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UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM

Master’s Thesis

Explaining the impact of the populist message: an effective appeal to Gut?

Truijens, T.S. 6/26/2015

thomas.truijens@gmail.com

Student number: 10874410

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to contemplate on the success of populism by analyzing populism as a style of political communication. I argue that this populist style is directed at Gut feelings of the public and results in intuitive decision making. However, it remains hard to operationalize and test the assumption that a populist message makes a different appeal and is processed in a different way than other political messages. This thesis contributes towards a solution for this problem by analyzing the extent to which a populist political message makes an effective appeal to System 1 in the human brain, which is commonly related to many heuristics and cognitive shortcuts. After describing the populist style, I argue that populism makes an effective appeal to heuristics (especially Affect heuristic and Prospect theory) and thus results in intuitive decision making. To test this argument, an experiment with four conditions was conducted among 215 participants, but did not provide sufficient grounds to confirm the theoretical expectations. Participants did not engage in more heuristic processing in the populist conditions than participants in the non-populist condition. The need for cognition did significantly predict heuristic processing of political messages, but for those with a low, medium or high need for cognition, the populist messages did not result in more heuristic or less systematic processing than the neutral message. This thesis therefore found no evidence of the common claim that populism is directed at Gut feelings of the public.

Key words: populism; populist communication style; heuristics; affect heuristic; prospect theory; system 1 and 2.

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Introduction

This thesis seeks to contemplate on the explanation of the success of populism. While the literature on the concept of populism, its different forms (e.g. Canovan, 1981; Taggart, 2004; Mudde, 2004; Stanley, 2008) and different successful examples is very large, I will try to broaden our understanding of the success of populism by analyzing the psychological appeal of the populist style and message. This approach is innovative, since the success of populism has been explained based on several structural arguments regarding the political system and situation (for the Dutch context e.g. Van Kessel, 2011; Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013), or the extent to which voters have populist attitudes (e.g. Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove, 2013), but never by analyzing whether the populist style and message in itself makes a different appeal to the voter and triggers a different psychological type of information processing.

As Mudde (2004, p.542) argues, the highly emotional and simplistic discourse of populism is directed at “Gut feelings”1 of the public, which suggests that the populist discourse triggers our intuition. Consequently, one can argue that the impact of the populist message on the people can be explained based on intuitive thinking instead of rational calculation. While this explanation seems to have some kind of instinctive value, it remains hard to empirically test it and put into operation. After all, “When is something “emotional” rather than “rational”, or “simplistic” rather than “serious”? Moreover, sloganesque politics constitute the core of political campaigning, left, right and Centre” (Mudde, 2004, p.542).

I argue that the populist political message is likely to be processed in a different way than other kinds of political messages, because the populist message makes an effective appeal to System 1 in our brain, which is commonly related to many types of cognitive heuristics (Kahneman, 2011). System 1 in our brain is what I will refer to as “Gut” since this part in our brain covers our intuition and is responsible for automatic affect and quick

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Also in the Dutch political debate, one often hears the claim that populist parties direct their message at “onderbuikgevoelens”

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decision making. System 1/”Gut” is thus responsible for “Fast Thinking” about politics (Gardner, 2009; Kahneman, 2011; Stoker, Hay & Bar, 2013).

I will adopt a discursive conceptualization of populism as inspired by Jagers & Walgrave (2007) and Moffitt & Tormey (2014). This discursive conceptualization allows me to describe the core elements of the populist style and its political message. After synthesizing these theoretical contributions that allow me to see populism as a style of politics that can be adopted (by any political party) (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), I will connect this particular political style to several cognitive heuristics that are argued to induce fast thinking about politics.

Afterwards, I present an approach for empirical research regarding information processing of the populist message. The question for this thesis is whether the populist style and message is a more effective appeal to System 1. To explore the strength of the arguments presented an experiment was conducted among 215 participants. This experiment contains four conditions in which participants are confronted with either a neutral message, a populist message or a populist message in combination with two prominent heuristics (the Affect heuristic and Prospect theory). The impact of these messages on heuristic information

processing, systematic information processing, political attitudes, and self-reported emotions, is tested.

Populism

Any paper on populism is almost forced to make the argument that describing the concept of populism is difficult. According to Taggart (2003, p.5) “populism is invariably miscast, misused and miscontructed”. Scholars have presented several conceptual definitions of populism as an ideology, strategy or as a style of politics (Taggart, 2000; Van Kessel,

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2014). Van Kessel (2014) argues that even when a sound definition of populism is presented, there still are problems with regard to the fact that it is not clear whether populism refers to an ideological feature of specific political parties, or whether populism can be seen as a style of political communication, which can be adopted by any political party.

More recent literature covering populism tends to focus on the important similarities within these different definitions and approaches. Van Kessel (2014) argues that many political scientists covering the topic of populism refer to a similar set of core components that together make up our current understanding of populism, while most of these elements are intrinsically related.

Hostile to representative democracy (Taggart, 2000; 2004) / Anti-elite (Stanley, 2008). Mudde (2004, p. 543) defines populism as an “ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people”. Stanley (2008) describes the relationship between the people and the elite as antagonistic. Populism makes a clear distinction between the “good” people and the “bad” elite; “the pure” and “the corrupt”. The elite is argued to threaten the purity and unity of the sovereign people (Mudde, 2004; Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove, 2013).

Populism is rooted in feelings of anti-elitism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) and blames intermediary institutions for frustrating the will of the people being effectively transferred to government (Crick, 2005). Any form of populism is thus hostile towards representative politics. Populist parties argue that the political elite has lost the connection with the masses (Taggart, 2000; 2004). The complexity of compromises of modern politics is a result of the incompetence and lack of courage of the elite, whose only ambition is to stay in power (Vossen, 2010). Populism is portrayed as being deeply ambivalent in its attitude towards several types of institutions, since wisdom is argued to reside within the people (Crick, 2005).

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The people (Canovan, 1999) / The heartland (Taggart, 2004).

Populism stresses the supremacy of the will of the people and seeks to create a direct relationship between the people and the government (Shils, 1956). The people as a concept within populism however, remains quite vague. Populism tends to identify itself with a “heartland”, which can be considered an idealized concept of the people. Taggart (2004) uses the term heartland because this has a firmer grip on something that is felt, rather than reasoned, as the term heartland represents that part of the people that is under threat from the intrusions of politicians and bureaucrats. Populist parties claim to speak in the name of the oppressed people, seeking to emancipate them and make them aware of the oppression of their status within the system of political representation (Mudde, 2004).

Populism regards the people to be sovereign, homogeneous, pure and virtuous. While they are the silent majority, they represent the backbone of the good society (Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove, 2013). This core idea of popular sovereignty leads to a positive

valorization of “the people” and denigration of “the elite” (Stanley, 2008). Canovan (1999) argues that describing the people within the populist appeal is difficult, because populism uses different rhetorical aspects of the people that can be blended together. The populist mostly talks about the “common” or “normal” people as against the privileged and highly educated elite. Mudde (2004) stresses that populism is not a political movement that seeks to change the people themselves or their values and beliefs. The will of the people however, should be incorporated correctly.

Lack of core values (Taggart, 2000; 2004) / Thin ideology (Stanley, 2008).

Populism reacts against elites and institutions. As the nature of these varies, the nature of populism and its position varies according to what is necessary or effective. Taggart (2000; 2004) therefore argues that populism lacks core values, while Stanley (2008) describes

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between left and right on the political specter. In Latin America for example, populism is left-wing, inclusive and focused on economic issues promising modernity and prosperity, while European populism is mostly right-wing, exclusionary and focused on identity-based differences pledging protection (Heinisch, 2010; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). Taggart (2003) describes this as the emptiness of populism, since exactly this element gives populism both its strength, but also its weakness. Populism tends to be highly chameleonic and dependent on its political context. Therefore, it is not always clear what populism is, since this context also changes over time (Taggart, 2004).

Reaction to crisis (Taggart, 2004) / Populist mood (Canovan, 1999).

Populism is not ordinary routine politics, but can be seen as a reaction to a sense of crisis (Taggart, 2004). Populism tries to bring about a certain mood or a revolutionary movement powered by enthusiasm that draws the unpolitical people to the electoral arena. This emotional element turns election campaigns into a mission to save the country or bring great renewal (Canovan, 1999). Populism gets its impetus from the perception of crisis, which is often related to the idea that the political elite has lost the connection with the people. However, a sense of urgency and breakdown can also be related to several other issues such as immigration, economic difficulties or perceived injustice (Moffit & Tormey, 2014).

Populism as a style of politics

Moffitt & Tormey (2014) argue that we should consider populism to be a political style. They identify ideological, discursive and organizational conceptualizations of populism, but criticize these because they lead us to argue that some of the “usual suspects” do not fit these descriptions of populism. Many scholars for example refer to Wilders as a populist political leader in the Netherlands, while Vossen (2010) outlines several characteristics of

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populism and argues that Wilders does not fit all of these.

Jagers & Walgrave (2007, p. 322) conceptualize populism “As a political

communication style of political actors that refers to the people”. Populist parties implicitly refer to the people by talking about the “the voter” or “the taxpayer” and stress the

sovereignty of the people. A populist thus claims that he or she primarily wants to defend the people’s interest and continuously highlights not being a part of the alienated political elite. Jagers & Walgrave (2007) argue the implicit populist motto is simple but powerful: I listen to you, because I talk about you. This thin conceptualization of populism makes populism one of many tools available to politicians. As Jagers & Walgrave (2007) state:

“Populism, thinly defined, has no political color; it is colorless and can be of the left and of the right. It is a normal political style adopted by all kinds of politicians from all times. Populism is simply a strategy to mobilize support, it is a standard

communication technique to reach out to the constituency” (p. 323).

Next to comparing populisms of the left and right, we can thus also compare populist with non-populist political styles. Based on different contributions and inspired by Moffit & Tormey (2014) and Jagers & Walgrave (2007), I argue that the following elements together make up the populist style and characterize its political and rhetorical appeal.

Appeal to the people

The populist style is first of all an appeal to the people. The people are both the central audience and the subject of their message. In a more general sense, populism can thus be seen as a communication frame that appeals to and identifies with the people, while pretending to speak in their name (Canovan 1981; Taggart 2000; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Populists claim to speak for the people, meaning, they pretend to speak for the democratic sovereign. Their style is characterized by the idea that the democratic sovereigns are the normal people or

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“common”/”little” people (Heinisch, 2010). Consequently, their style is simple, direct and aimed to capitalize popular distrust of the established authorities. The analysis of the current societal problems and the proposed solutions are also simple and direct (Canovan, 1999).

To underscore the glorification of the people, populists deploy a folksy popular

rhetoric, adopting simple and direct language, filled with anecdotes from everyday life, honest emotions and references to popular wisdom. They stress the distance to the political elite and their loyalty to the people (Vossen, 2010). Populist parties often describe opportunistic policies, aimed to quickly “buy” the support of voters. Examples such as lowering taxations or other promising financial advantages are aimed to please voters instead of looking for the best option (Mudde, 2004).

Anti-elitism

The populist style is rooted in anti-elite feelings of the people (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Populists emphasize their own decisiveness and no nonsense solutions and criticize the political elite for being unable to come up with and implement solutions for the problems of the common folk (Canovan, 1999). The populist concept of the elite is quite vague and therefore allows for an interpretation which suggests a coalition of different kinds of cultural, political and media elites who are accused of privileging certain groups in society (Vossen, 2010). While many things in populism, such as the concept of the people, are a bit vague or unclear, populist make sure that there is no misunderstanding about what they are against. They do not oppose political parties per se, but rather the establishment (Mudde, 2004) and criticize others for their so-called smugness (Bos & Brants, 2014).

Reaction to crisis

Because populists often react to crisis, they favor short term and swift action over what they call the slow politics of negotiations and democratization. Politics therefore becomes highly instrumentalized. Whatever gets in the way of addressing pressing issues

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needs to be removed. Procedural rights associated with liberal democracy, or international agreements, are denounced as instrumental and may be violated in order to better express the will of the people (Hawkins, 2009). All kinds of problems will be solved as soon as the elite is removed from power and the government is blessed with the qualities of the pure and honest people, such as practical knowledge and the nerve to ignore international treaties,

constitutional restrictions or bureaucratic procedures (Vossen, 2010). During election campaigns, populists claim they will save the country and bring great renewal (Canovan, 1999). Populism thus appeals to feelings of resentment about current political affairs and tries to exploit these feelings politically (Van Kessel, 2014). The effect of the evocation of crisis and emergency is to simplify the terms and conditions of the political debate (Moffit & Tormey, 2014). Populism pretends to have the magic solution: “expel the foreigners” or “restore our national glory” (Crick, 2005).

Bad manners

The populist style is also characterized by bad manners and disregards appropriate ways of acting within the political realm (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). Canovan (1999, p. 5) compares this with a “tabloid style”. Populism claims transparency and distrusts the

mystification of political compromises and technicalities that only the bureaucrats understand. The solutions of the problems that ordinary people care about are portrayed as essentially simple which makes the complicated politics of coalition-building an easy target for a populist attack (Canovan, 1999). In their condemnation of elite political deals, they often deploy slang, swearing and other forms which can be considered to be politically incorrect. The populist style is often overly demonstrative and colorful, highly emotional, slogan based, and often accompanied by exaggerations and verbal radicalism as opposed to the educated “high” behavior and technocratic language of the political elite (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Bos & Brants, 2014).

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Moral dimension

The populist discourse assigns a moral dimension to everything. The most technical and complicated issues are presented as part of the never ending struggle between good and evil. Within this dualistic world view, “the good” has a particular identity: (the will of) the people (Hawkins, 2009). According to the populist, there are only friends and foes.

“Opponents are not just people with different priorities and values, they are evil!

Consequently, compromise is impossible, as it corrupts the purity” of the people (Mudde, 2004, p.544).

Within the struggle for the representation of the will of the people, populism thus tends to identify an enemy. A conspiring elite is often described in different forms (e.g. National government or EU institutions). The identification of an enemy also helps to identify and constitute the vague connotation of the people (Hawkins, 2009).

Thinking Fast and Slow

An important key assumption of this thesis lies in the idea that people think about politics in the same way they think about all other aspects in their life. Following Zaller (1992), many scholars in the field of political communication agree that citizens are generally quite inattentive to politics. As with several other decisions, they rely on cognitive shortcuts to make political decisions.

Daniel Kahneman (2011) argues that the human brain is divided into two systems: System 1 and System 2. System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control. It is an unconscious procedure and uses a mixture of heuristics and shortcuts to come to a judgment. The operations of System 2 are conscious cognitive procedures. System 2 works based on ratio: it thinks, calculates and makes a

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rational decision based on evidence. System 1 however thinks super-fast, but especially without our conscious awareness. It is our intuition that constantly makes instant decisions (Kahneman, 2011; Shleifer, 2012).

Another theory that considers two strategies of information processing is the Elaboration Likelihood Model as developed Petty & Cacioppo (1986). This model outlines two basic routes to persuasion. The central route is based on thoughtful consideration of arguments, like System 2, whereas the peripheral route, like System 1, is based on affective associations or inferences based on emotional cues. Individuals can thus process information systematically or heuristically. When information is processed systematically, individuals are argued to exert cognitive effort, trying to comprehend and evaluate the message. When processing information heuristically, individuals exert comparably little cognitive effort, and rely on different types of cues and peripheral characteristics of a message (Kahlor,

Dunwoody, Griffin, Neuwirth & Giese, 2003). Although they can switch back and forth, most of the time, we lean towards one of the two strategies depending on our capacity and

motivation to process information (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989).

According to Kahneman (2011) however, System 1 works automatically and System 2 is generally in a low effort mode. System 2 only becomes activated when we are confronted with problems that System 1 cannot answer or when an event violates the perceptions of reality System 1 maintains. System 1 determines the interpretation of reality and our

expectations for the future (Kahneman, 2011, p. 71). The ELM model however suggests that recipients of information who use the peripheral route have a lower ability or motivation to understand the persuasive message and therefore rely on simpler means of evaluations (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), such as the heuristics of System 1. Furthermore, research suggests that the need for cognition, which refers to an individual’s tendency to enjoy and engage in

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(Cacioppo, Petty & Feng Kao, 1984).

Kahneman argues that cognitive errors can only be prevented by effortful activity of System 2. However, constantly questioning our own thinking would be impossibly tedious, but moreover, System 2 is much too slow for making daily routine decisions and requires a lot more effort than System 1 (Kahneman, 2011). Often, we think that we are making decisions based on System 2, which is conscious and based on reasoning. In practice, System 1 processes play a much larger part in our decisions. “If System 1 is involved, the conclusions come first and the arguments follow” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 45).

Gardner (2009) describes the intuitive system in our brain (System 1/peripheral route) as Gut. System 2 or the central route is described as Head, because it makes rational

calculations and demands more effort. System 1 is the part in our brain that is responsible for several heuristics that people use to make decisions (Stoker et al., 2013, 6). Following

Kahneman (2011, p.97) I see a heuristics as “a simple procedure that helps find, though imperfect, answers to difficult questions”.

Within a political context, heuristics are defined as information shortcuts that allow voters to deal with an overload of information. People make political decisions using only specific elements of the information at hand. Also in the context of elections, heuristics are thus beneficial and maybe even necessary for the decision making process (Kuklinski & Quirk 2000). Most cognitive heuristics function in slightly different ways, but they have one important effect in common: they limit the cognitive information considered in political decision making (Rosema, 2004) and thus allow people to come to decisions based on fast thinking (Kahneman, 2011) or the peripheral route (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).

Heuristics in a political context

Regarding political decision making, the literature commonly assumes that people’s information processing ability is limited. People make judgments based on a limited amount

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of information and they rely on simple judgment rules and cognitive shortcuts (Rosema, 2004). To make sense of politics and decide how to vote, people use several electoral

heuristics (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001) and may decide at any time who they will support during the coming elections (Rosema, 2004). Since applying the concept of heuristics is quite new within the literature on populism, I will focus on two heuristics that have already been linked to the context of political decision making. These heuristics are the Affect Heuristic (e.g. Lodge & Taber, 2005) and Prospect Theory (e.g. Mercer, 2005). However, as suggested by Levy (2003), the heuristics of System 1 can only be applied to a decision making context when we can identify factors of risk and uncertainty. I will argue why the evaluation of

political messages meets these conditions and why these heuristics are especially connected to the populist style. Consequently, I argue that they lead to a different kind of information processing based on System 1 thinking.

People are generally quite inattentive to politics (Zaller, 1992) and a large percentage of the public is simply not competent to formulate their own opinion on public affairs

(Lippmann, 1925). Kinder even states state that “The depth of ignorance demonstrated by modern mass publics can be quite breathtaking” (1998, p. 785). Many decisions in a political context are thus decisions based on incomplete information and uncertainty.

In psychological research, scholars have demonstrated that different forms of political participation combined with partisan alignment can affect the physical wellbeing of humans based on increased feelings of anxiety and higher cortisol levels that indicate a stressful response (Stanton, Beehner, Saini, Kuhn, & Labar, 2009; Stanton, Labar, Saini, Kuhn, & Beehner, 2010). Many decisions in a political context therefore also imply stress and risk. Consequently, I argue that the heuristics of System 1 are of significant value to explain the evaluation of (populist) political messages.

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means the quality of “goodness” or “badness” we consciously or unconsciously experience. These affective responses occur rapid and automatically. To experience the affect heuristic, Slovic et al. ask the reader to sense the feelings you experience with words “treasure” or “hate”. When citizens in political decision making rely on such feelings, this can be characterized as the affect heuristic.

When we have to make complex decisions, we often base ourselves upon rudimentary views of reality. The affect heuristic is a very powerful mode in our minds and quickly helps us to assess whether something is good or bad. This heuristic is also known to work in situations where we have to make decisions based on social norms, such as support for a candidate for public office. In these types of situations, it is highly improbable that we will rationally evaluate all pros and cons, because we do not know them, or we are not prepared to search for the information (Wajzer & Staniucha, 2014). Lodge & Taber (2005) call this the “Hot Cognition” hypothesis and find support for the automaticity of affect towards political leaders, groups and issues.

Regarding rudimentary views of goodness or badness, research suggests that negativity generates stronger reactions and higher attentiveness among citizens (Soroka & McAdams 2015; Diagnaut, Soroka & Giasson, 2014). Furthermore, negative political

advertisements are better remembered (Bradley, Angelini & Sungkyoung, 2007) and humans have more attention for negative news based on an evolutionary desire to prevent negative consequences (Soroka & McAdams, 2015). I argue that the constant identification of what is good and what is evil resonates and makes an effective appeal to Gut, because our intuition persuades us to support the good and prevent the evil.

The populist style is characterized by a constant identification of “good” and “bad”. Everything populists discuss is related to a moral dimension (Mudde, 2004; Hawkins, 2009). The people are “good” and “pure”, while the elite is “corrupt” and “evil”. Following this

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dimension, the populist disregards every aspect that belongs to the political elite such as the appropriate ways of acting in the political realm, mystification of backroom deals and political compromises (Canovan, 1999). The constant and overarching focus of the populist style on the positive valorization of the people and denigration of the elite (Stanley, 2008) results in intuitive and Gut based evaluations of goodness and badness, which in turn effects our decisions for political support. The populists themselves are of course part of the

goodness within this cosmic struggle. Following Lodge & Taber (2005), this “Hot Cognition Hypothesis” results in automatic affect towards parties, politicians and issues.

Prospect Theory. The intuitive idea behind prospect theory is that people are more afraid of losing something, than we are happy with winning something. Consequently we take more risks to avoid losses than we will to ensure a comparable amount of gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Mercer (2005) describes the political consequences for this heuristic based on the example that politicians know that people feel differently about an ensured 90%

employment rate or a policy guarantying to provide a 10% unemployment rate. Framing policies as a loss places people in what Kahneman & Tversky (1979) call the domain of loss and framing something as a gain will put them in the domain of gains. However, when we are confronted with frames of losing we are prepared to take more risks to avoid this outcome than when the identical outcome has been framed as a gain (Levy, 2003). No one prefers to lose, and therefore we are all loss averse. Mercer (2005) argues that within a political context the fear of loss makes us do strange things. He suggests for example that the fear of loss and not the hope of gain causes most wars and describes several studies that show how actors in a domain of loss are more willing to cooperate to avoid further losses.

I have characterized the populist style by its reaction to crisis combined with the expression of a sense of political urgency (Hawkins, 2009). The populists clearly identify a risk, claim that they will save the country from imminent threat (Canovan, 1999) and appeal

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to feelings of resentment about the current state of political affairs (Van Kessel). Populists thus identify both risks and some concrete and magical solutions (Crick, 2005) to avoid these losses. In a political context, prospect theory explains that we are willing to go to extreme solutions to prevent losses (Mercer, 2005). Just as with the Affect heuristic, the same mechanism applies to Prospect theory. People have an intuitive desire to prevent negative consequences, which results in intuitive decisions to prevent losses (Soroka & McAdams, 2015). When people are confronted with risks, we place the highest value in trying to avoid losses (Mercer, 2005).

Hypotheses and expectations

I have argued that the populist style makes a more effective appeal to Gut. Therefore, the populist message encourages people to make decisions based on fast thinking. The non-populist message makes an appeal to Head, because this message activates System 2 to determine the rationale behind questions and arguments. The following sections of this thesis present the results of an experiment that contains three populist conditions and one neutral condition. The three populist conditions are based on messages in a populist style, a populist style with a focus on affect, and a populist style with a focus on prospect. Based on our theoretical explorations, I have formulated the following hypotheses:

1. For the three populist messages I hypothesize to find that participants engage in more heuristic processing and less systematic processing compared to the neutral condition. 2. Furthermore, I hypothesize to find that participants are more easily persuaded and

show higher support for the source of the message (the politician) and higher support for the content of the message in the three populist conditions compared to the neutral condition.

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3. Additionally, I hypothesize to find more self-reported emotional arousal in the three populist conditions, especially in the affect condition.

4. Finally, I hypothesize that the need for cognition moderates the effect of the populist messages on heuristic and systematic processing, such that:

4a. for those with a low need for cognition, the populist message has a stronger impact on heuristic processing, and

4b for those with a low need for cognition, the populist message has a weaker impact on systematic processing.

Context of the experiment: populism in the Netherlands

The Netherlands has been argued to be an ideal laboratory for the analysis of populist parties because of the varying levels of success for Dutch populist parties in recent years (Van Kessel, 2011), both on the left and right side of the political specter. The Dutch socialist party (SP) is a good example of a hard case populist party on the socio-economic left. On the right side of the political specter we find Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom (PVV).

Observers identify two contemporary characteristics of the Dutch populist style. They see an increasing tendency among politicians to seek the electorate’s consent by making appeals to everyday live and hardworking, law abiding citizens. Second, observers point out that Dutch populists increasingly engage in “promises of salvation from evil and supposed dangers” (Houtman, Achterberg & Kemmers, 2015, p.3).

Method section

Few studies in cognitive heuristics, within a political context or any other, have developed methods to directly measure the use of a hypothesized heuristic. Most studies

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manipulate the availability of the heuristic in their stimulus material and the heuristic is argued to be the cause of differences in several dependent variables (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). The experiment in this thesis will follow a comparable strategy.

The experiment was conducted in the form of an online survey. An important advantage of internet survey experiments concerns the minimization of social desirability biases. Although participants still remain conscious of the social desirability of answers to politically charged questions, an internet survey experiment eliminates inter-personal interactions of focus groups or face-to face/telephone interviews. While other sources of social desirability remain (Borges & Clarke, 2008), in the context of the evaluation of

populists political messages, internet survey experiments can be argued to be an effective way to minimize these effects.

Procedure

The experiment was conducted online using Qualtrics. The experiment started with a small survey2 to gather information about the individual participants such as age, gender, interest in politics and the need for cognition. Second, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions (Neutral n= 51, Populist n= 62, Affect n= 48,

Prospect n= 54, Total n= 215). After reading the stimulus material, participants answered a series of questions about the message. First, participants had time to make comments on the statements they had just read. Participants were asked to imagine they had to explain the message to a friend. These reactions were coded with a short codebook (see appendix A for full procedure) focusing on whether participants agreed with the content of the message, whether they were positive or negative about the source (politician) of the message and if they recognized a populist style of politics. Second, they were confronted with questions that tap into the extent to which they felt several emotions after reading the statement such as anger or

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enthusiasm and the extent to which they agree with the message. Finally, participants answered questions which served to measure several other dependent variables. Participants

A total of 215 participants were recruited from the personal network of the researcher3. No significant differences were found regarding the distribution of gender over the four experimental conditions ( X2 (3, N = 215) = 1,106, p = .776). Except for age, variances for all other randomization variables between the groups were homogenously distributed according to Levene’s test (all groups, p>.05). No significant differences existed between the

experimental conditions regarding Age [F(3,211= .682, p=.564), Interest in politics [ F(3, 211= ,2,379 p=.071] and left or right political attitudes based on self-reports [ F(3, 211= ,.982 p=.402]. Table 1 (all tables can be found in Appendix D) shows the number and

characteristics of the participants in every condition with means and standard deviations.

Table 1 about here

Experimental conditions

The experiment consists of four conditions. In these conditions, participants are confronted with a political message in the form of a parliamentary question. In the

Netherlands, parliamentary representatives have the option to ask questions to any minister every Tuesday. The form of parliamentary questions allows me to introduce a populist message as if it were the original words of a politician without interference by journalists. Furthermore, parliamentary questions are often posted on Dutch party websites and covered in national media. They represent a credible and important outlet of political messages (Van Aelst & Vliegenthart, 2014).

I have chosen the topic of health care for the stimulus material, since health care is a

3

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topic that populist parties on both the left and the right could approach quite similarly. The stimulus material contains questions from a fictive politician (Van der Pol, typical Dutch surname) regarding the fusion of two large health insurance companies and asks why the chairman of one of these companies received a large severance payment for seven weeks of labor. The first condition covers a neutral parliamentary question about this topic. The second condition covers the same type of question, but also has a clear element of an appeal to the people and anti-elitism, which we have conceptualized as two important aspects of populism. The third condition appeals to differences between the people and the elite combined with an appeal to the affect heuristic. The fourth condition appeals to differences between the people and the elite combined with an appeal to prospect theory. The differences between these conditions are the bases for the explanation of variance in several dependent variables (see Appendix B for stimulus material).

Dependent variables

All scales in the survey were seven point Likert scales ranging from disagree to agree. To assess whether participants were engaged in Fast or Slow thinking about the stimulus material, I used several questions that provide data about heuristic and systematic information processing. These questions are based on the model initially presented by Chaiken, Liberman & Eagly (1989). Kahlor et al (2003) deploy several questions based on self-reports to

determine whether participants have been engaged in heuristic or systematic processing of information. Examples of these questions are: I found myself making connections between the story and what I’ve read or heard about elsewhere (Systematic processing) or I didn’t spend much time thinking about the story after I read it (Heuristic processing). Measures of heuristic processing were harder to formulate. This resulted in six items with good reliability

measuring a systematic index and three items composing the heuristic index, with lower reliability. Kahlor et al. (2003) argue that these factors correlate with patterns of heuristic and

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systematic information processing in larger data sets. In the dataset for this thesis, two of the three questions were ultimately used to compute a mean scale for dependent variable

Heuristic Processing (α =.731, M=4.48, SD=1.40). Including the third question would have resulted in a reliability score of α =.547. The six items that tap into Systematic Processing were used to create a mean scale based on reliability score α =.854. Despite the fact that deleting the third question would have resulted in a minimal increase of reliability (α =.863), I chose to compute all six questions into variable Systematic Processing (M=3.85, SD=1.14).

As another indicator of cognitive effort, I measure the time participants took to process the message. I computed both the amount of seconds that participants used to read the

messages and the amount of seconds that participants took to describe their cognitive response (M=153.06, SD=75.91). All participants that took more than five minutes or less than ten seconds for either of the two questions were reported as missing, assuming they took a break from completing the survey. A final indicator of cognitive effort is based on the results of the coding analysis of the cognitive responses and the degree of elaboration of these responses on a scale from zero (low elaboration) to three (high elaboration) (M=2.13, SD=.93) (see

Appendix A for criteria degree of elaboration).

To assess whether participants were engaged in intuitive decision making I analyze three different dependent variables, namely the heuristic and systematic self-reports, the amount of time that participants have used to read the material and answer the questions and finally the degree of elaboration in the cognitive responses. Together this should give us a good impression of the extent to which participants have deployed fast or slow thinking about politics in the different experimental conditions.

Other dependent variables in the experiment covered attitudes towards the politician that asked the parliamentary question (e.g. I think Mister van der Pol asks an important question) and the extent to which participants agreed with the content of the question (e.g. I

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think these kinds of severance payments are ridiculous and unfair). Based on the five

questions dependent variable Attitude towards Van der Pol was computed into a mean scale (α =.845, M=3.3814, SD=1.5660). Six questions were used to compute the variable Content Attitude into a mean scale ( α =.942, M=4.6641, SD=1.49541).

Finally, I also asked participants to what extent they experienced several emotions on a seven point Likert-scale, directly after reading the stimulus material. These resulted in dependent variables: Anger (M= 3.67, SD=1.86), Anxiety (M= 3.21, SD=1.34), Dreary (M= 3.38, SD=1.75), Hope (M= 2.23, SD=1.36), Enthusiasm (M=2.15, SD=1.35), Compassion (M= 2.5, SD=1.56) and Satisfaction (M= 2.16, SD=1.28)

Moderator: The Need for Cognition

I also measure the need for cognition, since this is argued to be predictive for the manner in which people process information (Cacioppo, Petty & Feng Kao, 1984). I use a short version to assess the need for cognition based on five items (e.g. I do not like to think hard about a problem or I prefer to solve simple over complicated problems) from Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj & Heier (1996). The need for cognition was recoded and computed into a mean scale ranging from low (1) to high (7) need for cognition (α =.869, M=5.67, SD=1.12). Participants were divided over three cognition groups: neutral/low cognition (score 1-4.99: 27.9%,), medium/high cognition (score 5-5.99, 33.5%) and high cognition (score 6/1-7: 38,6%).

Manipulation checks

To check whether manipulation within the experimental conditions was successful, I included several questions to check whether participants recognized the manipulated

differences in the messages (e.g. In the message, Van der Pol makes a clear distinction

between the people and the elite). Table 2A and 2B contain the means and standard deviations of the manipulation check questions and results of analyses of variance. Different subscripts

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indicate significant differences at the p<.05 level based on Tukey post-hoc tests. For all manipulation check questions, variances between the groups were homogenously distributed according to the Levene’s test (all groups, p>.05).

Tables 2A and 2B about here

The populist condition was based on the inclusio n of differences between the people and the elite. However, no significant differences existed in the extent to which participants recognized this contradiction in the stimulus material of the experimental conditions. The prospect condition was based on the identification of clear risks and dangers for the Dutch population. However, no significant differences existed in the extent to which participants recognized the identification of risks in the experimental conditions. The affect condition was based on a clear difference between “good” and “evil” in the message. Significantly more people reported that they had recognized these differences in the affect condition compared to those in the neutral condition and those in the prospect condition.

Differences existed in the extent to which participants identified that the politician used exaggerations in his message. Participants identified more exaggeration in the affect condition than those in the neutral condition. Also, in the prospect condition, participants identified slightly more exaggeration, though not significantly. Participants did not report different amounts of anxiety as expressed by the politician in his message. However,

participants in the prospect condition slightly reported more anxiety than those in the neutral condition, but not significantly. Differences also existed in the extent to which participants reported that the politician expressed anger in his message. Participants identified more anger in the affect condition and in the prospect condition than those in the neutral condition.

Manipulation of the affect condition was therefore successful. Manipulation of the prospect condition was slightly successful, because participants did identify more anger in the

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text, and slightly more exaggeration and anxiety. Manipulation of the populist condition was less successful.

Results

To see whether the participants processed the stimulus material in different ways over the experimental conditions, I compared the means of the dependent variables in an analysis of variance. Table 3 contains all means and standard deviations of several dependent variables regarding information processing and the results of analysis of variance over the four

experimental conditions.

Table 3 about here

For heuristic and systematic processing, variance was homogenously distributed according to the Levene’s test (p>.05). No significant differences existed among the four conditions between the average of self-reported systematic processing or self-reported heuristic processing over the experimental conditions.

To further explore the extent to which participant exert cognitive effort, I compared the amount of time participants needed to both read the text and describe their cognitive response. Table 3 also contains the means and standard deviations of response time and degree of elaboration and the results of analysis of variance over the four experimental conditions. According to the Levene’s test, variance was homogenously distributed for response time and degree of elaboration (p>.05). No significant differences existed between the necessary amount of time to complete these 2 parts of the survey over the experimental conditions and no significant differences existed in an analysis of variance among the four conditions between the degree of elaboration of the cognitive responses.

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Table 4 contains all means and standard deviations of the dependent variables Attitude towards Van der Pol and Content Attitude and the results of analysis of variance over the experimental conditions. Variance was homogenously distributed for both variables according to the Levene’s test (both variables, p>.05). No significant differences existed in an analysis of variance among the experimental conditions between Attitude towards Van der Pol and Content Attitude.

Table 4 about here

Table 5A and 5B contain all means and standard deviations of several self-reported emotions and the results of analysis of variance over the four experimental conditions. Except for Satisfaction (p=.006), variances between the groups for all other emotions were

homogenously distributed according to Levene’s test (all variables, p>.05). No significant differences existed among the four conditions between the extent to which participants experienced self-reported anger, anxiety, dreary, hope, compassion, enthusiasm or satisfaction.

Tables 5A and 5B about here

The cognitive responses were coded based on a short codebook. Table 6A and 6B contain the results of this exploratory content analysis based on means, standard deviation and the results of analysis of variance over the experimental conditions (for coding procedure, see appendix A).

Tables 6A and 6B about here

No significant differences existed in most of the codebook items, however, negative reactions towards Van der Pol and the amount of participants that recognized a populist political message did provide interesting and almost significant results.

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Participants in the affect condition reported (however not significantly) more negative reactions towards Van der Pol as a Politician than participants in the neutral condition. The codebook also covered a variable that assed whether participants claimed they recognized a populist or suggestive style of political communication. In the neutral condition, three participants recognized a populist message. In the populist condition ten participants, in the affect condition eight participants and in the prospect condition three participants recognized a populist political message.

Table 7A and 7B contain the results of an interaction analysis of experimental condition and the Need for Cognition on Heuristic and Systematic processing. In the neutral, populist and prospect conditions, low need for cognition led to higher heuristic processing scores. For the affect condition, the Need for Cognition had no effect on heuristic processing. No significant differences existed between the need for cognition groups in all experimental conditions on systematic processing scores.

There was no significant moderation of the Need for Cognition on Systematic processing or Heuristic processing within the different experimental conditions. For those with a low, medium or high need for cognition, the populist messages did not result in more heuristic or less systematic processing than the neutral message.

Tables 7A and 7B about here

Furthermore, at the end of the survey I asked participants to think about the political message they had read and name the political parties that were mentioned in the message. However, all stimulus material contained no mentioning of any political party. In all four conditions, participants claimed to have read a message about both populist and non-populist parties. Multiple answers were possible. Table 8A and 8B contain the means and standard deviations of the mentioned parties and the results of analysis of variance.

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Tables 8A and 8B about here

More participants in the prospect condition recognized PvdA, a non-populist party on the left side of the political specter, compared to those in the affect condition. Table 8 shows that there were no clear differences between the populist and non-populist conditions and the extent to which participants reported they had read a message about populist (SP & PVV) or non-populist parties (VVD, PvdA & CDA). VVD was mentioned often in all conditions, which is not strange because the current health care minister is a member of VVD. Only 28% of the respondents gave the correct answer and claimed they did not read a message about a political party. Furthermore, political parties on the left side of the political specter (SP & PvdA) were mentioned most often, which might suggest that the issue or topic is “owned” by these parties.

Discussion

This thesis has argued that a populist style of political communication makes a more affective appeal to our intuition. To analyze this claim, I have conceptualized several characteristics of a populist style and argued that this style can be adopted by any political party. In the

experiment, participants associated populist messages with both populist and non-populist parties, while there was no reference to a political party at all. This suggests that some elements of a populist style can be, and thus in the eyes of the public are adopted, by any political party. However, the public and academia seem to have different ideas of a populist style and which parties in the Netherlands use it.

Furthermore, I have argued that the populist style makes a more effective appeal to System 1 reasoning due to an appeal to several heuristics. Stoker et al. (2013) identify several developments in contemporary politics that have facilitated more fast thinking responses to

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politics such as the influences of political marketing and the mediatization of politics.

However, this experiment has not provided sufficient grounds to claim that a populist style of politics also induces more fast thinking. Statistical analysis of variance resulted in no

significant differences in all dependent variables between the experimental conditions. All expectations and hypotheses were disconfirmed.

Leaving statistics aside in this experiment with a relatively small N, a quick glimpse at the means as portrayed in several tables in appendix D tells us that differences between all dependent variables are minimal and cannot be attributed to the experimental conditions. This thesis therefore finds no empirical evidence for the claim that populism is directed at Gut feelings of the public (e.g. Mudde, 2004), since I have found no significant differences in information processing of a populist or non-populist message. Further analysis did provide sufficient evidence for an effect of the need for cognition on heuristic processing. Those who do not enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors have a tendency to process information

heuristically. However, for those with a low, medium or high need for cognition, the populist messages did not result in more heuristic or less systematic processing than the neutral message. This might be explained by the fact that the amount of respondent in the interaction cells were very small due to a relatively small set of total respondents.

One of the reasons for the absence of differences between the experimental conditions could be attributed to the failure of manipulation. Participants for example recognized

differences between the elite and the people and several clear risks in all four conditions. This suggests that the chosen topic for the stimulus material in itself was sufficient to evaluate the presented information along these lines. In this case, it seems like the chosen issue for the stimulus material made it difficult to create a neutral or control condition. The type of research design that manipulates messages into a populist or non-populist style can thus be a complicated endeavor since the content of messages can be intrinsically related to the extent

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to which participants identify the populist elements of communication I have conceptualized in the theoretical contribution. Manipulation of the affect condition was however successful, but especially the populist condition and to some extent the prospect condition were less successful.

A number of critical voices have been raised against theories that describe processes in the human brain as dual. Scholars have argued that the process of reasoning is based on a single process (e.g. Osman, 2004) and others have identified more than two systems in our brain (e.g. Moshman, 2000). Stoker et al. (2013) argue that critiques about the boldness of the conceptual differences between the two systems have gained the most traction. Bold

conceptual differences between Gut and Head are an essential element of the theoretical contribution of this thesis, while this differentiation might thus not be applicable to processing (populist) political messages. However, we have to consider that the participants in the

experiment were generally high educated, sophisticated concerning politics and have a quite high need for cognition due to the fact that the sample was recruited from a student’s personal network. Further research on a larger scale, especially within a sample that is representative of the Dutch society might result in different conclusions.

Intuition or existing discontent?

Several recent and preliminary contributions have provided interesting approaches to further explore the intuitive impact of populism. Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove (2013) for example find that those who score high on populist attitude scales are more likely to support populist parties. Spruyt (2015) argues that people who feel vulnerable or uncertain (e.g. economically or culturally) are more attracted by a populist discourse. Furthermore, the less educated are particularly attracted by populist messages (Bos, Van der Brug & De Vreese, 2013) and those who hold more radical opinions on the classical left/right dimension are also more susceptible to the populist message (Rooduijn ,Van der Brug & De Lange, 2015).

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However, the question remains whether those with more populist attitudes, those who feel vulnerable or those with lower educational status are also more likely to engage in System 1 reasoning in response to populism.

Appropriateness of the populist style?

The qualitative analysis of the cognitive response questions contains several

interesting additional findings. Participants were for example asked to imagine they had to explain the question they had just read to a friend. This question was therefore relatively open to the participant’s mood to answer. Several participants, especially in the populist and affect condition reported on their own initiative that they had just read populist political messages:

Respondent: A populist tries to put forward a public matter concerning salary in the health

care branch which he can easily use to score with the electorate. Respondent: Van der Pol asks somewhat in a populist way (hoping to get covered in the media)... Respondent: Clear example of symbolic politics. Respondent: Populist and opportunist.

These reactions first of all serve as further evidence for a relatively successful populist manipulation. Furthermore, some participants combined the identification of a populist

political message with an additional comment which suggests that they do not feel

comfortable with this kind of political communication. The results of the codebook indicated that especially in the affect conditions, participants were negative about politician Van der Pol:

Respondent: This politician chooses to formulate his questions in the most populist style as possible to generate emotional reactions from the public. Especially the connection he makes between salary and health that is being “taken away” from average citizens is very clever.

Respondent: Populist questions used to profile the politician’s character and maybe even an

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achieve any result. Respondent: I think that these questions especially serve to confirm the populist profile of this politician and I do not believe that he asks about these severance payments to actually propose policy improvements.

However, others also commented that, despite the fact that the questions were

formulated in a “populist” way, they did reflect on their personal opinion, or they did to some extent agree with the chosen style of communication:

Respondent: Driven by emotions and emotionally formulated. However, it does give an

appropriate description of sentiments that exist especially in leftist political circles regarding salary of managers. Respondent: I am glad that politicians do ask these kinds of critical questions, because these kinds of severance payments are ridiculous. Respondent: My first thought is that the politician who’s asking these questions is using rather suggestive words. The questions are formulated steering towards his own conclusion. However, regarding the content of his questions, I do agree with the fact that these kinds of severance payments are way too high.

Other reactions in the cognitive response sections could almost be characterized as populist political messages themselves:

Respondent: After a fusion between the two biggest health insurance companies, one of the

board members, who’s services apparently were not necessary anymore, received a severance payment of 170.000,00 for ONLY SEVEN weeks of labor. A politician in the second chamber has asked questions to the health care minister about this during the “question hour”. It should not be possible that due to these kinds of tips the quality of Dutch healthcare is endangered. WHILE WE HAVE TO WORK IN HEALTH CARE FOR ONLY 10 EUROS PER HOUR.!! These guys should join us for an afternoon of working in a our district. Through rain and wind, sweating my ass off while helping one client taking a shower, and then

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immediately on my bike towards my next client. Yes, on my bike, because I can’t park my car anywhere. And I can go on complaining for a few hours if you like. Respondent: Ridiculous that these board members receive money to bugger off! This should be illegal! Respondent: This is no democracy. Apparently, corruption is still possible in the Netherlands.

Some people therefore discard a populist communication style and evaluate it as unpleasant or unnecessary, but others do see this as an appropriate way of political

communication. A populist communication style might also be the way in which they would have formulated the question or message themselves. Does that make populism a more comprehensible and honest style of political communication for some, and an inappropriate style for others? Those who do accept populism (consciously or unconsciously) as an appropriate style of political communication might be tempted to use System 1 reasoning, since the message complies with the individuals interpretation of reality (Kahneman, 2011). The populist message might therefore be an effective appeal to Gut for some, but an effective appeal to Head for others.

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References

Akkerman, A., Mudde, C., & Zaslove, A. (2013). How populist are the people? Measuring populist attitudes in voters. Comparative Political Studies, 47(9), 1324 –1353. Bos, L., & Brants, K. (2014). Populist rhetoric in politics and media: A longitudinal study of

the Netherlands. European Journal of Communication, 29(6), 703-719.

Bos, L., Van der Brug, W., & De Vreese, C. (2013). An experimental test of the impact of style and rhetoric on the perception of right-wing populist and mainstream party leaders. Acta Politica, 48(2), 192-208.

Borges, W., & Clarke, H.D. (2008). Cues in context: analyzing the heuristics of referendum voting with an internet survey experiment. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 18(4), 433-448.

Bradley, S.D., Angelini, J.R., & Sungkyoung, L. (2007). Psychophysiological and memory effects of negative political ads: aversive, arousing, and well remembered. Journal of Advertising, 36(4), 115–127.

Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Feng Kao, C. (1984). The efficient assessment of need for cognitions. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(3), 306-307.

Canovan, M. (1981). Populism. New York: Harcourt Brace.

Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. Political Studies, 47(1), 2–16.

Chaiken, S., Liberman, A., & Eagly, A. (1989). Heuristic and systematic processing within and beyond the persuasion context. In J. S. Veleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 212–252). New York: Guilford.

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Diagnaut, P., Soroka, S.N., & Giasson, T. (2014). The perception of political advertising during an election campaign: A measure of cognitive and emotional effects. Canadian Journal of Communication, 38(1), 167- 186.

Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking styles. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(2), 390 – 405.

Gardner, D. (2009). The science of fear. London: Penguin Group

Hawkins, K. A. (2009). Is Chávez populist? Measuring populist discourse in comparative perspective. Comparative Political Studies, 42(8), 1040-1067.

Heinisch, R. (2003). Success in opposition – failure in government: explaining the

performance of right-wing populist parties in public office. West European Politics, 26(3), 91-130.

Houtman, D., Achterberg, P., & Kemmers, R. (2015, April 30 – May 2). Populist political communication in the Netherlands: An experimental-survey approach. Paper prepared for presentation at the Team Populism May 2015 conference: “Solving the Puzzles of Populism”, London.

Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: an empirical study of political parties discourse in Belgium. European Journal of Political Research, 46(3), 319-345.

Kahlor, L., Dunwoody, S., Griffin, R.J., Neuwirth, K., & Giese, J. (2003). Studying heuristic-systematic processing of risk communication. Risk Analysis, 23(2), 355-368.

Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. London: Penguin.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–91.

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