The Visegrad Group: Building Common Positions in CFSP

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THE VISEGRAD GROUP:

BUILDING COMMON

POSITIONS IN CFSP

A study of sanctions

Supervisor:

Dr. Dimiter Toshkov

d.d.tos hkov@fgga.leidenuniv.nl

Matej Jančošek

Public Administration Master Thesis s1593579 24th of March 2016

Second Reader:

Dr. Antoaneta Dimitrova

a .l.dimitrova@fgga.leidenuniv.nl

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1. Introduction

Security policies have always belonged to the realm of high politics, as opposed to low politics, such as economic policies, since they “touch on the fundamental definition, identity, security, and sovereignty of the nation-state” (Hix & Høyland, 2011, p. 325). States are less reluctant to give up full control over the direction of their security policies, therefore less willing to transfer these policies to the supranational level. Thus, a unanimity voting procedure has been retained in the field of foreign and security policies of the EU.

Unanimity voting procedure in the framework of the 28 EU member states, has bearings on the need for potential regional cooperation and thus on creation of regional cooperation structures. Within the EU, there are 3 such regional groups: Benelux, The Nordic Council of Ministers and the Visegrad Group. In a paper by Martin Dangerfield: “The Visegrad Group in the Expanded European Union: from Preaccession to Postaccession Cooperation”, the author offers a definition of what (sub) regional cooperation is: “a process of regularised, significant political and economic interaction among a group of neighbouring states. This interaction takes place between national governments, local authorities, private business and civil society actors across a wide range of issues.” (Dangerfield, 2008, p. 632)

Visegrad Group is a political pact, an alliance of four central European states, namely Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. “The Visegrad Group is a recognised symbol of successful political and economic transformation and, in many areas, also a model for regional cooperation. The Visegrad Group (V4) countries have become constructive, responsible and respected partners in Europe in implementing EU key priorities and programmes and, through their input, have contributed and will continue to contribute towards the processes of political and economic integration in Europe, including EU and NATO enlargement, in order to promote the prosperity, security and stability of the continent.” (Bratislava Declaration, 2011) Today, the V4 serves to further the integration process and cooperation between its members within and beyond the European Union sphere, including in common policies, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It is important to note, that the V4 made official their intention to discuss the CFSP agenda at their regular meetings in order to promote their brand and to gain an increase in the power of their voices through a common bargaining position, which would serve the individual interests of its members. Because the V4 is a prominent institution for cooperation of the four Central European states especially within the affairs of the EU and its wider region, an

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interest in the potential of this sub-regional cooperation on coordination of its members´ external preferences at the level of European Union´s CFSP is genuine.

Given the geography and political implications of what the V4 represents, other members of the EU will understand their 4 voices not simply as four random aligned positions, but positions aligned on principles of common culture, geography, economy and heritage. They will have to understand it as a political orientation resulting from the state of affairs in one of the corners of Europe, a building block of the entirety of the European Union. Other member states will have to consider that as a legitimate contribution of that building block and will have to assign greater weight to such a position, rather than perceiving it as a position of a defector, who might be dissenting for all sorts of selfish reasons, whether it might be for gain in economic or political capital or cunning tactical manoeuvring in the stormy waters of European politics. Therefore, a common position formulation by the Visegrad Group is a valuable asset on the side of the V4 member states, even at negotiations where everyone can veto a proposal unilaterally, since they represent a large bulk of a rather similar part of Europe that makes up the picture of the assorted mix the EU is composed of. At times you might have a government in one of the member states that has a strong, uncompromising opinion about an issue, due to party politics or for other reasons, but a regional stamp, such as Nordic, Baltic or Central European, will eliminate such appearances and give the position an aura of greater legitimacy. That is why common V4 positions in the field of CFSP have a very real and practical political meaning.

1.1 Research Question and Purpose of the Research

V4 meetings offer its participants an opportunity to discuss their positions with less actors, who possibly have a narrower range of preferences, which, if they agree, can provide them with a common bargaining position. Such a common bargaining position can increase the legitimacy of their opinions, due to the framework of a regional interest. This study is interested in the strength of the coherence of V4 on the CFSP level, by attempting to uncover the implications that determine the output of this platform, which takes the form of common positions. CFSP is a prominent foreign policy tool of the EU and thus a relevant point of discussion for the V4. Thus, a legitimate question emerges:

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An important tool of the CFSP are sanctions, also known as restrictive measures, which are imposed to pursue EU foreign policy objectives. Visegrad Group´s activities include external policies focusing on the countries of the wider Central – Eastern - South Eastern European region. Imposing EU sanctions on countries, individuals and entities has occurred in this geographical area as well. Therefore, I decided to study this question in the context of EU sanctions, since they are a tool through which it engages with entities whose activities it condemns. Sanctions are a part of the CFSP, a policy area of high politics, where the member states were unwilling to give up their veto power, as it is concerned with business of utmost importance - security. This means that each and every one of the 28 member states must vote in favour of the agenda proposed to be put into effect. Therefore, in this case, the common voice of the four member states does not mathematically increase the power of the combined votes, as would be the case in Qualified Majority Voting, where they can support one of the sides and perhaps make the difference between a yes and a no vote. But if they do form a common opinion on CFSP issues, they make greater “circles on the water”, adding weight to their opinion, making others think about their perspective more attentively.

The analysis of the V4 positions regarding the imposition of sanction regimes is not meant to merely expose its ability to formulate common positions on certain EU sanctions, but rather to explain how the V4 platform´s regular meetings and internal trust built through active involvement in common projects reflects on its ability to formulate common positions in the field of CFSP.

This study will contribute to the literature on V4´s decision-making process and how it fits within the institutional setting of the European Union. This study also explains the institutional structure of Visegrad cooperation and the extent to which they are willing to build a common position. By a research that traces public statements and activities on the level of Visegrad Group, it also contributes to a greater understanding of the process in which the V4 member states´ cooperation and outcomes are formed. The thesis draws attention to the behaviour of the four states on the V4 platform and to the extent of cooperation that the sub-regional grouping is able to carry out. The thesis also sheds more light on the V4 countries approach to EU sanctions and their willingness to support each other on CFSP affairs.

The purpose of this research is to better understand when a successful adoption of a V4 common position is viable. In other words, through an analysis of the processes of V4 cooperation, this study assesses the limits of the Visegrad Group as a sub-regional

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cooperation platform. Although it might seem clear that interests of high politics will not be sacrificed on the altar of a Central European “club” of states, the type of issue analysed, namely the EU sanctions, are part of CFSP and therefore a policy where unanimity needs to be achieved if it is to be implemented. Keeping that in mind, a V4 common position on this issue is highly desirable due to reasons of strengthened bargaining position. Within the context of the European Union as an institutional setting of which all four are part of and are forced to cooperate in, this question does bear significant relevance.

The analysis of the two sanction regimes, namely the sanction regime adopted by the Council of the European Union against the Republic of Belarus (2011) and the sanctions adopted against the Russian Federation (2014) aim to shed light on the Visegrad Group´s capacity to coordinate their foreign policies in the area of the EU´s Common Foreign and Security Policy.

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2. Literature Review

The cohesion of V4 policies within the foreign policy of the EU has been studied thoroughly by a number of scholars. Dangerfield (2008, 2009, 2012), Strážay (2008, 2009) and Kořan (2010) are some of the more prominent ones. In this section, I will map this field of study using the works of some of these authors who contribute to my theory framework. I will also justify the necessity of conducting a new research within a field which up until now focused mainly on V4 cooperation in certain sectors, assessments of V4´s entry to the EU´s foreign policy (Král 2005; Dangerfield 2012) or the consequences of V4 for the individual foreign policies of its members (Gniazdowski 2008; Marton 2012; Baun & Marek 2013).

On that note, this chapter will focus on the literature of decision-making cohesion of V4 towards areas of Europe´s external policy. As mentioned, most of the literature is focused on types of issues such as defence, Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership. Eastern Partnership has been of particular interest to the scholars who were studying V4´s contribution to the European Neighbourhood Policy. Works of different authors on the Eastern Partnership include M. Dangerfield´s “The Contribution of the Visegrad Group to the EU´s Eastern Policy: Rhetoric or Reality” (2009) and “Visegrad Group Cooperation and Russia” (2012), where he thoroughly dissects the reasons behind V4´s capacity or willingness to cooperate with Russia on the background of their external policy towards the Eastern Partnership. His analysis breaks down the context and functions of V4 and assesses that V4 has small chances to direct their cooperation on Russia, apart from limited economic areas. This is due to reasons such as intra-V4 political divergence in respect to Russia, lack of leverage the EU let alone V4 has on persuading Russia to cooperation and Russian preference for bilateral relations.

Policy analysts such as Duleba (2007) and Albrycht (2010) contribute to the debate on enhancing EU´s capacity in pursuing its objectives in Eastern Europe and V4´s role in co-shaping EU´s policy in the Eastern Partnership, respectively. Combining the extensive literature on V4´s activities in the Eastern Partnership and their involvement in Eastern Neighbourhood Policy, it would be interesting to see whether V4´s role in Eastern Europe translates into cooperation on CFSP activities targeting this area. This interest is partially motivated by the recent security crisis in Ukraine, which borders three of the four Visegrad member states.

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Scrutinising this topic, I have focused on V4 and its cooperation or non-cooperation in the field of sanctions literature, such as the work of Sofia Wallberg – “The price of sanctions – how far are the Western powers willing to go?” In this work she breaks down and analyses Visegrad Group´s divided positions on the sanction war with Russia over Ukraine and studied in depth the reasons for discrepancy on adopting 3rd level sanctions on Russia.1 The aim was to unravel the reasons behind the behaviour of the four countries based on rational choice approach and thus on Nested Game and Two-level Game theory. Wallberg notes that Adam Rácz defined V4 countries’ positions towards Russia by a constellation of geopolitical concerns, normative motivations, business interests and domestic political ambitions. Based on this, Wallberg built her 5 hypotheses around domestic political ambitions (H1), business interests (H2), geopolitical concerns (H3), European Union cooperation (H4) and external cooperation with non-EU countries (H5). The research fits into 3 different arenas: domestic (H1), supranational (H2, H3) and international (H4, H5), which are based on the multiple arena game theories. As mentioned before, this research presumes that the V4 members approach their participation in V4 behaving rationally and focuses only on one case.

To begin the review of some works which scrutinise possible causes determining failures or successes of V4´s cooperation, it would be useful to start with the article by Edit Csavajda and Bartlomiej Derski “V4 Countries in context of EU and NATO Security Policy”, where they contend that the most important reason justifying the existence of V4 is the non-power of the countries, in the sense that separately their voices mean little on the international and even the European scene. (Csavajda & Derski, 2010) The article analyses the needs for institutional formalisation in relation to being a player in security cooperation. They advocate that V4 needs to institutionalise more in order to facilitate agreeing on one unilateral position. The same conclusions are drawn by Naď, Gyarmati, Szatkowski and Frank, prominent V4 security and defence experts, in a 2010 policy paper on “Trans-Atlantic Security” who assess V4´s conjunction of interests, threat perceptions, its previous successes and failures and offer proposals on the lack of coordination in defence and security cooperation. They attribute these to the non-existence of formal but also informal mechanisms of cooperation in defence and security. They add that the expert level and the high level meetings are not substantial if there is not a clear identification of areas for close collaboration and if conditions to follow the declared political intentions are not defined.

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“3rd level of sanctions” are sanctions which target the entire economic sectors of the targeted country, such as the defence sector. (Wallberg, 2015)

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Michal Kořan in his book titled: “Czech Foreign Policy in 2007-2009: Analysis”, develops the discussion on Visegrad´s “socialisation”. He commends V4´s institutional developments such as: 1) the effort to focus the high level meetings on a single issue, 2) V4+ meetings with stake holding parties on a particular agenda, 3) proceeding in coordination with EU presidencies and inviting the Presidency representatives to their meetings (for example: coordination on EU´s neighbourhood policy resulted in the making of the Eastern Partnership), and 4) establishing contacts between V4 and GUAM (Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan). Overall he gives an assessment that the V4 is undergoing an intensification and qualitative improvement in the realm of institutionalisation, which in turn brings about deeper cooperation, but he warns against the formalisation of this institutional set-up. He suggests that because V4 countries are sometimes direct competitors and because the EU would react negatively on a formalised V4 that would attempt to secure its narrow interests. He recommends that V4 continues its “smart approach” where the meetings “are rarely devoted to an actual coordination of policies. Mostly they inform the partners of one´s intentions and seek a potential agreement.” (Kořan, 2010, p. 123)

Martin Dangerfield (2008) believes that it seems fairly safe to predict that for the immediate future, the relationship will be based on cooperation and acceptance of the principle that coordination is to be the norm only in cases where it suits all parties and where the EU governance system allows. Dangerfield´s (2012) article on why the V4 fails to extend its cooperation towards Russia enlightens this contention. In addition to the three points mentioned in the second paragraph of this chapter, he explains that all four states have dense bilateral links with Russia in key policy fields and have their own priorities vis-à-vis these fields, which they look to safeguard at the EU level. The salience of these issues seems to be too highly valued to be subjected to a capacity-lacking sub-regional partnership. This is as well backed up by Wallberg´s analysis of her 5 Game Theory hypotheses, which seem to be of causal relevance to the shattered positions of V4 countries on the sanctions war with Russia. (Wallberg, 2015) Therefore, differentiated political salience of an issue seems to be a relevant variable to be compared across cases of V4´s cooperation.

One of the focal works of this research includes an article by Törő, Butler & Grúber entitled: “Visegrad: The Evolving Pattern of Coordination and Partnership after EU Enlargement”, which describes thoroughly the structure of Visegrad cooperation. This work offers a succinct summary of V4´s institutional structure and analysis of certain areas of cooperation such as Defence, Eastern Partnership and Energy Policy. They divide the components of collaboration

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into the Presidential, Ministerial and Parliamentary dimension. The modalities are composed of regular V4 meetings, cooperation with EU presidencies and the V4+ format. The authors explain that V4 and its V4+ formats allow states to build a framework of internal trust, which facilitates elimination of clashes of interests. Just like M. Kořan, they acknowledge that intensified “socialisation” of the group may be a variable influencing outcomes of their cooperation but they as well highlight that the institutional flexibility allows them to build on shared preferences but withdraw from cooperation when their national positions are too far apart. Thus it becomes relevant to say that a critical divergence of preferences leads the member states to circumvent the sub-regional cooperation group.

2.1. Summary

The discussed literature often points to the fact that if there would be more institutionalisation or at least “socialisation”, cooperation in more areas could be achieved. Others tend to say that safeguarding of national key interests and often wide-ranging individual preferences are legitimate factors that limit the areas of Visegrad Group´s cooperation. In this regard, policy papers usually offer proposals which point to possible areas of common interest where V4 members should direct their collective attention. From this review, we can see that when scholars attempt to explain the presence or absence of V4 cooperation, they either tend to look for reasons based on a single case study or they focus on sectors of cooperation where either systematic cooperation occurs or sectors where cooperative approach is absent. An analysis which would focus on the conditions that determine when the V4 cooperates and when it does not cooperate within a certain policy area is missing.

En bloc, there exists voluminous literature on assessing Visegard Group´s cooperation in regard to multiple issues with a lot of attention paid to the context of the social reality. A scholar of public administration is interested in causal inferences related to uncovering systematic behaviour of a group of actors within a specific social context. Therefore, assessing the reasoning for the behaviour of the members of V4 within the context of CFSP is a valid topic to be explored. A study which would look into reasons that prove to be crucial in determining the outcome falling within the context of CFSP as such is missing. Assessment of such conditions addressed by a comparison of cases would be a desirable input for the scholarly literature. The literature as well lacks a comprehensive approach on V4´s involvement and contribution to EU sanctions across cases.

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3. V4 cooperation: Context of the study

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will focus on explaining the institutional structure of Visegrad cooperation and its historical development in order to grasp the context within which this study operates. The purpose for this stems from the need to define the major concepts from which it is possible to build the theory. Information on the institutional structure of the V4 is crucial in order to understand how the group works, what functions it carries out for its members and what sort of issues can be expected to be discussed at the platform. This chapter establishes the background for building the variables of this study and allows the findings to be assessed in a clear context of the social reality.

3.2 Historical overview of V4 cooperation

At the end of the Cold War, with the Soviet Union´s grip loosened over its satellite states in Eastern Europe, due to Mikhail Gorbachev´s policies of Glasnost and Perestroika, the abandonment of the Brezhnev´s Doctrine and the revolutions of 1989, a power vacuum has emerged in Central Europe. A possibility emerged for the small and middle-sized states of Eastern Europe to exercise its sovereignty and direct its efforts at integrating with the globalising world the direction it desires. Warsaw Pact´s functions were no longer fulfilled and the commitment of its members towards fulfilling these functions evaporated. Thus, there was no longer a superpower that would be guaranteeing the security and defence of the bulk of states previously attached to the socialist world´s institutional structures. In the face of these crucial changes that deeply affect the nature of existence of the states concerned, the field was cleared for the establishment of new regional and sub-regional groups.

As stated in a working paper by A. Cottey, “Sub-regional Cooperation in Europe: An Assessment”, sub-regional groups carry out up to 4 essential functions due to which state actors have an interest in forming them. The first is political – sub-regional groups are a tool in overcoming historical divisions and mitigating the emergence of new ones. The second is to help members integrate in the EU and NATO. Good neighbourly behaviour shows the readiness of states to enter into a responsible partnership. The third function is of practical concern – to address transboundary policy challenges that are requiring a transnational solution. Fourth function is to create a platform through which processes of reform may be facilitated or driven through mutual assistance. Considering the aspiration of countries such as

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Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary in 1990, cooperation in a form of sub-regional partnership offers a powerful tool to achieve their goals as stated in the Visegrad Declaration of 1991.

The Visegrad Group´s aim, initially, was to join the strengths of four Central European states that share similar cultural backgrounds, historical experiences and state of internal socio-economic realities in order to bargain their accession into the Euro-Atlantic security, political and economic structures; that is, into NATO and the European Union. Since the 1st of May 2004, all four states have been integrated into both organisations and the Visegrad Group´s existential purpose seemed to be fulfilled. The four Central European governments decided it would be in their interest to maintain this informal format of cooperation and give it a new purpose that could enhance the capacities of furthering their agendas. Agendas that they deem to be in their common interest.

It was essential for the heads of the governments to anchor this in a political declaration, which would give the format a stamp of new legitimacy, vision and purpose. The decision was to maintain V4´s informal structure, without setting up of a secretariat nor binding the governments into any form of legal commitment or treaty. This decision was aimed at shielding the Group from any potential strains that could be pressing the member states into decisions that they would be forced to take against their internal desires, which could bring about hard feelings and stain the friendship between the governments sharing territorial borders. Thus, they signed the Kroměříž Declaration on the 12th of May 2004, only 12 days after their official accession into the European Union. The Kroměříž Declaration uplifts the spirit of good faith and flexibility that the four Central European nations wilfully strived to maintain.

In the Kroměříž Declaration, as members of the European Union, V4 declared their intention to “continue to focus on regional activities and initiatives aimed at strengthening the identity of the Central European region. In this context, their cooperation will be based on concrete projects and will maintain its flexible and open character.” (Kroměříž Declaration, 2004) As we observe, the primary objective of the Group is to focus on the Central European region through initiatives and concrete projects. As the Declaration reads, these projects are mostly aimed at strengthening the democratic character and pro-European identity of the Central European region and to further the efforts of European Enlargement Policy. The primary geographical scope of their attention is Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Their efforts are

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aimed at initiatives and projects of common interest “with countries within the wider region, with other regional groupings in Europe as well as with third countries and international organizations.” (Kroměříž Declaration, 2004) This means that European Union and NATO are not the exclusive areas where the Visegrad Group plans its activities. The measure of its success or effectiveness should by no means be defined by the coherence of their behaviour in relation to a full array of foreign policy questions that arise, but rather in relation to projects and initiatives they set out for themselves to accomplish. Any issue can of course be discussed, any kind of issue can appear on the list of common initiatives or projects, but there is no obligation to put an issue on the agenda of the V4 meetings, just like there is no “must” in the Declaration of Kroměříž. Nonetheless, when it is in their common interest, a discussion ensues between the four states, since a common bargaining position offers the possibility of increased yields at international fora.

One of the paragraphs of the Kroměříž Declarations begins with: “The Visegrad Group countries are strongly determined to jointly contributing to the fulfilment of the European Union's common goals and objectives and to the successful continuation of the European integration.” (Kroměříž Declaration, 2004) Although this is not in any case a legal obligation, it is a commitment of a gentleman-like nature, an intention of their strong determination that they will contribute to the fulfilment of European Union´s common goals and objectives. Such an obligation has been signed by all four of the member states with the European Union upon their accession. This does not in any case mean that the V4 countries are determined to obey the Commission or other larger EU members, but that they will contribute to Union´s common goals and objectives.

The Bratislava Declaration, signed upon the 20th anniversary of the V4, expands and concretises V4´s aims, allowing for a better readability of what their cooperation has become to represent. In one of the points of the Bratislava Declaration we can read: „…to enhance the visibility of the Visegrad Group in third countries both through deeper V4 cooperation within the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU and through activities beyond the Union level.“ (Bratislava Declaration, 2011)

3.3 Institutional structure of V4 cooperation

The institutional structure is outlined in the “Guidelines on the Future Areas of Visegrad Cooperation”, a document attached to the Kroměříž Declaration, adopted on the 12th

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2004. It is divided into 5 sections: Co-operation within the V4 area, Co-operation within the EU, Co-operation with other partners, Co-operation within NATO and other international organisations and Mechanisms of co-operation. The cooperation within the V4 area includes thematic areas such as culture, infrastructure, environment and Schengen cooperation, among others. The sections on the cooperation with other partners and cooperation within NATO and other international organisations includes statements such as “cooperation with interested Central European countries”, “Cooperation with other regional structures”, “commitment to strengthening of transatlantic solidarity and cohesion, “possible mutual support of candidacies in international organisations and bodies” and “consultation, cooperation and exchange of information in international organisations”.2 However, cooperation within the EU is what is central to the purposes of this study.

The first point in the section on cooperation within the EU states: “Consultations and co-operation on current issues of common interest.” Although this point is a little too vague, the list continues with more concrete areas that are of great interest for the V4 members. Regarding contribution towards CFSP the guidelines mention “Wider Europe – New Neighbourhood” with an emphasis on Western Balkans.3

This directly connects to EU´s enlargement policy and its current European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which connects to the commitment, to support aspiring candidates for EU membership, presented in the 2004 Declaration itself. Other key areas of Visegrad cooperation within the framework of EU include the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), economic cooperation within the European Economic Area, preparations for joining the European Monetary Union (EMU), European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and strengthening the relations between EU and NATO. Indeed, according to a paper by Törő et al., “Visegrad: After EU Enlargement”, published in May 2014, the key areas of cooperation are the V4 candidature for EU decentralised agencies and institutional representation, energy policy, Eastern Neighbourhood and defence policy. These are the areas of common interest toward which the V4 countries devote their energy. Having summarised the areas of cooperation as perceived by the V4 members in 2004, I would like to concentrate on the mechanisms of this cooperation and the institutional structure within which the member states cooperate. As laid out in the Kroměříž Declaration, there are three institutional components of cooperation, copying the constitutional structure of division of responsibilities between the executive, presidential and legislative branches. At the

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UN, Council of Europe, OECD, etc. 3

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executive level, the guidelines on the governmental cooperation are most elaborate. It is based on a rotating one year presidency, each preparing its own programme which is supposed to ensure the continuity of the V4 cooperation and its long-term goals. Yearly, a summit of Prime Ministers is held, who have the greatest competency to subscribe to and execute projects that are to be pursued collectively. Meetings of deputy foreign ministers are held before the Prime Ministerial summits and the Prime Ministers together with Ministers of Foreign Affairs meet before international events such as the EU summits. Ministerial meetings are as well a significant element of the cooperation, since the multitude of tasks to be executed include a broad range of matters. Such ministerial meetings may as well be held in a V4+ format.4 V4 national coordinators are established to facilitate intensified communication and coordination. Consultation and cooperation between Permanent Representations to the EU and NATO is to be carried out, as well as in fora such as the UN. International Visegrad Fund5 (IVF) and its structures are another important mechanism for cooperation. IVF represents the only fully institutionalised structure of the V4, with its own budget and secretariat, which is based in Bratislava.

The other level of cooperation consists of Presidential summits. The role of the Presidents is rather ceremonial and limited to acts of declarations and common statements, since the execution of policies is in the hands of the governments. The legislative component entails the cooperation of V4 Parliaments, which discuss and coordinate legislative programmes. The communication rests at the level of the Speakers of National Assemblies and the Chairmen of Committees on European Affairs. As can be seen from the outline of the mechanisms, the mode of cooperation in V4 is intergovernmental, although not institutionalised as for example the Council of European Union is, where the decision making is intergovernmental. In V4 it is the separate but coordinated policies of the participants that determine the institutionalisation of the sub-regional structure.

After the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, vectors underlying common decision making make sub-regional cooperation increasingly valuable, especially in the fields where decisions are taken on the basis of qualified majority voting (QMV). However, decision making in the field of CFSP is still taken by unanimity, therefore each member state retains a veto power over legislation to be adopted. Nonetheless, the practice of frequent consultations and coordination before important EU summits or voting sessions holds the advantage of an increased capacity

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V4+ is a meeting format where other interested states or sub -regional groupings are invited to the V4 meeting. 5

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to form ideational coalitions, which then speak with a stronger voice, gaining an increased weight in intergovernmental negotiations on the field of the Council of European Union. This informal structure of cooperation, revolving around specific matters within the context of a larger organisation gives its members a flexible mechanism based on which the members may cooperate but are not bound to do so. On one hand it deprives the group of possible obstacles upon which the partnership may cease to continue, on the other, it may at times when members fail to agree, cause troubles in legitimising its existence.

The Lisbon Treaty transformed the scene for the Visegrad cooperation. The European Parliament (EP) is now at an equal footing with the Council regarding policy formation and decision making, meaning that the V4 states can now use their voting power in the EP committees as well (theoretically – if the MEPs do vote according to national and not party lines). However, on the matters of CFSP, EP can only run commentaries. Increased institutionalisation of QMV as well plays in favour of exerting effort to strive for collective action, but on CFSP issues, unanimity is the voting procedure. Nonetheless, the added value for sustaining sub-regional cooperation groups such as Visegrad, Baltic, Nordic and Benelux groups is increasing, especially among those where internal trust is already established. The rationale for the V4 cooperation lies in effective representation of the shared member states´ interests in EU decision making process and its main purpose is to support possible convergence of national positions on EU policies and brand the external presentation of such common positions. (Törő et al., 2014) The rotational presidency allows V4 to be flexible and set its agenda based on evolving priorities, while working with its predecessors on continuity and with successors on informing future agenda. This is similar to the principle of the Presidency Trios, which are an institutionalised practice in the rotating presidency of the Council of European Union. The Visegrad Group is institutionalised without a formal standing organisational structure6, through regional interest group behaviour. However, due to the loose approach their cooperation remains somewhat limited since they collaborate mostly when their interests are in harmony, meaning that they do not have to make adjustments to their existing preferences. Once adjustments of individual preferences have to be made, the cooperation is not automatically guaranteed, as found out by Silvia Pcolinska in her thesis named: “Security Implications of Central Europe´s In-Betweenness”. Nonetheless, coherence and stability may be achieved through internal trust and regular discourse practices.

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The relevance of Visegrad Group in EU decision making is quite significant. Synchronisation of policy formation is a practice of the EU policy cycle even among bigger states such as France and Germany. (Törő et al., 2014) Policy formulation and policy evaluation are usually concluded through meetings that take place before the actual summits or meetings of the European Council, which has become a tradition. This allows groupings of smaller states7 to better stand up to political pressures coming from the larger states of the Union. Foreign policy dimension is a frequent point of business on the V4 consultative meetings. The Council of the European Union itself offers ample opportunities to represent concerted positions of the V4. For example Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), Political and Security Committee (PSC) and various working groups related to the CFSP meet on weekly or even more frequent basis. V4 collaboration with EU presidencies and the V4+ format also offer good opportunities to present and propose common V4 policies. Among the meetings of the V4+ format, the most regular is the V4+B3,8 where usually questions of strategic significance are being discussed. This gives the seven countries a more powerful leverage, than would be the sum of the two separate groups. An established mechanism of such collective action within the EU gives these states advantageous positions to present concerted positions and promote their self-interest. (Törő et al., 2014) Nevertheless, this does not guarantee that collective agreement between them will be achieved.

Visegrad cooperation is based solely on the principle of periodical meetings of government representatives, official summits and presidency programs – so-called one-year plans of action. (Visegrad Group, 2016) IVF is the only V4 organisation with its own secretariat and its budget grew to €8 million as of 2014. IVF is engaged in numerous programs including individual scholarships, grant programs and artist residencies, thus representing the civic dimension of V4 cooperation. (Visegrad Group, 2016) This makes it a very effective tool for cooperation with its partners and the presentation of V4.

The backbone of the Visegrad Group today is made up of mutual contacts, ranging from experts, through diplomats to the highest political levels. The content of the cooperation lies in the implementation of joint projects, with particular interest in working closely with like-minded organisations and states in V4´s geographic vicinity, a practice which is preferred and consciously pursued over building big administrative secretariats. Its flexibility seems to be the biggest strength of V4, since it is better suited to withstand challenges posed by

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Although Poland is a larger state. 8

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heterogeneous preferences. It makes it more appealing to its members and positions it to remain on the political scene for the foreseeable future.

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4. Theory Framework

Based on the information presented in the previous chapter, it is now possible to proceed to the formulation of the theory framework. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss potentially important variables that could explain the difference in outcomes. Such variables need to be controlled for in order to arrive at an analysis which adequately answers the research question and which blocks out unwanted influences that would affect the outcomes by keeping the cases studied as similar as possible. The controlled variables will be chosen to reflect the needs of the research question and will contribute to the case selection, which is important in order to single out those independent variables that account for the difference in outcome. Although it is the intention of the conclusion of this study to produce hypotheses that account for the result when a common position can be reached in the field of CFSP and when it cannot, some possible directions in which to search for potentially important factors can be formulated even at this point, based on the previous chapters.

4.1 Defining V4 common positions and CFSP

This section will define the outcome that the research question focuses on. The research question asks what determines the outcome of formulating a common position of V4 in the field of CFSP. Formulating a common position needs to stem from a process of interaction on the V4 level and an agreement on the issue. This study focuses on the reasons which shape the final decision. The observed outcomes in the cases are binary; they either do formulate a common position that supports a certain issue or they do not. Such a common position must be based on discussions between the V4 states on the V4 platform. The aim of this study is to see when common positions are formulated and when the adjustment becomes impossible. Therefore, the study needs to be defined within the context of institutional cooperation of V4 states, which results in the formulation of a common position in the form of joint statements, non-papers9 or public statements.

Common Foreign and Security Policy is one of the dimensions of the external relations of the EU, which focuses on foreign security issues, not trade relations. Heads of state remain responsible for CFSP, while the foreign ministers coordinate at monthly meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), which is prepared by Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER II) coordinating with the Political Security Committee (PSC). An

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institutionalising common practice is that the defence ministers may meet at the FAC in jumbo-format, since they do not have a Council of their own. The Council can appoint special representatives (EUSRs) in different regions of the world to promote EU interests and policies.

Treaty of Lisbon redesigned the landscape of CFSP, its bodies and institutions. Most importantly it established the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is a department of the EU that serves as its “foreign ministry”. It is being supplied by diplomats from the EU member states, who are seconded to this body by their own governments. It is responsible for the representation of the EU in third countries and for the implementation of CFSP. In charge of the EEAS is the High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is at the same time the Vice-President of the European Commission an presides over the FAC meetings.10

CFSP has various instruments to employ to execute its policy. Decisions adopted by the Council determine this policy through positions and actions. They are binding the member states to certain policy and its execution in the form of joint action and funding. The High Representative is the speaker on behalf of the member states in regard to these issues. Within the CFSP the EU conducts a political dialogue with third countries and organisations that are focused on the positions and actions the CFSP decides to implement. An important dimension of this is its presence on the ground. The EU uses its own diplomatic network and sends out delegations that represents EU´s interests abroad. Special Envoys and Representatives are responsible for EU´s presence on the ground and inform the Union on the progress of the implementation of its policies abroad. Sanctions are another instruments used against foreign entities such as countries, non-state actors and individuals in response to violations of international law or policies that the EU deems as running contrary to its own principles.

4.2 Formulation of controlled variables

By now we were able to learn that V4´s activities are limited to certain topics and is free to discuss any issue it deems fit to be brought to the V4 meeting. It is as well evident that V4 does include CFSP issues on its agenda. This study´s interest is to look into the reasons which determine a successful formulation of a common position and a failed one across CFSP issues. In this hypothesis-generating, bottom-up approach it is necessary to keep important

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Treaty of Lisbon redefined the post of High Representative for CFSP who was at the same time the Secretary General of the Council. The Council instead got its own President and General Secretary.

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variables that can have a significant impact on the variable constant. For that purpose the cases studied need to be as similar as possible. An important way how to ensure that, is to choose such issues that fall under the same type and entail similar considerations on behalf of the V4 members when deciding whether to adopt a common position or not. Therefore, it would not be relevant to select cases that diverge on this principle. The type of issue needs to be controlled. For that purpose CFSP sanctions have been chosen. Thus, an important control variable is: Type of issue: CFSP sanctions.

Another control variable needs to be formulated along the lines of the time period studied. The study of the sanctions will need to reflect the phase when the V4 had an interest and need to discuss an EU sanction regime. This usually happens in the preparatory stages of the EU sanction regime. Therefore, the time period needs to be established between the eruption of the problem and the implementation of the sanctions connected with it. The Visegrad Group also has to have enough time to convene a meeting otherwise the time pressure required to take a decision will lead to a decision taken at the EU level only. Even if the V4 countries are in agreement on the issue, a common position of the V4 cannot be established when there is not enough time to negotiate separately. Based on this logic, the V4 has to have enough time to negotiate whether they adopt a common position or not in the time period between the eruption of the problem and the implementation of the sanctions connected with it. Therefore, another controlled variable needs to be: Data found within the relevant time period.

If a CFSP issue arrives on the table at a V4 meeting, the causes for this are that the matter has not been closed yet. This happens because the decision-making process in CFSP needs to accommodate the positions of 28 veto-holding states. At the very beginning of the process of position formation each state brings its own position to the negotiation table. Nonetheless, every state´s preference must be adjusted to a certain degree in order to reach a common position on the CFSP level. In a state of harmony when everyone´s interests are identical a decision would be taken automatically. In a comparative design strategy, an adopted common position based on harmonious interests would determine that the differentiating factor across cases is the fact that the states disagreed and would rule out the possibility of a degree of preference adjustment. This would distort the conclusion because adjustments do take place on the V4 level. Another controlled variable is: Positions of V4 countries are not identical at

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From the literature review and the chapter on the context of V4 cooperation, we can observe and deduce a number of potentially important explanations that might account for the difference in outcome.

As it was mentioned, an informal structure which revolves around specific matters within a context of larger organisation gives the members a flexible mechanism based on which the members may choose which topics to discuss and whether to cooperate. Therefore, the low institutionalisation itself has an effect on the levels of cooperation, since there are not any visible compensation mechanisms which would put pressure on maintaining the coherence and stability of the Group. Member states have a high degree of freedom to disagree and not formulate a common position on the V4 level. Although the institutional structure remains the same in V4, some literature proposes that an increase in the institutional “socialisation”11 may be responsible for cooperation to spread into more areas. This differs across cases because the Visegrad Group is involved in ever more intensive interaction and broader collaboration. The member countries may find themselves to disagree on a certain policy based on their differing views and strategies of their foreign policy. Since the V4 is largely a communication platform and at the level of CFSP they discuss possible coordination of their interests, the group is highly susceptible to a failure of cooperation based on differing views and strategies of their separate foreign policies, even if it is known that adjustments do occur. However, safeguarding of salient national interests decreases the flexibility of the countries´ willingness to be adjust their preferences and may prevent the formulation of a common position. Therefore, high salience of the issue at hand has a potential to decrease the ability of the group to adopt a common position when their preferences over it are diverging.

Another important aspect of the Visegrad cooperation is the scope of their projects, initiatives and therefore contacts they make with third countries. IVF is the only formal institution established by the V4 with its own budget and programmes, which executes a bulk of the joint effort of V4. The Eastern Partnership is another example of an initiative that ranks highly on the list of common V4 interests. The V4 coordinators and experts devote a lot of their energy in preparing and executing these joint initiatives. However, the political decision to formulate them stems from the high level political meetings where the four countries recognise the common interest to engage in a certain cooperation. Through these initiatives and

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programmes V4 creates a web of contacts between V4 and the partner countries. Presence of such contacts can have a possible increased leverage on the willingness of the V4 countries to formulate a common position if the country becomes a target of EU sanctions.

4.4 Summary of variables

Control Variables:

 Type of issue: CFSP sanctions

 Data found within the relevant time period

 Positions of V4 are not identical at the beginning of the studied period Possible explanatory variables

 Increase in the institutional “socialisation”

 Salience of the issue

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5. Methodology

5.1 Research strategy

To better understand what eventually decides when the V4 does choose to cooperate and when it does not, a comparison of cases with different outcomes would be relevant. For this reason an adequate research strategy needs to be chosen, which would allow for enough flexibility to analyse the array of possible causes. The cases need to reflect the contextual similarity defined by the type of issue, relevant data found within the time period studied and an indication that there are some disagreements between the V4 in the beginning of the process of position formation.

In order to determine what would be a relevant research strategy, we need to look at the question: When can a V4 common position be reached in the field of CFSP? The study is looking into possible reasons which facilitated or prevented the adoption of common positions across instances of CFSP sanction formation. Each outcome of an instance rests on the background of a rather complex context and results from a decision-making process involving multiple state actors, which requires an in-depth analysis of each case. Since the focus is to try to find out which conditions are systematically influential in formulating a common position of the V4 on CFSP issues, a single case would not be sufficient to generalise the findings across all other possible instances. Therefore, an extension to a case study, a multiple-case study needs to be carried out to compare at least two instances which would shed a light on the differences which determine the outcome. In political science and public administration, methodologists call this a Comparative Case Method. (Yin, 2003)

A comparative research design in the realm of inductive research questions “entails the comparison of two or more cases in order to… generate theoretical insights as a result of contrasting findings uncovered through the comparison.” (Bryman, 2012, p. 710) Since this study did not set out for itself to analyse every case of CFSP sanction regime, it will be a small-N comparative research. In an inductive scenario, the research does not start “with a hypothesis, but with a set of cases and asks: what can we learn, given the cases we have?” (Toshkov, 2016, p. 3) In a small-N comparative research design, a combination of variables needs to be established in order to limit possible explanatory factors that might moderate the outcome. Thus, the output of the thesis is to arrive at new hypotheses that determine the outcomes studied.

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According to A. Bryman case studies are relevant because the “intensive nature of exploring cases enhances the researcher´s sensitivity to the factors that lie behind the operation of observed patterns within a specific context.” (Bryman, 2012, p. 74) A multiple-case study offers an advantage of enabling the researcher to examine the operation of causal mechanisms in similar contexts. In the cases selected, based on the context of operationalised variables, the outcomes are known and different. Therefore, the comparison aims to observe concepts that are responsible for the different outcome in a particular context. The key to this comparative design is that it enables the researcher to use the contrast findings in formulating theoretical reflections.

5.2 Case selection

The goal of this qualitative research is theory building and for this reason an adequate strategy of case selection needs to be applied, which reflects the kind of comparative research design explained above. An appropriate way of selecting cases would be coherent with the logic of Most Similar Systems Design II, described in “Research design in political science” by D. Toshkov. The cases must remain similar in terms of possible explanatory conditions or contextual variables that can moderate how the main effect works. They should differ only on certain hypothesised causes, which account for the difference in outcome. Therefore, cases as similar as possible are selected and within the analysis both the control and outcome variables need to be taken into consideration and kept constant. “The task is to discover a difference between the cases that can account for the difference in outcome, where no variable shared by the cases can be responsible for the different outcomes.” (Toshkov, 2016, p. 10)

In this multiple-case study, the cases selected represent extreme types – namely, successful and unsuccessful adoption of a common position. As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, for the purposes of this specific research, the cases must satisfy the following controlled conditions: The type of issue: CFSP sanction; data found within the relevant time period: from eruption of the problem until the final implementation of the sanctions stemming from it; and indication that there are some disagreements between the V4 countries in the beginning of the process of position formation.

The summary of CFSP sanctions may be found in a list of EU sanctions composed by the EEAS. Greater challenge stemmed from the second controlled variable which requires the data to be found within the relevant time period of the study. A thorough research within the relevant documentation needed to be carried out to narrow down the possible sanction regimes which would satisfy this controlled variable. Further scrutiny was required to assess

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which data merely reflected harmonised positions of the V4 countries that they agreed upon at the EU level and which required cooperation because some commonalities were identified and thus the V4 raised the issue at their meeting. This narrowed down the range of relevant cases even more. The greatest problem rested with finding a case which yielded a negative result, but was proven to be discussed at V4 level. Since V4 does not publish minutes of its meetings and upon disagreement does not produce an official document stating this, public statements were key in identifying such a sanction regime. Two cases were selected, which were similar enough to be compared: the case of Belarus and Russian Federation.

Variable Belarus Russian Federation

CFSP sanction regime Yes Yes

Data found within time period studied Yes Time period: 19/12/2010 – 15/10/2012 Yes Time period: 28/02/2014 – 12/09/2014 Some disagreements in

the beginning of the process of position formation

Yes

SK, PL: preferred economic sanctions CZ, HU: preferred targeted sanctions

Yes

PL: pushed for “third level” sanctions CZ: Protested against “third level” sanctions, but wished to remain committed to EU unity

SK, HU: actively protested against the imposition of “third level” sanctions Explanation of the difference ? ? Outcome: common position

YES

NO

5.3 Data collection

What is the empirical evidence that should be collected? As Yin notes, documentary information is likely to be relevant to every type of case study. Communiqués, announcements, administrative documents, formal studies and articles all qualify as “Documentation”. The dependent variable of this study is the “outcome”, which is the V4 common position as defined in the theoretical chapter. V4 formulates its common positions in official documents such as Joint Statements, V4 Communiqués and Declarations. However, the review of official V4 documents does not only serve to find a reference to a common endorsement of a certain sanction regime, it as well serves as empirical evidence, which can offer explanations that are responsible for the difference in outcome. In addition to the list of relevant documents already mentioned, it is also necessary to look at articles, public

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statements, reports from discussion forums and other administrative documents such as the V4 Presidency Annual Reports and the Foreign Policy Annual Reports of the V4 member states.

A review of the relevant documentation will result in finding references to the particular cases and will shed light on the positions of the four Visegrad countries. Once all the relevant official declarations and statements are collected, they will be arranged in a chronological order so as to trace the process of interactions between the members of the V4 on the particular issue and map the development of the situation. The empirical data will serve the assessment of what were the areas of conflict or common grounds that facilitated or prevented the formulation of a common position.

Official V4 documents and the V4 Presidency Annual Reports were collected on the webpage “www.visegradgroup.eu”. Other relevant official documentation such as the Foreign Policy Annual Reports of Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were found on the foreign ministry website of the respective countries. Public statements are a crucial component of the empirical data, since the politicians often reveal information on their motivations that would be difficult to deduce from the official documentation alone. Also, when the V4 does not agree on a joint document, public statements can be the only source where we can read about this. The public statements, usually cited in state news agencies were collected using the Factiva database.

5.4 Measurement

The data collected are of a qualitative character and are comprised of all relevant official references to the positions of V4 countries in regard to the CFSP sanctions. These have to reflect in the official documents of the V4 as well, either by a direct reference of the common position or by the lack thereof if negotiations on the issue have taken place.

The aim of the analysis is to build explanatory accounts of outcomes through an unstructured approach, which means that an informal discussion will be the technique of analysing the data from the cases. The character of the findings was comprised of statements which were explaining or simply backing up the positions of the V4 countries in connection with the sanction regime discussed. These statements carried a political message that reflected the separate national or common V4 positions, sometimes being self-explanatory, but many times an analytical thought was needed in order to bring light into the potential motivations standing

The Visegrad Group: Building Common Positions in CFSP