The Trump Doctrine: an analysis of Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran - the continuities and changes of the American foreign policy traditions

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The Trump Doctrine:

an analysis of Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran -

the continuities and changes of the American foreign policy traditions

Master thesis Political Science – International Relations

Author: Parto Mirzaei, 12286826

Supervisor: Dr. Said Rezaeiejan

Second reader: Dr. Vivienne Matthies-Boon Date: 26th of June, 2020

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Abbreviations

ACF Advocacy Coalition Framework

AIPAC America Israel Public Affairs Committee

BCF Basij Cooperative Foundation

BMDS Ballistic Missile Defence Systems

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

DoD Department of Defense

FATF Financial Action Task Force

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FPA Foreign Policy Analysis

FTO Foreign Terrorist Organization

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IAG Iran Action Group

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

IS Islamic State

JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

LoN League of Nations

LSDNBP List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons

MDA Missile Defense Agency

MEB Mehr Eqtesad Bank

MEIIC Mehr Eqtesad Iranian Investment Company

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control

PM Prime Minister

PMF Popular Mobilization Forces

SA Saudi Arabia

SLO Supreme Leader’s Office

SoD Secretary of Defense

SU Soviet Union

SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

TBM Theater Ballistic Missiles

TEC Technotar Engineering Company

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

UK United Kingdom

US United States

USDS US Department of State

USTD United States Treasury Department

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Abstract

US – Iran relations have deteriorated significantly after President Trump decided to pull out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This decision was based on the idea that Trump considers Iran’s role in the Middle East region to be antagonistic and a threat to world peace. After the deal was cancelled, Trump imposed the ‘highest level’ of sanctions on several sectors of the Iranian industry and made trading with Iran almost impossible. Its national currency depreciated, and Trump’s ‘maximum pressure campaign’ made the life of the majority of Iranians tremendously difficult.

Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran has been remarked as ‘careless’, ‘lacking a clear strategy’ and as ‘a pressure cooker without a valve’. But is Trump’s foreign policy as

shocking and contradictory to his predecessors as many assume? Analysing Trump’s foreign policies towards Iran grants us more insight in how a change of office could have such a significant impact on the foreign relations with Iran. Furthermore, when comparing his foreign policy to the American foreign policy traditions, we could clarify whether Trump’s foreign policy is innovative, or if he is quietly walking the footsteps of the founders of American foreign policy.

This thesis aims to discover whether we can explain Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran through comparing it with the American foreign policy traditions. The American foreign policy traditions have existed for almost 300 years and offer a framework and classification to understand, historicize, and look at the continuities and changes of US foreign policy. This research provides a foreign policy analysis of US military power, economic statecraft and public diplomacy. Policy documents, speeches and transcripts have been evaluated to find out whether, and to which of the American foreign policy traditions Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran corresponds with. The findings suggest that Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran cannot be framed within one of the American foreign policy traditions, but instead demonstrates similarities with three of the four traditions.

Keywords:

Foreign policy, American foreign policy traditions, military power, economic sanctions, public diplomacy, Donald Trump, United States, Iran.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

After increased economic sanctions and the assassination of major general Soleimani, the relationship between the US and Iran has sharpened significantly. Whereas the US – Iran ties seemed to finally ameliorate after years of diplomatic efforts under the Obama

administration, they deteriorated heavily once Donald Trump became the president of the US.

The imposed sanctions by the US have caused the Iranian people to suffer tremendously. Besides the depreciation of its national currency, non-governmental organizations’ operations cannot be financed, and access to healthcare supplies and medicines have become limited (Human Rights Watch, 2019). This especially became a problem when the Covid-19 virus started to rise in Iran, and the country had difficulties with responding to the virus due to the debilitating sanctions (Al Jazeera, 2020)1.

The export of oil and the import of medical machinery and medication has become

practically impossible, which subsequently accelerated the spread of the Covid-19 virus. So far, the virus has led to 10,130 deaths and 215,096 Corona cases in Iran (World of Meters, 2020)2. As a response to these obstructive measures, the Iranian minister of foreign affairs has called for the termination of ‘economic terrorism’ through lifting the sanctions on Iran. He furthermore stated that the sanctions contravene with the resolution of the Security Council that affirmed the Nuclear deal of 2015, and that the UN member states should urge the US to discard its procedures against Iran (The New York Times, 2020)3.

In January 2020, president Trump provoked Iran by ordering the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the major general of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and Quds Force commander, through an airstrike at Baghdad’s airport (Al Jazeera, 2020)4. This aggravating

1 Al Jazeera, (2020),

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/iran-reports-113-virus-deaths-containment-concerns-mount-200315180552632.html. Retrieved on: 20-03-2020.

2 World of Meters (2020), Coronavirus case and deaths in Iran,

https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/iran/. Retrieved on: 25-06-2020.

3 The New York Times, (2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/03/12/world/middleeast/ap-un-united-nations-iran-us-virus.html. Retrieved on: 16-03-2020.

4 Al Jazeera, (2020),

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12 action seemed to contradict Trump’s ‘Hope not’ response to: ‘Mr. President, are we going to war with Iran?’ which was asked by a reporter prior to his meeting with the Swiss president in May 2019 (Associated Press Archive, 2019)5.

But even prior to initiating his first term as the president of the United States, Donald Trump sent out a number of twitter posts which could now be considered contradicting when comparing these statements to the actions he conducted during his presidency. A few examples of these contradictory comments are the following.

On the 14th of November in 2011, Trump made a statement in which he predicted that

president Obama would attack Iran in order to be re-elected in 2012 (Trump, 2011)6. In 2013, the same allegations were repeated three times through additional twitter posts (Vox, 2018).

These allegations were invalidated since president Obama was instead looking into the possibilities of rapprochement and intended to restore the ties with Iran through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement. The JCPOA was signed in May 2015 and entailed nuclear restrictions on Iran in return for the relief of sanctions (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). In 2018, president Trump decided to withdraw from the agreement since he believed it did not pay attention to Iran’s development of ballistic missiles and its influence in the

Middle-East. He accused Iran of ‘supporting terrorist proxies in the region’ and thus

announced that the US would pose ‘the highest level’ of economic sanctions on Iran (Donald Trump, 2018)7.

Although the economic sanctions on Iran have a severe impact on the Iranian people as well, Trump expressed his support for the Iranian people through a twitter post on January 11th, 2020, responding to the rising protests in Iran:

5 Associated Press Archive, (2019),

http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/61a3bf1b24cefa807307c4025c4ee19a. Retrieved on: 04-02-2020.

6 Donald Trump, (2011),

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/136172519307751425?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etwee tembed%7Ctwterm%5E136172519307751425&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vox.com%2F2018%2F7%2F 23%2F17602246%2Ftrump-iran-president-threat-tweet. Retrieved on: 05-02-2020

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13 ‘To the brave, long-suffering people of Iran: I've stood with you since the beginning of my Presidency, and my Administration will continue to stand with you. We are following your protests closely, and are inspired by your courage (Trump, 2020).’8

Nonetheless, the imposed economic sanctions seem to contradict his enounced concern with the interest of the Iranian people.

Some journalists have stated that Trump’s foreign policy is irrational, careless and without a clear strategy, whereas others are relieved that Trump finally stands up against Iran. Whilst journalists tend to be rather critical, academics also consider the historical aspects when analysing Trump’s foreign policy measures.

Academics argue that Trump’s foreign policy has the opposite effect of what Trump wants, and that it could lead to political insecurity, trade disagreements or even war. Walt describes Trump as being nationalistic, and he thinks that Trump lacks a foreign policy (Walt, 2018, pp. 18, 19). Mearsheimer thinks that Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran is rather

provocative, and that it will eventually lead to ‘a classic escalatory spiral’, and that his sanctions will only stimulate Iran to build nuclear weapons (Mearsheimer, 2019). Bajoghli agrees and believes that Trump’s attitude towards Iran might ignite Iranian anti-imperialist sentiments, and further deteriorate US – Iran relations (Bajoghli, 2019).

There are academics who tend to believe that Trump could be influenced by his advisors, whereas others reject this and state that Trump carefully chooses his advisors based on whether their ideas correspond with his.

8 Donald Trump, (2020), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1216114135529902081. Retrieved on:

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1.2 Research question

Based on the previously described contradictions regarding U.S. – Iran relations under the Trump administration, the research question of this thesis is:

‘How can we explain Donald Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran from the initiation of his presidency in 2017 until now?’

This research aims to explain Trump’s foreign policy from the beginning of his presidential term until now. This will be done through conducting a foreign policy analysis of the

following foreign policy practices: military power, economic statecraft and public diplomacy. Furthermore, it will investigate to which of the American foreign policy traditions Trump’s foreign policy resembles most.

1.3 Relevance

Political

Donald Trump has made some radical foreign policy decisions during his presidency. Some examples entail the denouncement and termination of multilateral agreements such as the JCPOA, the Paris Climate Agreement, and the TTP. Trump has imposed severe sanctions on Iran, which isolated the country almost entirely from trading with other countries. Years of diplomatic effort had finally led to an agreement between the US and Iran, but Iran’s discontent seems to have increased notably since Trump is in power.

Trump’s conducted foreign policy against Iran contradicts significantly with his predecessor, Barack Obama, who initiated the JCPOA. Therefore, it is helpful to evaluate Trumps method of conducting foreign policies in order to gain more understanding in how a change of office could have such a significant impact on the foreign relations with Iran. Also, analysing Trump’s role and impact enables us to understand the limitations that come with an individual leader in place. Becoming aware of deficiencies in the framework within which policies are formed, grants us more insight and possibilities in how policy making could be altered or improved.

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Academic

Trump’s foreign policy has already been explained through a comparison that was made between him and his precedents, Clinton, Bush and Obama, who had also imposed sanctions against Iran, supported Iran’s regional opponents, permitted clandestine actions against Iran and encouraged the idea of ‘regime change’ in Iran. However, some believe that his

administration has had a significant influence on how he executes his power, and that a conservative coalition was already on the rise before Trump came in power. Another scholar explains his foreign policy through the pressure and influence which were enforced by Arab countries and Israel, which could have steered Trump into pressuring Iran.

This research however focusses on how Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran could be

explained, based on how he executes three foreign policy practices: military power; economic statecraft and public diplomacy.

After the FPA has been conducted, Trump’s foreign policy will be compared to the American foreign policy traditions. Because, although Trump does not operate in the same manner as his predecessor, his foreign policy practices might correspond with one of these traditions.

1.4 Thesis outline

This thesis is divided into eight chapters. The literature review will provide insight in how Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran has been perceived by academics, think-tanks and journalists. Subsequently, the theoretical framework explains what foreign policy entails and introduces the chosen variables, the American foreign policy traditions and the collective memory of US – Iran relations. Followed by the methodology chapter which includes the chosen research method, operationalization of variables and a reflection on the chosen method. The following three chapters concern the analysis part of this thesis and are divided into the chosen foreign policy variables: military power, economic statecraft and public diplomacy. After each of these three chapters the outcomes of the analysis of the variables are compared to the American foreign policy traditions. Finally, an answer will be provided on how we can explain Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran.

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2 Literature review

Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran has been characterized as being provocative, reckless and without a clear strategy. A German think tanker has used a metaphor to characterize Trump’s foreign policy approach and compared his strategies to: ‘a pressure cooker without a valve’. But there are also people in favour of the man who finally went against the ‘greatest sponsor of terror in the region’.

Although journalists are often critical, Patterson suggests that they have a tendency for being purposely near-sighted, unprecise and more focussed on new and sudden events than

enduring affairs (Patterson, 1998, p. 55). Whilst academics recognize the historical aspects that play a role in how foreign affairs are conducted today. Nonetheless, there is no clear-cut answer available to how one could clarify Trump’s foreign policy vis à vis Iran.

2.1 Trump’s foreign policy

Trump’s overall foreign policy is described as careless and without a clear strategy. Escalation could only be confined through diplomacy, coordination and cooperation, but according to the Financial Times, these are the characteristics that have been hardly demonstrated by Trump until now (Financial Times, 2020)9.

Prior to Trump’s inauguration, experts on foreign policy addressed the following concerns about possible alterations in foreign policy under Trump. Thomas Wright stated that Trump would ‘seek nothing less than ending the US-led liberal order’. Goldgeier confirmed this through saying that Trump would not follow up on the foreign policy that had been conducted by the US since the second World War. Dueck stated that ‘A Trump foreign policy’ would have severe consequences for the US itself, its allies and the Republican party who would become associated with the outcome of his practices.

To evaluate these statements, Macdonald has assessed Trump’s foreign policy in his first presidential year and concluded that the ‘America First’ approach has dismissed three main

9 Financial Times (2020), https://www.ft.com/content/340be9aa-2e49-11ea-bc77-65e4aa615551. Retrieved on:

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17 pillars of post-war American foreign policy. Firstly, Trump was critical about the advantages of a collective and global economy and denounced multilateral trade agreements. He for instance referred to the TTP as being a horrible deal and described the NAFTA as ‘a disaster for our country’. He also discredited the United Nations and stated that the US does not benefit from the UN, and he was heavily against multilateral agreements such as the Paris Climate Agreement and the nuclear deal with Iran. Furthermore, Trump has complimented non-democratic leaders more than once and expressed a lack of faith in democracy promotion and rejected the distribution of universal values (Macdonald, 2018).

According to Gordon, it was initially unclear into what direction Trump’s foreign policy was headed. His character is described as being belligerent and daring, and his foreign policy as being mainly focused on the idea of ‘putting America first’ and preventing other countries from taking advantage of the US. Furthermore, the author states that Trump seems to apply Nixon’s ‘Madmen theory’, which entails that one tries to convince his opponent into

believing that he is erratic and might act unexpected and absurd if someone does not adhere to his demands.

However, this theory requires one to react reasonably at the right moments, and this is a characteristic which has not yet been exposed by Trump. Nonetheless, applying the Madmen theory to Trump would imply that Trump is an absolute ruler and that the power of the Senate, Congress and lobby groups could be ignored.

The author furthermore underlines the risks of unsuccessful diplomatic moves and explains how it could lead to political uncertainty, trade disagreements or even war. Trump is compared with previous leaders who took office after having expressed complaints about how adversaries were treated and subsequently vow to make them surrender. But they would eventually be caught in military, economic or diplomatic conflicts which in the end were deplored.

Furthermore, Gordon believes that Trump falsely claims that the US is not benefiting from the nuclear deal, and that the released frozen assets of Iran are now being used to

manufacture a bomb. When Trump became president, he terminated the encouragement of international companies and banks that would guarantee Iran to progress economically from the nuclear deal. He additionally supported plans of Congress that demanded supplementary

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18 sanctions for Iranian bodies that would violate human rights or supported terrorism and appointed the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to be a foreign terrorist organization. The Trump administration assumed that US allies would support Trump’s resilient approach, but also warned countries that they would have to choose between doing business with Iran or the US.

Instead of adhering to Trump’s approach, countries criticized Washington for triggering a crisis whilst the deal functioned well for other countries. As a response, the EU passed a law which said that collaborating with the US’s secondary sanctions was illegal for European companies. Trump then got into an argument with the closest allies of the US, and meanwhile, the tensions between Iran and the US intensified. The author thinks that escalation could be hardly avoided since Trump has already changed procedures without making compromises.

Although more experienced advisers could balance his behaviour, Trump’s decision-making behaviour, temperament and how he has conducted foreign policy so far, have demonstrated that failures may indeed occur (Gordon, 2017).

2.2 Trump’s foreign policy in relation to its precedents

Realists such as Walt and Mearsheimer describe Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran as being incompetent. However, Walt emphasizes that the foreign policy strategy of Trump is in line with its precedents who also conducted a policy with ‘anti-Iran’ sentiments.

Walt is convinced that foreign policy was never considered important by Trump, since the principal subject of Trump’s statements during his campaign was his aversion against globalization (Walt, 2018, pp. 18-19). Presidents have more freedom in conducting foreign policy nowadays, they can decide upon what they say and how they intend to channel it. Whether on Twitter or in person, the effect remains the same.

Walt believes that this power has enabled Trump to influence US foreign policy and its position in the world, in spite of the resistance he was challenged with. Walt subsequently describes Trump’s role in US foreign policy as:

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19 ‘The captain of the ship of state is an ill-informed and incompetent skipper lacking accurate charts, an able crew, or a clear destination.’ (Walt, 2018, p. 408)

He clarifies the statement above by explaining Trump’s foreign policy as having a zero-sum perspective of the world and being profoundly nationalistic. This was also emphasized in a speech for the UN General Assembly in September 2017 in which Trump emphasized the significance of national sovereignty (Walt, 2018, pp. 408-412):

‘I will always put America first, just like you, as the leaders of your countries will always, and should always, put your countries first.’

- Donald Trump at the UN General Assembly, September 2017

Walt describes Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran as being in line with the anti-Iran sentiments that have been present in US foreign policy since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA might seem extreme when compared to Obama’s foreign policy, yet it is not a revolutionary move in US foreign policy. Instead, the JCPOA was considered to be a rather disputatious agreement, and it was relatively difficult for the Obama administration to get approval from Congress.

Furthermore, Trump’s precedents, Clinton, Bush and Obama, had also imposed sanctions against Iran, supported Iran’s regional opponents, permitted clandestine actions against Iran and encouraged the idea of ‘regime change’ in Iran. This demonstrates how Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA could in fact be seen as the recovery of the ‘policy of

confrontation’ which has been essential in US foreign policy towards Iran since 1979 (Walt, 2018, pp. 428-429).

This idea is also emphasized by Gordon, by a journalist of The Nation, Danny Sjursen, and two think-tanks. Gordon compares Trump’s rhetoric about the Iran deal to Bush’s

overstatements about the weapons of mass-destruction in Iraq (Gordon, 2017). Sjursen agrees and also states how one should, in order to understand the actions conducted by Trump, also consider the combative foundation that George W. Bush introduced during his presidency. Bush already created tension between the US and Iran when he called Iran ‘the axis of evil’,

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20 and also initiated a war against Iraq. According to Sjursen, these actions have established a new standard of hazardous foreign policy (Sjursen, 2020)10.

The ICG also states that the US aims to eradicate Iran’s power in the region and the use of its ballistic missile program. And that although these approaches do not seem to be quite

balanced, they do coincide with the mentality of US administrators (International Crisis Group, 2018, pp. 1-25).

Marco Overhaus, a representative of think tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, refers to Trump’s foreign policy as being ‘a pressure cooker without a valve’ and considers the main problem to be that the demands the US has on Iran are so unclear and radical, that they are hardly attainable. However, he also states that we should keep in mind that Obama has also put economic and some military pressure on Iran, but that the main difference is that he rather chose a diplomatic way of translating these pressures into political results, which eventually led to the Iranian nuclear agreement (Tagesschau, 2020).

Mearsheimer believes that Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran rather provokes than prevents Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Although the US has imposed severe sanctions and is pressuring Iran’s existence, historical data has shown that such measures seldom lead to states giving in to the posed demands. Countries are more likely to resist those measures since they want to prevent great powers from thinking that their measures were successful. Mearsheimer therefore expects Iran to respond with attacks on oil facilities, tankers, and cyberattacks. As a response to this, Trump will reciprocate and increase pressure against Iran, which will eventually lead to a ‘classic escalatory spiral’.

Hence, the likelihood of Iran building nuclear weapons will increase since the country is exposed to intimidation from the US, and nuclear weapons will enable Iran to ameliorate its strategic position (Mearsheimer, 2019)11.

10 The Nation (2020),

https://advance-lexis-

com.proxy.uba.uva.nl:2443/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crid=a6aa90ff-6c90-4d26-bed0- ffc74438a579&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5Y2D-FSP1-JCMN-Y36G-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A5Y2D-FSP1-JCMN-Y36G. Retrieved on: 15-02-2020.

11 The New York Times (2019),

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21 However, one should keep in mind that Mearsheimer considers himself to be a realist who thinks that the international system is ruled by strong powers who immerse themselves in a security contest with the possible outcome of war (Mearsheimer, 2020). His political perspective is in this case quite crucial in how he perceives the possible continuation of US-Iran relations. The ICG has also evaluated the sanctions that are imposed on US-Iran by the Trump administration. They agree with Mearsheimer and also consider these sanctions to be unreasonable because historical data has indeed demonstrated that wealth adjustments in Iran did not have a significant impact on its management in the region. Alternatively, it might encourage Iran’s regional involvement.

Furthermore, if the US continues to debilitate the Iranian economy, it could lead to increased public support for the Iranian government, which could subsequently increase the likelihood of a conflict between the US and Iran (International Crisis Group, 2018, pp. 5-7). In a more recent report, the ICG shed light on effects of the implemented strategies and sanctions by the US and evaluated how the US its goals for Iran of constraining the development of missiles, reducing support for allies in the region and cultivating uranium have not succeeded. Instead of reaching an improved JCPOA deal, Iran has limited its compliance with the deal, and has become more belligerent in the Middle-Eastern region (International Crisis Group, 2020, pp. 1-25).

Bajoghli agrees with Mearsheimer on how the sanctions will strengthen Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, but she also points out how these sanctions will revive old ‘anti-imperialist’

sentiments among the Iranian people, which also prevailed after the 1953 coup d’état and during the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

Bajoghli also considers Trump’s foreign policy to be ineffective, and states that the

maximum pressure approach will merely fortify Iran’s revolutionary guard. Whilst sanctions are used to trigger divergent domestic opinions to effectuate possible regime changes, external pressure on Iran rather creates domestic support for the government. Bajoghli clarifies this through referring back to the anti-imperialist sentiment that prevailed in the aftermath of the 1953 coup and during the Iranian Revolution, in which the outcry of many Iranians was that they wanted ‘Neither East nor West’ interference.

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22 Moreover, she elaborates on how the IRGC has altered its approach towards the juvenile population in Iran and has tried to acquire more public through e.g. exhibitions in museums which were created by artists that were previously repelled. Additionally, social media and music videos were used to praise the military defence forces. These actions have led to the popularization of IRGC’s major general Qasem Soleimani and have fuelled the idea that the IRGC is the most appropriate defence apparatus against the US (Bajoghli, 2019)12.

Bajoghli takes the historic relationship between the US and Iran into account when

explaining the increased loyalty from the Iranian people towards their regime: now that the Iranians feel pressured by the US, old anti-imperialist sentiments will revive. The idea that the sanctions will lead to increased public support for the Iranian government is also supported by the ICG report of 2018.

However, there are also journalists who believe that Trump’s strategy for Iran deserves credit since it reversed Obama’s strategy. Schake, a journalist of The Atlantic, condemns Obama’s strategy since she states that there was too much focus on possible revenge actions from Iran, instead of dismissing Iran’s behaviour in the region.

Although the article seems to comprehend Trump’s resistance towards nuclear weapons, Iran’s role in the region and the human rights conditions in Iran, it has also generated some risks. Iraq could for instance dismiss or limit the right of the US to have armed forces, which could have an effect on the possibility for the US to control Iran.

Moreover, US allies in the Persian Gulf region consider the US’s reaction to the attacks on Saudi Arabia to have not been compelling enough. Hence, the US should try to restore confidence to its allies in the region.

Additionally, there are only a number of countries that are eager to join the maritime force that is led by the US. More allies have devoted their forces to a European coalition which is led by the French. As a response to the economic sanctions, the EU is trying to set up a

12 The New York Times (2019),

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23 system in which the sanctions are bypassed through a different method of payment which is considered to be an unsettling move for the US.

Albeit Schake agrees with Trump’s view on confining the influence and actions of Iran, she also believes that his actions will not have the desired effect (Schake, 2020)13.

2.3 Influence of the administration

Macdonald has also stated that she believes that White House staff and members of the cabinet have played a significant role in trying to deviate Trump from his campaign promises. In the case of Iran, Trump initially said that his main priority was to quit this terrible and catastrophic deal. But once he was in office, the UN ambassador of the US: Nikki Haley, has played an important part in trying to create middle ground in disallowing the deal. Hence, it seems as if the president is able to diverge from his initial promises when confronted with opposition from his advisers; therefore, he first threatened to pull out of the deal unless the terms were changed and thus used this threat in an attempt to alter the deal. Macdonald concludes with stating that Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran deal is rather backed up by the urgency to fulfil a campaign promise than by implementing a policy alternative (Macdonald, 2018).

But this is countered by Tabatabai, who states that Haley was severely against the nuclear deal and referred to it as being a ‘one-sided deal’ (Tabatabai, 2017)14. Additionally, Johnson elaborates on how Haley was ‘Trump’s Iran whisperer’ and how she held a pitch to Trump about how the public case should be led to avoid the reapproval of the nuclear deal. Haley was considered to be the ambassador who directed Trump’s ‘destructive instincts into policy’ (Johnson, 2017; Da Vinha, 2019).

According to Beeson, many analysts initially thought that Trump would blend in with contemporary geopolitics because of his reasonable security advisors. But he describes the

13 The Atlantic (2020),

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/trumps-iran-strategy-doesnt-work-as-well-as-he-thinks/605947/. Retrieved on: 05-02-2020.

14 The Atlantic (2017),

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24 replacement of his National Security Advisor, H.R. McMaster by John Bolton, as what

caused the retraction of the Iran deal (Beeson, 2019, p. 18; Da Vinha, 2019, p. 296).

Da Vinha considers these analysists to be ‘reluctant’ and explains that when Trump congregated his national security advisors, he deliberately chose those who had a realist internationalist perspective on international affairs.

Furthermore, the majority of the foreign policy and national security positions were given to military executives. Da Vinha however also underlines that in spite of formal structures, a president could always decide which advice he listens to (Da Vinha, 2019, p. 288).

Nonetheless, Trump’s national security advisors told him that although Iran should indeed be punished for its actions in the Middle-East, those actions should not be linked to the nuclear deal since the deal would bring about stability and other advantages. Trump did not want to acknowledge that the Iran deal was important for the US’s national security, and neither that Iran had met its duties. He subsequently requested more alternatives from his advisors and guaranteed he would not approve the Iran deal again. Since he considered the alternatives to be disappointing, he included Republican Senator Tom Cotton who was strongly against the deal. Cotton emphasized that if Trump would recertify the deal, this would suggest that the deal would be in the national security interest of the US, and this was exactly what Trump refused to believe was true (Hayes and Warren 2017, cited in Da Vinha, 2019, pp. 294-295).

On the surface it seems as if Trump’s realist-internationalist advisors could explain his nation-state orientation and his aversion against multilateral deals such as the Paris Climate Accord and the JCPOA. Although there seemed to be room for mitigation according to Macdonald, this is countered by two journalists and academics. Da Vinha argues that in spite of his advisors being perceived as realist-internationalist, they in fact favoured the Iran deal and tried to convince Trump to certify the deal.

Nonetheless, Trump terminated the JCPOA deal in May 2018; thus, he seemed to be more determined on realizing his campaign promises than to be moderated by his advisors as Macdonald suggested.

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2.4 Conservative coalition

Although it is rather enticing to aim attention at Trump’s authority and the power that presidents can have in adjusting foreign policy, especially since he has ignored his advisors as described previously, Lantis considers advocacy coalitions to be the principal agents behind the foreign policy changes towards Iran. He describes the existence of two coalitions that already existed prior to Trump becoming the president of the US. One coalition consisted of actors who were in favour of a policy shift towards Iran, including the negotiations about its role in the Middle East and nuclear weapons. This coalition consisted of members of Congress, think tanks from Washington and high-ranked administrators under the Obama and Trump administration. They were disputed by a conservative coalition which consisted of new Trump advisors, right-wing Congress members and media.

The conservative coalition became more accepted at the end of 2017 (Lantis, 2019, pp. 466-467). Drew describes how this coalition included members of Congress and how the

opposition amongst conservative members of Congress increased because of concerns about the government’s authority in the deal and the idea that Iran would be able to continue with uranium enrichment after ten years. The coalition consisted of many Republicans but also critical Democrats and pro-Israel lobby groups such as the America Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The AIPAC worked together with the Republican Jewish Coalition, the Zionist Organization of America; Anti-Defamation League and the Emergency Committee for Israel. These lobbyists already met frequently with senators in 2015 (Drew, 2015). Since these meetings already took place during Obama’s presidency, it demonstrates how such opposing entities were already present and active before Trump came into power.

The AIPAC successfully influenced the votes against the Iran deal through raising public awareness and advertising in the neighbourhood of principal members of Congress

(Rosenberg, 2015)15. The involvement of the AIPAC in opposing the Iran deal emphasizes Israel’s interest in holding back the deal and also explains the current relationship between Trump and Netanyahu.

15 The Nation (2015),

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2.5 Influence of Arab countries and Israel

In 2018, Trump refused to sign the JCPOA agreement. In spite of him being urged by fellow government members, he did not give up on the imposed sanctions on Iran. Additional economic sanctions were imposed and doing business with Iran has been averted. Subsequently, Iran has been put into the position in which it has to adhere to nuclear restrictions whilst having a fraction of economic interest.

Trump demanded alterations but consultations with the EU, UK, France and Germany have not led to solid results so far. The negotiations were delayed by Congress because of tax amendments and other legislative priorities. The president then repeated the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, by saying that if the deal cannot be fixed, implying that if a deadlock would be reached between the other countries and Congress, the deal would be ‘nixed’ (International Crisis Group, 2018, pp. 1-25).

According to Bahgat, the further decay of US – Iran relations could be explained by the US being internationally urged by Arab countries and Israel to take a more belligerent position towards Iran, and due to its domestic opposition against Iran (Bahgat, 2017, p. 94).

Netanyahu was highly in favour of Trump and had criticized the Obama administration before. His objectives were closer to the current US president than to his predecessor (Powaski, 2019). Moreover, during his presidential campaign, Trump had promised to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict, which by the Israeli government was perceived as the termination of the concept of a Palestinian state. Once in power, Trump moved the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and herewith recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel (Black, 2018, p. 25).

Black also compares the US – Saudi relations under Obama and Trump and states that in contrast to Obama, who planned on ameliorating the relationship with Iran through the JCPOA agreement, Trump was more appreciated by the Saudis because he announced to be stricter and more aggressive against ‘The world’s leading sponsor of terrorism’ and remarked that he considered the JCPOA to be a terrible idea. In an interview with the New York Times, Mohammed bin Salman referred to Ayatollah Khamenei as being a ‘new Hitler’, and Trump also made it clear not to be in favour of the Iranian regime when he encouraged the Iranian protests in December 2017 and said he hoped it would bring down Tehran’s ‘corrupt

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27 dictatorship’. Other protests and human rights abuses in the Middle-East were considered as indifferent to the White House (Black, 2018, pp. 23-24).

Trump’s objection against the JCPOA is rather difficult to understand since Iran’s human rights abuses, militant entity assistance and the use of ballistic missiles could also be rebuked without disproving the JCPOA. It seems quite implausible to restrict or abolish a deal

because Iran might magnify its nuclear power within ten years from now (International Crisis Group, 2018, pp. 1-25).

Black points out how Trump is using double standards when condemning the human rights violations in Iran, whilst he is not responding to the ones in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Black confirms Bahgat’s statement about how the US was urged by Israel and Saudi Arabia to have a more combative position towards Iran.

2.6 The assassination of Qasem Soleimani

Several journalists of TNYT describe Trump’s decision to kill the Iranian general as reckless. His action is believed to have led to a remarkable and worldwide drama which made

European leaders furious since they felt as if they were kept uninformed. Macron has attempted to de-escalate the situation through reaching out to Trump and Rouhani, but this did not have the desired effect.

Moreover, the article highlights how important negotiations out of sight contradicted

Trump’s behaviour towards the public. Quoting Trump’s response after Iran’s counterattack: ‘Iran appears to be standing down’ whilst also highlighting that he had sent a secret message through the Swiss before Iran’s response, in which he urged Iran to stand down (The New York Times, 2020)16.

The editorial board of the Financial Times goes a bit further in condemning the assassination of the Iranian general, they write that Soleimani was a high ranked general who was very popular in Iran, and that killing him in a country other than the US or Iran, makes this act

16 The New York Times (2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/11/us/politics/iran-trump.html. Retrieved

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28 notably outrageous and precarious. Although the Iranians have suffered significantly from the sanctions, this act will most likely lead to more unification and a call for revenge (Financial Times, 2020).

Sjursen describes the decision made by Trump to assassinate the Iranian major general Soleimani as being ‘rash, risky and repugnant’. This and other acts of the president in the Middle Eastern region are depicted as ‘a chaos machine that has gone off the rails’ (Sjursen, 2020)17. Additionally, the assassination of Iranian major general Soleimani has increased public support for the Iranian government and aversion against the US (International Crisis Group, 2020, pp. 1-25).

2.7 Conclusion

Against this background, the main points that describe Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran according to journalists, academics and think tanks are that presidents have more freedom in conducting foreign policy nowadays since they can decide upon what they say and how they intend to channel it. Whether on Twitter or in person, the effect remains the same. Walt believes that this power has enabled Trump to influence US foreign policy and its position in the world, in spite of the resistance he was challenged with. Furthermore, Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran is in line with the anti-Iran sentiments that have been present in US foreign policy since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Accordingly, the ICG states that the US aims to eradicate Iran’s power in the region and the use of its ballistic missile program. And that although these approaches do not seem to be quite balanced, they do coincide with the mentality of US administrators.

Furthermore, before Trump came into power, opposition amongst conservative members of Congress had already increased because of concerns about the government’s authority in the JCPOA deal, and the idea that Iran would be able to continue with uranium enrichment after ten years. This coalition consisted of many Republicans but also critical Democrats and pro-Israel lobby groups such as the America pro-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).

17 The Nation (2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/world/trump-bush-obama-foreign-policy/. Retrieved

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29 The further decay of US – Iran relations is also explained by the US being internationally urged by Arab countries and Israel to take a more belligerent position towards Iran.

In conclusion, the assassination of Soleimani is referred to as being notably outrageous and precarious by several journalists, and this act is believed to lead to more unification and a call for revenge.

Although some believe that White House staff and members of the cabinet have played a significant role in trying to deviate Trump from his campaign promises, others

explain that when Trump congregated his national security advisors, he deliberately chose those who had a realist internationalist perspective on international affairs.

Another key point that has been outlined is that if the US continues to debilitate the Iranian economy, it could lead to increased public support for the Iranian government. This could subsequently increase the likelihood of a conflict between the US and Iran and could also cause Iran to become more aggressive in the Middle Eastern region.

Additionally, Bajoghli emphasizes the historic relationship between the US and Iran when explaining the increased loyalty from the Iranian people towards their regime: now that the Iranians feel pressured by the US, old anti-imperialist sentiments could revive. The idea that the sanctions will lead to increased public support for the Iranian government is also

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3 Theoretical framework

This chapter will discuss relevant theories, frameworks, concepts, and variables with regards to the US foreign policy towards Iran, and the US – Iran relations in general. Furthermore, this section will explain what defines US foreign policy towards Iran through looking at both material- and immaterial factors, and the International context in which US – Iran relations abide.

3.1 Foreign policy

There are several definitions of the foreign policy concept in academic literature.

Hill defines the concept of foreign policy as ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually but not exclusively a state) in international relations.’ Hill includes ‘an independent actor’ since this enables a reference to non-governmental entities such as the European Union. With ‘official external relations’ Hill indicates that the proceedings that are executed by a governing entity are also included in foreign policy; thus, foreign policy is not only limited to actions that are conducted by ministries of foreign affairs. ‘The sum’ of these external relations result in ‘policy’ since these actions generally follow a certain foreseeable line of continuity in relation to the outer world. The policy is referred to as being ‘foreign’ since the world is divided into separate entities, and these entities require policies to deal with those who do not belong to their state or entity (Hill, 2015, pp. 21-22).

According to Leira, the difference between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ policy came forth as a result of the increasing contrast between the government and the population in the 18th century, which was expressed through the relative freedom of the press that engaged in the preliminary public domain. This increasing contrast facilitated the rise of foreign policy as a useful concept. Foreign policy served as a mean to exclude the executive domain of the king and the ministry from the legitimate domain of policy discourse. Whereas liberal academics think that secrecy impairs democracy, and that transparency and public debate will create better policies, realist academics and diplomats believe that a standard of secrecy is crucial in assuring state interests (Leira, 2019, pp. 187-188).

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32 On the other hand, Campbell states that ‘foreign policy is not a bridge between two distinct realms, but something that both divided and joined the inside and the outside, the state and the interstate system’ (Campbell, 1998, p. 60).

The variety in definitions demonstrates that there is a perceptual difference in how foreign policy is distinguished from domestic policy, and whether and to what extent the two overlap. Kissinger makes a clear distinction between the two and states that ‘the domestic structure is taken as given; foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends’ (Kissinger, 1966, p. 503).

On the contrary, Rosenau believes that there is no absolute dichotomy between the two and that and that they are rather ‘two ends of a continuum rather than being sharply demarcated’ (Rosenau 1997, cited in Hill, 2015, p.44). Instead, he states that the two are intertwined: both domestic and foreign policy have each other’s characteristics: it is a mutual stream (Rosenau 1967, cited in Hill, 2015, p. 45-46).

Rosenau’s perception is also more in line with how Alden and Aran regard the possible influence of domestic aspects on foreign policy: they elaborate on how non-governmental actors and structures such as the media, lobbyists, constitutional limitations and

socioeconomic factors could influence foreign policy (Alden & Aran, 2016, p. 63).

Wendt argues that ‘foreign policy behaviour is often determined primarily by domestic politics’ (Wendt 1999, cited in Hill, 2015, p. 230).

However, Kissinger’s definition does not suffice because it assumes a strict distinction between domestic and foreign policy. Wendt on the other hand argues that foreign policy decisions are mostly determined by domestic policy, but is that still the case if foreign policy could also be determined by NGO’s or the European Union, which often go beyond domestic policy decisions? This argument, which was mentioned by Hill, is also agreed upon by Alden and Aran who additionally state that the media and lobbyists could also influence foreign policy.

Against the background of these opinions, these are the terms, concepts and mechanisms that characterize foreign policy: ‘The sum of official external relations conducted by an

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33 p. 21). Which could be influenced by domestic policy, but also by non-governmental actors and structures such as the media, lobbyists, constitutional limitations and socioeconomic factors. This conceptualization is applied since it does not draw a firm line between domestic and foreign policy and encompasses a holistic view of what foreign policy entails and how it is established.

3.2 FPA variables

3.2.1 Power

To evaluate Trump’s foreign policy from 2017 until now, there will be looked into how he has tried to shape his foreign policy towards Iran through the use of hard and soft power resources. The following section will elaborate on what hard and soft power entail, and which other variables can be derived from them.

3.2.2 Hard and soft power

Hard power is described as ‘command power’ which has the ability to change someone’s position through the use of e.g. economic and military power. Nye argues that ‘hard power can rest on inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks)’ (Nye, 2004, p. 5). Hard power resources are tangible, such as ‘force’ and ‘money’. However, immaterial means such as legality, morale and nationalism significantly influence the ability of the military to battle and succeed.

At the same time, hard power resources could also generate soft power. Naval forces could for instance create hard power through prevailing a military fight, and simultaneously gain trust and support from the public, based on what the aim and the situation are. China’s economic accomplishments generate hard power resources such as confined access to markets and sanctions, but also create a soft power such as attractiveness through its reproduction of success (Nye, 2011, p. 19).

According to Hill, there does not exist a clear distinction between hard and soft power, or a point where hard power ceases and soft power commences. Economic sanctions could for instance be used as an expression, or as a mean of stimulating someone to take a different

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34 course of action. The same goes for diplomacy, which could also be a practice of coercion when e.g. ambassadors are displaced or if there are worse measures ahead if they do not cooperate.

Accordingly, ‘carrots’ policies or inducements, which could come in the form of either financial assistance or advantages, may appear to be soft power resources but are hard to decline by a state who needs such assistance. In that case, these policies possess a coercive nature (Hill, 2015, p. 144).

Nye defines soft power as ‘the ability to affect others to obtain outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment’ (Nye, 2008, p. 94). And as ‘the ability to affect others to obtain preferred outcomes by the co-optive means of framing the agenda,

persuasion and positive attraction’ (Nye, 2011, p. 19). Hill has made a figure called ‘the continuum of power in foreign policy’ which outlines the different instruments of hard and soft power and there severeness in terms of how ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ these measures are (Hill, 2015, p. 145). Figure 1 will be added to give an idea of where the chosen variables are approximately located on the scale of power to influence.

Figure 1: The continuum of power in foreign policy, Christopher Hill, 2015

Source: Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century, (Hill, 2015, p. 145).

Furthermore, Hill divides hard power into force and deterrence, and soft power into

persuasion and deference. Force refers to the stick policies of threat, and the instruments that are connected to force are the military, diplomacy, economic sanctions and manipulation. Deterrence is defined as exerting the threat of force, and has the same instruments as force. Persuasion is referred to as being the carrot policy and is connected to the following

instruments: military, diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, propaganda and economic inducements (Hill, 2015, p. 147).

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35 These definitions and their related instruments confirm what has already been stated by Nye and Hill: there is no clear distinction between hard and soft power instruments. The

definitions of hard and soft power and their accompanied instruments are intertwined instead (Hill, 2015, p. 144) and (Nye, 2011, p. 19).

3.2.3 Military power

Paret describes military power as the power that communicates and carries out state authority in- and outside the borders of the nation, and as a mean that creates and endures political power (Paret, 1989, p. 240).

Campbell and O’Hanlan refer to military power in their description of hard power as: ‘the application of military power to meet national ends, that is, the deployment of ground troops, naval assets, and precision munitions to secure a vital national objective’ (Campbell & O'Hanlon, 2006). Thus, military power entails the arrangement of means that are necessary to guard a state’s fundamental purposes. ‘Armed strength as a threat or potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political power of a nation’ (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 14).

Morgenthau describes military power as: ‘the obvious measure of a nation’s power, its

demonstration serves to impress the others with that nation’s power’ (Idem, p.54). Hill agrees with Morgenthau and mentions how military power is the leading force of hard power. He furthermore states that there is always some suggestion of pressure and impendence in international politics, and that this is also the case for weak states. This implies that every activity in the field of international relations carries the risk of producing unpredicted

responses coming from others. Military threats that specifically threaten with the deployment of military actions if the opponent refuses to cooperate or comply with the requested

demands, run the risk of changing the situation rapidly and uncontrollably (Hill, 2015, pp. 148-149).

Military force is often used as a defence or deterrence mechanism (Hill, 2015, p. 151). The political intention that lies behind military precautions is to intimidate other states and cause the enemy to abstain from using military force (Morgenthau, 1948, pp. 14-15).

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36 The conceptualization of the first variable, ‘military power’, is composed of the definitions that were given by Paret, Hill and Campbell and ‘O Hanlan. Military power is often used as a defence or deterrence mechanism (Hill, 2015, p. 151), it is the power that communicates and carries out state authority in- and outside the borders of the nation, and is also a mean that creates and endures political power (Paret, 1989, p. 240) which is deployed through ‘ground troops, naval assets, and precision munitions to secure a vital national objective’ (Campbell & O'Hanlon, 2006). These definitions are bundled into one definition in order to create a more holistic concept, which encompasses the term military power more thoroughly.

In relation to Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran, the analysis will focus on where the US is situated in the Middle East region, which nations are supported by the US and how the US relates towards Iran and what their attitude towards Iran’s role in the region is.

3.2.4 Economic statecraft

Economic statecraft entails the analysis of the scope of economic means that are available to a nation. It includes the study of the range of a nation’s foreign goals, including ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’ policies, or other power procedures. Nye considers carrot policies to be coercive as well. An inducement might seem appealing at first, but if the carrot is pulled out, it turns into a ‘punishment’ (Nye 2004, p.31, cited in Hill, 2015, p. 154). Economic statecraft is applied to realize matters that are already taking place through development aid, trade or investments. In the economic sphere, sanctions are used as a deliberate foreign policy mean which crosses contemporary business. However, these sanctions could have detrimental effects on the one who sanctions and the one that is being sanctioned. Economic actions are mostly extracted from the private sector, whereas foreign policy serves the business of nations.

Sanctions include export embargoes, import boytcotts, business and travel constraints, and the increase of prices through the use of e.g. punitive taxes. Whereas the majority states that sanctions do not work, there have also been sanctions which did have the desired effect (Hill, 2015, pp. 154-155).

The sanctions against Iran for example, which lasted for decades, eventually made Iran take a seat at the bargaining table (Ehteshami, 2014, cited in Hill, 2015, p. 155). Krasner perceives ecomomic sanctions as ‘the long-run use of economic power which has the most profound impact’.

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37 Provided that a country is capitalist, powerful and rich, economic sanctions are the most productive mean to realize foreign policy objectives (Krasner, 1985, cited in Hill, 2015, p. 155). The powerful economies of Western Europe, North America, China and Japan have enabled these countries to cast their norms and values on other nations. Through the use of ‘carrots’ in the form of trade advantages, credits and allowances, but mostly with economic expansions, which entails the reduction of tariffs and taxes on export and import (Cassen, 1986, p. 1-18, cited in Hill, 2015, p. 156).

Smith describes how Western states used the compensation for developments in a country dependent upon whether a country would carry out political and economic reforms (Smith, 1998, cited in Hill, 2015, p. 156).

The variable, ‘economic statecraft’ is conceptualized according to Nye’s definition: the analysis of the scope of economic means that are available to a nation. It includes the study of the range of a nation’s foreign goals, including ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’ policies, or other power procedures (Nye 2004, p.31, cited in Hill, 2015, p. 154). This conceptualization is considered as comprising enough, because it pinpoints the elements that need to be evaluated in order to formulate a nation’s economic statecraft strategy. In the case of Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran, an analysis will be provided on the economic relations between the US and Iran. More specifically, the (in)direct sanctions that are listed towards Iran, particular persons and companies that are affiliated with Iran, and the economic restrictions that are imposed on Iran will be evaluated.

3.2.5 Public diplomacy

According to the Department of State, public diplomacy entails ‘government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries’ (US Department of State, 1987, p.85, cited in Wolf & Rosen, 2004, p. 3).

There are a number of differences between public and official diplomacy: whereas public diplomacy is transparent and widely publicized, official diplomacy is considered more arcane and has a restrained dispersion. Furthermore, public diplomacy is communicated by

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38 belong to a certain community or entity (Wolf & Rosen, 2004, pp. 3-5). Passow et al.

describe public diplomacy as the attempt of a state to positively affect the public opinion in other nations (Passow, Fehlmann & Grahlow, 2005, cited in White & Radic, 2014, p. 461).

Nye defines public diplomacy as ‘an instrument that governments use to mobilize resources to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments’. These resources are the soft power generating outlets of a nation and include a nation’s culture, political values and foreign policy. Soft power is the capability of ‘shaping’ a preference.

However, whether preferences of a country are established is based on the perception of a number of matters. Institutions, political values, culture and having a captivating personality play a significant role, but it also depends on whether a country’s policies are considered to be ‘legitimate’ or based on the same fundamental beliefs as the targeted public. The means to generate soft power in international politics derive from the values that are asserted by a nation in its domestic practices and policies, culture and how it manages its relations with others.

The attraction Nye refers to occurs through the accentuation of these means through organizing exchanges, funding cultural exports, and informing the public through media outlets. Provided that these means are considered ‘attractive’, otherwise it might create the opposite effect. Hence, the soft power of a nation is based on three means: ‘its culture (in places where it is attractive to others); its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad); and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)’ (Nye, 2008, pp. 95-96).

Nowadays, politics is ‘a contest of competitive credibility’. Whereas it initially mattered which nation’s economy or military ‘wins’, politics in the information era is concerned with ‘whose story wins’ (Arquila and Ronfeldt, 1999 cited in Nye, 2008, p. 97). The significant increase of information leads to the ‘paradox of plenty’ in which the abundance of

information results into a lack of attention (Simon, 1998, p. 30-33 cited in Nye, 2008, p. 99). There exists a competition between governments and other organizations in which their own reliability is reinforced and the credibility of others is impaired. Although a nation’s

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39 ‘paradox of plenty’. If information for instance seems to be designed to mislead or persuade, it will undermine a nation’s reputation of reliability, and cause disdain (Nye, 2008, pp. 99-100).

‘Public diplomacy’ is conceptualized according to the definitions that were given by three sources: according to The Department of State, public diplomacy entails ‘government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries’ (US Department of State, 1987, p.85, cited in Wolf & Rosen, 2004, p. 3). The factors which influence the public’s perception are its people and culture, whether a country has an accountable government, its economic power and policies (Passow, Fehlmann & Grahlow, 2005, cited in White & Radic, 2014, p. 461). Nye further specifies these resources as the soft power generating outlets of a nation which include a nation’s culture, political values and foreign policy (Nye, 2008, pp. 95-96). The conceptualization of public diplomacy is based on three definitions because one definition did not sufficiently cover the meaning, the means through which public diplomacy is diffused, and through which outlets it could be measured.

In the case of Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran, an analysis will be provided on how Trump and his administration inform and possibly influence the public of Iran through statements, speeches and interviews.

3.3 American foreign policy traditions

This thesis will look into the American foreign policy traditions in order to find out to what extent these foreign policies are reflected in Trump’s foreign policy. Evaluating these

traditions allows us to discover whether Trump’s foreign policy fits within one tradition or if it is a combination of multiple traditions. Furthermore, these traditions offer a framework and classification to understand, historicize, and look at the continuities and changes of US foreign policy.

The US has known a variety of conducted foreign policy traditions. The following section elaborates briefly on what each foreign policy tradition entails.

‘American foreign policies have manifested themselves to the culture, identity and broader American approach to life and politics’ (Lebow 2008, cited in Clarke & Ricketts, 2017, p. 495). Evaluating these traditions therefore helps us in understanding what the political

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40 perspective of US foreign policy has been, and why certain decisions were made in the past (Clarke & Ricketts, 2017, p. 495).

3.3.1 Hamiltonian tradition

The Hamiltonian tradition has a powerful ‘top-down’ approach and aimed to increase the power of public administration: ‘energy in the executive is a leading character of the definition of good government’ (Kettl, 2000, p. 15). According to Mead, Hamiltonians believe that the main goal of US foreign policy is to strengthen its position on the world’s marketplace. Hamilton aspired to collaborate with Britain, which at the time was the world’s most dominant trader. Although Hamiltonians doubt whether human nature could improve, they do believe in the development and expansion of businesses and the institutions that maintain it. Furthermore, they believe that this foreign policy method accompanies stability and peace as well (Mead 2001, cited in Brands, 2001).

With regards to foreign policy, Hamilton mainly wanted the US to become another British 17th century giant (Bowman, 1956, p. 41). Hamiltonians believe that the US should be as powerful as Britain had been. This means having a powerful economy and have the federal government work closely with large companies to improve its benefits in international trade. The aim is to create a global system of economic alliances and commerce which enables the US to remain wealthy in order to prevent other countries from disturbing US profits, or from becoming too powerful. Moreover, Hamiltonians argue that if another country becomes too powerful and poses a threat for the US, an alliance must be set up to overthrow them, whether it is through war or peace (Mead, 2003).

3.3.2 Jeffersonian tradition

In contrast to the Hamiltonian approach, the Jeffersonian tradition has a more ‘bottom-up’ approach (Kettl, 2000, p. 16). It is an ‘inward looking’ tradition and rather protects and improves its own country than spreading its moral values to the rest of the world (Clarke & Ricketts, 2017, p. 495). Foreign policy is rather used as a mean to promote and protect the collective’s well-being and the individual’s freedom. Jefferson’s aim was to turn the US into a democratic society which was based on ‘freedom, republicanism, and social and economic equality’.

The Trump Doctrine: an analysis of Trump’s foreign policy towards Iran - the continuities and changes of the American foreign policy traditions