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THE DYNAMICS

OF REBEL

FINANCE IN

SOUTH SUDAN

How does the source of finance influence the rebel

movement?

ABSTRACT

This thesis deals with the complex dynamics of finance and rebel movements. It addresses the question how sources

of finance influence rebel movements and affect the longevity of conflicts. Secure and ongoing sources of finance, especially if the source is from outside, give conflicts a longer-term dynamic that may swing free of grievance and other factors, even when peace has been

negotiated. South Sudan was selected as a case study because of its long history of intra-state conflict and rebel

movements. The presence of oilfields in Sudan has provided the rebel movements with a source of finance

and is a cause of the ongoing conflict in South Sudan.

Victor Flietstra Master thesis Political Science:

International Relations University of Amsterdam Student number: 10469664

Under supervision of: Mr. prof. dr. G.R.D. Underhill June 27th 2014

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Geoffrey Underhill for his ceaseless help tutoring and supporting me. Both Geoffrey Underhill and Brian Burgoon were great with introducing me to the different subjects of International Relations and their counselling in this thesis project.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DRC The Democratic Republic of the Congo

FARC The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Spanish: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)

GoSS Government of Southern Sudan

KLA Kosovo Liberation Army

LRA Lord’s Resistance Army

M23 Tutsi rebel movement in the DRC, founded on March 23

NGO Non Governmental Organization

RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front

SAF Sudan Armed Forces

SDG Sudanese pound

SPDF Sudan People's Defense Forces/Democratic Front

SPLA Sudan's People Liberation Army

SPLM Sudan's People Liberation Movement

SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement

SSDF South Sudan Defence Forces

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ... 1

List of Acronyms ... 2

1. Introduction ... 4

2. Theory of rebel finance ... 8

2.1. Methodology ... 8

2.2. Why rebel finance? ... 10

2.3. Grievances vs opportunity ... 12

2.4. Types of Finance ... 16

2.5. Sources of Finance ... 19

2.6. Capabilities and other sources of finance ... 22

2.7. Spoilers of Peace Processes ... 24

3. The Dynamics of Rebel Finance ... 26

4. Case study: South-Sudan ... 29

4.1. History of South-Sudan ... 29

4.2. History of oil in Sudan and South Sudan ... 33

5. South Sudan after Independence ... 37

6. Finance of rebel movements in (South) Sudan ... 42

7. Conclusion ... 47

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1. INTRODUCTION

In 2011 South Sudan became the world’s youngest country. After a long and violent civil war with the regime in Khartoum South Sudan succeeded in seceding from Sudan. Unfortunately, after only two years of independence, the young country fell into renewed open conflict. In December 2013 the conflict between Riek Machar, former vice president and former rebel movement leader, and Salva Kiir, president and also former rebel leader, became violent. Fights broke out in Juba between elements of the SPLA (Sudan’s People Liberation Army) loyal to Kiir and Nuer elements of the SPLA loyal to Machar. This raises the question why and how conflict keeps reoccurring in developing countries such as South Sudan. Sudan has seen two civil wars and the December 2013 fighting is the first civil war for South Sudan. How and why do rebel movements keep reappearing and how are they financed? What is the dynamic between finance, rebel movements and intra-state conflict?

After the end of the Cold War a drastic decline in conflict can be seen across the globe. Most conflicts are no longer inter- but intra-state conflicts and take place in the developing world. Current conflicts have become civil wars or secessionist conflicts (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, pp. 1-2). Motivation for intra-state conflict thus becomes a key area of interest in the study of modern conflicts. It is necessary to better understand the underlying dynamics that cause these conflicts and understand how the dynamics influence the course of conflicts. If it becomes possible to predict and understand conflicts better, then perhaps the

circumstances that promote conflicts can be addressed and the number of future conflicts can be lowered. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler showed in their article “Greed and grievance in civil war” (2004) about the difference between the two major causes for civil conflict, greed and grievance. Collier argues that greed or opportunity is a much clearer indication for the occurrence of conflict than grievance causes are (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004, p. 563). After the publication of Collier’s article a debate took off between proponents of both sides, like Fearon and Laitin, Stetman and Kalyvas, of the greed vs grievance debate. Whether these circumstances are greed or grievance based is irrelevant for this thesis. If the cause of a conflict can be removed this would lead to a more peaceful (developing) world. Peace and stability are two of the main conditions for stable economic growth of a country. The absence of growth is one of the clearest and most used indicators for the chance of conflict (Collier, 2008, pp. 8-12). Collier is one of the advocates of conflict prevention through

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5 growth. He argues that if a country has sustainable growth the chances of intra-state conflict are significantly reduced. Due to the growth of a country the population is provided in its basic needs for survival and does not need to fight for these basic necessities of life (Collier, 2008, pp. 8-12). An assumption of this theory is that a grievance is often the start or kick-off for violent conflict, but to sustain conflict opportunities are required. A stable source of finance for the rebels is the most important factor in these opportunities. Without money there is no room to aggravate against the government (Collier, 2008, pp. 8-12).

Numerous authors have already researched the prerequisites of a conflict emerging, the different types of internal conflict and the relation between types of finance and types of insurrection against governments. Examples on which I will draw are James Fearon and David Laitin, Stuart Kaufman, Phillipe Le Billon, Michael Ross and Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. Though these authors have researched the phenomena of growth, finance and conflict, the specific dynamic between finance and rebel movements remains insufficiently studied. Secure and ongoing sources of finance, especially if the source is from outside, give conflicts a longer-term dynamic that may swing free of grievance and other factors. The current literature does not focus sufficiently on the importance of the dynamics between the source of finance of rebel movements and the longevity of a conflict. A more detailed

analysis would be able to yield better policy advices and more direction to the debate on conflict causes.

For developing and transient states, rebellion is a recurring problem and some states have become entrenched in a recurring cycle of rebellion. In some cases the victory of a rebel movement does not mean an end to the conflict. It simply means the replacement of the government with the rebel movement and a continuation of the situation that allowed the rebel movement to emerge. In this similar situation a new rebel movement often develops and challenges the new government again. This vicious circle of rebel movement replacing government and struggles between government and rebel movement, is a significant drain on developing economies and prevents the development of a secure investment

environment. This recurrence of violence is devastating for a country. If we would

understand how rebel groups are motivated and financed, it could be possible to break this vicious cycle of rebellion and for development to take place. And in some cases this would mean the dispersal of the rebel movement. In other cases the rebel movement sees itself

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6 forced to negotiate peacefully with the government to come to a negotiated settlement. The source of rebel movements finance may hinge on the presence of conflict and the removal of conflict, means the removal of their source of income. In order to understand this phenomenon, the way in which a rebel movement is financed and organized, is central to understanding the relationship between the dynamics of rebel finance and the dynamic of intra-state conflict (Collier, 2000, pp. 839, 852).

In order to examine this phenomenon further it is necessary to research the relationship between the dynamics of rebel finance and the dynamics of civil conflict. How and in what ways do these two elements interact over time? The case of South Sudan is a good example of this phenomenon and helps to indicate the areas where further research is required. South Sudan is a country that has known numerous rebel movements and the resulting conflict has undergone the different stages from rebellion to secession to independence. Even after gaining independence South Sudan is experiencing internal conflict and is unable to transform into a stable state. Former rebel movements have re-emerged in the wake of independence instead of integrating into the government or the national army. These characteristics make South Sudan a very interesting case to study in connection with rebel finance. South Sudan is an example where rebel movements keep emerging around key areas, mainly the oilfields. These oilfields are currently the most important source of finance for both rebel movements and government. Both the rebel movements in South Sudan and the government boycott and utilise the peace processes. For a rebel movement it can be necessary to keep a conflict going to assure their access to their sources of income.

This thesis will start by giving an overview of the different kinds of research that have been done on conflict in general and rebel movements in particular. The theory of Lorreta

Napoleoni will serve as a framework for the different types of finance that can be identified as legitimate or illegal income. Then I will elaborate on my hypothesis: a stable source of income for rebel movements give conflicts a longer-term dynamic that can be independent of grievance and other factors. The availability of finance may then undermine a peace settlement as well. The case of South Sudan will then serve as an illustration how finance interacts with the conflict and rebel movements. The oilfields in South Sudan play an important part in these dynamics. I will end with a conclusion about the influence that finance has on rebel movements and conflict in general and in South Sudan in particular.

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7 This thesis will show the importance of a better understanding of rebel finance and the

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2. THEORY OF REBEL FINANCE

2.1. Methodology

The goal of this thesis will be to show how rebel movements develop in the presence of different types of finance and how the dynamic of finance, rebel movements and conflict influences the longevity of the conflict. A secure source of finance can prolonged a conflict without the influence of grievances and other factors. In order to show the importance of finance, a comparative research study has been conducted, taking the leading articles in the grievance versus opportunity debate as a framework to construct a hypothesis about the dynamics of rebel finance. The articles and theories from Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, and James Fearon and David Laitin are of strong influence in the scholarly discussions about grievance and opportunity and play a central role in this thesis. Halvard Buhaug, Michael Ross, Reed Wood, Phillipe le Billon and Loretta Napoleoni have written articles on natural resources, the actions of rebel and terrorist movements and the financing of these

movements. These articles are instrumental to a better understanding of the dynamics of state conflict and the dynamics of finance, rebel movements and the longevity of state conflict. These sources provide statistical substantiation to the possible causes of intra-state conflict. As Evan Lieberman shows in his article ‘Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research’ (2005) a combined approach to study phenomena of international relations can give new insights. If large-n-studies are combined with small-n-studies, as Lieberman suggests in his article, this can provide a different approach to studying intra-state conflicts. In order to use this approach this thesis uses the large-n-studies of Collier and Hoeffler, Fearon and Laitin, Ross, Buhaug, Napoleonti and others to define the most important aspects of rebel movements motives, capabilities, actions and methods of finance. To complement this with a small-n-study and create a nested analysis a case study needed to be selected. South Sudan has been selected as the focus for this case study. The case of South Sudan was chosen because of its current situation, history and the role the oil resources played in the conflict. There has been conflict and civil war since before the decolonization in South Sudan. The many different rebel movements that South Sudan has seen make the country suitable to study the dynamics between finance, rebel

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9 response to the types of finance that were available to it. South Sudan thus represents a

most likely case for this research and hypothesis and is a good case to illustrate the workings of the dynamics between rebel movements, finance and the longevity of conflict. The main rebel movement in Sudan, the SPLA/M has received funding both from oil sources and external backers. These sources of finance have changed over time, this makes the SPLA an outstanding subject in the framework of this thesis. The role that oil and foreign support have played in the development of the rebel movements in South Sudan is important in order to understand the dynamics of rebel movements and finance. All these aspects of the civil wars and conflicts in South Sudan add to the value of South Sudan as a case subject. This thesis uses a wide variety of sources to map out the history and current situation of South Sudan. These sources were found in journals and reports of NGO’s like Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group and are all available for review in the bibliography. In order to establish the causal mechanisms in the dynamics of finance of rebel movements, a case study is necessary. Due to the nature of the different rebel movements in different countries no rebel movement and its source of finance is exactly alike. To be able to extract a causality that is applicable to other cases a case study is required. This enables the thesis to indicate what the causal mechanisms are the handle the dynamics of rebel finance. For reports on the more recent outbursts of violence, due to its chaotic and changing nature, this thesis is primarily reliant on newspapers and other forms of current and fast

information. This gives a current insight into the conflict, but has its drawbacks. Fortunately, enough data is available on the events prior to the recent outburst of violence, starting in December 2013, and the focus of this thesis remains on the period before these events and especially before the independence of South Sudan in 2011. The development of the SPLA under influence of the different sources of finance illustrates the dynamics of rebel finance most accurately. In order to give the widest possible view of the conflict situation the case study starts with a short history of South Sudan. This to prevent a bias of information towards any specific rebel movement or event. It is however impossible to go into detail of all events of the conflict. This would require much more extensive research than is needed to illustrate the dynamics of rebel finance or feasible for this thesis. For this reason the thesis will comment on recent events and use these events to illustrate the necessity of continued research on the dynamics of rebel movements and finance. The primary focus will

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10 remain on the SPLA, the oilfields and rebel finance in the period before the current crisis and

before independence in 2011.

2.2. Why rebel finance?

What is the importance of rebel finance, what can be achieved if rebel finance is better understood? To analyse the phenomenon of intra-state conflict to reduce the instances of its occurrence is a noble goal, but how feasible is this? Are there other examples than the case of South Sudan? All over the world, but especially in developing countries, rebel movements are present. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA, Uganda), Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF, Rwanda), M23 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (Sudan) are a few examples of these movements. Each movement has its own organization, source of finance, motivation and manner of acting. These movements have different goals: secession, more representation in governments, addressing ethnic grievances, greed and so on. One shared aspect of rebel movements is that they need financing. Without a steady income and weapon supply a rebel movement will cease to exist very soon (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

An example of the consequence of disappearing financial security is the rebel group M23 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). M23 was a movement in the DRC of extremist Tutsis that targeted Hutu extremists and Hutu refugees that had fled Rwanda after the genocide in 1994. M23 developed in reaction to the formation of Hutu extremist groups, like Hutu Power, that were being formed in the east of the DRC. Hutu Power was planning to recommence a genocide in Rwanda and M23 tried to hunt down all Hutus that fled Rwanda after the genocide. The DRC has already seen many internal conflicts and rebel movements. The addition of external movements fighting in the DRC further complicates the unstable situation in the DRC. Both Hutu Power and M23 sided with different factions in the ongoing turmoil in the DRC. These alliances added insecurities and extra complexities to an already unstable country (Manson, et al., 2012) and (Lynch, 2012). While M23 emerged in the DRC unsupported, there were reasons to assume that the government of Rwanda was helping M23 both financially and logistically. In reaction to the strong suspicions of Rwandan support of M23, the international community increased pressure in 2011 on the Rwandan

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11 was very successful. The Rwandan government complied, which meant that M23 lost its

primary source of finance. After this withdrawal of financial support M23 has not been able to be active in the DRC and literally crumbled away (Manson, et al., 2012). Another example of this phenomenon of an external source of finance is the Hutu extremist movement in the DRC, Hutu-power, who receive finance from a Hutu-diaspora in the West, international donors and sometimes humanitarian assistance from NGO’s. Thanks to this diaspora, which is more difficult to influence through international pressure, the Hutu rebels in the DRC can still operate in the region and form a threat to both the Rwandan and DRC government (Mamdani, 1999, pp. 58, 59).

The FARC is another example of a rebel movement and its connection to a source of finance. In Colombia the FARC has developed with reliance upon its environment for its source of finance. They needed a local and reliable source of income to sustain their insurrection against the Colombian government. The period after the Second World War was a period of extreme violence in Colombia. There were very few safe areas in the country and the few stable areas were protected by rebel and anarchistic groups. Following this violent era the FARC was founded in 1962. In the period following its founding until the 1980’s, the FARC managed to increase its military capabilities. During this first period the FARC used all available sources of finance, but the FARC was limited in its options. Their main source of income was the coca plant and cocaine production and trafficking. The coca plant was essential for the development of the military capabilities of the FARC, because the trade in coca and cocaine was the only stable source of income available to the FARC. The money that was produced with the drug production and trafficking went almost directly into the military capabilities and the FARC grew tremendously in the period between 1962 and 1983. After 1983 the FARC was capable to expand its influence into more urbanized areas and also diversified its sources of income. They were able to exploit more natural resources and able to kidnap and ransom people as a new source of finance (Ortiz, 2011, pp. 136-140). Under influence of these developments the organization developed from an ideological

organization to a movement that was more flexible in its doctrine. The FARC started out as a Marxist communist group, but during the development of the FARC the leadership allowed a great deal of autonomy to its sub-groups and also a great deal of ideological freedom. This ideological freedom led to great flexibility and appealed to a large group of people. This

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12 enabled the FARC to have a larger number of independent groups. Though these groups did

not have a uniform and strong ideological bond, due to good communications and clear leadership the FARC was able to remain a cohesive rebel movement. These groups required a lot of funding. The funding required, justified an intensification of the drug trafficking and criminal activities of the organization. Making money through illegal practices became a goal for the FARC and began to take priority above the ideological beliefs of the group. Though this move to a more flexible organization eventually meant a move to a criminal

organization, it also ensured the continuation of the FARC. The diversification of the FARC’s finance sources and its strong grasp on these sources of finance increased the longevity of the conflict between the FARC and the Colombian government (Ortiz, 2011, pp. 140-141). M23 and the FARC are two examples of rebel movements that demonstrate the importance of finance to rebel movements. Without a steady income and weapon supplies a rebel movement will very soon cease to exist. These examples also show that the source of finance can influence the longevity of a conflict and can alter the manner of operation of a rebel movement.

2.3. Grievances vs opportunity

After the Cold War it was assumed that overall conflicts would diminish. The clash between the USA and the USSR that had dominated international relations and international conflicts was over so the reason for conflict was presumed less prevalent. The number of inter-state conflicts dropped significantly, the number of intra-state conflicts unfortunately increased (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, pp. 1-2). In first instance this was blamed on ethnic differences and most intra-state conflicts were labelled as an ethnic conflict. Though to some extend conflicts are fuelled by cultural and ethnic differences other causes were also identified. Causes like slow growth, poverty, large wealth discrepancies and high unemployment are some examples that were found as alternative causes of conflict (Collier, 2008, pp. 8-12). There were different causes visible to researchers and in the wake of the first conflicts this led to an ethnicity discourse. The civil war in Yugoslavia had significant influence on this debate (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, pp. 849-851). Some researchers considered the identity based explanations and increasing political dissatisfactions an adequate explanation for intra-state conflicts. These types of explanations were unique to the different conflicts and left a lot of

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13 room for nuancing of differences between conflicts and a high level of nuancing of theories

(Collier & Hoeffler, 2004, p. 24). Other researchers sought to develop more general theories and thus more universally applicable. Examples are the work of Paul Collier and Anke

Hoeffler who try to come to a general conclusion about growth and the causes of conflict (Lieberman, 2005, p. 435). This often means less nuance but also greater insights into a general approach of conflict.

Stuart Kaufman for example belongs to the first category of researchers. In his article

“Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence” Kaufman shows that there are different approaches towards (ethnic) conflict. Kaufman argues that an ‘ethnic myth’ or discourse needs to be present to enable violent conflict. An ‘ethnic myth’ is a (perceived) history of an ethnic group that represents a struggle with another group, this viable discourse of hatred justifies violent action against other groups. Without the ethnic myth or discourse of struggle people are unlikely to participate in violent conflicts, they simple miss the motivation (Kaufman, 2006, p. 47). The society as a whole, and especially the different ethnic groups, needs to believe that there is a struggle grounded in history that explains the ethnic differences and the conflict between the different groups. These ethnic myths can be created or merely perceived struggles, but this discourse or myth making can become very potent and can cause conflict. These ethnic myths then fuel fears, hostile mass attitudes and create opportunities for elites to become predatory. According to Kaufmann, this explains the political coherence of an ethnic group and the adoption of predatory goals of an ethnic group (Kaufman, 2006, pp. 49-50).

There were two packages of factors or explanations for intrastate conflict: socio-economic underlying factors that were associated with more frequent occurrence, and ethic

grievances that became politicised and led to civil war. This raised the issue of what was more important and how they might be related. Especially if inequalities and poor socio-economic conditions accrued and varied across ethnic divisions. But these several forms of grievance based factors can then be contrasted with the ‘greed’ or ‘opportunity-based’ factors.

This second category, the opportunity part of the grievance versus opportunity debate, led to a more statistical approach and a new debate in international conflict studies. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler were one of the first researchers to start this debate, in 2004, with an

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14 article titled “Greed and grievance in civil war”. In this article Hoeffler and Collier explore the

explanatory power of grievances and of greed. Collier and Hoeffler use a wide range of variables to proxy greed and grievance. In this article they find that greed provides better indications for conflict and rebel building than grievance does. This has led to a grievance versus greed, or more recently grievance versus opportunity, debate on the causes of internal conflicts. Much has been written about these two different categories of conflict causes. Collier and Hoeffler, and Fearon and Laitin have contribute greatly to this debate in favour of the opportunity explanation of conflict. In the opportunity versus grievance debate it becomes clear that grievances clearly play a role but in a way that is less direct. The

rationale behind opportunity to explain conflict is that in order to get from grievance to conflict there has to be room for rebels or protesters to organize themselves. A grievance is needed as the rationale the reason to fight. This can be a real, perceived or constructed grievance. The grievance however does not explain the incidence of outbreak, not all

grievances escalated into violence. This means that there was no opportunity for escalation. The likelihood of a violent conflict to emerge is better predicted and described through the opportunities in a country for violent conflict (Collier, et al., 2009, p. 24). A group will always run into collective action problems. While a group as a whole can have certain goals, the goals of the group are not always the same as the goals of individual group members. Individual group members have few incentives to sacrifice their own goals for the groups goals. Thus rendering advancement of the group difficult through this dynamic. The easiest and quickest way to solve this is with adequate opportunities and financing to bridge this start-up problem. Collier argues that predation, targeting finance sources to finance a movement and to make a profit for the group’s leaders, is the way to sustain a rebellion. Predation avoids any collective action problems and has a build in reward system that promotes potential leaders to stimulate rebellion and conflict. Any other way of financing a rebellion will encounter many startup problems and will not be able easily to bridge the initial investment in a rebellion. All alternatives to predation will encounter difficult

collective action problems. The actions require a high degree of collective cooperation and while some individuals might sacrifice themselves for the public good, the temptation to free-ride on their efforts will sabotage the collective attempt. A rebellion will often sabotage itself from within in this way. If a smaller group has the possibility to make a profit and is in that way capable to sustain the rebellion this has a higher chance of delivering a longer lived

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15 rebellion. However, legal ways to make a profit are not very often available to rebel

movements and thus the rebel movement becomes reliant on predation of illegal methods and natural resources for its survival. After these phases a rebellion becomes

indistinguishable from crime.

While a rebel movement requires an initial surge, provided by grievances, real, imagined or fabricated, the long term fuel of rebellion is predation. Collier argues in short that without feasibility for predation, without a source of finance there would be no conflict, there are no resources to maintain the conflict. Collier argues that this can yield clear policy directives. If we would know what kind of financial and logistical opportunities a rebel movement

requires to initiate, we can block a rebel movement from forming. If you were to remove the source of finance of the rebel movement, this would remove the incentive for predation. With the incentives to form a rebel movement removed the movement would sooner fall victim to collective action problems. Without financing a rebel movement quickly disbands (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004, p. 24) and (Collier, 2000, pp. 841-842). In this way Collier and Hoeffler argue that though grievances can initiate a rebellion, the persistence of a movement is determined by its capability to make a profit.

Fearon and Laitin elaborate on the point that Collier and Hoeffler make in their article: ‘If, under the right environmental conditions, just 500 to 2000 active guerrillas can make for a long-running and highly destructive internal war, then the average level of grievance in a group may not matter that much. What matters is whether active rebels can hide from government forces and whether economic opportunities are so poor that the life of a rebel is attractive to 500 or 2000 young men.’ (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 28).

Thus, the most important aspect that determines the success of a rebel movement is not grievance but opportunity. ‘[W]e have argued that all the guerrillas really need is superior local knowledge to the government's, which enables them to threaten reprisal for

denunciation.’ (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 28). In this argument the opportunities and financing that a rebel movement is able to ascertain is of crucial importance for the rebel movement to give any form of longevity to the conflict.

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16 ‘Collier and Hoeffler (1999) usefully observe that a grievance-based rebellion would

face significant collective action problems, in contrast to a “greed-based" rebellion. We would add, however, that solving this collective action problem would not necessarily imply war. Instead, it could yield a common minority front for bargaining with center and the in-group policing of extremists. Indeed, insurgency is often better understood not as a success of collective action but as a failure by the nonrebels to police their own extremists (Fearon and Laitin 1999).’ (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 28). Thus, even if the collective action dilemma is overcome, a rebel movement will be much more successful in remaining coherent and much better capable in maintaining an actor in any form of conflict with the government, as long as the rebel movement has sufficient opportunities. And of these opportunities their form of finance is of key importance. If a rebel movement has a stable source of income they are much better equipped to resist the government, both militarily and politically (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 28). This leads to the question: how are rebel movements financed, or: where do they get their money?

2.4. Types of Finance

The source of finance can be differently categorised. Lorreta Napoleoni in her article “The New Economy of Terror: How Terrorism is Financed” (2004) divides the income of terrorists into two groups: legitimate revenues and illegal revenues. Though Napoleonis’ research focuses on terrorism, the same approach can be used in studying the financing of rebel movements. Napoleoni uses both terms for the groups that she is studying and shows that on some occasions the definitions are vague and groups switch from rebel movements to terrorist groups and back again (Napoleoni, 2004, p. 34). The main differences between terrorist and rebel movements is that rebels are local and use different tactics than terrorists to achieve their goals. While terrorists use fear and terror primarily as their leverage to achieve their goals, rebel movements use military and guerrilla tactics to gain victories. Often rebel movements divert to terror tactics to inspire fear into opponents and civilians to force compliance with their goals. The main difference with terrorists remains that rebel movements remain local movements. However, as can be seen in this short definition, there is much overlap between terrorism and rebel movements. As another author Reed Wood argues in his article “Rebel capability and strategic violence” (2010), rebel movements base

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17 their tactics and strategies on their capabilities. Tactics and strategies swing free of cause.

The sort of finance available may affect tactics much more strongly than the cause will affect tactics and strategy. The more financially secure a group, the more possibilities they have and the group might form more like an army. If the finance that is available is meagre, the group may resort to terrorist tactics (Wood, 2010, p. 612). The distinction between a rebel movement and a terrorist group is thus tenuous. It also makes it possible to use the general theory that Napoleoni developed to categorise the financial sources available to rebel movements. Both groups utilize the same sources of finance and are both highly opportunistic (Napoleoni, 2004, pp. 32-33, 46).

Legitimate revues can exist of normal businesses, support from local population, exploitation of local natural resources or gifts of diasporas and charities. Some rebel movements possess or run local markets and local businesses, which generate some income (Napoleoni, 2004, pp. 33-34). Expatriates that live in for example western countries often donate time, money and sometimes resources to the rebel movements:

‘Although such remittances represent a major source of foreign exchange,

immigrants’ contributions do not come only in the form of cash. During the war in Kosovo, Albanian-Americans provided KLA fighters with radios, night-vision

equipment and bullet-proof vests bought from an American mail-order catalogue. Such contributions are often not technically illegal, as national laws frequently do not distinguish between legitimate remittances and sponsorship of armed groups. In the United States of America, for example, until recently, people could collect “donations for rebel organizations, groups or armies, nor [was it] a crime for an individual or group to join [them]—except when such an organization, group or ‘army’ [was] on the list of terrorist groups and organizations prepared by the State Department”.’ (Napoleoni, 2004, pp. 33-34).

Charity and donations also constitute a part of rebel movement finance. Charities knowingly and unknowingly finance terrorists and rebel movements. Through churches fundraisers and other donations rebel movements can receive substantial amounts of money. These

charities and donations are a valuable source of legal income for these movements. But an often neglected revenue is the individual donation. In 2002 the Bosnian police handed over a report to the United States Justice Department entitled “Golden chain link”. This report

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18 listed the 20 top financial backers of terrorism (Solomon, 2003). ‘Among the alleged

“terror-sponsors” listed were some of the wealthiest and most powerful men in the world. It reportedly included, for instance, one of the Saudi king’s brothers-in-law who, according to Forbes Magazine, is the one hundred and thirty-seventh richest man in the world, with a fortune worth $4 billion.’ (Napoleoni, 2004, p. 34) All these donations are voluntary

individual donations and through this diaspora of benevolent funders a rebel movement can receive substantial income.

The other major revenue sources of terrorists and rebel movements are illegal revenues. Examples of illegal revenues are criminal revenues, illegal exploitation of natural resources, kidnapping, smuggling and extortions. These sources of finance often overlap with legal activities. The legal activities of rebel movements are sometimes merely cover-ups of money laundering activities for these groups. Activities like money laundering are often only

possible in legal areas, so the legal and illegal are tightly linked (Napoleoni, 2004, pp. 40-41, 43-44). Napoleoni argues in her article “The New Economy of Terror: How Terrorism Is Financed” that due to globalization the shadow economy, for example money laundering and drug trafficking, and the normal economy have become more entwined than ever and that globalization has given terrorist and rebel movements new and nearly unlimited ways to finance themselves (Napoleoni, 2004, p. 46). Napoleoni often uses rebel movements as examples to illustrate how the so called shadow economy works. The most significant restriction for rebel movements in comparison with terrorists is that rebel movements are restricted to a single location and thus have more limited access to international markets (Napoleoni, 2004, pp. 31-33). Because a rebel movement is ideologically motivated, very much like a terrorist organization, and their conflict is geographically limited rebel movements have to deal with the restrictions that follow. In order to respond to these restrictions some movements have chosen to drastically change their motivations and change their location. An example is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). It can be argued that this rebel movement changed from rebel movement to terrorist organization to criminal organization. The LRA started their rebellion in Uganda, but in the course of its existence changed locations many times in response to military pressures. The organization started out as a rebellion but evolved into a criminal organisation with sect like properties. This

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19 blurred the goals of the LRA until the LRA became much more like a criminal organization

than a rebel movement (Doom & Vlassenroot, 1999, pp. 20-36).

This shows that there are many different opportunities to find funding for a rebel movement. And this also shows that finding an adequate source of finance is crucial for rebel movements. In the next part I will elaborate more on the most common sources of conflict and of finance in intra-state conflict situations. I will focus mainly on the most important cause of conflict and source of finance: natural resources.

2.5. Sources of Finance

To know where rebel movements gain their source of finance, is to know the likelihood of a rebel movement emerging and how to handle the rebel movement. If the source of finance of a rebel movement is known this could influence the way in which a government and the international community interact with this rebel movements. In his article “Natural

Resources and Civil War: An Overview with Some Policy Options” (2002) Ross examines the role of natural resources in conflict. Paradoxically, the presence of natural resources

increases the risk of conflict. The presence of natural resources promotes conflict in four different ways: ‘by harming a country’s economic performance; by making its government weaker, more corrupt, and less accountable; by giving people who live in resource-rich regions an incentive to form an independent state; and by helping finance rebel

movements.’ (Ross, 2002, p. 28). Ross shows that the presence of natural resources is an incentive to form rebel movements. The way in which rebels make money from natural resources is varied. They can directly loot the natural resources and illegal sell them on the international market (Ross, 2002, pp. 21-22). A related way to use the natural resources is to sell the future rights to natural resources to external investors. The natural resources then become part of a war booty and are an extra incentive for the rebel movement to win the conflict and receive rents over the natural resources (Ross, 2002, pp. 22-25). If the region is eventually exploited by external developers like oil companies these companies become high value targets for rebel movements. The structures become targets for extortions and the employees targets for kidnappings (Ross, 2002, pp. 25-26). Through these mechanisms a rebel movement can earn money from the exploitation of natural resources.

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20 Le Billon carried out a different research in “The political ecology of conflict: natural

resources and armed conflict” (2001) and came to the conclusion that the nature of resource can determine the type of movement that is likely to evolve. So the sources of finance that are available for a rebel movement determine to an extent what type of movement can emerge. Le Billon emphasizes that ‘[w]hile it would be an error to reduce armed conflicts to greed-driven resource wars, as political and identity factors remain key, the control of local resources influence the agendas and strategies of belligerents.’ (Le Billon, 2001, p. 580). This means that though natural resources are not the main reason for conflict, they can be an indicator to the likely course that actors will take. Natural resources become objectives during the conflict and present big profits for the victor of the conflict.

To analyse this phenomenon Le Billon describes resources according to two characteristics. The distance to the centre of power, for example the capital, and the geographical

distribution of the resource. A resource that is geographically centred, like oil or gold, is more easily exploited and mined. Because it is more centred all activities and industry is also more centred and more easily defended. When a resource is geographically centralized, a point resource, and proximate to the capital or source of power then a movement towards state control, a coup d’état, is more likely to occur. If the resource is distant from the centre but still concentrated in one geographical point, a movement towards secession is more likely. If the resource is both distant from the centre and geographically diffused the movement tends to be more illegal and warlordism is the most likely type of movement to emerge. And finally, if a resource is proximate to the centre but geographically diffused a rebellion or rioting is most likely to occur (Le Billon, 2001, pp. 572-575).

Ross and Le Billon demonstrate the importance of natural resources as a source of finance for rebel movements. Le Billon specifies this further that the type of resource and its characteristics, like proximity and properties can predict the types of resistance to the established authority. What I want to show with my case in South Sudan, the development of the SPLA, the conflict between Machar and Kiir and the ethnic violence, is what influence the difference of external and illegal financing can have on the form a rebel movement is likely to take.

The idea that the motivation of a rebel movement is solely responsible for the form of its organization, capabilities and actions is thus a hard hypothesis to defend. The notion that

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21 the basis of a rebellion, whether it is opportunity driven or grievance based, can determine

the actions and organisation of the rebel movements would be according to Ross and Le Billon to narrow an analysis. What is more important to acknowledge is that a rebel movement can evolve during and after a conflict, as is the case with the SPLA/M.1 This

means that the rebel movements can change under the influence of outside pressures, like regime violence, international pressure, external financing and support. But the organization of a rebel movement is strongly determined by its finance and capabilities. Motivation and grievance determines whether or not a movement will develop. The source of income of the movement then determines the possibilities and capabilities for the rebel movement, how the movement will evolve over time and its longevity.

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22

Table 12

Relation between the nature/geography of a resource and type of conflict

Point Diffuse

Proximate State control/coup d’etat Rebellion/rioting Rebellion/rioting

Algeria (gas) El Salvador (coffee)

Angola (oil) Guatemala (cropland)

Chad (oil) Israel–Palestine (freshwater)

Congo–Brazzaville (oil) Mexico (cropland)

Iraq–Iran (oil) Senegal–Mauritania (cropland)

Iraq–Kuwait (oil)

Liberia (iron ore, rubber) Nicaragua (coffee) Rwanda (coffee) Sierra Leone (rutile)

Distant Secession Warlordism

Angola/Cabinda (oil) Afghanistan (opium)

Caucasus (oil) Angola (diamonds)

D.R. Congo (copper, cobalt, gold) Burma (opium, timber)

Indonesia (oil, copper, gold) Caucasus (drugs)

Maroco/Western Sahara (phosphate) Cambodia (gems, timber)

Nigeria/Biafra (oil) Colombia (cocaine)

Papua New Guinea/Bougainville (copper) D.R. Congo (diamonds, gold)

Senegal/Casamance (marijuana) Kurdistan (heroin)

Sudan (oil) Lebanon (hash)

Liberia (timber, diamonds, drugs) Peru (cocaine)

Philippines (marijuana, timber) Sierra Leone (diamonds) Somalia (bananas, camels) Tadjikistan (drugs)

Former Yugoslavia (marijuana, timber)

2.6. Capabilities and other sources of finance

In the past chapters I focused on the different financial options open to a rebel movement. These sources of finance mainly focussed on the presence of natural resources. Although, as Napoleoni showed, there are other sources of finance available to rebel movements.

Together these sources of finance help determine the capabilities of a rebel movement.

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23 Capabilities signifies size, strength and capacity of a rebel movement, the extent to which

the movement is capable to control an area and establish its own governance over the region. This is the definition with which Reed M. Wood analyses rebel movements and tactics in his article “Rebel capability and strategic violence” (Wood, 2010, pp. 604-605). The capabilities of a rebel movement determine to a large extent the actions that it

undertakes. The source of finance determines the tactics and strategy of a movement, and as finance changes the tactics and strategies of a movement are expected to change as well. Reed Wood researches the link between the capabilities, the size, resource base and thus the strength of the organization of rebel movements and the likely hood of rebel

movements using violence against civilians. Wood explains that civilians are the most important non-monetary resource for a rebel movement. They can provide financial and logistical support, troops, intelligence information and so on. This means that the incentive for a rebel movement to attack the local civilians is small (Wood, 2010, p. 612). Wood argues that this is true but only if the capabilities of a rebel movement are sufficient to represent a credible alternative to the government. If the rebel movement isn’t capable to provide a credible alternative to regime legitimacy for protection and public services, civilians have no incentive to aid or join the rebel movement. With this logic it is more useful for a rebel movement to scare or force civilians into cooperation with the rebel movement if they lack the capability and size to inspire loyalty in the local population. The actions, tactics and strategies that a rebel movement employs is thus linked to its capabilities. And the capabilities of a rebel movement are again linked with the finances that are available to a rebel movement, as we have seen in the article of Ross (Wood, 2010, p. 612) and (Ross, 2002, pp. 19-26). In the conclusion of his article Wood emphasizes that there are multiple factors that determine rebel movement behaviour. Halvard Buhaug and Scott. Gates “The Geography of Civil War” (2002) show that the location of conflict and the position of the rebel movement determine to a large degree the duration, type and outcome of internal conflicts. The link between size, distance to the capital and location or availability of natural resources all have an influence on what type of conflict is likely to occur. Buhaug and Gates show statistically how different types of intra-state conflict are dependent on environmental aspects. Location determines wheter there will be a seccesion conflict, a coup or a rebel

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24 movement. All these properties of the country also influence the longevity of the conflicts

(Buhaug & Gates, 2002, pp. 430-431).

Wood argues that the capabilities of a rebel movement to an extent determine its actions. Buhaug and Gates demonstrate the importance of geography and environment. All these characteristics of rebel movements can be identified as different opportunity factors of rebel movements and conflict. These properties are also consequences of the finance of the rebel movement. The source of finance determines the capabilities of a movement and the

sources of finance open to a rebel movement are subject to the geography and environment of the country and region where the rebel movement operates.

2.7. Spoilers of Peace Processes

What illustrates the importance of finance, financial security and the different sources of finance are spoilers during negotiations. In a conflict situation there are often attempts to bring the conflict to a negotiated end (Stedman, 1997, pp. 5-6). The United Nations (UN) and the AU (African Union) are often two mediators, in conflicts in Africa. Often neighbouring countries are heavily involved with mediating the negotiations, and the call for a negotiated end to the conflict comes often from within the country. A good example of a successful negotiated peace agreement is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 in Sudan. All parties came together and established a peace agreement. This eventually led to the secession of South Sudan and a peace between Sudan and South Sudan. Though the border region is still affected by skirmishes, often around the oilfields, the peace between Khartoum and South Sudan has been relatively stable since the signing of the CPA in 2005. For all parties the peace agreement represented the most favourable outcome.

Unfortunately, the recurrence of conflict in South Sudan and the skirmishes around the oilfields show the most problematic part of any peace agreement and the CPA in particular: the source of finance for rebels and government alike. The oil fields have become a source of finance and power for both the Khartoum government, the SPLA, the new Juba government and rebel movements in the area. Because the oilfields are such a difficult and high value negotiation topic, the CPA was not entirely conclusive about the division of these areas (International Crisis Group, 2011, pp. 21-22). The signing of the CPA and the successful and peaceful secession of South Sudan from Sudan can be seen as a success for negotiations. In

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25 other instances the peace process is being used, hijacked and exploited by spoilers purely in

their own advantage. Spoilers are people, groups, governments or organisation knowingly or unknowingly sabotaging a peace process. Like Stephen Stedman wrote in his article “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”:

‘The greatest source of risk comes from spoilers-leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.’ (Stedman, 1997, p. 5)

This means that in some cases the conflict situation is preferable for an actor participating in the peace process. A conflict situation can be preferable to rebel movements if their income source is dependable on conflict. Rebel movements often prefer conflict when they are dependable on illegal sources of income, like drugs and illegal trade. This shows that the source of income can be crucial in the course of a conflict. If a rebel movement only has a reliable source of income during conflict it would be improbable that the rebel movement would give this up for the promises in a peace agreement. Here the rebel movements need to put a high degree of fate in willingness of the government to honor the agreement and will be highly dependent on the international community to monitor the peace agreement. A rebel movement can be more likely to choose the relative security of their current source of finance over the possibility of peace and a more stable place in the government and other financial possibilities (Stedman, 1997, pp. 52-53).

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26

3. THE DYNAMICS OF REBEL FINANCE

The previous chapter gave an overview of the different relevant theories about intra-state conflict, rebel movements and rebel capabilities and rebel finance. In this chapter these theories will be used to enable a better analysis of the civil wars and rebel movements in South Sudan. This chapter will combine the different types of rebel finance that Loretta Napoleoni introduced in her article “The New Economy of Terror: How Terrorism is

Financed” (2004), Reed Wood’s analysis of rebel capabilities and actions in “Rebel capability and strategic violence against civilians” (2010). Reed Ross and Phillipe le Billon both describe the impact of natural resources on a country and a conflict.

Napoleoni categorizes the sources of income available to terrorists and rebel movements. Le Billon and Ross show that the types of natural resources that are available determine the likelihood of different types of conflict and different types of rebel movements to emerge. The location of the natural resources and the type of resource have a correlation with the type of insurrection that governments face (see Table 1). This shows the direct influence that the source of finance can have on a conflict and on rebellions (Le Billon, 2001, pp. 572-575). Wood argues that the size and capabilities a rebel movement has, can determine the actions that the movements make. If a rebel movement is sufficiently strong and capable they have the option to refrain from violence against civilians. If, on the other hand, a rebel movement is relatively weak the movement can see itself forced to coerce the local population to comply and support the rebel movement in its efforts. This coercion takes different forms, but is most easily recognised as violence against civilians, which is the characteristic that Wood uses in his study to substantiate his article (Wood, 2010, pp. 604-605).

Stedman shows that sometimes both governments and rebel movements can have clear reasons to sabotage peace processes. These so called spoilers can view a possible loss of power or finance as a reason to plunge a country again into conflict even after a settlement has been reached (Stedman, 1997, pp. 5-6).

These theories and authors each show a specific area of dynamics in conflicts and represent different viewpoints into intra-state conflict. The focus of this general theory overview has been on the opportunity side of the research. But grievances and other motivations can be equally important for conflicts. Often grievances are the catalysts or starting signal for

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27 conflicts to break out. After the start of conflicts the opportunities determine the likely

course for rebel movements, governments and the conflict in general. To be able to get a general idea of the driving forces behind intra-state conflict a focus on opportunities and specifically financing is essential. As Fearon and Laitin argue, if only a small number of rebels is required for a successful rebellion, the question isn’t as much of grievances but of

opportunity. Grievances can always be found in a community, if a relatively small group can be enough to form an effective rebellion then the opportunity factors for these groups play a much more important role than grievance factors. There will always be (perceived)

grievances the opportunity to act upon these grievances is not always present (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 28). As the successful international pressures have shown with the rebel group M23, which disappeared after pressure of the international community on Rwanda to stop their support of the group, financing and foreign support play an essential role in rebel movements. This thesis argues that the opportunities and sources of finance a rebel

movement has can determine how a rebel movement acts, how viable and strong the rebel movement will be and the longevity of a conflict. In this the focus should be on the way in which a rebel movement can and eventually does finance itself. While a lot of other factors are grouped in the term opportunity, in the greed vs opportunity debate, the financing of rebel movements is a phenomenon that determines strongly the total opportunities, size, actions and capabilities of a rebel movement.

All the sources of income combined are the total possibilities for rebel movements. The problem with rebel movements is that they are often in transition positions between legal and illegal actions. If a rebel movement for example grows in size and takes over

government responsibilities, the rebel movement will try to legalize its mode of finance. The case in South Sudan is an example of this practice. The SPLA used to be a rebel movement. When it was still a rebel movement their main sources of finance were their Ethiopian backers and income from the oil revenues. The oil revenues came in the form of extortion of the active oil companies in the Sudan border regions and rents on the areas that they

controlled. When the SPLA became the ruling party in South Sudan the relation with the oil companies normalized and changed from an illegal to a legal cooperation with revenue and rents the oil companies paid for the oilfields. Due to the legalization the SPLA went through they were forced to change their methods. With the signing of the Juba declaration in 2006

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28 the SPLA became head of a new nation, then still a province of Sudan, official military and

other rebel militias and groups were integrated into the SPLA. With this change from the SPLA rebel movement to the SPLA military, the focus of governance switched more to the South Sudan’s People Liberation Movement (SPLM) and became more institutionalized. The SPLA still focuses their efforts mainly on the oilfields. The oilfields represent the biggest source of finance and the source of power for the country. The case of South Sudan is an example of how rebel finance is a key factor in the dynamics of intra-state conflict. The source of finance changes and can influence the dynamics of conflict and of a rebel

movement. Next I will explain how South Sudan came into its current position and what the current situation is. Then I will link the current situation of South Sudan with the

phenomenon of finance dynamics. I will elaborate on this process and its consequences in the chapter on South Sudan’s current situation after independence.

This case study will make clear that finance is the most important aspect in the dynamics of rebel movements and intra-state conflicts. Secure and external sources of finance have a strong effect and give a conflict its own dynamic. There is interaction between the sources of finance, the capabilities, strategies and tactics of a rebel movement and the longevity of a conflict. If we would be capable to determine with certainty the sources of finance of a rebel movement, the possibility arises to influence and block the source of finance. By influencing the financing of rebel movements we might be able to influence the course of conflicts.

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29

4. CASE STUDY: SOUTH-SUDAN

4.1. History of South-Sudan

Since the end of colonialism in Sudan in 1956, the country has known many internal

conflicts. The fragmented state of the country can be traced back to the colonial era. During the British reign the country was divided into two separate administrative provinces. But even before the colonial period, the south of Sudan was plundered by the Arab regime of Khartoum which used Islam and religion as a tool to divide the country in the governing north and oppressed and exploited south (Metelits, 2004, p. 68). The colonial regime of the British solidified this divide and rule tactic, and governed the north and the south as two different administrative entities. The north remained Islamic and the south was quickly Christianised. With the end of colonialism after the second World War Sudan was to be decolonized. Nine years before the independence of Sudan the north and south were rapidly combined into on administrative whole. With the fusing of these two provinces, the north and south of Sudan, the ruling of the divided country became much more complicated during and after the period of decolonization. The British chose to divide the country along its religious lines, the north primarily Islamic and the south primarily Christian. However, during the decolonization period the Europeans had no interest in establishing formal institutions to help the unification of north and south. The attitudes of the northern Islamic elites towards the southern region did not help. The regime in Khartoum has historically seen the south as a more backward region and tried to convert the area to Islam. To add to the complexity of the conflict there have been oil finds in the border regions between the north and the south since the 1970’s. Given the fact that the south felt that most of the revenues remained in the north of Sudan, particularly the capital Khartoum, this led to aggravate the grievances against the northern part of Sudan and increased the longevity of conflicts in the region (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p. 89). The ensuing conflict can be seen as a protracted civil war and a secession war of South Sudan from Sudan. In 1955, months before Sudan gained independence from Great-Britain, the First Sudanese Civil war broke out. This civil war continued until 1972 and was primarily fought out between the

government in Khartoum and a rebel movement called Anya Nya I. The goal of the rebel movement was increased autonomy from Khartoum and eventually secession. The civil war

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30 ended with the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972. After this first Sudanese Civil

War, there was a period of relative peace until the Second Sudanese Civil War in 1983. An underlying source of unrest is the large ethnic diversity: the Dinka, Nuer, Murle and Shiluk are some of the bigger ethnic groups in the region. However, these groups are subdivided into smaller tribal groups. These groups aren’t fixed and each tribal group has its own allegiance, makes the situation very ambiguous. Added to the situation are nomadic tribes which frequent the area and a long history of cattle raiding. All these factors complicate the situation to the extreme. The cattle raiding takes an important place in the volatile situation in South Sudan. Cattle is one of the most important sources of income for the population of South Sudan and provides them with a stable food source. The ownership of cattle

determines the status in society and this influences the demand of livestock. Due to the long tradition of cattle raiding, these raids have been part of society in Sudan and South Sudan for a long time. Due to the wide availability of small arms however, these raids turn violent and deadly very easily. This leads to escalation of a tradition. Because of the easy trade in neighbouring countries of the cattle, the cattle raiding has evolved into a lucrative business. Through this changed practices of cattle raid becomes part of the problem of instability in the region (Willems, 2011, p. 51).

The relations between the government in Khartoum and the south soured in the decade following the end of the First Sudanese Civil War culminating in 1983 with the formation of Anya Nya II by a group of Nuer. An important reason for deteriorating relations between the Khartoum and South Sudan was the way in which Khartoum used the newly discovered oilfields in 1973 and thereafter. To be able to develop an oil industry, the border regions between north and south Sudan, where the oilfields are located, needed to be developed. In order to develop these regions the local population needed to be removed. The government in Khartoum used local rebel movements to clear these villages. Khartoum developed this strategy further. By backing different rebel groups and exasperating south-south differences Khartoum knowingly encouraged turf wars and simultaneously cleared the oilfields due to the in fights. The systematic clearing of oilfields remains a source of grievances for the local population (Human Rights Watch, 2003, pp. 50-59).

According to Anya Nya II, they formed their rebel movement as an answer to the oppression of the north, against the oppressive exploitation of certain border regions. Others say that

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31 the group formed for more selfish motives. The Nuer wanted to take revenge for raids

conducted by other Arab tribes (backed by Khartoum) and retaliate. This is one of the first examples of inequalities fuelling conflict, while a source of finance, namely the oilfields, caused and facilitated these conflicts. 1983 was the year of the beginning of the second Sudanese Civil War that would last until 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement(CPA). In 1983 the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), a guerrilla movement against the regime in Khartoum, was also formed. The SPLA, led by Dr. John Garang de Mabior, was comprised primarily by Dinka soldiers, but the SPLA was capable to unify a very diverse group of rebel movements by emphasizing the grievances against the northern regime (Metelits, 2004, p. 70). Salva Kiir managed to bind all separate rebel groups into the SPLA that became the national army. ‘When the CPA was signed, the SPLA was in fact just one of many military forces in South Sudan. Arguably as strong as the SPLA was the rival South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF), which is organized and funded by Khartoum and has a strong ethnic-regional base.’ (De Waal & Mohammed, 2014). This was accomplished with the signing of the Juba Declaration in 2006. Thanks to this agreement the divided south remained cohesive for some years. Kiir managed this with extensive military spending and promotions for all rebel leaders. ‘The prize was not just internal peace but a share in oil revenues. The SPLA payroll expanded to well over 200,000 names. Fully 55 percent of the south’s budget went to defense -- and more than 80 percent of that went to salaries.’ (De Waal & Mohammed, 2014).

The protracted civil war was primarily fought out between the government of Sudan and the different rebel movements in South-Sudan. The rebel movements formed roughly along ethnic and tribal lines and the SPLA, the Sudan’s People Liberation Movement (SPLM), the political part of the SPLA, was at the heart of this insurrection against Khartoum. Garang founded the SPLA with a multi ethnic resistance in mind. From the beginning ethnic Dinka’s formed the core of the SPLA. After the death of Garang the SPLA became more and more a Dinka officered rebel movement.

In 2005 the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed. In this agreement the SPLM and the government in Khartoum agreed upon greater sovereignty of South Sudan and a referendum to determine whether or not South Sudan should become independent. In January 2011 the referendum among the South Sudanese was held and with 98,83% the

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32 South Sudanese people voted in favour of independence. Six months later South Sudan was

the youngest country in the world. Since the independence of South Sudan there has been no relapse into conflict with Sudan until the relapse of December 2013. There have however been significant skirmishes in the border regions, especially the oil rich areas. Since the official independence the new country has also encountered internal struggles and new rebellions.

The signing of the CPA was the conclusion of a three year long negotiation process. Since 2002 the government in Khartoum and the SPLM, with the mediation of the UN participated in the process of reconciliation. This negotiation between SPLA and Khartoum implies that the conflict between the North and the south of Sudan was a dichotomous conflict. Though true to a certain extent, the south of Sudan wanted a higher degree of autonomy from Khartoum, this is a simplification of the diverse nature of South Sudan and the separatist movements (International Crisis Group, 2011, pp. i-ii, 3, 30-31). While the SPLA was the biggest rebel movement in South Sudan, each tribe supported their own soldiers and had an own rebel movement and their own objectives. These smaller rebel movements were often enough part of or worked with the SPLA. The SPLA was a large patchwork of different smaller rebel movements held together by the struggle against Khartoum. In the CPA one of the terms was that all rebel movements would be incorporated into a regular army whereof the SPLA would be a significant part but not the only part. In 2006 the Juba Declaration, formally the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the SPLA and the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), continued this integration. The SSDF the second biggest rebel movement was to be integrated with the SPLA. This was the basis of unifying rival rebel movements in South Sudan into the new national military. Because the SSDF was mainly active around the known oil fields and provided protection for the oil field and at times for the government forces from Khartoum, this remains a troublesome partnership. The SSDF had switched from pro-Khartoum to forming a strained alliance with the SPLA (Human Rights Watch, 2003, pp. 50-59) and (De Waal & Mohammed, 2014).

While the main goal of increased independence from Khartoum has succeeded the

remaining goals for each faction during the North-South conflict have not yet been fulfilled. Two important demands were economic growth and equal distribution of natural resource revenues (Kalyvas, 2003, p. 487). This is one of the main reasons of recurring violence in the

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