Why stabilization missions fail : a comparative case study exploring the aims, nature, and outcomes of the stabilization missions in Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Mali

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Why Stabilization Missions Fail

A Comparative Case Study Exploring the Aims, Nature, and Outcomes of the

Stabilization Missions in Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of

the Congo, and Mali

by Hanna Winberg

12284084

University of Amsterdam

Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations Thesis Elective: UN and Peacebuilding

Supervisor: Dr. Jana Krause Second reader: Dr. Dimitris Bouris

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Abstract

1

The latest trend for UN peacekeeping is to deploy stabilization missions in conflict-prone countries where there is “no peace to keep”. These missions are distinct from previous missions since they are operating in the midst of ongoing conflict, mandated with a robust use of force to assist the government in retaking territories, reestablish state authority, neutralize identified aggressors, and to restore and maintain stability. This comparative case study investigates why the stabilization missions on the African content (MINUSCA, MONUSCO, and MINUSMA), however, have failed to achieve stability in their host countries. By probing theoretical assumptions on the implications of the stabilization logic and local peace, this thesis aims at exploring why the missions have undermined, rather than built, stability. The analysis is threefold where it first maps out the development of instability, second, it explores the role of the UN, and third, it analyzes the stabilization logic. The conclusion is that whilst the missions show context-awareness, stabilization is a top-down and short-term approach that favors militarization and extending state authority over addressing local peace and root causes for conflict, which ultimately causes the missions to undermine long-term stability.

Key Words: Stabilization, Local Peace, Peacekeeping, United Nations, MINUSCA,

MONUSCO, MINUSMA

Word Count: 21 824

1_{The title was inspired by the book “Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty” by Daron} Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) which explains why some nations prosper and others fail by looking at economic explanations in institution building, development politics, as well as economic history.

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List of Abbreviations

ACLED Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project

ASIFU All Sources Information Fusion Unit

AU African Union

BINUCA United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the

Central African Republic

CAR Central African Republic

CNDP National Congress for the Defense of the People

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration

DFID Department for International Development

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

FACA Central African Armed Forces

FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the

Congo

FDLR Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda

FIB Force Intervention Brigade

FSI Fragile States Index

HIPPO High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations

Peace Operations

IDP Internally Displaced Person

ISSSS International Security and Stabilization Support

Strategy

LRA Lord’s Resistance Army

M23 23rd_{of March Movement}

MDSF Malian Defense and Security Forces

MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated

Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated

Stabilization Mission in Mali

MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

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MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in

the Democratic Republic of the Congo

POC Protection of Civilians

SSR Security Sector Reform

UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program

UK SU United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit

UN United Nations

UNSC United Nations Security Council

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Figures and Tables

Figures

Figure 1. Total Country Score: CAR, DRC and Mali (2006-2019) ... 35

Figure 2. Disorder in the CAR (2006-2019) ... 36

Figure 3. Disorder in the DRC (2006-2019) ... 37

Figure 4. Disorder in Mali (2006-2019) ... 38

Figure 5. Fatalities by Type of Violence in CAR (2006-2018)... 40

Figure 6. Fatalities by Type of Violence in the DRC (2006-2018) ... 40

Figure 7. Fatalities by Type of Violence in Mali (2006-2018) ... 40

Tables Table 1 Ranking of CAR, DRC and Mali by the Fragile State Index (2006-2019) ... 33

Table 2. Quick Facts on CAR, the DRC and Mali ... 41

Table 3. Identified Aggressors and Mission-Specific Robust Responses ... 52

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1. Introduction

The nature of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations has changed dramatically in recent years. They are increasingly operating in complex or fragile settings where there is “no peace to keep” and mandated to achieve peace trough stabilization (Bellamy & Hunt 2015:1277,1298; de Coning 2016). Although receiving increasing attention, the record of success for stabilization missions, as well as the conceptual and operational boundaries for them, are still largely diffuse (Muggah 2014). Nevertheless, between 2010 and 2014,2_{three UN stabilization missions were} deployed on the African continent: United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) in 2010, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013, and United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in 2014.3_{All missions} included a central aim to stabilize respective areas and to restore state authority, demanded destabilizing activities by armed groups to cease, and were all authorized with a Chapter VII mandate (UNSC 2053:2012; UNSC 2100:2013; UNSC 2149:2014).4_{All three countries are} among the 21 most fragile countries in the world (Fund for Peace 2019a) but the contexts are widely different. The conflict in CAR is often described as “misunderstood” and “largely ignored” by the international community, and although having experienced years of violence, the UN only entered in 2013 when warnings for a possible genocide surfaced (Isaacs-Martin & Mafeje 2016; Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke 2017). The situation in the DRC is considered to be one of the most complex in the world, and the main grievance, being the political-military struggle between armed groups and the government, is still intense especially in the northern parts (de Vries 2015). Mali, once considered to be the “poster child” for democracy-building in Africa, experienced a succession of destabilizing events following the 2012 Tuareg uprising (Chauzal & van Damme 2015). Thus, with increasing reports of turbulence, violence, and simultaneous crumbling stability in all states, the UN turned to stabilization.

The nature, mandate, and character of the stabilization missions are widely different from previous missions by the UN. The meaning of stabilization also varies between the missions since the UN has not yet defined the concept and barely mentions the concept in any UN policy or guidance document (Gorur 2016:7-8). Whilst some UN officials and

2_{The first stabilization mission by the UN - MINUSTAH - was launched in 2004 in Haiti and had the central goal}

to help the transitional government and to ensure a secure and stable environment (Lemay-Hébert 2015).

3_{All missions henceforth interchangeable referred to as their specific mission names, or joint together as “the}

missions” or “the stabilization missions”.

4_{Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations allows peacekeepers the use force if a situation is determined}

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diplomats claim that the three missions are unique and should not be lumped together, other UN officials and diplomats’ state that the missions reflect a new era, or approach, of the UN Security Council (UNSC) (de Coning 2018:87). Due to the uncertainty of the meaning of stabilization in these missions by both UN policy makers and practitioners, along with tendencies towards a more robust type of peacekeeping5_{, stakeholders are becoming} increasingly concerned that these missions are taking peacekeeping into unexplored territories and potentially harming the basic principles of peacekeeping (Gorur 2016:5,7).6_{Still, there is a} great confusion between the theoretical understanding of the stabilization missions, and the current academic debate focuses heavily on disentangling how stabilization is expressed through the missions in practice, as well as reflecting over the new path of UN peacekeeping.

Despite international intervention by the UN, during the time-period from when the missions were deployed until the time of writing (June 2019), none of the countries have shown significant improvement for their stability. Simply by looking at the Fragile State Index (FSI) one can notice an overall negative trend for the CAR during 2014-2019, the DRC pendulating between the eight place (best) and the second place (worst) between 2010 and 2019, and Mali jumping from 38th_{in 2013 to becoming the 21}st_{most fragile state in the world in 2019} (Fund for Peace 2019b). The perplexity that this thesis wishes to explore is that whilst stabilization is seemingly the “new” approach in UN peacekeeping and could be considered a necessary way of combating the existing threats of instability in these fragile environments – none have achieved the aims of progress regarding decreased violence and increased stability. In other words, this thesis will explore why, counter to the expressed aims of the missions, the host countries generally have experienced less stability and sometimes more violence since the missions were deployed. Furthermore, the aim is to analyze UN’s role in the overall negative trends and see how the stabilization approach has contributed to this development. The thesis will utilize theoretical assumptions of stabilization and local peace in an attempt to explain the limited outcome on stability in the three countries. This thesis aspires to comparatively disentangle what effect stabilization, through its aim and nature, has on the mission’s outcomes. Foremost, this thesis evaluates the new stabilization approach, or the “stabilization logic”, in UN peacekeeping and attempts to explain why stabilization has weakened rather than fostered

5_{When referring to peacekeeping, this paper will consider it to be the deployment of a UN presence in a host}

country with consent by the parties, usually involving military and/or police personnel and civilians. Peacekeeping aims at both preventing conflict and making peace (Boutros-Gali 1992: §20).

6_{The “basic principles of peacekeeping” consists of “consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force,}

except in self-defense and defense of the mandate, (…) recognizing that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned” (see for example UNSC 2149:2014).

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stability. Or in other words, it will explain why stabilization missions fail.7_{This thesis will} argue that the stabilization logic is a top-down and short-term approach that favors militarization over local peace, which subsequently undermines the chances for long-term stability. The robust nature of stabilization endangers the impartiality of the UN and has shown counterproductive outcomes. In addition, whilst the stabilization missions often are lumped together and portrayed as utilizing the same peacekeeping approach, the missions show great context sensibility and awareness of promoting local initiatives. Nevertheless, stabilization is an acute approach which in many cases favors military action and expanding state authority over decisions informed by local awareness and long-term strategies. Subsequently, the stabilization logic fails in addressing root causes for conflict and thus undermines, rather than builds, stability.

1.1 Research Questions

The research question is: Why have the stabilization missions MINUSCA, MONUSCO, and

MINUSMA undermined, rather than built, stability?

The purpose of this thesis is to explore how the stabilization missions in CAR, the DRC, and Mali have not achieved, but in some instances even worked counterproductively to, the mandates’ goals of stability. By comparatively exploring theoretical assumptions made about the missions, this thesis will seek to explore the differences and similarities between the stabilization logic in the three cases. Through this, one can identify the nuances of the stabilization approach and evaluate how it has contributed to the limited results. The aim of this thesis can be considered threefold; first it will map out how, focusing on the time-period since the missions were deployed, the situation of stability has developed. Second, the thesis will attempt to explore the UN’s role in this development and evaluate the peace operations. Third, the thesis will attempt to analyze and theoretically explain the findings.

The research question is thus subsequently divided into three sub-questions:

• Sub-question (1): Have the countries CAR, the DRC, and Mali been “stabilized” since

the missions MINUSCA, MONUSCO and MINUSMA were deployed?

• Sub-question (2): How have MINUSCA, MONUSCO, and MINUSMA attempted to

implement their stabilization mandate in respective countries?

7_{For the purpose of this thesis - when stating that a mission “fails”, albeit sounding harsh, the wording simply}

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• Sub-question (3): How can we understand the limited progress of stability for

MINUSCA, MONUSCO and MINUSMA?

The specific methodology for researching the three sub-questions will be further explained in the Methodology Chapter.

1.2 Relevance

This topic has societal relevance at various levels. It is important at the local level for the inhabitants directly affected by the actions and inactions by the international community. In practice, it has importance for peacekeepers deployed that are carrying out the mandates. Through spillover effects, one can argue that the outcome of the stabilization missions carries a great importance for the regions, both the Sahel region in the case of Mali and the Central African region - for CAR and the DRC. For the international community, the situation in these countries are considered to be a threat for the international and regional peace and security (UNSC 2053:2012; UNSC 2100:2013; UNSC 2149:2014), thus, evaluating the methods to combat instability and violence has utmost importance. By analyzing all three stabilization missions deployed on the African continent, one can gain a deeper understanding if the stabilization logic is more or less suitable for these countries specifically - but also fragile environments generally.

At a scientific level, this thesis builds on the literature on state fragility, UN, peacekeeping, local peace, and stabilization. This thesis aims at contributing to the existing research by comparatively analyzing all three stabilization missions deployed in Africa. In addition, this thesis will conduct an in-depth empirical analysis that aims at generating further knowledge on the strengths and weaknesses of the UN’s most recent peacekeeping approach. The specific angle of the thesis, which is attempting to explain through a comparative analysis why the stabilization missions have not reached their aims and a trend of instability can instead be seen, is considered to be an original approach and highly relevant.

1.3 Outline

This thesis proceeds as follows. First, the literature review will introduce the scholarly debate surrounding the topic and motivate the necessity for this thesis. Thereafter, the theoretical framework will build on the literature review but specifically highlight the implications of the stabilization logic. Subsequently, the research design will explain the specific methodology for each sub-question used in this thesis, motivate the case selection, discuss the material, provide

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an ethnical reflection, and introduce the delimitations and limitations. In Chapter 5, a brief historical background on CAR, the DRC, and Mali will be provided. Thenceforth, the analysis will map out the development of instability, explore the role of the UN in the three countries, and analyze the stabilization logic in the missions. Lastly, the thesis will end with a conclusion summarizing the main findings as well as providing recommendations for future research.

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2. Literature Review

This chapter will explore the literature on fragile states, militarization of peacekeeping, as well as primarily stabilization and stabilization missions. By illustrating the scholarly discourse, it will be illustrated that stabilization is a concept of great confusion and ambiguity. Most importantly, it will become evident that there is a need to further explore the stabilization missions in a comparative manner, and that there is a gap concerning why the missions are experiencing difficulties in achieving their mandate goals of stability. Many studies rely upon generalized theoretical assumptions and speculation about the missions, which points to the need for further empirical evidence.

From State Fragility and Robust Peacekeeping to Stabilization Missions

To understand why the UN is deploying stabilization missions it is important to explain the scholarly discourse on the topic as well as the changing nature of UN peacekeeping. The stabilization discourse stems from the debate on state fragility and fragile states, which brings the fields of security, conflict, and development together. Both concepts are widely used by policy analysts and other actors to label and rank developing countries facing for example violence, malfunctioning governments, conflict, instability, severe poverty, large number of displaced persons and refugees, and other threats to security and development (Fund for Peace 2017b; Nay 2013:326-327; Roberts 2015:27). The 1990s witnessed a gradual emergence of the “security-development nexus”, and under the umbrella-term “fragile states” security and development was problematized more broadly (Grimm et al 2014:199).8_{It was thus suggested} that in order to create stability, actions focusing on effective governance, security, and reducing poverty had to be prioritized (Dennys & Rodwell 2015:86). After the end of the Cold War, and especially after the 9/11-attacks in 2001, growing attention was given to intra-state conflicts in fragile states. Thus, countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq were considered to be in need of external intervention in order to build stability (Roberts 2015:30; UK SU 2019:7-8). Countries with weak or no legitimate government were considered to be potential sanctuaries for criminals or terrorist organizations (Grimm et al 2014:200; Roberts 2015:30) which is still a common

8_{Several concepts are used to explain the same type of states experiencing these problems: “weak states”, “failing}

states”, “collapsed states”, “quasi states”, or “rogue states” (Grimm et al 2014:198; Nay 2013:327; Roberts 2015:28). However, such concepts have been faced with criticism since using labels such as “collapsed” describes a situation that is finite rather than transitory, that could be true in certain areas but perhaps not for the country as a whole. It is also considered simply “insulting” (Roberts 2015:28). Thus, “state fragility” is nowadays commonly used by Western Governments and international organizations, which aims to illustrate the wider spectrum of state fragility rather than solemnly focusing on those states traditionally considered “failed” (Nay 2013:327; OECD 2015:2).

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current understanding among the international community (see Fund for Peace 2017b; UN & WBG 2018:11). In a report by the UN and the World Bank Group it is stated that “[a]t the United Nations, we believe [conflict] prevention means doing everything we can [...] to achieve peace and development” and “[a]t the World Bank Group, we believe that preventing fragility, conflict and violence is central to reducing poverty and achieving shared prosperity” (2018:XI). This illustrates that the security-development nexus is still highly relevant for the international community.

During the past two decades, the UNSC has increasingly authorized UN missions with a Chapter VII mandate giving peacekeepers to protect civilians with “all means necessary” (Bellamy & Hunt 2015:1280; Karlsrud 2018a). In the last decade especially, issues of terrorism and violent extremism have moved high up on the international agenda, pressuring the UN to adapt their methods for combatting asymmetric threats (Karlsrud 2019:153; Riis Andersen 2018:353). Consequently, the use of force in peacekeeping mandates, or the militarization of peacekeeping, has become an increasingly frequent method in facing these new dangers to international security. Alex J. Bellamy and Charles T. Hunt discuss the changing nature of UN peace operations; once perceived as primarily dealing with buffer zones between warring states, peacekeeping has become one of the international community’s primarily means of response in maintaining international peace and security (2015:1278). They identify the transformation as characterized by a “robust turn”; an increased readiness to use force to implement the mandate.9 The robust development is partly explained by the Protection of Civilians (POC) obligation, where an increased robust posture is considered needed in order to face the persistent attacks on civilians (Bellamy & Hunt 2015:1278-1279; Hunt 2017). Through this, a new key concept for the UN, proving a more pragmatic and realistic alternative to previous strategies, arose:

stabilization (Riis Andersen 2019:351).

Stabilization has its roots in the liberal peace theory and was introduced in the mid-1990s, referring to reinforcing economies to withstand shocks (Gorur 2016:13). Simultaneously, the concept developed into a type of conflict intervention by Western states and has frequently been used in interventions such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Gorur 2016:12). The first stabilization mission by an international organization was deployed by National Atlantic Treaty Organization in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1996 and 2004 (Karlsrud 2018a:10). UN peacekeeping has often been authorized to carry out

9_{In the 2009 “New Partnership Agenda”, the UN identifies the robust approach to peacekeeping as: “a political}

and operational strategy to UN mission to implement its mandate and to deter threats to an existing peace process in the face of resistance from spoilers” (UN 2009:21).

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tasks of civil reconstruction in fragile states, and since 2000, 29 missions have been mandated by the UNSC to promote stabilization activities (Dennys & Rodwell 2015:85; Roberts 2015:31). Since its introduction, stabilization has derived into a way of illustrating the complex relationship between national security, economic development, human security, and that issues of poverty and underdevelopment pose threats to international security (Gorur 2016:13). The United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit (UK SU) describe stabilization to be “[...] an activity undertaken as an initial response to violence or the immediate threat of violence” where the ability of local political processes to manage that conflict have broken down (UK SU 2019:11,13). However, the definition of stabilization has been a subject for debate.

The scholarly debate on stabilization has partly focused on disentangling the concept by looking at the mandate and practices of UN stabilization missions. The concept is highly discussed among scholars and the UN has not defined its meaning and barely mentions it in any UN policy or guidance document (Gorur 2016:9; UK SU 2019:15), a problem pointed out in the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO) report (2015:30 § 111). In UN peacekeeping missions, stabilization can have different meanings and thus generate different functions (Gorur 2016), but many scholars agree that the stabilization missions mark a new path for UN peacekeeping towards a more robust approach (see Bellamy & Hunt 2015; de Coning 2016; Hunt 2017; Karlsrud 2015, 2017 & 2018a). Aditi Gorur effectively structures the academic debate on what the concept entails through three main definitions of stabilization (2016:13-14): stabilization as pre-peacebuilding10_{intervention (see} Muggah 2014), stabilization as active conflict intervention (see Bellamy & Hunt 2015; Boutellis 2015; de Coning 2016 & 2018), and stabilization as robust use of force (see de Coning 2016 & 2018; Hunt 2017; Karlsrud 2015). Robert Muggah defines stabilization as a pre-peacebuilding phase in peacekeeping interventions, where stabilization “appears to constitute a ‘transition’ from large-scale peacekeeping operations in areas affected by widespread insecurity to smaller-scale program with targeted security and development packages” (2014). He places stabilization in a broader trend of increasingly multidimensional and robust operations that are combined with both statebuilding and peacebuilding (Gorur 2016:13). Muggah argues that in practice, the concept serves as a synonym of a new kind of peacekeeping mission, or a subcomponent of it (2014). This is an interpretation that is supported by peacekeeping personnel in the field (Gorur 2016:13). Moreover, stabilization can be seen as part of an active conflict intervention phase in peacekeeping (see Bellamy & Hunt 2015; Boutellis 2015; de Coning 2016

10_{Peacebuilding is defined by: “[...] action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and}

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& 2018). Related to this, Cedric de Coning (2016) notices a departure from the 2000 Brahimi report, in which it was recommended that the UN should not be operating in the midst of conflict. Lastly, contemporary stabilization missions are deployed where there is “no peace to keep” (de Coning 2016; Hunt 2017:113).

Stabilization is an ambiguous concept that could be linked to other aspects of peacekeeping for example protection of civilians, use of force, strengthening institutions, demobilizing combatants, as well as military operations (Gorur 2016:14), creating many angles of study. Other than disentangling the meaning of the concept, scholars have dissected the specific characteristics within the missions and its implications. Missions are deployed in more hostile and complex conflict environments than at any time in their history, where success is often out of reach (Hunt 2017:108-109). Again, many studies on the stabilization missions have focused specifically on the robust turn in peacekeeping (Hunt 2017; Nadin et al 2014) or how the UN has turned to counterterrorism (Charbonneau 2017; Karlsrud 2017) and the implications of those actions. John Karlsrud argues that traditional liberal peacebuilding is waning in importance, both in practice and as a concept, and that Western states are increasingly shifting their focus towards stabilization and counterterrorism (2018a). Many scholars agree that the focus on stabilization, robust peacekeeping, or counterterrorism in UN peacekeeping, will have counterproductive results for the UN and lead to the undermining of UN’s legitimacy and partiality in general, and the value of UN peacekeeping operations in particular (Cheng et al 2018; Hunt 2017; Karlsrud 2018a; Mac Ginty 2012).

Most studies have focused solely on one of the stabilization missions (see for example Barrera 2015; Boutellis 2015; Karlsrud 2017 & 2018b; Lemay-Hébert 2014) which calls for a need to explore and evaluate the missions comparatively. Some studies have focused on comparing MINUSCA, MONUSCO, and MINUSMA, however solely focusing on a specific angle of the mandates. For instance, Karlsrud (2015) compares the implication on the peace enforcement mandates in the missions in CAR, the DRC and Mali. Similarly, Hunt (2017) focuses primarily on unintended implications of the robust peacekeeping mandates in (among others) the same three countries. Nevertheless, there is a significant gap in exploring all three missions simultaneously and explaining how and why none of the three stabilization missions deployed on the African continent have experienced increased stability and less violence. There is a need to explore this particular focus and by comparing all three missions one can better evaluate whether stabilization is the most suitable approach for these missions.

This literature review has illustrated the necessity for this thesis, and to repeat, the research question that this thesis will explore is: Why have the stabilization missions MINUSCA,

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MONUSCO, and MINUSMA undermined, rather than built, stability? The following chapter

will derive from the academic debate presented in this chapter and introduce the theoretical framework that will be utilized for the analysis.

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3. Theoretical Framework

This chapter will introduce the theoretical framework which will narrow and guide the analysis. The theories used in this thesis were considered well suited for the specific aim for this thesis, and a good way to generate further insights on the topic. In short, this chapter will theoretically explain how the stabilization logic neglects local peace and undermines the chances for stability. First, a framework for evaluating peace operations will be developed. Second, the stabilization framework will be provided where a definition will be presented along with theoretical implications of the stabilization logic. This is followed by a theory of local peace, an aspect commonly argued to be neglected in stabilization efforts and considered to be an explanation for lasting peace.

3.1 Evaluating Peace Operations

This thesis will utilize Frank F. Diehl and Daniel Druckmans (2015) framework for evaluating peace operations. When evaluating peace operations, it is first important to state the measures that will constitute a “successful” mission (Diehl & Druckman 2015:94). For this thesis, the “success” would mean an improvement in stability, or when a country is considered “stabilized”.11_{The framework consists of four decisions that constitutes the success of a} peacekeeping mission: stakeholders, time perspectives, baselines and mission types (idem: 95). First, considering the stakeholders involves determining for whom the peacekeeping mission was successful. For this thesis, the stakeholders would be the international community, the host government, and the local population (idem: 95-96). Second, taking a short-term perspective involves looking at if the goals were reached during the course of a peace operation. This perspective allows a more established link between the peace operation and the observed outcome (idem: 96-97). The third decision, baseline for assessment, involves setting benchmarks to which the operation should be compared to. Here, one can compare the mission with the conditions prior to deployment to the ones following the operations, providing an “before versus after” analysis. Thus, the peacekeeping operation function as the key dividing line for evaluation of the peacekeeping operation, which is useful when making comparisons across missions and for measuring progress in for example violence (idem: 99). This will be utilized for sub-question (1) when exploring if the stabilization missions have managed to “stabilize” the countries. The positive or negative trends and variations “early after” and “later after” are tracked since the deployment and allows further analysis (idem: 99). Lastly, the final

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aspect involves the types of peacekeeping missions, where comparative assessments are best made between missions that are deployed in similar situations and have similar aims (idem: 99-100), such as the stabilization missions.

3.2 The Stabilization Framework

Stability, as a concept, stands in contrast to instability, although there are different levels of stability forming a spectrum of more and less stable countries. The Department for International Development (DFID) Building Stability Framework defines long-term stability as when: “communities, states and regions are able to develop, and manage conflict and change peacefully” (UK SU 2019:152). In this thesis, the level of stability12_{will be generated by a joint} interpretation by the operationalized concepts of fatalities, disorder, and fragility.13

The objective in undertaking stabilization interventions is to reduce violence, ensure basic security, and to facilitate peaceful political deal-making, all of which would create a foundation for building long-lasting stability (UK SU 2019:11). Although stabilization is a concept separated from peacebuilding, statebuilding and counter-terrorism, all actions work alongside with a mutual aim to build stability. The UK SU identify stabilization to be “[...] an activity undertaken as an initial response to violence or the immediate threat of violence” where the ability of local political processes to manage that conflict has broken down (UK SU 2019:11,13). This is a good, however broad, definition of stabilization which does not fully reflect the UN stabilization missions. Due to the fluctuating and ambiguous definitions provided for the concept, nonetheless on UN’s part, this thesis will utilize a broad definition of stabilization presented below.

This thesis will consider stabilization as peacekeeping activities by the UN, referring to actions operating in the midst of ongoing conflict with a mandate to restore and

maintain stability by protecting the government and civilians against identified aggressors,

assisting the government in retaking control over territories controlled by aggressors, re-establishing the authority of the state in its territory. It also operates alongside governmental security forces and is mandated to use robust force both to protect civilians but also for a preventive purpose (de Coning 2018:90).

12_{Note that for the purpose of this thesis there is a difference in stability, here being a measurable variable referring}

to a certain situation within a state, and stabilization, being a method, logic, or political design for a UN peacekeeping mission.

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As previously mentioned, one key element of stabilization through UN missions is that it includes a robust use of force in peacekeeping (Hunt 2017; Karlsrud 2015; Nadin et al 2014). Here, the “stabilization logic” is a key component of the more robust turn noticed in the most recent peace operations (Gorur 2016:14). Stabilization has derived into both a political strategy, explicit goal, and logic to these mission design (Hunt 2017:112). Characteristics of these type of missions include identifying aggressors such as “spoilers” or armed groups (and thus bending the notion of impartiality) and using significant force to combat them. The missions are additionally tasked to protect the government against an insurgency (de Coning 2016; Hunt 2017:112). The essential difference between peacekeeping and stabilization is that peacekeeping is aimed at maintaining cease-fire or implement a peace agreement as an impartial third party, whereas in stabilization the central goal is to achieve peace by managing or removing an aggressor and achieving a political solution with the political actors not engaged in violent conflict (de Coning 2018:91-92). Specifically, using a robust use of force in supporting a particular actor in the conflict (most likely the host-state government) is a distinguishing factor for the UN stabilization missions (Gorur 2016:14; de Vries 2015:34). However, the robust aspect of stabilization should not be confused with an attempt to find a military solution to a conflict. Rather, it should be seen as part of creating a larger security environment and aims at creating a space for a subsequent political solution (de Coning 2018:94).

3.2.1 Implications of the Stabilization Logic

This thesis will argue that the stabilization logic entails certain implications which unhallows the possibilities for lasting peace and stability. To begin with, stabilization is criticized for being theoretically rooted in, and conceptually dependent on, liberal peace as a sufficient solution to conflict (Carter 2012:1-2).14_{When applied to different conflict settings, the approach is often} translated into counterinsurgency, military operations, and institution building, as well as pursuing liberal values and victor’s peace,15_{which sometimes produces counterproductive} outcomes (ibid). Stabilization is considered not to respond to the “root causes of conflict”, to be aggravating the problems facing these countries (Karlsrud 2018a:14) and running counter to

14_{The liberal peace framework involves for example strengthening of security, promoting liberal ideas such as}

rule of law, and marketization, and is historically characterized by little local input. Liberal peacebuilding favors a top-down approach, strengthening institutions, and cooperating with governmental elites (Richmond 2011:450-452).

15_{Victor’s peace is the notion of peace deriving from a conflict coming to an end as a result of one party of the}

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its stated goals of increasing local legitimacy and participation (Mac Ginty 2012). Further, a normalization of stabilization could be dangerous because it results in a “hollowing out” of peace in international intervention. Also, as a concept and in practice; stabilization lowers the horizons of peace and furthers control, mainstreaming of military measures, order, and institutions (Mac Ginty 2012). Other issues include the possibility of using force to “neutralize” particular armed groups can cause harm to the very people that are meant to be protected, as well as the UN personnel becoming targets, however, there is no established connection between the robustness of a peace operation and the number or severity of attacks of UN personnel (Hunt 2017:115-116,118). Critics have raised concerns regarding impartiality and legitimacy of the missions, and the robustness may reduce the mission’s overall effectiveness and potentially hinder the pursuit of the wider objectives of sustainable peace (Hunt 2017:118). The stabilization logic could backfire and lead to a dominant vision of state-centric post-conflict development by fostering close relationships with the host governments and providing support to strengthen the host state’s power over territory and populations (Hunt 2017:122).

The counterinsurgency-like tactic of freeing small areas from armed groups (called creating islands of stability) could deteriorate in the long term since the measure does not facilitate a peacebuilding process that adequately addresses the needs of the local populations (Hunt 2017:122). The exact meaning of this strategy is contested and can mean either an end state (when a territory is liberated from an armed group it is thus considered to be an island of stability - a secured area), or a methodology (to deploy police, administration, or justice, staff in the field for short-term support). The strategy involves military operations that would push out armed groups and is mainly focused on securing politically important towns or population centers. The concept has gained critique for extending the state without proper support or state-society dialogue and lacking efforts in follow up and monitoring (de Vries 2015:54). Alberto Barrera calls this notion the “sea of instability”, where the “sea” is the space surrounding the secured area. Barrera argues that the “sea of instability” surrounding the “islands of stability” could create major obstacles the core goal of this stabilization tactic - ensuring state legitimacy and authority (Barrera 2015:5). Lastly, by focusing too much on the external assistance to strengthen the state can negatively affect the prospects for local ownership and a broad participation in the peacebuilding process (Barrera 2015:8; Hunt 2017:123), the importance of which will be explained below.

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3.3 Local Peace

This thesis agrees with the notion that stabilization is a strategy that focuses on short-term, top-down solutions that neglects local participation and legitimacy, which ultimately runs counter to the set aims of the peacekeeping missions. The connection between stabilization and local peace that this thesis wishes to highlight, is that stabilization creates the loss of focus for emancipation and local peace - and favors institutional and military development (see Mac Ginty 2012). Local peacebuilding is included in this thesis theoretical framework since it is one central aspect that is considered neglected in practice when using the stabilization logic (see for example Chauzal & van Damme 2015:52; de Coning 2018; Hunt 2017:123; Mac Ginty 2012).

Local peace, or local peacebuilding, is the involvement of local actors at multiple levels, the acknowledgement for local ownership, and the priority for taking a bottom-up approach to a peacebuilding mission (Autesserre 2014; Connolly 2018; de Coning 2013). Actions in local peacebuilding involve for instance allowing room for grassroot networks and taking steps to connect local-level initiatives to international programs in order to build and sustain peace and stability (Connolly 2018). Local ownership is, at least rhetorically, something that the international community in peace interventions strive for, but it is not always easily implemented (de Coning 2013:2). Evidence shows that peacebuilding initiatives are much more effective when interveners value local expertise and develop personal relationships with their local counterparts (Autesserre 2014:14).

Although considered conventional wisdom and essential for successful peacebuilding, too often peacebuilding priorities are set by national elites and international stakeholders which leaves local stakeholders to feel excluded or neglected. The feeling of exclusion is moreover reinforced as interveners often use models that are standardized rather than specialized (Autesserre 2014:4; Connolly 2018). However, two common problems in a post-conflict setting, hindering a local approach to peacebuilding, is that communities emerging from conflict are considered to be too weak to govern solely, and it is difficult for external peacebuilders to know the will of the people and help the “right” representatives (de Coning 2013:2). In addition, it is important to point out the positive outcomes of external interventions in a fragile setting. Regardless of local conditions, interventions increase the chance of building sustainable peace, and have been proven to improve security conditions, support peace initiatives, and to undermine efforts to resume violence (idem 2014:7-8). One can argue that international interventions contributes to peace in warring situations, however, for sustainable

peace local aspects should and must be favored. Indeed, the central argument is nevertheless

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top-down by external actors looking in (de Coning 2013:1,3). Related to the top-top-down nature of stabilization is that warfare and conflict are often a result of local clashes, not only of national or international competition. Thus, a top-down approach shows a significant weakness since it neglects these conflicts over issues such as land, resources, water, and low-level traditional and administrative power (Autessere 2019:110). If such aspects are not addressed at the local level, clashes will surely continue, and conflict will resume.

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4. Research Design

This chapter will present the research design, which is in other words the framework for the collection and analysis of data (Bryman 2016:45). First, the methodology will be introduced, where the specific methodological approach for each sub-question will be thoroughly motivated. This is followed by a motivation of case selection and a brief discussion on the used data and literature for the thesis. The chapter concludes with an ethical reflection and lastly a declaration of the limitations and delimitations for the thesis.

4.1 Methodology

This thesis will answer the research question(s) by using a qualitative comparative case study design on the missions MINUSCA, MONUSCO, and MINUSMA. By probing the theoretical assumptions previously presented in the theoretical framework, this thesis aims at generating a new and nuanced way of analyzing why stabilization missions fail. The comparative approach is a fundamental tool of analysis that brings forward similarities and contrasts among cases (Collier 1993:105). A qualitative approach is favorable over a quantitative one when evaluating and analyzing the stabilization strategies as the three research questions require high contextual awareness, a quality that a quantitative approach lacks. The project would function as ‘cases of’ international interventions in fragile states, and an example of stabilization efforts by the UN. The reason for conducting a comparative case study on three cases instead of one in-depth case is that it increases the validity, the strength of the conclusion from the research (Bryman 2012:47), of demonstrating the trajectories and impact of stabilization activities. The nature of a comparative case study implies a certain trade-off; the broader point of view for all three cases results in that all details and information for each case cannot be considered. Nevertheless, narrowness will be achieved through focusing on the stabilization aspect of the three missions.

4.1.1 Methodological Approaches for the Research Questions

The research method, the way that one collects the data needed for a specific research project (Bryman 2016:45), will be slightly different for each of the sub-questions. The analysis will be taking a short-term perspective, analyzing the outcome for the stabilization mission since the year of deployment (see Diehl & Druckman 2015:96-97). The “before versus after” perspective is specifically important when mapping out the development in the first sub-question because it minimizes the risk of exaggerating or minimizing the effect of the mission on for example violence. However, all three questions have a short-term perspective with a focus on comparing

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“early after” with “later after” the baseline for assessment; being when the missions were deployed (see Diehl & Druckman 2015:96-99).

Sub-question (1): Have the countries CAR, the DRC and Mali been “stabilized” since the

missions MINUSCA, MONUSCO and MINUSMA were deployed?

This question aims at mapping out the development in instability and violence in CAR, the DRC and Mali. In this question, when referring to the countries being “stabilized” the thesis will make a joint interpretive conclusion from the data found through FSI, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). It will map out the development within each country since the missions were deployed to explore how the situation referring to disorder16_{, fatalities by type of violence}17_, and fragility18_{has evolved. Triangulation, the notion of using more than one source of gathering} the data (Bryman 2016:392), will be used in order to gain a more valid answer to the research question. Triangulation of the data is an absolute advantage in order to gather the most accurate understanding of development in all countries. In all three countries, historical events have had an impact and is explanatory for the current conflict, which is why it is important to briefly look at the development in state fragility and disorder before the missions were deployed. Looking at historical data will allow to put the more recent developments in perspective and minimizes the risk of putting too much value onto misleading trends since the stabilization missions were deployed. Most importance, however, will be given to the developments since the missions were deployed, and whether the countries have been “stabilized”. Lastly, acknowledging that the sub-question is proposed in a confirmatory versus rejecting nature, the purpose for this question is to provide the background for the subsequent sub-questions. Therefore, it is considered to be phrased in a manner that generates a starting-point for the following sub-questions.

16_{According to ACLED, “[d]isorder encompasses a range of activity from severe political violence, such as}

targeted attacks on civilians and battles, to spontaneous demonstrations (…)” as well as remote violence, riots, protests, but also non-violent events such as non-violent takeover of territory, headquarter and base establishment and strategic developments (ACLED Definitions 2019).

17_{When referring to fatalities by type of violence this thesis will refer to the definition by the UCDP: “}_Deaths

incurred in the three categories [state-based, non-state, and one-sided violence] of organized violence captured by the UCDP. For state-based armed conflict and non-state conflict these are defined as battle-related deaths (i.e. the use of armed force between warring parties in a conflict dyad, be it state-based or non-state, resulting in deaths). For one-sided violence these are deaths stemming from attacks carried out by organized actors, targeting unarmed civilians.” (UCDP Definitions).

18_{Fragility, or state fragility, is “the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state,}

system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies.” (UK S.U. 2019:150). In this paper, fragility is operationalized using the Fragile State Index.

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Sub-question (2): How have MINUSCA, MONUSCO, and MINUSMA attempted to implement

their stabilization mandate in respective countries?

In this question, when considering the implementation of the stabilization mandate, this thesis will refer to specific strategies or tasks meant to stabilize the country, not the mandate as a whole. Answering this question will build on the former question that maps out the development of insecurity and violence in each country since deployment of the missions, and subsequently explore the UN’s role in this development through evaluating the peace operations. Here, the specific stabilization strategies for each mission that the UN have pursued will be presented and analyzed. The evaluation of the stabilization strategies will be guided by the framework provided by Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman (2015), as well as the conceptual frameworks of stabilization and local peace.

Sub-question (3): How can we understand the limited progress of stability for MINUSCA,

MONUSCO and MINUSMA?

The ambition of this question is to apply the conceptual framework and theories in an attempt to gain a better understanding of the possible strategic flaws in the stabilization missions. The theoretical frameworks on stabilization and local peacebuilding will be applied to further evaluate and analyze what explains why the mission might have worked counter towards their own central goals. Here, the first and second sub-question comes together where the development in the countries is analyzed alongside the efforts of the stabilization missions. The stabilization framework and the implications of the stabilization logic will guide the analysis forward along with a focus on local peace. This sub-question will ponder if the actions of the missions stemming from the stabilization mandate focusing on robust peacekeeping, have unhallowed peace and increased instability. Likewise, theories of local peacebuilding explain how neglecting the bottom-up focus does not result in lasting peace and stability. Further, this question will allow for a comparative analysis on the advantages and disadvantages of the stabilization logic.

4.2 Motivation of Case Selections

This thesis will analyze the three most recent UN stabilization missions in CAR, the DRC and Mali. The missions are similar in several aspects. They are all deployed in Africa, where the DRC and CAR are neighboring states in Central Africa, whereas Mali is situated in the

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Sahel-region. All countries are among the 21 most fragile countries in the world, where the DRC and CAR are on the fifth respectively sixth place (Fund for Peace 2019a). As the background will show, the countries have a similar history characterized by colonialism, violence, and turbulent political history. The underlying question of whether the nature of stabilization missions is the most prosperous way of achieving the intended goals of peace and stability is well represented through all three cases.

The aim is not to explore the difference between stabilization missions and other robust peacekeeping missions, thus other peacekeeping missions with a similar mandate on the African continent and elsewhere, will not be considered. Many scholars and UN policymakers see the recent stabilization missions as marking a new era of UN peacekeeping therefore it is more fruitful to explore the trajectories of these missions. However, it is important to clarify that although the stabilization mission can be seen as a new development for UN peacekeeping, they share many elements with previous and current peacekeeping missions that are not labeled “stabilization missions”, which also focus on reaching peace and stability. In that sense, one should be aware of that notion, and be careful with focusing too heavily on the labeling of the missions. Nevertheless, this thesis will argue that the stabilization missions entail certain elements that distinguish them from other missions hence making them particularly interesting to explore in regard to promoting stability. Further, the stabilization mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) will not be considered due to the contextual deviations which makes a comparison with the African countries difficult. Haiti experienced different dilemmas during the missions, involving earthquakes, cholera-outbreaks, and uprisings against the UN personnel, but is nevertheless considered a “good” mission (Lemary-Hébert 2014, 2015). The stabilization mission in Haiti was extremely different from the ones on the African continent, who are all facing for example widespread terrorism and armed groups in a much greater extent than Haiti, which would make them very difficult to compare.

4.3 Discussion of the Material

Regarding the data and material, the thesis will be utilizing a wide range of primary and secondary sources. The first part of the thesis, mapping the development of violence and stability, will be informed by information through three data sets: ACLED, UCDP, and FSI. The different data sets have a separate focus and use different definitions to sort their data. Therefore, one can argue that a more accurate and well-grounded analysis can be furthered by using all three data sets when mapping out the developments. Nevertheless, it is important to

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clarify the differences in how they measure violence and stability. The aim for ACLED is to “capture how disorder occurs in states” (ACLED Definitions 2019). ACLED separates different types of violence within their data, for example, battles, violence against civilians, riots and explosions are categorized and quantified separately.19_{Moving on, UCDP gathers data on} state-based violence, non-state violence, and one-sided violence, and its data is regularly used and published by practitioners and researchers in peace and conflict studies (UCDP About).20_In contrast to ACLED which does not define a conflict (ACLED Definitions 2019), the definition of armed conflict has become a global standard of how conflicts are systematically defined and studied (UCDP About).21_{This thesis will utilize the information from UCDP on fatalities by} type of violence since it reflects the levels of violence in a country as well as responsible actors within a conflict. Lastly, the Fragile States Index is an annual report published by the Fund for Peace since 2005 which measures fragility, risk, and vulnerabilities in 178 countries (FSI Report 2019:33). The FSI is useful since it contains several smaller categories, for example factionalized elite, group grievances, or state legitimacy, all receiving a specific score. The smaller categories are then calculated into an overall index score which decides the ranking on the FSI. The FSI thus generates an overall score mirroring the fragility or situation within a state and constitutes an excellent supplement to the information provided ACLED and UCDP when researching stability. Presented as an index, the Fund for Peace states that “ultimately the goal of the FSI is to measure trends in pressure within each individual state” and that it is most useful when comparing a country against itself in order to spot development over time (FSI Report 2019:32-33). Furthermore, the FSI should be considered to be “an entry point into deeper interpretive analysis [...] to understand more about a state’s capacities and pressures which contributed to levels of fragility and resilience” (FSI Report 2019:33), making the FSI a useful index to map and analyze the trends of instability in the three selected cases.

19_{ACLED uses an “atomic” way of counting battles, meaning that they collect and sort information by date,}

location, agent, and event type. For example, if an event occurs during the course of a weekend it will be reported as two separate events. If two separate events occur, i.e. a battle and a riot, they will also be reported as two separate events. An important distinction (primarily between ACLED and UCDP) is that ACLED aims at capturing disorder within states, regardless if they generate fatalities or not (ACLED Methodology). In other words, ACLED’s reporting does not specify if an event (for instance violence against civilians) killed 2 people or 2000 people.

20_{UCDP and ACLED use different ways of categorizing a unit of analysis. UCDP classifies an “event” or unit of}

analysis to be: “[t]he incidence of the use of armed force by an organized actor against another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least 1 direct death in either the best, low or high estimate categories at a specific location and for a specific temporal duration” (Sundberg and Melander, 2013 cited on UCDP Methodology). The dataset contains events for all dyads or actors that surpass 25 deaths per calendar year (UCDP Methodology). 21_{Armed conflict is: “[a] state-based armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or} territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (UCDP Definitions).

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As stated in the Fragile State Index report 2019: “A ranking, in the end, is pretty meaningless - it is the underlying scores, and as far as they can be determined, the specific root causes and drivers of instability that must be recognized and addressed” (FSI Report 2019:12). Thus, there is a need to critically analyze these data sets and compare the information with additional sources. In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the role of the UN as stated in the second and third sub-questions; UN resolutions, statements, reports, factsheets and other publications regarding the mission was primarily utilized. All UN resolutions from when the missions started until present day was processed. In an attempt to keep results from being one-sided or biased, the information was balanced out by several reports and academic literature. For chapters such as theoretical framework, literature review, and historical background on the countries and the missions, secondary sources such as scholarly articles were most valuable.

4.4 Ethical Reflection

This comparative case study has initially an ethical advantage since this thesis does not include any participants, such as interviewees, nor observations or field work. However, certain aspects of ethics are important to bring forward. One problem could be over-simplifying highly complicated conflicts and horrific situations in the CAR, the DRC, and Mali. By using data sets, one should reflect on the implications of reducing lives to figures and numbers, and it is important not to forget that there are real people and dreadful events behind the reported incidents. Likewise, one should be careful in reducing the situation within a state to a ranking on an index, which is why additional qualitative information is crucial for this study. Similarly, actions and interventions by the UN can be easily criticized, but it is important to remember the diplomatic effort, funding, and personnel working for the organization and every day try to end conflicts all over the world. Therefore, one can problematize and analyze the action plans and outcome, but it is important to keep the critique respectful and reasonable.

4.5 Delimitations and Limitations

The following delimitations were consciously made in order to achieve more focus and depth for the thesis. This thesis will not consider all aspects of the mandates, for example, the POC mandate which is visible in all three missions will not receive much attention because it is not the focus of this thesis and multiple previous studies have already explored this aspect. Further, that fact that the UN Member States have their own foreign agenda and how that might affect the missions will not be discussed. Although acknowledging that there are external aspects

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which are out of control of the UN which could exaggerate the conflict and instability in the three countries, this thesis will focus specifically on why stabilization, as a peacekeeping method, is proven insufficient.

Regarding the method, conducting interviews was not considered since finding one or more representatives with sufficient insight, or knowledge, for all three missions would be difficult. A comparative thesis design relies on comparing all three cases and requires the most similar method in attaining the information. Interviews could therefore endanger the similarity of methods between the cases since it would require interviewees at a comparative level. Sufficient knowledge to answer the research questions is considered to be successfully attained through the material described in this chapter. Furthermore, the thesis is not attempting to prove direct causality between the UN stabilization missions and increase in instability and violence. However, it attempts to illustrate how the stabilization approach can work counterintuitive to its own goals, seen through the three missions. Likewise, it is important to acknowledge that there are other important explanations to what causes or accelerates conflict and instability in CAR, the DRC and Mali other than the UN or their strategies. This could be grievances, local feuds, spoilers, government corruption or other explanations. This thesis does not attempt to diminish these explanations, but rather to argue that this is knowledge that the UN should be well aware of and adapt to. Those aspects are part of the complexity of the conflicts, nevertheless, the focus for this paper is to see how the UN act in these fragile environments and if that action could exacerbate the conflicts.

Regarding limitations; for monetary, safety, and time restricted reasons the author was not able to conduct a field study nor participant observations in CAR, the DRC, nor Mali. Further, this thesis is restricted to the data available from the three data-sets ACLED, UCDP and FSI. For certain data-sets some years of data are missing, and all data-sets are providing material from different starting-points. Mostly, this is not an issue because the focus of this thesis will be on since the missions were deployed, however, this is important to point out. Lastly, for the CAR especially, this thesis has experienced certain difficulties in finding recent and relevant academic material, yet the material utilized is considered to be sufficient for providing a successful comparative analysis.

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5. Case Studies: Central African Republic, Democratic Republic

of the Congo, and Mali

Before presenting the findings and the analysis, it is important to present a brief background of the three conflicts. The background will highlight the aspects that are most important for the coming analysis and will mainly focus on the events leading up to the deployment of MINUSCA, MONUSCO and MINUSMA. The conflict in CAR has been considered misunderstood and forgotten and only received attention from the international community when warnings of genocide surfaced, subsequently leading to the deployment of MINUSCA. In the DRC, the background focuses on the two Congolese Wars and the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide leading to the launch of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). In Mali, a brief background will be given of the development from being considered the “poster-child” for democracy on the African continent, to becoming a country deeply struck by terrorism and conflict.

5.1 Background: Central African Republic

The long-term crisis in CAR is characterized by sporadic surges of violence caused by state disintegration, a malfunctioning economy, and deep ethnic cleavages (ICG 2015). To fully grasp the current conflict, it is important to understand its historical context which for centuries was characterized by colonization and exploitation by foreign actors (Knoope & Buchanan-Clark 2017:8). Since independence in 1960, CAR has experienced deep social, economic, and political crises, and prior to 1993 the country was ruled in an authoritarian way (Siradag 2016). State formation remains difficult in Africa due to persistent economic, political, and security fragility, partly attributed to European colonialism, expansion, border drawing, and resource extraction. Initially weak, CAR descended to violence shortly after independence. In addition, political authority in Africa has a tradition of undermining the potential for institution-building by relying heavily on ethnic and religious affiliations and client relationships to maintain political power (Isaacs-Martin & Mafeje 2016:28). The violence is commonly a result of political competition or political leaders attempting to maintain power, along with the perpetual scourge of rebel armies, militias and civilian criminality. The persistent weakening of state institutions, along with declining economy and frail social, political, and democratic structures, all helped to prolong the situation (Isaacs-Martin & Mafeje 2016:26). Even after colonization, mineral exploitation continued, causing CAR’s natural wealth to flow out of the country and leaving the government unable to provide the inhabitants with their basic needs. A system

Why stabilization missions fail : a comparative case study exploring the aims, nature, and outcomes of the stabilization missions in Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Mali