No longer on the sidelines

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NO LONGER ON THE SIDELINES

Joey Verbeek

Student number: 0809616 E-mail: jmm.verbeek@gmail.com

Master thesis in Political Science – International Relations Radboud University Nijmegen

A neoclassical realist perspective on Indonesia’s foreign

policy behavior

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*

Front page image copied from

:

Madarang (2018). How Indonesia’s leader sailed the South China Sea, made a point to China.

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Indonesia has recently become a claimant state in the South China Sea conflict as it displayed balancing behavior against China regarding the disputed Natuna islands. This study tries to explain Indonesia’s sudden display of balancing behavior by using neoclassical realism, and the balance of threat theory, to create a theoretical model that can be applied to Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making during president Widodo’s presidency. The model tries to explain foreign policy behavior by assessing both systemic and domestic incentives that influence a state’s foreign policy decision-making process. This study concludes that a change in Indonesia’s foreign policy elites’ threat perception of China’s resources and capabilities can explain Indonesia’s display of balancing behavior. Additionally, the politicization of anti-Chinese sentiments in Indonesia’s domestic politics when president Widodo’s hold on power was declining, can also account for Indonesia’s display of balancing behavior. The combination of these systemic and domestic approaches exhibits that foreign policy decision-making can be influenced by both systemic and domestic incentives.

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List of figures and tab

Figure 2.1 Rose’s four theories of foreign policy ...13

Figure 2.2 The theoretical model...22

Figure 2.3 Systemic incentives’ influence on the FPE...23

Figure 2.4 Internal factors intervene in foreign policy making process...24

YFigure 4.1 Indonesia’s import and export with China...40

Figure 4.2 Disputed areas in the South China Sea...44

YFigure 5.1 President Widodo’s approval ratings...55

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Abbreviation/acronym Meaning

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations ACFTA ASEAN-China Free Trade Area

BoT Balance of Threat EEZ Exclusive economic zone FPE Foreign policy elites

FPI Front Pembela Islam GDP Gross domestic product NCR Neoclassical realism PAN Partai Amanat Nasional

PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa

PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute UN United Nations

US United States

1. Introduction

1.1 The puzzle

“Our policy is independent and active – independent because Indonesia does not wish to align herself with either of the opposition blocs, the Western bloc or the Communist bloc; active because it actively carries out a peaceful policy as a loyal member of the United Nations. By practicing her independent and active policy Indonesia endeavors to seek friendship with all nations - whatever their ideology or form of government – upon a basis of mutual respect.” – Mohammed Hatta (1958)

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The first Vice-president of Indonesia, Mohammed Hatta, concisely describes Indonesian foreign policy in an article in Foreign Affairs in 1958. This policy is called the Bebas-aktif policy as it consists out of the Indonesian words independent (bebas) and active (aktif). This policy has guided Indonesia through the Cold War by assuring the nation’s sovereignty as it balanced itself between the capitalist and communist blocs. Hatta referred to Indonesia’s situation in the Cold War as “rowing between two reefs”, and although the Cold War between the Soviet-Union and United States might be over, the Bebas-aktif policy is still applicable in the 21st_{century (Wnukowski, 2015, 116). The Soviet-Union’s power bloc has since}

been replaced by China as the two reefs that Hatta referred to in 1958, now consist out of China and the United States. Meanwhile, Indonesia is still trying to row between these two major powers in what the former Indonesian minister of foreign affairs Natalegawa referred to as a “dynamic equilibrium” (Ibid, 118). The former Indonesian president Yudhoyono tried to concretize the policy by enhancing the Indonesia’s image in international politics and for Indonesia to be known as an international peace-maker and bridge-builder (Puspitasari, 2010, 6). The Bebas-aktif remains relevant today because of the flexibility in its meaning, however, the limits of this policy are being strained by recent developments in the South China Sea conflict.

This conflict derives from multiple confrontations between China and Southeast Asian states regarding their territorial claim in the South China Sea. China has increasingly been projecting its power in the South China Sea as it seeks to expand its influence in the area. Beijing identified protecting its sovereignty in the South China Sea as a core interest as this sovereignty claim is based on China’s ‘nine-dash’ line. This area covers a large part of the South China Sea and overlaps with territorial claims of the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei, most of whom are ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) members. Indonesia remained a non-claimant state in the South China Sea conflict despite growing tensions in the region and fulfilled its role as a bridge-builder by often acting as a mediator between Beijing and claimant ASEAN members (Hellendorff & Kellner, 2014). However, recent developments suggest Indonesia is withdrawing from its bridge-builder role and is becoming an active participant in the South China Sea dispute. On the 14th_{of July 2017, the Indonesian}

government renamed a stretch of sea surrounding the northern Natuna islands (Allard & Munthe, 2017). This action defies China’s nine-dash line territorial claim in the South China Sea which converts Indonesia into a claimant state in the dispute. This territorial claim by the Indonesian government is a culmination of the Indonesian government’s increased assertiveness against China expansion in the South China Sea. Other examples of this assertiveness since the start of 2016 are the sinking of Chinese fishing vessels, skirmishes between Indonesian and Chinese naval vessels, and Indonesia’s president Joko Widodo

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visiting the disputed Natuna islands multiple times whilst being escorted by Indonesian war ships (Parameswaran, 2017).

This increased push back seems puzzling as Indonesia officially claims to be a non-claimant state in the South China Sea dispute. In 2016, the Indonesian foreign minister Marsudi reiterated Indonesia’s position as a “non-claimant state in the South China Sea dispute” and “Indonesia was not involved in the South China Sea dispute because it was not a claimant to any of the disputed geographical features, including islands, coral reefs and lagoons, which were the basis of the disagreements over the region” (Yosephine, 2016). The minister’s words seem to downplay the actions that the Indonesian government has been taking against Beijing’s expansion concerning the Natuna islands. The same diplomatic downplaying of the conflict, whilst simultaneously engaging in assertive actions, can be found on the Chinese side of the conflict. On November 12th_{2015, a China’s foreign}

ministry spokesman publically stated that “[T]he Indonesian side has no territorial claim to China’s [Spratly Islands]. The Chinese side has no objection to Indonesia’s sovereignty over the Natuna Islands” (Yu, 2015). However, Chinese fishing vessels have violated Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone around the Natuna islands which were supported by a Chinese coast guard ship several months later (Leavenworth, 2016). The situation between both states seems to be escalating as both parties seem unwilling to back down. The escalation of the situation seems to be especially puzzling considering Indonesia’s growing economic ties to China. The current Indonesian president Widodo pursues a policy of economic development which has resulted in China being one of the largest investors in the Indonesian economy. Therefore, Indonesia’s involvement in the South China Sea dispute might hurt Indonesia’s economic ties to China and undermine president Widodo’s economic development policy (Wnukowski 2015, 128). This makes Indonesia’s assertive behavior is even more puzzling as it might damage Indonesia-China relations. The current developments in the South China Sea that dragged Indonesia into this conflict seem to have far reaching implications for Indonesia’s foreign policy. Indonesia’s recent external actions such as the renaming of a part of the South China Sea and the skirmishes between Indonesian and Chinese vessels have made Indonesia part of the South China Sea conflict which violates their role as an international peace-maker and bridge-builder. Therefore, the causes of Indonesia’s assertive external behavior, or balancing behavior, seem puzzling. The main research question thesis tries to answer is:

What are the causes for Indonesia’s balancing behavior regarding China in the South China Sea during president Widodo’s administration?

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In order to answer this question, I will use a neoclassical realist approach as this theory incorporates changes in both international and domestic factors. I will thereby focus on Indonesia’s foreign policy elites’ foreign policy decision-making process to assess which factors have caused the Indonesian display of balancing behavior. Neoclassical realism provides the tools to assess the influence of systemic and domestic factors on the foreign policy decision-making process, thereby increasing the explanatory power of this thesis by assessing both approaches. It will be complemented by the balance of threat theory which is capable to assess when states resort to balancing behavior.

1.2 Relevance

This study contributes to the theoretical development of neoclassical realism. The theory is still developing and this study will try to contribute to this development by introducing a theoretical model that can be used in foreign policy assessment. It offers a possibility in which domestic incentives can be incorporated into structuralist theories of international relations. Neoclassical realism achieves this feature by assessing the primary influence of structural, or international, incentives on foreign policy, and includes secondary domestic incentives’ intervening influence on these systemic incentives (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009, 4). The applicability of this theory will be tested by applying this neoclassical realist perspective on the Indonesian case to assess to what extent the incorporation of both international and domestic factors can result into an effective and accurate form of foreign policy analysis. Additionally, this thesis offers societal relevance due to its analysis of the South China Sea conflict. The involvement of Indonesia in this conflict could increase regional tensions and escalate the conflict. An escalation of the South China Sea conflict could have consequences for the global economy as the conflict involves strong economic states. Understanding the motives for Indonesia’s assertive behavior can uncover the likelihood of the escalation of this conflict. Moreover, Indonesia’s foreign policy has remained underdeveloped for a state with its resources and capabilities (Rosyidin, 2017, 187). As Indonesia has the potential to increase its international role, it becomes relevant to explore which factors influence Indonesia’s foreign policy. This study contributes by elevating the understanding of influential actors in Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making.

1.3 Structure

In order to answer the research question, this thesis adheres to a certain structure. The second chapter will elaborate on the utilized theories of neoclassical realism and the balance of threat theory. Neoclassical realism will be addressed by exploring its development and key concepts. This will be supplemented by discussing Walt’s balance of threat theory after which the theoretical model is

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introduced. The third chapter will discuss the methodology and will go over the research methods and evidence this study will be using to answer the research question. This chapter will be followed up by two empirical analysis chapters. The first empirical chapter will utilize a systemic approach as it assesses the international incentives that influence foreign policy. The second empirical analysis chapter utilizes a domestic approach as it assesses domestic incentives that influence foreign policy. The final chapter will combine the findings of both analytic chapters in order to answer the research question and will reflect upon the study itself.

2. Theoretical framework

This chapter is intended to outline the theories that will be used to answer the research question. I will start by looking at neoclassical realism (NCR) and its major assumptions starting with the work of Gideon Rose followed by discussing the work of Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman and Jeffrey Taliaferro. I will explore how NCR can contribute to answering the research question by incorporating the influence of systemic and domestic factors on foreign policy decision-making and external state behavior. I will also specify the definition of neoclassical realism that I will be using because a diversity of neoclassical realist

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theories exist (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009, 10). Subsequently, I will elaborate on the ‘balance of threat’ concept that will be used in the analysis to assess the influence of international factors on foreign policy decision-making. I will conclude this chapter by taking neoclassical realism and the balance of threat theory, and incorporate them in a theoretical model. This model is based on neoclassical realism’s causal logic and uses the balance of threat theory to answer the research question. This model thus combines the two concepts discussed in this chapter in an analytical model that will help answer the research question.

2.1 Neoclassical Realism

NCR is a foreign policy theory that seeks to explain a state’s behavior by incorporating different aspects. While it is rooted in realism, it combines aspects of neorealism and classical realism. NCR tries to solve a major point of critique of neorealism, namely treating the state as a closed ‘black box’ by disregarding domestic factors’ influence on a state’s foreign policy. The subsequent subparagraphs will explore the introduction of NCR by Gideon Rose, address NCR’s notion on foreign policy making, and reflect upon the advantages and disadvantages of NCR.

2.1.1 The introduction of NCR

The first scholar to introduce NCR is Gideon Rose, in his 1998 article titled Neoclassical realism and

theories of foreign policy. Rose took neorealism as the starting point in explaining individual state

behavior and he pointed out its flaws. He concurs with neorealism that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is primarily driven first and foremost by the country’s relative material power. However, the impact of power capabilities on a state’s foreign policy is indirect and complex as many independent variables influence the output of these power capabilities (Rose, 1998, 144-146). Rose distinguishes three schools in neorealism which are Innenpolitik theories, “Offensive realism” and “Defensive Realism”. He characterizes Innenpolitik theories as theories that are most common and which stress the influence of domestic actors on foreign policy. Offensive realism can be seen as an opposite of

Innenpolitik as it stresses systemic factors’ dominance. Defensive realism also stresses systemic factors as

driving some parts of state behavior but not all parts can be explained by systemic factors and Defensive realism in capable of incorporating both spheres (Ibid, 146).

As an addition to the distinguished three schools of thought, Rose develops NCR as a fourth school that incorporates both domestic and systemic variables to explain a state’s external behavior. Rose gives an explanation how this approach combines realist and classical realist elements on page 146 of his article:

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“It [neoclassical realism] explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.”

NCR thus puts relative material power at the center of a state’s foreign policy but incorporates domestic variables as they influence the effectiveness of the exertion of this power. Rose portrays this effectiveness as the lack of a “perfect transmission belt” that directly links material capabilities to foreign policy behavior. A state might have access to a high abundance of material capabilities like military ships but to what extent they can be used is influenced by many variables. This means that the perception of the power by the political leaders that make the state’s foreign policy is more important than the actual quantity of relative material power. The consequence is that the options in foreign policy presented to the political leadership can be diminished because of how they perceive the situation at hand (Rose, 1998, 147). NCR thus tries to open the black box of the domestic situation to assess how this influences the eventual foreign policy of the state.

Additionally, states do not necessarily seek security but, according to NCR, respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking control and shape their external environment. NCR, thus, assumes an anarchic international system which, however, is difficult to read for states. This, in turn, makes it hard for them to assess if their security is plentiful. The uncertainty leaves room for interpretation and misperceptions. Because NCR takes interpretation and misperception in foreign policy making into account, it exhibits aspects of both pure structural realism and constructivism. Material, measurable power stands at the center of NCR and is a characteristic of structural realism. By comparison, the interpretation and perception of this power by other states is taken into account by constructivists as this cannot be measured and is constructed (Rose, 1998, 152). NCR, thus, acknowledges the structural theorist perspective of the existence of an objective reality which indirectly influences state interactions. Subsequently, NCR combines structuralism with the subjectivity of human interpretation and perception that are constructed and affect reality.

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system

Innenpolitik

theories

Unimportant Highly

differentiated

Internal factors  foreign policy

Defensive realism Occasionally important; anarchy’s implications variable Highly differentiated

Systemic incentives or internal factors  foreign policy (two sets of independent variables

in practice, driving “natural” and “unnatural” behavior respectively)

Neoclassical realism

Important; anarchy is murky

Differentiated Systemic incentives (independent variables)  internal factors (intervening variables)  foreign

policy

Offensive realism

Very important; anarchy is Hobbesian

Undifferentiated Systemic incentives  foreign policy

Figure 2. 1 Rose’s four theories of foreign policy (Rose, 1998).

Table 1 gives an overview of NCR described by Rose in relation to the other three schools that he discusses. It includes the importance of the international system or structural level, the unit view and the causal logic that shows the steps taken to reach foreign policy. In conclusion of Rose’s argument, which is highlighted in table 1, NCR looks at the context in which foreign policies are formulated by taking systemic incentives’ influence of foreign policy decision-making and check their how this influence is intervened by internal or domestic factors.

2.1.2 NCR and the shaping of foreign policy

The work of Rose on NCR is further elaborated in the book Neoclassical realism, the state and foreign

policy by Jeffrey Taliaferro, Steven Lobell and Norrin Ripsman. They seek to expand Rose’s work on NCR

as its combination of systemic and unit-level variables makes it applicable to all types of states like great powers, as well as small powers. The book specifically regards NCR as a theory that wants to explain why, how, and under what conditions the internal characteristics of states intervene between the leaders’ assessment of international threats and opportunities and the actual foreign policies those leaders pursue (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009, 4). Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro also elaborate on Rose’s image of the lack of a perfect transmission belt that links material capabilities to foreign policy behavior. They point at a difference between long term and short term mirroring of material capabilities and foreign policy behavior. Over the long term, states’ foreign policies often mirror their material capabilities. However, short term state behavior is often harder to explain by assessing their material

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capabilities (Ibid, 5). The goal of NCR is to explain variation in the foreign policies of the same state over time or across different states facing similar external constraints. NCR does not have an answer about explaining broad patterns of systemic outcomes or the systemic consequences of states’ responses. NCR might explain diplomatic, economic, and military responses of states to systemic incentives but it cannot explain the systemic consequences of these outcomes (Ibid, 21). The ability to analyze short term foreign policy and the ability to analyze state responses to systemic incentives enables NCR to answer the research question. Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro also identify NCR’s conception of the state and international system. NCR identifies the state as the most important actor in international politics. Next to that, NCR has a top-down conception of the state as systemic forces drive its external behavior or foreign policy. The state is epitomized by the head of the government, ministers and officials that are charged with making foreign security policy. These actors who are in charge of the state’s foreign policy have to bargain with domestic actors to reach a policy and extract resources to reach this policy (Ibid, 24). The national interest is thereby defined based on the assessment of the relative power of the government’s executive branch and other states’ intentions, but also is subject to domestic constraints. This means that although states are the most relevant actors, they are not the only actors that influence a state’s foreign policy. Sub-state actors can contribute to the policy as they bargain with the state’s leadership to define the state’s national interests and threat assessment (Ibid, 26). Policy responses are often the product of state-society coordination and negotiation which can be troublesome. The amount of autonomy between the state and society might vary over time and across states. Thereby, many states do not always function as unitary actors because disagreement, international division and social cohesion can all affect the state’s ability to respond to systemic pressures (Ibid, 27-28). The state is thus the most important actor in NCR but it also recognizes non-state actors’ exerting of influence on the state’s foreign policy. NCR’s incorporates systemic and domestic factors to explain a state’s foreign policy. NCR emphasizes systemic pressures as they shape the environment to which states will respond in their foreign policy (Lobell, 2009, 43). However, systemic pressures alone do not dictate exactly how each state will react to these pressures. The reaction of the state to these systemic pressures in the short run often leads to suboptimal responses by the FPE. In the long run, feedback and exogenous shocks influence threat perception and state’s actions, thereby optimizing responses (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009, 29). Feedback on state actions will lead to debate among the state leadership after which the threat perception and strategy might be adjusted. The same happens after an exogenous shock like the terrorist attacks on September 11th_{, 2001 as it solidified the threat perception}

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of impending shifts in the distribution of power, changes in the intentions of other states and non-state actors, and feedback on current policies that shows their ineffectiveness. After that, a lack of consensus within the top leadership and the calculation of international pressures might still lead to a skewed net threat assessment. Even if the net international threat assessment is correctly perceived by the state’s leadership, domestic political dynamics might force the leadership to pursue counterproductive foreign policies (Ibid, 32). However, systemic pressures cannot solely account for a state’s particular foreign policy of a specific historical event (Lobell, 2009, 62). Only a theory which includes unit-level variables, can explain which countries will balance, when countries balance or why countries fail to balance (Ibid, 63). Domestic politics acts as an intervening variable that influences the effect of these systemic incentives on foreign policy. NCR’s incorporation of both the international and the domestic environment generates more explanatory power of the behavior of states (Dueck, 2009, 139). Therefore, domestic politics perform a key role in foreign policy decision-making.

The ways in which domestic politics can exert influence on the foreign policy decision-making process varies. According to Norrin Ripsman (2009), NCR incorporates three ways in which domestic actors can exert their influence. The first, most well-known example of domestic actors’ influence on foreign policy decision-making is by direct electoral payoff in democratic states. A state’s foreign policy elites (FPE) are especially susceptive to domestic actor influence as an election approaches and public opinion shows that reelection will be difficult (Ripsman, 2009, 188). Additionally, the influence of domestic actors on the FPE increases as the FPE are less autonomous. Democratically elected FPE are less autonomous than an autocratic FPE thus domestic actors have an increased influence on foreign policy in democracies (Ibid, 189). This is linked to the FPE’s own interests as they are primarily concerned with the survival of their ruling regime rather than the nation-state’s survival (Lobell, 2009, 51). When their hold on power is slipping, the FPE is more responsive to domestic preferences and may choose riskier external security policies in order to secure themselves domestically (Ripsman, 2009, 173). The second method in which domestic actors can exert influence is the legislative branch’s option to obstruct the government’s political agenda. This entails that the FPE has to take the interests of other domestic political actors into account. This influence is especially noteworthy in coalitional parliamentary democracies and presidential democracies as the FPE is non-autonomous and public preferences trump executive preferences (Ibid, 177). The third manner of domestic actors’ influence is the ability to shape and frame the interpretation of international circumstances. When empowered, domestic actors can shape the interpretation of international circumstances as they can operate as an epistemic community that provides the FPE with information on

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which the FPE base foreign policy. However, this empowerment only occurs when ambiguity reigns in the political environment and domestic actors are called upon to assist in shaping foreign policy (Ibid, 188). Furthermore, the FPE are inclined to act externally if this benefits the FPE’s political and economic power within their society. A hardline foreign policy and interstate conflict can divert attention from domestic issues and create internal solidarity. This is achieved by the “rally-around-the-flag” effect in which an external threat increases public support for the government. External action can also lead to expanded power of the state over society, punishment of internal opposition, or mobilization of internal backing for strategies the population normally would not support (Lobell, 2009, 52). NCR thus offers multiple methods through which it can influence foreign policy decision-making.

2.1.3 Reflection on the NCR approach

Despite all the advantages NCR gives, it does not remain without criticism. I will briefly address this criticism and further elaborate my choice to use NCR to answer the research question. NCR has been claimed to be reductionist. Reductionism is discussed by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book Theory of

International Politics. According to Waltz, reductionism assumes the whole shall be known through the

study of its parts. Reductionist theories explain international outcomes through elements and combinations of elements located at national or subnational levels. Waltz is highly critical of reductionist theories as systemic characteristics cannot be explained by the internal composition of states and an understanding of international politics cannot be reached by summing up the foreign policies and external behaviors of states (Waltz, 1979, 60-64). However, NCR avoids reductionism by not solely focusing on internal factors to explain international outcomes. Instead, it uses states’ internal characteristics as a guide to national responses to international constraints (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009, 22). This defense of NCR also holds-up against claims by neorealist critics who deem that NCR violates the structural logic of neorealism. Unit-level variables do not overrule the influence of systemic incentives but they can be incorporated in explaining state behavior while maintaining the importance of systemic incentives (Ibid, 23). Additionally, a short term development in a state’s foreign policy can better be explained by incorporating domestic factors as short-term foreign policy developments are more complex to clarify (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009, 4).

An alternative approach to my research question is offered by Putnam’s two-level game. This also addresses the influence of domestic politics on international politics and vice versa. According to Putnam (1988), national governments seek to

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maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments on the international level. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups (Putnam, 1988, 434). Putnam’s main critique on systemic theories is the assumption of the state acting as a unitary actor whilst the top-decision-makers are not unified (Ibid, 435). Although I agree, I still opt to use NCR because it addresses this critique and does not view the FPE as unitary actors. Additionally, NCR still adheres to the systemic concepts of anarchy and security. NCR views states as the central actors in a world of anarchy. Security is therefore the most important value for a state in an anarchic international system. This means that state leaders are interested in externally securing the state but also holding their position of power at home (Ripsman, 2009, 176). Moreover, the opening of the domestic ‘black box’ does not provide other states with a perfect image of the perceived state’s domestic incentives. This lack of transparency forces states to primarily base their foreign policy decision-making on systemic incentives (Dueck, 2009, 141). Therefore, NCR’s structural top down approach enables me to answer the research question most effectively, even though the scientific debate concerning NCR is still active. Neoclassical realism can provide an answer to the research question. First, it emphasizes systemic incentives which allow for the incorporation of the military build-up and disputes in the South-China Sea. Second, NCR incorporates domestic actors’ influence on the state’s foreign policy. NCR can incorporate the systemic factors influencing Indonesia’s FPE, and combine this influence with domestic factors intervening effect on foreign policy decision-making, in order to reach an explanation to Indonesia’s balancing behavior. This will be reflected in the theoretical model that I will present in the final paragraph of this chapter. The next section will elaborate on one of the key elements of NCR and the theoretical model, the balance of threat theory.

2.2 The Balance of Threat theory

The previous chapter concerning neoclassical realism covered its combination of systemic and domestic elements as both influence a state’s external behavior. To get a better understanding of the systemic elements and how these are perceived by the state’s FPE, the Balance of Threat (BoT) theory will be used. This will help in comprehending how Indonesia’s FPE perceives systemic threats from China. Moreover, it helps in reaching an explanation for Indonesia’s recent balancing behavior and answering the research question.

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and the balance of world power. Walt reviews the balance of power theory and attempts to explain why

some states engage in bandwagoning behavior and others in balancing behavior (Walt, 1985, 4). Bandwagoning behavior is described by Walt as states that ally with the state that poses the major threat. States will thus tend to ally with, rather than against, the dominant side as states are often attracted to strength. Motives for states to engage in bandwagoning behavior are to appease the threatening state, and to share potential spoils of victory (Ibid, 6). Balancing behavior dictates that states will join alliances in order to avoid domination by stronger powers. States join alliances to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat and is a more common behavior than bandwagoning (Walt, 1987, 28). The first motive for a state to use balancing behavior is that this is a safer strategy than to ally with a dominant power, as the state forced to trust the threatening state’s continued benevolence. Secondly, the influence of a state is greater when siding with the more vulnerable side as this side is more in need of assistance. This leaves alignment with the weaker side as the preferred choice (Walt, 1985, 5-6). Walt tries to find an explanation why states would show balancing or bandwagoning behavior. To find this explanation, he turns to the Balance of Power theory and the relation between balancing, bandwagoning and power perception. Walt argues that although power is an important factor in state’s calculations, this is not sufficient to explain state’s behavior. It is more accurate to say that states will ally with or balance against the most threatening power (Walt, 1985, 8-9). Balancing and bandwagoning are thus viewed as responses to a state’s threat perception of other states. Walt expands his argument in his 1987 book The Origin of Alliances in which he discusses four factors that affect the level of threat states may pose and the likelihood a state will display balancing behavior. These factors are aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions (Walt, 1987, 22). These four factors influence the FPE’s threat perception and determine a state’s reaction in the form of balancing or bandwagoning behavior (Ibid, 32).

The first factor aggregate power assesses a state’s resources as the greater these resources are, the bigger the threat this state poses. The resources that are taken into account are population, economic and military capability, and technological prowess, making this factor strongly connected with structuralism (Walt, 1987, 21-23). However, Walt’s concept of aggregate power is amended by NCR’s notion of component power (Lobell, 2009, 54). Aggregate power takes the resources of a state and assesses to what extent its volume might pose a threat. Lobell, by comparison, argues that a state’s FPE will not perceive the increase of resources on the part of others as a threat and that some resources or components might be perceived more threatening than others (Ibid, 55). These resources and components might be shifts in population, territory, ideology,

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economy and more specifically land-based military or naval and air power. Economic growth by a state might not be perceived as threatening per se, however, a growth in naval power might be perceived as more threatening. This all depends on a state’s national interests as well as the interests of domestic actors (Ibid, 56). Component power thereby contributes to identifying the FPE’s threat perception. Geographic proximity influences threat perception because the ability to project power declines with distance. This also means that states that are in close proximity pose a greater threat than those who are located further. Balancing behavior resulting from geographic proximity often occurs through alliance networks that try to encircle the threatening central power (Ibid, 23). Geographic proximity explains why the US intervened in several Central-American states in the 1980’s and not in states that are located further from the US. Bandwagoning might also be a result related to geographic proximity. When small states are in close proximity of a state with much aggregate power, these states might engage in bandwagoning because of

their vulnerability (Ibid, 24). The third factor

Walt describes is offensive power and this factor seems to overlap with aggregate power and geographic proximity. However, offensive power is a decisive factor because when aggregate power and geographic proximity are equal, states with large offensive capabilities may create a strong incentive for other states to balance (Ibid, 25). Although balancing behavior is most common, bandwagoning behavior can occur if the threatening great power resorts to rapid conquest and when potential allies are not present in the immediate vicinity. Offensive power is the capability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state at an acceptable cost (Ibid, 25). Offensive power thus emphasizes a state’s ability to pose a potential threat to a state’s sovereignty or territorial integrity. Walt’s fourth factor assesses to what extent a state is viewed as aggressive or displays aggressive intentions. Aggressive states force other states to employ balancing behavior against them more frequent than less aggressive states. A state might have displayed aggressive behavior in the past which makes other states perceive it as being aggressive. Another factor is the perception of aggressive intention which is based on a display of aggressive actions and aggressive rhetoric. Consequently, the more aggressive or expansionist a state appears to be, the more likely it is to trigger balancing behavior (Ibid, 25-26). This last factor seems to incorporate some constructivist elements as aggressive intentions are open to interpretation thus construction. In conclusion, aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions influence threat perception and state’s balancing or bandwagoning behavior. The four discussed factors can be incorporated in the BoT theory. This theory dictates that an imbalance of threat occurs when the most threatening state or coalition is significantly more dangerous than the

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second most threatening state or coalition. The degree to which a state threatens others is the product of its aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability and aggressive intentions. This will lead to a behavior of balancing against the most threatening state (Ibid, 265). This adaptation by Walt of the Balance of Power theory is insightful as it gives greater explanatory power to a states’ external behavior than the Balance of Power theory. BoT can for example, offer an explanation why Western European states engaged in balancing against the Soviet-Union but not against the United States, even though the US had the power to be a threat to these states. This same applicability will be used in answering the research question by focusing on the threat perception of Indonesia’s FPE and to what extent this

influenced the external actions. Walt’s

BoT theory is not without criticism. Robert Keohane reacted to it by claiming that BoT requires so much information about perceptions as well as objective facts that it has relatively little theoretical power of its own. However, he later acknowledged BoT did contribute within the neorealist perspective (Bock & Henneberg, 2013, 3). Others have put BoT to the test by applying it to US interventions in the Persian Gulf, Russian foreign policy and a large-N study. These researchers found evidence that the BoT theory performs better than the Balance of Power theory in its explanatory power (Ibid, 5). The BoT theory thus seems to be a useful adaptation of the balance of power theory. Because I will be performing a single case study, the BoT theory will be useful in assessing Indonesia’s FPE’s threat perception. If I were to apply the BoT theory to more cases, I would have to agree with Keohane’s criticism that it would take too much information for the theory to be applied.

Another reason I want to use Walt’s BoT theory is that it corresponds more with NCR than the balance of power theory due to its focus on perception and the incorporation of domestic threats. Domestic factors’ influence on the FPE’s threat perception constrains balancing efforts by the FPE. Lobell (2009) distinguishes four types or threats; systemic threats, subsystemic threats, domestic threats and multitiered threats. It is important to differentiate between these different levels of threat because the actor is involved into multiple spheres. The FPE act on one level while they try to force an outcome on another level. What appears to be suboptimal in one sphere might turn out optimal in the leader’s target sphere (Ibid, 46-47). IN addition to serving an international goal, Indonesia’s balancing behavior could serve a domestic purpose.

As stated by NCR, systemic elements or threats are the most important features in determining a state’s external actions. Systemic threats are threats deriving from interstate competition as one state might be perceived as a threat by another state. If we apply systemic threats specifically to regional powers, these threats are often exerted by great powers and their impact on regional dynamics (Ibid,

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48). This threat is elaborated by the concept of subsystemic threats, which is a form of interstate competition. Regions have their own dynamics which are part of state’s national interest. As great powers exert their power in a region, the regional distribution of power can create new threats and opportunities for local states (Ibid, 50). China’s rise in power might change the dynamics vis-à-vis another state like Indonesia, but it might also change the dynamics in the entire South-East Asian region. Next to the interstate competition, intra-state competition can be observed in the form of domestic threats. These threats are often internal competitors of the FPE and societal leaders that seek to challenge the ruling political elite. This threat plays a vital role in the ruling FPE’s decision-making as regime survival often has priority over the nation-state’s survival in day-to-day politics (Ibid, 51). To get a more complete understanding of a state’s external behavior it is important to identify domestic threats. By identifying domestic threats, NCR exposes state’s external behavior that in fact is internally driven. As mentioned before, FPE can act in the international arena in order to achieve a goal in the domestic arena (Ripsman, 2009, 173). For example, a state might show aggressive behavior towards another state in order to unite and increase the domestic support for the state’s administration. The incorporation of domestic politics therefore plays a key role in the analysis of a state’s foreign policy. The combination of systemic, subsystemic and domestic threats is identified as multi-tiered threats (Lobell, 2009, 51). This is important to take into consideration because the ruling FPE takes all three levels of threat perception into account in their decision-making according to NCR. This leads to a complex process of threat analysis which houses several advantages. First, it helps to identify state’s external behavior which primary goal is to influence domestic society. Second, it can identify state’s internal actions which are intended to influence other states and the power dynamics in the region. Third, it can identify external acts at the global level that are intended to influence regional dynamics (Lobell, 2009, 51-54). This combination thus provides a foreign policy analysis from the systemic, subsytemic and domestic perspectives.

Combining Walt’s BoT theory and Lobell’s assumption regarding threat perceptions will help in answering the research question by identifying Indonesia’s FPE’s threat perception. These threats are primarily dictated by the perception of systemic elements or interstate competition, which in turn are intervened by domestic elements. The next chapter will combine the theories into the theoretical model that will be used to address the research question.

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2.3 The theoretical model

The final part of the theory chapter is used to combine the discussed theory into a model that can help answer the research question. Figure 2.2 displays this theoretical model and it includes the theories discussed in the previous paragraphs. It is a representation of Rose and Lobell’s neoclassical realist perspective on the factors that influence the foreign policy decision-making process of a state’s FPE by incorporating externally and internally driven incentives. The FPE is situated on the nexus of

international and domestics politics as the operate in both spheres. The differentiation between internally driven and externally driven causal pathways is derived from the theory. Balance of threat theory is driven by external or systematic incentives, which Rose referred to as “insights drawn from

Figure 2.2 The theoretical model

classical realist thought” (Rose, 1998, p.146). The externally driven incentive influences the FPE, which is depicted by the one way arrow. The BoT theory assesses to what extent another state is perceived as a threat based on that states’ capabilities. In this model, the externally driven factors act as the

independent variables that influence the dependent variable, which is the FPE’s foreign policy decision-making.

The model in figure 2.2 also features a two-way arrow between the BoT theory and domestic politics which represents the mutual influence these factors have on each other. Although I will not address this in great detail, it does provide some useful insights. Domestic politics can influence the BoT theory in subjects as religion or ideology. If another state shows unfavorable behavior against the state’s religion, this might be perceived as threatening. In turn, the BoT theory can influence domestic politics as threats are not only located externally but threats to the FPE can also be found domestically. The extent to which systemic and domestic incentives influence each other will be taken into consideration in

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the analysis, but the main focus lies with each incentive’s influence on the FPE’s foreign policy decision-making. The first step of the theoretical model is addressing the influence of systemic incentives on the FPE’s foreign policy decision-making process. Figure 2.3 displays how systemic incentives are comprised out of the BoT theory which includes the four threat determining factors introduced by Walt. The systemic incentives act as the independent variables that influence the dependent variable.

Figure 2.3 Systemic incentives’ influence on the FPE

However, solely relying upon the systemic incentives will only provide a partial explanation for the behavior of the FPE. Since the FPE are situated on the nexus of externally and internally driven

incentives, and are influenced by internal or domestic politics, this should be incorporated in the model. Not only does domestic politics serve as a transmission belt that influences the effectiveness of state resources, it directly influences the FPE’s decision-making process as the FPE can act on the international level to achieve a certain goal on the domestic level (Lobell, 2009, 51). This makes it imperative to include domestic politics in the theoretical model as it also might offer an explanation on a state’s external behavior. The internal factors are added to the model in figure 2.4 to represent the causal logic of NCR. The internal factors in my research are represented by domestic politics which consist out of the FPE’s hold on power and the FPE’s susceptibility to domestic actors’ influence on foreign policy. The internal factors operate as intervening variables as they intervene with the influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable. The FPE has to take internal factors into account in foreign policy decision-making due to the lack of a perfect transmission belt between the independent and dependent variable as Rose and Lobell have pointed out. Therefore, internal factors act as an intervening variable upon the influence of the independent variable on the dependent variable.

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Figure 2.4 Internal factors intervene in foreign policy making process

The theoretical model helps to understand how the FPE’s foreign policy decision-making process is influenced according to NCR. The ensuing methodology chapter will elaborate on using this model to answer the research question. It will also elaborate on applying this model in the Indonesian case and how I will find the data to use this model.

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3. Methodology

This chapter will explore the methodology used in my study. The first paragraph will introduce the hypotheses that I will test in my empirical analysis to answer the research question. These hypotheses correspond with the theoretical model as they represent the systemic and domestic approaches to the research question that offer separate explanations. Additionally, the testing of the hypotheses will be addressed and the conditions by which the hypotheses are supported or rejected are set. The second paragraph will elaborate on the different data sources used to test the hypotheses. The third and fourth paragraphs explore the research methods I will use to answer the research question and why these methods are utilized. The fifth paragraph will expand upon the Indonesian case to readdress the puzzle the Indonesian case presents and why Indonesia’s external actions can be considered balancing behavior. The final paragraph of this chapter will reflect upon the selected theory, research methods and identify certain limitations.

3.1 The hypotheses

I will utilize two different hypotheses to answer the research question. These two hypotheses are:

1. An altered threat perception by Indonesia’s FPE regarding China can explain Indonesia’s recent balancing behavior.

2. A change in the influence of Indonesia’s domestic politics on the FPE’s foreign policy decision-making during president Widodo’s administration can explain Indonesia’s balancing behavior regarding China.

The first hypothesis is based on systemic elements that derive from externally driven modes of explaining the research question. The systemic incentives will act as the independent variables that influence the dependent variable of foreign policy making by the FPE. Hereafter, I will complement this hypothesis by introducing a second hypothesis that is internally driven. This second hypothesis assesses the state’s internal factors that influence foreign policy decision-making and will act as intervening variables to the dependent variable. Introducing this additional hypothesis broadens the explanatory power of my thesis by approaching the research question from two different perspectives. Moreover, adding a hypothesis that is internally driven is in line with the neoclassical realist approach this study adapts. I do recognize the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and that they are interrelated as shown in the theoretical model. I have chosen to address the hypotheses separately to create a clear distinction

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between systemic and domestic factors that influence the foreign policy elite in their decision-making. The following subparagraphs discuss how I will test these hypotheses.

3.1.1 Testing the first hypothesis

The first hypothesis will be tested by identifying Indonesia’s FPE and the way these elites’ perceptions affect Indonesia’s foreign policy. I will use this approach due to the influence the FPE can exert onto a country’s foreign policy. The position of the FPE allows them to shape a state’s foreign policy and let them play a crucial role in the opinion-policy process (Chittick & Billingsley, 1989, 201). To determine Indonesia’s most influential FPE members, I will make use of Daniel Novotny’s study in his book Torn

between American and China: Elite perceptions and Indonesian foreign policy. This is the most elaborate

and recent study into Indonesia’s FPE’s perceptions. Novotny performed multiple interviews with members of Indonesia’s FPE from which he derived a distinction in the layers of FPE. The top FPE officials are represented by the president and members of his cabinet. The second layer of FPE consists of top officials of the department of foreign affairs that provides the president with input. The third layer consists of other governmental institutions, departments and the military. The fourth and fifth layers consist out of the Indonesian parliament and outside actors like academics, journalists and think-tanks (Novotny, 2010, 67-68). Novotny puts his focus on the top executive branch of government to represent the FPE which translates in considering the first two layers as Indonesia’s FPE. This includes interviews with 2 former presidents, three former cabinet ministers and eleven prominent Indonesian diplomats (Ibid, 87-88). I will only focus on the threat perception of the top layer of Indonesia’s FPE as they are the determining actors in Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making and it offers a smaller amount of perceptions I will have to incorporate in the theoretical model. This selection is supported by Wibisono’s study as he determined that “foreign policy making is a privilege of those in the executive branch of government” (Wibisono, 2009, 26). Therefore, when I refer to threat perception by Indonesia’s FPE, I imply the threat perception by Indonesia’s top FPE officials, consisting out of the president, minister of foreign affairs and minister of defense.

In order to uncover the threat perception of the afore determined FPE, I will analyze the Indonesia-China relation in order to find certain patterns in this relation using secondary literature. Subsequently, I will identify Indonesia’s FPE’s threat perception of China during previous administrations. I will uncover the previous perception by analyzing the studies of Daniel Novotny and A. Wibisono into Indonesia’s FPE threat perception of China. These studies relied on firsthand interviews with members of Indonesia’s FPE to uncover their threat perceptions, and are the most elaborate and

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recent studies into Indonesia’s FPE’s threat perception. Unfortunately, due to the limited scope of my study, I am not be able to personally interview current members of Indonesia’s FPE.

Indonesia’s FPE’s previous threat perception will be combined with Indonesia’s FPE’s current threat perception of China. In order to determine the current perception, I will use Walt’s method of threat perception which states that the factors that influence the FPE’s threat perception are a state’s aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions (Walt, 1987, 21). I will use the neoclassical realist amendments of component power proposed by Lobell (2009) instead of Walt’s aggregate power as discussed in the theoretical chapter. Lobell amended the aggregate power by differentiating between the specific components of state power which he referred to as component power (Lobell, 2009, 54-56). Following Walt’s example, China’s component power will be determined by assessing its population, economic strength and military capabilities (Walt, 1987, 21-23). Technological prowess will be incorporated within the technological advancement of China’s military capabilities as it plays a marginal role in the Indonesia-China relationship and economic strength and military capabilities are of more importance (Novotny, 2010, 210). Component power distinguishes the perceptions of a state’s resources and capabilities as not all components will be perceived as threatening. China’s resources and how these are perceived by Indonesia’s FPE affects a state’s behavior to bandwagon or balance with the state that poses a threat (Walt, 1987, 21). To assess Indonesia’s FPE’s current threat perception of China, I will apply these four factors as proposed by Walt and Lobell to Chinese external behavior and resources during the presidency

of Widodo. The combination of uncovering

patterns in the Indonesia-China relation, Indonesia’s FPE’s previous threat perception, and threat analysis of China based on Walt and Lobell’s criteria during Widodo’s presidency will allow me to test the hypothesis as to what extent an alteration in Indonesia’s FPE’s threat perception regarding China can explain Indonesia’s balancing behavior. The hypothesis will be supported if I uncover a changed perception in at least one of the four factors of threat perception. This criterion is based on Walt’s theory in which a change in one of the four factors of threat perception can lead to a state to adopt balancing behavior (Ibid, 20). If none of the factors exemplify changes in perception, there will not be enough evidence to support the claim that the threat perception of Indonesia’s FPE has changed and thus the hypothesis will be disproven. The next subparagraph will discuss how the second hypothesis will be tested.

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3.1.2 Testing the second hypothesis

The second hypothesis is driven by internal factors contrary to the first hypothesis. It tries to explain the research question by evaluating Indonesia’s domestic politics of president Widodo’s administration and how this influences Indonesia’s FPE’s foreign policy decision-making. This will be done by testing the hypothesis; a change in the influence of Indonesia’s domestic politics on Indonesia’s FPE’s foreign policy decision-making during president Widodo’s administration can explain Indonesia’s balancing behavior against China.

Incorporating domestic politics to answer the research question will add even more explanatory power to this study as this is based the notion that the FPE are positioned at the nexus of domestic and international politics. As a result, the FPE might act on the international level in order to achieve a goal on the domestic level and vice versa. Furthermore, the FPE can act internationally in order to preserve its own power position domestically (Ripsman, 2009, 173). To assess to what extent domestic politics has influenced Indonesia’s external actions and whether the hypothesis is supported, I will analyze president Widodo’s approval ratings to assess if the preservation of the president’s hold on power is threatened. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, the influence of domestic actors on the FPE’s foreign policy decision-making is enhanced when the FPE’s hold on power is threatened (Ibid). Additionally, I will analyze Indonesia’s domestic politics starting with the 2014 presidential elections. This will uncover domestic political actors and developments in Indonesian politics since these elections, that influenced Indonesia’s balancing behavior against China. I will specifically focus on domestic developments regarding Chinese Indonesians and their role in Indonesian politics as this can spill-over and influence Indonesia-China relations. I will also focus on Indonesia’s Islamic-nationalists’ rising influence in Indonesian politics and their politicizing of ethno-religious sentiments in Indonesian politics during president Widodo’s first presidential term. These domestic political developments can influence the FPE’s foreign policy decision-making if the FPE’s hold on power is threatened but also if the FPE can be affected by these domestic sentiments. I will therefore assess to what extent Indonesia’s FPE, and specifically president Widodo, is vulnerable to be affected by these domestic developments and thereby assessing the probability these developments can influence foreign policy decision-making. This

assessment of domestic influence on foreign policy is in accordance with Ripsman’s first method of domestic influence on foreign policy, which is by direct electoral payoff in democratic states, and this is linked to the FPE’s hold on power (Ripsman, 2009, 189). I will apply Ripsman’s first method of domestic influence as this is the most frequent method, shows overlap with Ripsman’s second method, and his third method is not applicable on the Indonesian case as there is no evidence to suggest domestic actors

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act as an epistemic community (Ibid, 189).

The hypothesis will be supported if president Widodo’s hold on power is threatened directly by impending election, or indirectly by a decline in approval ratings. Additionally, domestic incentives to which Indonesia’s FPE are vulnerable, need to be present in order to make balancing behavior against China domestically beneficial for Indonesia’s FPE. My choice for this combination of conditions is in accordance with Ripsman’s theory as to what conditions would enable domestic politics to influence the FPE’s foreign policy decision-making. If the chance for reelection is high or Widodo’s approval ratings do not display a threat to his hold on power, the hypothesis will be disproven. Moreover, if domestic incentives do not make balancing behavior against China domestically beneficial for Indonesia’s FPE, the hypothesis will also be disproven. Now that I have covered the hypotheses and conditions that I will be testing, I will briefly elaborate on the data I will be using to test the hypotheses in my analysis.

3.2 Data selection

In order to test the aforementioned hypotheses I will use multiple data sources which include primary sources, scientific literature, news articles, policy briefs and secondary surveys. In order to test the first hypothesis, I use qualitative data from the studies of Wibisono and Novotny that conducted in-depth interviews and surveys with members of Indonesia’s FPE. I chose these studies as they are the most recent and have performed the most elaborate interviews with multiple members of Indonesia’s FPE. In order to assess the current threat perception of China, I will assess to what extent China adheres to the four factors of threat perception given by Walt and Lobell. Using data provided by the United Nations and The World Bank, I will be able to assess the factors such as population and Indonesia’s economic relations with China. This will be combined with secondary literature such as scientific, and news articles, that give additional insights into the nature of Indonesia-China economic relations. Assessing China’s military build-up will prove to be more difficult as the Chinese are not transparent regarding their military forces. I will therefore resort to the analysis of China’s military capabilities based on research by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). This institute cooperates with The World Bank and the United Nations regarding states’ military data creating coherence in my data sources as I already use data provided by the UN and World Bank. Additionally, in order to assess China’s offensive capabilities, annual rapports of the US Department of Defense will be assessed that analyze the

composition of China’s offensive military capabilities, supplemented with secondary literature. I will use these sources because the Chinese do not provide an overview of their military resources themselves. China’s aggressive intentions will be assessed by using primary sources such as speeches and secondary

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sources. The second hypothesis will use data to look at president Widodo’s approval ratings. This data will derive from polls conducted by FT Confidential Research as these are more accessible due to their use of English, and offer more

credibility as Indonesian polls are notorious for being inaccurate (Setijadi, 2017b, 9). These polls will be supplemented with secondary sources such as newspaper articles and rapports that have analyzed these polls. The role of Chinese Indonesians and Islamic-nationalists in Indonesian politics will primarily be assessed by using scientific articles that address Indonesian politics, supported by policy briefs, news articles and secondary surveys to cover the most recent developments in Indonesia’s politics. I am forced to mostly rely upon secondary material regarding Indonesian politics as I am not a native speaker of the Indonesian language. Overall, the data sources that I am using to test my hypotheses are qualitative sources.

3.3 The research method

To test my hypotheses, I will use process-tracing research in order to uncover the causal mechanisms in my case study. The goal of my study is to explain why the Indonesian government has been showing a more assertive foreign policy towards China as part of the South-China Sea conflict. In order to explain this action I need to uncover the causal chain and causal mechanisms to find out what factors

contributed to this action. This is the reason I have chosen to use process-tracing. Process-tracing is a technique that derived from cognitive psychology in which it refers to the examination of intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it generated the outcome of interest (Bennet & Checkel, 2014, 6). The ambition of process-tracing is to trace causal mechanisms and identify the intervening causal process between the independent variables and the outcome of the dependent variable. More specifically, process-tracing methods are used to study causal mechanisms in a single case research design, on which I will elaborate in the next section (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, 55).

Process-tracing can be divided into three variants; theory-testing, theory-building and

explaining-outcome. Theory-testing employs a deductive approach as it is a theory centric approach that starts with the theory from which to derive hypotheses that can be tested by a case. (Beach, 2017, 20-22). Theory-building is a inductive approach and is case centric. This approach starts with empirical material from the case and then uses a structured analysis of this material to build a plausible

hypothetical causal mechanism. This hypothetical causal mechanism is linked to an outcome that can be present in other cases as well thereby making it more generalizable (Ibid, 22-23). Finally,

No longer on the sidelines