A Bottom-up approach to Human
Security?
A study on the implications of civil society
engagement in countering radicalization in
Amsterdam
Master thesis MSc Conflict Resolution and Governance
Student name: Inès Aouaj
Student number: 5645875
Course: Research Project in CRG
First reader: Dr. Anja van Heelsum
Second reader: Dr. Floris Vermeulen
Friday, 26 June 2016
MSc in Conflict Resolution and Governance
The University of Amsterdam
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I wish to thank Dr. Anja van Heelsum for her expert advice, patience, and
encouragement throughout this semester. Her valuable and constructive suggestions
during the planning and development of this research work were very appreciated. I
also wish to acknowledge the help provided by Dr. David Laws in this process. I also
would like to offer my special thanks to Habib El Kaddouri, Project manager
‘Radicalization’ at the Samenwerkingsverband Marokkaanse Nederlanders for
providing me with the information and the contacts needed to conduct my fieldwork.
Furthermore, I wish to thank the Management of the Municipality of Amsterdam and
various people for their contribution and time to this project: Mr. Roemer van Oordt,
Mr. Taoufik Benyahia, Ms. Fatima-Zohra Hadjar, Ms. Naziha Senoussi, Mr. Abdou
Menebhi, Mr. Abdou El Khattabi, Mr. Mohamed Assalihi, Mr. Mohamed Mouman,
the Nasr Mosque, the Badr Mosque, and all other respondents who wanted to remain
anonymous. Finally, I would like to thank my friends and my family for their support
during the research.
Table of Contents
Abstract
4
Chapter 1. Introduction
5
1.1. Background
5
1.2. Radicalism
7
1.3. Radicalization in the Netherlands
8
1.4. De-radicalization in the city of Amsterdam
10
Chapter 2. Defining ‘Civil Society’ and ‘Human Security’
12
2.1. Civil Society: definition, debate, and functions
12
2.1.1. Introduction
12
2.1.2. Debate on Civil Society in IR
13
2.1.3. CSOs: entities, types, and functions
16
2.1.3.1. Types of CSOs
16
2.1.3.2. CSO functions
17
2.2. Human Security
19
2.2.1. Background
19
2.2.2. Defining Human Security
20
2.2.3. Security in IR
21
2.2.3.1. Need for Alternative approach to security? 21
2.2.3.2. The scope of the definition
22
2.2.4. Civil society as security provider?
24
2.3. Problem Definition
25
2.3.1 Introduction
25
2.3.2. The Main Question
26
2.3.3. Core Concepts and Sub Topics
26
Chapter 3. Research Methods
28
3.1. Research Design
28
3.3. Collecting Data
29
3.4. Selection of Interviewees
30
3.5. The Respondents
30
3.5.1. Religious CSOs
30
3.5.2. Community-Building CSOs
31
3.5.3. Non-CSOs
32
3.6. Ethics Statement
32
Chapter 4. Roles and Functions of Moroccan Civil Society
34
4.1. Introduction
34
4.2. Moroccan CSO-functions
34
4.2.1. Respresentation
34
4.2.2. Social roles
35
4.2.3. Education/ information provision
36
4.2.4. A place for debate
38
4.3. Breeding grounds for radicalization
40
4.3.1. Discrimination
40
4.3.2. Socioeconomic factors
41
4.3.3. Identity
42
4.4. Summary
44
Chapter 5. Moroccan Civil Society as Security Actor
46
5.1. Introduction
46
5.2. The local government
46
5.3. Moroccan CSOs
48
5.4. The Dutch-Moroccan Communities
51
5.5. Dutch-Moroccan parents
52
5.6. Summary
54
Chapter 6. Conclusion
55
Bibliography
58
Abstract
This study is set out to explore the possibility for a bottom-up approach to
human security. By studying the case of the Dutch-Moroccan civil
society in Amsterdam and its role in countering radicalization, it is aimed
to provide an answer to the question on whether there is a possibility of a
bottom-up approach in counter-radicalization, as part of human security,
and how it is feasible to strengthen the role of civil society in this field.
Centered on locally conducted fieldwork in different boroughs of
Amsterdam, this research uses the concepts of ‘civil society’ and ‘human
security’ to analyze the role of local Dutch-Moroccan individuals and
civil society organizations in preventing radicalization among
Dutch-Moroccan youngsters. A major finding in this case is that there is indeed
a possibility for a bottom-up approach to security, and that this is already
taking place on a wide scale.
Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1. BackgroundOn 8 September 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted the ‘United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy’, with the aim to ‘enhance’ efforts to counter terrorism, both on the national, regional and international level.1 In its implementation, however, the Global
Strategy still lacks a few fundamental issues, since the only actors involved are UN entities and important international organizations (who cooperate with member states). Civil society, in the form of non-governmental organizations, is in fact excluded, while it sometimes has fundamental knowledge about particular situations, which could make a positive contribution to the implementation of the Global Strategy (Van Ginkel, 2012: 1). A few years ago, the UN Security Council (SC) started to make reference to civil society organizations (CSOs) in several resolutions and to engage some of them in the SC’s Counterterrorism Executive Directorate (Ibid.: 2). This change of attitude has to do with a shift in the conventional security discourse. Traditionally, security is considered to be a state-centered notion, which puts the emphasis on the “territorial integrity of the state and the role of military force”.2 Nowadays, this definition falls short in several ways as several
other dimensions of ‘security’ are covered by the definition, which is at present used. Baylis (2008) explains that ‘the meaning of security has been broadened to include
political, economic, societal, environmental, and military aspects’ (Baylis, 2008: 230), but also mentions that the national security approach (which is a top-down approach) traps “civilians and civil society in the middle of violent conflict between states and terrorist groups.” The national security approach often results in lack of respect to the security situation of civilians and human rights being violated, which could eventually lead to counterproductive results, such as further radicalization (Wall, 2012: 2). As such, the UN has advised its member states to move towards a more human-centered approach to security. It believes that counterterrorism actions would be more effective “if based on notions of human security, with a focus on root causes and context specificity”.3
Although some UN-member states formally recognize this new role for CSOs, most states still focus on state-security and thus exclude CSOs from their strategies (Ibid.: 1). One of
1 United Nations, 2006. ‘United Nations General Assembly Adopts Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy’ [online]. Available at: < http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml> [Accessed 20 February 2016].
2 Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, the Civil Society Network for Human
Security, IKV Pax Christi, 2013. ‘The Human Security Approach in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding’[pdf]. Available at:
<https://www.peaceportal.org/documents/130226273/130473583/GPPAC+Position+Paper+on+Human +Security+April2013/25d000da-597e-4c78-ae4e-fbdee183a56e > [Accessed 20 February 2016].
the most often cited reasons for this attitude has to do with the lack of trust in civil society organizations. Van Ginkel(2012) explains that ‘[t]he common concern with regard to civil society organisations and apparently a prerequisite for any form of cooperation, has been whether it can be absolutely certain that they do not maintain any contacts with individuals or organisations that have been labeled as terrorist’ (Van Ginkel, 2012: 8). Many scholars, including Van Ginkel, state that this belief is groundless as several examples from the past have shown that CSOs have in fact played an important role in counterinsurgency. They believe that these CSOs can play a ‘crucial role in preventing and countering violent extremism in numerous ways – by working on development programs, through their work in conflict transformation, in providing a platform to raise political grievances and to facilitate dialogue, or through their work in empowering victims and survivors of terrorism’ (Ibid.: 7).
In this study I want to look at this ‘crucial role’ by looking at how CSOs prevent and counter radicalization and how the role of the governments in this domain is limited. For the purpose of this paper, I will narrow the topic down into a case study on Moroccan CSOs Amsterdam. The Netherlands is an interesting case to look at, because since 2004, the Dutch government has put much effort in countering extremism. Amsterdam is an interesting city to look at, because it is one of the few municipalities in the Netherlands that have been playing an active role in countering radicalization since 2004 (Van Heelsum, 2010: 16).
The choice for a case study of Moroccan CSOs Amsterdam has been made, because
according to studies of the Dutch Ministry of Home Affairs and the Algemene Inlichtingen-
en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD)- the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service- young
Dutch men of Moroccan origins are one of the biggest groups that are attracted to jihadism or other extremist activities in the Netherlands (AIVD, 2002: 39). Furthermore, it is believed that they are one of the groups that have become more extremist over the years. Hence, radicalization-experts and the Dutch government have often made the call to Moroccan parents and Moroccan mosques to play a more active role in countering extremism, because Moroccan parents are often accused of keeping aloof from cases of radicalization, and many mosques are still believed to be passive actors when it comes to intervention.4
The purpose of this study is multifold. I am studying Moroccan CSOs as a case-study, because I want to find out how CSOs prevent and counter radicalization, in order to understand how to limit the role of governments in this domain. The significance of such a
4 Wijbenga, I., 2015. Laat de imams opstaan tegen radicalisering [online]. 17 January 2015. Available
at BN DeStem: < http://www.bndestem.nl/algemeen/binnenland/laat-de-imams-opstaan-tegen-radicalisering-1.4718452 > [Accessed 25 February 2016].
study is that it will give a unique perspective to the matter. So far, most studies have focused on top-down approaches to counter-radicalization, especially when it comes to regional settings. The purpose of this study is to turn this upside down and to look at the role of CSOs in countering radicalization and thus to study bottom-up approaches to human security, in which CSOs will be studied as active actors, instead of passive objects.
Although there have been scholars in the social sciences who have written about the role of imams and mosques in countering extremism, the bottom-up approach of this study of radicalization in Amsterdam will makes it unique in character. The objective of my research is not to look at why Dutch-Moroccan young men are more attracted to
radicalization than others, nor am I interested in the question if the anti-insurgency policies of the past few years have been effective enough to prevent extremism. Instead, I am interested in the question how the Moroccan community in Amsterdam could do more to counter radicalization: what could parents do to prevent their children from getting extremist ideas, and what could mosques do when they signal suspicious behavior of (potential) radicalization? Through the study of Moroccan CSOs in Amsterdam, I hope to get an insight into questions as these.
In order to answer the question that is at the center of this study, it is important to split my article into subtopics and sub-questions that will cover most elements needed to answer my main question. Throughout the entire paper, the research will focus on two core concepts: ‘human security’ and ‘civil society’. This chapter will continue with some background information on radicalization and de-radicalization policy in both Amsterdam and the Netherlands. Next, chapter two will be dedicated entirely to the two central concepts, on which I will reflect the writings of several scholars. In the first section of the same chapter, I will discuss the concept of civil society, and in the second section I will discuss the concept of human security. The third chapter will be dedicated entirely to the methodology that I am planning to use for my research. In chapter four and five, I will discuss the results of the data-collection of my field-research. Finally, in the conclusion, I will answer the main question and I will discuss the generalizability of my results, and I will discuss suggestions for further research on this topic.
1.2. Radicalism
Radicalism, or radicalization is a difficult concept to define; hence academic scholars do not use the same definition of what it is (Schmid, 2013). Giving an overview of all the possible definitions would go beyond the scope of my research. My research focuses on the situation of Amsterdam and as such, I have decided to make use of the definition as used by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, which defines radicalization as: “The (active) pursue and / or support of radical changes in society, which may
endanger (the existence of) the democratic order (target), possibly with the use of undemocratic methods (means) which may undermine the functioning of the democratic order (effect).
By extension, radicalization can be defined as the (growing) willingness to pursue and / or support such changes (possibly by undemocratic means), or to encourage others to do so.”
(Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2004:15).
There are many reasons and causes for someone to radicalize. Root causes might be: violations of basic rights; (extreme) poverty; hopelessness; social inequality;
marginalization and exclusion; illiteracy or lack of education; and despair for lack of perspectives (Schmid, 2013: 2). However, all these factors do not necessarily have to lead to radicalism or terrorism. Academic scholars differ for instance, in opinion about the link between socioeconomic factors such as individual poverty or unemployment on the one hand and terrorism on the other. Some even call it a ‘myth’ or a ‘half-truth’, because no empirical study has yet been able to link these two elements together. An example that is often given is that there is “so much [grief and injustice] in the world”, but at the same time, in proportion, there are “so few terrorists” (Schmid, 2013: 25-26).
There are, however push-an pull factors to radicalization and terrorism. The Dutch terrorism scholar Alex P. Schmid (2013) explains how push-and pull factors work: “Push factors are the negative social, cultural, and political features of one’s societal environment that aid in ‘pushing’ vulnerable individuals onto the path of violent extremism. Push factors are what are commonly known as ‘underlying/root causes’ such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and political/economical marginalization. Pull factors, on the other hand, are the positive characteristics and benefits of an extremist organisation that ‘pull’ vulnerable individuals to join. These include the group’s ideology[…], strong bonds of brotherhood and sense of belonging, reputation building, prospect of fame or glory, and other socialization benefits.” (Schmid, 2013: 26). 1.3. Radicalization in the Netherlands
Radicalization has been a problem of all times, but for the Dutch government the first time the Netherlands has dealt with Islamist terrorism, was in 2004 when Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh got murdered by the Dutch-Moroccan Mohamed Bouyeri. A few months later, 52 people got killed during a series of suicide attacks in several subway stations in London. Unlike 11 September a few years earlier, these terrorist attacks were not committed by foreigners, but (mostly) by extremists who were born and raised in Western Europe. This so-called homegrown terrorism means that this type of terrorism was created in the West, but was inspired by foreign and transnational developments. In response to all these developments, the Dutch government created the National Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding (NCTb) in 2004. Right from the beginning, Dutch contra-terrorism policy has been especially aimed at preventing radicalization and preventing people from becoming terrorist. This has to do with the fact that the NCTb5 considers radicalization to be the pre-phase of terrorist violence. The
implemented method of the Dutch contra-terrorism policy involves recognizing
radicalization processes at an early stage and changing them (Sieckelinck en de Winter, 2015: 25; De Graaf, de Poot en Kleemans, 2009: 331-332).
Although there is a strong emphasis on Islamist radicalization, Dutch policy is also targeting anarchist; right wing; and left wing radicalization, but this happens to a lesser extent. Islamist radicalism is a form of radicalism, which is religiously inspired (Slootman en Tillie, 2006: 17). The AIVD does not have an estimation6 of the number of Islamist
radicals in the Netherlands, because of three main reasons: first, not everyone expresses his/her ideas in public; second, sometimes it is difficult to make a distinction between
salafism7 on the one hand and jihadism8 on the other; and finally, people may appear
differently on the Internet than they really are. However, the AIVD does have an estimation of the amount of support for Islamic State (IS), which is estimated at several hundred supporters, and several thousand sympathizers. According to its findings, many Dutch jihadists are of Moroccan descent, even among the ones who leave for Syria(AIVD, 2014: 29).
In response to the trend, the Dutch government has created several projects, such as the
Action Plan Polarization (2007-2011) to fight radicalization and has trained civil servants
in this process. School teachers were trained on how to recognize signs of potential radicalization, and academic imam studies were established as an effort to counter
extremism.9 Through time, many of these projects were cancelled, because they were not as
successful as was predicted. Some social scientists, including Jean Tillie (2007), believe that national projects such as the Actionplan were not as effective as regional ones. Tillie’s
5 In 2010, the NCTb was extended with a cyber task force, and was soon to be called the National
Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV)
6 Back in 2007, the estimated amount of Dutch-Moroccans who were susceptible to messages of radical
preachers was estimated at 25.000 to 30.000. Today, the group is bigger, but there is no official number of its size (AIVD, 2007: 42)
7 A salafi is a contemporary orthodox Muslim who tries to practice his religion as devout as the first
generation of Muslims who lived at the time of the Prophet Muhammad. These early generations of Muslims, also called the salaf, are considered to be ‘perfect’ Muslims, because they are believed to have practiced the purest form of Islam (Slootman en Tillie, 2006: 17-18).
8 Jihadism has two possible translations. In traditional Islamic interpretation the ‘great’ jihad refers to
the inner religious struggle that Muslim believers face when they try to become a better religious human being. The ‘small’ jihad however, to refer to the participation of radical Islamists in the so-called ‘Jihad’, what is believed to be the ‘holy war’ against the ‘enemies of Islam’ (Slootman and Tillie, 2006: 21).
9 Tillie, J., 2007. Gemeenten hebben beste zicht op radicalisering jongeren. Interviewed by Joke Mat.
[online] NRC, 29 August 2007. Available at: < http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2007/08/29/gemeenten-hebben-beste-zicht-op-radicalisering-jongeren-11382975 > [Accessed 24 February 2016].
main argument is that radicalization is mostly an individual process and takes place within a small group of people in particular neighborhoods in the city, hence the local government could operate more effectively in such a small-scaled situation.10
1.4. De-radicalization in the city of Amsterdam
The process of radicalization largely takes place at the micro level; hence, the local government is also preoccupied with countering radicalism. Local governments make use of the so-called ‘key figures’(sleutelfiguren)- frontline workers, such as teachers, mosque board members, social workers, etc.- who get trained by the government on how to recognize the elements of radicalization (De Graaf, de Poot en Kleemans, 2009: 337). In Amsterdam, a policy on counterterrorism has already existed before the murder of Theo van Gogh. After 2004 however, a new approach was developed to prevent radicalization from turning into terrorism. This was done primarily within the framework of integration policies (Van Heelsum, 2010: 16). An important unit that was created within this
framework is the Platform Amsterdam Together (Platform Amsterdam Samen, PAS). As a response to the escalating situation after the murder of Van Gogh, PAS was created to promote social cohesion. As such, it launched a temporary program called “We Amsterdammers” with a strong focus on countering radicalization (not only Islamist radicalism, but also right-wing extremism and left-wing radicalism). The basis of PAS was a dialogue model, with the aim of promoting mutual understanding and discussion between the different societal groups in the city of Amsterdam, in order to deal with polarization, social cohesion and stopping exclusion (Ibid.: 17-19; 40).
Another element of Amsterdam’s policy on counterterrorism was that this policy was aimed at intervention at an early stage, with the emphasis on de-radicalization and detection. Since 2011, the focus in this approach has started to become risk-based, which means: the focus on actual identified risks. Through early detection of warnings, the Municipality of Amsterdam tries to intervene on time. During this process it makes use of the earlier mentioned ‘key figures’ who operate on a voluntary basis. The purpose of the ‘key figures’ is on the one hand to detect cases of potential radicalization in the city, but also to work as a mediator or facilitator of dialogue between the different societal groups in the city (Aanscherping Aanpak Radicalisering, 2015).
However, the effect and the results of this approach have not been proven. As such, a few years later, the city council made efforts to come up with an adjusted approach to
radicalization. The new approach would still be risk-based, but its emphasis would be on prevention of radicalization. First, it would consist of activities that would guarantee defensibility and the protection of vulnerable groups and individuals. Second, it would be
risk-based and would thus consist of actions targeting individuals and groups who constitute a risk. A difference with the previous approach, however, is the so-called individual case approach (Casuïstiekaanpak): this means that each case will be assessed individually, in order to know what kind of interventions or measures to implement. Finally, it puts emphasis on connecting (Verbinding) almost radicalized individuals with both the city and other societal groups of Amsterdam, to fight isolation. To strengthen the connecting element of this new approach, the Municipality wants to encourage citizens’ initiatives, with its so-called ‘Dialogue Action Program Amsterdam’ (Actieprogramma
Dialoog Amsterdam). It calls for NGOs and citizens to invent these initiatives themselves,
because the Municipality will merely play a stimulating and facilitating role (Van Heelsum, 2010: 3-4; Aanscherping Aanpak Radicalisering, 2015; Actieprogramma Amsterdam Dialoog, 2015/2016: 4-5).
Chapter 2. Defining ‘Civil Society’ and ‘Human Security’
This chapter will serve as the theoretical framework for this study, in which first the concept of ‘Civil Society’ will be discussed in section 2.1., and in the next section, 2.2., the concept of human security will be reviewed. Finally, in section 2.3. the research question will be presented in relation to both concepts.
2.1. Chapter 2. Civil Society: definition, debate, and functions
2.1.1.Introduction
There is no single definition of the concept of civil society, and as such, it can be defined in multiple ways. Although most scholars think of civil society being an arena of ‘voluntary, uncoerced collective actions around shared interests, purposes and values’ there is no unanimous definition. When it comes to categorizing the different definitions of how modern-day scholars in International Relations (IR) approach civil society, and the way in which they describe the relationship between civil society and other segments of society, we may see that there are two main categories of approaches to civil society (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006: 2; Merkel and Lauth, 1998: 7; Kaldor, 2003: 585).
According to the first approach- which is seen as the ‘basic approach’- civil society is considered to be ‘a sector on its own vis-à-vis the three other core sectors of society—state, business and family’ (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006: 2). Van Leeuwen and Verkoren (2012) define ‘civil society’ as “the sphere of organised society that exists outside of government and the private sector. It covers a wide variety of actors, ranging from development organisations operating internationally to localised initiatives and traditional forms of association” (Van Leeuwen and Verkoren, 2012: 81). David Held (1993) defines civil society as follows: “Civil society constitutes those areas of social life – the domestic world, the economic sphere, cultural activities and political interaction – which are organized by private or voluntary arrangements between individuals and groups outside the direct control of the state”(Held, 1993: 274).
Paffenholz and Spurk (2006) however, explain that ‘[a]lthough there is some degree of consensus in the literature on this basic approach, the attribution of actors is
contested’(Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006: 2). Nevertheless most scholars agree on the following actors in civil society: NGOs, labor unions, traditional and religious institutions, media, human rights activism, and sports and welfare associations (Van Leeuwen and Verkoren, 2012: 81). Furthermore some disagree on the categorization of family or business as separate sectors, and see them instead as part of civil society. While others
believe that actors as family and commercial organizations might belong to multiple categories: a political sphere, an economic sphere, and a private sphere. Hence they believe that there is a space, ‘where these spheres overlap’ (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006: 2). This idea reflects the second approach, which states that civil society is ‘not a sector on its own but the space between societal sectors’, in which the before mentioned actors might operate in both the specific category, and in civil society as a category (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006: 2; Merkel and Lauth, 1998: 7). In what follows, these definitions will be elaborated further below, in the framework of several IR-theories.
2.1.2. Debate on Civil Society in IR
Theorists on civil society such as De Tocqueville in the 19th century and Putnam in modern times, believe that civil-society is an essential part of democracy, as it promotes the interests of citizens (De Tocqueville 1864; Putnam 1993). Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) describes in De La Démocratie en Amérique (1835-1840) his experiences with American democracy, in which he explained that the ideas of liberty and equality have great virtues, but could result in the isolation of individuals and could eventually disband the entire society. The only way to keep society together was to maintain bonds of solidarity, through the creation of ‘networks of voluntary associations’ (De Tocqueville, 2010: 455; Parekh, 2004: 18). De Tocqueville saw independent associations (comparable to civil society) as ‘schools of democracy’ in which individuals were taught ‘democratic thinking and attitudes’, but also how to behave in particular manners. These associations had to be established ‘voluntarily and at all levels’ and their aim was to “protect and defend individual rights against potentially authoritarian regimes and tyrannical majorities in society” (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006: 4; Islamoglu, 2015: 710).
Putnam (2000) adds to this that these associations are important, because they create ‘trust and confidence’, which he calls ‘social capital’(Putnam, 2000: 19-26; Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006:4). The participation of people in such associations is called ‘civic
engagement’ (Putnam, 1993: 87-88). One of the main ideas concerning civil society is that there is a social contract between the state and its citizens (Van Leeuwen and Verkoren, 2012: 83). This idea goes back to Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) who described societies as the outcome of a contract between ‘individual members of society’ (Laine, 2014: 61; Kaldor, 2003: 584). Kaldor (2003) explains that Hobbes considered civil society as “a society governed by laws, based on the principle of equality before the law, in which everyone […] was subject to the law” (Kaldor, 2003: 584). Parekh (2004) states that although individuals were by nature equal, free and rational “[t]hey could not flourish in the unregulated state of nature and needed a well-ordered society that ensured them maximum freedom to pursue their self-chosen purposes”. A ‘public’ or ‘civil’ authority was authorized to make all necessary decisions: “[t]he authority was derived from the consent of its members[…] and governed according to general laws. Its subjects were free
to lead such lives, pursue such purpose, and enter into such relations as they thought proper within the limits set by the laws”(Parekh, 2004: 14). The social contract is thus the idea that ‘state authority is based on the consent of citizens, who forfeit some of their freedoms in exchange for the benefits of social order through the rule of law’. It is believed that citizens pay taxes in exchange for protection or other social services (Van Leeuwen and Verkoren, 2012: 83).
Neoliberalists on the other hand believe that civil society is ‘in sharp contrast to the state, serving as a watchdog against its excesses or protecting citizens from it’ (Van Leeuwen and Verkoren, 2012: 82-83). Locke (1632-1704) is considered to be the first in modern history to stress the importance of civil society as ‘[a] body in its own right, separate from the state’(Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006:4). According to his thought, people take part of a community in a non-political sphere, in which they design their social lives, and on which the state does not have any influence. The main purpose of civil society is to ‘protect’ the individual against the oppressive state (Ibid.; Armstrong and Gilson, 2011:4). Later scholars also feel this idea of a civil society independent from the state. There are scholars who consider civil society to be ‘a sector on its own vis-à-vis the three other main
sectors—state, business and family.’ Paffenholz and Spurk(2006) explain however, that ‘[a]lthough there is some degree of consensus in the literature on this […] approach, the attribution of actors is contested’(Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006: 2). Van Leeuwen and Verkoren (2012) define ‘civil society’ as ‘the sphere of organised society that exists outside of government and the private sector’, which might include many actors, such as ‘media, labour unions, political parties, human rights activists, NGOs, traditional and religious institutions and sports and welfare associations’ (Van Leeuwen and Verkoren, 2012: 81). Some disagree about the categorization of family or business as separate sectors, and see them instead as part of civil society. While others believe that actors as family and business might belong to multiple categories: a political sphere, an economic sphere, and a private sphere. Hence they believe that there is a space, ‘where these spheres overlap’ (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006: 2).
This idea is closely related to another approach, which says that civil society is not a subdivision on its own, but ‘the space between societal sectors’. The idea is that the before mentioned actors might be both actors in the specific categories, but also actors in civil society (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006: 2; Merkel and Lauth, 1998: 7). This is closely related to the teachings of Georg Hegel (1770-1830), who was the first to consider civil society as something separate from the political sphere of the state(Richter, 1998: 33). Kaldor says that “[i]t was Hegel who defined civil society as the intermediate realm between the family and the state, where the individual becomes a public person and, through membership in various institutions, is able to reconcile the particular and the universal” (Kaldor, 2003: 584). Hegel was the first to present the difference between civil society and the state in a
way in which they also intersect. In this view, civil society is not only a space to attain self-sufficiency in desires and needs, but also a space where “the interests of individuals are structured and given an institutional form (corporations, police), so that they become universalized and do not contradict the interests of the community”(Perret, 2006: 4). Other theorists such as Gramsci and Habermas focus more on the ‘active role’ of citizens (Van Leeuwen and Verkoren, 2012: 82-83). Van Leeuwen and Verkoren explain that according to this approach “civil society not only scrutinises the functioning of the state, but might also question its very attributes and powers”. In this sense, civil society has the role of negotiator of ‘mutual rights and obligations of state and citizens’, but it might also ‘critically assess dominant modes of representation and accountability’, and finally ‘press for alternative ways of policy making. Instead of ‘making democracy work’’, whereas for Habermas and Gramsci civil society is focused on ‘making democracy happen’ (Putnam 1993; Van Leeuwen and Verkoren, 2012: 82-83).
Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) looked at civil society from a Marxist perspective, in which he stressed the ‘oppositional role of civil society’ as a ‘public room’ from ‘state and
market’. He believed that civil society is not a single organization, but that it in fact contained a multitude of organizations that ‘challenge’ the state. Paffenholz and Spurk add to this that ‘[t]he political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes and societal
consensus is formed within civil society’(Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006: 4). Gramsci was the first to view civil society as a separate sphere from both the state and the economy (Perret, 2006: 5). Kaldor explains that Gramsci does not only perceive it as a sphere between the family and the state, but also “occupying the space outside the market, state and family”, thus “the realm of culture, ideology and political debate” (Kaldor, 2003: 584-585). Civil society was not a single organization, but it contained a multitude of organizations that could challenge the state (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006:4). It was a realm of ‘free associational activity’, which included the church, the family, trade unions, cultural institutions, schools, etc. (Parekh, 2004: 17). Furthermore, it had “the potential for rational self-regulation and freedom”, in which these organizations would discuss the ‘hegemony’ of the ruling class (Laine, 2014: 64). Civil society could thus also be considered “as the realm in which counter- hegemonic forces can be constituted”(Perret, 2006: 5). Van Leeuwen and Verkoren explain that according to this approach “civil society not only scrutinises the functioning of the state, but might also question its very attributes and powers”. In this sense, civil society has the role of negotiator of ‘mutual rights and obligations of state and citizens’, but it might also ‘critically assess dominant modes of representation and accountability’, and ultimately ‘press for alternative ways of policy making’. As such, we can say that civil society is aimed at ‘making democracy happen’ instead of ‘making democracy work’ (Putnam 1993; Van Leeuwen and Verkoren, 2012: 82-83). Gramsci’s ideas turned out to be very influential during the massive uprisings in
Latin America and Eastern Europe in the 1980s, which eventually resulted in the overthrow of several military regimes (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006: 4).
Jürgen Habermas’ focus in his approach to civil society was on its role in the so-called ‘public sphere’, in which ‘marginalized groups’ were able to organize and discuss their political interests, which should not be left entirely to the established institutions (Calhoun, 1992; Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006: 4). As Gramsci, Habermas considers the public sphere to be independent from both state and economy. It is a “realm of our social life in which […] public opinion11 can be formed” by all citizens. He explains that “[c]itizens behave as
a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion-that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their
opinions-about matters of general interest”. Individuals use the media (newspapers, radio, and television) as a tool to transmit their information. Additionally, it is Habermas who has introduced the concept of ‘political public sphere’: “when public discussion deals with objects connected to the activity of the state”. State authority is not part of the political public sphere, although it is its ‘executor’: “state authority is usually considered "public" authority, but it derives its task of caring for the well-being of all citizens primarily from this aspect of the public sphere. Only when the exercise of political control is effectively subordinated to the democratic demand that information be accessible to the public, does the political public sphere win an institutionalized influence over the government through the instrument of law-making bodies”. The public sphere thus functions as a self-organized mediator between society and the state (Habermas, 1974:49-50).
2.1.3. CSOs: entities, types, and functions
2.1.3.1. Types of CSOs
Until now it is made clear that civil society is composed of a multitude of entities. Salamon, et al. (2003) describe the civil society sector as a sector composed of
organizations who are private, not profit distributing, self-governing, and voluntary, which
he explains in the following way. First of all, these entities are organizations, because they have some structure or regularity when it comes to their operations, regardless of their formal constitution or legal registration. What matters most is that there is some
organizational permanence (such as regular meetings, membership, and decision-making). Second, they are private, because they are not part of the ‘apparatus of the state’, although they may receive support from the state. Third, they are not profit distributing, which means that primarily they have no commercial purpose and they do not ‘distribute profits’ to stockholders or managers. Instead, any profits will be invested in their own operations.
11 Habermas defines the idea of ‘public opinion’ as “[t]he expression "public opinion" refers to the
tasks of criticism and control which a public body of citizens informally-and, in periodic elections, formally as well- practices vis-à-vis the ruling structure organized in the form of a state”(Habermas, 1974: 50).
Fourth, they are self-governing, meaning that CSOs are independent from both businesses and the government, because they have their own means to regulate their affairs. And finally, they are voluntary, because membership of these organizations, or joining such an organization, is not compulsory. As such, membership happens out of free choice
(Salamon, et al., 2003: 6-8; Desse, 2012: 7-8).
Fabrice Desse (2012) builds upon Salamon’s set of five entities, by adding an additional distinction between five main types12 of organizations,which might be of importance to
look at in the context of this research. Desse outlines the five types of CSOs as religious;
community-based; philanthropic; expert; and trade unions. The religious type of CSO is
linked to a particular religion, but this does not necessarily mean that these CSOs have to promote the worship of this religion. They do however operate following religious principles. When a CSO is community-based, it means that they are based on community building, solidarity, and resource sharing. Philanthropic CSOs are based on values such as generosity and humanism, instead of religious affiliation. Expert CSOs have some
scientific knowledge and expertise. They do not merely consist of scientists or experts, but they do have an expertise unit that issues technical reports. Finally, trade unions, consist of labor and worker associations who promote the workers’ interests (Desse, 2012: 8-9).
2.1.3.2. CSO functions
So far, I have discussed the definitions, the entities, and the types of CSOs. What remains are the functions or roles of CSOs. Although civil society organizations have several functions, most scholars agree on a set of basic functions. Both Salamon and Desse make a distinction between two broader categories of functions of CSOs: one the one hand there are the service delivery functions, and on the other hand there are the expressive/advocacy
functions. The former “involve the delivery of direct services such as education, health,
housing, economic development promotion, and the like”, which is a bottom-up mechanism (Salamon, et al., 2003: 22; Desse, 2012: 9). The latter on the other hand contains “activities that provide avenues for the expression of cultural, religious,
professional, or policy values, interests, and beliefs”. This is more a top-down approach, because CSOs try to influence and impact authorities in their policy, through agenda-setting and awareness campaigns (Salamon, et al., 2003: 22; Desse, 2012: 9).
In this overview, I shall discuss seven basic functions of civil society organizations, as
12 Desse’s types of CSOs consist of the five main types as discussed in this chapter, but also of two
so-called ‘hybrid types’ of CSOs. The first type consists of the Government oriented NGOs (GONGOs), who are explained by Desse as “independent civil organizations which are more or less influenced and controlled by national authorities”, such as is the case in some industrialized Asian countries
“following the tradition of a strong bureaucratic central State”. The second type embodies the Business & Industry NGOs (BINGOs), who are “civil organizations which defend a given firm’s or industry’s interests, or at least which are very influenced by the latter”, which is the case in the United States, because they follow “the tradition of a liberal capitalist oriented society”(Desse, 2012: 8-9).
outlined by Paffenholz and Spurk(2006). The work of these authors has because it contains several concepts useful for this study.13 In what follows, a short overview shall be given of
the seven basic functions according to Paffenholz and Spurk.
• As cited above, one of the key functions of civil society is to protect citizens, not only to protect their lives, but also their freedom and property.
• Second, Paffenholz and Spurk speak of a feature called monitoring for accountability, which means “monitoring the activities of the central powers, state apparatus and government”.
• Third, civil society creates channels for communication, in order to discuss the interests of the people, and it functions as advocate for minorities, who have no say in political matters.
• Fourth, civil society as a sphere could also function as a way for socialization, which is explained by Paffenholz and Spurk as follows: “civil society contributes to the formation and practice of democratic attitudes among citizens”.
• Fifth, CSOs can build community, through “[e]ngagement and participation in voluntary associations”, which might strengthen social capital.
• Sixth, CSOs might facilitate intermediation between citizens and the state, because civil society has the role of “balancing the power of and negotiating with the state by
establishing diverse relations (communication, negotiation, control) of various interest groups or independent institutions to the state”.
• Finally, civil society organizations also function as service deliveries, because they provide particular services to the people (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006: 13).
In sum, civil society is composed of a multitude of entities. Salamon et al. (2003) have mentioned five elements of importance for the definition of civil society organizations: organizations, private, not profit distributing, self-governing, and voluntary. In addition, I have discussed five types of CSOs: religious; community-based; philanthropic; expert; and trade unions. Finally, I have made a distinction between two broader types of
CSO-functions: the advocacy/expressive functions and the service delivery functions, which on their turn consist of multiple CSO-functions, as outlined by Paffenholz and Spurk (2006). Paffenholz and Spurk speak of seven core functions of civil society: protection; monitoring and accountability; advocacy and public communication; socialization (and a culture of peace); conflict sensitive social cohesion; intermediation and facilitation; and service delivery (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006). Discussing each of the seven functions individually in the upcoming chapters would go beyond the limited time and scope of my research.
13 There are plenty of other scholars who have written in depth about the role and functions of CSOs:
the role of CSOs in Post-Conflict situations (Van Leeuwen and Verkoren, 2012); the role of civil society in international politics (Perret, 2006); the functions of associations in the United States (Putnam, 1993); the importance of CSOs in India (Chandhoke, 2009); the role of CSOs in supporting AIDS/HIV victims in Africa (Colvin and Robins, 2009): etc.
Hence, I want to regroup these CSO functions into broader and more useful groups of functions. The functions that I would like to use for the discussion of my field-research shall consist of the functions that I find most suitable for the case study that I am studying, but shall be renamed into: representation, which consists of intermediation, protection of citizens, and advocacy of interests; education/information provision; social roles, which consists of community building, socialization; and civil society as a place for debate.
2.2. Human Security
2.2.1. Background
Human security is considered to be an important attempt to extend the meaning of security. Traditionally, security is a state-centric concept, and was for a long time interpreted as ‘national security’. In this traditional idea of ‘national security’, security is focused on the “protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity from external military threats” (Acharya, 2008: 492-294). This state-centered approach has dominated the whole Cold-War period, and was shared by most policymakers at the time. It was not until the rise of globalization that people became aware about global problems, such as the oil crisis in the Middle East and environmental problems. As such, both scholars and policy-makers have made several attempts to broaden the scope of security that it would also include other possible spheres of security, and thus to consider security in a non-military (or violent) way. Despite this progressiveness, the state remained the prime focus in their approach (Acharya, 2008: 492-494). Security, as understood within the framework of state sovereignty, is a top-down approach that fails to address the question of what security means for individual human beings (Thomas and Tow, 2002:177). As such, the new concept of security challenges the traditional state-centered discourse on security, because it replaces the state by the people as prime object of security (Acharya, 2008: 492-494). After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international security agenda of many countries remained dominated by elements and policies on how to prevent global conflict and how to maintain global peace. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War was also the moment when the traditional state-centered discourse on security started to get questioned once again by both scholars and UN-policymakers. Breslin and Christou (2015) state that right in the aftermath of the Cold War, the UN started to reconsider the nature of security, because “[w]ith the threat of global conflict and annihilation […] removed, the focus on international security could move away from preventing war to other things” (Breslin and Christou, 2015:3). As such, more critics saw the need for a redefinition of security, which would also address the problems faced by individuals and communities. It is against this background, that the UN has advised the international community to establish a new
approach to human security, which had to be human-centered, instead of centered on the state.14
2.2.2. Defining Human Security
The Cold-War provided a key context in which the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has launched the concept of ‘human security’ (Dahl-Eriksen, 2007:17). Dahl-Eriksen (2007) explains that the notion of human security was created “with the recognition that human beings as well as groups could feel their wellbeing (meaning either their survival, their wealth or their welfare) severely threatened, even in situations where the existence of the state was not threatened by other states”, because “[s]tate-power in itself, with different forms of repression, could be a threat towards individuals”(Dahl-Eriksen, 2007:17).
In 1994, a UNDP-research-team, headed by Pakistani former Minister of Finance Manhub Ul-Haq, has published a UN report called the UNDP Human Development Report: New
Dimensions of Human Security (UNDP, 1994). This report stated that human security is
based on two ‘major components’: on the one hand, ‘freedom from fear’, and on the other, ‘freedom from want’(UNDP, 1994:24). Acharya (2008) explains the difference between the two as: “[Freedom from fear] stresses protecting people from violent conflicts through measures such as a ban on landmines and child soldiers. For [freedom from want], human security is a broader notion involving the reduction of threats to the well-being of people, such as poverty and disease”(Acharya, 2008: 496). Dahl-Eriksen illustrates the importance of ‘freedom from fear’, when he explains that: “[a] society where the state fulfills its obligations concerning the civil and political rights will be a society where many sources of fear are eliminated. But fear connected to life and health may exist even though, for
instance, the state is threatened by war. Even where states use heavy resources to fight international crime, this phenomenon may threaten individuals, as can different diseases and border-crossing environmental damage. Such questions are central to the discussions around human security.” On the other hand, he defines ‘Freedom from want’ as: “the group of human rights called economical and social. Basic human needs must be satisfied if a life with dignity shall be possible” (Dahl-Eriksen, 2007: 19). The UNDP-report therefore states that human security has two main aspects: “first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. [S]econd, […] protection from sudden and hurtful
14 Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, the Civil Society Network for Human
Security, IKV Pax Christi, 2013. ‘The Human Security Approach in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding’[pdf]. Available at:
<https://www.peaceportal.org/documents/130226273/130473583/GPPAC+Position+Paper+on+Human +Security+April2013/25d000da-597e-4c78-ae4e-fbdee183a56e > [Accessed 20 February 2016].
disruptions in the patterns of daily life-whether in homes, in jobs or in communities”(UNDP, 1994:23).
The report presented a model that covers seven broad dimensions of security: economic security; environmental security; personal security; community security; health security;
political security; and food security (Tzifakis, 2011:353; Dahl-Eriksen, 2007:17; Thomas
and Tow, 2002:178). These dimensions of security are explained as follows:
1. Economic security, to assure a basic income for everyone (UNDP, 1994:25).
2. Environmental security, to provide a healthy physical environment (clean
drinking water, tackling deforestation, and reducing air pollution) (UNDP, 1994: 28-30). 3. Personal security, to offer safety from physical violence (torture, war, crime,
sexual abuse, child abuse, etc.) (UNDP, 1994: 30-31).
4. Community security, referring to safety from oppressive (traditional) community
practices and safety from ethnic violence (UNDP, 1994: 31-32).
5. Health security, to ensure access to personal healthcare for everyone (UNDP,
1994: 28).
6. Political security, to guarantee every human being basic human rights and
freedom from repression (UNDP, 1994:32-33).
7. Food security refers to the idea that all people need to have access (both physical
and economic) at all times to basic food (UNDP, 1994: 27).
Although consensus has been reached among the UN-member states on the above-mentioned dimensions of human security, there was no agreement on which one of the seven dimensions should have the priority. As such, ever since the publication of the UNDP-report, there has been no consensus definition of human security (Aguilera Garcia and Uribe Arzate, 2014: 73).
2.2.3. Security in IR
The implications of the above-mentioned lack of consensus were also visible in IR. For a long time, scholars in IR have been debating on how to approach the concept of human security. The debate has been centered on two problems: 1) the necessity of the concept as an alternative approach to the traditional security-discourse; and 2) the scope of the definition of human security.
2.2.3.1. Need for alternative approach to security?
One of the first debates concerning the concept of human security is around the question whether IR and international politics are in need of an extra definition of security. To advocates of this new approach, human security is a necessary tool to approach security, because the traditional approach had many shortcomings. One of its well-known advocates is Acharya (2004) who states that: “Human security reflects new forces and trends in
international relations. In an era of globalization and democratization, governments can no longer survive – much less achieve legitimacy – solely by addressing economic growth; nor can they maintain social and political stability solely by providing for defense against external military threats. Democratization empowers new actors, such as civil society, that must be accounted for in the security frame- work. And globalization means that the national security of states can be challenged by forces other than foreign armies, including forces that endanger the lives of people while leaving the physical boundaries of states intact. Human security in this sense reflects real-world developments that cannot be
captured by the narrow and military-focused notion of national security alone” (Ibid., 2004: 355).
Human security therefore reflects the dimensions of security that have been traditionally neglected by ‘national security’. It is said that national security reflects only one aspect related to human security, which is purely physical, namely the protection from violence. Critics of the traditional approach, such as MacFarlane (2004) believe that violence is “only one threat among many facing individuals”, and this approach neglects other live-threating situations, such as starvation and fatal diseases(Ibid.: 369). Many scholars even believe that diseases can kill over millions people a year, which is significantly more than the casualties of most wars. As such, other advocates of the human security approach, such as Mack (2004), believe that the traditional approach of security is “incapable of dealing with the threat states pose to their own citizens”, and that therefore famine and civil wars are difficult to explain from the traditional approach (Ibid. 366).
Nonetheless critics of human security, such as Buzan (1983), remain skeptical of this approach. His main critique refers to the possibility of non-state actors as potential security-providers. He firmly believes that non-states actors, such as NGOs, do not have the power to solve security-threatening situations, without the assistance of the state. He therefore says that the state should remain the main driver for the security of its citizens (Buzan, 1983). Other well-known critics, such as Paris (2004) state that because human security includes both ‘physical security’ and for example, ‘economic and social well-being’, it is therefore “impractical to talk about certain socioeconomic factors ‘causing’ an increase or decline in human security, given that these factors are themselves part of the definition of human security”(Ibid. 371). Paris’ comment raises another issue, which is the lack of the ‘definitional boundaries’ of human security. The next section will further elaborate upon this critique (Ibid.).
2.2.3.2. The scope of the definition
The lack of consensus is also visible in IR, when it comes to the definitions that are used to define the concept of human security. In general, the debate has been centered on two categories of competing definitions: the ‘broad’ conception or formulation on the one hand,
and the ‘narrow’ conception or formulation on the other (Fukuda-Parr and Messineo, 2012: 5; Aguilera Garcia and Uribe Arzate, 2014: 73).
The broad definition states that human security is safety and security from different types of threats from all possible dimensions, which is not only safety from political violence, but also from the above-mentioned environmental and economic threats for example (Fukuda-Parr and Messineo, 2012: 5). As such, it has at its core the same form as was initially defined by the UNDP (Tzifakis, 2011:360-361)
This broad definition has been heavily criticized. Some scholars accuse the concept of containing too much dimensions, which renders it to be ‘too broad’ to be useful both in policy-purposes and for academic research. Krause (2004) therefore believes that such a broad definition is: “ultimately nothing more than a shopping list; it involves slapping the label of human security on a wide range of issues that have no necessary link. At a certain point, human security becomes a loose synonym for ‘bad things that can happen’, and it then loses all utility to policymakers – and incidentally to analysts – since it does not allow us to see what is distinctive about the idea of ‘security’, and how it is inextricably tied up with the threat and use of violence” (Ibid.: 367-368). Because of this vague and expansive definition, there is little to no guidance for policymakers when it comes to “the
prioritization of competing policy goals” (Paris, 2001:88).
Additionally, there is disagreement on whether human security is really about ‘freedom from want’ (Acharya, 2008: 496). Dahl-Eriksen (2007) for instance states: “A society where the state fulfills its obligations concerning the civil and political rights will be a society where many sources of fear are eliminated. But fear connected to life and health may exist even though”(Ibid.: 19). As such, scholars believe that it remains unclear what the UNDP believes are the ‘accepted minimum standards’ for the ‘freedom from want’ aspect of the human security discourse(Ibid.).
In an effort to meet this criticism half way, the Commission on Human Security (2003) has attempted to redefine the concept of human security as: “[...]to protect the vital core of all
human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means
creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity” (Commission
Despite this effort of redefinition, ambiguity has not ceased to exist, and has left scholars once again to disagree about one single definition on human security. Hence, many
institutions and scholars opt for a narrow definition of human security instead. The narrow definition of human security focuses on violent threats, principally ‘organized political violence’, and is mostly used by scholars and some organizations, such as the Human Security Network at the UN. Hence scholars such as MacFarlane and Khong(2006) add another concept next to ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’, which is ‘freedom from organized violence’(Ibid.: 245). Fukuda-Parr and Messineo (2012) explain that organized violence in this sense means that it is “committed by an identifiable perpetrator”, and that is “not random but rather is organized in a way that “makes that violence
potent””(Ibid.: 7). As such, the opponents of the broad definition, such as Liotta and Owen (2006), believe that a narrow definition in fact emphasizes only the “immediate necessary for intervention capability”(Ibid.: 43). Some scholars therefor believe that the narrow definition of human security is closely related to the traditional security discourse, which connects human security with questions about political violence (Tzifakis, 2011:361). 2.2.4. Civil society as security provider?
Along with the shift in discourse from a state-centered approach to security to a human-centered approach, other changes have taken place as well, both in politics and in practice. As was told earlier, the human-centered approach to security differs from the traditional approach, because the latter is state-centered, and puts the focus primarily on the safety of the state against (external) military violence. The new approach, as encouraged by the UNDP, not only stresses the role of individuals or people as the object of security, but also as the ‘providers of security’, hence the latter is not only the responsibility15 of states, but
also of citizens and local communities (Acharya, 2008: 494).
This potential role of human beings as security providers is not a new concept, because its origins date back to the 16th and 17th century, when philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes,
John Locke and Hugo Grotius thought about the importance of human rights in the relationship between the individual and the state. Dahl-Eriksen explains that to these philosophers human rights “define boundaries surrounding the individual that the state is not allowed to cross’. In the traditional state-centered discourse on security, ‘[h]uman beings are expected to be loyal to what states find suitable in order to safeguard state security”(Dahl-Eriksen, 2007: 19-20). However, when human beings become “the object of reference, it becomes natural to think that security must be built from below” (Ibid.).
15 Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, the Civil Society Network for Human
Security, IKV Pax Christi, 2013. ‘The Human Security Approach in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding’[pdf]. Available at:
<https://www.peaceportal.org/documents/130226273/130473583/GPPAC+Position+Paper+on+Human +Security+April2013/25d000da-597e-4c78-ae4e-fbdee183a56e > [Accessed 20 February 2016].
Even though this idea of a bottom-up approach to security is centuries old, it is not as easy to implement as one would think. It will only be achieved in a secure environment, but if this secure environment (the state) itself is endangered by an outside threat, human beings will automatically feel unsafe: “[t]he building of security from below will be difficult or impossible as long as the threat persists. A downside-up perspective therefore demands the ability to deal with two parallel thoughts. Human security must be created from the
individual as well as from the state level, with the state as the framework, which gives necessary guarantees” (Dahl-Eriksen, 2007: 19-20).
Nonetheless, as was stated in the introduction of this study, a few years ago, the United Nations Security Council (SC) started to stress the importance of CSOs in its policy papers and in various resolutions (Van Ginkel, 2012: 2). Civil society is believed to play an important role when it comes to bridging the “gaps between global policy and local realities”, and this also applies for its role in the domain of human security. In relation to countering radicalization, Wall (2012) states: “Local civil society actors hold unique local knowledge, the trust of local actors, and an understanding of root causes of conflict that drive extremism” (Wall, 2012: 2). The UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force has therefore indicated that civil society should be included in counterterrorism measures, because of the broad possibilities of functions and roles of CSOs, the latter are able to fill in gaps that are otherwise left unoccupied (Van Ginkel, 2012: 10). Because of their easy accessibility to communities, they are believed to improve the ‘legitimacy of
counterterrorism polices’, and their effectiveness (Van Ginkel, 2012:10). At the same time however, they are able to advocate the human-rights interests of groups who are otherwise not heard (Ibid.: 2).
In short, human security is a heavily debated concept. Initially, it has been introduced as a counter-discourse to the traditional approach of human security, but for many critics it has not provided enough evidence for the relevance of its existence. The main critique
concerns its original definition, as was implemented by the UNDP, which is accused of being too broad to be of use to both policymakers and scholars. As such, several attempts have been made to redefine or to narrow the concept, but nevertheless to this day there is still no consensus on what the concept should define.
2.3. Problem Definition
2.3.1.Introduction
In the previous chapters it was made clear that in the last century CSOs have been recognized to be important political actors. Ever since 17th-century philosophers have
actor instead of a tool of the state, many scholars have written at great length about the contribution of CSOs to IR, to democracy, to peace, and most of all to security. Even supranational organizations such as the UN could not stay behind when it comes to acknowledging the importance of CSOs to human security. As such, it has encouraged its member states to involve CSOs in countering terrorism, as part of their security-policies. The only problem however is that not all states are ready to involve CSOs in areas such as security, because most governments are primarily concerned with state-security, assuming that there would be no role for CSOs in it, because of its top down character. Indian political scientist Neera Chandhoke (2009) once said that “[i]n popular imagination, it is still the State that seems to occupy a central position” in our lives. People tend to believe that “there are certain problems that only the State can resolve, and should be resolving” (Chandhoke, 2009: 12, italics added). This quote illustrates in a nutshell what the main problem of this research is, when including CSOs in sensitive areas such as security. To this study it is essential to see if the before-mentioned idea depicts a status quo, or that civil society involvement is possible. And if so, what are its limits? And how feasible is it to think of civil society being an ‘alternative’ to the state? (Chandhoke, 2009: 12) The question that is at the center of this study is to see if human security could be practiced from a bottom-up approach. The aim is to answer this question by looking at how CSOs could prevent and counter radicalization and how it might be possible to limit the role of governments in this area.
2.3.2. The Main Question
The aim of this research is thus to study the possibilities of a bottom-up approach to human security, including the active involvement of CSOs. When it comes to human security, the focus shall be on counter-radicalization.
Although in this thesis I want to look into a case study on the role of Moroccan CSOs in Amsterdam in preventing and countering radicalization, it will remain a case study for the broader puzzle on the role of CSOs in safeguarding human-security. The main question that I therefore aim to answer shall be: Is there a possibility for a bottom-up approach in
counter-radicalization, and if so, how is it feasible to strengthen the role of civil society in this field?
2.3.3. Core Concepts and Sub Topics
In order to solve the problem that is at the heart of this research, it is important to split the article into subtopics that will cover most elements needed to answer the main-question. Throughout the entire paper, the research shall focus on the two core concepts of ‘human security’ and ‘civil society’, as was discussed at full length in the previous sections. The sub-topics of these concepts shall be respectively ‘radicalization’ and ‘Moroccan CSOs in Amsterdam’. Radicalization does not need to be discussed in the upcoming chapters,
because in the introduction of this essay, a definition of radicalization was already given. An overview of counter radicalization policies in both the Netherlands and Amsterdam has also been discussed. When discussing the topic of Moroccan CSOs in Amsterdam,
however, the focus shall be both on Moroccan mosques and on local Dutch-Moroccan networks. The questions that I would like to address during my research shall be on the role of Moroccan CSOs as active actors in countering radicalization: what function could Moroccan parents and mosques have in preventing extremism among the youth? And moreover, do they share any responsibility at all in security issues? The previously discussed functions of civil society shall be applied in questions of this sort, before their application in the interviews that will be conducted as part of the data-collection.
