Analyzing the application of the Dublin
Regulation by street-level bureaucrats:
a Lesbos perspective
Gabriëlle op ‘t Hoog MSc
S2023644
Crisis and Security Management
Leiden University
June 2018
First Reader: Tim Dekkers MSc
Second Reader: Dr. Kate Kirk
Foreword
This thesis is the result of my desire to combine the interests, knowledge, and academic insights that I have developed over the past years. My internship at the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Greece sparked my fascination for European immigration and has ever since been an inspiration for projects both within and outside the scope of my academic activities. It has, therefore, been a great pleasure to dig deeper into the European policies on immigration in the light of this research.
I would like to take this chance to express my gratitude for the support that I received from my former colleagues of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Athens. The Embassy personnel, in particular Verena and Astrid, have been of immeasurable help in bringing me in touch with relevant contacts both in Athens and Lesbos. Without this support, it would have been much more difficult to reach the relevant people in the organizations both on the mainland as well as on the islands.
Furthermore, I would like to thank all interviewees for taking the time to speak to me about their experiences and opinions. Knowing the immense pressure they experience, I feel honored that they made time available to share with me their observations, opinions, and worries.
I hope you will enjoy reading this thesis as much as I enjoyed writing it.
Rotterdam, June 2018 Gabriëlle op ‘t Hoog
Abstract
As a result of the recent upsurge in arriving migrants and refugees to the outer borders of the EU, the union’s Dublin Regulation has been under enormous pressure. The regulation was criticized for not ensuring fair burden sharing among the European Member States. However, rather than analyzing the flaws in the design of the Dublin Regulation, this research builds upon the case study of Lesbos and attempts to understand the weaknesses of the application of the Dublin Regulation by street-level bureaucrats as perceived by migration management professionals. Applying Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucracy, the role of the caseworkers in the implementation of the policy is analyzed. Through interviews, the opinions of professionals regarding the weaknesses in the application of the regulation by the street-level bureaucrats on the Greek island were collected. This research concludes that the street-level bureaucrats on Lesbos enjoy a considerable amount of discretion in applying the Dublin Regulation. Moreover, the regular changes in policies, misinformed applicants, late information provision to applicants, inexperienced caseworkers, and a high turnover in staff enhance the degree of discretion. These weaknesses are particularly evident in the cases of alleged minors and during the vulnerability assessment. This study shows that the caseworkers on Lesbos do, congruent to Lipsky's theory, play a pivotal role in shaping the policy on the ground as decisions on claims might differ from caseworker to caseworker.
Keywords: Common European Asylum System, Greece, Lesbos, Dublin Regulation, Street-level bureaucracy
List of abbreviations
AA Advocates Abroad
CEAS Common European Asylum Policy
DR Dublin Regulation
EASO European Asylum Support Office
EC European Commission
ECRE European Council on Refugees and Exiles ELL European Lawyers Lesbos
ERP Ecumenical Refugee Program
EU European Union
Eurodac European Dactyloscopy GAS Greek Asylum Service GCR Greek Council for Refugees
HP Hellenic Police
IGO Intergovernmental Organization LCL Legal Center Lesbos
MPI Migration Policy Institute NGO Non-Governmental Organization
Table of Contents
Foreword 2 Abstract 3 List of abbreviations 4 1. Introduction 6 1.1 Research Question 7 1.2 Relevance 8 2. The Dublin Regulation 10 2.1 Development of the Dublin Regulation 11 2.1.1 Situation in Lesbos 11 2.2 Academic perspectives 12 2.3 Evaluations 13 3. Theory 14 3.1 Critical reflections on street-level bureaucracies 16 3.2 Multi-level governance 18 3.3 Migration management 18 3.4 Application to this research 20 4. Method 21 4.1 Case study 21 4.1.1 Lesbos as a case study 22 4.2 Interviews 22 4.3 Approach 23 4.3.1 Applied Thematic Analysis 26 4.4 Limitations 28 5. Analysis 30 5.1 Discretion 30 5.2 Causes for discretion 32 5.2.1 Changing policies 32 5.2.2 Misinformation 33 5.2.3 Inexperienced staff 36 5.3 Effects of discretion 38 5.3.1 Alleged minors 39 5.3.2 Vulnerability assessment 40 5.4 General observations 44 6. Conclusion 45 6.1 Street-level bureaucracies 46 6.2 Discussion 49 6.3 Recommendations 50 7. Bibliography 51 Annex A – Interview guide 56 Annex B – Coding scheme 58 Annex C – Invitation interview letter 60 Annex D – Simplified asylum procedure Lesbos 611. Introduction
Early in 2015, the European Union (EU) experienced an upsurge in arriving migrants and refugees. The instability in the Middle East and Northern Africa and the escalation of the conflict in Syria caused vast masses to leave their countries to seek safety and better lives in the EU. In particular, Greece witnessed a vast increase in the number of people arriving at its shores; in 2015, 856.723 people arrived in Greece via sea (UNHCR, 2018). The boom in migrants challenged the EU and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in many ways. The CEAS was established in 1999 to ensure uniform procedures regarding asylum applications in all Member States. It includes, amongst others, the Eurodac system for registering fingerprints, the Dublin Regulation (DR) that determines which Member State is responsible for an asylum application and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) that implements the CEAS. The CEAS was in crisis when the Southern Member States states were struggling with the registration and accommodation of the arrivals while the Northern Member States, as destination countries, experienced a vast increase in the number of asylum applications. The functioning of the CEAS was imperiled by the vast upsurge of migrants to its outer borders and the secondary movement resulting from it.
The one aspect of the EU’s migration policy that received significant critique is the DR. While this regulation had initially been established to ensure share burden sharing among the Member States, it was now criticized for not providing adequate protection to the asylum applicants. Since the DR’s inception in 1997, the EU had not been inundated with such large numbers of asylum applications. While currently, the third iteration of the DR is in place, the regulation is still incapable of helping the Member States cope with the increased pressure.
The landscape of European asylum policies is complex and widely criticized. It constitutes a large spider web of interrelated national policies and procedures that are linked to the overarching CEAS. In this network of interconnections, the DR comprises only one tiny group of knots. However, despite its relative size, the DR does constitute a highly interesting sub-area within the broader field of European asylum policies. Therefore, the DR has received substantial academic attention over the years. In particular, the policy-related flaws and weaknesses of the regulation have been scrutinized thoroughly. Amongst others, the
unequal burden for the Southern European states (Brekke & Brochmann, 2015), secondary movement, and the aspect of human rights (Guild, 2006) have been identified as core weaknesses of the design of the DR. Besides the substantial amount of research that has been done on these ‘design flaws’, there exist various evaluations of the DR examine the practical implementation of the regulation (EC, 2015; EC, 2016b). The European Commission’s (EC) analyses are of great use in providing a broad understanding of the practical working of the DR. However, while these evaluations provide a thorough analysis of the execution of the DR, the reports have a broad approach and thereby fail to focus on one specific geographic area.
1.1 Research Question
To address this gap in the existing literature, this research builds upon the academic body of knowledge on the DR as well as on the two EC evaluations. The research at hand focuses specifically on the Greek island of Lesbos and the implementation of the DR by street-level bureaucrats in the island’s hotspot, Moria. More specifically, this research attempts to identify the weaknesses in the application of the DR by the caseworkers on Lesbos. The following explorative research question, therefore, guides the study at hand:
What are the weaknesses as perceived by migration management professionals of the application of the Dublin Regulation by street-level bureaucrats?
This research will make use of a case study to thoroughly research and analyze the situation on the Greek island of Lesbos. The research will explore in-depth how migration management professionals perceive the implementation of the DR on Lesbos during the so-called European migration crisis that is ongoing. Lesbos’ geographic location on the outer border of the EU and the increased burden on the island that followed from the influx of migrants, make this island a particularly interesting topic to study. As the migration crisis has not come to a halt, this research will concentrate on the period starting early 2015 and ending in April 2018, when this research is conducted. This study will make use of Lipsky’s (1980) theory on street-level bureaucracy to analyze the role of street-street-level bureaucrats in the implementation of a policy.
Moreover, this research attempts to look into the perceptions on the implementation, which allows the researcher to get an in-depth understanding of the practical challenges that impact the implementation of the DR on Lesbos as experienced by the professionals. Rather than attempting to analyze the DR in a broad sense, this research question allows to go in-depth and to scrutinize the ‘first step’ (Articles 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the DR) within the DR that is being implemented in Lesbos. Due to the island’s location on the EU outer border and as a result of the suspension of the DR in Greece (see chapter 2), the reception facilities on the island are predominantly occupied with executing this ‘first step’ of the DR. They determine whether or not an applicant is eligible for international protection under the DR and secondly, which Member State is responsible for processing the claim. The initial registration and determination are crucial for the procedure that follows and therefore, they play a critical role in the implementation process of the DR.
1.2 Relevance
By combining the evaluation of the implementation of the DR with the academic research on the design flaws, this research aims to paint a more accurate picture of the challenges regarding the application of the DR by street-level bureaucrats on Lesbos. If the EU aims to improve the DR, the practical implementation of the DR requires to be scrutinized alongside the analysis of the flaws of the regulation on the policy and theoretical level. If the updated version of the DR only takes into account the suggested improvements on the policy-level and ignores the challenges that hinder the adequate implementation on the ground, one can hardly perceive the update as an actual upgrade. By identifying weaknesses in the application of the DR by street-level bureaucrats, this research aims to contribute specifically to the development of the initial step of the DR on Lesbos. Whereas this study only covers a tiny knot of the complex spider web of EU asylum policies, it will nevertheless be useful when improving the DR on a small scale on Lesbos.
Besides the potential societal impact this study could have, it also aims to enhance the body of academic knowledge by applying Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucracy (1980). This approach allows one to investigate and analyze how a policy is implemented, what the role of the street-level bureaucrat is in the application of the policy, and whether the implementation deviates from the envisaged application.
Lipsky (1980) provides a framework for this deviation and this will be of help to scrutinize the role of the caseworkers on the application of the DR on Lesbos. In other words, the analysis of the implementation of the DR in Lesbos will constitute a case study on the role a caseworker plays in the implementation of a policy. Applying this theoretical angle to the unique research setting in Lesbos will enhance the academic body of knowledge on the DR. In particular, it will add to the existing literature an in-depth analysis of the case of Lesbos.
This research fits well within the field of security studies, as migration is often perceived as a threat to various aspects of the receiving country. Border controls (Benam, 2011; Biehl, 2009) and the collection of private data of migrants (Boswell, 2007; Fauser, 2006) emphasize that migration can be perceived as a threat to the established way of life in a receiving country. In some cases, these threats are not only perceived but they are real in the sense that immigrants do actually challenge some aspects of the society of the receiving state. They pose, for example, an additional burden on welfare services because they are often unemployed and low skilled (Razin and Sadka, 2000). Furthermore, immigrants can pose a health-related threat to society as they might bring along new diseases, be more sensitive to diseases against which the host population has built resistance, and they might have unequal access to medical services (Carballo and Nerukar, 2001).
Migrants are, thus, often understood to be a threat to the receiving country and, therefore, security studies provide an interesting angle to analyze (im)migration.
2. The Dublin Regulation
Since the implementation of the DR in 1997, the number of ‘Dublin states’ has increased from 12 to 32 (EU28 plus Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Switzerland) (hereafter, this group will be referred to as ‘the Member States’). Currently, the EU is working on developing the fourth iteration of the regulation (DR IV). The union aims to present itself as a safe haven for those seeking refuge and the DR is a tool for the EU to achieve this goal.
The reasons for initiating the DR are manifold; from the perspective of the Member States, it is essential to have a European regulation that distributes the asylum applications over the Member States (EC, 2015, p. 2). In a borderless EU, applicants can move (almost) freely and can, therefore, lodge their application for international protection in the state of their choice. To avoid imbalance, the DR aims to enhance solidarity among the Member States and helps to divide the received applications among all Member States (in proportion to their capacity). Furthermore, the DR enhances clarity regarding asylum applications. It provides a management tool that outlines which Member State is responsible and how an application should be transferred (EC, 2015, p. 2). This system enhances the efficiency of the processing of the applications; as only one Member State is in charge of the application. Subsequently, this reduces the amount of ‘double’ efforts that are being put into one application. Thirdly, the DR discourages migrants to apply for asylum twice in two different Member States (EC, 2015, p. 3). The Eurodac system allows the Member States to check the fingerprints of applicants; if they turn up in the system it means the applicant has applied for asylum elsewhere already, meaning that this application can be transferred to the Member State in which the application was first lodged.
On the other hand, the DR was also created to benefit the applicant. Since only one Member State can be held responsible for an application, the chance of applicants ‘orbiting’ around is reduced significantly (MPI, 2015, p 4). Once an application is lodged, the responsible Member State will be identified which means that applicants hardly fall between two stools. In this perspective, the DR is a useful tool to ensure the applicant’s fundamental rights are respected. Furthermore, the DR provides an applicant with clarity on which Member State to turn to when inquiring about the status of the application (EC, 2015, p. 2).
2.1 Development of the Dublin Regulation
Since its inception, the DR has been under continuous development. In particular, two court cases (N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece) have impacted the implementation of the DR severely; from 2011 on, the application of the DR was suspended for Greece meaning that no applicants were being returned to Greece even if that was their first country of entry to the EU. Following this suspension, the incentive of an applicant to engage in secondary movement had become more attractive as the applicant could not be sent back to Greece anymore (EC, 2016c). However, lately, the EC has encouraged Member States to resume the application of the DR to Greece as the latter has improved its facilities sufficiently (EC, 2016c). As a result of this, the implementation of the DR on the Greek islands pertains to Articles 3-5 and 7 (identifying if an applicant is eligible), Articles 7 – 11 (Determining the Member State responsible; Family Reunification), and Articles 16 and 17 (Dependent Persons and Discretionary Clauses). Slowly, Greece is receiving take-charge requests from other Member States again.
2.1.1 Situation in Lesbos
In practice, this means that in Lesbos, the Hellenic police and Frontex register individuals at arrival. Their fingerprints are registered in Eurodac and, subsequently, the Greek Asylum Service (GAS) interviews the applicants briefly to determine the applicant's age, nationality, vulnerability, and the presence of relatives in other Member States. It is at this point that the applicant officially lodges the request for international protection. In Lesbos, all cases that qualify as DR-cases, as well as the claims of minors, are handled by GAS. Thus, anyone who has (relevant) relatives in another Member State or is recognized as being vulnerable has his or her case reviewed by GAS. Those who do not match these criteria are being interviewed by either GAS or EASO to confirm whether their claim can be dealt with in the framework of the fast-track border procedure (resulting from the EU-Turkey statement). If EASO establishes during the interview that an applicant is vulnerable, minor or if he or she does have a relevant relative in another Member State, the case is handed over to GAS. Eventually, only GAS has the mandate to make a decision on a claim. EASO supplies GAS with an opinion based on the interview they conducted with the respective applicant. When GAS completes the interview, the claim will be
reviewed in the regular procedure, meaning that GAS investigates whether the claim is a DR case or an asylum application in Greece. If EASO completes the interview, the applicant will be assessed in the framework of the border procedure. Important to note is that the description above is a simplified version of the asylum procedure on Lesbos, zoomed-in on the DR in particular. Please see Annex E for a flowchart that visualizes this simplified application procedure on Lesbos.
Legal aid organizations on the island provide the applicants with legal advice on their claim, the collection of documents (i.e. proof of age, proof of family ties), interview preparation and representation during the interview.
2.2 Academic perspectives
Since its inception, the DR has been criticized continuously for various reasons. Guild (2006) has been particularly critical of the DR and argues that the system treats migrants as “objects of the state” (Guild, 2006, p 636). She argues that migrants are passive bodies upon whom the Member States decide but who do not have any effective rights. Furthermore, Guild (2006, p. 636) argues that the DR puts in place a system of pooling responsibility that is founded upon the notion that being responsible for an application is a burden. The first country of entry principle punishes the Member State who let the migrant enter the European territory with the responsibility to take care of the asylum application (Guild, 2006, p. 636; Guild, 2001). She criticizes the DR for invoking the wrong incentives among Member States as letting a migrant access European territory is punished with responsibility. Furthermore, academics have critiqued the DR for going against the logic of a borderless EU (Bouteillet-Paquet, 2003; Guild, 2006; Carlier, 1992). While European citizens have become increasingly free to move throughout the European Union, the Union restricts this free movement for asylum seekers.
Also, the DR has been criticized for creating an unequal division of the burden in the EU (Brekke & Brochmann, 2014, p. 148). This results in Member States at the outside border of the EU ignoring the principle of the first country of entry and, hence, granting migrants access to the EU's borderless environment without registering them (Trauner, 2016, p. 320). In one of the expert interviews conducted by Trauner (2016, p. 315), an interviewee admitted that Italy would sometimes delay the registration of the fingerprints taken in the Eurodac system to leave enough time for
the migrants to reach their destination country without being ‘caught’ and, thereby, alleviating the burden on Italy.
Also, many perceive the DR to be based on the assumption that capacity and facilities in all Member States are equal (Brekke & Brochman, 2014, p. 146). However, in reality, "national differences in reception conditions, access to integration measures and social rights" (Brekke & Brochman, 2014, p. 146) affect the efforts of the EU to create and implement a harmonized asylum system. These national differences encourage secondary movement, a strategy that the DR aims to prevent (Brekke & Brochman, 2014, p. 146). Moreover, a quantitative study by Toshkov and de Haan (2013) has shown that based on the number of asylum statuses granted, Member States differ greatly, too. Thus, it does matter in which country one lodges an application (Trauner, 2016, p. 313).
2.3 Evaluations
The DR has been criticized by a broad variety of non-academic sources such as ECRE (2015), UNHCR (2017), AITIMA (2017), and the Migration Policy Institute (2015). Moreover, the EC itself has been critical about the implementation of the DR as well. In its analysis of the DR III (EC, 2015) and the assessment of the implementation (EC, 2016), the EC notes that the hierarchy of criteria does not adequately take into account the needs and interests of the applicant (EC, 2015, p. 5). It fails to look at elements other than family ties (i.e. language skills). Furthermore, the EC mentions that the intergovernmental nature of the DR results in slow procedures (EC, 2015, p. 4); the lack of coordination among states, incomplete transfer requests, and administrative issues as mentioned as reasons for the vast delays in the processing of applications (EC, 2015, p. 8) (EC, 2016, p. 12). Moreover, the EC notes that for most Member States the amount of net transfers is close to zero (EC, 2015, p. 10) and only in 8% of the cases in 2014, a transfer was actually completed.
3. Theory
This research aims to analyze the implementation of the DR on Lesbos. It seeks to understand how the DR is implemented and which weaknesses impact its implementation. In essence, this study is focused on identifying what role the caseworkers play in the application of the DR. The theory of street-level bureaucracy by Lipsky (1980) is particularly well suited to investigate this instance. ‘Street-level bureaucracies’ refers to the public service agencies that employ street-level bureaucrats. Street-level bureaucrats, in turn, are the public service providers (low-level) that stand in direct contact with the citizens (thus, clients). These are, for example, teachers, police officers, and municipality clerks. Lipsky’s work is perceived to lay down the foundation on the so-called ‘bottom-up’ perspective in public administration (Hill and Hupe, 2009, p. 52).
One essential feature of a street-level bureaucracy is that clients are non-voluntary (Lipsky, 1980, p. 54). As the government holds the monopoly to a particular type of service, the client has no choice but to engage with the street-level bureaucracy. Lipsky (1980) argues that as a result of this lack of choice, the street-level bureaucrats have a significant impact on the implementation. Furthermore, Lipsky (1980) notes two other reasons why the street-level bureaucrat has a vast impact on the policy implementation. Firstly, as the street-level bureaucrats are the ones that are in contact with the ‘client', they make decisions that can impact the client's life. A policy provides a framework of guidelines that the street-level bureaucrat is supposed to live up to but in practice, the public servant decides ‘on the spot’ about the sanctions or benefits a citizen will receive. The servant, thus, impacts the way the policy is implemented. While policies are intended to standardize processes and to ensure all citizens receive equal treatment, the street-level bureaucrat is in direct contact with the clients and, thereby, experiences the complexity of the situations and requests (Lipsky, 1980, p. 22). This can confront the street-level bureaucrats with the unfairness of treating all people alike. When being faced with individual cases, the public servants tend to see the clients as more than merely demographic characteristics upon which a decision needs to be made. Therefore, street-level bureaucrats tend to go outside the set rules and take action when they deem it fair based on their personal ideas and opinions (Lipsky, 1980, p. 22).
Secondly, the street-level bureaucrat enjoys a certain degree of discretion in the implementation of policies. These workers are considerably free to “determine the nature, amount, and quality of benefits and sanctions provided by their agencies” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 13). The low amount of supervision by managers can be explained by the notion that the managers respect the professionalism of the street level bureaucrats in their task to implement the respective policy. Also, Lipsky (1980, p. 50) argues that the managers give servants the freedom to exercise the discretion that is necessary to make the policy work. Lipsky (1980, p. 13) argues that street-level bureaucrats make policy by exercising discretion in the decisions they make and, eventually, all these decisions together shape the behavior of an organization. While the elite shapes the major dimensions of the policy, the implementation and, thus, the actual behavior of an organization is determined by the decisions of the street-level bureaucrats. As the volume and density of the rules established by the elite is often enormous, street-level bureaucrats can only selectively apply these rules. Through this selective application of rules, they are able to shape the implementation of the policy. Furthermore, Lipsky (1980, p. 17) argues that the differences in the objectives and desires of managers (high-level) and public officers (low-level) result in the public officers implementing the policies differently than envisaged. Also, Lipsky (1980, p. 18). argues that workers are keen to minimize the danger and discomfort of their job while maximizing the income and personal gratification. The management shares these goals to some extent; however, they perceive productivity as the ultimate goal. It is because of these variations in incentives that the actual implementation of a policy is not always in line with the foreseen implementation by the policymakers. Moreover, the workers are often facing limited resources and large amounts of work. Often, street-level bureaucrats are expected to make decisions in a limited amount of time and with scarce resources (Lipsky, 1980, p. 29). Given the complexity of the cases and the frequency of client consultations, this leads street-level bureaucrats to invent ‘shortcuts' and simplifications to be able to deal with their work effectively (p.18). Hereby, the workers are able to ensure that the process of work is consistent with their own preferences. Contrarily, the management wants the results of the work to be in accordance with the organization's objectives. Lipsky (1980, p. 38) argues that increasing resources (i.e. manpower) does not necessarily reduce the number of shortcuts, as the work of street-level bureaucrats is often supply-driven; the bigger capacity the servants have, the more work they will receive. Therefore, enhancing
resources is more likely to result in workers having to make more decisions rather than that it will impact the quality of the decisions. This contradiction in incentives and aims between the low-level workers and the elite management exposes a paradox in the implementation of policy: the street-level bureaucrats develop shortcuts that are against the organization’s policy but these shortcuts are necessary to ensure the organization’s survival (Lipsky, 1980, p. 19).
3.1 Critical reflections on street-level bureaucracies
While Lipsky's (1980) ideas have been widely used and have served as the foundation of much other research, the theory of street-level bureaucracy has been criticized on different aspects, too. A small portion in the academic community questions whether Lipsky's ideas are still relevant today as management strategies have become increasingly important and power has shifted away from the servants towards the managers (Howe, 1991, p. 203). Howe (1991, p. 204) argues that the role of street-level bureaucrats has changed significantly throughout the last decades and, therefore, the validity of Lipsky's theory should be questioned. Other scholars (Ellis, 2007) (Evans, 2011, p. 370) disagree and argue that the theory of street-level bureaucracy is still relevant today as Lipsky's ideas are very much centered on the role that the manager plays in a bureaucracy. Evans (2011, p. 371) argues that Lipsky perceives street-level bureaucrats as resource units that are used to reach the goals of an organization. Managers are put in place to ensure these goals are actually achieved and to, simultaneously, check upon the servant's work.
While Evans argues that Lipsky’s work is still relevant today, he notes that the theory of street-level bureaucracy pays insufficient attention to the notion of professionalism (2011, p. 371). Evans argues that Lipsky overlooks the impact and role professionalism plays in the behavior of and decisions made by the servants. Street-level bureaucrats are the individuals that implement a certain policy, however, they are first and foremost professionals who are skilled to carry out this job. Since the work of street-level bureaucrats demands flexibility, professionals who are well versed in a particular field are suited to fulfill such position (Hood, Rothstein & Baldwin, 2000). Therefore, Evans (2011, p. 371) argues that street-level bureaucrats should not merely be perceived as those who implement a policy but rather as professionals who are experienced and knowledgeable. As Lipsky (1980) fails to
approach the servants this way, he also implies that the discretion that street-level bureaucrats enjoy relies heavily on their personal understanding on what is fair. Evans (2011, p. 371) notes that the decisions made by the servants are deeply influenced by their professionalism, which reduces the impact of their personal judgments on the decisions they make. Moreover, Kallio and Kouvo (2014, p. 331) argue that those with a professional background have different ideas about fairness and deservingness than amateurs in the first place. Friedson (2001) notes that professionalism leads a servant to predominantly take into account the service user wellbeing rather than having personal opinions and ideas take the upper hand.
Apart from under appreciating the role of professionalism, Lipsky also fails to value the position of the manager in a street-level bureaucracy (Evans, 2011, p. 372). Whereas Lipsky perceives the manager to be inherently different from the street-level bureaucrat, Evans (2011, p. 372) argues that within a bureaucracy there are managers who stand close to the servants and managers who are more closely connected to the policymakers. Those managers that are closely linked to the street-level bureaucrats are often drawn from the same professional pool (Evans, 2011, p. 372). Thus, a manager who is engaged in the implementation of a policy should not be perceived, as Lipsky does, as merely being a guardian of the policy but instead he or she should be understood as a support-provider to the street-level bureaucrat. In Evans' research (2011, p. 382) on social workers in the UK, it is concluded that street-level bureaucrats perceive their close managers as sources of professional support rather than ‘agents of hierarchical control'. Evans (2011, p. 382) concludes that the street-level bureaucrats work together with their managers to promote and enhance professionalism to, eventually, provide the needs of service users.
In sum, the biggest critique on the theory of street-level bureaucracy can be found in the notion of professionalism that is, in turn, closely connected to the role of the manager. In particular, Lipsky’s ideas on the degree of discretion are criticized; the theory of street-level bureaucracy introduces the notion of discretion but provides little to no guidelines about the content of this discretion and why it differs from servant to servant (Winter, 2002, p. 5). It is, thus, argued that Lipsky overlooks the role that human agency and other factors that impact the nature of discretion play. Furthermore, Lipsky is criticized for not paying sufficient attention to the role of the manager who can, according to Evans (2011), provide support and guidance as well as exercise bureaucratic control to curb discretion.
3.2 Multi-level governance
While Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracies has been developed in the 80's and is based on the realities of public servants in the US, it can be applied effectively to the case of the implementation of the DR. What complicates the case of the DR is that it has been created in the framework of the CEAS and it has been ratified and included in the national legislation by all Member States. The DR, thus, flows from being EU legislation to the national legal frameworks on to the implementation on the local level. Lipsky’s (1980) original theory did not include this ‘in-between’ step at the European level and is built upon policy that is shaped by national bodies and implemented by the national street-level bureaucrats. Since the EU does not have in place an implementation apparatus it has to rely on its Member States to implement EU policies (Dörrenbächer, 2017, p. 1328). Hereby, the street-level bureaucrats who implement the EU policies (i.e. the caseworkers on Lesbos) find themselves at ‘the second frontline’ between national and European legislation (Treib, 2014, p. 6). This relative unclear policy framework leaves space for the street-level bureaucrats to exercise discretion. They operate between the national transpositions and the EU framework and, as Lipsky (1980) wrote, they are granted a certain degree of discretion to decide upon the way a policy is implemented.
The evaluation of the Greek asylum procedures by non-governmental organization (NGO) AITIMA (2017) illustrates Treib's (2014) argument. In Greece, EASO personnel conducts interviews (to determine the credibility and vulnerability) with applicants and completes the registrations. The information gathered is subsequently passed on to the GAS officers who are in charge of taking a final decision on the application. However, AITIMA (2017, p. 68) notes that often, the Greek officers base their decision solely on the information provided by the EASO personnel. As the information gathered during the interview plays an essential role in the final decision, this set-up leaves a substantial degree of discretion for the EASO employees whereby they are given (indirect) powers regarding the decisions on individual applications (Tsourdi, 2017).
3.3 Migration management
As Ellerman (2006, p. 294) argues, in migration management the role of the street-level bureaucrat is particularly well visible as it is a very client-intensive field.
Migration management requires a substantial amount of street-level implementation because the servant handles instances on a case-to-case basis. Kalir and Wissink (2016, p. 36) argue that particularly in the domain of migration management, the street-level bureaucrats are at least as important for the actual shape of a policy as the policymakers themselves. Belabas and Gerrits (2017, p. 133) note that public servants in the migration domain are confronted with, on the one hand, the bureaucratic rules set out by the policy and, on the other hand, the broad diversity of immigrants. They negotiate between the needs of migrants and the standardized bureaucracy. Therefore, discretion can be understood to be a core element of the implementation of immigration policies by street-level bureaucrats. Kalir and Wissink (2016, p. 40) illustrate this claim by referring to the findings of their research on deportation procedures of immigrants in the Netherlands; servants admit that face-to-face interactions with clients can substantially change their opinion and thereby also the extent to which they make use of their discretionary power.
While little scholarly attention has been paid to the implementation of migration policies in general, the work of entry- and exit officials (i.e. DR caseworkers) has been particularly under-researched (Belabas and Gerrits, 2017, p. 134). Academics thus far have been primarily concentrated on deportation and integration. While these domains differ from the DR in nature, they do analyze the significance of the work of street-level bureaucrats in the field of migration management as a whole. Kalir and Wissink (2016, p. 36) examined the example of deportation, which is known for high levels of discretion and changing interpretations of street-level bureaucrats. They found that Dutch caseworkers are specifically sensitive to families with children (Kalir and Wissink, 2016, p. 41). Such instances create a bias and impact the degree of discretion they exercise. The role of street-level bureaucrats has also been examined in the light of integration into a receiving society by, among others, Belabas and Gerrits (2017). These scholars found that servants regularly find themselves doubting between obedience to the policy and compassion to the client. These examples show how the role of street-level bureaucrats is of vast importance in the implementation of a policy. The decisions made by these servants do not only have a significant impact on the life of the client, they also shape the policy itself.
Migration management does not only involve policymakers and street-level bureaucrats. Therefore, Kalir and Wissink (2016, p. 42) also address the role that civil-society actors play in the domain of migration management. However, NGO’s
find themselves in a complicated position featured by ‘secret solidarity’; on the one hand they operate within the legal framework set out by the (supranational) government while, on the other hand, they reject this framework and criticize it (Kalir and Wissink, 2016, p. 42). While the DR is only implemented by street-level bureaucrats, NGO’s do indeed play an important role in providing support, shelter, and basic needs to applicants. It is, therefore, crucial to understand which role civil-society plays in the implementation of policy; in particular because NGOs are so active in the realm of migration management on Lesbos.
3.4 Application to this research
Despite its relative age, Lipsky's theory (1980) of street-level bureaucracy is well suited to reflect upon the implementation of migration policies. The analysis of the literature on migration management has shown that the theory of street-level bureaucracy is exceptionally relevant to evaluate the implementation of a policy in the migration domain. As implementing migration-related policies requires frequent face-to-face interactions with clients, this domain allows for a substantial amount of discretion by the street-level bureaucrat. This freedom, in turn, allows the servants to deviate from the envisaged implementation of the policy. Furthermore, it allows differences among street-level bureaucrats to occur. Moreover, the complexity of the EU policy that has been integrated into national frameworks and that is sub-sequentially executed by a street-level bureaucrat further enhances the space for discretion to be exercised. The case of the Lesbos' caseworkers who find themselves between EU policy and the Greek national policy on asylum and who, in addition, experience frequent direct contact with the clients is, therefore, particularly relevant from the perspective of Lipsky's street-level bureaucracy.
4. Method
This research has been built upon a single case study approach and has applied qualitative semi-structured interviews. The choice for this approach as well as the operational details will be discussed below.
4.1 Case study
As described above, European migration and asylum policy is an extremely complex field with many issues, challenges, and weaknesses. All issues are, in one way or another, linked to each other. The only way to start untangling this spider web is by focusing on very tiny, specific knots within the broader picture. Following this approach, this research has made use of a case study to create a thorough understanding of one element of the European asylum policy’s spider web. The case study approach is particularly suitable for this type of research as it allows one to get an intense understanding of one single unit (Gerring, 2004, p. 345). Furthermore, a case study allows for an investigation into a relatively small amount of cases, a collection of information on various features pertaining to the case, analysis in a ‘natural' setting, and it does not necessarily aim at applying findings to other cases (Gomm, Hammersley & Foster, 2009, p. 4).
As this study aimed to get an in-depth understanding of the application of the DR by street-level bureaucrats in Lesbos, a case study approach is the most suitable method. It allows for a thorough analysis of the case at hand and sheds a light on the issue from various angles. Hereby, it enhances the quality of the in-depth understanding of the case. Besides, following Gomm, Hammersley and Foster’s (2009) features of a case study research, this research is focused on one specific case and has analyzed the case in a non-experimental setting. The circumstances and variables in such a setting are not controlled for and, therefore, the case study approach allows for an analysis of an issue that has not been influenced or otherwise manipulated.
4.1.1 Lesbos as a case study
Lesbos serves as a case study within the DR. Due to its location on the outside border of the EU, Lesbos is one of the main entry points of migrants to the union. The island has experienced a vast increase in asylum applications since 2016 (an increase of 287.2% compared to 2015) (the Hellenic Republic, 2018). Whereas the island only witnessed 30 applications in 2013, this number had grown to 11.952 in 2017 (the Hellenic Republic, 2018). Lesbos is the biggest of the five ‘hotspots’ in Greece where asylum applications are registered and processed. The upsurge in migrants and applications has challenged the island in various ways; reception facilities have been established and enhanced continuously, the island population had to adapt to the vast influx, and the island’s infrastructure had to be upgraded to facilitate the asylum application process. One could argue that the island of Lesbos has suffered intensively under the migration crisis. It is, therefore, that this island will form the décor of this research.
4.2 Interviews
The research at hand uses qualitative semi-structured interviews as the main source of data collection. Since this research is focused on revealing the perceptions of migration management professionals on the implementation of the DR on Lesbos, interviews are the most suitable method to achieve this goal. This approach allows the researcher to speak with interviewees about their ideas and views. The flexible nature of interviews allows the interviewer to ask follow-up questions when a topic seems particularly important to the interviewee or when the interviewee brings up a topic that had not been foreseen by the researcher. This feature enables the researcher to go in-depth and to continue asking questions until the position of the interviewee can be fully understood (Bryman, 2015, p. 470). Interviews provide rich data on perceptions and opinions and are, therefore, particularly suitable for this research.
Through open-ended interviews with migration management, a comprehensive understanding of the interviewees’ perspectives on the vulnerabilities of the implementation of the DR has been established. Lesbos forms the core of the research and, therefore, interviews have been conducted with representatives of NGOs, international organizations, and the EU. These individuals have first-hand experience with the implementation of the DR and have, therefore, been able to provide detailed
and relevant insights on the implementation of the DR on Lesbos. The EASO caseworkers were able to share their experiences with implementation of Article 3-5 and 7 of the regulation on Lesbos. They have been crucial sources of information regarding the procedures of the implementation of the DR. Other stakeholders (NGO representatives, international organizations) on Lesbos have been able to enhance the researcher’s understanding of the circumstances under which the applications are filed and processed. Their insights have been essential in understanding the environment in which the DR is implemented.
Secondly, a number of organizations are not present on Lesbos and/or have their headquarters in Athens. While those who are working from Athens do not always have first-hand experience with the DR implementation in Lesbos, they do have a thorough understanding of the practical challenges that are present in the hotspots. The interviewed individuals in Athens were cooperating directly with the professionals on Lesbos and could, therefore, provide a new relevant perspective.
At the core of the interviews lies the collection of different views and perceptions on the implementation of the DR. This research aims to answer what the ‘perceived’ weaknesses are and, therefore, it is crucial to speak to a broad variety of stakeholders. The broad scope of types of interviewees allows the implementation to be analyzed from a multiplicity of angles. This approach strengthens the answer to the research question. However, since the DR as such and in particular its weaknesses are a sensitive topic, the interviewees have been asked about both challenges and best practices. Hereby, it was attempted to reduce the potential negative sentiment of the interview.
4.3 Approach
In total, thirteen interviews have been conducted with seventeen individuals. These interviewees were selected based on their role in the implementation of the DR (type of stakeholder). As this research aims to collect a broad variety of perceptions, a fair balance between the nature and background of the interviewees was ensured. Therefore, at least two individuals of each type of stakeholder were interviewed (i.e. two representatives of the European government, two NGO representatives, two international organization representatives). By ensuring a balance between the types
of interviewees, it was attempted not to allow bias to affect the analysis and answer to the research question.
The previously established network of the author has been used to contact potential interviewees. As a result of an internship at the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Athens, the researcher was able to ensure a ‘warm introduction’ to various contacts of the Embassy. The Embassy has introduced the researcher to relevant contacts and as a result of this approach; the researcher has been able to establish direct contact with professionals that would have otherwise been difficult to reach. The Embassy has been particularly active in the domain of migration throughout the last three years and, thereby, it has established a broad network of contacts on both the mainland and on the islands. An introductory letter describing the goal of the research has been sent to the Embassy along with an overview of questions (see Annex B and D). Relevant interviewees were selected based on the contacts in the network of the Dutch Embassy as well as on research by the researcher on the active bodies and organizations in the field of the DR in Greece (and Lesbos in particular). Moreover, each interviewee has been asked to suggest any other relevant contacts within his or her network. The full list of interviewees can be found below:
