Capabilities, occupational choice and unconditional basic income : basic income as a precondition for freedom of occupational choice

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Capabilities, occupational choice and

unconditional basic income

Basic income as a precondition for freedom of

occupational choice

Master thesis Political Science

Specialisation: Political Theory and Behaviour Author: Marit Brom

Student number: 10295631 Date: June 26, 2015

Supervisor: Dr. E. Rossi

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Abstract

In recent decades, the idea of an unconditional basic income gained ground in a wide variety of political and intellectual arenas. A basic income disburses a subsistence income to every single adult citizen, irrespective of other income, and without any work or willingness to work requirement. Basic income is often justified through left-libertarians ideals, but in this thesis, I defend basic income on the basis of Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach. First, I argue that Nussbaum’s capability for material control over one’s environment requires freedom of occupational choice. Then, I argue that freedom of occupational choice requires an acceptable alternative to paid work. Finally, I argue that unconditional basic income is a precondition for freedom of occupational choice, because it ensures an acceptable alternative to paid work. I conclude that Nussbaum’s capability for material control over one’s environment requires unconditional basic income. Therefore, from a capabilities perspective, Western liberal democratic countries can only be called minimally just if they provide their citizens with an unconditional basic income.

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1 Introduction

In recent decades, unconditional basic income gained ground in a wide variety of political and intellectual arenas (McKay 2001, p. 97). An unconditional basic income pays every adult citizen a sustenance income, without any means tests or work requirements. Basic income is a minimum income guarantee that differs from existing welfare programs in the sense that it is paid out to individuals, rather than to households, it is paid out irrespective of other income and it is granted without any work or willingness to work requirement (Van der Veen 1998, p. 140). Van Parijs (2003, p. 5) describes basic income as an income at a uniform level, paid to each adult member of society, at regular intervals. As Van Parijs (2003, p. 5) puts it: ‘the grant is paid, and its level is fixed, irrespective of whether the person is rich or poor, lives alone or with others, is willing to work or not’.

Basic income is often defended by left-libertarians (Powell 2011; Vallentyne 2011; Van Parijs 1995). According to Van Parijs (1995), societies are maximally free if they provide their citizens with the highest sustainable unconditional basic income. In this thesis, however, I argue for basic income from another perspective. On the basis of Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach, I argue that a society is only minimally just if it provides every citizen with an unconditional basic income. It takes three steps to reach this conclusion. First, I argue that Nussbaum’s capability ‘material control over one’s environment’ requires freedom of occupational choice. Second, I argue that freedom of occupational choice requires an acceptable alternative to paid work. Finally, I argue that unconditional basic income is a precondition for freedom of occupational choice, because it ensures an acceptable alternative to paid work.

1.1 The Capabilities Approach

Currently, the Capability Approach or Capabilities Approach is one of the most influential paradigms for the analysis of wellbeing and social justice. Central to the approach is a focus on ‘capabilities’: the substantial freedoms people have to do and be want they want to. These possible beings and doings are called ‘functionings’. They include being healthy, being well nourished, being literate, being an active participant in community life, play volleyball, practice medicine, make love, and so forth (Anderson

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1999, p. 316). Capabilities are the effective freedoms to achieve those functionings: the greater the range of accessible opportunities for leading a life in a way one values, the more freedom that person enjoys (Sen 1992).

The Capability or Capabilities Approach had been pioneered by Amartya Sen (1985a; 1985b; 1992; 1999) and further developed by Martha Nussbaum (2000; 2003; 2006; 2011). Sen calls the approach ‘Capability Approach’, but Nussbaum (2011, p. 18) prefers the term ‘Capabilities Approach’, to emphasize that the elements that are most important to people’s quality of life are plural. Because I focus on Nussbaum’s version of the approach in this thesis, I will also use the term ‘Capabilities Approach’. Sen and Nussbaum’s versions of the approach are closely related, but they also differ in some ways. The most important difference is that Nussbaum (2000; 2006; 2011) developed a specific list of relevant capabilities, while Sen (2004) refuses to come up with such a list. According to Sen (2004), it is not the task of a theorist to define the relevant capabilities; citizens should decide for themselves which capabilities matter, in a democratic process. Nussbaum (2003) argues that Sen’s approach does not say anything about justice, as long as he does not endorse a specific list. As Nussbaum (2003) points out, without such a list, any capability can be argued valuable, including irrelevant capabilities like whistling Yankee Doodle Yankee (Nussbaum 2011, p. 28) or bad capabilities like consuming so much that it harms other people (Robeyns 2005, p. 105).

Building on the Aristotelian tradition, Nussbaum bases a human development ethic on the idea of capabilities (Gasper 1999, p. 281). She sets up a list with ten Central Capabilities that all human beings are entitled to (Nussbaum 2000; 2006; 2011). According to Nussbaum (2011, p. 33) a society can only be called minimally just if it secures at least a threshold level of those ten capabilities. The basic claim of her account of social justice is that respect for human dignity requires every citizen to be placed above the threshold level of capability, in all ten areas (Nussbaum 2011, p. 36). Nussbaum’s (2011, p. 33-34) ten Central Capabilities include:

1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.

2. Bodily health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.

3. Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.

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4. Senses, imagination, and thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason – and to do these things in a truly ‘human’ way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain.

5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.)

6. Practical reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious observance.)

7. Affiliation. (A) Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.) (B) Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin.

8. Other species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.

9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.

10. Control over one’s environment. (A) Political. Being able to participate effectively in

political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association. (B) Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.

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The Central Capabilities belong to individual persons, and cannot be traded off against each other or against money (Nussbaum 2011, p. 35). The list is a proposal: an item can be contested by arguing that it is not so central for human dignity that it needs special protection. If such a case can be plausibly made, the item does not belong on the list and should be left to the normal political process (Nussbaum 2011, p. 36). Nussbaum’s list is grounded in her Aristotelian essentialism (that I discuss in detail in section 2.7). The ten Central Capabilities follow from the functions that, according to Nussbaum (1992, p. 214-223), are essential to human life. Empirical work by Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) confirms that the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list are recognised as most important in immigrant communities in Israel and Great Britain.

1.2 Capabilities versus GDP, utility and resources

The Capabilities Approach is developed as a counter-theory to GDP approaches, utilitarian approaches, and resource-based approaches to assessment of wellbeing or quality of life1_{(Nussbaum 2011, p. 46-57). The Capabilities Approach states that we} should not evaluate quality of life in terms of GDP, utility or resources, but in terms of capabilities. As Nussbaum (2011, p. 47-56) points out, measuring quality of life in terms of GDP, utility, or resources has important shortcomings. The GDP approach overlooks inequalities and political freedoms, and distracts attention from the separate aspects of life that matter for wellbeing and that poorly correlate with each other, like health, education, employment opportunities, environmental quality and so forth.

Utilitarian approaches measure wellbeing in terms of total or average utility understood as preference satisfaction. Thereby, like GDP approaches, utilitarian approaches aggregate across human lives and across different components of human lives. Furthermore, utility is a poor measure of quality of life, because of the problem of adaptive preferences. As Elster (1982) points out, people often learn not to want what is out of reach for them. The utilitarian approach would lead to the implausible conclusion that a malnourished homeless person that adapted her preferences has the same quality of life as a well-nourished person with a roof over her head. Finally, utilitarianism undervalues freedom. As Nussbaum (2011, p. 55) points out, satisfaction is a state or condition that can be reached without agency. She points at Nozick’s ‘experience machine’ and states that most people would not choose for such a device. The

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experience machine gives people hooked up to the device the illusion of eating, working, loving and so forth; people also experience the satisfaction associated with these things. With the experience machine people can have all their preferences satisfied, without undertaking any activity (Nozick 1974, p. 42-44). According to Nussbaum (2011, p. 55), most people would prefer a life full of choice and activity to such a machine.

Resource-based approaches measure quality of life in terms of resources divided equally (enough) among citizens. Nussbaum (2011, 56-58) objects to these approaches that income and wealth do not measure what people are actually able of doing or being. People have different needs for resources. Differences can be physical – a pregnant woman needs more nutrients than a nonpregnant woman – or created by social inequalities: to create equal job opportunities in a very gender unequal labour market, societies have to spend more on job opportunities for women. If we want disabled people to move around as well as people with ‘normal’ ability, we need to spend money on buildings ramps and lifts for buses. Furthermore, political freedoms can be largely absent in a wealthy society where income is equally distributed: such a society can still lack freedom of speech and freedom of religion. A focus on wealth and income overlooks these freedoms (Nussbaum 2011, p. 57-58).

1.3 Basic income from a capabilities perspective

At first sight it may seem strange to argue for unconditional basic income from a capabilities perspective. As I just pointed out, Nussbaum (2011, p. 57-58) clearly states that quality of lifeis not about money or resources, but about what people are able to do and be.But this does not meanthat wellbeing hasnothing to do with money at all. The fact that money and resources are not everything does not mean they are nothing. As Wolff and De-Shalit (2007, p. 147) point out, a great share of social policy still includes cash transfers. For good reasons, they think, since money gives people the opportunity to obtain many of the things they need, in the particular form they prefer. In this thesis, I answer the following central question:

Does Nussbaum’s account of social justice require an unconditional basic income in a Western liberal democratic context?

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I understand unconditional basic income as a separate policy measure, not as a comprehensive theory of justice, and my argument is based on the following underlying assumptions: a Western country, a liberal state, a democratic system, a welfare state, and a capitalist system. Unconditional basic income would probably have an impact on many of Nussbaum’s Central Capabilities, but because of the length of this thesis it is not possible to analyse the relation between basic income and all ten capabilities. Therefore, I focus on the material aspect of the capability ‘control over one’s environment’ (see section 1.1). In section 4.9, however, I shortly touch on the effects basic income may have on other Central Capabilities.

1.4 The argument

In this thesis, I argue that Western liberal democratic countries can only be called minimally just if they provide their citizens with an unconditional basic income. I will argue that Nussbaum’s capability for material control over one’s environment requires freedom of occupational choice, and that unconditional basic income is a necessary condition for freedom of occupational choice. My argument has the following structure:

Premise 1: Nussbaum’s capability for material control over one’s environment requires freedom of occupational choice.

Premise 2: Freedom of occupational choice requires an acceptable alternative to paid work.

Premise 3: Unconditional basic income ensures an acceptable alternative to paid work. Conclusion: Nussbaum’s capability for material control over one’s environment requires

unconditional basic income.

The first premise of my argument is the claim that material control over one’s environment requires freedom of occupational choice. I will argue that forced labour is impermissible from a capabilities perspective, because forcing people into certain lines of work shows insufficient respect for human agency. I will show that agency and choice are central to human dignity in Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach, and argue that Nussbaum’s ‘capabilities’ in fact can be interpreted as ‘having a choice’. I conclude that

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Nussbaum’s capability for material control over one’s environment requires freedom of occupational choice.

The second step of the argument is to argue that freedom of occupational choice requires an acceptable alternative to work (premise 2). I will defend Olsaretti’s (1998) definition of voluntary choice2_{, and argue that a choice is not voluntary, if it was made} because no acceptable alternative was available. On the basis of this definition, I argue that, generally, people are forced to do paid work. To make sure that people are not forced, we have to give them an acceptable alternative to paid work. Therefore, freedom of occupational choice requires an exit option to work.

Finally, I will argue that unconditional basic income is a necessary condition for freedom of occupational choice, because it provides people with an exit option to work and thereby ensures an acceptable alternative (premise 3). Following Widerquist (2013), I argue that basic income is an exit option for the propertyless. Under unconditional basic income the propertyless attain some property to fulfil their basic needs with, and are no longer forced to serve the propertied. I conclude that Nussbaum’s capability for material control over one’s environment, in a Western liberal democratic context, requires basis income. It follows that Westerns countries are only minimally just if they provide their citizens with an unconditional basic income.

1.5 Outline of the thesis

The thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2, I argue that Nussbaum’s capability for material control over one’s environment requires freedom of occupational choice (premise 1). In chapter 3, I argue that freedom of occupational choice requires an acceptable alternative to paid work (premise 2). In chapter 4, I argue that unconditional basic income is a precondition to freedom of occupational choice, because it assures an acceptable alternative to paid work (premise 3). In chapter 4, I will also deal with objections to basic income and shortly touch on the effects basic income could have on Nussbaum’s other capabilities. Chapter 5 is a concluding chapter.

2_{Throughout the thesis, I use the terms ‘freedom of choice’, ‘free choice’ and ‘voluntary choice’}

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2 Material control and occupational choice

In this chapter, I argue that material control over one’s environment requires freedom of occupational choice (premise 1). I argue that freedom of occupational choice is a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for material control. In order to argue for freedom of occupational choice, I need to make a plausible distinction between forced labour and taxation, and show why, from a capabilities perspective, taxation is permissible, while forced labour is not. I argue that forced labour is impermissible, because it shows insufficient respect for agency and choice. I will show that agency and choice play a central role in Nussbaum’s Capability Approach, through the architectonic role of the capability ‘practical reason’. I argue that taxation is significantly less an infringement on choice and agency than forced labour, and I conclude that Nussbaum’s capability for material control over one’s environment requires freedom of occupational choice.

The chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.1, I describe Nussbaum’s capability for material control, and show that it needs further specification. In section 2.2, I point at the distinction between forced labour and taxation I have to make, in order to argue for freedom of occupational choice. In section 2.3 and 2.4, I discuss several arguments against forced labour, and show that they all fall short. In section 2.5, I propose that forced labour is problematic because of a lack of respect for agency. In section 2.6, I show that agency and choice are central to human dignity in Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach. In 2.7, I compound that this central role of agency follows from Nussbaum’s Aristotelian essentialism. In section 2.8, following Olsaretti (2005), I argue that we can view the Capabilities Approach as being underpinned by an account of wellbeing that includes the endorsement of valuable functionings, and in section 2.9, I argue that we can interpret Nussbaum’s concept of capability as ‘having a choice’. In section 2.10, I show that coercive taxation is significantly less an infringement on agency than forced labour, and conclude that material control over one’s environment requires freedom of occupational choice.

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2.1 Material control over one’s environment

Nussbaum’s list of Central Capabilities includes the capability ‘control over one’s environment’ (see section 1.1). The capability consists of both political and material control. Where the political part of control over one’s environment is about being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life, the material part is about being able to participate effectively in material choices. Therefore one needs to be able to hold property, or find a job. As Nussbaum (2011, p. 34) points out, people should have a ‘right to seek employment on an equal basis with others’, and be able ‘to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers’ (Nussbaum 2011, p. 34).

Nussbaum is not very specific about what her Central Capabilities precisely mean. She formulated them in an abstract way to give nations room to specify them given their different histories and traditions (Nussbaum 2011, p. 40). In this chapter, I argue that material control over one’s environment requires (amongst other things) freedom of occupational choice. By freedom of occupational choice, I mean that people are not forced into particularjobs,whether done by direct state controlor something else that can also be called ‘coercive’ (Cohen 2008, p. 184). By a particular job, I mean a particular line of work, for a particular wage, under particular working conditions.

2.2 Forced labour versus taxation

As Nussbaum has often stated, capabilities are about having effective freedoms or opportunities. Nussbaum (2011, p. 65) emphasizes that securing a capability requires more than just the absence of interference by the state. As Van Hees (2013, p. 251) points out, Nussbaum’s capabilities can be viewed as positive claim rights.3_{Creating the} threshold of the ten Central Capabilities entails government action, and government action generally requires resources collected through taxation. Most capability theorists would indeed allow for coercive taxation in order to create capabilities. However, in order to secure capabilities, governments do not only need resources, but also people that do certain lines of work. In order to secure a threshold level of ‘bodily health’, for example, we need doctors. To educate children up to the threshold level of the capability

3_{For an extensive discussion on the analytic distinction between negative and positive rights see}

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‘senses, imagination, and thought’, we need teachers. Now think of a person that is capable of being a doctor, but prefers gardening4_{. Should a government force her to} become a socially more productive doctor? Would it be permissible to force people into socially productive lines of work, in order to reach threshold level of Nussbaum’s ten Central Capabilities?

The answer is no. In this chapter, I will argue that Nussbaum’s capability for material control requires freedom of occupational choice. In order to do so, I have to make a plausible distinction between forced labour and taxation. According to Nozick (1974, p. 169), ‘taxation of earnings from labour is on a par with forced labour.’ In Nozick’s view, taking a part of the earnings of someone’s labour is the same as taking a part of her time. And taking a part of someone’s time is like forcing her to work that part of her time for another’s purpose. In this chapter, I argue that Nozick is wrong. I will show that there is a crucial difference between forced labour and taxation. In the following two sections, I will discuss some attempts to distinguish between the two.

2.3 Cohen’s objections to forced labour

According to Cohen (2008, p. 218-222), we can distinguish between forced labour and taxation with four objections to forced labour that do not apply to taxation. The first one, that Fabre (2010, p. 400) calls the ‘deterrence objection’, claims that forcing people into certain lines of occupation would deter them from acquiring the needed skills to do socially productive lines of work. Cohen (2008, p. 218) argues that the possibility of being forced to become a doctor could make eligible people deter from acquiring the relevant knowledge and developing the needed skills, in order to avoid the forcing. This deterrence would then have adverse effects on the labour supply of doctors, and the policy of force would therefore work counterproductive.

However, as Fabre (2010, p. 402) points out, this objection is a practical one that we might be able to overcome. According to Fabre (2010, p. 402), we could train people from an early age on to develop the conviction that they ought to choose socially productive lines of work and develop the needed skills for doing so. Under these circumstances, the deterrence objection would not apply. Cohen might respond that under these circumstances, force would not be necessary, since people would choose the right lines of work based on their conviction anyway. However, it is possible that people

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have the principled conviction to do socially productive lines of work, but do not act on it. If we would then force people to take the jobs they were trained to do, the deterrence objection to forced labour would not apply.

Cohen’s (2008, p. 219) second objection to forced labour, that Fabre (2010, p. 400) calls the ‘informational constraints objection’, is that it would simply be impossible for the state to acquire the necessary information to force people into socially productive lines of work. According to Cohen (2008, p. 219), it would be absurd to suppose that the state could know everything it had to know about people’s powers and situation in order to force them into socially useful occupations. However, according to Fabre (2010, p. 404), we do not necessarily need very detailed information about an individual’s psyche to force her into the right job; somerough knowledge of her tastes and personality could be enough. Furthermore, even if we did need detailed information, one could imagine that technology would make it possible to acquire that information in the nearby future, if it is not already possible today. Again, Cohen (2008, 219) points at a practical problem that we might be able to overcome.

Cohen’s (2008, p. 219-220) third objection, that Fabre (2010, p. 400) calls the ‘motivational objection’, holds that even if the described practical deterrence and informational problems could be overcome, it is still preferable that agents choose socially useful occupations for the right reasons instead of being forced. Cohen (2008, p. 219-220) compares the occupational decision to making a promise. He states that it would give more satisfaction when someone keeps a promise voluntarily, than when she is forced to keep it. The same applies to choosing a profession, according to Cohen (2008, p. 220). We would want people to choose their jobs for high-minded reasons, and such a condition of mind would be difficult to achieve when people are forced to choose.

However, as Fabre (2010, p. 407-408) points out, this objection is false for at least two reasons. First, we legally force people to do things that we would rather see them doing for the right reasons all the time. We surely want employers to treat employees well for the right reasons, and probably most of them do, but we still impose legal requirements on them to make sure they look after their employees’ safety in the workplace, or that they do not discriminate against employees during application procedures. Second, according to Fabre (2010, p. 208), the law often helps people to developthe right reasons.She gives the example of laws against sexual harassment in the workplace. Fabre (2010, p. 208) states that, while sexual harassment unfortunately still

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occurs, there are far fewer reported cases than there were before legislation (at least in the United Kingdom). Of course this shift is not due to laws only, but according to Fabre (2010, p. 208), there is every reason to believe that laws has at least played a part.

Cohen’s fourth and last objection, that Fabre (2010, p. 400) calls the ‘Kantian objection’, rejects forced labour, because it unacceptably treats agents as means. To force, or to ‘frogmarch’, as Cohen (2008, p. 220) puts it, someone into a socially useful occupation is to use her as means, and according to Cohen (2008, p. 220), ‘we should not use a person as a means’. But to state that we should never use others as means would be extremely implausible. Almost every profession asks for the use of people as means in some way. Fabre (2010, p. 409) thinks that Cohen has misstated his position here. Cohen probably does not mean that we should not use people as means, but that we should not treat them as means only. However, as Fabre (2010, p. 409) points out, if that is what Cohen means, the objection is still unconvincing. It is not plausible that Cohen holds the view that, in general, forcing people to do the right thing violates Kant’s requirement. Not only would that lead to the absurd conclusion that we should not legally forbid theft or murder, but also inconsistent with Cohen’s defence of coercive taxation. Moreover, it is not likely that Cohen’s objection means that forcing people into socially useful professions is an instance of wrongful use of people (Fabre 2010, p. 409). Therefore, Cohen’s Kantian objection fails as well.

As Cohen (2008, p. 221) points out himself, some could argue that his motivational and Kantian objections do not plausibly distinguish between forced labour and taxation, because they also apply to taxation. However, according to Cohen (2008, p. 221-222), taxation does not assert the control over people’s behaviour, and knowledge over people’s intimacies, that forced labour does require. According to Cohen (2008, p. 221-222), it is this invasiveness that distinguishes forced labour from taxation. Cohen is probably right that taxation requires less intrusive investigation, but, as Otsuka (2008, p. 447) points out, this invasiveness is not an adequate objection to forced labour. According to Otsuka (2008, p. 447), most people would still object to forced labour if such an invasive investigation were unnecessary. To see this, imagine a society in which people’s talents and preferences regarding work are all manifest. In that society it is common knowledge that all people with a talent for doctoring prefer to be (socially less productive) gardeners, and that all people with a talent for teaching would rather be (socially less productive) opera singers. Although no invasive investigation is needed to force those people into socially productive professions, intuitively, it would still be

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objectionable to force them to become a doctor or a teacher, Otsuka (2008, p. 447) thinks.

As I pointed out, none of Cohen’s arguments against forced labour are particularly convincing, nor do they plausibly distinguish between forced labour and taxation. According to Fabre (2010, p. 298), the crucial difference between forced labour and taxation for Cohen seems to be that the former is, and the latter is not,connected to the person we are, in some intimate way. This becomes clear when Cohen writes that:

The worker is more closely connected with his labour power than the capitalist is with his capital. When I sell my labour power, I put myself at the disposal of another, and that is not true when I invest my capital. I come with my labour power. I am part of the deal (Cohen 1983, p. 20).

This seems intuitively right, but it is not clear why would it be objectionable for me to become part of the deal.

2.4 The right to self-ownership

According to Otsuka (2008), the right to self-ownershipprovides the explanation of why forced labour is objectionable and taxation is not. Otsuka describes the right to self-ownership as:

A very stringent right of control over and use of one's mind and body that bars others from intentionally using one as a means by forcing one to sacrifice life, limb, or labour, where such force operates by means of incursions or threats of incursions upon one's mind and body (Otsuka 2003, p. 15).5

On the basis of this right of self-ownership, it would in a society in which half of the members are two-eyed and half of the members are blind, be impermissible for the state to force sighted people to each donate one eye to the blind. According to Otsuka (2008, p. 448), one does not need to be an extreme libertarianto see that the fundamental right of control over one’s own body stands in the way of astate forcing sighted individuals to make such a sacrifice. Otsuka (2008, p. 449) sees the same right of control apply when

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people need to sacrifice labourrather than a body part. Even if we think people have a moral duty to do socially useful work, it would, according to Otsuka (2008, p. 449), be unacceptable to use means as imprisonment to force individuals to do these lines of work.

However, as Otsuka (2008, p. 450) points out himself, self-ownership rights cannot provide a full explanation of what’s wrong with forced labour. Otsuka’s (2008) argument only points out what’s wrong with the means of imprisonment. Most people who object to forced labour by means of imprisonment, would also object to making people do a certain job by means of denying them access to those resources necessary for survival (in the following chapter, I will argue in detail that denying people access to resources is also a way of forcing them). But because this way of forcing does not constitute an infringement of self-ownership rights, the right to self-ownership can never tell the whole story.

According to Quinn (1989, p. 309-310), we should not force people into certain lines of work, because (barring great emergencies) people’s lives must be theirs to lead. Since body and mind are parts or aspects of a person, every person should have a primary say over her body and mind. Any arrangement that denies that say would be a serious indignity. According to Quinn (1989, 309), in the same moral sense as people’s body and mind are theirs, people own their lives. People should be able to make the decisions concerning it, including choices of occupation. I agree with Quinn that denying people to make occupational decisions would be a grave indignity. However, I will argue that this is not because your life is yours in some ownership sense, but because a life in which you cannot make such decisions, is not a life worth of human dignity.

2.5 Occupational choice, human dignity and agency

Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach focuses on the protection of the freedoms so central to human life, that their removal would make a life not worthy of human dignity (Nussbaum 2011, p. 31). I will argue that people that are being forced into certain lines of employment do not live lives fully human. First, I will show that agency and choice are central to human dignity in Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach. Then, I will use Nussbaum’s conception of human dignity to distinguish between forced labour and taxation and argue that forced labour is a problem, from capabilities perspective, while coercive taxation is not.

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Nussbaum’s conception of human dignity clearly has to do with the human ability to act, plan, and to make a difference. Nussbaum (2000, p. 73) sees people as ‘having activity, goals, and projects – as somehow awe-inspiringly above the mechanical workings of nature, and yet in need of support for the fulfilment of many central projects’. Furthermore, Nussbaum speaks of human beings as ‘sources of agency’ (Nussbaum 2000, p. 69; Nussbaum 1999, p. 38), ‘centers of agency and freedom’ (Nussbaum 1999, p. 67), and ‘centers of thought and choice and action’ (Nussbaum 1999, p. 195).

However, some theorists argue that there is insufficient respect for agency in Nussbaum’s version of the Capabilities Approach (Crocker 2008; Robeyns 2003; Peter 2003). As Crocker (2008, p. 19) points out, Nussbaum has no clear notion of agency, like Sen does. In his Dewey Lectures, Sen (1985) makes a distinction between ‘wellbeing freedom’ and ‘agency freedom’. The wellbeing aspect of a person refers to that person’s flourishing, or her life going well. The agency aspect of a person refers to her power to choose. Sen (1985, p. 201) describes ‘wellbeing freedom’ as the freedom to choose functionings regarding wellbeing. A person’s ‘agency freedom’ is about ‘what the person is free to do and achieve in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important’ (Sen 1985, p. 203). Crocker (2008, p. 161) claims that, without such a particular ideal of agency, Nussbaum is unable to do justice to people’s freedom to make decisions and shape their own lives.

According to Nussbaum (2011, p. 197-201), however, there is no need for a distinction between wellbeing and agency freedom: agency is already captured in the concept of wellbeing freedom, because of the focus on choice of functionings. As Nussbaum (2011, p. 199) points out, the distinction between agency and wellbeing only makes sense if you define wellbeing in terms of happiness our desire satisfaction. When wellbeing means happiness, it is clear that one needs a different concept to show that people also do things that don’t make them happy. But the Capabilities Approach clearly rejects such a notion of wellbeing and already defines wellbeing in terms of whatever people value according to their own conception of the good. Nussbaum does not need a distinction between wellbeing freedom and agency freedom to assure respect for agency, because her conception of capabilities already sufficiently refers to agency and choice (Nussbaum 2011, p. 197-201).

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2.6 The architectonic role of practical reason

Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach clearly focuses on agency and choice. According to Nussbaum (2011, p. 18), societies should promote opportunities, or substantial freedoms. People can then decide for themselves whether they want to exercise these opportunities in action or not. In this way Nussbaum’s approach commits to respect of peoples power of self-definition. According to Nussbaum (2011, p. 24) the political goal in a nation should be to get all citizens above a certain threshold level of her ten Central Capabilities, not in the sense of coercing them into certain types of functioning, but in the sense of freedom to choose and act. According to Nussbaum (2011, p. 30), a focus on human dignity leads to policies that protect and support agency, rather than treat people as passive recipients of benefit.

Agency in Nussbaum’s approach refers to choice as part of her Central Capability ‘practical reason’. Nussbaum (2011, p. 34) describes practical reason as ‘being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life’. The capability for practical reason plays an architectonic role in Nussbaum’s approach, in the sense that it is woven it into all other capabilities. In the absence of practical reason a situation would not be considered fully in accordance with human dignity (Nussbaum 2011, p. 39). The architectonic role of the capability practical reason makes agency and choice central to Nussbaum’s notion of capability, and follows from Nussbaum’s Aristotelian essentialism.

2.7 Nussbaum’s Aristotelian essentialism

Nussbaum’s Central Capabilities are grounded in the Aristotelian essentialism that she defends (Nussbaum 1992). Nussbaum (1992, p. 214-223) gives a sketch of human essence by identifying a group of important functions that, according to Nussbaum, define human life. Nussbaum argues that in the absence of those functions humans would not be considered fully human.Nussbaum (1992, p. 214) callsthis account of the essential human functions the ‘thick vague theory of the good’. With this name she

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points at on the normative character of her list6_. _{Nussbaum is not pretending to reveal} some value-neutral facts about human beings.She is conducting an evaluative inquiry.

Nussbaum’s (1992, p. 215) sketch of human essence departs from two basic ideas: first, that we recognize other people as human across different segments of time and place, and second, that we have a rough shared consensus about the features in whose absence we would not consider a life human. Whatever differences amongst human beings we are confronted with, we are rarely unsure if we are dealing with a human being or not. Nussbaum’s essentialist account tries to describe these human features by mapping out a general idea of the human form of life. Nussbaum (1992, p. 215-216) does this by examining a large variety of human ‘self understandings’ written in different times and places. She focuses especially on stories that distinct human beings from gods, on the one hand, and beasts, on the other7_{. According to Nussbaum (1992, p.} 216), the convergence across such stories gives us reason to think that we can have a theory with essential human features that is not just a projection of our own tradition.

Nussbaum (1992, p. 216-220) comes up with a first approximation of the features that seem to be part of any life that we consider human and she includes ‘practical reason’ to this list. According to Nussbaum:

All human beings participate (or try to) in the planning and managing of their own lives, asking and answering questions about what is good and how one should live. Moreover, they wish to enact their thought in their lives - to be able to choose and evaluate and to function accordingly. This general capability has many concrete forms and is related in complex ways to the other capabilities, emotional, imaginative, and intellectual. But a being who altogether lacks this would not be likely to be regarded as fully human in any society (Nussbaum 1992, p. 219).

In Nussbaum’s view, a life with no practical reason would be too impoverished to be considered human at all (Nussbaum 1992, p. 220). Note that Nussbaum’s conception of practical reason is very close to Sen’s notion of agency discussed above.

Nussbaum bases her ten Central Capabilities on the features that she considers essential to human life. She claims that in the absence of one of her central capabilities Nussbaum a life is not considered fully human. As I pointed out in section 2.6, the

6_{Nussbaum also chose the name to contrast her account with John Rawls's ‘thin theory of the}

good’, see Rawls (1999).

7_{Examples are Greek myths on immortal gods, and stories on human-like creatures that have no}

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capability practical reason plays a central role, in the sense that all capabilities should be interpreted in accordance with practical reason. As Nussbaum expounds:

All animals nourish themselves, use their senses, move about, and so forth; what is distinctive and distinctively valuable to us about the human way of doing all this is that each and every one of these functions is, first of all, planned and organized by practical reason and, second, done with and to others (Nussbaum 1992, p. 222-223).

Human nourishing is not the same as animal nourishing, human sex is different from animal sex, and human mobility is not like an animal moving around, because human beings can choose to regulate their nutrition, sexual activity and movement by practical reason (Nussbaum 1992, p. 222-223). In the absence of practical reason, a life would not be considered fully human.

2.8 Capabilities and endorsement

Olsaretti (2005) argues that we can view the Capabilities Approach as being underpinned by an account of wellbeing that includes the endorsement of valuable functionings. As Olsaretti (2005, p. 95) points out, the Capabilities Approach should standardly allow for ‘choice-sensitive departures’ from functionings. This means that under the Capabilities Approach people should have the freedom to achieve valuable functionings, but they should also have the freedom to forgo them. Olsaretti’s (2005, p. 98) claims that the Capabilities Approach can plausibly be argued to hold a conception of wellbeing that views the endorsementof functionings as constitutive of wellbeing.

The Capabilities Approach then endorses a particular type of view of the good life; not a specific view of the content of the good life, but a view on the structure that the good life has (Olsaretti 2005, p. 98). This view states that a person’s life goes well if that person has things that (1) are valuable in general and (2) that the person herself endorses (Dworkin 2002;Raz 1988, p. 288-320). In this view, wellbeing means achieving functionings that one has reason to value and towards which one has a positive evaluative attitude, or pro-attitude (Davidson 2001, p. 3; Scanlon 1998, p. 50). Olsaretti (2005, p. 98) defines ‘endorsing’ as having ‘a positive evaluative attitude, or pro-attitude, which may take the form of desiring, wanting, holding dear, thinking agreeable, and so on’.

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According to Olsaretti (2005, p. 98), it is for wellbeing both necessary that beings and doings are valuable in an objective way (with being valuable not being a function of the person’s subjective attitude), and in some subjective way, for the person herself. As Olsaretti (2005, p. 98-99) points out, having a pro-attitude towards a functioning is not enough to make its presence valuable. However, having a positive evaluative attitude is a necessary condition for anobjectively valuable functioning to have a positive impact on someone’s life. Having an intimate relationship, being an active member of a community, or being a parent are valuable functionings, but they only positively influence someone’s quality of life, if they are endorsed by that person.

According to Olsaretti (2005, p. 99), endorsement is best secured when people voluntarily choose what functionings to achieve, rather than being forced into them. People can choose freely what functionings to achieve, if they both have the freedom to achieve, and to forgo them. If people are forced into choosing something, they typically do not endorse it. If a person is forced to do a particular job on pain of imprisonment, she is unlikely to have the pro-attitude towards that job that would be necessary for that job to contribute to her wellbeing. We do not talk about a pro-attitude if it comes from fear of another option. If people choose to do a job because of fear of unemployment, they do not choose it voluntarily (as I will argue in detail in the next chapter), and are unlikely to endorse it. For this reason, giving people opportunities (or capabilities) to achieve valuable functionings is a better way of promoting their wellbeing than forcing them into these valuable functionings (Olsaretti 2005, p. 99-100).

2.9 Capabilities as having a choice

As Nussbaum (2011, p. 25) points out in her Creating Capabilities, the notion of freedom of choice is built directly into her conception of capabilities. Capabilities are defined as opportunities to select different functionings. According to Nussbaum (2011, p. 26), policy should aim at promoting capabilities, not functionings: when governments promote capabilities, they respect people’s lifestyle choices. This preference for promoting capabilities rather than functionings is connected to the liberal principle of state neutrality. The liberal neutrality principle states that governments should respect different views of life; policy should not be biased towards any particular conception of the good. If Nussbaum took functioning as the right policy goal, pushing citizens into certain specific functionings like being well nourished or enjoying sexual expression,

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liberals would rightly complain that she thereby prevents citizens from making choices in accordance with their own conception of the good. A religious person could, because of a fasting period, prefer not to be well nourished, and whether for religious our other reasons, some people choose to live a celibate life (Nussbaum 2000, p. 87).

Nussbaum (2011, p. 25) expounds the difference between promoting capabilities and promoting functionings with the comparison between the starving person and the fasting person already mentioned above8_{. In terms of functioning there is no difference} between the two: both lack the functioning being well nourished. In terms of capability, however, there is a difference. The fasting person has the capability to be well nourished, because she can choose not to fast. The starving person lacks the capability to be well nourished, because she has no choice. Nussbaum’s list of Central Capabilities is a list of capabilities, rather than functionings, precisely to leave room for this type of choice (Nussbaum 1992, p. 225). Therefore, having a capability means having a choice.

2.10 Freedom of occupational choice

In the previous sections, I have shown that agency and choice are central to human dignity in Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach. Now, I will distinguish between forced labour and taxation on the basis of agency, and argue that coercive taxation is not a problem, from capabilities perspective, while forced labour is. Coercive taxation is significantly less an infringement on choice and agency than forced labour. As Gowder (2014, p. 309) points out, work generally takes an overwhelming proportion of our time. The standard form of employment inthe United States and in many Western-European countries is a 40-hour workweek with just a couple of weeks of vacation, and many of us with full-time jobs work even more than 40 hours per week.Moreover, work often takes over a part of life outsidework as well. Jobs occupy our minds, often require us to travel, and sometimes even remove us from home for long periods. Obviously, taxation has much less of an impact on the way we can live our lives, and the choices that we can make.

To force people into certain lines of work would disrespect people’s practical reason. It would for a great deal take away people’s ability to plan their lives according to their own conception of the good. As I have pointed out in section 2.6, practical reason plays an architectonic role in Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach. If people are employed,

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but not empowered to exercise practical reason with regard to their working life, they are not treated fully human. As Nussbaum (2011, p. 39) points out, the possibility to plan one’s life means the opportunity to choose the functionings that correspond to the various capabilities. Therefore, the capability material control over one’s environment requires freedom of occupational choice.

To sum up, in this chapter, I have argued that Nussbaum’s capability meaningful material control requires freedom of occupational choice. I have shown that different theorists fail to make a plausible distinction between forced labour and taxation, and argued that there is difference with respect to agency, and therefore human dignity, between the two. I showed that agency and choice are in the centre of Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach, and that having a capability in fact means having a choice. Since taxation is significantly less of an infringement of agency and choice than forced labour, from a capabilities perspective, taxation is permissible, while forced labour is not. People that are forced into certain lines of work would not live lives fully human. Therefore, the capability for material control over one’s environment requires freedom of occupational choice. But under what conditions can we say people have freedom of occupational choice? I turn to this question in the next chapter.

3 Occupational choice as having acceptable alternatives

In the previous chapter, I argued that Nussbaum’s capability for material control over one’s environment requires freedom of occupational choice. But under what conditions can we speak of freedom of choice in general, and freedom of occupational choice specific? In this chapter, I argue that freedom of occupational choice requires an acceptable alternative to paid work (premise 2). I argue that we should evaluate the voluntariness of a choice in terms of acceptable alternatives: we can speak of freedom of occupational choice if and only if someone does not choose to do a job, because she has no acceptable alternative. In order to ensure this, we need to provide people with an exit option to work.

The chapter is structured as follows. Sections 3.1 to 3.4 define freedom of choice in general. Following Olsaretti (1998), I will argue that Nozick’s rights-based definition of voluntary choice is inherently flawed, and that we should evaluate voluntariness in terms of acceptable alternatives. In section 3.5, I discuss the issue of proletarian

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unfreedom and I argue that people are generally forced to do paid work. In sections 3.6 and 3.7, I discuss whether the freedom to choose between different lines of work ensures freedom of occupational choice. I argue that we cannot ensure freedom of occupational choice as long as we are not sure that people choose voluntarily to do paid work. Section 3.8 concludes that in order to ensure freedom of occupational choice, we have to provide people with an exit option to paid work.

3.1 Defining freedom of choice

As I have pointed out in the previous chapter, agency and choice are central to Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach. However, Nussbaum nowhere gives a clear definition of choice, and never specifies the conditions under which a choice can be deemed voluntary. In the following sections, I will discuss different conceptions of freedom of choice, and I will argue that we should define the voluntariness of a choice in terms of acceptable alternatives. Before I turn to that discussion, however, I will first set out what I mean by choice. The concept of choice as used in rational choice theory standardly contains the following features. First, a choice requires a choice-set. To be able to choose one needs a number of (at least two) options to choose from. Second, choice depends on an agent’s preferences: the agent’s comparative evaluative attitudes that enable her to rank the different options in terms of desirability. Third, choice consists of a selection process. The agent ranks the options according to her preferences, and picks the best option. Finally, choice includes opportunity costs. These are the values of the options forgone by the agent (Dan-Cohen 1992, p. 222).

3.2 Moralised definitions of freedom

According to Nozick (1974: 262-265),the voluntariness of a choice depends on whether the actor that limited another actor’s choice set acted within her rights. This definition suggests that limited choice sets do not undermine freedom of choice per se. Nozick states that, in limited choice situations, the voluntariness of a choice is not affected if those who have restricted the choice have acted according their rights. According to Nozick (1974, p. 262), ‘other people's actions place limits on one's available opportunities. Whether this makes one's resulting action non-voluntary depends upon

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whether these others had the right to act as they did’. This is a moralised definition, because it presupposes a theory of rights (Kymlicka 2002, p. 142).

As Olsaretti (1998) points out, Nozick bases his definition of voluntariness on his moralised definition of freedom. According to Nozick (1974, p. 262) interference restricts an individual’s freedom to actonly if as she had the rightto act as she did before interference. A person prevented from doing x is only made unfreeifshe had the right to do x. This implies that punishing a thief by fining or imprisoning her does not amount to limiting her freedom. Inscribing the concept of freedom in a theory of rights enables Nozick to distinguish between interference that is freedom curtailing and non-curtailing interference. Miller (1983) also holds a moralised definition of freedom. He claims that an actor is only made unfree by restrictions for which we can hold some other person morally responsible (Miller 1983, p. 74-75).

There are some important objections to moralised conceptions of freedom. First, as Cohen (1995, p. 60) points out, Nozick’s rights-based definition of freedom runs counter our ordinary use of the terms 'free' and 'freedom'. It seems counterintuitive to state that a justly imprisoned thief is not rendered unfree. Moreover, as Scanlon (1974, p. 14) points out, if notions of freedom appeal to moral principles, these notions are going to be problematic when the moral principles that underlie them are in dispute. Disagreements about these underlying principles would then lead to conflicting judgments about voluntariness. Second, rights-based or moralised definitions of freedom assume choice-sets that are constrained by people. However, as Zimmerman (1981, p. 134) points out, a person facing non-human constraints is as unfree as a person constrained by other people. Compare a person who is hindered by another person to leave an island to a person who is hindered by a storm: both are just as unfree to leave the island.

Third, as Cohen (1995, p. 60-61) shows, Nozick’s definition of freedom lands inside some kind of circle. The rights-based definition states that a person is free if she is not prevented from acting within her rights. Interfering interferes with freedom only if the interfering person lacks the right to interfere. To know whether the person is free, we need to know what her rights are. But Nozick gives either no characterisation of rights or he characterises rights in terms of freedom (Ryan 1977, p. 136-140). According to Kymlicka (2002, p. 142), we cannot derive a theory of justice from judgements of freedom, if our definition of freedom already presupposes principles of rights. Therefore, if we want freedom to do any work, we need to define it in a non-moralised way.

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3.3 Freedom versus voluntariness

Before I propose a more satisfactory account of freedom of choice, I want to point at the distinction between freedom and voluntariness. When discussing voluntary choice, freedom and voluntariness are often confused9_{. As Olsaretti (1998, p. 70) points out,} Nozick (1974) conflates questions of voluntariness with questions of freedom when he bases his definition of voluntariness on his moralised account of freedom. But an account of voluntary choiceneeds to ask under what precise conditions a choice counts as free or voluntary. These conditions cannot be the same conditions that characterise individuals as being free in general: they need be conditions for voluntariness in particular (Olsaretti 1998, p. 71).

Olsaretti (1998, p. 71) demonstrates the difference between freedom and voluntariness with two examples10_{. The first example is about Anna, who is an inhabitant} of a city that is located in the middle of a desert. Anna is free to leave the city. But she knows (and is absolutely sure) that when she leaves her city, she will not be able to survive the tough circumstances of the desert and will die. Anna’s chooses to stay in the city, but her choice is not a voluntary one. The second example is about Babet, who lives in an insurmountably walled city that she is not free to leave. However, her city has all that she could ever ask for, and therefore, she has no wish to leave it. Babet voluntarily chooses to stay in the city. The first example shows circumstances in which freedom does not suffice for voluntariness. In the second example a lack of freedom does not undermine voluntariness. According to Olsaretti (1998, p. 71), a satisfactory account of voluntariness has to be able to distinguish between the two examples.

I will now turn to another of Olsaretti’s examples to show that Nozick’s rights-based definition of voluntary choice conflates freedom and voluntariness11_. _{Consider the} following case that in fact is the central case of this chapter. Christina chooses to sell her labourto employer Diana. Christina’s choice set contains two options, namely [to work for Diana at a very low wage], and [to be unemployed and starve eventually]. Does Christina choose voluntarily to work for Diana? If Diana, by offering Christina a low wage, acts within her rights, on the basis of Nozick’s rights-based definition of freedom,

9_{I use the terms ‘freedom of choice’, ‘free choice’ and ‘voluntary choice’ to point at a choice that}

is made free or voluntarily. The distinction between freedom and voluntariness is about the distinction between freedom in general, and the freedom or voluntariness of a choice.

10_{I present slightly modified versions of the two examples.} 11_{I present the example in a slightly modified way.}

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she does not render Christina unfree. Therefore, Nozick would conclude, Christina’s choice to work for Diana is a voluntary choie (Olsaretti 1998, p. 58-59). According to Olsaretti (1998, p. 59), this conclusion is false. Even if we would accept Nozick’s rights-based definition of freedom, voluntariness does not follow from it. This is because, as the examples above have shown, freedom is in no necessary relation to voluntary choice. Consider the case of the justly imprisoned murderer again. The rights-based definition of freedom states that a guardian does not make the murderer unfree to leave her cell. As I pointed out in section 3.2, that runs counterour ordinary use of the terms ‘free’ and 'freedom'. But it seems even more implausible to state that the prisoner voluntarily chooses to stay in prison, because the guardian that is preventing her from leaving acts within her rights. Image a case in which a prisoner escapes from prison, but is recaptured. To deem her going back to prison a voluntary act seems extremely dubious. Conversely, imagine a prisoner that has gained the right to leave prison, because sentence is over, but voluntarily stays in prison because she prefers prison routine to her loneliness at home. She voluntarily stays in prison although shehas the right to leaveand although the guardian, by preventing her from leaving, renders her unfree.

So far, I argued that Nozick’s rights-based definition of voluntariness is inherently flawed. As I pointed out, the fact that a person who limits someone’s options has not violated someone’s rights does not settle the question of voluntary choice. Nozick bases his definition of voluntariness on his rights-based definition of freedom.I have shown that defining freedom in terms of rights leads to some kind of circular reasoning. Moreover, by defining both freedom and voluntariness in terms of rights, Nozick simply does not say anything relevant about voluntariness. Therefore, I reject Nozick’s rights-based account of voluntary choice. In the next chapter, I turn to a more satisfactory definition of voluntariness.Following Olsaretti (1998),I argue that we should deem a choice voluntary, if and only if it was not made because no acceptable alternative was available.

3.4 Voluntary choice as having acceptable alternatives

Olseretti (1998) defines voluntariness on the basis ofthe acceptability of the options in a choice set.As Cohen (1983, p. 4) points out, when people areforced to do something, it is usually not true that they did not have any alternative. When they say ‘I was forced to do this. I had no other choice’, they usually mean ‘I had no other choice worth

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considering’ (Cohen, 1983, p. 4). According to Olsaretti (1998, p. 54), a choice can be considered voluntary if it was not made because no acceptable alternative was available. Under this definition, a choice is deemed voluntary when there was an acceptable alternative available, or when no acceptable alternative was available, but the only available optionwas chosen because it was liked so much, and not because there was no acceptable alternative.

On the basis of this definition, a person involuntarily hands over her wallet to a thief that is threatening her with a gun. Her only alternative to handing over her wallet is to get shot. That is not an acceptable alternative. It is also unlikely that she hands over her wallet because she just very much likes to give it to the thief. Olsaretti states that:

A person’s freedom of choice – her ability to make free or voluntary, rather than forced, choices – is increased when the likelihood of her acting only so as to avoid unacceptable options (that is, options which frustrate some basic need) is minimised (Olsaretti (2005, p. 95).

Furthermore, Olsaretti (1998) makes a distinction between force and coercion, to emphasize that the use of threats is not the only way to undermine voluntariness. According to Olsaretti (1998, p. 54), coercion is a particular type of forcing. To be coerced to do x means to do x because of some kind of threatening. However, things other than threats can also undermine voluntariness. Choices that are made in response to offers or warnings, or in other limited choice situations, are involuntary under the same conditions that make coerced choices involuntary. A choice is involuntary if it was made because no other acceptable alternative was available, no matter the nature of the restrictions that limited the choice set.

Olsaretti’s account of voluntary choice is more satisfying than Nozick’s moralised definition described above, for at least three reasons. First, in contrast to Nozick’s rights-based definition of voluntary choice, Olsaretti’s definition makes it possible to plausibly distinguish between freedom and voluntariness. When returning to the two examples described in section 3.3, we can deem Anne’s choice to stay in the city in the first example involuntary. She chose to stay, because her only alternative – to die in the desert – was not an acceptable alternative. In the second example, Babet chose voluntarily to stay in the city, because she very much liked to stay. Second, with Olsaretti’s account of voluntary choice we do not have to distinguish between threats and offers. Thereby, we avoid the difficulty of judging actions that canbe redefined under the different headings.

Capabilities, occupational choice and unconditional basic income : basic income as a precondition for freedom of occupational choice