, “no direct funding goes to such programs” (OLI 2013d).
As noted in Table 3 the significance of these projects is enormous. They cover a broad range of areas and sectors. A single project’s functioning concerns multiple donors and stakeholders. Considering the Governance and Capacity Building sector, traces of protection of human rights are found in the goals. Thus Ethiopia is a case where donors do believe that there needs to be improvement in areas of civil participation and political expression. Providing funds to the projects in this sector makes the donors liable to the progress of democratic practice and good governance. MDGs has helped the donors to tackle disease and poverty reduction, however how does the human rights promotion fare in their aftermath? This leads us to how donors cover up for the shortcomings in practice. Reflected in their practice, I believe donors ‘frame’ their success in a way to overshadow their inability to tackle difficult issues. The theory of use of frames, which will be used to analyze donor behavior is explained in the next section.
3.5. Framing theory
In this study the framing theory is used to analyze the donors’ behavior. It is used in a way which best represents the donors attitude in the context of human rights violation. Due to the nature of the theory, it is best suited to study the practices of donors. The theory will help inform how the donors react to when met with issues on ground. In this case it’s the allegations of human rights violations and consequences of ignoring it. In order to understand how ‘frames’ are used by donors, we need to look at the concept of ‘framing.’
Framing means social construction of a social phenomenon and how it is presented to the listeners. In a way the framing process could be used to pin point an issue or an event and to amplify its salient features, using it for one’s advantage. Or as Entman (1993) puts it, framing is “selection and salience” (p. 52). He further deems it necessary to define ‘salience’ itself, which he describes as “making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences” (p. 53). According to Benford and Snow (2000) “frame articulation involves the connection and alignment of events and experiences so that they hang together in a relatively
unified and compelling fashion.” They further elaborate that, “frame amplification process involves accenting and highlighting some issues, events, or beliefs as being more salient than others” (p. 623). In the same vein, Ardevol-Abreu (2015) explain the concept of ‘frames’ as something that contains and facilitates the information in them. All the while ‘ignoring’ whatever message that is outside the frame (p. 428). In this manner, the framing theory will also help understand the significance of the human rights framework in a broader development aid debate. By employing the concept of ‘framing’ the real attitude of donors could be analyzed.
Drawing from the literature on aid conditionality we can say that there is disconnect between policy and practice. This is one of the reasons why conditional aid has proved to be a failure. Many scholars cite the reasons that if (recipient) governments are willing to reform, they do not need conditional aid (Morrissey 2004). From this it could be said that since governments are not actively willing to implement reforms, donors need to make extra efforts to make sure that the necessary conditions are met. This means that donors need to be committed to their policy agenda. But in practice they are not. Because donors have to protect other interests which help run the development aid industry. The practical difficulties and technicalities on the ground forces the donors to use ‘frames’ to make sure that their reputation and agenda is not put in disarray. One of the reasons why enforcement of sanctions in conditional aid is difficult for donors is due to their vested interest in the industry rather than development of recipient. To hide this side of their behavior, donors use framing to elucidate the success of their development assistance. Donor governments and agencies indulge in the use of frames to avoid reputational harm, disruption in aid programs and to boast about their achievements. Use of framing in donor practice can be counter-productive, and can lead to undermining of policy principles. And this is exactly what happens when the conditionalities are not met. In this study the framing theory will help understand when and why donors use frames. The donors’ motives behind such a behavior is vital for understanding the broader picture of the rhetoric of development.
Framing theory would also help us understand what aspects donors decide to include and exclude when they talk about development aid on the ground. Donors usually focus on ‘presentable’ aspects such as facts, progress and recipients’ cooperation in their success. This in turn it helps exclude aspects that are difficult for the donors to address. In Ethiopia’s case we have human rights violation as an aspect that is contentious and could prove detrimental to the development assistance agenda. Exclusion of aspects that are difficult for the donors to address or
solve should give the reader an idea about what get priority on the ground. Donors’ attitude towards the human rights situation of Ethiopia, will help to elucidate the importance of these priorities. Because learning about what donors give priority to, is important for many reasons. First, it will help to understand the donors’ level of commitment towards their policy principles. Second, it will help shed light on the less talked about implicit interests of donors in development assistance. And finally, it will provide donors’ insight on how much significance they give to human rights.
4. Methodology
In this chapter explanation of all the methods used in the study is provided. Starting with the method for data analysis Section 4.1. The details all the two phases of the method is provided in two sub-sections (4.1.1 and 4.1.2). This is followed by the sections on limitations of the method used and ethical considerations of the study. The final section (4.3) will explain the rationale behind sampling of the data and collection of the data for analysis.
4.1. Data Analysis Method
This thesis is basically a case study of Ethiopian development aid. However, the emphasis is on the donors’ activities and reactions to Ethiopian human rights violations. For studying the nature of donors’ behavior it was necessary to analyze it in a particular ‘situation’. The ‘situation’ is the widespread human rights violation in a popular recipient country. Starman (2013) states that “qualitative research is characterized by an interpretative paradigm” for which the “subjective views of the researcher on a situation” are vital (p. 30). In order to gain better insights on the hurdles of human rights based approach to development, Ethiopia is the perfect ‘situation.’
In order to study behavior, an interpretivist qualitative research approach was employed. The study is in essence trying to find out the meaning donors give to their own practices and what implications it has on the human rights based approach to development. Carcary (2009) says that the qualitative data analysis method is effective when the “dynamics of the process” and “deeper understanding of behavior” are under study. He states that in interpretivist research, “the meaning derived by the researcher is a function of the circumstances, the people involved and the broad interrelationships in the situations being researched” (p. 12). Giving meaning to the rhetoric behind the adoption of human rights framework involves such a sense-making process. To that end the qualitative content analysis method was used to analyze the data and to study the donor behavior.
The purpose of this study is to analyze donor behavior in order to understand the compatibility of human rights framework and development assistance. Furthermore the themes that were identified during the analysis helped to answer the study’s research question. Three cases will provide the basis for understanding donors’ practice. The details of the cases will be explained in Chapter 5. The aim is to understand the effect of the violation of human rights on the donors’ behavior. Since mainly textual documents were examined, AtlasTi was used for coding the
documents to recognize different themes present in the textual documents. Data was coded in two phases, called the first coding phase and the second coding phases, which are loosely based on the grounded theory method.
4.1.1. First Coding Phase
In order to make interpretations from the data collected it was important to systematically code the raw data, done during a process called ‘coding.’ Bohm (2004) describes coding as “the deciphering or interpretation of data and includes the naming of concepts and also explaining and discussing them in more detail”. He further states that the “target” of coding is “to produce codes that directly relate to the data” (p. 270). Khandkar (n.d.) mentions the importance of ‘noticing’ in the process of analysis. He states that as we gather new information we start to ‘notice’ new things or patterns, which we deem important and learn where to draw the readers’ attention to. Coding is thus the process of labeling or naming concepts, properties and things. An effort has been made to thoroughly portray the different interpretations and meanings that the raw data presented. This resulted in recognition of 34 types of codes, which can be found in Appendix I.
My method involved linking codes to sentence or sentences. This should not take away the credibility of analysis in understanding the text under investigation. As different kinds of observations were duly noted and codes linked to the text. As an example, let us look at the following text:
The safety net is used to buy loyalty to the ruling party. That is money that comes from abroad…. Do those people who send the money know what it is being used for? Let them know that it is being used against democracy (HRW 2010, p. 40).
The farmer who supports the opposition party said this to Human Rights Watch in an interview undertaken in 2009. Firstly, this small excerpt was coded as a whole as accusation of link between aid and oppression (code for which is Accusations by NGOs). Secondly, the following lines [the safety net is used to buy loyalty, let them know that it is used against democracy] ‘them’ refers to the donors and implies a criticism of their aid. Thus it was coded under Criticism of Donors (General). It was coded for this particular code because the interviewee blames all the donors that
fund PSNP in Ethiopia. Thirdly, words such as ‘against democracy’ imply the oppressive tactics used by the Ethiopian government, which indicates evidence of oppression (code for which is Beating/Oppression/Rapes). Fourthly, since this interview is part of the investigations carried out by the Human Rights Watch, it was also coded under the code Human Rights Violation Observations by Organizations.
In my analysis, many codes repeat themselves because of the nature and size of the data set. According to Saldana (2009) this is both “natural and deliberate.” Natural in the sense that there are “mostly repetitive patterns of action and consistencies in human affairs.” And deliberate “because coder’s primary goal is to find these repetitive patterns of action and consistencies in human affairs” (p. 5). The majority of the concepts (codes) that were identified relate to the background knowledge that I possessed from preliminary finding (Bohm 2004). However, as I progressed with the analysis and gathered other relevant data, patterns of similarity started to appear between the codes. These clusters of codes in turn “facilitate(d) the development of category” (Saldana 2009, p.8). This step of identification and interaction of different categories was done during the second coding phase.
4.1.2. Second Coding Phase
This phase involved finding links and connections between the concepts (codes) identified during the initial coding phase. Also referred to as coding families (in AtlasTi), these categories are products of further refinement of the concepts (codes) identified during the first coding phase (Bohm 2004). As I proceeded with the initial coding phase, I started to recognize similarities between the different codes. For instance, the following six codes Aid Data, Development Aid Related Materials/Factors, Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), Promoting Basic Services (PBS) and Public Service Capacity Building Program (PSCAP) were linked together to represent a category for ‘data.’ They represent different types of data related to the development projects and forms the basis for a link for framing done by donors. This process of contraction led to identification of 9 categories which enabled me to represent a concise understanding of the concepts from the first coding stage. Table 1 shows the categories and codes that fall under them. Further analysis of the categories was undertaken and a pattern of interaction between the categories was devised.
